No More Learning

Holkar's defeat at Mahidpur
was followed by the Treaty of Mandasor, signed on 6 January, 1818,
under the terms of which the chief relinquished his possessions south
of the Narbada, abandoned his claims upon the Rajput chiefs, recog-
nised the independence of Amir Khan, reduced the state army and
agreed to maintain a contingent to co-operate with the British, and
acquiesced in the appointment of a British Resident to his court.
Sindhia, who failed to fulfil his promise of active help in the
Pindari campaign and, in contravention of the Treaty of Gwalior, had
connived at the retention of the great fortress of Asirgarh by his
killadar, Jasvant Rao Lad, now saw that further opposition would be
fruitless, and, therefore, agreed in 1818 to a fresh treaty with the
Company. This agreement provided, inter alia, for the cession to the
English of Ajmir, the strategical key to Rajputana, and for a readjust-
ment of boundaries. The Gaekwad, Fateh Singh, who acted as:regent
1 Fortesque, op. cit. XI, 180-247.
? Idem, pp. 189-97:246-9.
.


## p. 382 (#410) ############################################

382
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
for Anand Rao, signed a supplementary treaty in November, 1817,
whereby he agreed to augment his subsidiary force, ceded his share
of Ahmadabad for a cash payment representing its estimated value,
and received in exchange the district of Okhamandal, the island of
Bet, and other territory. Fateh Singh, who died in 1818 a few months
before the titular ruler Anand Rao, adhered scrupulously to his
alliance with the British during the operations against the Pindaris
and the Maratha states. In return he was granted full remission of
the tribute annually payable to the Peshwa for the revenues of
Ahmadabad. 1
In accordance with the precedent set by Wellesley in the case of
Mysore, the raja of Satara, who had been delivered from the clutches
of Baji Rao by Colonel Smith's victory at Ashti, was provided with
a small semi-independent principality around Satara, and was en-
throned on 11 April, 1818. With a view to a pacific settlement of the
Peshwa's conquered dominions, arrangements satisfactory to both
parties were made by the Company with the Pant Pratinidhi, the Pant
Sachiv, the raja of Akalkot, the Patvardhans, and the other Maratha
nobles and jagirdars; while the piratical chiefs of the western littoral,
who had been incompletely chastised in 1812, were completely
reduced in 1820 and forced to cede the remainder of the coast
between Kolhapur and Goa.
“The struggle which has thus ended”, wrote Prinsep in his Political Review,
published in 1825, “in the universal establishment of the British influence is
particularly important and worthy of attention, as it promises to be the last
we shall ever have to maintain with the native powers of India. Hencefor-
ward this epoch will be referred to as that whence each of the existing states
will date the commencement of its peaceable settlement and the consolidation
of its relations with the controlling power. The dark age of trouble and
violence, which so long spread its malign influence over the fertile regions of
Central India, has thus ceased from this time; and a new era has commenced,
we trust, with brighter prospects,-an era of peace, prosperity and wealth at
least, if not of political liberty and high moral improvement. ”
There can be no doubt that the English and Maratha Governments
could not co-exist in India; for the practical working of the Maratha
system, which was inspired more deeply than has hitherto been
recognised by the doctrines of the ancient Hindu text-books of auto-
cracy, was oppressive to the general mass of the people, destitute of
moral ideas, and directly antagonistic to the fundamental principles
of the Company's rule. Lord Hastings fully realised that, if India
was ever to prosper, orderly government must be substituted for the
lawless and predatory rule of his chief antagonists, and he brought
to the achievement of his complex task a singular combination of
firmness and moderation. Every chance was offered to the treacherous
Peshwa and the raja of Berar of reforming their corrupt adminis-
tration and living in amity with the English; consideration was shown
1 Prinsep, op. cit. pp. 418-68.


## p. 383 (#411) ############################################

THE SETTLEMENT
383
to avowed freebooters like Amir Khan and even to the ruffians who
led the Pindari raids across India; Sindhia's duplicity was treated
with undeserved forbearance. And when the doom of Maratha rule
had been sealed, the governor-general's prudence and knowledge
framed the measures which converted hostile princes like Sindhia and
Holkar into staunch allies of the British Government, caused new
villages and townships to germinate amid the ashes of rapine and
desolation, created new and permanent sources of revenue, and
diffused from Cape Comorin to the banks of the Satlej a spirit of
tranquillity and order which India had never known since the spacious
days of Akbar.


## p. 384 (#412) ############################################

CHAPTER XXIII
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
THE Maratha administrative system, in the eighteenth century and
the opening years of the nineteenth, may be described as a compound
of the principles embodied in ancient works on Hindu polity, such as
the Arthasastra of Kautilya, of the arrangements institutea by Sivaji
and followed to some extent by his immediate successors, Sambhaji,
Raja Rama, and Shahu, and of the modifications introduced by the
Peshwas from the year 1727. In the various branches of the state's
activities, the main differences between the system originally pei.
fected by Sivaji and that which obtained under the Peshwas resulted
naturally from the change in the position of Sivaji's lineal descendant,
the raja of Satara, whose powers and prestige rapidly declined from
the moment when the appointment of Peshwa became hereditary
in the family of Balaji Visvanath (1714-20). Although the raja
continued after that date to be regarded as the head of the Maratha
state, and in theory retained the right to appoint the Peshwa and
other high officials, his powers gradually became little more than
nominal, and he was subsequently deprived even of the right of
appointing and dismissing his own retainers. His personal expenses,
moreover, were closely scrutinised by the Peshwa's secretariat, and he
was obliged to obtain sanction from Poona for all expenditure con-
nected with public works, private charities, and the maintenance of
his household. Originally one of Sivaji's Ashta Pradhan and holding,
like the other seven ministers, a non-hereditary appointment, the
Peshwa gradually assumed a position superior to that of the other
ministers, including even the pratinidhi who had originally been
appointed by Raja Rama as his vice-regent at Jinji and continued to
occupy the senior position on the board until the genius of Balaji
Visvanath made the Peshwa's office both hereditary and supreme.
The gradual transformation of "the mayor of the palace" of the raja
of Satara into the virtual ruler of the Maratha state and the Maratha
confederacy, thus initiated by Balaji Visvanath, was aided by Tara
Bai's imprisonment of Raja Rama in the Satara fort and was com-
pieted by Raja Shahu's grant of plenary powers to the Peshwa Balaji
Baji Rao on his deathbed. ?
Thus from the first quarter of the eighteenth century until the final
débâcle of the Maratha power, the Peshwa, though acting nominally
as the vice-regent of the raja of Satara and showing him on public
occasions the attentions due to the ruler, actually controlled the whole
1 Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, pp. 186-96.
? Idem, pp. 196-202.


## p. 385 (#413) ############################################

THE PESHWA
385
administration and even usurped the raja's powers and prerogatives
as ecclesiastical head of the state. This latter function was not con-
sequent upon the Peshwa's social position as a Brahman, for the
Chitpavan sect, to which the Peshwas belonged, was not accounted
of much importance by other Brahmanic sects and by some, indeed,
was considered ineligible for inclusion in the Brahmanic category.
As was the case with Sivaji, the Peshwa's supremacy in the socio-
religious sphere was the natural corollary of his position as head
executive power or chief magistrate, and in that capacity he gave
decisions in a large variety of matters, including the appointment of
officiating priests for non-Hindu congregations, the remarriage of
widows, the sale of unmarried girls, and arrangements for dowry and
adoption.
The Peshwa's predominant position was also recognised by the
Maratha feudal nobility, composed of estate-holders and chiefs, who
were expected to provide troops and render military service, as
occasion demanded, in return for their saranjams or fiefs, and were
practically independent autocrats within the boundaries of their own
lands and villages. As the Peshwa himself was originally one of these
feudal landholders, subject to the general control of the raja of
Satara, he was not slow to realise that his assumption of supremacy
might evoke combinations of the others against himself. This possi-
bility was largely discounted by dividing the revenues of any one
district between several Maratha chiefs, who generally considered it
beneath their dignity as fighting men to learn the art of reading and
writing their mother-tongue and were at the same time exceedingly
resentful of any supposed infringement of their financial proprietary
rights. This system of sub-division of revenues gave rise to great
complications in the state accounts, of which the Peshwa and his
Brahman secretariat were not slow to take advantage : and it also
engendered among the Maratha chiefs perpetual feuds and jealousies.
which prevented their combining whole-heartedly against a common
enemy and were ultimately responsible in large measure for the
downfall of the Maratha power. The Maratha respect for the maxim
that "it is well to have a finger in every pie”, and their constant
search for opportunities of extortion and pillage, are well illustrated
by the refusal of Sindhia, as recorded in the private journal of the
Marquess of Hastings, to relinquish his share in certain lands included
in the possessions of the chief of Bundi, although he was offered in
exchange more valuable territory, contiguous to his own dominions.
The focus of the Maratha administration was the Peshwa's secre-
tariat in Poona, styled the Huzur Daftar, which was composed of
several departments and bureaux. It dealt, broadly speaking, with
the revenues and expenditure of all districts, with the accounts
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 202-4, 397-417.
25


## p. 386 (#414) ############################################

386
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
submitted by the district and village officials, with all alienations of
public revenue in the form of inams, saranjams, etc. , with the pay and
privileges of all grades of the public service, and with the budgets of
the civil, military and religious establishments. The daily registers
.
(roz kird) of the various departments recorded all revenue transac-
tions, all grants and payments, and all contributions and exactions
levied on foreign territory. These records, which included state
transactions of every kind, were maintained with great care and
efficiency until the rule of Baji Rao II (1796-1818), when they
became practically valueless by reason of the maladministration and
political disorder of that period.
The foundation of the Peshwa's administrative system was the
self-contained and self-supporting village community, which had its
roots in an almost prehistoric past. Each village had a headman,
the patel (the pattakila of ancient lithic and copperplate records), who
combined the functions of revenue officer, magistrate and judge, and
acted as intermediary between the villagers and the Peshwa's officials.
His office was hereditary and might form the subject of sale and
purchase, and his emoluments, which varied slightly from village to
village, consisted chiefly in the receipt from every yillager of a fixed
share of his produce. These receipts ranged from a daily supply of
betel-leaves, provided by the dealers in pan-supari, to a tax on the
remarriage of a widow; and in return for these emoluments and for
his recognition as the social leader of the village community, the patel
was expected to shoulder the responsibility for the village's welfare
and good conduct. The kulkarni, or village clerk and record-keeper,
who was always a Brahman, was second in importance to the patel,
and like the latter was remunerated by a variety of perquisites. He
was often expected to share the patel's responsibility for the good
behaviour of the village community, and ran an equal risk of oppres-
sion and imprisonment by casual' invaders or tyrannous officials.
Excluding the chaugula who had custody of the kuikarni's bundles of
correspondence, assisted the patel, and was frequently an illegitimate
scion of the patel's family, the communal duties and wants of the
village were performed and supplied by the bara balute or twelve
hereditary village servants, who received a recognised share of the
crops and other perquisites in return for their services to the com-
munity. The personnel of the bara balute was not invariably the same
in all parts of the Deccan, and in some places they were associated
with an additional body of twelve village servants, styled bara alute.
Up to the period of the rule of the Peshwa Madhu Rao I (1761-72),
certain classes of village mechanics and artisans, like the carpenter
and blacksmith, were liable to forced labour (begar) on behalf of the
state-an exaction which had the express sanction of the most ancient
* Sen, op. cit. pp. 267-71.
2 Idem, pp. 211-37, 503-21.


## p. 387 (#415) ############################################

THE MAMLATDAR
387
Hindu law codes and was certainly practised by previous governments
in India. 1
The backbone of the Maratha district administration, which
perhaps drew its origina) inspiration from the principles laid down
in Kautilya's Arthasastra, was supplied by the mamlatdar, who was in
charge of a division styled sarkar, subha, or prant, and by the kamu-
visdar, his subordinate or deputy, who administered a smaller terri-
torial area of the same kind, usually termed a pargana. This territorial
nomenclature had, however, lost its significance by the beginning of
the nineteenth century, and the revenue divisions—the sarkar, the
pargana, and the smaller areas styled mahal and tarf, had been largely
broken up as a result of internal changes and confusion. The mam-
latdar, who corresponded roughly to the subhedar or mukhya desha-
dhikari of Sivaji's day, and the kamavisdar were directly subordinate
to the Peshwa's secretariat in: Poona, except in the case of Khandesh,
Gujarat and the Karnatak, where a superior official, styled sarsubhe-
ddr, was interposed between them and the government. Originally the
mamlatdar and the kamavisdar were appointed for short terms only,
but in practice they managed frequently to secure renewals of their
term of office in a district. As the direct representative of the Peshwa
they were responsible for every branch of the district administration,
including agriculture, industries, civil and criminal justice, the control
of the sihbandis (militia) and the police, and the investigation of
social and religious questions. They also fixed the revenue assessment
of each village in consultation with the patel, heard and decided
complaints against the village officers, and were responsible for the
collection of the state revenue, which in cases of recalcitrance they
were accustomed to recover through the medium of the sihbandis. 2
It will be obvious that under this system there were many oppor-
tunities for peculation and maladministration on the part of the dist-
rict officials, while the only checks upon the action of the mamlatdar
were of a theoretical rather than a practical character. The first of
these restraints was provided by the desmukh and despande, who had
long ceased to hold any official status and had been relegated to a
more or less ornamental position since the days of Sivaji. 3 In theory
the mamlatdar's accounts were not passed by the secretariat at Poona,
unless corroborated by corresponding accounts from these local
anachronisms, and in all disputes regarding land the deshmukh was
expected to produce his ancient records, containing the history of all
watans, inams and grants, and the register of transfer of properties,
which he maintained in return for the annual fee or perquisites
received from the villagers. The safeguards not infrequently proved
illusory, for there was nothing to prevent the mamiatdar obtaining
official approval of his returns by methods of his own, while the
.
2 Idem; -pp. 252-8.
1. Sen, op. cit. pp. 532-4.
3 Idem, pp. 243-51.


## p. 388 (#416) ############################################

388
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
desmukh's registers were irregularly written up and often very
incomplete. The second check upon the mamlatdar was provided by
a staff of hereditary darakhdars or office-holders, who were appointed
to the various provinces or major divisions of the Maratha dominions,
were directly subordinate to the Peshwa, and reported direct to the
government in Poona. These officials were eight in number, viz. the
dewan or mamlatdar's deputy, mazumdar, phadnavis, daftardar,
potnis, potdar, sabhasad, and chitnis; and they were expected to act
as a check, not only upon one another but also on the mamlatdar, who
was not empowered to dismiss any one of them. A ninth official of
this class, the jamenis, who apparently concerned himself with the
land revenue of the villages, is mentioned in the reign of the Peshwa
Madhu Rao 1. 1
With the object, doubtless, of preventing the wholesale malversa-
tion of public money, the Maratha Government was accustomed to
demand from the mamlatdar and other officials the payment of a
heavy sum (rasad) on their first appointment to a district, and careful
estimates of probable income and expenditure were drawn up for
their guidance by the Huzur Daftar. These precautions were of even
less value than those mentioned above. The mamlatdar was at pains
to recover his advance with interest and frequently made considerable
illicit profits by concealment of receipts, non-payment of pensions,
and the preparation of false bills and muster-rolls. A fruitful source
of gain was the sadąr warid pattiman extra tax intended to cover
miscellaneous district expenditure not provided for by the govern-
ment; and one of the chief items of this additional expenditure was
the darbar kharch or fee to ministers and auditors, which, originally
a secret bribe, developed eventually into a recognised scale of pay.
ments, audited like other items of account. These illicit claims showeci
a constant tendency to increase, and as it was obviously impolitic to
recover more than a certain amount from the peasantry, who pro-
vided in one way or another a very large proportion of the public
revenues, the mamlatdar did not scruple to pay himself and his
superiors out of funds that should have been credited wholly to the
government. ? Under the rule. of the last Peshwa, Baji Rao II, the
peasantry were deprived of even this modified protection from extor-
ti:in by the system of farming the district appointments, which had
been in vogue under the preceding Muhammadan governments of the
Deccan.
“The office of mamlatdar"; according to Mountstuart Elphinstone, “was put
up to auction among the Peshwa's attendants, who were encouraged to bid
high and were sometimes disgraced, if they showed a reluctance to enter on
this sort of speculation. ”
The mamlatdar, who had secured a district at these auctions, promptly
a
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 238-63.
2 Idem, pp. 263-5; Forrest, official Writings of Mountstuart Elphinstone,
pp. 287-9.


## p. 389 (#417) ############################################

THE KAMAVISDAR
389
rented it at a profit to under-farmers, who repeated the process until
it reached the village officers. Under such a system the scale on.
which each peasant was assessed was based upon his ability to pay,
not upon the area and quality of the land which he occupied; and
as the demand was usually immoderate and constant resort was had
to fictitious accounts, the villagers were steadily exhausted by the
shameless exactions of the official hierarchy. 1
The kamavisdar, whose official emoluments were often fixed at
4 per cent. of the revenues of the district in his charge together with
certain allowances, e. g. for the upkeep of a palanquin, was provided,
like the mamlatdar, with a staff of clerks and menials, who were
generally paid ten or eleven months' salary in return for a full year's
work. The reason for this short payment, which was also adopted in
the military department, is not clear. Possibly it amounted to a tacit
acknowledgment that an aggregate period of at least one or two
months in every twelve would be spent on leave or otherwise wasted,
or that petty illicit perquisites, which it would be fruitless to trace
or expose, would probably total to the amount of a month's salary.
The small territorial divisions, known as mahal or tarf, were adminis-
tered on the same lines as the mamlatdar's and kamavisdar's charges
by a non-hereditary official styled havaldar, assisted and checked by
a hereditary mazumdar (accountant) and phadnis (auditor). In each
mahal, as a rule, were stationed four additional officials of militia,
viz. the hashamnavis, who maintained a muster-roll of the villagers,
their arms, and their pay; the hasham phadnis and hasham daftardar,
who kept the accounts and wrote up the ledger of the militia, and
the hazirinavis, who maintained a muster-roll of those actually
serving in the militia. 2
The Maratha judicial system has been described as very imper-
fect, there being no rules of procedure, no regular administration of
justice, and no codified law. In both civil and criminal matters
decisions were based upon custom and upon rules or formulae
err. bodied in ancient Sanskrit compilations, like those of Manu and
Yajnavalkya. In civil cases the main object aimed at was amicable
settlement, and arbitration was therefore the first step in the disposal
of a suit. If arbitration failed, the case was transferred for decision
to a panchayat, appointed by the patel in the village and by the shete
mahajan, or leading merchant, in urban areas. An appeal lay from
the decision of a panchayat to the mamlatdar, who usually upheld the
verdict, unless the parties concerned were able to prove that the
panchayat was prejudiced or corrupt. In serious or important suits,
however, it was the duty of the mamlatdar to appoint an arbitrator
or a panchayat, the members of which were chosen by him with the
approval, and often at the suggestion, of the parties to the suit. In
1 Forrest, op. cit. pp. 294-6.
2 Sen, op. cit. p. 266.


## p. 390 (#418) ############################################

390
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
such cases the panchayat's decision was subject to an appeal to the
Peshwa or his legal minister, the nyayadhish. The system of pancha-
yats left a good deal to be desired from the standpoint of modern legal
administration. These bodies were slow in action and uncertain in
their decisions: the attendance of the members was usually irregular,
depending as it did entirely upon the individual's sense of duty or
fear of public opinion. The powers of the panchayat were strictly
limited; it was exposed to constant obstruction; and it possessed no
authority to enforce its decisions, which were left to the mamlatdar
to carry out or neglect, as he pleased. It had likewise no power to
compel the attendance of parties and their witnesses, and depended
upon the mamlatdar or other local official to supply a petty officer for
this purpose. In cases where the members of a panchayat were nomi-
nated by the parties to a suit, they functioned rather as advocates
than as judges; and, speaking generally, the system offered consider-
able scope for partiality and corruption, which became very marked
under the rule of Baji Rao II. Yet, despite its primitive character
and its liability to be improperly influenced, the panchayat was a
popular institution, and the absence of a decision by a panchayat in
any suit was almost always regarded as complete justification for a
retrial of the issues. The fact must be admitted that among themselves,
within the confines of the self-contained ancestral village, the
peasantry did obtain a fair modicum of rude justice from the village
panchayat. What they failed to obtain either from the panchayats or
from the government was any measure of redress against the merciless
oppression of their superiors. 1
In criminal cases much the same procedure was adopted, though
a punchayat was less frequently appointed than in civil disputes. The
chief authorities were the patel in the village, the mamlatdar in the
district, the sarsubhedar in the province, and the Peshwa and his
nyayadhish at headquarters; and they administered a law which was
merely popular custom tempered by the trying officer's own ideas of
expediency. Ancient Hindu law in its criminal application had
become practically obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century,
and Mountstuart Elphinstone's opinion that "the criminal system of
the Mahrattas was in the last stage of disorder and corruption" was
fully justified by the state of the criminal law and procedure imme-
diately prior to the downfall of the last Peshwa. No regular form of
trial of accused persons was prescribed; flogging was frequently
inflicted with the object of extorting confessions of guilt; and in the
case of crimes against the state torture was usually employed. The
punishment for serious offences against the person was originally fine,
or confiscation of property, or imprisonment, the fine being propor-
tioned to the means of the offender; ? but after 1761 capital punisi-
2
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 347-79.
2 Idem, pp. 381-3.


## p. 391 (#419) ############################################

JUDICIAL SYSTEM
391
>
.
ment and mutilation were inflicted upon persons convicted of grievous
hurt, dacoity and theft, as well as upon those found guilty of murder
or treason. The usual methods of execution were hanging, decapi-
tation, cutting to pieces with swords, or crushing the skull with a
mallet, exception being made in the case of Brahmans, who were
poisoned or starved to death. Powers of life and death were originally
vested in the ruler only, and in the principal feudal chiefs within the
limits of their respective jagirs. In later times, however, these powers
were delegated to the sarsubhedar of a province; while throughout the
second half of the eighteenth century the mamlatdar, as head of a
district, considered himself justified in hanging a Ramosi, Bhil, or
Mang robber, without reference to higher authority. The punishment
of mutilation consisted usually in cutting off the hands or feet and
in the case of female offenders in depriving them of their nose, ears
or breasts. False evidence must often have figured in criminal er-
quiries, as it still does to some extent; and the false witness and the
fabricator of false documents were praciically immune from prose-
cution under a system which prescribed no penalty for either perjury
or forgery. The only notice taken of a case of deliberate and wholesale
fabrication of false evidence consisted of a mild reproof from the
nyayadhish.
The penalties imposed on convicted prisoners were aggravated by
the knowledge that their families were not secure from oppression;
for it was a common practice of the Maratha Government to in-
carcerate the innocent wives and children of convicts, as a warning
to other potential malefactors. The prison arrangements were primi-
tive, the only jails being rooms in some of the larger hill-forts. Here
the prisoners languish in the gravest discomfort, except on rare
occasions when they were temporarily released to enable them to
perform domestic religious ceremonies such as the sraddha. 3 It is
perhaps needless to remark that a prisoner had to pay heavily for
such temporary and occasional freedom, as well as for other minor
concessions to his comfort. Provided that he could command sufficient
funds to satisfy the avarice of his gaolers, even a long-term convict
could count upon a fairly speedy release. Even in the days of Sivaji
the power of gold to unlock the gates of hill-forts had often proved
greater than that of the sword, spear and ambush.
The district police arrangements under the Peshwas were practi-
cally identical with those that existed in the seventeenth century, and
were apparently based largely on the doctrine of setting a thief to
catch a thief. Each village maintained its own watchmen, who belonged
to the degraded Mahar or Mang tribes, under the direct control of
the patel, and remunerated them for their services with rent-free lands
а
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 393-6.
2 Tone, Institutions of the Maratha People, pp. 15-16.
8 Sen, op. cit. pp. 417-24.


## p. 392 (#420) ############################################

392
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
and other perquisites. These watchmen were assisted in the detection
of crime by groups or gangs of hereditary criminal tribesmen, like
the Ramosis and BKils, who were attached to each village, or to a
group of villages, and resided on its ouiskirts. Each group was under
the control of its own naiks or headmen, who were answerable to the
patel for any theft or robbery committed in the village, and for any
disturbance created by their followers.
The antiquity of the system
is indicated by the fact that most of these village groups of Ramosis or
Bhils received certain perquisites of long standing in return for their
services to the village, in the same way as the recognised village
servants, and they cherished their rights as ancillary watchmen and
thief-catchers, particularly in respect of some of the hill-forts, as
jealously as any village officer or village artisan.
The practical working of the system was as follows. Whenever a
crime against property occurred in a village, the Mahars or Ramosis,
as the case might be, were bound as a body to make good the value
of the stolen property, unless they succeeded in recovering the actual
goods or in tracing the offenders to another village. In the latter case
the delinquent village was forced to indemnify the owners of the
property. While this system afforded a moderate safeguard to each
village against the anti-social propensities of its own particular group
of criminal tribesmen, it failed to prevent crime and predatory
incursions by the Ramosis of other areas or by Bhils from the forest-
clad hills of the northern Deccan. It offered, moreover, unlimited
chances of subterfuge and blackmail on the part of the tribesmen
concerned. A striking example of the shortcomings of the system is
affcrded by the career of Umaji Naik, the famous Ramòsi outlaw,
who during the administration of Sir John Malcolm (1827-30) per-
petrated a long series of crimes against person and property, while
he was actually in receipt of a salary from the Bombay Government
for performing police duties in the Sasvad division of the Poona
collectorate. 2 His methods proved that there was nothing to prevent
the village police and the Ramosis combining to escape responsibility
by falsely saddling crimes upon the innocent. These watch and ward
arrangements were also of no avail in cases where the petty chiefs
and estate-holders of the Deccan plundered the villages of their rivals.
For the payment of fees and perquisites to the Ramosis or Bhils,
either by the village or by the government, was essentially a form of
blackmail, designed to secure immunity, partial or complete, from
the depredations of a body of professional criminals and freebooters,
and it naturally could not influence the intentions or actions of the
landed gentry, whenever its members chose to indulge in marauding
excursions through the countryside. Consequently, whenever serious
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 425-7.
2 Mackintosh, An Account of the Origin and Present Condition of the Tribe
of Ramossies, pp. 125-227.


## p. 393 (#421) ############################################

POLICE
393
epidemics of dacoity and other crime occurred, the government
authorities usually strengthened the village police with detachments
of sihbandis, or irregular infantry, from the neighbouring hill-forts.
The sihbandis in every district were under the control of the mamlat.
dar, and were maintained on the proceeds of a general house tax
imposed on the residents of the disturbed area. Their duty was to
support the village police under the patel and to oppose violence by
force of arms, but did not extend to the detection of crime. They were
alsc deputed to assist the village police in maintaining order at
festivals, fairs and other important social gatherings.
Under the misguided rule of Baji Rao II the district police system
was modified by the appointment of additional police officials, styled
tapasnavis, charged with the discovery and seizure of offenders. 1 These
officials were independent of the mamlatdar and other district autho-
rities, and their area of jurisdiction was not necessarily conterminous
with that of the revenue and police officials. As a class they were
shamelessly corrupt; they constantly extorted money by means of
false accusations, and were often hand in glove with avowed robbers
and outlaws. In the latter respect they were little less culpable than
the Maratha jagirdars and zamindars, who frequently offered an
asylum and protection to fugitive criminals wanted for serious crimes
in other districts.
In urban centres magisterial and police powers were vested in a
kotwal, who also performed municipal duties. He regulated prices,
took a census of the inhabitants, investigated and decided disputes
relating to immovable property, supplied labour to the government,
levied fees from professional gamblers, and, generally speaking,
performed most of the functions ascribed to the nagaraka or polica
superintendent in the Arthasastra of Kautilya. ? The best urban police
force at the close of the eighteenth century was unquestionably that
of the capital, Poona. It was composed of foot-police, mounted
patrols, and Ramosis, used principally as spies and trackers, and was
described as efficient. Opportunities for nocturnal delinquency on
the part of the inhabitants were, however, greatly lessened by a
strict curfew order which obliged everyone to remain within doors
after 10 p. m.
The Maratha army, composed of the mercenary forces of the
feudal chiefs and the regiments under the immediate command of the
Peshwa, had undergone a radical change since Sivaji's day. Originaliy
recruited from men who, though not invariably Marathas by race,
were yet united by a common bond of country and language, the
army tended, as the Maratha power spread across India, to assume
a professional rather than a national character. The real Maratha3
3
1 Forrest, op. cit. pp. 305-6.
Sen, op. cit. pp. 427-31; 522-4.
3 Idem, pp. 431-2; Tone, Institutions of the Maratha People, pp. 54-5.


## p. 394 (#422) ############################################

394
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
were gradually relegated almost entirely to the cavalry, in which their
horse-craft and knowledge of horse-breeding proved of the highest
value; the infantry was mostly drawn from Northern India; and the
artillery, which offered little attraction to the Maratha freebooter,
was manned and commanded by Portuguese and Indian Christians.
As has been mentioned, the military services of the various Maratha
chiefs and landholders were secured by the grant of saranjams (fiefs),
care being taken by the Peshwa and his Brahman secretariat so to
group the holdings of rival chiefs in the same area that the former
might reap full advantage from their inveterate mutual jealousies.
A hegemony founded on internal strife and dissension was not cal-
culated to give stability to the state; and ultimately the lack of
cohesion induced by this policy, coupled with the personal unpopu-
larity of the last Peshwa, contributed largely to the downfall of the
Maratha confederacy.
The Maratha state did little towards the economic improvement
of the country and the intellectual advancement of its inhabitants.
Being essentially a predatory power, it regarded itself as always in
a state of war, and a large proportion of its revenue was supplied by
marauding expeditions into the territory of its neighbours. Unlike
other ancient and contemporary Hindu governments, it constructed
no great works of public utility, and its interest in education was
confined to the annual grant of dakshina to deserving pandits and
vaids. ” In the days of Sivaji and his successors it had been one of the
duties. of the Pandit Rao to enquire into the merits and accomplish-
ments of applicants for this form of state aid and to settle in each case
the amount and character of the award. But the system had de-
generated at the opening of the nineteenth century into a form of
indiscriminate largesse to Brahmans, of whom some at least were
probably unworthy of special recognition. Some writers on Maratha
affairs have sought to discover the germ of modern postal communi-
cations in the system of intelligence maintained by the Maratha
Government. The comparison has no value, in view of the fact that,
although the jasuds (spies) and harkaras (messengers) did carry
messages and letters with astonishing rapidity throughout India, they
were primarily employed for political and military purposes, and not
for the public convenience. 3 They represented, in fact, during the
eighteenth century the official system of intelligence, which was
originally described in the Arthasastra and was perfected by Chan-
dragupta Maurya in the third century B. C.
A survey of Maratha administration must necessarily include some
account of the principal sources of the state revenues. The most
important items were the chauth (one-fourth) and sardesmukhi (the
tenth), which originally were payments in the nature of blackmail
>
2 Idem, pp. 470-2.
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 439-69.
3 Idem, pp. 469-70.


## p. 395 (#423) ############################################

LAND TENURES
395
made by districts under the government of other powers which
desired protection from plunder. While the proceeds of both levies
were reserved for the state treasury, the chauth from early days had
been sub-divided into the following shares :
(a) babti or 25 per cent. , reserved for the raja or ruler.
(b) mokasa or 66 per cent. , granted to Maratha sardars and chiefs
for the maintenance of troops.
(c) sahotra or 6 per cent. , granted to the pant sachiv.
(d) nadgaunda or 3 per cent. , awarded to various persons at the
ruler's pleasure.
This sub-division of chauth continued under the régime of the
Peshwas; and when the territories, which paid both the levies, were
finally incorporated in the Maratha dominions, the remaining three-
fourths of their revenues, after deducting the chauth, were styled
jagir and were also granted in varying proportions to different indi-
viduals. As previously stated, this system was characterised by a
multiplicity of individual claims upon the revenues of a single tract
or village, and consequently in great complication of the accounts,
which the Brahman secretariat in Poona was alone in a position to
comprehend and elucidate. During the Peshwa's rule a somewhat
similar sub-division was made of the sardesinukhi, which had origi-
nally been credited wholly to the raja, in accordance with Sivaji's
fictitious claim to be the hereditary sardesmukh of the Deccan.
The second important head of state revenue was the agricultural
assessment upon village lands, which were generally divided between
two classes of holders, the mirasdar and the upri. 2 The former, who
is supposed to have been the descendant of original settlers who
cleared the forest and first prepared the soil for agriculture, possessed
permanent proprietary rights and could not be ejected from his hold-
ing so long as his rent was paid to the government. His property was
hereditary and saleable; and even if he was dispossessed for failure
to pay the government dues, he had a right of recovery at any time
during the next thirty or forty years, on his liquidating all arrears.
The upri, on the other hand, was a stranger and tenant-at-will, who
merely rented and cultivated his fields with the permission and under
the supervision of the Peshwa's district officers. He did not enjoy
the same advantages and fixity of tenure as the mirasdar, but he was
not liable, like the latter, to sudden and arbitrary impositions, and
he bore a comparatively moderate proportion of the miscellaneous
village expenses, which included such items as the maintenance of
the village temple and the repair of the village well. Theoretically
the assessment on the village lands was supposed to be based on a
careful survey of the cultivated area, the lands themselves being
divided into three main classes. Allowance was also supposed to be
1 Sen, p. 112.
2 Idem, pp. 237-9


## p. 396 (#424) ############################################

396
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
made for the character of the crop and the facilities existing for
irrigation, and special rates were imposed upon coconut and other
plantations and also upon waste or permanently unproductive lands.
The assessment was payable either in cash or in kind, and it was gener-
ally recognised that reinission of the assessment and advances of money
and grain (tagai) should be granted to the peasantry in seasons of
drought and distress. Theoretically, indeed, the Maratha land revenue
system was favourable to the interests of the cultivator, and under
the rule of, a Peshwa like Madhu Rao I the peasantry were probably
contented and tolerably well off. But actually the patel was the only
person who could champion the rights of the villager against the
higher official authorities, and as the latter had usually to satisfy the
demands of the government and fill their own pockets at one and the
same time, the cultivator met with much less consideration than was
due to his position in the economic sphere. Under a bad ruler like
Baji Rao II, whose administration was stained by perfidy, rapacity and
cruelty, the equitable maxims of land revenue assessment and collec-
tion were widely neglected, and the cultivator was reduced in many
cases to practical penury by the merciless exactions of the Peshwa's
Dificials. In addition to the regular village. lands, there were certain
lands which were regarded as the private property of the Peshwa.
These fell into the four-fold category of pasture, garden, orchard, and
cultivated land, and were usually let on lease to upris under the
authority of the mamlatdar or kamávisdar, who was responsible for
recovering the rental and other dues from the tenant. 1
A third item of the Maratha revenues consisted of miscellaneous
taxes, which varied in different districts. They included, inter alia,
a tax of one year's rent in ten on the lands held by the destrukh and
despande, a tax on land reserved for the village Mahars, a triennial
cess on mirasdar occupants, a tax on land irrigated from wells, a
house tax recovered from everyone except Brahmans and village
officers, an annual fee for the testing of weights and measures, a tax
on marriage and on the remarriage of widows, taxes on sheep and
she-buffaloes, a pasturage fee, a tax on melon cultivation in river
beds, a succession duty, and a town duty, including a fee of 17 per
cent. on the sale of a house. There were several other taxes and cesses
of more or less importance, as for example the bat chhapai or fee for
the stamping of cloth and other merchandise; and some of these can
be traced back to the Mauryan epoch and were probably levied by
Indian rulers at an even earlier date. In theory such taxes were to
be proportioned in their incidence to the resources of the individual;
but on the not infrequent occasions when the Maratha Government
was pressed for money, it had no scruple in levying on all landholders
a karja: patti. or jasti patti, which was generally equivalent to one
year's income of the individual tax-payer. 2
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 277-307.
2 Idem, pp. 308-14.


## p. 397 (#425) ############################################

MISCELLANEOUS REVENUES
397
The fourth source of Maratha revenue was customs duties, which
fell roughly into the two classes of mohatarfa or taxes on trades an:
professions, and jakat or duties on purchase and sale, octroi and ferry
charges. The mohatarfa, for example, included a palanquin tax on
the Kolis, a shop tax on goldsmiths, blacksmiths, shoemakers and
other retail dealers, a tax on oil mills, potter's wheels and boats, and
a professional impost of three rupees a year on the Gondhalis or wor-
shippers of the goddess Bhavani. The jakat, a term originally borrow-
ed from the Muhammadans, was collected from traders of ail castes
and sects, and was farmed out to contractors, who were often corrupt
and oppressive. It was levied separately in each district, and was divi-
ded into thalbarit or tax at the place of loading the merchandise, thal.
mod or tax at the place of-sale, and chhapa or stamping-duty. In some
places a special fee on cattle, termed shingshinyoti, was also imposed.
Remissions of jakat were sometimes granted, particularly to cultivators
who had suffered from scarcity or from the incursions of troups; but,
as a rule, every trader had to submit to the inconvenience of having
his goods stopped frequently in transit for the payment of these dues
and octroi. Elphinstone records that the system was responsible for
the appearance of a class of hundikaris or middlemen, who in return
for a lump payment undertook to arrange with the custom farmers
for the unimpeded transit of a merchant's gonds. Brahmans and
government officials were usually granted exemption from duty on
goods imported for their own consumption, just as they were exenip-
ied from the house tax and certain minor cesses.
A small revenue was derived from forests by the sale of permits
to cut timber for building or for fuel, by the sale of grass, bamboos,
fuei and wild honey, and by fees for pasturage in reserved areas
(kurans). Licences for private mints also brought some profit to the
state treasury. These licences were issued to approved goldsmiths
(sonars), who paid a varying royalty and undertook to maintain a
standard proportion of alloy, on pain of fine and forfeiture 'of licence.
At times spurious and faulty coins were put into circulation, as foi
example in the Dharwar division in 1760. On that occasion the
Maratha Government closed all private mints in that area and esta-
blished in their stead a central inint, which charged a fee of seven
coins in every thousand. 3
The administration of justice produced a small and uncertain
amount of revenue. In civil disputes relating to money bonds, the
state claimed a fee of 25 per cent. of the amount realised; whicn
really amounted to a bribe to secure the assistance of the official who
heard the case. The general inertia of the government effectually
prevented the growth of revenue from legal fees and obliged suitors to
depend for satisfaction of their claims on private redress in the form
2 Idem, pp. 314-17.
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 321-5.
3 Idem, pp. 317:21.


## p. 398 (#426) ############################################

398
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
>
of takaza or dharna (dunning), or on patronage, which signified the
enlistment of the aid of a superior neighbour or influential friend. In
suits for partition of property worth more than 300 rupees in value,
the parties were expected to pay a fee at the rate of 10 per cent. of
the value of the property; fees were also charged in cases concerned
with maintenance or inheritance, particularly in cases in which an
applicant claimed to succeed to the estate of a childless brother. It
is not clear what proportion of the fines imposed in criminal proceed-
ings was credited to the state; but during the ministry of Nana
Phadnavis (1762-1800) the legal revenues included a considerable sum
extorted from persons suspected or found guilty of adultery.
No definite estimate of the total revenue of the Maratha state can
be given. Lord Valentia (1802-6) calculated the Feshwa's revenue at
rather more than 7,000,000 rupees; while J. Grant, writing in 1798,
estiniated the total revenue of the Maratha empire at six crores, and
the revenue of the Peshwa alone at not less than three crores of
rupees, including chauth from the Nizam, Tipu Sultan, and the Rajput
chiefs of Bundelkhand. The revenue of a state which subsists largely
on marauding excursions and blackmail, as the Maratha Government
did in the time both of Sivaji and the Peshwas, must necessarily
fluctuate; and the facts outlined in the preceding pages will serve to
indicate that, though the general principles of the domestic adminis-
tration may have been worthy of commendation, the practices of the
Maratha Government and its officials precluded all possibility of the
steady economic and educational advance of the country. Tone
records that the Maratha Government invariably anticipated its land
revenues.
These mortgages on the territorial income are negotiated by wealthy sou-
cars (between whom and the Minister there always exists a proper under-
standing), and frequently at a discount of 30 per cent. and then paid in the
inost depreciated specie.
Owing to the unsettled state of the country, the Maratha Government
preferred to raise a lump sum at enormous interest on the security
of the precarious revenue of the next two or four years, and made
little or no attempt to balance its revenue and current expenditure.
The Maratha army was organised primarily for the purpose of
plunder, and not so much for the extension of territory directly
administered; and the people were gradualiy impoverished by the
system of continuous freebooting, which the Marathas regarded as
their most important means of subsistence. The general tone of the
internal administration was not calculated to counteract to any
appreciable extent the feelings of instability and insecurity. engend-
ered among the mass of the people by the predatory activities of their
rulers. Indeed the constitution of the Maratha Government and army
was "more calculated to destroy, than to create an empire”; and the
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 371-3.
2 Idem; pp. 342-3.


## p. 399 (#427) ############################################

PREDATORY POLICY
399
spirit which directed their external policy and their internal admi-
nistration prevented all chance of permanent improvement of the
country over which they claimed sovereign rights. There can be no
doubt that the final destruction of the Maratha political power and
the substitution of orderly government by the East India Company
were necessary, and productive of incalculable benefit to India.


## p. 400 (#428) ############################################

CHAPTER XXIV
THE CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
THE English had been nearly two centuries in India before Ceylon
attracted their attention. They were too much occupied with, at
first, establishing a precarious foothold, and then extending their
conquests on the continent, to trouble much about a small island so
far to the south. There had indeed been a curious attempt at inter-
course as far back as 1664, which the Dutch historian, Valentyn,
records. The king of Kandi at that period had a penchant for retaining
in captivity any Englishman he could capture—mostly castaways
from merchant-ships wrecked on the coast, and an effort was made
to negotiate with him for their release, but it was abortive, and the
curtain fell for 100 years. But towards the end of the eighteenth
century, the rivalry with the Dutch became acute, and the protection
of our communications with our Indian possessions was a question
of vital importance. Not only might the Dutch prey upon our com-
merce from their harbours in Ceylon, but there was a fear lest other
nations, tempted by the tales of the fabulous wealth that poured into
Holland from the Isle of Spices, Inight be induced to forestall us.
Indeed the French, our dangerous rivals in India, had shown signs
of this inclination a hundred years earlier, and had sent a fleet to
attack Trinkomali. Though it was repulsed, a small embassy under
de Laverolle was dispatched to Kandi to negotiate with the raja. But
the ambassador was badly chosen: his unwise and intemperate
behaviour resulted not only in the failure of the mission but in his
own imprisonment.
The first serious attempt made by the English to gain a footing was
in 1762, when Pybus was sent to Kandi to arrange a treaty with the
raja, Kirti Sri. He has left an account of his mission-subsequently
published from the records of the Madras Government-which gives
a curicus, if somewhat tedious, sketch of the state of affairs at the
Kandian court. He was admitted to the audience hall at midnight,
and ordered to pull his shoes off and hold above his head the silver
dish containing the letter for the raja. Six separate curtains, white
and red, were withdrawn, and the king was then discovered seated
on his throne, which was a large chair, handsomely carved and gilt,
which may now be seen in Windsor Castle. The envoy was forced
upon his knees and had to make endless prostrations till at last his
painful progress ended at the foot of the throne, where he presented
his credentials. He describes the elaborate costume of the monarch,
and the decorations of the hall, and adds :
I should have been well enough pleased with the appearance it made, had


## p. 401 (#429) ############################################

>
CAPTURE OF COLOMBO
401
I been in a more agreeable situation. At the foot of the throne knelt one of
the King's Prime Ministers, to whom he communicated what he had to say to
me, who, after prostrating himself on the ground, related it to one of the
generals who sat by me; who, after having prostrated himself, explained it to
a Malabar doctor, who told it in Malabar to my cubash, and he to me. And
this ceremony was repeated on asking every question. 1
Whether or not this somewhat tortuous method of communicaticn
led to misunderstandings, the Madras Government took no steps to
pursue the matter further then; but in 1782 war' was declared against
the Dutch, an English fleet under Hughes captured Trinkomali, anci
Hugh Boyd was sent to Kandi to solicit the raja's help against the
Dutch. The failure of Pybus's mission had left a bad impression on
the Kandian court; the raja curtly refused to negotiate; and Trinko-
mali was next year lost to the French and finally restored to the
Dutch when peace was declared. However in 1795 the Dutch were
involved in the European upheaval, and had also got into trouble
with the Kandian court; and the English determined to strike. A
force under Colonel James Stuart was dispatched to Ceylon by the
governor of Madras, and accomplished its object with an unexpected
rapidity. The Dutch had been firmly established for 140 years along
the sea coast; they had built magnificent forts--the great foriress of
Jaffna, which is little the worse for wear even to-day, was perhaps the
finest specimen—and they were a sturdy and tenacious people. But
the smaller sea-ports were easily occupied, and the garrison of Colombo
marched out without a blow. The English historian asserts that the
enemy was in a state of utter demoralisation. When the English
entered the gates of Colombo, he says,
the Duich were found by us in a state of the most infamous disorder and
drunkenness, in no discipline, no obedience, no spirit. The soldiers then awoke
to a sense of their degradation, but it was too late; they accused Van Angelbeck
of betraying them, vented loud reproaches against their commanders, and
recklessly insulted the British as they filed into the fortress, even spitiing on
them as they passed. "
On the other hand it is asserted that adequate preparations had been
made for the defence, but that the surrender was due to the treachery
of the governor. Van Angelbeck. The facts were as follows. Early
in 1795 an English agent, Hugh Cleghorn, induced the Comte de
Meuron, colonel propriétaire of the Swiss regiment of that nanie, to
transfer his regiment, then forming the chief part of the Ceylon
forces, from the Dutch to the English service. Cleghorn and de
Meuron arrived in India in the following September. Much seemed
to depend upon the conduct of Van Angelbeck. He was believed
to be an Orangist, but several of his council were strong revolution-
aries, and it was feared that precipitate action might lead to the
governor's arrest or murder. It was decided therefore to send him a
"Pybus, Mission, t. 79,
2 Percival, r. 118.