inges to comen 4496
ben yp{ur}ueied of god.
ben yp{ur}ueied of god.
Chaucer - Boethius
er an vncerteyn
oppiniou{n}. ? e whiche ? inge to trowen on god I deme it
felonie {and} vnleueful.
[Sidenote: Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some.
For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God
hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be
hid from the divine Providence. ]
? Ne I ne proeue nat ? ilk 4456
same resou{n}. as who sei? I ne allowe nat. or I ne p{re}ise
nat ? ilke same resou{n} by whiche ? at som men wenen
? at ? ei mowen assoilen {and} vnknytten ? e knot of ? is
questiou{n}. ? For certys ? ei seyn ? {a}t ? ing nis nat to 4460
come for ? at ? e purueaunce of god ha? seyn it byforn{e}.
? at is to comen but ra? er ? e cont{ra}rie. ? And ? at
is ? is ? at for ? at ? e ? ing is to comen ? at ? erfore
ne may it nat ben hyd fro ? e purueaunce of god. 4464
[Sidenote: [* fol. 35. ]]
[Sidenote: Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides.
For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should
happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall
should be foreseen. ]
*{and} in ? is manere ? is necessite slydi? a? ein in to ? e [[pg 155]]
contrarie p{ar}tie. ne it ne byhoue? [nat] nedes ? at ? inges
bytiden ? at ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes /
? {a}t thinges ? {a}t ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it 4468
were yt{ra}uailed.
[Sidenote: As if the question was, which was the cause of the
other--_prescience_ the cause of the necessity of future events,
or the _necessity_ the cause of the prescience of future events? ]
as who sei? . ? at ? ilke answere p{ro}cedi?
ry? t as ? ou? men trauailden or weren bysy to
enqueren ? e whiche ? ing is cause of whiche ? inges. as
whe? er ? e p{re}science is cause of ? e necessite of ? inges to 4472
comen. or ellys ? at ? e necessite of ? i{n}ges to comen is
cause of ? e purueau{n}ce.
[Sidenote: But I will prove that, however the order of causes may
stand, the event of things foreseen is necessary, although
prescience doth not seem to impose a necessity upon future things
to fall out. ]
? But I ne enforce me nat now
to shewe{n} it ? at ? e bytidyng of ? inges y-wist byforn is
necessarie. how so or in what manere ? at ? e ordre of 4476
causes ha? it self. al ? ou? ? at it ne seme nat ? at ? e
p{re}science brynge in necessite of bytydynge of ? inges
to comen.
[Sidenote: For if a man sit--the belief in the sitting is true;
and, on the other hand, if the opinion is true of his sitting, he
must needs sit. ]
? For certys yif ? at any wy? t sitte? it byhoue?
by necessite ? at ? e oppiniou{n} be so? e of hym 4480
? {a}t coniecti? ? at he sitte? . and a? einward. al so is it of
? e contrarie. yif ? e oppiniou{n} be so? e of any wy? t for
? at he sitte? it byhoue? by necessite ? at he sitte
[Sidenote: In both cases there is a necessity--in the latter that
the person sits--in the former, that the opinion concerning the
other is true. ]
? ? an
is here necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? {a}t o? er. for in ? at 4484
oon is necessite of sittynge.
[Sidenote: But the man does not sit because the opinion of his
sitting is true, but the opinion is true because the action of his
being seated was antecedent in time. ]
{and} certys in ? at o? er is
necessite of so? e but ? erfore ne sitte? nat a wy? t for ? at
? e oppiniou{n} of sittyng is so? e. but ? e oppiniou{n} is
ra? er so? e for ? at a wy? t sitte? by-forn.
[Sidenote: So that although the cause of truth arises from the
sitting, there is a common necessity in both. ]
and ? us al 4488
? ou? ? {a}t ? e cause of so? e come? of [? e] syttyng. and
nat of ? e trewe oppiniou{n}. Algates ? itte is ? er comune
necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? at o? er.
[Sidenote: Thus may we reason concerning Providence and future
events. ]
? ? us shewe? it
? {a}t I may make semblable skils of ? e p{ur}ueau{n}ce of god 4492
{and} of ? inges to come.
[Sidenote: For allowing things are foreseen because they are to
happen, and that they do not befall because they are foreseen, it
is necessary that future events should be foreseen of God, or if
foreseen that they should happen; and this alone is sufficient to
destroy all idea of _free-will_. ]
? For al ? ou? for ? at ? at ? inges
ben to comen. ? er-fore ben ? ei p{ur}ueid. nat certys for
? ei ben p{ur}ueid. ? er-fore ne bytide ? ei nat. ? it na? eles
byhoue? it by necessite ? at ei? er ? e ?
inges to comen 4496
ben yp{ur}ueied of god. or ellys ? at ? e ? inges ? at ben
p{ur}ueied of god bitiden [. s. ] by necessite. ? And ? is [[pg 156]]
? ing oonly suffise? I-nou? to distroien ? e fredome of
oure arbitre. ? at is to seyn of oure fre wille
[Sidenote: But it is preposterous to make the happening of
temporal things the cause of eternal prescience, which we do in
imagining that God foresees future events because they are to
happen. ]
? But now 4500
[certes] shewe? it wel how fer fro ? e so? e {and} how vp
so dou{n} is ? is ? ing ? at we seyn ? at ? e bytidinge of
temp{or}el ? inges is ? e cause of ? e eterne p{re}science.
? But forto wenen ? at god p{ur}uei? [the] ? inges to comen. 4504
for ? ei ben to comen. what o? er ? ing is it but forto
wene ? at ? ilke ? inges ? at bitiden som tyme ben causes
of ? ilke souereyne p{ur}ueaunce ? at is i{n} god.
[Sidenote: And, moreover, when I know that anything exists, it is
necessary for my belief that it should be. ]
? And
her-to I adde ? itte ? is ? ing ? at ry? t as whan ? at I woot 4508
? at o ? ing is it byhoue? by necessite ? at ? ilke self ? ing be.
[Sidenote: So also when I know that an event shall come to pass,
it must needs happen. ]
{and} eke ? at whan I haue knowe ? at any ? i{n}ge shal
bitiden so byhoue? it by necessite ? {a}t ? ilk[e] same
? ing bytide.
[Sidenote: The event, therefore, of a thing foreseen must befall. ]
so folwe? it ? an ? at ? e bytydynge of ? e 4512
? inge Iwist by-forn ne may nat ben eschewed.
[Sidenote: Lastly, if a person judge a thing to be different to
what it is--this is not knowledge, but a false opinion of it, and
far from the true knowledge. ]
? And
at ? e last[e] yif ? at any wy? t wene a ? ing to ben o? er
weyes ? an it is. it nys nat oonly vnscience. but it is deceiuable
oppiniou{n} ful diuerse {and} fer fro ? e so? e of 4516
science.
[Linenotes:
4437 _harde_--hard
4445 _ha? _--MS. ha? {e}
4446 _whiche_--which
4450 _wille_--wil
_whiche_--which ? {a}t
4451 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4453 _stedfast_--stydefast
4454-55 _? inge_--thing
4455 _on_--of
4456 _? ilk_--thilke
4458 _whiche_--which
4459 _knot_--knotte
4461 _come_--comyn
_ha? _--MS. ha? e
4464 _hyd_--MS. hydde, C. hidde
4466 [_nat_]--from C.
4467-8 [_but----yporueyid_]--from C.
4471 _? inges_--thing
4477 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4480-82 _so? e_--soth
4486 _so? e_--sooth
4487 _so? e_--soth
4488 _so? e_--sooth
4489 _so? e come? _--sooth comth
[_? e_]--from C.
4490 _comune_--MS. comme, C. comune
4493 _come_--comyn
4494 _to_--omitted
4494-95 _purueid_--MS. p{ur}ueide, C. p{ur}ueyid
4498 [_. s. _]--from C.
4499 _fredome_--freedom
4500 _wille_--wil
4501 [_certes_]--from C.
4504 _puruei? _--MS. p{ur}uei? e
[_the_]--from C.
4506 _bitiden_--bytydden
_som tyme_--whilom
4509 _o_--a
_self_--selue
4510 _? inge_--thing
4511 _? ilk[e]_--thilke
4513 _? inge_--thing
4514 _last[e]_--laste
4515 _nys_--is]
[Headnote:
FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL. ]
[Sidenote: If, therefore, a thing be so to happen that the event
of it is neither necessary nor certain, how can any one foresee
what is to happen? ]
? wher-fore yif any ? ing be so to comen so ? at
? e bytydynge of it ne be nat certeyne ne necessarie.
? who may weten [byforn] ? {a}t ? ilke ? ing is to come.
[Sidenote: For as pure knowledge has no element in it of
falsehood, so what is comprehended by true knowledge cannot be
otherwise than as comprehended. ]
? For ry? t as science ne may nat be medelyd wi? falsnesse. 4520
as who sei? ? at yif I woot a ? ing. it ne may nat
be fals ? at I ne woot it. ? Ry? t so ? ilk ? ing ? at
is conceyued by science ne may [nat] ben noon
o? {er} weyes ? an [as] it is conceiued.
[Sidenote: Hence it is that true knowledge cannot err, because
everything must precisely be what true knowledge perceives it to
be. ]
For ? at is ? e cause 4524
whi ? at science wa{n}ti? lesynge. as who sei? . whi ? at
witynge ne receyue? nat lesynge of ? at it woot. ? For
it byhoue? by necessite ? at euery ? i{n}ge [be] ry? t as science
co{m}p{re}hendi? it to be.
[Sidenote: What follows, then? How does God foreknow these
uncertain contingencies? ]
what shal I ? an sein. ? In 4528
whiche man{er}e knowe? god byforn ? e ? inges to comen.
? yif ? ei ne be nat certeyne. [[pg 157]]
[Sidenote: For if he thinks that a thing will inevitably happen,
which possibly may not, he is deceived--but this is sheer
blasphemy. ]
? For yif ? at he deme
? at ?
oppiniou{n}. ? e whiche ? inge to trowen on god I deme it
felonie {and} vnleueful.
[Sidenote: Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some.
For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God
hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be
hid from the divine Providence. ]
? Ne I ne proeue nat ? ilk 4456
same resou{n}. as who sei? I ne allowe nat. or I ne p{re}ise
nat ? ilke same resou{n} by whiche ? at som men wenen
? at ? ei mowen assoilen {and} vnknytten ? e knot of ? is
questiou{n}. ? For certys ? ei seyn ? {a}t ? ing nis nat to 4460
come for ? at ? e purueaunce of god ha? seyn it byforn{e}.
? at is to comen but ra? er ? e cont{ra}rie. ? And ? at
is ? is ? at for ? at ? e ? ing is to comen ? at ? erfore
ne may it nat ben hyd fro ? e purueaunce of god. 4464
[Sidenote: [* fol. 35. ]]
[Sidenote: Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides.
For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should
happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall
should be foreseen. ]
*{and} in ? is manere ? is necessite slydi? a? ein in to ? e [[pg 155]]
contrarie p{ar}tie. ne it ne byhoue? [nat] nedes ? at ? inges
bytiden ? at ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes /
? {a}t thinges ? {a}t ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it 4468
were yt{ra}uailed.
[Sidenote: As if the question was, which was the cause of the
other--_prescience_ the cause of the necessity of future events,
or the _necessity_ the cause of the prescience of future events? ]
as who sei? . ? at ? ilke answere p{ro}cedi?
ry? t as ? ou? men trauailden or weren bysy to
enqueren ? e whiche ? ing is cause of whiche ? inges. as
whe? er ? e p{re}science is cause of ? e necessite of ? inges to 4472
comen. or ellys ? at ? e necessite of ? i{n}ges to comen is
cause of ? e purueau{n}ce.
[Sidenote: But I will prove that, however the order of causes may
stand, the event of things foreseen is necessary, although
prescience doth not seem to impose a necessity upon future things
to fall out. ]
? But I ne enforce me nat now
to shewe{n} it ? at ? e bytidyng of ? inges y-wist byforn is
necessarie. how so or in what manere ? at ? e ordre of 4476
causes ha? it self. al ? ou? ? at it ne seme nat ? at ? e
p{re}science brynge in necessite of bytydynge of ? inges
to comen.
[Sidenote: For if a man sit--the belief in the sitting is true;
and, on the other hand, if the opinion is true of his sitting, he
must needs sit. ]
? For certys yif ? at any wy? t sitte? it byhoue?
by necessite ? at ? e oppiniou{n} be so? e of hym 4480
? {a}t coniecti? ? at he sitte? . and a? einward. al so is it of
? e contrarie. yif ? e oppiniou{n} be so? e of any wy? t for
? at he sitte? it byhoue? by necessite ? at he sitte
[Sidenote: In both cases there is a necessity--in the latter that
the person sits--in the former, that the opinion concerning the
other is true. ]
? ? an
is here necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? {a}t o? er. for in ? at 4484
oon is necessite of sittynge.
[Sidenote: But the man does not sit because the opinion of his
sitting is true, but the opinion is true because the action of his
being seated was antecedent in time. ]
{and} certys in ? at o? er is
necessite of so? e but ? erfore ne sitte? nat a wy? t for ? at
? e oppiniou{n} of sittyng is so? e. but ? e oppiniou{n} is
ra? er so? e for ? at a wy? t sitte? by-forn.
[Sidenote: So that although the cause of truth arises from the
sitting, there is a common necessity in both. ]
and ? us al 4488
? ou? ? {a}t ? e cause of so? e come? of [? e] syttyng. and
nat of ? e trewe oppiniou{n}. Algates ? itte is ? er comune
necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? at o? er.
[Sidenote: Thus may we reason concerning Providence and future
events. ]
? ? us shewe? it
? {a}t I may make semblable skils of ? e p{ur}ueau{n}ce of god 4492
{and} of ? inges to come.
[Sidenote: For allowing things are foreseen because they are to
happen, and that they do not befall because they are foreseen, it
is necessary that future events should be foreseen of God, or if
foreseen that they should happen; and this alone is sufficient to
destroy all idea of _free-will_. ]
? For al ? ou? for ? at ? at ? inges
ben to comen. ? er-fore ben ? ei p{ur}ueid. nat certys for
? ei ben p{ur}ueid. ? er-fore ne bytide ? ei nat. ? it na? eles
byhoue? it by necessite ? at ei? er ? e ?
inges to comen 4496
ben yp{ur}ueied of god. or ellys ? at ? e ? inges ? at ben
p{ur}ueied of god bitiden [. s. ] by necessite. ? And ? is [[pg 156]]
? ing oonly suffise? I-nou? to distroien ? e fredome of
oure arbitre. ? at is to seyn of oure fre wille
[Sidenote: But it is preposterous to make the happening of
temporal things the cause of eternal prescience, which we do in
imagining that God foresees future events because they are to
happen. ]
? But now 4500
[certes] shewe? it wel how fer fro ? e so? e {and} how vp
so dou{n} is ? is ? ing ? at we seyn ? at ? e bytidinge of
temp{or}el ? inges is ? e cause of ? e eterne p{re}science.
? But forto wenen ? at god p{ur}uei? [the] ? inges to comen. 4504
for ? ei ben to comen. what o? er ? ing is it but forto
wene ? at ? ilke ? inges ? at bitiden som tyme ben causes
of ? ilke souereyne p{ur}ueaunce ? at is i{n} god.
[Sidenote: And, moreover, when I know that anything exists, it is
necessary for my belief that it should be. ]
? And
her-to I adde ? itte ? is ? ing ? at ry? t as whan ? at I woot 4508
? at o ? ing is it byhoue? by necessite ? at ? ilke self ? ing be.
[Sidenote: So also when I know that an event shall come to pass,
it must needs happen. ]
{and} eke ? at whan I haue knowe ? at any ? i{n}ge shal
bitiden so byhoue? it by necessite ? {a}t ? ilk[e] same
? ing bytide.
[Sidenote: The event, therefore, of a thing foreseen must befall. ]
so folwe? it ? an ? at ? e bytydynge of ? e 4512
? inge Iwist by-forn ne may nat ben eschewed.
[Sidenote: Lastly, if a person judge a thing to be different to
what it is--this is not knowledge, but a false opinion of it, and
far from the true knowledge. ]
? And
at ? e last[e] yif ? at any wy? t wene a ? ing to ben o? er
weyes ? an it is. it nys nat oonly vnscience. but it is deceiuable
oppiniou{n} ful diuerse {and} fer fro ? e so? e of 4516
science.
[Linenotes:
4437 _harde_--hard
4445 _ha? _--MS. ha? {e}
4446 _whiche_--which
4450 _wille_--wil
_whiche_--which ? {a}t
4451 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4453 _stedfast_--stydefast
4454-55 _? inge_--thing
4455 _on_--of
4456 _? ilk_--thilke
4458 _whiche_--which
4459 _knot_--knotte
4461 _come_--comyn
_ha? _--MS. ha? e
4464 _hyd_--MS. hydde, C. hidde
4466 [_nat_]--from C.
4467-8 [_but----yporueyid_]--from C.
4471 _? inges_--thing
4477 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4480-82 _so? e_--soth
4486 _so? e_--sooth
4487 _so? e_--soth
4488 _so? e_--sooth
4489 _so? e come? _--sooth comth
[_? e_]--from C.
4490 _comune_--MS. comme, C. comune
4493 _come_--comyn
4494 _to_--omitted
4494-95 _purueid_--MS. p{ur}ueide, C. p{ur}ueyid
4498 [_. s. _]--from C.
4499 _fredome_--freedom
4500 _wille_--wil
4501 [_certes_]--from C.
4504 _puruei? _--MS. p{ur}uei? e
[_the_]--from C.
4506 _bitiden_--bytydden
_som tyme_--whilom
4509 _o_--a
_self_--selue
4510 _? inge_--thing
4511 _? ilk[e]_--thilke
4513 _? inge_--thing
4514 _last[e]_--laste
4515 _nys_--is]
[Headnote:
FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL. ]
[Sidenote: If, therefore, a thing be so to happen that the event
of it is neither necessary nor certain, how can any one foresee
what is to happen? ]
? wher-fore yif any ? ing be so to comen so ? at
? e bytydynge of it ne be nat certeyne ne necessarie.
? who may weten [byforn] ? {a}t ? ilke ? ing is to come.
[Sidenote: For as pure knowledge has no element in it of
falsehood, so what is comprehended by true knowledge cannot be
otherwise than as comprehended. ]
? For ry? t as science ne may nat be medelyd wi? falsnesse. 4520
as who sei? ? at yif I woot a ? ing. it ne may nat
be fals ? at I ne woot it. ? Ry? t so ? ilk ? ing ? at
is conceyued by science ne may [nat] ben noon
o? {er} weyes ? an [as] it is conceiued.
[Sidenote: Hence it is that true knowledge cannot err, because
everything must precisely be what true knowledge perceives it to
be. ]
For ? at is ? e cause 4524
whi ? at science wa{n}ti? lesynge. as who sei? . whi ? at
witynge ne receyue? nat lesynge of ? at it woot. ? For
it byhoue? by necessite ? at euery ? i{n}ge [be] ry? t as science
co{m}p{re}hendi? it to be.
[Sidenote: What follows, then? How does God foreknow these
uncertain contingencies? ]
what shal I ? an sein. ? In 4528
whiche man{er}e knowe? god byforn ? e ? inges to comen.
? yif ? ei ne be nat certeyne. [[pg 157]]
[Sidenote: For if he thinks that a thing will inevitably happen,
which possibly may not, he is deceived--but this is sheer
blasphemy. ]
? For yif ? at he deme
? at ?
