" Secondly, the
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the
one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other.
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the
one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other.
Summa Theologica
Therefore
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from
actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but
also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which
is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its
object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused
suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved;
wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and
the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not
imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager
inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one
man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous
acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to
us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to
win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs
from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between
the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him.
On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we
wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of
the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of
charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of
affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that
"goodwill is a beginning of friendship. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does
not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to
the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.
Reply to Objection 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong
to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
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Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.
Objection 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. "
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Mat.
1:1, and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his
commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon.
Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God,
while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it
seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or
some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy
is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed"
as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
I answer that, The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality.
Now there are four kinds of cause, viz. , final, formal, efficient, and
material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though
it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four
different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect
of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in
respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to
wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in
respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for
instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect
of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause,
we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it,
e. g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we
have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors,
but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we
love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not
directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of
all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be
good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the
exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to
Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth
way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are
disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by
favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or
even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
Reply to Objection 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love
what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason
for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
to love the unknown.
Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but
through Himself, according to Jn. 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy
saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed
the Saviour of the world. "
Reply to Objection 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above ([2573]Q[17], A[8];[2574] Q[19],
AA[4],7,10).
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Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this
life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now
through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore,
do we love Him immediately.
Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man
cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
immediately.
Objection 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is.
59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God. " Now sin
is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able
to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be
"enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But
charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Cor.
13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
I answer that, As stated above ([2575]FP, Q[82], A[3]; Q[84], A[7]),
the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in
the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect
of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows
the mode of the knower.
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are
knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of
knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.
Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God
immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with
regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other
things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of
pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
[2576]FP, Q[12], A[12]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known
through another thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since to love God is something greater than to
know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest
in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins
there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to
speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love
begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin,
is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
spiritual union.
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Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
by us.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because
"God is greater than our heart" (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be
loved wholly.
Objection 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be
loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved
by a creature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover
and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question
may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification
"wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved
wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover:
and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love
God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God,
according to Dt. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart. "
Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the
thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing
loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion
to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is
infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of
creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
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Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving
God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as
Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the
best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things,
have charity. " Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought. " But it would be
useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one.
Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the
measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode. " Now the measure
of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause
of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure. "
I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ
3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to
be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the
same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure
is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things;
whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so
far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing
unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if
it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.
Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken
from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the
end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being
proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit.
i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited,"
whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put
limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he
puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he
can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too
little, the medicine would be immoderate.
Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God,
whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above
([2577]Q[23], A[6]), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be
taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but
as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the
more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love
God the better our love is.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence
of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the
measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the
goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something
else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands
before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured .
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the
measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that
is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode
which is proper to the measure.
Reply to Objection 3: An affection, whose object is subject to reason's
judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine
love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not
measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the
interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of
charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists
in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps. 72:28: "It is good for me
to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the
end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according
to reason.
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Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?
Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to
love a friend. For it is written (Mat. 5:46): "If you love them that
love you, what reward shall you have? " Therefore it is not deserving of
reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to
love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
Objection 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding
from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God
to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity
love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.
Objection 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems
to be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a
greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is
more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's enemy
than to love one's friend.
On the contrary, The better an action is, the more meritorious it is.
Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love a
better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who
hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend than
to love one's enemy.
I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
charity, as stated above ([2578]Q[25], A[1]). When therefore it is
asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or
one's enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the
part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason
for which we love him.
In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that
he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love
that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is
worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than one's
friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love
one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only
reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that
both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the
stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are
furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the
power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws
its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to
be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we
accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much the
stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter.
Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than
on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who
are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect
the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better
than the love of one's enemy.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their
strict sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in
God's sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and
this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way
that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends
is meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because
they are our friends.
The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in
the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason
for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those
who are loved.
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Whether it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's
neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to
be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of
our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished
myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren. " Therefore it is
more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
Objection 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less
meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above [2579](A[7]). Now God
is our chief friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 Jn. 4:10).
Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more
virtuous and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult
and good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love
one's neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because
there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's
neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than
to love God.
On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more
so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason
of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more
meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by
considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of
God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own
sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the
movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him
that loves God (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My
Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him.
" Secondly, the
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the
one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other.
In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of
God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be
between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and
inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 Jn. 4:21).
Reply to Objection 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not
desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he
was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a
state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
Ep. ad Rom. ] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he
wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains
to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his
neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
but is the entire reason for merit.
Reply to Objection 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do
with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.
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OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)
WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of
charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior
effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy,
(2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
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Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God,
Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this
state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the
Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than
joy.
Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Mat. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. " Therefore
sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
above ([2580]Q[17], A[6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to
Rom. 12:12: "Rejoicing in hope. " Therefore it is not the effect of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. " But
joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: "The
kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in
the Holy Ghost. " Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
I answer that, As stated above ([2581]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2,3), when we
were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in
contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence
of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved
exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the
love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his
friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love,
either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved
object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with
some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable,
since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He
is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1
Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him. "
Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is
present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on
to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight. "
Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
by the indwelling of His grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about
those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to
the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy
about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
grieve for things that are contrary to it.
Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The
former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the
latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy
the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or
imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an
admixture of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, 6:
"Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth. " But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep. " Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
with an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
those we have deplored. " But there is no true penance without charity.
Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to
be with Christ. " Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
prolonged! " Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
sorrow.
On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now
such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her
conversation hath no bitterness. " Therefore the joy of charity is
incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God
arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and
with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This
joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the
good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil:
hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always. "
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for
that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us
or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of
some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the
sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far
as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to
Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating
in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate,
after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the
delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of
the Divine good.
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Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is
meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
in God can never be filled.
Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater
than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is
finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
can be filled.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My
joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled. "
I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on
the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as
it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in
Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to
the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the
one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement,
as stated above ([2582]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), when we were treating of
the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence
joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as
we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us,
because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by
grace, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however, perfect
happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because
then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain
whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to
Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things. " Hence desire
will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so
that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection---indeed over-full,
since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by
the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom. " Yet, since
no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that
this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary,
man enters into it, according to Mat. 25:21: "Enter into the joy of thy
Lord. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in
reference to the thing in which we rejoice.
Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach
the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some
will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be
full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at
rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a
fuller participation of the Divine happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in
respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be.
There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just
as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That
you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding. "
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Whether joy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of
which is "good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always. " Therefore joy is a virtue.
On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor
among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from
what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).
I answer that, As stated above ([2583]FS, Q[55], AA[2],4), virtue is an
operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to
a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed
several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous
habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is
defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those
other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we
have said about the passions ([2584]FS, Q[25], AA[2],4) that love is
the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy
follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and
desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love
is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy,
nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not
a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for
which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by
inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general
source of the vices, as stated above ([2585]FS, Q[77], A[4]); so that
it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special
vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general
vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue,
namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as
stated above (here and A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
"difficult," and "possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted
a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any
special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
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OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
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Whether peace is the same as concord?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered
concord. " Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men.
Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Objection 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of
peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi)
that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is
the same as concord.
Objection 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are
themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and
peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not
the God of dissension but of peace. " Therefore peace is the same as
concord.
On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But
"there is no peace to the wicked" (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not
the same as concord.
I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence
wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever
there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the
same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse
things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse
appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that
which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: "The
flesh lusteth against the spirit. " Secondly, in so far as one and the
same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it
cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a
clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such
movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace,
so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there
still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at
the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to
concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various
persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of
the appetites even in one man.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which
is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through
one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both
of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord,
but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that
besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each
concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring
cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of
order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in
one man being set at rest together.
Reply to Objection 2: If one man consent to the same thing together
with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.
Reply to Objection 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
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Whether all things desire peace?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent. " But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at
the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do
not desire peace.
Objection 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a
certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said
(Mat.
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from
actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but
also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which
is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its
object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused
suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved;
wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and
the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not
imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager
inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one
man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous
acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to
us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to
win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs
from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between
the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him.
On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we
wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of
the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of
charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of
affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that
"goodwill is a beginning of friendship. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does
not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to
the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.
Reply to Objection 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong
to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
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Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.
Objection 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. "
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Mat.
1:1, and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his
commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon.
Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God,
while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it
seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or
some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy
is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed"
as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
I answer that, The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality.
Now there are four kinds of cause, viz. , final, formal, efficient, and
material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though
it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four
different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect
of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in
respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to
wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in
respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for
instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect
of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause,
we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it,
e. g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we
have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors,
but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we
love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not
directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of
all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be
good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the
exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to
Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth
way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are
disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by
favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or
even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
Reply to Objection 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love
what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason
for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
to love the unknown.
Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but
through Himself, according to Jn. 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy
saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed
the Saviour of the world. "
Reply to Objection 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above ([2573]Q[17], A[8];[2574] Q[19],
AA[4],7,10).
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Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this
life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now
through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore,
do we love Him immediately.
Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man
cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
immediately.
Objection 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is.
59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God. " Now sin
is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able
to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be
"enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But
charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Cor.
13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
I answer that, As stated above ([2575]FP, Q[82], A[3]; Q[84], A[7]),
the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in
the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect
of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows
the mode of the knower.
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are
knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of
knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.
Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God
immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with
regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other
things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of
pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
[2576]FP, Q[12], A[12]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known
through another thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since to love God is something greater than to
know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest
in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins
there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to
speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love
begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin,
is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
spiritual union.
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Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
by us.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because
"God is greater than our heart" (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be
loved wholly.
Objection 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be
loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved
by a creature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover
and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question
may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification
"wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved
wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover:
and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love
God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God,
according to Dt. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart. "
Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the
thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing
loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion
to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is
infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of
creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
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Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving
God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as
Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the
best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things,
have charity. " Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought. " But it would be
useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one.
Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the
measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode. " Now the measure
of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause
of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure. "
I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ
3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to
be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the
same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure
is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things;
whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so
far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing
unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if
it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.
Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken
from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the
end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being
proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit.
i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited,"
whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put
limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he
puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he
can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too
little, the medicine would be immoderate.
Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God,
whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above
([2577]Q[23], A[6]), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be
taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but
as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the
more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love
God the better our love is.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence
of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the
measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the
goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something
else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands
before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured .
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the
measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that
is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode
which is proper to the measure.
Reply to Objection 3: An affection, whose object is subject to reason's
judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine
love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not
measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the
interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of
charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists
in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps. 72:28: "It is good for me
to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the
end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according
to reason.
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Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?
Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to
love a friend. For it is written (Mat. 5:46): "If you love them that
love you, what reward shall you have? " Therefore it is not deserving of
reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to
love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
Objection 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding
from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God
to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity
love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.
Objection 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems
to be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a
greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is
more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's enemy
than to love one's friend.
On the contrary, The better an action is, the more meritorious it is.
Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love a
better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who
hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend than
to love one's enemy.
I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
charity, as stated above ([2578]Q[25], A[1]). When therefore it is
asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or
one's enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the
part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason
for which we love him.
In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that
he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love
that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is
worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than one's
friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love
one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only
reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that
both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the
stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are
furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the
power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws
its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to
be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we
accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much the
stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter.
Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than
on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who
are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect
the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better
than the love of one's enemy.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their
strict sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in
God's sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and
this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way
that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends
is meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because
they are our friends.
The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in
the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason
for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those
who are loved.
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Whether it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's
neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to
be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of
our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished
myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren. " Therefore it is
more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
Objection 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less
meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above [2579](A[7]). Now God
is our chief friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 Jn. 4:10).
Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more
virtuous and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult
and good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love
one's neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because
there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's
neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than
to love God.
On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more
so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason
of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more
meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by
considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of
God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own
sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the
movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him
that loves God (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My
Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him.
" Secondly, the
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the
one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other.
In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of
God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be
between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and
inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 Jn. 4:21).
Reply to Objection 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not
desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he
was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a
state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
Ep. ad Rom. ] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he
wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains
to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his
neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
but is the entire reason for merit.
Reply to Objection 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do
with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.
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OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)
WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of
charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior
effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy,
(2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
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Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God,
Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this
state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the
Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than
joy.
Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Mat. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. " Therefore
sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
above ([2580]Q[17], A[6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to
Rom. 12:12: "Rejoicing in hope. " Therefore it is not the effect of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. " But
joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: "The
kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in
the Holy Ghost. " Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
I answer that, As stated above ([2581]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2,3), when we
were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in
contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence
of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved
exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the
love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his
friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love,
either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved
object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with
some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable,
since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He
is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1
Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him. "
Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is
present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on
to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight. "
Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
by the indwelling of His grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about
those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to
the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy
about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
grieve for things that are contrary to it.
Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The
former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the
latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy
the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or
imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's charity.
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Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an
admixture of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, 6:
"Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth. " But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep. " Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
with an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
those we have deplored. " But there is no true penance without charity.
Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to
be with Christ. " Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
prolonged! " Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
sorrow.
On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now
such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her
conversation hath no bitterness. " Therefore the joy of charity is
incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God
arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and
with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This
joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the
good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil:
hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always. "
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for
that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us
or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of
some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the
sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far
as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to
Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating
in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate,
after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the
delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of
the Divine good.
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Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is
meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
in God can never be filled.
Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater
than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is
finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
can be filled.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My
joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled. "
I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on
the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as
it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in
Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to
the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the
one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement,
as stated above ([2582]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), when we were treating of
the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence
joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as
we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us,
because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by
grace, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however, perfect
happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because
then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain
whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to
Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things. " Hence desire
will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so
that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection---indeed over-full,
since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by
the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom. " Yet, since
no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that
this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary,
man enters into it, according to Mat. 25:21: "Enter into the joy of thy
Lord. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in
reference to the thing in which we rejoice.
Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach
the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some
will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be
full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at
rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a
fuller participation of the Divine happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in
respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be.
There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just
as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That
you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding. "
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Whether joy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of
which is "good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always. " Therefore joy is a virtue.
On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor
among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from
what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).
I answer that, As stated above ([2583]FS, Q[55], AA[2],4), virtue is an
operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to
a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed
several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous
habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is
defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those
other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we
have said about the passions ([2584]FS, Q[25], AA[2],4) that love is
the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy
follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and
desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love
is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy,
nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not
a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for
which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by
inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general
source of the vices, as stated above ([2585]FS, Q[77], A[4]); so that
it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special
vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general
vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue,
namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as
stated above (here and A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
"difficult," and "possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted
a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any
special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
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OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
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Whether peace is the same as concord?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered
concord. " Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men.
Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Objection 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of
peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi)
that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is
the same as concord.
Objection 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are
themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and
peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not
the God of dissension but of peace. " Therefore peace is the same as
concord.
On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But
"there is no peace to the wicked" (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not
the same as concord.
I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence
wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever
there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the
same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse
things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse
appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that
which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: "The
flesh lusteth against the spirit. " Secondly, in so far as one and the
same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it
cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a
clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such
movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace,
so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there
still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at
the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to
concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various
persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of
the appetites even in one man.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which
is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through
one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both
of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord,
but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that
besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each
concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring
cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of
order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in
one man being set at rest together.
Reply to Objection 2: If one man consent to the same thing together
with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.
Reply to Objection 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
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Whether all things desire peace?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent. " But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at
the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do
not desire peace.
Objection 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a
certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said
(Mat.
