The “conscious world” cannot be a starting-
point for valuing: an “objective" valuation is
necessary.
point for valuing: an “objective" valuation is
necessary.
Nietzsche - v15 - Will to Power - b
Spinoza's proposition concern-
ing “self-preservation " ought as a matter of fact to
put a stop to change. But the proposition is false;
the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can
(
## p. 163 (#193) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
163
be clearly shown that they do everything not to
remain as they are, but to become greater.
«
689.
" Will to power” and causality. -From a psycho-
logical point of view the idea of “cause " is our feel-
ing of power in the act which is called willing-our
concept "effect" is the superstition that this feeling
of power is itself the force which moves things. . . .
. A state which accompanies an event and is
already an effect of that event is deemed "suffi-
cient cause ” of the latter; the tense relationship
of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of
power) and of an obstacle being overcome—are
these things illusions ?
If we translate the notion cause back into
the only sphere which is known to us, and out of
which we have taken it, we cannot imagine any
change in which the will to power is not inherent.
We do not know how to account for any change
which is not a trespassing of one power on another.
- Mechanics only show us the results, and then
only in images (movement is a figure of speech);
gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because
it is itself the first cause of mechanical results.
The will to accumulate force is confined to the
phenomenon of life, to nourishment, to procreation,
to inheritance, to society, states, customs, authority.
Should we not be allowed to assume that this will
is the motive power also of chemistry ? -and of
the cosmic order ?
Not only conservation of energy, but the mini-
mum amount of waste; so that the only reality is
## p. 164 (#194) ############################################
164
THE WILL TO POWER.
this: the will of every centre of power to become
stronger-not self-preservation, but the desire to
appropriate, to become master, to become more,
to become stronger.
Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the
principle of causation—"From like causes, like
effects”—“A permanent law of things "-" In-
variable order"? Because something is calculable,
is it therefore on that account necessary?
If something happens thus, and thus only, it is
not the manifestation of a “principle,” of a “law,"
of “order. " What happens is that certain quanta
of power begin to operate, and their essence is
to exercise their power over all other quanta of
power. Can we assume the existence of a striving
after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,
i. e. without the sensation of an increase or a de-
crease of power? Is mechanism only a language
of signs for the concealed fact of a world of fight-
ing and conquering quanta of will-power ? All
mechanical first-principles, matter, atoms, weight,
pressure, and repulsion, are not facts in themselves,
but interpretations arrived at with the help of
psychical fictions.
Life, which is our best known form of being, is
altogether" will to the accumulation of strength
all the processes of life hinge on this: everything
aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and
accumulation. Life as an individual case (a
hypothesis which may be applied to existence in
general) strives after the maximum feeling of
power; life is essentially a striving after more power;
striving itself is only a straining after more power ;
"
## p. 165 (#195) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
165
the most fundamental and innermost thing of all is
this will. (Mechanism is merely the semeiotics of
the results. )
690.
The thing which is the cause of the existence
of development cannot in the course of investiga-
tion be found above development; it should neither
be regarded as "evolving” nor as evolved .
the “ will to power" cannot have been evolved.
691.
What is the relation of the whole of the organic
process towards the rest of nature ? —Here the
fundamental will reveals itself.
692.
Is the “will to power” a kind of will, or is it
identical with the concept will ? Is it equivalent
to desiring or commanding; is it the will which
Schopenhauer says is the essence of things?
My proposition is that the will of psychologists
hitherto has been an unjustifiable generalisation,
and that there is no such thing as this sort of will,
that instead of the development of one will into
several forms being taken as a fact, the character
of will has been cancelled owing to the fact that
its content, its “whither," was subtracted from it:
in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree;
what he calls “ will ” is merely an empty word.
There is even less plausibility in the will to live :
for life is simply one of the manifestations of the
will to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous
## p. 166 (#196) ############################################
166
THE WILL TO POWER.
to suggest that everything is striving to enter into
this particular form of the will to power.
693
If the innermost essence of existence is the will
to power; if happiness is every increase of power,
and unhappiness the feeling of not being able to
resist, of not being able to become master : may
we not then postulate happiness and pain as
cardinal facts ? Is will possible without these two
oscillations of yea and nay?
But who feels
happiness? . . . Who will have power? . . .
Nonsensical question. If the essence of all things
is itself will to power, and consequently the
ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: con-
trasts and obstacles are necessary, therefore also,
relatively, units which trespass on one another.
694.
According to the obstacles which a force seeks
with a view of overcoming them, the measure of
the failure and the fatality thus provoked must
increase: and in so far as every force can only
manifest itself against some thing that opposes it,
an element of unhappiness is necessarily inherent
in every action.
But this pain acts as a greater
incitement to life, and increases the will to power.
695.
If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling
of power, life would have to represent such an
increase in power that the difference, the “plus,"
## p. 167 (#197) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
167
.
.
would have to enter consciousness. A dead
level of power, if maintained, would have to
measure its happiness in relation to depreciations
of that level, i. e. in relation to states of unhappi-
ness and not of happiness. . . . The will to an
increase lies in the essence of happiness: that
power is enhanced, and that this difference becomes
conscious.
In a state of decadence after a certain time the
opposite difference becomes conscious, that is
decrease: the memory of former strong moments
depresses the present feelings of happiness—in
this state comparison reduces happiness.
696.
It is not the satisfaction of the will which is
the cause of happiness (to this superficial theory
I am more particularly opposed—this absurd
psychological forgery in regard to the most simple
things), but it is that the will is always striving to
overcome that which stands in its way. The feel-
ing of happiness lies precisely in the discontented-
ness of the will, in the fact that without opponents
and obstacles it is never satisfied.
“ The happy
man": a gregarious ideal.
697.
The normal discontent of our instincts for
instance, of the instinct of hunger, of sex, of move-
ment-contains nothing which is in itself depress-
ing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and,
whatever the pessimists may say to us, like all
## p. 168 (#198) ############################################
168
THE WILL TO POWER.
the rhythms of small and irritating stimuli, it
strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us
sick of life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.
(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised
as the rhythm of small and painful stimuli. )
Kant says:
698.
“These lines of Count Verri's (Sull
indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm
with absolute certainty: 'Il solo principio motore
dell'uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni
piacere. Il piacere non è un essere positivo. '"*
699.
Pain is something different from pleasure-I
mean it is not the latter's opposite.
If the essence of pleasure has been aptly char-
acterised as the feeling of increased power (that is
to say, as a feeling of difference which presupposes
comparison), that does not define the nature of
pain. The false contrasts which the people, and
consequently the language, believes in, are always
dangerous fetters which impede the march of truth.
There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is
conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of
small, painful stimuli: in this way a very rapid
growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling
* On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. “The only motive
force of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure.
Pleasure is not a positive thing. "—TR.
>
## p. 169 (#199) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
169
a
of pleasure is attained. This is the case, for
instance, in tickling, also in the sexual tickling
which accompanies the coitus: here we see pain
acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems
to be a small hindrance which is overcome, followed
immediately by another small hindrance which
once again is overcome-this play of resistance
and resistance overcome is the greatest excitant
of that complete feeling of overflowing and surplus
power which constitutes the essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in
the feeling of pain through small intercalated
pleasurable stimuli, does not exist : pleasure and
pain are not opposites,
Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in
which a judgment is inherent-the judgment
“harmful,” in which long experience is epitomised.
There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not
the wound that hurts, it is the experience of the
harmful results a wound may have for the whole
organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving
way, and is called pain. (In the case of deleterious
influences which were unknown to ancient man,
as, for instance, those residing in the new combina-
tion of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is
lacking, and we are lost. )
That which is quite peculiar in pain is the pro-
longed disturbance, the quivering subsequent to a
terrible shock in the ganglia of the nervous system.
As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause
of pain (from any sort of injury, for instance),
but from the protracted disturbance of his equi-
librium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a
1.
## p. 170 (#200) ############################################
170
THE WILL TO POWER.
disease of the cerebral centres-pleasure is no
disease at all.
The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex
actions has appearances and even philosophical
prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden
accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the
reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the
feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way when
I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had
struck the bell of my consciousness, and until a
hint of what I had to do had been telegraphed
back to me.
On the contrary, what I notice as
clearly as possible is, that first, in order to avoid
a fall, reflex action on the part of my foot takes
place, and then, after a certain measurable space of
time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful
wave in my forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to
pain. Pain is subsequently projected into the
wounded quarter-but the essence of this local
pain is nevertheless not the expression of a kind
of local wound: it is merely a local sign, the
strength and nature of which is in keeping with
the severity of the wound, and of which the nerve
centres have taken note. The fact that as the
result of this shock the muscular power of the
organism is materially reduced, does not prove in
any way that the essence of pain is to be sought
in the lowering of the feeling of power.
Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to
pain: pain is no “cause" of action, . Pain itself
is a reaction; the reflex movement is another
and earlier process—both originate at different
points.
## p. 171 (#201) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
171
700.
The message of pain : in itself pain does not
announce that
that which has been momentarily
damaged, but the significance of this damage for
the individual as a whole.
Are we to suppose that there are any pains
which “the species " feel, and which the individual
does not?
701.
“ The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum
of happiness: consequently it were better that the
world did not exist "-" The world is something
which from a rational standpoint it were better
did not exist, because it occasions more pain than
pleasure to the feeling subject "—this futile gossip
now calls itself pessimism!
Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not
causes; they are second-rate valuations derived
from a dominating value,—they are one with the
feeling “ useful," "harmful," and therefore they are
absolutely fugitive and relative. For in regard to
all utility and harmfulness there are a hundred
different ways of asking “what for? ”
I despise this pessimism of sensitiveness : it is
in itself a sign of profoundly impoverished life.
702.
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid
unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous pre-
judices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are
mere results, mere accompanying phenomena—that
which every man, which every tiny particle of a
## p. 172 (#202) ############################################
172
THE WILL TO POWER.
living organism will have, is an increase of power.
In striving after this, pleasure and pain are en-
countered; it is owing to that will that the organism
seeks opposition and requires that which stands in
its way. . . . Pain as the hindrance of its will to
power is therefore a normal feature, a natural in-
gredient of every organic phenomenon; man does
not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly in
need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure,
every event presupposes an obstacle overcome.
Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive
nourishment; the protoplasm extends its pseudo-
podia in order to seek for that which resists it,
it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its
Then it makes the attempt to over-
come, to appropriate, and to incorporate that with
which it comes into contact—what people call
“nourishment” is merely a derivative, a utilitarian
application, of the primordial will to become
stronger.
Pain is so far from acting as a diminution of
our feeling of power, that it actually forms in the
majority of cases a spur to this feeling, the
obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power.
will to power.
703
Pain has been confounded with one of its
subdivisions, which is exhaustion: the latter does
indeed represent a profound reduction and lowering
of the will to power, a material loss of strength
-that is to say, there is (a) pain as the stimulus
to an increase or power, and (6) pain following
## p. 173 (#203) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
173
upon an expenditure of power; in the first case it
is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of ex-
cessive spurring. . . . The inability to resist is
proper to the latter form of pain : the provocation
of that which resists is proper to the former. . .
The only happiness which is to be felt in the state
of exhaustion is that of going to sleep; in the other
case, happiness means triumph. . . . The great
confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact
that they did not keep these two kinds of happi-
ness—that of falling asleep, and that of triumph
-sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have
repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet and these
things constitute the bliss of Nihilistic religions and
philosophies; the wealthy in vital strength, the
active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the
extension of their feeling of power over ever wider
regions. Every healthy function of the organism
has this need,—and the whole organism constitutes
an intricate complexity of systems struggling for
the increase of the feeling of power. . . .
704.
How is it that the fundamental article of faith
in all psychologies is a piece of most outrageous con-
tortion and fabrication? “Man strives after happi-
ness," for instance-how much of this is true ? In
order to understand what life is, and what kind of
striving and tenseness life contains, the formula
should hold good not only of trees and plants, but
of animals also. "What does the plant strive
after ? "-But here we have already invented a
## p. 174 (#204) ############################################
174
THE WILL TO POWER.
false entity which does not exist,-concealing and
denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth,
with individual and semi-individual starting-points,
if we give it the clumsy title “plant” as if it were
a unit.
It is very obvious that the ultimate and
smallest individuals ” cannot be understood in the
sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their
sphere of power is continually shifting its ground:
but with all these changes, can it be said that any
of them strives after happiness -All this expand-
ing, this incorporation and growth, is a search for
resistance; movement is essentially related to
states of pain: the driving power here must
represent some other desire if it leads to such
continual willing and seeking of pain. -- To what
end do the trees of a virgin forest contend with
each other? “For happiness"? -For power ! . . .
Man is now master of the forces of nature, and
master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings
(the passions have followed suit, and have learned
to become useful)—in comparison with primeva/
man, the man of to-day represents an enormous
quantum of power, but not an increase in happi-
ness! How can one maintain, then, that he has
striven after happiness ? . .
.
.
705.
But while I say this I see above me, and below
the stars, the glittering rat's-tail of errors which
hitherto has represented the greatest inspiration of
man: "All happiness is the result of virtue, all
virtue is the result of free will”!
## p. 175 (#205) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
175
Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the
outcome of a happy organisation, all freedom is the
outcome of capacity (freedom understood here as
facility in self-direction. Every artist will under-
stand me)
706.
“The value of life. ”—Every life stands by itself;
all existence must be justified, and not only life,
—the justifying principle must be one through
which life itself speaks.
Life is only a means to something : it is the
expression of the forms of growth in power.
»
707.
The “conscious world” cannot be a starting-
point for valuing: an “objective" valuation is
necessary.
In comparison with the enormous and compli-
cated antagonistic processes which the collective life
of every organism represents, its conscious world
of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small
slice. We have absolutely no right to postulate
this particle of consciousness as the object, the
wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: the.
attainment of conseiousness. is obviously only an
additional means to the unfolding of life, and to. .
the extension of its power. That is why it is a
piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness, or
intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual
sphere of consciousness, as the highest value: and
maybe to justify " the world” with it.
## p. 176 (#206) ############################################
176
THE WILL TO POWER.
This is my fundamental objection to all philo-
sophical and moral cosmologies and theologies, to
allwherefores and highest values that have appeared
in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto.
A kind of means is misunderstood as the object
itself: conversely life and its growth of power were
debased to a means.
If we wished to postulate an adequate object of
life it would not necessarily be related in any way
with the category of conscious life; it would
require rather to explain conscious life as a mere
means to itself. . .
The “denial of life” regarded as the object of
life, the object of evolution ! Existence—a piece of
tremendous stupidity! Any such mad interpreta-
tion is only the outcome of life's being measured
by the factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain,
good and evil). Here the means are made to stand
against the end-the" unholy,” absurd, and, above
all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any
use when it requires such means ? But where the
fault lies is here instead of looking for the end
which would explain the necessity of such means,
we posited an end from the start which actually
excludes such means, i. e. we made a desideratum
in regard to certain means (especially pleasurable,
rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only
did we decide what end would be desirable. .
Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact
that, instead of regarding consciousness · as an
instrument and an isolated phenomenon of life in
general, we made it a standard, the highest value
in life: it is the faulty standpoint of a parte ad
.
## p. 177 (#207) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
177
totum,—and that is why all philosophers are
instinctively seeking at the present day for a col-
lective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills
consciously with all that happens, a “Spirit,” a
“God. ” But they must be told that it is precisely
thus that life is converted into a monster; that a
“God” and a general sensorium would necessarily
be something on whose account the whole of
existence would have to be condemned.
Our greatest relief came when we eliminated the
general consciousness which postulates ends and
means—in this way we ceased from being neces-
sarily pessimists. . . . Our greatest indictment
of life was the existence of God.
.
708.
Concerning the value of “Becoming. ”—If the
movement of the world really tended to reach a
final state, that state would already have been
reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is
that it does not tend to reach a final state: and
every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e. g.
materialism) according to which such a final state
is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.
I should like to have a concept of the world
which does justice to this fact. Becoming ought
to be explained without having recourse to such
final designs. Becoming must appear justified at
every instant (or it must defy all valuation : which
has unity as its end); the present must not under
any circumstances be justified by a future, nor
must the past be justified for the sake of the
M
VOL. II.
## p. 178 (#208) ############################################
178
THE WILL TO POWER.
present. Necessity” must not be interpreted
in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective
force or as a prime motor; and still less as the
necessary cause of some valuable result. But to
this end it is necessary to deny a collective
consciousness for Becoming,—a “God,” in order
that life may not be veiled under the shadow of a
being who feels and knows as we do and yet wills
nothing: “God” is useless if he wants nothing;
and if he do want something, this presupposes a
general sum of suffering and irrationality which
lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortun-
ately any such general power is lacking (a suffering
God overlooking everything, a general sensorium
and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the greatest indict-
ment of existence).
Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of
Being must be allowed to remain, because in
that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be
sheer and superfluous nonsense.
The next question, then, is: how did the
illusion Being originate (why was it obliged to
originate);
Likewise: how was it that all valuations based
upon the hypothesis that there was such a thing
as Being came to be depreciated.
But in this way we have recognised that this
hypothesis concerning Being is the source of all
the calumny that has been directed against the
world (the “Better world,” the “True world” the
“World Beyond," the “ Thing-in-itself").
(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not
tend towards stability.
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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
179
(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance;
the world of Being is probably only
appearance.
(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value
at every instant; the sum of its value
always remains equal: expressed other-
wise, it has no value; for that according
to which it might be measured, and in
regard to which the word value might
have some sense, is
is entirely lacking.
The collective value of the world defies
valuation ; for this reason philosophical
pessimism belongs to the order of farces.
709.
We should not make our little desiderata the
judges of existence ! Neither should we make
culminating evolutionary forms (eg. mind) the
"absolute " which stands behind evolution !
710.
Our knowledge has become scientific to the
extent in which it has been able to make use of
number and measure. It might be worth while
to try and see whether a scientific order of values
might not be constructed according to a scale of
numbers and measures representing energy. . .
All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity,
and misunderstanding. They may all be reduced
to that scale of numbers and measures represent-
ing energy.
The ascent in this scale would
## p. 180 (#210) ############################################
180
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent an increase of value, the descent a
diminution.
But here appearance and prejudice are against
one (moral values are only apparent values com-
pared with those which are physiological).
711.
Why the standpoint of “value” lapses :-
Because in the " whole process of the universe”
the work of mankind does not come under considera-
tion; because a general process (viewed in the
light of a system) does not exist.
Because there is no such thing as a whole ;
because no depreciation of human existence or
human aims can be made in regard to something
that does not exist.
Because “necessity," causality,” “ design,” are
merely useful semblances.
Because the aim is not “the increase of the
sphere of consciousness," but the increase of power;
in which increase the utility of consciousness is
also contained; and the same holds good of
pleasure and pain.
Because a mere means must not be elevated to
the highest criterion of value (such as states of
consciousness like pleasure and pain, if con-
sciousness is in itself only a means).
Because the world is not an organism at all,
but a thing of chaos; because the development of
“intellectuality” is only a means tending relatively
to extend the duration of an organisation.
Because all desirability” has no
sense in
regard to the general character of existence.
## p. 181 (#211) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
181
712.
“God” is the culminating moment: life is an
eternal process of deifying and undeifying. But
withal there is no zenith of values, but only a
zenith of power.
Absolute exclusion of mechanical and material-
istic interpretations: they are both only expres-
sions of inferior states, of emotions deprived of all
spirit (of the “will to power ').
The retrograde movement from the zenith of
development (the intellectualisation of power on
some slave-infected soil) may be shown to be the
result of the highest degree of energy turning
against itself, once it no longer has anything to
organise, and utilising its power in order to
disorganise.
(a) The ever-increasing suppression of societies,
and the latter's subjection by a smaller number of
stronger individuals.
(6) The ever-increasing suppression of the
privileged and the strong, hence the rise of
democracy, and ultimately of anarchy, in the
elements,
713.
Value is the highest amount of power that a
man can assimilate-a man, not mankind! Man-
kind is much more of a means than an end. It
is a question of type: mankind is merely the
experimental material; it is the overflow of the
ill-constituted a field of ruins.
## p. 182 (#212) ############################################
182
THE WILL TO POWER.
714.
Words relating to values are merely banners
planted on those spots where a new blessedness
was discovered—a new feeling.
>
715
The standpoint of “value” is the same as that
of the conditions of preservation and enhancement,
in regard to complex creatures of relative stability
appearing in the course of evolution.
There are no such things as lasting and
ultimate entities, no atoms, no monads: here also
permanence was first introduced by ourselves
(from practical, utilitarian, and other motives).
“The forms that rule”; the sphere of the sub-
jugated is continually extended; or it decreases
or increases according to the conditions (nourish-
ment) being either favourable or unfavourable.
“Value” is essentially the standpoint for the
increase or decrease of these dominating centres
(pluralities in any case; for “unity” cannot be
observed anywhere in the nature of development).
The means of expression afforded by language
are useless for the purpose of conveying any facts
concerning “development”: the need of positing
a rougher world of stable existences and things
forms part of our eternal desire for preservation.
We may speak of atoms and monads in a relative
sense : and this is certain, that the smallest world
is the most stable world. . . . There is no such thing
as will: there are only punctuations of will, which are
constantly increasing and decreasing their power.
## p. 183 (#213) ############################################
NII.
THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLI-
FIED IN SOCIETY AND THE IN-
DIVIDUAL.
I. SOCIETY AND THE STATE.
716.
We take it as a principle that only individuals feel
any responsibility. Corporations are invented to
do what the individual has not the courage to do.
For this reason all communities are vastly more
upright and instructive, as regards the nature of
man, than the individual who is too cowardly to
have the courage of his own desires.
All altruism is the prudence of the private man:
societies are not mutually altruistic. The com-
mandment, “Thou shalt love thy next-door
neighbour," has never been extended to thy
neighbour in general. Rather what Manu says is
probably truer: “We must conceive of all the
States on our own frontier, and their allies, as being
hostile, and for the same reason we must consider
all of their neighbours as being friendly to us. ”
The study of society is invaluable, because man
in society is far more childlike than man in-
183
## p. 184 (#214) ############################################
184
THE WILL TO POWER.
dividually. Society has never regarded virtue as
anything else than as a means to strength, power,
and order. Manu's words again are simple and
dignified : “Virtue could hardly rely on her own
strength alone.
Really it is only the fear of
punishment that keeps men in their limits, and
leaves every one in peaceful possession of his own. ”
717
The State, or unmorality organised, is from
within--the police, the penal code, status, com-
merce, and the family; and from without, the will
to war, to power, to conquest and revenge.
A multitude will do things an individual will
not, because of the division of responsibility, of
command and execution; because the virtues of
obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment
are all introduced; because feelings of pride,
severity, strength, hate, and revenge-in short, all
typical traits are upheld, and these are character-
istics utterly alien to the herd-man.
718.
You haven't, any of you, the courage either to
kill or to flog a man. But the huge machinery of
the State quells the individual and makes him de-
cline to be answerable for his own deed (obedience,
loyalty, etc. ).
Everything that a man does in the service of
the State is against his own nature. Similarly,
everything he learns in view of future service of the
## p. 185 (#215) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
185
State. This result is obtained through division of
labour (so that responsibility is subdivided too) :-
The legislator—and he who fufils the law.
The teacher of discipline and those who have
grown hard and severe under discipline.
719.
A division of labour among the emotions exists
inside society, making individuals and classes
produce an imperfect, but more useful, kind of
soul. Observe how every type in society has
become atrophied with regard to certain emotions
with the view of fostering and accentuating other
emotions.
Morality may be thus justified :-
Economically,—as aiming at the greatest possible
use of all individual power, with the view of pre-
venting the waste of exceptional natures,
Æsthetically,--as the formation of fixed types,
and the pleasure in one's own.
Politically,—as the art of bearing with the
severe divergencies of the degrees of power in
society.
Psychologically,—as an imaginary preference for
the bungled and the mediocre, in order to preserve
the weak,
720.
Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he
desires power, and this impulse, which is called
freedom, must be the longest restrained. Hence
## p. 186 (#216) ############################################
186
THE WILL TO POWER.
ethics has instinctively aimed at such an education
as shall restrain the desire for power; thus our
morality slanders the would-be tyrant, and glorifies
charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd.
721.
-
Impotence to power,--how it disguises itself
and plays the hypocrite, as obedience, subordina-
tion, the pride of duty and morality, submission,
devotion, love (the idolisation and apotheosis of
the commander is a kind of compensation, and
indirect self-enhancement). It veils itself further
under fatalism and resignation, objectivity, self-
tyranny, stoicism, asceticism, self-abnegation,
hallowing. Other disguises are: criticism, pessim-
ism, indignation, susceptibility, “ beautiful-soul,”
virtue, self - deification, philosophic detachment,
freedom from contact with the world (the realisa-
tion of impotence disguises itself as disdain).
There is a universal need to exercise some kind
of power, or to create for one's self the appearance
of some power, if only temporarily, in the form of
intoxication.
There are men who desire power simply for the
sake of the happiness it will bring; these belong
chiefly to political parties. Other men have the
same yearning, even when power means visible
disadvantages, the sacrifice of their happiness, and
well-being; they are the ambitious. Other men,
again, are only like dogs in a manger, and will have
power only to prevent its falling into the hands
of others on whom they would then be dependent.
## p. 187 (#217) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
1. 87
722.
If there be justice and equality before the law,
what would thereby be abolished ? -Suspense,
enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think that
you thereby increase happiness; for the Corsicans
rejoice in more happiness than the Continentals.
a
723
Reciprocity and the expectation of a reward is
one of the most seductive forms of the devaluation
of mankind. It involves that equality which de-
preciates any gulf as immoral.
724.
Utility is entirely dependent upon the object to
be attained, the wherefore? And this wherefore,
this purpose, is again dependent upon the degree
,
of power. Utilitarianism is not, therefore, a funda-
mental doctrine; it is only a story of sequels, and
cannot be made obligatory for all.
725
Of old, the State was regarded theoretically as
a utilitarian institution; it has now become so
in a practical sense. The time of kings has gone
by, because people are no longer worthy of them.
They do not wish to see the symbol of their ideal
in a king; but only a means to their own ends.
That's the whole truth.
## p. 188 (#218) ############################################
188
THE WILL TO POWER.
726.
I am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the
communal standard of judgment and valuation,
naturally without any intention of deducing morals.
The degree of psychological falsity and dense-
ness required in order to sanctify the emotions
essential to preservation and expansion of power,
and to create a good conscience for them.
The degree of stupidity required in order that
general rules and values may remain possible
(including education, formation of culture, and
training).
The degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and in-
tolerance required in order to deal with exceptions,
to suppress them as criminals, and thus to give
them bad consciences, and to make them sick
with their own singularity.
727
Morality is essentially a shield, a means of
defence; and, in so far, it is a sign of the im-
perfectly developed man (he is still in armour;
he is still stoical).
The fully developed man is above all provided
with weapons: he is a man who attacks.
The weapons of war are converted into weapons
of peace (out of scales and carapaces grow feathers
and hair).
728.
The very notion," living organism,” implies that
there must be growth,—that there must be a
## p. 189 (#219) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
189
striving after an extension of power, and therefore
a process of absorption of other forces. Under the
drowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people
speak of the right of the individual to defend himself;
on the same principle one might speak of his right
to attack: for bothm and the latter more than the
former-are necessities where all living organisms
are concerned: aggressive and defensive egoism
are not questions of choice or even of “free will,"
but they are fatalities of life itself.
In this respect it is immaterial whether one
have an individual, a living body, or "an ad-
vancing society” in view. The right to punish (or
society's means of defence) has been arrived at
only through a misuse of the word "right": a
right is acquired only by contract,—but self-
defence and self-preservation do not stand upon
the basis of a contract. A people ought at least,
with quite as much justification, to be able to regard
its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade,
or colonisation, as a right—the right of growth,
perhaps. When the instincts of a society
ultimately make it give up war and renounce
conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy
and the rule of shopkeepers. In the majority of
cases, it is true, assurances of peace are merely
stupefying draughts.
.
729.
The maintenance of the military State is the
last means of adhering to the great tradition of
the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive it.
By means of it the superior or strong type of
## p. 190 (#220) ############################################
190
THE WILL TO POWER. '
man is preserved, and all institutions and ideas
which perpetuate enmity and order of rank in
States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs,
etc. , may on that account seem justified.
730.
ing “self-preservation " ought as a matter of fact to
put a stop to change. But the proposition is false;
the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can
(
## p. 163 (#193) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
163
be clearly shown that they do everything not to
remain as they are, but to become greater.
«
689.
" Will to power” and causality. -From a psycho-
logical point of view the idea of “cause " is our feel-
ing of power in the act which is called willing-our
concept "effect" is the superstition that this feeling
of power is itself the force which moves things. . . .
. A state which accompanies an event and is
already an effect of that event is deemed "suffi-
cient cause ” of the latter; the tense relationship
of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of
power) and of an obstacle being overcome—are
these things illusions ?
If we translate the notion cause back into
the only sphere which is known to us, and out of
which we have taken it, we cannot imagine any
change in which the will to power is not inherent.
We do not know how to account for any change
which is not a trespassing of one power on another.
- Mechanics only show us the results, and then
only in images (movement is a figure of speech);
gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because
it is itself the first cause of mechanical results.
The will to accumulate force is confined to the
phenomenon of life, to nourishment, to procreation,
to inheritance, to society, states, customs, authority.
Should we not be allowed to assume that this will
is the motive power also of chemistry ? -and of
the cosmic order ?
Not only conservation of energy, but the mini-
mum amount of waste; so that the only reality is
## p. 164 (#194) ############################################
164
THE WILL TO POWER.
this: the will of every centre of power to become
stronger-not self-preservation, but the desire to
appropriate, to become master, to become more,
to become stronger.
Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the
principle of causation—"From like causes, like
effects”—“A permanent law of things "-" In-
variable order"? Because something is calculable,
is it therefore on that account necessary?
If something happens thus, and thus only, it is
not the manifestation of a “principle,” of a “law,"
of “order. " What happens is that certain quanta
of power begin to operate, and their essence is
to exercise their power over all other quanta of
power. Can we assume the existence of a striving
after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,
i. e. without the sensation of an increase or a de-
crease of power? Is mechanism only a language
of signs for the concealed fact of a world of fight-
ing and conquering quanta of will-power ? All
mechanical first-principles, matter, atoms, weight,
pressure, and repulsion, are not facts in themselves,
but interpretations arrived at with the help of
psychical fictions.
Life, which is our best known form of being, is
altogether" will to the accumulation of strength
all the processes of life hinge on this: everything
aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and
accumulation. Life as an individual case (a
hypothesis which may be applied to existence in
general) strives after the maximum feeling of
power; life is essentially a striving after more power;
striving itself is only a straining after more power ;
"
## p. 165 (#195) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
165
the most fundamental and innermost thing of all is
this will. (Mechanism is merely the semeiotics of
the results. )
690.
The thing which is the cause of the existence
of development cannot in the course of investiga-
tion be found above development; it should neither
be regarded as "evolving” nor as evolved .
the “ will to power" cannot have been evolved.
691.
What is the relation of the whole of the organic
process towards the rest of nature ? —Here the
fundamental will reveals itself.
692.
Is the “will to power” a kind of will, or is it
identical with the concept will ? Is it equivalent
to desiring or commanding; is it the will which
Schopenhauer says is the essence of things?
My proposition is that the will of psychologists
hitherto has been an unjustifiable generalisation,
and that there is no such thing as this sort of will,
that instead of the development of one will into
several forms being taken as a fact, the character
of will has been cancelled owing to the fact that
its content, its “whither," was subtracted from it:
in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree;
what he calls “ will ” is merely an empty word.
There is even less plausibility in the will to live :
for life is simply one of the manifestations of the
will to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous
## p. 166 (#196) ############################################
166
THE WILL TO POWER.
to suggest that everything is striving to enter into
this particular form of the will to power.
693
If the innermost essence of existence is the will
to power; if happiness is every increase of power,
and unhappiness the feeling of not being able to
resist, of not being able to become master : may
we not then postulate happiness and pain as
cardinal facts ? Is will possible without these two
oscillations of yea and nay?
But who feels
happiness? . . . Who will have power? . . .
Nonsensical question. If the essence of all things
is itself will to power, and consequently the
ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: con-
trasts and obstacles are necessary, therefore also,
relatively, units which trespass on one another.
694.
According to the obstacles which a force seeks
with a view of overcoming them, the measure of
the failure and the fatality thus provoked must
increase: and in so far as every force can only
manifest itself against some thing that opposes it,
an element of unhappiness is necessarily inherent
in every action.
But this pain acts as a greater
incitement to life, and increases the will to power.
695.
If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling
of power, life would have to represent such an
increase in power that the difference, the “plus,"
## p. 167 (#197) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
167
.
.
would have to enter consciousness. A dead
level of power, if maintained, would have to
measure its happiness in relation to depreciations
of that level, i. e. in relation to states of unhappi-
ness and not of happiness. . . . The will to an
increase lies in the essence of happiness: that
power is enhanced, and that this difference becomes
conscious.
In a state of decadence after a certain time the
opposite difference becomes conscious, that is
decrease: the memory of former strong moments
depresses the present feelings of happiness—in
this state comparison reduces happiness.
696.
It is not the satisfaction of the will which is
the cause of happiness (to this superficial theory
I am more particularly opposed—this absurd
psychological forgery in regard to the most simple
things), but it is that the will is always striving to
overcome that which stands in its way. The feel-
ing of happiness lies precisely in the discontented-
ness of the will, in the fact that without opponents
and obstacles it is never satisfied.
“ The happy
man": a gregarious ideal.
697.
The normal discontent of our instincts for
instance, of the instinct of hunger, of sex, of move-
ment-contains nothing which is in itself depress-
ing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and,
whatever the pessimists may say to us, like all
## p. 168 (#198) ############################################
168
THE WILL TO POWER.
the rhythms of small and irritating stimuli, it
strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us
sick of life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.
(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised
as the rhythm of small and painful stimuli. )
Kant says:
698.
“These lines of Count Verri's (Sull
indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm
with absolute certainty: 'Il solo principio motore
dell'uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni
piacere. Il piacere non è un essere positivo. '"*
699.
Pain is something different from pleasure-I
mean it is not the latter's opposite.
If the essence of pleasure has been aptly char-
acterised as the feeling of increased power (that is
to say, as a feeling of difference which presupposes
comparison), that does not define the nature of
pain. The false contrasts which the people, and
consequently the language, believes in, are always
dangerous fetters which impede the march of truth.
There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is
conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of
small, painful stimuli: in this way a very rapid
growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling
* On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. “The only motive
force of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure.
Pleasure is not a positive thing. "—TR.
>
## p. 169 (#199) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
169
a
of pleasure is attained. This is the case, for
instance, in tickling, also in the sexual tickling
which accompanies the coitus: here we see pain
acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems
to be a small hindrance which is overcome, followed
immediately by another small hindrance which
once again is overcome-this play of resistance
and resistance overcome is the greatest excitant
of that complete feeling of overflowing and surplus
power which constitutes the essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in
the feeling of pain through small intercalated
pleasurable stimuli, does not exist : pleasure and
pain are not opposites,
Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in
which a judgment is inherent-the judgment
“harmful,” in which long experience is epitomised.
There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not
the wound that hurts, it is the experience of the
harmful results a wound may have for the whole
organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving
way, and is called pain. (In the case of deleterious
influences which were unknown to ancient man,
as, for instance, those residing in the new combina-
tion of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is
lacking, and we are lost. )
That which is quite peculiar in pain is the pro-
longed disturbance, the quivering subsequent to a
terrible shock in the ganglia of the nervous system.
As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause
of pain (from any sort of injury, for instance),
but from the protracted disturbance of his equi-
librium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a
1.
## p. 170 (#200) ############################################
170
THE WILL TO POWER.
disease of the cerebral centres-pleasure is no
disease at all.
The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex
actions has appearances and even philosophical
prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden
accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the
reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the
feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way when
I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had
struck the bell of my consciousness, and until a
hint of what I had to do had been telegraphed
back to me.
On the contrary, what I notice as
clearly as possible is, that first, in order to avoid
a fall, reflex action on the part of my foot takes
place, and then, after a certain measurable space of
time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful
wave in my forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to
pain. Pain is subsequently projected into the
wounded quarter-but the essence of this local
pain is nevertheless not the expression of a kind
of local wound: it is merely a local sign, the
strength and nature of which is in keeping with
the severity of the wound, and of which the nerve
centres have taken note. The fact that as the
result of this shock the muscular power of the
organism is materially reduced, does not prove in
any way that the essence of pain is to be sought
in the lowering of the feeling of power.
Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to
pain: pain is no “cause" of action, . Pain itself
is a reaction; the reflex movement is another
and earlier process—both originate at different
points.
## p. 171 (#201) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
171
700.
The message of pain : in itself pain does not
announce that
that which has been momentarily
damaged, but the significance of this damage for
the individual as a whole.
Are we to suppose that there are any pains
which “the species " feel, and which the individual
does not?
701.
“ The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum
of happiness: consequently it were better that the
world did not exist "-" The world is something
which from a rational standpoint it were better
did not exist, because it occasions more pain than
pleasure to the feeling subject "—this futile gossip
now calls itself pessimism!
Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not
causes; they are second-rate valuations derived
from a dominating value,—they are one with the
feeling “ useful," "harmful," and therefore they are
absolutely fugitive and relative. For in regard to
all utility and harmfulness there are a hundred
different ways of asking “what for? ”
I despise this pessimism of sensitiveness : it is
in itself a sign of profoundly impoverished life.
702.
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid
unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous pre-
judices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are
mere results, mere accompanying phenomena—that
which every man, which every tiny particle of a
## p. 172 (#202) ############################################
172
THE WILL TO POWER.
living organism will have, is an increase of power.
In striving after this, pleasure and pain are en-
countered; it is owing to that will that the organism
seeks opposition and requires that which stands in
its way. . . . Pain as the hindrance of its will to
power is therefore a normal feature, a natural in-
gredient of every organic phenomenon; man does
not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly in
need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure,
every event presupposes an obstacle overcome.
Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive
nourishment; the protoplasm extends its pseudo-
podia in order to seek for that which resists it,
it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its
Then it makes the attempt to over-
come, to appropriate, and to incorporate that with
which it comes into contact—what people call
“nourishment” is merely a derivative, a utilitarian
application, of the primordial will to become
stronger.
Pain is so far from acting as a diminution of
our feeling of power, that it actually forms in the
majority of cases a spur to this feeling, the
obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power.
will to power.
703
Pain has been confounded with one of its
subdivisions, which is exhaustion: the latter does
indeed represent a profound reduction and lowering
of the will to power, a material loss of strength
-that is to say, there is (a) pain as the stimulus
to an increase or power, and (6) pain following
## p. 173 (#203) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
173
upon an expenditure of power; in the first case it
is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of ex-
cessive spurring. . . . The inability to resist is
proper to the latter form of pain : the provocation
of that which resists is proper to the former. . .
The only happiness which is to be felt in the state
of exhaustion is that of going to sleep; in the other
case, happiness means triumph. . . . The great
confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact
that they did not keep these two kinds of happi-
ness—that of falling asleep, and that of triumph
-sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have
repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet and these
things constitute the bliss of Nihilistic religions and
philosophies; the wealthy in vital strength, the
active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the
extension of their feeling of power over ever wider
regions. Every healthy function of the organism
has this need,—and the whole organism constitutes
an intricate complexity of systems struggling for
the increase of the feeling of power. . . .
704.
How is it that the fundamental article of faith
in all psychologies is a piece of most outrageous con-
tortion and fabrication? “Man strives after happi-
ness," for instance-how much of this is true ? In
order to understand what life is, and what kind of
striving and tenseness life contains, the formula
should hold good not only of trees and plants, but
of animals also. "What does the plant strive
after ? "-But here we have already invented a
## p. 174 (#204) ############################################
174
THE WILL TO POWER.
false entity which does not exist,-concealing and
denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth,
with individual and semi-individual starting-points,
if we give it the clumsy title “plant” as if it were
a unit.
It is very obvious that the ultimate and
smallest individuals ” cannot be understood in the
sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their
sphere of power is continually shifting its ground:
but with all these changes, can it be said that any
of them strives after happiness -All this expand-
ing, this incorporation and growth, is a search for
resistance; movement is essentially related to
states of pain: the driving power here must
represent some other desire if it leads to such
continual willing and seeking of pain. -- To what
end do the trees of a virgin forest contend with
each other? “For happiness"? -For power ! . . .
Man is now master of the forces of nature, and
master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings
(the passions have followed suit, and have learned
to become useful)—in comparison with primeva/
man, the man of to-day represents an enormous
quantum of power, but not an increase in happi-
ness! How can one maintain, then, that he has
striven after happiness ? . .
.
.
705.
But while I say this I see above me, and below
the stars, the glittering rat's-tail of errors which
hitherto has represented the greatest inspiration of
man: "All happiness is the result of virtue, all
virtue is the result of free will”!
## p. 175 (#205) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
175
Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the
outcome of a happy organisation, all freedom is the
outcome of capacity (freedom understood here as
facility in self-direction. Every artist will under-
stand me)
706.
“The value of life. ”—Every life stands by itself;
all existence must be justified, and not only life,
—the justifying principle must be one through
which life itself speaks.
Life is only a means to something : it is the
expression of the forms of growth in power.
»
707.
The “conscious world” cannot be a starting-
point for valuing: an “objective" valuation is
necessary.
In comparison with the enormous and compli-
cated antagonistic processes which the collective life
of every organism represents, its conscious world
of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small
slice. We have absolutely no right to postulate
this particle of consciousness as the object, the
wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: the.
attainment of conseiousness. is obviously only an
additional means to the unfolding of life, and to. .
the extension of its power. That is why it is a
piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness, or
intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual
sphere of consciousness, as the highest value: and
maybe to justify " the world” with it.
## p. 176 (#206) ############################################
176
THE WILL TO POWER.
This is my fundamental objection to all philo-
sophical and moral cosmologies and theologies, to
allwherefores and highest values that have appeared
in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto.
A kind of means is misunderstood as the object
itself: conversely life and its growth of power were
debased to a means.
If we wished to postulate an adequate object of
life it would not necessarily be related in any way
with the category of conscious life; it would
require rather to explain conscious life as a mere
means to itself. . .
The “denial of life” regarded as the object of
life, the object of evolution ! Existence—a piece of
tremendous stupidity! Any such mad interpreta-
tion is only the outcome of life's being measured
by the factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain,
good and evil). Here the means are made to stand
against the end-the" unholy,” absurd, and, above
all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any
use when it requires such means ? But where the
fault lies is here instead of looking for the end
which would explain the necessity of such means,
we posited an end from the start which actually
excludes such means, i. e. we made a desideratum
in regard to certain means (especially pleasurable,
rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only
did we decide what end would be desirable. .
Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact
that, instead of regarding consciousness · as an
instrument and an isolated phenomenon of life in
general, we made it a standard, the highest value
in life: it is the faulty standpoint of a parte ad
.
## p. 177 (#207) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
177
totum,—and that is why all philosophers are
instinctively seeking at the present day for a col-
lective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills
consciously with all that happens, a “Spirit,” a
“God. ” But they must be told that it is precisely
thus that life is converted into a monster; that a
“God” and a general sensorium would necessarily
be something on whose account the whole of
existence would have to be condemned.
Our greatest relief came when we eliminated the
general consciousness which postulates ends and
means—in this way we ceased from being neces-
sarily pessimists. . . . Our greatest indictment
of life was the existence of God.
.
708.
Concerning the value of “Becoming. ”—If the
movement of the world really tended to reach a
final state, that state would already have been
reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is
that it does not tend to reach a final state: and
every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e. g.
materialism) according to which such a final state
is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.
I should like to have a concept of the world
which does justice to this fact. Becoming ought
to be explained without having recourse to such
final designs. Becoming must appear justified at
every instant (or it must defy all valuation : which
has unity as its end); the present must not under
any circumstances be justified by a future, nor
must the past be justified for the sake of the
M
VOL. II.
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178
THE WILL TO POWER.
present. Necessity” must not be interpreted
in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective
force or as a prime motor; and still less as the
necessary cause of some valuable result. But to
this end it is necessary to deny a collective
consciousness for Becoming,—a “God,” in order
that life may not be veiled under the shadow of a
being who feels and knows as we do and yet wills
nothing: “God” is useless if he wants nothing;
and if he do want something, this presupposes a
general sum of suffering and irrationality which
lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortun-
ately any such general power is lacking (a suffering
God overlooking everything, a general sensorium
and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the greatest indict-
ment of existence).
Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of
Being must be allowed to remain, because in
that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be
sheer and superfluous nonsense.
The next question, then, is: how did the
illusion Being originate (why was it obliged to
originate);
Likewise: how was it that all valuations based
upon the hypothesis that there was such a thing
as Being came to be depreciated.
But in this way we have recognised that this
hypothesis concerning Being is the source of all
the calumny that has been directed against the
world (the “Better world,” the “True world” the
“World Beyond," the “ Thing-in-itself").
(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not
tend towards stability.
## p. 179 (#209) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
179
(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance;
the world of Being is probably only
appearance.
(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value
at every instant; the sum of its value
always remains equal: expressed other-
wise, it has no value; for that according
to which it might be measured, and in
regard to which the word value might
have some sense, is
is entirely lacking.
The collective value of the world defies
valuation ; for this reason philosophical
pessimism belongs to the order of farces.
709.
We should not make our little desiderata the
judges of existence ! Neither should we make
culminating evolutionary forms (eg. mind) the
"absolute " which stands behind evolution !
710.
Our knowledge has become scientific to the
extent in which it has been able to make use of
number and measure. It might be worth while
to try and see whether a scientific order of values
might not be constructed according to a scale of
numbers and measures representing energy. . .
All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity,
and misunderstanding. They may all be reduced
to that scale of numbers and measures represent-
ing energy.
The ascent in this scale would
## p. 180 (#210) ############################################
180
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent an increase of value, the descent a
diminution.
But here appearance and prejudice are against
one (moral values are only apparent values com-
pared with those which are physiological).
711.
Why the standpoint of “value” lapses :-
Because in the " whole process of the universe”
the work of mankind does not come under considera-
tion; because a general process (viewed in the
light of a system) does not exist.
Because there is no such thing as a whole ;
because no depreciation of human existence or
human aims can be made in regard to something
that does not exist.
Because “necessity," causality,” “ design,” are
merely useful semblances.
Because the aim is not “the increase of the
sphere of consciousness," but the increase of power;
in which increase the utility of consciousness is
also contained; and the same holds good of
pleasure and pain.
Because a mere means must not be elevated to
the highest criterion of value (such as states of
consciousness like pleasure and pain, if con-
sciousness is in itself only a means).
Because the world is not an organism at all,
but a thing of chaos; because the development of
“intellectuality” is only a means tending relatively
to extend the duration of an organisation.
Because all desirability” has no
sense in
regard to the general character of existence.
## p. 181 (#211) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
181
712.
“God” is the culminating moment: life is an
eternal process of deifying and undeifying. But
withal there is no zenith of values, but only a
zenith of power.
Absolute exclusion of mechanical and material-
istic interpretations: they are both only expres-
sions of inferior states, of emotions deprived of all
spirit (of the “will to power ').
The retrograde movement from the zenith of
development (the intellectualisation of power on
some slave-infected soil) may be shown to be the
result of the highest degree of energy turning
against itself, once it no longer has anything to
organise, and utilising its power in order to
disorganise.
(a) The ever-increasing suppression of societies,
and the latter's subjection by a smaller number of
stronger individuals.
(6) The ever-increasing suppression of the
privileged and the strong, hence the rise of
democracy, and ultimately of anarchy, in the
elements,
713.
Value is the highest amount of power that a
man can assimilate-a man, not mankind! Man-
kind is much more of a means than an end. It
is a question of type: mankind is merely the
experimental material; it is the overflow of the
ill-constituted a field of ruins.
## p. 182 (#212) ############################################
182
THE WILL TO POWER.
714.
Words relating to values are merely banners
planted on those spots where a new blessedness
was discovered—a new feeling.
>
715
The standpoint of “value” is the same as that
of the conditions of preservation and enhancement,
in regard to complex creatures of relative stability
appearing in the course of evolution.
There are no such things as lasting and
ultimate entities, no atoms, no monads: here also
permanence was first introduced by ourselves
(from practical, utilitarian, and other motives).
“The forms that rule”; the sphere of the sub-
jugated is continually extended; or it decreases
or increases according to the conditions (nourish-
ment) being either favourable or unfavourable.
“Value” is essentially the standpoint for the
increase or decrease of these dominating centres
(pluralities in any case; for “unity” cannot be
observed anywhere in the nature of development).
The means of expression afforded by language
are useless for the purpose of conveying any facts
concerning “development”: the need of positing
a rougher world of stable existences and things
forms part of our eternal desire for preservation.
We may speak of atoms and monads in a relative
sense : and this is certain, that the smallest world
is the most stable world. . . . There is no such thing
as will: there are only punctuations of will, which are
constantly increasing and decreasing their power.
## p. 183 (#213) ############################################
NII.
THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLI-
FIED IN SOCIETY AND THE IN-
DIVIDUAL.
I. SOCIETY AND THE STATE.
716.
We take it as a principle that only individuals feel
any responsibility. Corporations are invented to
do what the individual has not the courage to do.
For this reason all communities are vastly more
upright and instructive, as regards the nature of
man, than the individual who is too cowardly to
have the courage of his own desires.
All altruism is the prudence of the private man:
societies are not mutually altruistic. The com-
mandment, “Thou shalt love thy next-door
neighbour," has never been extended to thy
neighbour in general. Rather what Manu says is
probably truer: “We must conceive of all the
States on our own frontier, and their allies, as being
hostile, and for the same reason we must consider
all of their neighbours as being friendly to us. ”
The study of society is invaluable, because man
in society is far more childlike than man in-
183
## p. 184 (#214) ############################################
184
THE WILL TO POWER.
dividually. Society has never regarded virtue as
anything else than as a means to strength, power,
and order. Manu's words again are simple and
dignified : “Virtue could hardly rely on her own
strength alone.
Really it is only the fear of
punishment that keeps men in their limits, and
leaves every one in peaceful possession of his own. ”
717
The State, or unmorality organised, is from
within--the police, the penal code, status, com-
merce, and the family; and from without, the will
to war, to power, to conquest and revenge.
A multitude will do things an individual will
not, because of the division of responsibility, of
command and execution; because the virtues of
obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment
are all introduced; because feelings of pride,
severity, strength, hate, and revenge-in short, all
typical traits are upheld, and these are character-
istics utterly alien to the herd-man.
718.
You haven't, any of you, the courage either to
kill or to flog a man. But the huge machinery of
the State quells the individual and makes him de-
cline to be answerable for his own deed (obedience,
loyalty, etc. ).
Everything that a man does in the service of
the State is against his own nature. Similarly,
everything he learns in view of future service of the
## p. 185 (#215) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
185
State. This result is obtained through division of
labour (so that responsibility is subdivided too) :-
The legislator—and he who fufils the law.
The teacher of discipline and those who have
grown hard and severe under discipline.
719.
A division of labour among the emotions exists
inside society, making individuals and classes
produce an imperfect, but more useful, kind of
soul. Observe how every type in society has
become atrophied with regard to certain emotions
with the view of fostering and accentuating other
emotions.
Morality may be thus justified :-
Economically,—as aiming at the greatest possible
use of all individual power, with the view of pre-
venting the waste of exceptional natures,
Æsthetically,--as the formation of fixed types,
and the pleasure in one's own.
Politically,—as the art of bearing with the
severe divergencies of the degrees of power in
society.
Psychologically,—as an imaginary preference for
the bungled and the mediocre, in order to preserve
the weak,
720.
Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he
desires power, and this impulse, which is called
freedom, must be the longest restrained. Hence
## p. 186 (#216) ############################################
186
THE WILL TO POWER.
ethics has instinctively aimed at such an education
as shall restrain the desire for power; thus our
morality slanders the would-be tyrant, and glorifies
charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd.
721.
-
Impotence to power,--how it disguises itself
and plays the hypocrite, as obedience, subordina-
tion, the pride of duty and morality, submission,
devotion, love (the idolisation and apotheosis of
the commander is a kind of compensation, and
indirect self-enhancement). It veils itself further
under fatalism and resignation, objectivity, self-
tyranny, stoicism, asceticism, self-abnegation,
hallowing. Other disguises are: criticism, pessim-
ism, indignation, susceptibility, “ beautiful-soul,”
virtue, self - deification, philosophic detachment,
freedom from contact with the world (the realisa-
tion of impotence disguises itself as disdain).
There is a universal need to exercise some kind
of power, or to create for one's self the appearance
of some power, if only temporarily, in the form of
intoxication.
There are men who desire power simply for the
sake of the happiness it will bring; these belong
chiefly to political parties. Other men have the
same yearning, even when power means visible
disadvantages, the sacrifice of their happiness, and
well-being; they are the ambitious. Other men,
again, are only like dogs in a manger, and will have
power only to prevent its falling into the hands
of others on whom they would then be dependent.
## p. 187 (#217) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
1. 87
722.
If there be justice and equality before the law,
what would thereby be abolished ? -Suspense,
enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think that
you thereby increase happiness; for the Corsicans
rejoice in more happiness than the Continentals.
a
723
Reciprocity and the expectation of a reward is
one of the most seductive forms of the devaluation
of mankind. It involves that equality which de-
preciates any gulf as immoral.
724.
Utility is entirely dependent upon the object to
be attained, the wherefore? And this wherefore,
this purpose, is again dependent upon the degree
,
of power. Utilitarianism is not, therefore, a funda-
mental doctrine; it is only a story of sequels, and
cannot be made obligatory for all.
725
Of old, the State was regarded theoretically as
a utilitarian institution; it has now become so
in a practical sense. The time of kings has gone
by, because people are no longer worthy of them.
They do not wish to see the symbol of their ideal
in a king; but only a means to their own ends.
That's the whole truth.
## p. 188 (#218) ############################################
188
THE WILL TO POWER.
726.
I am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the
communal standard of judgment and valuation,
naturally without any intention of deducing morals.
The degree of psychological falsity and dense-
ness required in order to sanctify the emotions
essential to preservation and expansion of power,
and to create a good conscience for them.
The degree of stupidity required in order that
general rules and values may remain possible
(including education, formation of culture, and
training).
The degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and in-
tolerance required in order to deal with exceptions,
to suppress them as criminals, and thus to give
them bad consciences, and to make them sick
with their own singularity.
727
Morality is essentially a shield, a means of
defence; and, in so far, it is a sign of the im-
perfectly developed man (he is still in armour;
he is still stoical).
The fully developed man is above all provided
with weapons: he is a man who attacks.
The weapons of war are converted into weapons
of peace (out of scales and carapaces grow feathers
and hair).
728.
The very notion," living organism,” implies that
there must be growth,—that there must be a
## p. 189 (#219) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
189
striving after an extension of power, and therefore
a process of absorption of other forces. Under the
drowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people
speak of the right of the individual to defend himself;
on the same principle one might speak of his right
to attack: for bothm and the latter more than the
former-are necessities where all living organisms
are concerned: aggressive and defensive egoism
are not questions of choice or even of “free will,"
but they are fatalities of life itself.
In this respect it is immaterial whether one
have an individual, a living body, or "an ad-
vancing society” in view. The right to punish (or
society's means of defence) has been arrived at
only through a misuse of the word "right": a
right is acquired only by contract,—but self-
defence and self-preservation do not stand upon
the basis of a contract. A people ought at least,
with quite as much justification, to be able to regard
its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade,
or colonisation, as a right—the right of growth,
perhaps. When the instincts of a society
ultimately make it give up war and renounce
conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy
and the rule of shopkeepers. In the majority of
cases, it is true, assurances of peace are merely
stupefying draughts.
.
729.
The maintenance of the military State is the
last means of adhering to the great tradition of
the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive it.
By means of it the superior or strong type of
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190
THE WILL TO POWER. '
man is preserved, and all institutions and ideas
which perpetuate enmity and order of rank in
States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs,
etc. , may on that account seem justified.
730.
