6:21), "where thy
treasure
is, there is
thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
acquires by observation.
thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
acquires by observation.
Summa Theologica
13:2, "If I should
have all faith, so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons
for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, "And He
wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief. " Therefore,
if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in
addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says that among other
gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing . . . to
another, the working of miracles. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3711]Q[177], A[1]), the Holy Ghost
provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto
salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now
just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought
to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of
the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that
it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles,
according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs that
followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the
intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man
led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God
through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of
supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural
effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles
belongs to a gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known
supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that
can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence
which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible
for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a
habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet's mind is
moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is
it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do
something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His
power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to
life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): sometimes without any previous
prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias
and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority,
sometimes by prayer. " In either case, however, God is the principal
worker, for He uses instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his
speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a
dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh.
10:12): "Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh.
10:14): "There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying
the voice of a man. "
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be
wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess.
2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of
Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders. " To quote the words
of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of debate whether
they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the
senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem to do what
he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce
into falsehood them that believe. " They are said to be real, because
the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made
real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles,
because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in
the [3712]FP, Q[114], A[4]; whereas the working of miracles which is
ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's
profit.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is
that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
and in this respect miracles are called "virtues. " The other thing is
the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of
something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called
"signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the name of
"wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar [procul].
Reply to Objection 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately,
because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on
man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely
the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for
two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of
faith, secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which
faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the
grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the
faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be
confirmed in their faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the wicked can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For
miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now
the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, "We know
that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that turneth away
his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination. "
Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles.
Objection 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Mat.
17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to
this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove. " Now
"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that,
seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would
seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work
miracles.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to
Heb. 2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and
divers miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear
witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot
work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the
wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do
the wicked.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have all
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am
nothing. " Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this gift
alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from
the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18).
Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because
they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others
are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle,
because they are done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these
can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God
works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the
confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's
holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the
first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true
faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In
this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on
Mat. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name? " says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the
invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom
such great miracles are wrought. "
In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since
it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their
lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read
(Acts 19:11,12) that "God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles"
and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs .
. . and the diseases departed from them. " In this way indeed there is
nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint;
but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of
whose holiness such things are done.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3713]Q[83], A[16]) when we were
treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but
on God's mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers
even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says
(Tract. xliv in Joan. ) that "the blind man spoke these words before he
was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God
does hear sinners. " When it is said that the prayer of one who hears
not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the
sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
the spiritual welfare of the one who prays---as the publican was heard
(Lk. 18:14)---or for the good of others and for God's glory.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as
regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace.
But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead
instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while
employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
Reply to Objection 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose
for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although
sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they invoke,
and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach
a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their
teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good
Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by
private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest
righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the
reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most
baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply
greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is
obtained. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration
will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and
contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life;
(4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its
essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living
things to live is to be. " Now the soul is the principle of action and
contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not
fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the
intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
repose myself with her. " Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech. ): "There is a
twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
active life and the contemplative. "
I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose
movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is
proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is
most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives
proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to
which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist
in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and
movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting
according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would
seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most
intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with his friends"
(Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external
actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active
and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually
"to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to
live" is, in living things, "to be," because living things through
having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
Reply to Objection 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having
an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and
human life.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from
external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of
the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
defined "the act of a perfect thing. " In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely,
"straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. [3714] Q[180], A[6]].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into
active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions
three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to the
contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a
third "composed of both. " Therefore it would seem that life is
inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers
actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should
be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of
Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the
two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the
active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were
more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active
and contemplative.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to
the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to
the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately
divided into active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast. "
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it
is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in
white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that
which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the
simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the
contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
Reply to Objection 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed
to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason,
belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the
present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand,
they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of
pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human
occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to
the contemplative life.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
several?
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
contemplative life?
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv);
(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and
pertains wholly to the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end
of contemplation is truth. " Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech. )
that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn};
Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr. ], signifies the contemplative life. " Now the
vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the
contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that it belongs
to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action. " Now the
affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore
it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
appetitive power.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator. " Now desire
and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above
([3715]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3716]FS, Q[26], A[2]). Therefore the
contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or
appetitive power.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the
contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now
intention is an act of the will, as stated above ([3717]FS, Q[12],
A[1]), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will.
Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the
action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of
the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the
other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above
([3718]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3719]FS, Q[9], A[1]).
Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
because, as it is written (Mat.
6:21), "where thy treasure is, there is
thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life
to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God we are
aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he
obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life
terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the
result being that love also becomes more intense.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of
contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and
delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 2: We are urged to the vision of the first
principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares
and longs to see the face of its Creator. "
Reply to Objection 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily
members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice
the act of contemplation, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with
the whole mind. " Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God
and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law"
(Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to
the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the
contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
Creator. " Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,
which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. [3720] Q[8], A[7]]. For it is
written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see
God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God. " Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified
by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was "of a beautiful
countenance. " Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues,
especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46).
Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative
life.
On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions.
Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech. ; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]])
that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external
action. " Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
contemplative life.
I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to
the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the
consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to
active but not to contemplative happiness.
On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative
life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the
passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to
sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues
curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of
outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3721](A[1]), the contemplative
life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this
respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the
contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of
a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that
the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the
virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of
the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,
according to Is. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since he
who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and
disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative
life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.
Reply to Objection 3: Beauty, as stated above ([3722]Q[145], A[2]),
consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is
found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty
seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to
reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the
reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore
it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a
lover of her beauty. "
On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in
so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it
in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially
darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity
most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures
most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says
(Soliloq. i, 10).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl.
i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and
"cogitation. " Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation.
Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . .
beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are
transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg. : 'into the same image from
glory to glory. ']. " Now this belongs to the contemplative life.
Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio]
belongs to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first
and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty. " Now according
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.
Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.
Objection 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of
St. Victor, Alleg. in N. T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the
contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life:
since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk.
10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.
On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is
chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the
contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative
lives.
I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as
applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between
man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the
truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of
a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then,
the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed,
namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its
unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some
of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds
to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from
the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the
last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation"
would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a
person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may
comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of
certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's
discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the
truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7),
cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.
"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain
principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and
"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid.
ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every
operation of the intellect may be called "consideration. " But
"contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth;
wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that
"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of
its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in
searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is
prone to wander. "
Reply to Objection 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of
Augustine on this passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in
a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]. " Now to see a
thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness
is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to
meditation.
Reply to Objection 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the
apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results
from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above
[3723](A[1]) that contemplation terminates in the affections.
Reply to Objection 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways.
First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as
regards the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according
to Wis. 7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon
me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs
"hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and
"reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ.
Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he
requires "meditation. "
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Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or
also in the consideration of any truth whatever?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not
only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any
truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my
soul knoweth right well. " Now the knowledge of God's works is effected
by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it
pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine
truth, but also any other.
Objection 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that
"contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly
of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises. "
Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the
other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life
consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in
the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.
Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6]
distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the
imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The
second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in
considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is
in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the
consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in
"the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent on
things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth
is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by divine
revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by
the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and contrary to reason";
when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem
contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the
Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine
truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine
truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.
Objection 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of
truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
consists in the contemplation of any truth.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we
seek the principle which is God. "
I answer that, As stated above [3724](A[2]), a thing may belong to the
contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or
dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life
is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is
the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8)
that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all
our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys. " This
contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see
God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas
now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us
imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark manner" (1 Cor.
13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which
begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate happiness in the
contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.
Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of
God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of God . . .
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," it
follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to
the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the
knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that "in
the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile
curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things
unperishable and everlasting. "
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said ([3725]AA[1],2,3) that
four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life;
first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of
contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly,
the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth
itself.
Reply to Objection 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so
that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps.
142:5,6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of
Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee. "
Reply to Objection 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided
to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the
divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's
mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be
vouchsafed.
Reply to Objection 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by
means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step
consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step
consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible
things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible
objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is
the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable
by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth
step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can
neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation
of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is
the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
the divine truth.
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Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the
vision of the Divine essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the
contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For,
as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face, and
my soul has been saved. " Now the vision of God's face is the vision of
the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life
one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative
men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things,
nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if
these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of
seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of
their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above
them, they overcome that which they are. " Now man is not hindered from
seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by
the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would
seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are
small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of
God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower and
angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things
by the light of God. " Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life.
Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the essence of God.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "As long as we live
in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as
to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible
light. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing
God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play:
and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether
out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not
caught up into that vision. " This has been carefully discussed above
(Q[175], AA[4],5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the [3726]FP,
Q[12], A[2], where we treated of the vision of God.
Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways.
First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the
bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise
attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in this
life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the
soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use
neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens
in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can
attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest
degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in
rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and
the life to come.
have all faith, so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons
for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, "And He
wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief. " Therefore,
if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in
addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says that among other
gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing . . . to
another, the working of miracles. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3711]Q[177], A[1]), the Holy Ghost
provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto
salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now
just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought
to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of
the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that
it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles,
according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs that
followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the
intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man
led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God
through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of
supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural
effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles
belongs to a gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known
supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that
can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence
which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible
for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a
habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet's mind is
moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is
it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do
something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His
power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to
life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): sometimes without any previous
prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias
and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority,
sometimes by prayer. " In either case, however, God is the principal
worker, for He uses instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his
speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a
dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh.
10:12): "Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh.
10:14): "There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying
the voice of a man. "
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be
wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess.
2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of
Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders. " To quote the words
of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of debate whether
they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the
senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem to do what
he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce
into falsehood them that believe. " They are said to be real, because
the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made
real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles,
because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in
the [3712]FP, Q[114], A[4]; whereas the working of miracles which is
ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's
profit.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is
that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
and in this respect miracles are called "virtues. " The other thing is
the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of
something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called
"signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the name of
"wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar [procul].
Reply to Objection 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately,
because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on
man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely
the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for
two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of
faith, secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which
faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the
grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the
faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be
confirmed in their faith.
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Whether the wicked can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For
miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now
the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, "We know
that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that turneth away
his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination. "
Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles.
Objection 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Mat.
17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to
this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove. " Now
"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that,
seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would
seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work
miracles.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to
Heb. 2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and
divers miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear
witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot
work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the
wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do
the wicked.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have all
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am
nothing. " Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this gift
alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from
the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18).
Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because
they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others
are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle,
because they are done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these
can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God
works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the
confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's
holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the
first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true
faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In
this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on
Mat. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name? " says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the
invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom
such great miracles are wrought. "
In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since
it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their
lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read
(Acts 19:11,12) that "God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles"
and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs .
. . and the diseases departed from them. " In this way indeed there is
nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint;
but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of
whose holiness such things are done.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3713]Q[83], A[16]) when we were
treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but
on God's mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers
even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says
(Tract. xliv in Joan. ) that "the blind man spoke these words before he
was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God
does hear sinners. " When it is said that the prayer of one who hears
not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the
sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
the spiritual welfare of the one who prays---as the publican was heard
(Lk. 18:14)---or for the good of others and for God's glory.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as
regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace.
But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead
instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while
employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
Reply to Objection 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose
for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although
sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they invoke,
and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach
a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their
teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good
Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by
private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest
righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the
reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most
baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply
greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is
obtained. "
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OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration
will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and
contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life;
(4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
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Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its
essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living
things to live is to be. " Now the soul is the principle of action and
contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not
fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the
intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
repose myself with her. " Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech. ): "There is a
twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
active life and the contemplative. "
I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose
movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is
proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is
most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives
proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to
which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist
in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and
movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting
according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would
seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most
intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with his friends"
(Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external
actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active
and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually
"to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to
live" is, in living things, "to be," because living things through
having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
Reply to Objection 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having
an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and
human life.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from
external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of
the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
defined "the act of a perfect thing. " In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely,
"straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. [3714] Q[180], A[6]].
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Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into
active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions
three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to the
contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a
third "composed of both. " Therefore it would seem that life is
inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers
actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should
be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of
Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the
two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the
active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were
more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active
and contemplative.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to
the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to
the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately
divided into active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast. "
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it
is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in
white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that
which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the
simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the
contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
Reply to Objection 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed
to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason,
belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the
present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand,
they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of
pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human
occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to
the contemplative life.
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OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
several?
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
contemplative life?
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv);
(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
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Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and
pertains wholly to the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end
of contemplation is truth. " Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech. )
that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn};
Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr. ], signifies the contemplative life. " Now the
vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the
contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that it belongs
to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action. " Now the
affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore
it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
appetitive power.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator. " Now desire
and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above
([3715]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3716]FS, Q[26], A[2]). Therefore the
contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or
appetitive power.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the
contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now
intention is an act of the will, as stated above ([3717]FS, Q[12],
A[1]), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will.
Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the
action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of
the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the
other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above
([3718]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3719]FS, Q[9], A[1]).
Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
because, as it is written (Mat.
6:21), "where thy treasure is, there is
thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life
to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God we are
aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he
obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life
terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the
result being that love also becomes more intense.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of
contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and
delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 2: We are urged to the vision of the first
principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares
and longs to see the face of its Creator. "
Reply to Objection 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily
members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice
the act of contemplation, as stated above.
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Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with
the whole mind. " Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God
and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law"
(Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to
the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the
contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
Creator. " Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,
which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. [3720] Q[8], A[7]]. For it is
written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see
God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God. " Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified
by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was "of a beautiful
countenance. " Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues,
especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46).
Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative
life.
On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions.
Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech. ; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]])
that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external
action. " Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
contemplative life.
I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to
the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the
consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to
active but not to contemplative happiness.
On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative
life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the
passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to
sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues
curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of
outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3721](A[1]), the contemplative
life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this
respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the
contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of
a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that
the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the
virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of
the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,
according to Is. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since he
who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and
disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative
life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.
Reply to Objection 3: Beauty, as stated above ([3722]Q[145], A[2]),
consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is
found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty
seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to
reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the
reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore
it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a
lover of her beauty. "
On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in
so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it
in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially
darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity
most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures
most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says
(Soliloq. i, 10).
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Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl.
i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and
"cogitation. " Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation.
Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . .
beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are
transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg. : 'into the same image from
glory to glory. ']. " Now this belongs to the contemplative life.
Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio]
belongs to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first
and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty. " Now according
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.
Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.
Objection 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of
St. Victor, Alleg. in N. T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the
contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life:
since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk.
10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.
On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is
chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the
contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative
lives.
I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as
applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between
man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the
truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of
a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then,
the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed,
namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its
unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some
of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds
to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from
the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the
last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation"
would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a
person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may
comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of
certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's
discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the
truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7),
cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.
"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain
principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and
"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid.
ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every
operation of the intellect may be called "consideration. " But
"contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth;
wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that
"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of
its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in
searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is
prone to wander. "
Reply to Objection 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of
Augustine on this passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in
a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]. " Now to see a
thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness
is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to
meditation.
Reply to Objection 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the
apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results
from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above
[3723](A[1]) that contemplation terminates in the affections.
Reply to Objection 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways.
First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as
regards the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according
to Wis. 7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon
me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs
"hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and
"reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ.
Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he
requires "meditation. "
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Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or
also in the consideration of any truth whatever?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not
only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any
truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my
soul knoweth right well. " Now the knowledge of God's works is effected
by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it
pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine
truth, but also any other.
Objection 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that
"contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly
of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises. "
Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the
other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life
consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in
the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.
Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6]
distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the
imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The
second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in
considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is
in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the
consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in
"the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent on
things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth
is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by divine
revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by
the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and contrary to reason";
when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem
contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the
Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine
truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine
truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.
Objection 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of
truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
consists in the contemplation of any truth.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we
seek the principle which is God. "
I answer that, As stated above [3724](A[2]), a thing may belong to the
contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or
dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life
is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is
the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8)
that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all
our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys. " This
contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see
God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas
now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us
imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark manner" (1 Cor.
13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which
begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate happiness in the
contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.
Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of
God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of God . . .
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," it
follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to
the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the
knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that "in
the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile
curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things
unperishable and everlasting. "
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said ([3725]AA[1],2,3) that
four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life;
first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of
contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly,
the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth
itself.
Reply to Objection 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so
that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps.
142:5,6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of
Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee. "
Reply to Objection 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided
to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the
divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's
mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be
vouchsafed.
Reply to Objection 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by
means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step
consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step
consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible
things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible
objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is
the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable
by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth
step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can
neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation
of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is
the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
the divine truth.
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Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the
vision of the Divine essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the
contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For,
as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face, and
my soul has been saved. " Now the vision of God's face is the vision of
the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life
one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative
men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things,
nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if
these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of
seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of
their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above
them, they overcome that which they are. " Now man is not hindered from
seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by
the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would
seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are
small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of
God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower and
angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things
by the light of God. " Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life.
Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the essence of God.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "As long as we live
in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as
to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible
light. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing
God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play:
and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether
out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not
caught up into that vision. " This has been carefully discussed above
(Q[175], AA[4],5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the [3726]FP,
Q[12], A[2], where we treated of the vision of God.
Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways.
First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the
bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise
attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in this
life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the
soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use
neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens
in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can
attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest
degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in
rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and
the life to come.
