No More Learning

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To the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical
tity, the first and negative answer is : The world has no be ginning in time, and no absolute limit in space.
For, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the one hand, and by a void space on the other. Now, since the world, as a phenomenon, cannot be thus limited in itself -- for a phenomenon is not a thing in itself; it must be possible for us to have a perception of this limita tion by a void time and a void space. But such a perception --such an experience is impossible ; because it has no content. Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically, and therefore absolutely, impossible. *
From this follows the affirmative answer : The regress in
the series of phsenomena --as a determination of the cosmical
quantity, proceeds in indef. nitum. This is equivalent to sny- ing--the world of sense has no absolute quantity, but the
series -- as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether
through personal experience, or by means of history, or the chain of cause and effect), and not to erase at any point in this extension of the possible empirical employment of the
And this is the proper and only use which renson can make of its principles.
The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of phenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent from an individual human being through the line of his ancestors, to expect that we shall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair, or to admit, in the series of heavenly bodies, a sun at the farthest possible distance from some centre. All that it demands is a perpetual pro gress from phenomena to phsenomena, even although an
* The reader will remark that the proof presented above is very dif ferent from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of the first antinomy. In that demonstration, it was taken for granted that the world is a thing in itself-- given in its totality prior to all regress, and ? determined position in space and time was denied to it--if it was not
considered as occupying all time and all space. Hence our conclusion differed from that given above ; for we inferred in the antithesis the ac tual infinity of the world.
understanding.
qnatt-
? empirical regress (through which alone the world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions) rests upon a rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of the
? ? ? IDEA 0? TOTALITY OF DIVTSIOS. 325
actnal perception is not presented by them (as in the case of our perceptions being so wenk, as tliat we are unable to be come conscious of them), since they, nevertheless, belong to possible experience.
Every beginning is m time, and all limits to extension are in space. But space and time are in the world of sense. Con sequently phenomena in the world are conditionally limited, but the world itself is not limited, either conditionally or un
conditionally.
For this reason, and because neither the world nor the
cosmical series of conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given, our conception of the cosmical quantity
is given only in and through the regress and not prior to it--- in a collective intuition. But the regress itself is really nothing more than the determining of the cosmical quantity, and can not therefore give us any determined conception of it -- still less a conception of a quantity which in relation to* certain standard, infinite. The regress does not, therefore, proceed to infinity (an infinity given), but only to an indefinite extent, for the purpose of presenting to us quantity -- realized only
and through the regress itself.
II.
Solution of the Cosmologieal Idea of the Totality the Division of Whole given in Intuition.
ceed from conditioned to its conditions. The division of the parts of the whole (subdivisio or decompositio) regress
the series of these conditions. The absolute totality of this series would be actually attained and given to the mind, the regress could arrive at simple parts. But all the parts iu continuous decomposition are themselves divisible, the division, that to say, the regress, proceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum because the conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the conditioned, and, as the latter
given in limited intuition, the former are all given along with it. This regress cannot, therefore, be called regretsus indrftnitum, as happened the case of the preceding cos- Bjologicf! Mii, the regress which proceeded from the con-
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ditioned to the conditions not given contemporaneously and along with but discoverable only through the empirical repress. We are net, however, entitled to affirm of whole of this kind, which divisible in infinitum, that consists
an infinite number ofparts. For, although all the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division not contained therein. The division contained only in the progressing decomposition --in the regress itself, which the condition of the possibility and actuality of the series. Now, ns this regress infinite, all the members (parts) to which attains must be contained in the given whole as an aggregate. but the complete series of division not contained therein. For this series, being infinite in succession and always incom plete, cannot represent an infinite number of members, and still less composition of these members into whole.
To apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space presented to intuition whole, the parts of which are always spaces --to whatever extent subdivided. Every limited space
hence divisible to infinity.
Let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenou enclosed in limits, that body. The divisibility of body rests upon the divisibility of space, which the condition of the possibility of the body as an extended whole. body
? divisible to infinity, though does not, for that reason, consist of an infinite number of parts.
It certainly seems that, as body must be cogitated as substance in space, the law of divisibility would not be appli cable to as substance. For we may and ought to grant, in the case of space, that division or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate composition (that to say, the smallest part of space must still consist of spaces) otherwise space would entirely cease to exist -- which im
tiia pure category. Phenomenal substance not an absolute
consequently
But, the assertion on the other hand, that when all
possible.
composition in matter annihilated in thought, nothing re mains, does not seem to harmonise with the conception of substance, which must be properly the subject of all compo sition and must remain, even after the conjunction of its attri butes in space--which constituted body -- annihilated in thought. But this not the case with substance in the p'uenomenal world, which not thing in itself cogitated by
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327
lubject ; it is merely a permanent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in which the unconditioned is not to be found.
But, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation or filling of space, it is not applicable to a whole con sisting of a number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum --that is to say, an organised body. It cannot be admitted that every part in an organised whole is itself organ ised, and that, in analysing it to infinity, we must always meet with organised parts ; although we may allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum, may be organised. For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon in space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phse nomenon is given only in and through this infinity, that is an undetermined number of parts is given, while the parts them selves are given and determined only in and through the sub division ; in a word, the infinity of the division necessarily pre supposes that the whole is not already divided in te. Hence our division determines a number of parts in the whole --a number which extends just as far as the actual regress in the division; while, on the other hand, the very notion of a body orgauised to infinity represents the whole as already and in itself divided. We expect, therefore, to find in it a determinate, but, at the same time, infinite, number of parts -- which is self-contradic tory. For we should thus have a whole containing a series of members which could not be completed in any regress --which is infinite, and at the same time complete in an organised composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable only to a quantum continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite divisibility of space. But in a quantum discretum the multi tude of parts or units is always determined, and hence always equal to some number. To what extent a body may be or ganized, experience alone can inform us ; and although, so far as onr experience of this or that body has extended, we may not have discovered any inorganic part, such parts must exist in possible experience. But how far the transcendental division of a phenomenon must extend, we cannot know from experience --it is a question which experience cannot answer; it is answered only by the principle of reason which forbid*
? ? ? ? 328 iBivscnrsxKTAL biauoro.
us to consider the empirical regress, in the analysis of extended oody, as ever absolutely complete.
Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental Mathematical Idea*--and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas.
We presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, and we endeavoured to show the ground of this self-contra diction on the part of reason, and the only means of bringing it to a conclusion -- namely, by declaring both contradictory statements to be false. We represented in these antinomies the conditions of phenomena as belonging to the conditioned according to relations of space and time--which is the usual supposition of the common understanding. In this respect, all dialectical representations of totality, in the series of con ditions to a given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous. The condition was always a member of the series along with the conditioned, and thus the homogeneity of the whole series was assured. In this case the regress could never be cogitated as complete ; or, if this was the case, a member really con ditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member, conse quently as unconditioned. In such an antinomy, therefore, we did not consider the object, that the conditioned, but the series of conditions belonging to the object, and the magni tude of thafcseries. And thus arose the difficulty -- difficulty not to be settled by any decision regarding the claims of the two parties, but simply cutting the knot-- declaring the series proposed reason to be either too long or too short for the understanding, which could in neither case make its con ceptions adequate with the ideas.
But we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential dif ference existing between the conceptions of the understanding which reason endeavours to raise to the rank of ideas -- two of these indicating mathematical, and two dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto, was not necessary to signalize this distinction for, just as in our general representation of all transcendental ideas, we considered them under phenomenal conditions, so, the two mathematical ideas, our discussion
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it concerned solely with an object ia the world of phenomena.
But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration of
the dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their adequateness with ideas, we must not lose sight of this dis tinction. We shall find that it opens up to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which reason is involved. For, while in the first two antinomies, both parties were dismissed, on the ground of having advanced statements based upon false hypotheses ; in the present case the hope appears of discover ing a hypothesis which may be consistent with the demands of reason, and, the judge completing the statement of the grounds of claim, which both parties had left in an unsatis factory state, the question may be settled on its own merits, not by dismissing the claimants, but by a comparison of the arguments on both sides. --If we consider merely their exten sion, and whether they are adequate with ideas, the series of conditions may be regarded as all homogeneous. But the conception of the understanding which lies at the basis of these ideas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous, (presup posed in every quantity -- in its composition as well as in its division) or of the heterogeneous, which is the case in the dynamical synthesis of cause and effect, as well as of the necessary and the contingent.
Thus it happens, that in the mathematical series of pheno mena no other than a sensuous condition is admissible --a condition which is itself a member of the series ; while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series, but, as purely intelligible, lies out of and beyond it. And thus reason is satisfied, and an unconditioned placed at the head of the series of phenomena, without introducing confusion into or discon tinuing contrary to the principles of the understanding.
Now, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit con dition of phenomena which does not form part of the series of phenomena, arises result which we should not have ex pected from an antinomy. In former cases, the result was that both contradictory dialectical statements were declared to be false. In the present case, we find the conditioned the dynamical series connected with an empirically unconditioned, but non-sensuous condition and thus satisfaction done to the understanding on the one hand and tc th^ reason on the
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other. * While, moreover, the dialectical arguments for ut> conditioned totality in mere phenomeni fall to the ground, both propositions of reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification. This could not happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which demanded a mathematically un conditioned unity ; for no condition could be placed at the head of the series of phenomena, except one which was itself a phsenomenon, and consequently a member of the series.
III.
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the De duction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.
There are only two modes of causality cogitable --the caus ality of nature, or of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular state with another preceding it in the world of sense, the former following the latter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of pheuomena is subject to conditions of time, and the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which would make its first appearance at a particular time, the causality of a cause must itself be an effect -- must itself have begun to be, and therefore, according to the principle of the understanding, itself requires a cause.
We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom,
in the cosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origin ation of a state ; the causality of which, therefore, is not sub ordinated to another cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains no empirical element ; the object of which, in the second place, cannot be given or determined in any expe rience, because it is a universal law of the very possibility of experience, that everything which happens' must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself some thing that has happened, must also have a cause. In this view
* For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition which is itself empirically unconditioned. Bui if it is possible to cogitate an intelligible condition --one which is not a member of the series of phe nomena--for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be admissible as empirically mcondiltoned, and the empirical regress continue regular, unceasing, anal inlact.
? ? ? ? IDEA OF TOTALITY OF DEDUCTION.
331
of the case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it may extend, contains nothing that is not subject to the laws cf nature. But, as we cannot by this means attain to an ab solute totality of conditions in reference to the series of causes and effects, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which can begin to act of itself, and without any external cause determining it to action, according to the natural law of causality.
It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom is based upon the transcendental idea, and that the question of the possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the consideration of the truth of the latter. Free- dom,jn^he_graslical tense, is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous impulses. A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically affected (by sensuous impulses) ; it is termed animal (arbitrium brutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is certainly an arbitrium sensi- twum, not brutum, but liberum ; because sensuousness does not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in man of self- determination, independently of all sensuous coercion.
? ' It is plain, that, if all causality in the world of sense were
natural --and natural only, every event would be determined
by another according to necessary laws, and that consequently, phenomena, in so far as they determine the will, must neces sitate every action as a natural effect from themselves ; and thus all practical freedom would fall to the ground with the transcendental idea. For the latter presupposes that, although a certain thing has not happened, it ought to have happened, and that, consequently, its phenomenaPcause was not so powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our will -- a causality capable of producing effects independently of and even in opposition to the power of natural causes, and capable, consequently, of spontaneously originating a series of events.
Here, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass the bounds of possible experience, that the pro blem ! b properly not physiological,* but transcendental. The question of the possibility of freedom does indeed concern psychology; but, as it rests upon dialectical arguments of
* Probably so error of the press, and that we >>ho"ld read ptytk*
? ? ? S32 TBAFSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
pure reason, its solution must engage the attention of trans cendental philosophy. Before attempting this solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it will be ad visable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the settlement of the question.
If phsenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms of the existence of things, condition and con ditioned would always be members of the same series ; and
I thus would arise in the present case the antinomy common to I all transcendental ideas -- that their series is either too great or too small for the understanding. The dynamical ideas,
wbicli we are about to discuss in this and the following sec tion, possess the peculiarity of relating to an object, not con sidered as a quantity, but as an existence ; and thus, in the discussion of the present question, we may make abstraction of the quantity of the series of conditions, and consider merely the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. The question, then, suggests itself, whether freedom is pos sible ; and, if it whether can consist with the universality of the natural law of causality and, consequently, whether we enounce proper disjunctive proposition when we say-- every effect must have its origin either nature or in free dom, or whether both cannot exist together in the same event in different relations. The principle of an unbrok-eti conuec- tion between all events in the phenomenal world, in accord- ance with the unchangeable laws of nature, well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits of no e. icep- tion. The question, therefore, Whether an effect, deter mined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time
be produced free agent, or whether freedom and nature mutually exclude each other And here, the common, but fallacious hypothesis of the absolute reality of phsenomena manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the procedure of reason. For phsenomena are things in themselves, free dom impossible. In this case, nature the complete and all-sufficient cause of every event and condition and con ditioned, cause and effect, are contained in the same series, and necessitated the same law. If, on the contrary, phe- nomena are held to bo, as they are in fact, nothing more than mere representations, connected with each other accordance
with empirical laws, they must have ground which
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But the causality of such an intelligible causa
phaenomenal.
is not determined or determinable
by phenomena ; although its effects, as phenomena, must be determined by other phe-
nomenal existences. This cause and its causality exist there fore out of and apart from the series of phenomena ; while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of em pirical conditions. Such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary con sequence --a distinction which, stated in this perfectly general and abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure. The sequel will explain. It is sufficient, at present, to remark that, as the complete and unbroken con nection of phenomena is an unalterable law of nature, freedom is impossible --on the supposition that phenomena are abso lutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere to the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in recon ciling the ideas of nature and freedom.
Possibility of Freedom in harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.
That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sen suous, I may be allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object which must be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it is capable of being the cause of phenomena, the causality of an object or existence of this kind may be regarded from two different points of view. It may be considered to be intelligible, as regards its action --the action of a thing which is a thing in itself, and sensuous, as regards its effects--the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world. We should, accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of such a faculty or power --both, however, having reference to the same effect. This two-fold manner of cogitating a power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to any of the conceptions, which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of a possible experience. Phenomena --not
being things in themselves --must have a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as mere represent*
? ? ? ? 334 nUNBCENBENTAL DIALECTIC.
nut ? scribe to this transcendental object, "in addition to the pro* pertyof self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects arc to be met with in the world of phsenomena, although"~it"is not itself a phenomenon. But every effective cause must possess o character, that is to say, a law of its causality, without which it would cease to be a cause. In the above case, then, every sensuous object would possess an empirical character, which
guaranteed that its actions, as phsenomena, stand in com plete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from these, as conditions, and that they do thus, in connection with these, constitute a series in the order of nature. This sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an intelli
gible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those actions, as phsenomena, although it is not itself aphenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may be termed the character of the thing as a phe
nomenon, the latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself.
Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition of phsenomena, and not of things in them selves. No action, would begin or cease to be in this subject ; it would consequently be free from the law of all determination of time --the law of change, namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the phsenomena of a preceding state. In one word, the causality of the subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an event in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a thing cannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive nothing but phsenomena, but it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony with the empirical character ; for we always find ourselves compelled to place, in thought, a trans cendental object at the basis of phsenomena, although we can never know what this object is in itself.
In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same time Sz subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, it*
effects would have to be accounted for by a reference to pr*
? ? ? ? '
FREKDOM ANB NECESSITY/. 335
ceding phenomena. External phenomena must be capable y of jnfiuencinj* and its actions, in accordance 'with natural laws, musTexplain *o us how its empirical character, that is,
the law of its causality, to be cognized in and by means of experience. In a word, all requisites for complete and ne cessary determination of these actions must be presented to
us by experience.
In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand,
- ter), the subject must be regarded as free from all sensuous
(although we possess only general conception of this charac-
influences, and from all phenomenal determination. More over, as nothing happens in this subject --for noumenon, and there does not consequently exist in any change, de manding the dynamical determination of time, and for the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes -- this active existence must in its actions be free from and indepen dent of natural necessity, for this necessity exists only in the world of phenomena. would be quite correct to say, that
originates or begins its effects in the world of sense from itself, although the action productive of these effects does not begin in itself. We should not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves, because they are always determined by prior empirical conditions--
virtue of the empirical character, which the pheno menon' of the intelligible character --and are possible only as constituting continuation of the series of natural causes. And thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and ab solute signification of these terms, can exist, without contra diction or disagreement, in the same action.
Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in harmony with the Universal Law Natural Necessity.
have thought advisable to lay before the reader at first merely sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to enable him to form with greater ease clear con ception of the course which reason must adopt in the solution,
shall now proceed to exhibit the several momenta of this so lution, and to consider them in their order.
The natural law, that everything which happens must have cause, that the causality of this cause, that the action of
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the cause, (which cannot always have existed, hut must hit itself an event, for it precedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have itself a phenomenal cause, hy which it is determined, and, consequently, that all events are empiri cally determined in an order of nature -- this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience, and of a connected system of phenomena or nature, is a law of the understanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single phe nomenon from its operation, is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience, and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain.
Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes, in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we need not detain ourselves with this question, for it has already been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion^of^tranBcen- " dental idealism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom exists. Now the question is : Whether, admitting the exist ence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is possible to consider an effect as jit the same time an effect of nature and an effect of freedom --or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and incompatible ?
No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every action, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself an event or occurrence, and presupposes another pre ceding state, in which its cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a series, and an absolute be ginning is impossible in the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and pre* suppose causes preceding them in time. A primal action-- an action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the causal power of phenomena.
Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a phenomenon, and belong to the empirical world 1 Is it not rather possible that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected with an empirical cause, according to the uurfersal law of nature, this empirical
? ? ? ? Or THE CO8MOLOBI0AL IDEA OF FRKKDOM.
587
causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and intel ligible causality --its connection with natural causes remaining nevertheless intact ? Such a causality would be considered, in reference to phsenomena, as the primal action of a cause, which is in so far, therefore, not phcenomenal, but, by reason of this faculty or power, intelligible ; although it must, at the same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as belonging to the seusuous world.
A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is neces sary, if we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which recognises nothing but nature in the region of phenomeua, are satisfied, and our physical ex planations of physical phenomena may proceed in their regular
course, without hindrance and without opposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the idea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes in
the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but intelli
gible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical
? conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought for
ward by the understanding -- this action being still, when
the cause is phsenomenizcd, in perfect accordance with the
laws of empirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a
causal phenomenon, would continue to preserve a complete con nection with nature and natural conditions ; and the phe
nomenon only of the subject (with all its phenomenal causality) would contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the
empirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily be re garded as intelligible. For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world of phsenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need not trouble ourselves about the rela tion in which the transcendental subject, which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phenomena and their connec tion in nature. The intelligible ground of phsenomena in this subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only with pure thought; and, although the effect*- of this thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomeua, these phsenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete explanation, upon purely physical grounds, and in accordance with natural laws. AndIin this
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case we attend solely to their empirical, and omit all consider ation of their intelligible character, (which is the transcendental cause of the former,) as completely unknown, except in so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now let us apply this to experience. Man isapheromenon of the eensuous world, and at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an empirical character, like all other natural phsenomena. We remark this empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate, or merely animal nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous man ner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure apperception ; and this in actions and internal determi nations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions.
He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phsenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely in- ? telligible object --intelligible, because its action cannot be as cribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are under standing and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for
it employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by mean8 of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own conceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and non-empirical.
TbRt reason possesses the faculty of causality, iir that at leastwe are compelled so to represent it^is evident from the
? imperatives, which in the sphere of the practi/cal we impose
on many of our executive powers. The words
ought
a species of necessity, and imply a Connection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man.
Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which
or has been, or will be. would be absurd to say that any
nature might to be other than the relations ol time in which stands indeed, the ought, when we consult merely the course of nature, has neither application nor meali ng The question, what ought to happen in the sphere of nature, just as absurd as the question, what ought to be the properties of circle All that we are entitled to ask is, whaf
thing
express
? ? is a
in
it ?
;
It
!
is,
it is in
? Or THE C08MOLOGICAI. IDEA OF FREEDOM. 339
iBKes place in nature, or, in the latter case, what an lie pro perties of a circle ?
But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the ground of winch is ajgure ^conceptipn , "while tin ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or natural conditions do not con cern the determination of the will itself, they relate to its effect alone, and the consequences of the effect in the world of phse nomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses--the moral ought it is beyondjtheir_p. o. 5tex- to. produce. . . They may produce a volition, which, so far from being necessary, is always conditioned -- a volition to which the ought enunciated by reason, sets an aim and a standard, gives permission or prohibition. Be the ob ject what it may, purely sensuous --as pleasure, or presented by pure reason -- as good, reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin. Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience, but, with perfect
? them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place, and which perhaps never will take place ; and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For, in the
absence of thioupposition, it could not expect its ideas to produce certain effects in the world of experience.
Now, let us stop here, and admit it to be at least possible, that reason does stand in a really causal relation to phse- nomena. In this case it must -- pure reason as it is -- exhibit an empirical character. For every cause supposes a rule, ac cording to which certain phenomena follow as effects from th<< cause, and every rule requires uniformity in these effects ; and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause -- as a faculty or power. Now this conception (of a cause) may be termed the empirical character of reason ; and this charac ter is a permanent one, while the effects produced appear, iu conformity with the various conditions which accompany and partly limit them, in various forms.
Thus the volition of every man has an empiricalIcharacter, 2
spontaneity, rearranges
? ? ? 840 TBAWflCENDKNTAI DIAlECTIC.
which is nothing more than the causality of his reason, in M far as its effects in the phenomenal world manifest the pre sence of a rule, according to which we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds and degrees, the actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these actions, and in this way to decide upou the subjective principles of the volition. Now we learn what this empirical character is only from phe nomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is presented by experience ; and for this reason all the actions of man in the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical cha racter, and the co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we
; could investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind, there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognise to
be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions. So far as relates to this empirical character, therefore, there can be no freedom ; and it is only in the light of this character that we can consider the human will, when we confine ourselves to simple observation, and, as is the case in anthropology, insti tute a physiological investigation of the motive causes of human actions.
lation to speculative reason --but to practical reason, as the producing cause of these actions, we shall discover rule and an order very different from those of nature and experience. For the declaration of this mental faculty may be, that what has and could not but take place in the course of nature, ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too, we discover, or be lieve that we discover, that the ideas of reason did actually stand in causal relation to certain actions 01 roan and that these actions have taken place because they were determined, not empirical causes, but the act of the will upon grounds of reason.
Now, granting that reason stands in causal relation to phenomena can an action of reason he called free, when we know that, sensuously --in its empirical character, completely determined and absolutely necessary But this empirical character itself determined the intelligible cha racter. The latter we cannot cognize we can only indicat'
by means of phenomena, which enable us to have an imme
? --But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason not for the purpose of ezplaininpAheW origin, that in re
? ? it
;
by
a
is
?
it is
;
by
a
by
;
a
is,
? 07 THB COSMOLOOICAX IDEA Of FBKEDOM. 841
diate cognition only of the empirical character. * An action, then, in so far as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause, does not result from it in accordance with empirical laws. That is to say, not the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the internal sense, precede the act. Pure reason, as n purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character Joes not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at a certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect. If this were not the case, the causality of reason would be subservient to the natural law of phenomena, which determines them ac cording to time, and as a series of causes and effects in time ; it would consequently cease to be freedom, and become a part of nature. We are therefore justified in saying --If reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects. For the condition, which resides in the reason, is non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or begin to be. And thus we find--what we could not discover in any empirical series -- a condition of a successive series of events itself empirically unconditioned. For, in the present case, the condition stands out of and beyond the series of pheno- mena -- it intelligible, and consequently cannot be subject to any sensuous condition, or to any time-determination by preceding cause.
But, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series of phenomena. Man himself phenomenon. Hia will has an empirical character, which the empirical cause of all his actions. There no condition --determining man and his volition in conformity with this character --which does not itself form part of the series of effects in nature, and subject to their law -- the law according to which an empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist. For this reason no given actio* can have an absolute and spon taneous origination, all actions being phenomena, and belong-
The real morality of action! -- their merit or demerit, and even that of our own conduct, completely unknown to ua. Our estimates can relate only to their empirical character. How much the result of the net ion of free-will, how much to V ascribed to nature and to blameless CTror. or to happy constitution of temperament (merito fortune), no oca ntn dueuTcr, nor, for this reason, determine with perfect justice.
? ? ? * a
is^
is
is
is
is
is
it
is a
is a
? TBAN9CENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ing to the world of experience. But it cannot be said of rea>> >on, that the state in which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state determining it. For reason it not a phenomenon, and therefore uot subject to sensuous conditions ; and, consequently, even in relation to its causality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason, nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the sequence of time according to certain rules, be applied to it.
Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all ac tions of the human will. Each of these is determined in the empirical character of the man, even before it has taken place. The intelligible character, of which the former is but the sen suous schema, knows no before or after ; and every action, irrespective of the time-relation in which it stands with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible charac ter of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys freedom of action, and is not dynamically determined either by internal or external preceding conditions. This freedom must not be described, in a merely negative manner, as independence of empirical conditions, for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena ; but it must be re garded, positively, as a faculty which can spontaneously ori ginate a series of events. At the same time, it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place in reason ; on the contrary, reason, as the unconditioned condition of all action of the will, admits of no time-conditions, although its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena -- a beginning which is not, however, absolutely primal.
I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example, from its employment in the world of experience ; proved it cannot be by any amount of experience, or by any number of facts, for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental propositions. Let us take a voluntary action --for example, a falsehood --by means of which a man has in troduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life of hu manity, which is judged according to the motives from which it originated, and the blame of which and of the evil conse quences arising from imputed to the offender. We at hr>>t proceed to examine the empirical character of the ofTence,
mi. lor this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to the loured of that character, Mich as defective education, bad company
? ? ? I
it, a is
? OF THE COSMOLOGIOAX IDEA OF FKKEUOM.
343'
a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want of reflection --not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed at the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of causes which determine a given physical effect. Now, although we believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances, we do not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for Ilia unhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances which in fluenced him, nay, not even for his former course of life ; for we presuppose that all these considerations may be set aside,
conditions may be regarded at having never existed, and that the action may he considered
as completely unconditioned in relation to any state preced ing, just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely nev series of effects. Our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of reason, whichjeq<<iresjia to regard this faculty as a cause, which could have and ought to have otherwise deter mined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all em pirical conditions. This causality of reason we do not regard as a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It mat ters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this causality, the offence is estimated according to its intelligible character --the offender is decidedly worthy of blame, the moment he utters a falsehood. It follows that we regard reason, in spite of the empirical conditions of the act, as completely free, and therefore, as in the present case, culpable.
The above judgment is complete evidence that we are ac customed to think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it no change takes place -- although ita pluenomena, in other words, the mode in which it appears in its effects, are subject to change -- that in it no preceding state determines the following, and, consequently, that it does not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which necessitate phenomena according to natural laws. Reason is present and the same in all human actions, and at all times ; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It relatively to new states or conditions, determining, bnt uot determinable. Hence we cannot ask Why did uol
? ? ? :
is,
? 844 THANSCEITOTnTAI, DTAUOTTC.
reason determine itself in a different manuer ? The question ought to be thus stated : Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain phenomena in a dif ferent manner? But this is a question which admits of no auswer. For a different intelligible character would have ex hibited a different empirical character ; and, when we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the offender could have refraiued from uttering the falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority -- permissive or prohibitive -- of reason. Now, reason is not subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time ; and a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of phenomena to each oilier -- for these are not things, and therefore not causes in themselves, --but it cannot produce any difference in the re lation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason.
Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which, however, we cannot go ; although we can recognize that it is free, that independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phsenomena. But for what reason the intelligible character generates such and such phseno mena, and exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain circumstances, beyoad the power of out reason to decide. The question as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the following would be Whj does the transcendental object of our external sensuous in tuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in space But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not require us to entertain any such questions. The problem was merely this--whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition in the same action. To this question we have given a sufficient answer for we hare shown that, as the former stands relation to dif ferent kind of conditions from those of the latter, the law the one does not affect the law of the other, and that, coi. se- quently, both can exist together in independence of and with out interference with each other.
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in a
; a
:
?
it
is, is is
it
? or the oomoLOOiOiX idra or defendencb 345
Tlie reader must be careful to remark that my intention iu the above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence if freedom, as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain ? i-nsuous phsenomena. For, Dot to mention that such an argument would not have a transcendental character, nor have been limited to the discussion of pure conceptions, --all at tempts at inferring from experience what cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be unsuccessful.
more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of freedom ; for this too would have been a vain endeavour, inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality or of a causal power, by the aid of mere a priori conceptions. Freedom has been considered in the foregoing remarks only ns a transcendental idea, by means of which reason aims at originating a series of conditions in the world of phsenomena with the help of that which is sen suously unconditioned, involving itself, however, in an anti nomy with the laws which itself prescribes for the conduct of the understanding. That this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion, and that nature and freedom are at least not opposed --this was the only tiling in our power to prove, and the question which it was our task to solve.
IV.
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.
In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world of sense as constituting a dynamical scries, in which each member is subordinated to another --as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an existence which may be the high est condition of all changeable phsenomena, that to ne- oessary being. Our endeavour to reach, not the uncondi tioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of substance. The series before us therefore series of conceptions, and not ot intuitions, (in which the one intuition
of the other). that, But evident
as all phsenomena
are
cb>>Hr,t, and conditioned in their existence, the series of dc
subject tc
Nay,
? the condition
? ? it is
is
is
a
is
is, a
? 346 rKAKSCENDKNTAL DIALECTIC.
pendent existences cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would be absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phsenomena were things in themselves, and-- as an immediate consequence from this supposition -- condi tion and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena, the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the existence of sensuous phsenomena, would be perfectly im possible.
An important distinction, however, exists between the dy namical and the mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely witli the combination of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole into its parts ; and therefore are the con ditions of its series parts of the series, and to be consequently
regarded as homogeneous, and for this reason, as consisting, without exception, of phsenomena. In the former regress, on the contrary, the aim of which is not to establish the pos sibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of given parts, or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to demon strate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance from that which exists necessarily, it is not requisite that the con dition should form part of an empirical series along with the conditioned.
In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present dealing, there exists a way of escape from the diffi culty ; for it is not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true in different relations. All sensuous
phsenomena may be contingent, and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence, and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series, or, in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary being, as an intelligible condition, would not form a member -- not even the highest member --of the series ; the whole world of sense
would be left in its empirically determined existence uninter- fered with and uninfluenced. This would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in the consider
ation of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing itself--
? the cause (substantia phitnomenon) was regarded as belonging to the scries of conditions, and only its causality to the in
telligible world, -- we are obliged in the present case to cogi
? ? ? 01 THE COSMOLO01CAL IDEA Or DEVENDENOB 347
tate this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramun- danum) ; for otherwise it would be subject to the phenomena! law of contingency and dependence.
In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an empirically conditioned existence, --that no pro- perty of the sensuous world possesses unconditioned necessity, --that we are bound to expect, and, so far as is possible, to
seek for the empirical condition of every member in the series of conditions, --and that there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the empirical series, or in regarding any ex istence as independent and self-subsistent ; although this Bhould not prevent us from recognising the possibility of the whole series being based upon a being which is intelligible,
and for this reason free from all empirical conditions.