No More Learning

(l2 27, 603-608/498-504) The essence of the asian religions was the immedi- ate unity of subjectivity and substantiality, consciousness going deeply into itself in a way that the subject was no longer needed: Brahma as 'the inwardly absorbed empirical self-consciousness. ' (l2 27, 607/501) This unity must be reached by the subject through an escape from the empiri- cal world, which is placed out of this unity. however, one can say also, that Brahma only exists in the consciousness of the yogi, who has brought himself into this state of mind. The universal lacks objectivity and exists as this finite subject that actually cannot totally empty itself. This contra- diction must be resolved. Two points concerning unification and separa- tion determine the next step in the development. firstly, the externality of the opposition between the real world, with the empirical subject, many powers and determinations on the one side and the transcendent unity on the other is sublated into a true, concrete totality, which is no lon- ger an alternation of origination and perishing. secondly, the empirical self-consciousness is separated from the absolute, its content, such that god now obtains genuine objectivity. The break between subjectivity and objectivity begins. The content becomes an independent object for the conscious self; it is the concrete totality, unity as a relationship between the finite and infinite. from now on, the objectivity deserves the name god properly. The knowledge of the objectivity of spirit is manifest in the way a people is able to bring religion and social life together into an ethi- cal world. The spirit becomes its known object. (l2 24, 379-381/280-81) There, the subject is no longer the consciousness of an isolated individual like a king, lama, yogi or Brahman, but a human being as such, as a free member of a community.
god, as the objective content of consciousness, is essentially spirit, even if he may still be represented, on this immediate level, by natural forms.
the religions of persia, syria and egypt 89
light is one of these natural forms; because of its universal, abstract and ideal character, it is a more adequate expression for spirit than particular things, animals or even an individual human being. Therefore, in com- parison with lamaism, where an individual human being from his birth is worshipped as god, Persian worship of light does not mean, for hegel, a backfall. 13 The break between objectivity and subjectivity makes god essentially to an object in front of man. however, the break is only begin- ning and not yet completed. Thus, within the religions of the transition, god can have still the shape of natural things, animals and human beings. according to hegel, these shapes do not have any longer an essential but only a superficial meaning. objectivation of spirit has started.
hegel speaks in one sentence of objectivation, distinction, differentia- tion and resumption. (l2 27, 608/503) resumption (Resumtion) means beginning again: the religious subject does not only resume its normal life, but god, too, leaves the empty space, which also means his con- traction out of the motley of representations into an objective, true and universal unity. 14 Chaos and arbitrariness are not passed away, however; the figures of the transition from natural religion to the higher level are still elements within a wild totality. (l2 27, 608/502) This totality has in general two forms: on the one hand, it is portrayed in a pure and simple way, on the other as a 'struggle, the fermenting of these distinct elements into a unity--an impure subjectivity that is the striving toward pure unity itself'. (l2 27, 609/504) fermentation is the metaphor for the first form, used by hegel for the religions of syria and egypt. The resumption in the first mode of the religions of transition, the religion of the good, is mainly characterised by the simple and pure form of the totality. its objective content is the universal, in the shape of light. The many representations of the good are harmoniously united in the concept of light. evil is some- thing external to it, an independent principle. The struggle between good and evil has the form of an abstract dualism.
13 hegel seems to think otherwise in the 1821 manuscript, in which religion of light is considered the first form of natural religion. There, he admits that worship of animals and even of physically present persons is repulsive for us and that we have more sympathy for the Parsees with their religion of light, but he justifies that worship as animals and human beings are figures of greater subjective power than the sun and stars (l2 m, 13-14). religion of light is here still identified with worship of the sun.
14 The expression Resumtion gets a central role since 1827. Probably, it may also be interpreted in opposition to reincarnation, which is connected with mere succession and, therefore, with dispersion and distroying of individuality.
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i wrote above that hegel put forward, in the 1824 lectures, three deter- minations of the good: the world of finite things in their variety, the realm of the good against the realm of evil, and the light as the natural represen- tation of the good. in the 1827 lectures, hegel reformulates the first two in three points. firstly, the good is connected with objectivity, truth and the absolute power of spirit to determine itself as the universal content, without losing its unity. secondly, this power counts as the origin of all things. The emphasis is not on the multitude of separate things, but on something affirmative, the positive connection and coherence of the finite with the absolute: 'it is not the case that only a subset of them are twice- born, as in india, but rather the finite is created from the good and is good'. (l2 27, 612/506)15 Thirdly, the good as such remains still an abstract determination. it does not give answer to questions about what we have to do, in what respect something is good. elsewhere and in other words, hegel says that the good does not have yet negativity in it; because it does not have an intrinsic connection with evil, it is opposed to it in a merely external way. 16
The text continues, not very consistently after these three points, with the sentence: "The third determination is that the good in its universality has at the same time a natural mode [. . . ]--light" (l2 27, 614/508). This sentence is an almost literal quotation from the 1824 text. The change of content in the preceding passages is not completed in a totally logical form, but the importance of it is that the emphasis is laid upon the pure positive character of this notion of the good--and so upon its abstract- ness. The dualism is an external effect of this abstractness and does not belong to the determination of the good itself. The good is the totality that does not accept evil, so that the confrontation never comes into real existence. indeed, there is struggle between good and evil and the latter ought to be conquered, but--as hegel smartly retorts--"what ought to be is not. 'ought' is a force that cannot make itself effective, it is this weak- ness or impotence. " (l2 27, 613/507)
Compared with the power of spirit, it is the impotence of nature, which is manifest in this dualism of light and darkness. according to hegel, the juxtaposition of distinct determinations or their merely external relation
15 however, this must not be understood as the concept of a genuine creation, but more as emanation. Creation presumes a more concrete concept of action as an act of free sub- jectivity. (l2 27, 615/510)
16 an intrinsic relation of the good with evil is, for example, the moral conscience con- cerning good and evil, the good as the negation of sin (in avoidance, victory, forgiveness).
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is the characteristic of nature. 17 nature lacks the capacity to integrate the negative in itself and to sublate it. natural life--nature's highest form of being--is a continuous succession of birth and dying, in which death is not conquered. The dualism also means that darkness cannot be ban- ished completely. Therefore, the idea of god as light or abstract good is still something powerless, having evil as a principle next to it. (l2 27, 616/510) The continuous struggle between good and evil is represented in the personifications of light and darkness as ormazd and ahriman. hegel admits that there are texts, in which ahriman is conquered ultimately by ormazd, but puts against it that this "is not expressed as a present state, it is only something future. god, the essence or the spirit, must be present and contemporary, not relegated to the domain of imagination, into the past or the future. " (l2 27, 622/515)
hegel pays little attention to ahriman, the personification of darkness; probably because this representation does not involve a positive contribu- tion for the development of the concept of spirit. ormazd is the personifi- cation of the highest light, that is 'the energy, spirit, soul, love and bliss' in sensible life. (l2 27, 618/512) he is the personification of substance, which is not yet determined as developed subjectivity, as he represents every- thing that is life and is worshiped. ormazd is also the personification of the sun. Therefore, this representation of ormazd as a person is, according to hegel, only superficial. (l2 27, 616/511) other lights like the stars and seven planets have their own personifications, the amshadspan; they are the companions of ormazd in his realm of light. at the same time, the Persian state 'is portrayed as the realm of righteousness and good. The king was surrounded by seven magnates, too, who formed his council, and were regarded as representatives of the amshaspans, just as the king was thought of as the deputy of ormazd', without being identified with him.
The cultus of this religion is in total conformity with this order: the whole life of the Parsees is cultus and attended to the promotion of life such that the good would prosper and flourish as a light in all regions of nature. (l2 27, 621/514) also, care for the sick and hungry was part of it. (l2 24, 358/259) The contrast to india is clear: Persian cultus is not an escape from the concrete and particular, but directed toward the affirma- tion of a cosmos that is good in itself.
17 Compare the Cartesian definition of matter, as the substance having its parts side by side or separate from each other, in opposition to the unity of thought.
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5. sorrow and death in the religion of syria
light is the representation of the good, coming from heaven and pouring out over the world, without being affected by evil and never dying. as far as it is determined as subject, this subject is a serene unity without nega- tivity, and therefore not coming back to itself from a point of alienation or otherness that it had to overcome. There is also no idea of reconciliation involved in this goodness. however, according to hegel's logic, the subject has to take on the confrontation with the negativity in itself because the subject achieves its spiritual freedom through the annulment of its subor- dination to nature, through the sublation of its natural self. The dialectical development of subjectivity is a struggle with negative powers within the subject itself. This struggle has different moments. on the level of imme- diacy or the natural state, in which the religions of our discourse are still situated, these moments stay side by side in a time sequence, which the one subject passes through. Thus, the subject has a history, in which it is affected by negative vicissitudes. death, an evil that hurts the subject in its essence, is the ultimate negative moment of that natural history. The central theme of the religion, which is situated by hegel as a transition to the next stage of the religion of egypt, has as its central content the death of god and the story of how he after that returns into a higher, spiritual life. (l2 27, 620-624/514-17) it is only in the 1831 lectures that this religion is allotted a proper, modest place in the classification of religions. it is the syrian religion, the religion of the Phoenicians. (l2 24, 369/269, l2 27, 608/503, l2 31, 743/629)
a new principle is realizing itself in the way of life of the Phoenicians, a people of trade and industry: "The human will and activity do have prior- ity here, not nature and its goodness. "18 The biblical prophets detest the religions of their non-Jewish neighbours and describe the cultus of these people as horrible idolatry, in which sensuality and cruelty are rampant. The sacrifice of human beings is explained by hegel as a proof that, for the religious consciousness that practices this cultus, nature counts as the highest and that human beings as such do not have value. This is totally different in Phoenician culture and cultus.
according to herodotus, Phoenicians worship hercules, and hegel com- ments, that hercules becomes a god through human bravery and courage
18 g. W. f. hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nde, Bd. 12, Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der geschichte, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1970, p. 237.
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and passes his life in labour and supreme effort. he is a human god. The same is true for adonis, who dies as a young man and is the object of a whole cultus of sorrow. life is renewed and regains its value during the holy days of mourning for the death and celebrating the resurrection of this, to a god elevated, adonis. Concrete consciousness is working here in the place of the abstract powers. 19
stories about dying gods are told in hinduism, too. But there, death does not have, according to hegel, the meaning of a negation that pen- etrates into the essence of the subject. Thus, Khrisna rises again and indra may die a thousand deaths and live further as a substance without fun- damental change. These resurrections lack the meaning of a spiritual vic- tory over natural death. (l2 27, 625/518) The representations of death and resurrection in the figure of the Phoenix, however, the bird that reborns from the ashes of his funeral, and of adonis, who rises from death three days after his bones are collected, refer to spiritual life as the sublation of natural death. 20 These representations have their place within a cul- tus of sorrow for life that is passing by, a sorrow that is overcome by joy in the sight of the recovered and rejuvenated life. The adonis cultus is connected with spring and the change of seasons. The natural course is a symbol, in which the awareness breaks through that the transition of death is a general determination and moment of the absolute itself. (l2 31, 743/629) death and resurrection are present in all religions, but they are the central theme of the egyptian religion; a narrow relationship exists between its osiris cultus and the cultus of adonis. 21
6. egypt: The religion of the enigma
The egyptian religion does not possess the abstract dualism, which was characteristic of the Persian. a concept of power connected with subjec- tivity replaces the universal concept of the good: the good is endowed with the power of subjectivity. for the first time, subjectivity is manifest in the form of representation. (l2 27, 629/522) This subjectivity is distinguished
19 hegel, Werke 12, pp. 239-40.
20 Comparisons with Christian representations are obvious, but hegel does also his best to make clear why the representations of the resurrection of Jesus, as god's son, give a deeper insight in the essence of god as spirit.
21 There is also a relationship with the mithra cultus, which is originating in these regions. hegel gives only few attention to it, because he considers the differences as only of historical interest. (cf. l2 27, 629/522)
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from a multitude of further determinations, which are not external or alien to it, but over which it is lord and master. These determinations are independent only in appearance, as they become, within this relation of lordship, for the subject its own otherness in a natural, sensible shape. Because of this lack of independency of the other, there is no place for an intersubjective relationship and subjectivity does not yet come to the free development of its essence; therefore, the relationship between subject and substance, between unity and a diverse multitude is still caught in a mixture of inconsequences, of which the subject has to clean and liberate itself. Thus, the representation of the subject remains a riddle, an enigma. (l2 24, 363-365/264-65) hegel has described the egyptian religion at length. 22 i can give only the outlines and some interesting details.
The negative is immanent to this subjectivity in different ways and on several levels. (l2 24, 365-369/266-69) on the level of the general con- cept, divine power has not yet been completely developed into a genu- ine subject and remains a substance that can be represented in different ways, especially in the worship of animals. on the level of particularity, the good is no longer something abstract, but the specific quality of osiris, principle of life and the most important god, who has been killed by a real opponent: the god Typhon, his enemy, the destructive principle and sym- bol of physical evil. Thus, negativity does not remain external to osiris. negativity is also connected with the will, the awareness of good and bad, and the choice between them. The subject (god, too) can act, and choose or reject particular ends. The good is connected with ethical life: osiris is lawgiver, founder of marriage and judge of the souls in the realm of the dead. on the level of singularity, the individual and spiritual subject, who has to liberate itself from its animal (i. e. natural) form, is coming to the fore. it is the human being, who is confronted with his own death and is guided by a notion of rising from it.
The relationship with negativity is, of course, most clear and concrete in the cultus of the dead. hegel recognizes in it the principle of the nega- tion of negation, the principle of the activity of spirit: death is killed, evil conquered. (l2 24, 368/269) This religion, too, has the representation of the death of god. Typhon defeats and kills osiris initially, but osiris lives further as the mighty lord of the realm of the dead. (l2 24, 370/271, 628/521) Thus, also osiris is twice born, but his second birth has gone through neg- ativity, a coming back to itself in the form of a specific power. The role
22 not only in the 1824 and 1827 lectures but also in other publications and lectures.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 95
death takes on in this religion is highly esteemed by hegel, because it is no longer the natural destine of the finite, but a determinate moment in the life of spirit and not accidental to the concept of god. This deep negativity is immanent and sublated in spiritual life, within which spirit is returning back to itself by defeating physical evil and natural death. here it becomes clear that the dignity of the human being is in law and ethical life. (l2 24, 369-372/270-72)
all religions have representations of god in the shape of a human fig- ure. in natural religions, those figures are natural, sensible, immediately observed creatures, without fundamental distinction between human and animal. in egypt, consciousness breaks with this immediacy of sen- sible representations. egyptian religious art uses an abundance of natu- ral images, but the nile, the sun, plants, animals and human figures are bestowed with a symbolic meaning, which elevates them above the nat- ural. (l2 24, 632/525) symbolism in egyptian art is carried out into the smallest detail. even the number of columns and steps toward a platform is not determined functionally, but symbolises, for example, the different months or the number of feet the nile has to rise for the irrigation of the land. The symbol mixes the natural with inner substance, which has sub- jectivity as its essence, and makes the subject intuitable; it is domination of the natural, inner reality that exists in an external form. The enigmatic sphinx counts, for hegel, as the ultimate symbol of egyptian mind: "The sphinx, in and for itself a riddle, an ambivalent statue, half animal and half human, can be seen as a symbol for the egyptian mind as such: the human head, looking out of the animal body, presents the mind beginning to elevate itself out of nature. "23 The sphinx counts even as the symbol of symbolism itself. 24
The enigmatic character of the sphinx is that it symbolizes a twofold movement, in which the struggle between inner essence and external form is recognizable: on the one hand
the movement of the inner, of subjectivity, to liberate itself from the mere natural, on the other hand the drive or impulsion (Trieb, Drang) toward intuition and labour. 25 egypt as a whole is driven toward the expression
23 hegel, Werke 12, pp. 245-46.
24 hegel, Werke 13, p. 465.
25 in the Pha? nomenology of Spirit and elsewhere, hegel characterizes egyptian religion
as the religion of the artificer (see above, note 13). it is evident that the dialectic of lord- ship and bondage is present at the backstage of this characterization: in the egyption religion, the consciousness of the bondsman (servant, labourer), which has shuddered in
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of its spirit in enormous works of art, without achieving complete clarity. Temples, pyramids and other graves cover a hidden realm that does not come to daylight. 26 in a comparable mode, Priests, scribes and embalmers of mummies frequently appear in sculptures and paintings wearing animal masks, which hide the human being as subject. (l2 27, 635/528)
Both sphinx and animal masks can be considered as symbols for the mediation (Vermittlung) between spirit and nature, which is character- istic for the religions of the near east. (cf. l2 24, 359, 259) mediation is the opposite of immediacy and a break with undeveloped, abstract unity, which is hegel's determination of the preceding natural religions. it is the necessary activity of thinking, starting from the difference between the moments of a concept and connecting them, without coming already to a complete unification or reconciliation. The mediation in egyptian religion still has the character of an exterior mixture of the essential elements, in which that what is present and living is intermixed and combined with the idea of the divine. (l2 27, 634/527) hegel speaks in chemical metaphors about this thinking as a compound of colliding elements and mixture full of fermentation. (l2 24, 370/271, 372/273, 379/280) it is characteristic for a riddle to bring together two elements in a conflicting manner that asks for a solution. The egyptian way of treating their dead bodies presents also an enigmatic mixture of nature and spirit, of body and soul. hegel refers to herodotus, who says that the egyptians were the first who taught that souls are immortal (l2 27, 633/526), but he himself is reticent concerning this point. Their belief in immortality is moulded in a form of building and labour that is aimed at the retaining of the soul, whereas spirit should lib- erate itself. mummification of animals is also an indication that the care for the dead body is not a genuine concern with spiritual life. 27 egyptian art is the product of this fermentation of spirit; it is a step toward a spiri- tual relationship with the infinite.
according to hegel, egypt is the country of origin of a religious art that fulfils the need for making the subject manifest in representations. That need exists where the natural level of life is sublated (l2 24, 373-375/274-75): "the natural moment must be mastered everywhere in such a way that
fear of death (the absolute master), breaks with its thing-like, animal life and develops itself, through its own labour, as the actual master of an objective world.
26 subjectivity will come to clarity only in the laws and rules that make a people to a political community. (cf. l2 24, 379-381/280-281)
27 hegel writes in a short note that the egyptian realm of the dead is not a spiritual realm because animals and cattle, too, belong to it. (hegel, Werke 11, p. 558)
96
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it serves only for the expression and revelation of spirit.
" (l2 27, 636/529) The imperfection of egyptian art is that it remains largely portraying and distortion (Verzerrung) (l2 24, 378-380/279-80). however, it has already in itself, especially in its architecture, a craving for the beautiful and for fine art, which is more than imitation, and without dispersion in wild phan- tasy. (hegel qualifies hindu temples and their statues as bizarre, far from beautiful. ) egyptian art bears in itself contradictions, which are connected with the attempt to determine the idea of god in the external shape of an immense architecture, as if god could be produced in a work of art, produced by human beings. here we find a relationship between spirit and its creation, but not yet reconciliation (l2 24, 375-378/276-78). The fact that the statues of the gods must be consecrated, counts for hegel as an indication of the awareness concerning the deficiency of the artefacts in representing the divinity. also, the work of art itself is an expression of this deficiency, because external shape and inner spirit are still sepa- rated. The statues have a meaning without being actually animated and spirited. Their meaning is the inner that is longing for coming outward, struggling for expression. for the purpose of illustration, hegel refers to the difference between the pyramid, which looks like a crystal hiding the soul of a dead person, and a greek statue of a human body, the external shape in which the inner beauty of the soul comes to expression. (l2 27, 638-639/530)
Conclusion
egyptian art is the expression of the fermentation of subjectivity, its crav- ing for freedom and beauty. Therefore, egypt is the transition par excel- lence to the spirit of the greek. The egyptian spirit itself remains a riddle, like its language, which, for hegel, only existed in its silent buildings and enigmatic hieroglyphs (ibid. ). The spirit of the egyptian people is itself an enigma, while in greek works of art everything is clear (l2 27, 636/529). in greek representations of human beings and gods, spirit comes to a free expression of itself. The greek themselves were also aware of this freedom and put this awareness, still naively, in words in the myth of oedipus, who liberated the (greek! ) city of Thebe from the plague of the sphinx by resolving its riddle. oedipus gave the answer to the question of the sphinx: what goes first on four, than on two and finally on three legs? The answer to the riddle is man. The content of the enigma, hidden in the egyptian religion, is the human being, the free, self-knowing spirit. (l2 27, 639/532)
Religion in the foRm of ARt Paul Cobben
1. introduction
in his Phenomenology of Spirit, hegel classifies religion in three stages: natural religion, religion in the form of art, and revealed religion. in each of the three stages, the godhead is an absolute master that is served by humankind. But the relationship between master and servant is submit- ted to variation. in natural religion, the godhead is an absolute power that leaves no room for human independence. At the level of religion in the form of art, the human being recognizes its own essence in the divine essence: man has learnt to understand himself as a free being. however, at this stage, freedom has not yet emancipated itself from nature. here, free- dom only exists as the freedom that is incorporated in natural relations. Spirit and nature shape a harmonic unity. only at the level of revealed religion is freedom understood as the essence of nature: the natural world can become valid as the reality in which the divine freedom manifests itself. now, man can understand himself as the 'son of god'. he not only recognizes oneself in the divine freedom, but also knows this freedom to be a super-sensual, absolute being that manifests itself in human freedom.
therefore, the position of religion in the form of art is in between: it is the transition from natural religion to revealed religion. it already expresses freedom, but this freedom is still immediate, i. e. , encased in natural relations. for this reason, the development of religion in the form of art consists of freedom's emancipation from these natural relations. in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, the equivalents of the stages of the religion in the form of art (the stages of the religion of the Beauty) maintain this in between position and, therefore, their development is also aimed towards the emancipation of freedom. 1 however, the system- atic elaboration of the development of these equivalents in the Lectures
1 Vgl. W. Jaeschke, Vernunft in der Religion, Stuttgart: fromann holzboog 1986, p. 208: "trotz der im Vergleich zu den Vorlesungen unterschiedlichen methodik zeigen die Resul- tate [der Religion in der Pha? nomenologie, P. C. ] A? hnlichkeit mit den spa? teren. " ("notwith- standing the methodological differences compared to the lectures the results (of the Religion in the Phenomenology) show equality with the later ones". )
? 100 paul cobben
lags behind the exposition of religion in the form of art given in the Phe- nomenology. As a result, my discussion of religion in the form of art takes its starting point from the Phenomenology and will, now and then, refer to subsequent versions in the lectures. 2
Religion in the form of art is already a religion of freedom. therefore, religion in the form of art belongs to the people who shaped freedom the first time, namely, the greeks, who created the first form of a democratic state (the polis). the fundamental basis for the existence of religion in the form of art is the ethical world of the polis. 3 the freedom that is practiced in the ethical institutions expresses the divine substance. it is no accident that the name of the city-state Athens is also the name of a goddess. 4 god- dess and city-state coincide. But there is also a distinction: Athens is also represented by a statue. in this sense, the statue can be understood as a copy or 'duplication' of Athens. to understand this duplication of Athens, the immediate form of the freedom of the polis has to be discussed.
2. the Polis as the immediate form of freedom
the city-state of the polis cannot be understood as the expression of a universal concept of freedom (nowadays, we would say, 'as the expression of human rights'), but is bound to a specific, traditional content. freedom is immediately identified with the specific view of the citizens of a spe- cific city-state. therefore, hegel remarks: "on account of this unity, the individuality is the pure form of substance which is the content, and the action is the transition from thought to actuality merely as the movement
2 it is conspicuous that hegel places the Jewish religion, time after time, prior to the religion in the form of art. however, this becomes comprehensible when one realizes that the god of the Jewish religion anticipates the religion in the form of art insofar as it expresses pure freedom, but falls subsequent to it insofar as this freedom does not yet appear in the world.
3 g. W. f. hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one Volume edition, edited by Peter C. hodgson, oxford 2006, p. 331/535: "Because ethical life con- stitutes the essential foundation here, what we are dealing with is the initial [mode of] ethical life so to speak, ethical life in its immediacy. "
4 "the essential being of the god is, however, the unity of the universal existence of nature and of self-conscious Spirit which, in its actuality, confronts the former. At the same time, being in the first instance an individual shape, its existence is one of the ele- ments of nature, just as its self-conscious actuality is an individual national Spirit. " Hegel's Phenemenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. miller, oxford: oxford UP 1977, p. 428. [here- after all page numbers referring to this work will appear in parentheses PhSp within my text].
? religion in the form of art 101
of an insubstantial antithesis whose moments have no particular, distinc- tive content and no essentiality of their own" (PhSp, 281). it is exactly because of this reason that the polis can be considered as a work of art. the citizen who realizes the laws of the state (the human law) does so by realizing his 'pathos'. 5 the ethical content is immediately experienced by the citizen as the essence of his own freedom. he is not capable of relat- ing critically to this content. therefore, the content as 'thought', which hegel speaks about, has the status of an immediate evidence: its content is true because any thought of a possible alternative is lacking. freedom's immediate shape in the polis, i. e. , the freedom practically existing in the ethical institutions, which the citizen realizes in and by his actions, has the consequence that its unity only practically exists and can only come to consciousness in an external way, namely, in the statue of the god. in the statue, the polis is represented by a work of art; it is not brought to its philosophical concept. As the citizen expresses his pathos in ethical act- ing, so the artist expresses his pathos in the statue of god. 6
the representation of the city-state's unity as godhead does not explain the religion of art as polytheism. At best, it could be maintained that the multitude of city-states implies the multitude of gods. however, in this case, it would not be clear why those gods are valid for the other city- states. 7 When the drive behind the development of the religion of art
5 "the substance does appear, it is true, in the individuality as his 'pathos' . . . " (PhSp, 284).
6 in Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827 hegel discusses the activ- ity of the artist: "But the organ by which self-consciousness grasps this subsisting thing, this substantial and essential [being], is phantasy, which images what is initially abstract, the inwardly or outwardly subsisting [essence], and produces it as what first deemed to be a god. explanation here consists in making it representational, in enabling consciousness to represent to itself something divine" (p. 344/548) A bit further he says: "insofar as spirit has naturel and sensible existence, the human figure is the only way in which it can be intuited" (p. 347/551-552). Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Religion ii, frankfurt am main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1969: "Wie der gott, obwohl geistige, allgemeine macht, von der natu? rlichkeit herkommt, so muss er auch zum elemente seiner gestaltung das natu? rliche haben, und es muss zur erscheinung kommen, dass eben das natu? rliche die Weise des go? ttlichen ist. Der gott erscheint so im Stein, und das Sinnliche gilt noch als angemessen fu? r den Ausdruck des gottes als gottes" (p. 124). ("As the god, although a spititual, general power, originates from naturalness, he must also have the natural as the element of its incarnation, and it has to appear that precisely the natural is the mode of the devine. thus god appears in the stone and the sensual still appears as adequate for the expression of god as god").
7 in 1827 hegel combines polytheism with the immediacy of the ethical life in the polis. in its immediate form, "the ethical content fragments" and this fragmentation is repre- sented by a multitude of gods. By the way, in Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Religion ii, not the god of the polis, but Zeus is introduced as superior god: "Dagegen Zeus ist der
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has been understood, it will also become clear why polytheism can have meaning in the single polis.
3. the internal Contradiction of the Polis
the democratic society, i. e. , the society of free citizens, has to solve, in one way or another, the conflict that can arise between individual and community. in principle, the free individual can determine the content of his action. therefore, it is not trivial that many free individuals can live together in one society. the free action of one does not need to be compatible with the free action of others. therefore, a free society is only possible if the free action of all can be brought to a harmonic unity. the polis succeeds in this by regulating the action of its citizens according to norms and values that are traditionally given. the citizens realize the morals of the state they are living in. this is exactly why the freedom of the polis has an immediate form. it is true that the actions of the citizens are free because the content of these actions is not imposed by nature; it is a traditional, human made content. But as traditionally determined, this freedom limits itself to the specific historic form in which human freedom can appear. therefore, the harmony of the polis is only possible as long as this restriction is respected. the pure free self, the self that has the ability to determine its action purely from out of itself, has to be distinguished from the real free self, the self that has given its action a specific historical content. the harmony of the polis can only exist if the pure self has been repressed in some way or, at least, gets no validity. the solution of the polis is the banishment of the pure self to the underworld. 8 As long as this banishment is effectuated, the harmony of the polis is not threatened. however, the pure self refuses its definitive confinement in the underworld. this is expressed in the development of the polis that can be characterized as the return of the repressed. the freedom of the pure self is the implicit presupposition of the polis. the pure self will invade the public domain of the polis step by step. Ultimately, the pure self can claim its place as the formal person. if this occurs, however, the polis is destroyed.
politische gott, der gott der Gesetze, der herrschaft, aber der bekannten gesetze, nicht der gesetze des gewissens" (p. 104). ("Zeus, however, is the political god, the god of the laws, the power, but of the known laws, not the laws of Conscience". )
8 The Lectures of 1827, p. 332/536: "the ethical is an objective content such that a sub- jectivity or this internal reflection is not yet present. "
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the development of the polis immediately reflects itself in the religion in the form of art, in which the self-consciousness of the polis is repre- sented. Without the threat of this decline the polis would be in perfect harmony and the motive to represent this harmony would be absent. this changes when the harmony is in danger. "Since the ethical nation lives in immediate unity with its substance and lacks the principle of the pure individuality of self-consciousness, the complete form of its religion first appears as divorced from its existential shape"9 (PhSp, 425).
Apparently, the religious representation has a double meaning. on the one hand, the representation already expresses the decline of the polis, for the religious consciousness is a manifestation of the principle of pure singularity. Without the emergence of self-consciousness, there would be no need for religion. on the other hand, the decline of the polis can be delayed when its absolute essence is represented by the religious con- sciousness. the religious representation contradicts the actual decline. for the religious consciousness, the polis still has an absolute essence, even though the facts show otherwise. here, religion functions as an ideo- logical consciousness, which is dedicated to the status quo.
in contrast with the development of natural religion, the development of religion in the form of art does not express itself in distinct religions and distinct forms of society. Rather, religion in the form of art concerns the internal development of one and the same religious form. At the same time, this development presents itself as an unavoidable destiny and does not have the self-conscious form characterizing revealed religion.
4. the Work of Art within the Practical framework of the Polis
Before going into the development of religion in the form of art, it is advisable first to dwell upon hegel's view of the work of art and its practical meaning in the polis. how can the work of art express the self- consciousness of the polis and why can this representation contribute to the delay of its fall?
9 "indem das sittliche Volk in der unmittelbaren einheit mit seiner Substanz lebt und das Prinzip der reinen einzelheit des Selbstbewusstseins nicht an ihm hat, so tritt seine Religion in ihrer Vollendung erst im Scheiden von seinem Bestehen auf " (Phdg, 490/1). the english translation is obviously wrong. the point is not that the religion is divorced from the ethical substance, but that the religion only gets existence when the polis threatens to become ruined.
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first, we have to know how hegel understands the 'work of art'. of course, the work of art is a work, which means it is a remaining product of human labour. What specific conditions, however, make the work a work of art? the first condition to distinguish a work of art from other works has to do with the content of that work. the content of the work can refer to other entities. A house, for example, refers to an individual who wants protection against hostile forces of nature. or, a hammer is a labour product that itself refers to labour and the resulting product. But the content of the work of art only refers to itself. the work of art repre- sents the absolute being, or at least an absolute being. in this sense, the work of art has a religious meaning.
this determination of the content of the work of art, however, is still insufficient. old egyptian mummies or the paintings in the pyramids, which are images of the gods, are also labour products with an absolute content. But they are not works of art in the strict hegelian sense of the word. According to hegel, the real work of art only appears in the Ancient greek world because, in that world, for the first time, the riddle of the sphinx was solved. 10 in the greek world, man has manifested himself as the absolute essence. the absolute being has been identified as human freedom. only a work that represents human freedom can rightly be called a work of art.
this conclusion, however, leads to a problem. if the work of art has to express human freedom, then the polis itself must be considered as the work of art par excellence. in this case, it becomes problematic to under- stand the reason and meaning behind representing the polis in another work of art. Why can the duplication of the polis in another work of art accomplish what the polis itself cannot, namely, a delay of decline?
from a certain point of view, the polis is, indeed, the perfect work of art. it is not only a work that embodies human freedom, but it is also the only existence of this freedom. freedom has no other mode of being. to be free means to be a citizen of the polis. to be a citizen of the polis means to be free. there is no way to be free outside the polis. the citi- zen has no conscience or subjective identity to differentiate between his public and subjective role. in this sense, freedom only exists insofar as it is practically performed. Any reflection on this freedom, any subjective
10 PhSp, 423: "But the work still lacks the shape and outer reality in which the self exists as self; it still does not in its own self proclaim that it includes within it an inner meaning, it lacks speech, the element in which the meaning filling it is itself present.