Tout
cocy tend a mettre le Roi sous la
loi, touteffois il y a un axiomo aux
Paudoctes, qui dit qu'il n'est sous la
VOL.
cocy tend a mettre le Roi sous la
loi, touteffois il y a un axiomo aux
Paudoctes, qui dit qu'il n'est sous la
VOL.
Thomas Carlyle
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 333
or sin, and therefore the wisest men have thought that the
law should be added, to enlighten his ignorance, and to bring
him back into the right way if he errs. 1
Buchanan expresses this again in more general terms, and
says that kings were created to maintain "aequitas," and
if they had done this they would have retained an authority
free and "legibus solutus "; but, as is natural in human
things, the authority which was intended for the public
good changed into a " proud lordship. " Laws therefore were
made by the people, and the kings were compelled to obey
the law which the people had created. They had found, by
much experience, that it was better to entrust their liberty
to the law than to the king. 2
The king is subject to the law, and Buchanan then dis-
cusses the question, who is the legislator? The people, he
says, who have conferred authority upon the prince should
have the power to impose a limit upon this authority. He
explains that he did not mean that this power should be
given to the whole mass of the people, but that, as "our"
1 Georgo Buchanan, 'De Jure Regni
apud Scotos. '
(p. 8): "B. Haec igitur (prudential,
si sirama et perfecta in quopiam
esset, tum natura, non suffragiis
regem esse diceremus; liboramque
re rum omnium potestatem ei tra-
ileremus: sin talem non reperiamus,
qui proximo ad ilism eccellentem
naturae praestantiam accesserit, simili-
tudinem quandam in eo veri regis
amplexi, etiam regem appellabimus
. . . Et quoniam advorsus animi affec-
tionos, quae possum et plerumque
solent avertere a vero, ne satis firmus
sit, timemus, legem ei, velut collegam,
aut potius moderatricem libidinum,
adjiciemus.
M. Non censes igitur re rum omnium
arbitrium penes regom osse debere!
B. Hinime. Nam eum, non solum
regem, sed etiam hominem esse memini,
multa per ignorant iam errantom, multa
sponte poccantem, multa prope invi-
tum; quippe animal ad omnem favoris
et odii auram facile mutabile. . . .
Quamobrem legem ei adjungendam
censuerunt homines prudentissimi, quae
vel ignoranti viam ostendat, vel aber-
rantem in viam reducat. Ex his
opinor, intelligis, ui iv Tuiry, quodnam
ego veri regis officium esse reor. "
* Id. id. (p. 8): "Ulud igitur, quod
initio diximus, tenere semper oportet,
reges primum tuendae aequitati fuisse
constitutos. Id illi si tenere potuissent,
imperium, quale acceperant, tenere
perpetuo potuissent, hoc est liberum
et legibus solutum. Sed (ut humana
sunt omnia) statu re rum in pejus pro-
labente, quod publicae utilitatis causa
fuerat constitutum imperium, in super-
bam dominationem vertit. . . . Leges
igitur, hae de causa, inventae sunt a
populis, regesque coacti, non sua in
judiciis Iicentia, sed, quod populus in
se dedisset, jure uti. Multis enim
edooti erant experimentis, melius libor-
? ? tatem legibus quam regibus credi. "
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? 334
[PABT IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
custom is, men chosen from all the "orders" should enter
into counsel with the king, and only after this Trpo/3ov\ev/j. a
should the final judgment be given by the people. 1 Maitland
objected that the people were rash and inconstant, and
says that these advisers will be no better. Buchanan replies
that he thinks differently. For the many not only know more,
and are wiser than any one of them, but they are wiser and
know more than any single person, even if he excel every one
of them in prudence and intelligence; the multitude judges
all questions better than any one man. 2
Buchanan also maintains that the interpretation of the
Law must not be left to the judgment of the king. 3
We shall return to Buchanan later when we deal with the
whole question of the position of the king, but in the mean-
while it is clear where he stands with regard to the source
and the authority of the Law. He is, under his own terms,
setting out the normal medieval conceptions.
We must turn to the treatment of law in the great and
complex mass of. the political tracts of the period of the civil
wars in France. The immediate occasion of these civil wars
was, no doubt, the question of religion; but it is also evident
that the religious conflict was the occasion rather than the
cause of the development of a very emphatic constitutionalism.
? Id. id. (p. 13): "M. Quando
igitur re gem solvere legibus non licet,
quia tandem est legislator, quem ei
tanquam pedagogum dabimus? . . .
B. Neminem ergo ei dominum impono,
sed populo, qui ei imperium in se dedit,
licere volo, ut ejus imperii modum ei
prescribat: eoque jure, quod populus
in se dederit, ut rex utatur, postulo.
Nequo has leges per vim, ut tu inter-
pretaris imponi volo, sed communicato
cum rege consilio, communiter statuen-
dum arbitror, quod ad omnium salu-
tem communiter faciat. . . . Ego
nunquam existimavi universi populi
judicio, eam rem permitti deberi;
sed ut, prope ad consuetudinem nos-
tram, ex omnibus ordinibus selecti ad
regem in concilium coirent. Deinde,
ubi apud eos, wpo$oi':\tvfia factum osset,
id ad populi judicium deferetur. "
> Id. id. (p. 13): "B. At ego
longe aliud ac tu opinaris exspecto. . . .
Primum, non omnino verum est, quod
tu putas, nihil ad rem facere multi-
tudinis advocationem, quorum e
numero nemo fortassis erit excellenti
sapientia praeditus. Non enim solum
plus vident et sapiunt multi, quam
unus quilibet eorum soorsum, sed etiam
quam unus, qui quemvis eorum ingenio
et prudentia praecedat. Nam multi-
tudo fere melius quam singuli de rebus
omnibus judicat. "
>> Id. id. , p. 121.
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 335
It was between the years 1573 and 1579 that there appeared
several tracts or pamphlets, the ' Eemonstrance aux Seigneurs
Gentilshommes et autres,' the 'Droit des Magistrats,' the
'Franco Gallia,' the ' Archon et Politie ' (or ' la Politique '), and
the ' Vindiciae contra tyrannos,' and others which are related
to each other in subject-matter and in principles. The general
principle, which they seek to assert, is well expressed in the
'Eemonstrance. ' This work is addressed, primarily, to the
nobles and gentlemen of the Eeformed Eeligion in France,
but also to all those Frenchmen who sought the preservation
of the kingdom, and it begins with the declaration that the
name of Frenchman (Francs) was a proper description of
men who desired to maintain an honourable liberty under the
authority of their kings. 1
It goes on a little later to denounce the flatterers and
parasites who tell the king that if he were under the rule and
order of the Law he would be nothing but a ' valet" of the
people, and to lament the fact that the Courts of Parlement,
which were formerly over the kings and resisted their absolute
power, were now basely servile to the commands of those
from whom they expected rewards. 2 The statement that
the king was under and not over the Law, and that the
Parliament was the organ of the supremacy of the Law, may
seem somewhat extreme, but it should be remembered that
it is practically what had been said in the early years of
the sixteenth century by de Seyssel in the ' La Grant Monarchie
de France. ' 3
The same principle is restated in the 'Droit des Magis-
trats. ' It is the part of a detestable flatterer, and not of
* "Remonstrance aux Seigneurs,
gentils hommee, et autres, faisans pro-
fession de la Religion reformee en
France, et tous autres bons Francais
deeirant la conservation de ce royaume. "
(In 'Memoires de l'estat de France,'
Ed. 1576, vol. iii. p. 64. )
* Id. id. (p. 73): "Voyons nostre
roi, environne de tels flattoroaus et
parasites, qui pour lui gratifier, osent
dire, que de reduire les Roys a la roigle
et ordre prescrit par les loix c'est autant
que les faire valets du peuple. . . .
(p. 74): Les cours de parlement qui
anciennement estoyent pardessus les
Rois, et s'opposoient avec grande
integrite? a leur puissanoes absolues,
aujourd'hui se laschent servilement aux
commandements de tous ceux dont ils
esperent prouflt. "
? Cf. pp. 219 225.
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? 336
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART IV.
a loyal subject, to tell the prince that sovereigns are not
bound by the Laws. On the contrary, they are bound
to govern by them, for they have sworn to maintain and
to protect them. 1 In a later passage of the same work we
find a good illustration of the circumstances under which
the Huguenots thus appealed to the supremacy of the
Law. The author admits that subjects have not the right
to force their lord to change the order of the State in matters
of religion, but must submit to persecution, if the laws com-
mand it, for their religion. It is, however, wholly different
if by public edicts, lawfully issued and confirmed by public
authority, they have been permitted to exercise their religion.
In that case the prince is bound to obey them, or by the
same authority to revoke them. Otherwise he is exercising
a manifest tyranny, and it is lawful, under proper conditions,
to resist. 2
The same conceptions are restated and further developed in
the treatise called 'La Politique, Dialogue de l'authorite? des
Princes, et de la liberte? des peuples,' generally cited as 'Archon
et Politie. ' Tyranny, Politie says, in an hereditary kingdom,
is when a legitimate prince is not content with what he has
1 "Du Droit des Magistrats" (in
'Me? moires de l'estat de France,' Ed.
1576), vol. ii. p. 750: "Car, pour
certain, c'est une parole tres fausse,
et non poinet d'un loyal sujet a` son
Prince, mais d'un de? testable flatteur,
de dire que les souverains ne sont
astraints a` nulles loix. Car, au con-
traire, il n'y en a pas une, par laquelle
il ne doyve et soit tenu de regler
son gouvernement, puis qu'il a jure?
d'estre le mainteneur et protecteur de
toutes. "
1 Id. id. (p. 788): "En tel cas, donc-
ques, assavoir, si on veut forcer les
consciences d'idolatrer, que ferons les
sujets? Certainement, de vouloir
contraindre leurs seigneur a` changer
l'estat publio il n'y auroit ordre: et
pourtant il faut que tous endurent
patiemment la persecution, ce neant-
moins servans a` Dieu, ou bien qu'ils
se retirent d'ailleurs.
Mais, les Edits, estans legitimement
dresses et emologuez par authorite?
publique, par lesquels sera permis
d'exercer la vraye Religion: je dis
que le prince est d'autant plus tonu
de les observer, que nuls autre, que
l'estat de la Religion est de plus grande
consequence que nul autre: ou bien
par mosme ordre, et telle connaissance
de cause qu'il appartient, les revoquer.
Sinon, je dis, qu'il use de manifeste
tyrannie, a` laquelle il est permis de
s'opposer, avec les distinctions ci-
dessus mentionnees; voire par raison
d'autant meilleure, que nos ames et
nos consciences nous doyvent estre
plus cheres que tous les biens de ce
monde. "
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OP LAW.
337
lawfully acquired, but violates the ancient laws and customs
of his country. 1
Archon protests that this is to put the king under the
law, but there is a sentence in the Pandects which says that
he is not under the law, though " par honnestete? " he should
carry it out. For it is he who makes the law, and he does
not submit to it except so far as he pleases, otherwise his
power is not sovereign but bridled and restrained. 2
To this contention Politie replies by considering the real
source of laws. He cites the definitions of law by Papinian,
Demosthenes, and Chrysippus (' Dig. ,' i. 3. 1, and 2), and
the opinion of Cicero that the deliberation and consent of the
commonwealth are implied in the laws, and that the prince
must therefore be subject to them. 3
When Archon contends that the Civil Law is composed of
the ordinances of princes, and that in all its parts it is subject
to their power, Politie replies that in general terms the Law
includes all ordinances which are just; these have been
formed by the people in their customs. If they are not suit-
able, the prince can adjust them to the needs of particular
times and persons, but must not usurp the power to do this
without the consent of those who are most concerned* Archon
objects that this is very far indeed from the opinion of many
kings, who consider that their subjects, their lives, and
property are completely under their power. Politie agrees
that they are under their jurisdiction, but only by process of
1 "Archon et Politie," in (' Me-
moiros do l'etat do Franco,' Ed. 1576),
vol. iii. p. 102: "Politie. Mais celle
(tyrannie) qui survient en una royaume
qui est tenu pour hereditaire, est,
quand un prince, le? gitimement pour-
venu, no se contente pas de ce qu'il
trouve de droit equitable luy estre
acquis, ains pour dominer plus seig-
neurialement viole les anciennes loix
et ooutumes do ses pays. "
? Id. id. (p. 110): "Archon.
Tout
cocy tend a mettre le Roi sous la
loi, touteffois il y a un axiomo aux
Paudoctes, qui dit qu'il n'est sous la
VOL. VI.
loi, combien que par honneetete? , il
s'y doit ranger. Par ainsi, puis que
e'est lui qui la donne, il ne s'y subniet
pas s'il ne luy plait; ou autrement
on ne doit pas nommer sa puissance,
souveraine, mais bridee et restrainte. "
? Id. (p. 110): "Politie. Ciceron
. . . dit quo l'entrotenement et con-
soil de la re? publique estans situoz
dans les loix, faut nocessairement que
le prince y soit sujet: d'autant que
son autorito soit de la, et se maintient
par la conservation de justice qui i-. t
descrite en icello. "
* Id. (p. 117).
T
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? 338 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
law,1 and he adds a reminiscence of the Feudal Law, that the
Lord owes the same faith and love to his vassal as the vassal
to him, and loses his lordship for the same causes and crimes
as the vassal loses his fief. 2
In another place the author of this treatise, like the author
of the 'Droit des Magistrats,' appeals to the supremacy of
the Law as justifying the resistance of the Huguenots to
persecution, when the exercise of their religion had been
granted them by formal laws and edicts; and he extends
this principle to the general legal rights of the people, for,
as he says, there are few kingdoms or principalities where
the chief rulers are not restrained by many laws to which
they have sworn, when they were accepted, and which they
have promised to the sovereign power to obey--that is, to
the estates which are formed by the whole body of the people. 3
(We shall have much more to say later of the conception of the
sovereign power which is represented in these words. )
The best known of these Huguenot works is the ' Vindiciae
Contra Tyrannos,' published in 1579. There has been much
discussion of its authorship, but we are not here concerned
with this but with the judgment of the author on the origin
of law and its relation to the prince. His judgment is very
clearly expressed. Men would have been satisfied to have
received law from one good and just man, but the judgment
1 Id. (p. 120): "Archon. Quoy, les
roys n'ont-ila pas puissance sur la
mort et sur la vie de leurs sujets?
"Politie. Oui bien, mais avec con-
nsissance de cause et informations
valables, et non autrement. "
1 Id. id.
>> Id. (p. 128): "Politie: Et si par
lois et edits solennels, le peuple a obtenu
de ses princes l'exercice de la vraye
Religion; et puis apres par mauvais
conseil, le prince se veut desdire et
oster tyranniquement ce qu'il avait
sainctement accorde? , les sujets ont
double raison de ne luy obeyr en cest
endroit, et de conserver leur vraye
liborte? , par les moyeus le? gitimes sus
declarez, dont nous parlerons encore
apre`s.
Gela se doit estendre aussi aux
autres droits du peuple, lesquels ne
peuvent estre abolis sans manifeste
confusion et aneantissement des Estats,
et a` plus forte raison quand les lois
reiglont des longtemps la grandeur des
princes et magistrats souverains:
comme il se trouvera bien peu de
royaumes et principautez, dont les
principaux gouverneurs ne soyent liez
et retenus en limites par beauooup de
lois, queux mesmes jurent a` leur
reception, et promettent a` la souver-
ainete? (c'est a` dire aux Estats com-
posez du corps de tout le peuple) de
garder inviolablement. "
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? chap. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW.
339
of kings was too uncertain and variable. Laws were therefore
made by the wise men and the magistrates. The principal
function of the king is to keep and maintain the law. It is
better to obey the law than the king; the law is the soul
of the king, while the king is the instrument of the law. The
law represents the combined reason and wisdom of the many,
for the many see and understand more than the one. It
has thus come about that while in the earliest times kings
reigned absolutely and their will was law, this now only
continues among barbarians, while the more polite and
civilised people are bound by laws. We do not accept the
saying of Caracalla that the emperor makes laws but does
not receive them; rather in all well-ordered kingdoms the
king receives the law from the people, and does not obtain
the kingdom until he has promised to give every man his
right (jus) according to the laws of the country. He can
only amend or add to the laws when this has been approved
by the people, or the chief men of the people, formally or
informally, called together. 1
1 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos ' (Ed.
Edinburgh, 1579), Q. ILT. (p. 114):
"Carte cum populus jus aequabile
quereret, id si ab uno jus to et bono
viro consequebatur, eo contentus erat.
At quia vix id fieri poterat, et raro
contingobat; saepe vero, dum arbitria
Regum, legum instar osscnt, evoniebat,
ut alia aliis loquerentur. Leges tum
quae cum omnibus una oademque voce
loquuntur, a prudentioribus et ceteris
magistratibus proximo inventn<< fuer-
unt. Regibus vero id procipua munoris
commendatur, ut legum custodes,
ministri et conservatores ossent. Inter -
dum etiam, quia lex in omnem eventum
prospicero non potuerat, quaedam ex
eadem aequitate naturali supplerent.
. . . (p. 115) Quia vero ambigat, quin
legi, quam regi parere, id est homini,
utilius et honestius sit? Lex est boni
regis anima: per hanc movetur, sentit,
vivit. Rex legis organum est, et
quasi corpus, per quod ilia suas vires
exerit, sua munora obit, sua sensa
eloquitur. Animae vero, quam corpori
parere justius est.
Lex est multorum prudentum in
unum collecta ratio et sapientia. Plures
autem oculatiores et perspicaciores
sunt quam unus. . . . (p. 117) Inde
vero pactum est, inquit idem, ut
quum primis temporibus reges absolute
imperarent, quorum arbitrium lex
erat, paulo post inter politiores et
civiliores passim legitimi fioront, id est,
legibus servandia oustodiendisque obli-
garentur; absoluta vero ilia potestas,
ponos barbarorum regee tantum man-
eret. . . . (p. 119) Non denique quod
ipse Caracalla, Imperatores leges daro,
non accipere. Quin potius in omnibus
regnis bene constitutis, regem a populo
leges, quas tueatur quasque intueatur,
accipere. . . . (p. 121) Neque enim
Imperator, Rex Franciae, Regos His-
paniae, Angliae, Poloniae, Hungariae et
? ? omnes legitimi principes . . . prius in
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? 340
[PART IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The author of the ' Vindiciae ' adds some important observa-
tions on the actual or traditional practice of some of the
more important countries of Western Europe. In the empire
the emperor " rogat in concilio," and, if they approve, the
princes, barons, and representatives of the cities sign the
decree, and only then is the law valid; the emperor swears
to observe the laws which have been thus made, and not
to make other laws except with the common consent. In
France, where the authority of the king is commonly thought
to be higher than elsewhere, laws were formerly made in the
Assembly of the three Orders, and all commands of the king
were void, unless the Senate (i. e. , the Parlement) ratified
them. In England, Spain, and Hungary the custom is the
same as it always was. He concludes that if it is true that
the laws are greater than the king, if kings must obey the
law as the slave does his master, who would not prefer to
obey the law rather than the king? Who would obey the
king if he violated the law, or would refuse to defend the
law which had been violated ! 1
These writers are agreed in maintaining that the king
was under the law and not over it, for his authority was
derived from the law, and the law proceeds ultimately from
principatum rocipiuntur, quam . . . se
secundum leges patriae jus ouique
suum roddituros promiserint. . . . (p.
122) In summa, principes legitimi,
leges a populo accipiunt, diadema vero
honoris, sceptrum potestatis, insigne,
ut et acceptas tueatur et ex earum
praecipua tutela gloriam sibi quaerant.
. . . Si quid abrogandum, surrogan-
dum, derogandum, putabit, populum,
populive optimatos, aut ordinarios,
aut extra ordine convocatos, admonebit
legemque rogabit. At sane non prius
jubebit, quam ab iisdem rite expensa
comprobataque fuerit. "
1 Id. (p. 123): "Imperator rogat pri-
mum in Comitiis. Si probatur, Prin-
cipes, Barones, civitatum legati sub-
signent ac demum lex rata esse solet.
Jurat vero se leges (p. 124) latns serva-
turum, et novas non nisi de communi
consensu, ullas laturum. . . In Francia,
ubi tamen amplissima vulgo censetur
regum auctoritas, ferebantur olim
leges in trium ordinum conventu,
regiove consilio ambulatorio. Ex quo
vero Parlamentum statarium est,
frustra sunt omnia regum edicta, ni
senatus ilia comprobet, cum tamen
senatus seu Parlamenti aresta, si lex
desit, legis vim passim obtinesnt.
Et in Anglico, Hispanico, Hungarico,
et caeteris idem juris est, ut et in
antiquis quoque fuit. . . . Quod si
vero, ut ostendimus, leges regibus
potiores sunt, si reges legibus, ut servi
dominis, parero tenentur; quis non
legi, quam regi parere malit? quia
regi legem violanti obsequatur. Quis
violatae auxilium fcrro recuset? "
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 341
the community. They admit that, in the earliest stages of
human life, men may have submitted to the authority of
rulers, uncontrolled by law; but they found long ago that it
was impossible to submit to the arbitrary and capricious
rule of one man, and this only now survives among barbarous
and uncivilised people; and, as we have just seen, the author
of the 'Vindiciae ' asserts this principle of the supremacy of
the Law of the community as representing the normal con-
ception of the greater European countries.
It may be suggested that these writers were Protestants,
though, as we have observed, there is nothing in these con-
tentions which represents an appeal to distinctively Pro-
testant opinions. We turn, therefore, to a group of writers
who belonged to the Order of the Jesuits.
We begin with Molina, an important Spanish Jesuit, whose
work, 'De Justitia et Jure,' was published in 1592. He
maintains that the light of nature teaches that it is in the
power of the commonwealth to entrust authority over itself
to one or more persons, as it judges best. This authority is
greater or less according to its judgment, and if the ruler
endeavours to exercise more authority than is given to him,
he acts tyrannically. 1
Having thus set out clearly the source and limits of the
authority of the ruler, Molina approaches the subject with
which we are here immediately concerned--that is, the con-
ditions of the legislative authority.
One of the functions of the king is to make laws, but the
question must be considered whether the people gave him
the power to make laws only with their approval, or without
1 Molina, 'De Justitia et Jure,'
vol. i. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23: "Lumen
ipsum naturae docet, in reipublicae
arbitrio esse positum, committere
alicui, vel aliquibus, regimen et potes-
tfttem supra se ipsum, prout voluerit,
expedireque judicaverit. . . . (3) Cum
autem potestas a republica in rectores
derivetur, pro ipsius reipublicae arbi-
tratu, poterit sane in unaquaque
reipublicae specie, derivari amplior, et
minus ample, neque est maior in
reipublicae rectoribus quam a republica
fuerit illis concessa. Quin potius, si
rec tores eam extendant, maioremque
sibi usurpant, in tyrannidem per in-
justitiam, quam ea in parte committunt,
degenerant. "
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? 342
[past rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
it; and Molina thinks that if it is the custom that laws have
no force unless they are approved by the people, it must be
assumed that the commonwealth only granted to the king
the legislative power, subject to this condition; for it is more
probable that the king increased his power, the subjects not
venturing to resist, than that they had diminished the power
which they had given him. If, as Castro suggested, the
custom was that the commonwealth should obey all the laws
of the prince which were not actually unjust, it would have
to be concluded that it had granted all its authority to the
king, but it could scarcely be believed that any commonwealth
had done this. 1 Molina's principle seems to be clear, that
it is almost incredible that the commonwealth should have
completely surrendered all that authority, which originally
belonged to it, to the ruler.
It must not indeed be supposed that Molina was an enemy
of monarchy; indeed, he clearly holds that it is the best
form of government, for it tends more to internal peace than
any other form,2 and he maintains that the authority of the
monarch is greater, not merely than that of individuals in
the commonwealth, but than that of the whole commonwealth
--that is, within the limits of the authority which has been
granted to him. 3 But again, it must be observed that this
authority is limited, and if the king attempts to take more
'Id. id. id.
? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 333
or sin, and therefore the wisest men have thought that the
law should be added, to enlighten his ignorance, and to bring
him back into the right way if he errs. 1
Buchanan expresses this again in more general terms, and
says that kings were created to maintain "aequitas," and
if they had done this they would have retained an authority
free and "legibus solutus "; but, as is natural in human
things, the authority which was intended for the public
good changed into a " proud lordship. " Laws therefore were
made by the people, and the kings were compelled to obey
the law which the people had created. They had found, by
much experience, that it was better to entrust their liberty
to the law than to the king. 2
The king is subject to the law, and Buchanan then dis-
cusses the question, who is the legislator? The people, he
says, who have conferred authority upon the prince should
have the power to impose a limit upon this authority. He
explains that he did not mean that this power should be
given to the whole mass of the people, but that, as "our"
1 Georgo Buchanan, 'De Jure Regni
apud Scotos. '
(p. 8): "B. Haec igitur (prudential,
si sirama et perfecta in quopiam
esset, tum natura, non suffragiis
regem esse diceremus; liboramque
re rum omnium potestatem ei tra-
ileremus: sin talem non reperiamus,
qui proximo ad ilism eccellentem
naturae praestantiam accesserit, simili-
tudinem quandam in eo veri regis
amplexi, etiam regem appellabimus
. . . Et quoniam advorsus animi affec-
tionos, quae possum et plerumque
solent avertere a vero, ne satis firmus
sit, timemus, legem ei, velut collegam,
aut potius moderatricem libidinum,
adjiciemus.
M. Non censes igitur re rum omnium
arbitrium penes regom osse debere!
B. Hinime. Nam eum, non solum
regem, sed etiam hominem esse memini,
multa per ignorant iam errantom, multa
sponte poccantem, multa prope invi-
tum; quippe animal ad omnem favoris
et odii auram facile mutabile. . . .
Quamobrem legem ei adjungendam
censuerunt homines prudentissimi, quae
vel ignoranti viam ostendat, vel aber-
rantem in viam reducat. Ex his
opinor, intelligis, ui iv Tuiry, quodnam
ego veri regis officium esse reor. "
* Id. id. (p. 8): "Ulud igitur, quod
initio diximus, tenere semper oportet,
reges primum tuendae aequitati fuisse
constitutos. Id illi si tenere potuissent,
imperium, quale acceperant, tenere
perpetuo potuissent, hoc est liberum
et legibus solutum. Sed (ut humana
sunt omnia) statu re rum in pejus pro-
labente, quod publicae utilitatis causa
fuerat constitutum imperium, in super-
bam dominationem vertit. . . . Leges
igitur, hae de causa, inventae sunt a
populis, regesque coacti, non sua in
judiciis Iicentia, sed, quod populus in
se dedisset, jure uti. Multis enim
edooti erant experimentis, melius libor-
? ? tatem legibus quam regibus credi. "
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? 334
[PABT IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
custom is, men chosen from all the "orders" should enter
into counsel with the king, and only after this Trpo/3ov\ev/j. a
should the final judgment be given by the people. 1 Maitland
objected that the people were rash and inconstant, and
says that these advisers will be no better. Buchanan replies
that he thinks differently. For the many not only know more,
and are wiser than any one of them, but they are wiser and
know more than any single person, even if he excel every one
of them in prudence and intelligence; the multitude judges
all questions better than any one man. 2
Buchanan also maintains that the interpretation of the
Law must not be left to the judgment of the king. 3
We shall return to Buchanan later when we deal with the
whole question of the position of the king, but in the mean-
while it is clear where he stands with regard to the source
and the authority of the Law. He is, under his own terms,
setting out the normal medieval conceptions.
We must turn to the treatment of law in the great and
complex mass of. the political tracts of the period of the civil
wars in France. The immediate occasion of these civil wars
was, no doubt, the question of religion; but it is also evident
that the religious conflict was the occasion rather than the
cause of the development of a very emphatic constitutionalism.
? Id. id. (p. 13): "M. Quando
igitur re gem solvere legibus non licet,
quia tandem est legislator, quem ei
tanquam pedagogum dabimus? . . .
B. Neminem ergo ei dominum impono,
sed populo, qui ei imperium in se dedit,
licere volo, ut ejus imperii modum ei
prescribat: eoque jure, quod populus
in se dederit, ut rex utatur, postulo.
Nequo has leges per vim, ut tu inter-
pretaris imponi volo, sed communicato
cum rege consilio, communiter statuen-
dum arbitror, quod ad omnium salu-
tem communiter faciat. . . . Ego
nunquam existimavi universi populi
judicio, eam rem permitti deberi;
sed ut, prope ad consuetudinem nos-
tram, ex omnibus ordinibus selecti ad
regem in concilium coirent. Deinde,
ubi apud eos, wpo$oi':\tvfia factum osset,
id ad populi judicium deferetur. "
> Id. id. (p. 13): "B. At ego
longe aliud ac tu opinaris exspecto. . . .
Primum, non omnino verum est, quod
tu putas, nihil ad rem facere multi-
tudinis advocationem, quorum e
numero nemo fortassis erit excellenti
sapientia praeditus. Non enim solum
plus vident et sapiunt multi, quam
unus quilibet eorum soorsum, sed etiam
quam unus, qui quemvis eorum ingenio
et prudentia praecedat. Nam multi-
tudo fere melius quam singuli de rebus
omnibus judicat. "
>> Id. id. , p. 121.
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 335
It was between the years 1573 and 1579 that there appeared
several tracts or pamphlets, the ' Eemonstrance aux Seigneurs
Gentilshommes et autres,' the 'Droit des Magistrats,' the
'Franco Gallia,' the ' Archon et Politie ' (or ' la Politique '), and
the ' Vindiciae contra tyrannos,' and others which are related
to each other in subject-matter and in principles. The general
principle, which they seek to assert, is well expressed in the
'Eemonstrance. ' This work is addressed, primarily, to the
nobles and gentlemen of the Eeformed Eeligion in France,
but also to all those Frenchmen who sought the preservation
of the kingdom, and it begins with the declaration that the
name of Frenchman (Francs) was a proper description of
men who desired to maintain an honourable liberty under the
authority of their kings. 1
It goes on a little later to denounce the flatterers and
parasites who tell the king that if he were under the rule and
order of the Law he would be nothing but a ' valet" of the
people, and to lament the fact that the Courts of Parlement,
which were formerly over the kings and resisted their absolute
power, were now basely servile to the commands of those
from whom they expected rewards. 2 The statement that
the king was under and not over the Law, and that the
Parliament was the organ of the supremacy of the Law, may
seem somewhat extreme, but it should be remembered that
it is practically what had been said in the early years of
the sixteenth century by de Seyssel in the ' La Grant Monarchie
de France. ' 3
The same principle is restated in the 'Droit des Magis-
trats. ' It is the part of a detestable flatterer, and not of
* "Remonstrance aux Seigneurs,
gentils hommee, et autres, faisans pro-
fession de la Religion reformee en
France, et tous autres bons Francais
deeirant la conservation de ce royaume. "
(In 'Memoires de l'estat de France,'
Ed. 1576, vol. iii. p. 64. )
* Id. id. (p. 73): "Voyons nostre
roi, environne de tels flattoroaus et
parasites, qui pour lui gratifier, osent
dire, que de reduire les Roys a la roigle
et ordre prescrit par les loix c'est autant
que les faire valets du peuple. . . .
(p. 74): Les cours de parlement qui
anciennement estoyent pardessus les
Rois, et s'opposoient avec grande
integrite? a leur puissanoes absolues,
aujourd'hui se laschent servilement aux
commandements de tous ceux dont ils
esperent prouflt. "
? Cf. pp. 219 225.
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? 336
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART IV.
a loyal subject, to tell the prince that sovereigns are not
bound by the Laws. On the contrary, they are bound
to govern by them, for they have sworn to maintain and
to protect them. 1 In a later passage of the same work we
find a good illustration of the circumstances under which
the Huguenots thus appealed to the supremacy of the
Law. The author admits that subjects have not the right
to force their lord to change the order of the State in matters
of religion, but must submit to persecution, if the laws com-
mand it, for their religion. It is, however, wholly different
if by public edicts, lawfully issued and confirmed by public
authority, they have been permitted to exercise their religion.
In that case the prince is bound to obey them, or by the
same authority to revoke them. Otherwise he is exercising
a manifest tyranny, and it is lawful, under proper conditions,
to resist. 2
The same conceptions are restated and further developed in
the treatise called 'La Politique, Dialogue de l'authorite? des
Princes, et de la liberte? des peuples,' generally cited as 'Archon
et Politie. ' Tyranny, Politie says, in an hereditary kingdom,
is when a legitimate prince is not content with what he has
1 "Du Droit des Magistrats" (in
'Me? moires de l'estat de France,' Ed.
1576), vol. ii. p. 750: "Car, pour
certain, c'est une parole tres fausse,
et non poinet d'un loyal sujet a` son
Prince, mais d'un de? testable flatteur,
de dire que les souverains ne sont
astraints a` nulles loix. Car, au con-
traire, il n'y en a pas une, par laquelle
il ne doyve et soit tenu de regler
son gouvernement, puis qu'il a jure?
d'estre le mainteneur et protecteur de
toutes. "
1 Id. id. (p. 788): "En tel cas, donc-
ques, assavoir, si on veut forcer les
consciences d'idolatrer, que ferons les
sujets? Certainement, de vouloir
contraindre leurs seigneur a` changer
l'estat publio il n'y auroit ordre: et
pourtant il faut que tous endurent
patiemment la persecution, ce neant-
moins servans a` Dieu, ou bien qu'ils
se retirent d'ailleurs.
Mais, les Edits, estans legitimement
dresses et emologuez par authorite?
publique, par lesquels sera permis
d'exercer la vraye Religion: je dis
que le prince est d'autant plus tonu
de les observer, que nuls autre, que
l'estat de la Religion est de plus grande
consequence que nul autre: ou bien
par mosme ordre, et telle connaissance
de cause qu'il appartient, les revoquer.
Sinon, je dis, qu'il use de manifeste
tyrannie, a` laquelle il est permis de
s'opposer, avec les distinctions ci-
dessus mentionnees; voire par raison
d'autant meilleure, que nos ames et
nos consciences nous doyvent estre
plus cheres que tous les biens de ce
monde. "
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OP LAW.
337
lawfully acquired, but violates the ancient laws and customs
of his country. 1
Archon protests that this is to put the king under the
law, but there is a sentence in the Pandects which says that
he is not under the law, though " par honnestete? " he should
carry it out. For it is he who makes the law, and he does
not submit to it except so far as he pleases, otherwise his
power is not sovereign but bridled and restrained. 2
To this contention Politie replies by considering the real
source of laws. He cites the definitions of law by Papinian,
Demosthenes, and Chrysippus (' Dig. ,' i. 3. 1, and 2), and
the opinion of Cicero that the deliberation and consent of the
commonwealth are implied in the laws, and that the prince
must therefore be subject to them. 3
When Archon contends that the Civil Law is composed of
the ordinances of princes, and that in all its parts it is subject
to their power, Politie replies that in general terms the Law
includes all ordinances which are just; these have been
formed by the people in their customs. If they are not suit-
able, the prince can adjust them to the needs of particular
times and persons, but must not usurp the power to do this
without the consent of those who are most concerned* Archon
objects that this is very far indeed from the opinion of many
kings, who consider that their subjects, their lives, and
property are completely under their power. Politie agrees
that they are under their jurisdiction, but only by process of
1 "Archon et Politie," in (' Me-
moiros do l'etat do Franco,' Ed. 1576),
vol. iii. p. 102: "Politie. Mais celle
(tyrannie) qui survient en una royaume
qui est tenu pour hereditaire, est,
quand un prince, le? gitimement pour-
venu, no se contente pas de ce qu'il
trouve de droit equitable luy estre
acquis, ains pour dominer plus seig-
neurialement viole les anciennes loix
et ooutumes do ses pays. "
? Id. id. (p. 110): "Archon.
Tout
cocy tend a mettre le Roi sous la
loi, touteffois il y a un axiomo aux
Paudoctes, qui dit qu'il n'est sous la
VOL. VI.
loi, combien que par honneetete? , il
s'y doit ranger. Par ainsi, puis que
e'est lui qui la donne, il ne s'y subniet
pas s'il ne luy plait; ou autrement
on ne doit pas nommer sa puissance,
souveraine, mais bridee et restrainte. "
? Id. (p. 110): "Politie. Ciceron
. . . dit quo l'entrotenement et con-
soil de la re? publique estans situoz
dans les loix, faut nocessairement que
le prince y soit sujet: d'autant que
son autorito soit de la, et se maintient
par la conservation de justice qui i-. t
descrite en icello. "
* Id. (p. 117).
T
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? 338 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
law,1 and he adds a reminiscence of the Feudal Law, that the
Lord owes the same faith and love to his vassal as the vassal
to him, and loses his lordship for the same causes and crimes
as the vassal loses his fief. 2
In another place the author of this treatise, like the author
of the 'Droit des Magistrats,' appeals to the supremacy of
the Law as justifying the resistance of the Huguenots to
persecution, when the exercise of their religion had been
granted them by formal laws and edicts; and he extends
this principle to the general legal rights of the people, for,
as he says, there are few kingdoms or principalities where
the chief rulers are not restrained by many laws to which
they have sworn, when they were accepted, and which they
have promised to the sovereign power to obey--that is, to
the estates which are formed by the whole body of the people. 3
(We shall have much more to say later of the conception of the
sovereign power which is represented in these words. )
The best known of these Huguenot works is the ' Vindiciae
Contra Tyrannos,' published in 1579. There has been much
discussion of its authorship, but we are not here concerned
with this but with the judgment of the author on the origin
of law and its relation to the prince. His judgment is very
clearly expressed. Men would have been satisfied to have
received law from one good and just man, but the judgment
1 Id. (p. 120): "Archon. Quoy, les
roys n'ont-ila pas puissance sur la
mort et sur la vie de leurs sujets?
"Politie. Oui bien, mais avec con-
nsissance de cause et informations
valables, et non autrement. "
1 Id. id.
>> Id. (p. 128): "Politie: Et si par
lois et edits solennels, le peuple a obtenu
de ses princes l'exercice de la vraye
Religion; et puis apres par mauvais
conseil, le prince se veut desdire et
oster tyranniquement ce qu'il avait
sainctement accorde? , les sujets ont
double raison de ne luy obeyr en cest
endroit, et de conserver leur vraye
liborte? , par les moyeus le? gitimes sus
declarez, dont nous parlerons encore
apre`s.
Gela se doit estendre aussi aux
autres droits du peuple, lesquels ne
peuvent estre abolis sans manifeste
confusion et aneantissement des Estats,
et a` plus forte raison quand les lois
reiglont des longtemps la grandeur des
princes et magistrats souverains:
comme il se trouvera bien peu de
royaumes et principautez, dont les
principaux gouverneurs ne soyent liez
et retenus en limites par beauooup de
lois, queux mesmes jurent a` leur
reception, et promettent a` la souver-
ainete? (c'est a` dire aux Estats com-
posez du corps de tout le peuple) de
garder inviolablement. "
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? chap. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW.
339
of kings was too uncertain and variable. Laws were therefore
made by the wise men and the magistrates. The principal
function of the king is to keep and maintain the law. It is
better to obey the law than the king; the law is the soul
of the king, while the king is the instrument of the law. The
law represents the combined reason and wisdom of the many,
for the many see and understand more than the one. It
has thus come about that while in the earliest times kings
reigned absolutely and their will was law, this now only
continues among barbarians, while the more polite and
civilised people are bound by laws. We do not accept the
saying of Caracalla that the emperor makes laws but does
not receive them; rather in all well-ordered kingdoms the
king receives the law from the people, and does not obtain
the kingdom until he has promised to give every man his
right (jus) according to the laws of the country. He can
only amend or add to the laws when this has been approved
by the people, or the chief men of the people, formally or
informally, called together. 1
1 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos ' (Ed.
Edinburgh, 1579), Q. ILT. (p. 114):
"Carte cum populus jus aequabile
quereret, id si ab uno jus to et bono
viro consequebatur, eo contentus erat.
At quia vix id fieri poterat, et raro
contingobat; saepe vero, dum arbitria
Regum, legum instar osscnt, evoniebat,
ut alia aliis loquerentur. Leges tum
quae cum omnibus una oademque voce
loquuntur, a prudentioribus et ceteris
magistratibus proximo inventn<< fuer-
unt. Regibus vero id procipua munoris
commendatur, ut legum custodes,
ministri et conservatores ossent. Inter -
dum etiam, quia lex in omnem eventum
prospicero non potuerat, quaedam ex
eadem aequitate naturali supplerent.
. . . (p. 115) Quia vero ambigat, quin
legi, quam regi parere, id est homini,
utilius et honestius sit? Lex est boni
regis anima: per hanc movetur, sentit,
vivit. Rex legis organum est, et
quasi corpus, per quod ilia suas vires
exerit, sua munora obit, sua sensa
eloquitur. Animae vero, quam corpori
parere justius est.
Lex est multorum prudentum in
unum collecta ratio et sapientia. Plures
autem oculatiores et perspicaciores
sunt quam unus. . . . (p. 117) Inde
vero pactum est, inquit idem, ut
quum primis temporibus reges absolute
imperarent, quorum arbitrium lex
erat, paulo post inter politiores et
civiliores passim legitimi fioront, id est,
legibus servandia oustodiendisque obli-
garentur; absoluta vero ilia potestas,
ponos barbarorum regee tantum man-
eret. . . . (p. 119) Non denique quod
ipse Caracalla, Imperatores leges daro,
non accipere. Quin potius in omnibus
regnis bene constitutis, regem a populo
leges, quas tueatur quasque intueatur,
accipere. . . . (p. 121) Neque enim
Imperator, Rex Franciae, Regos His-
paniae, Angliae, Poloniae, Hungariae et
? ? omnes legitimi principes . . . prius in
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? 340
[PART IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The author of the ' Vindiciae ' adds some important observa-
tions on the actual or traditional practice of some of the
more important countries of Western Europe. In the empire
the emperor " rogat in concilio," and, if they approve, the
princes, barons, and representatives of the cities sign the
decree, and only then is the law valid; the emperor swears
to observe the laws which have been thus made, and not
to make other laws except with the common consent. In
France, where the authority of the king is commonly thought
to be higher than elsewhere, laws were formerly made in the
Assembly of the three Orders, and all commands of the king
were void, unless the Senate (i. e. , the Parlement) ratified
them. In England, Spain, and Hungary the custom is the
same as it always was. He concludes that if it is true that
the laws are greater than the king, if kings must obey the
law as the slave does his master, who would not prefer to
obey the law rather than the king? Who would obey the
king if he violated the law, or would refuse to defend the
law which had been violated ! 1
These writers are agreed in maintaining that the king
was under the law and not over it, for his authority was
derived from the law, and the law proceeds ultimately from
principatum rocipiuntur, quam . . . se
secundum leges patriae jus ouique
suum roddituros promiserint. . . . (p.
122) In summa, principes legitimi,
leges a populo accipiunt, diadema vero
honoris, sceptrum potestatis, insigne,
ut et acceptas tueatur et ex earum
praecipua tutela gloriam sibi quaerant.
. . . Si quid abrogandum, surrogan-
dum, derogandum, putabit, populum,
populive optimatos, aut ordinarios,
aut extra ordine convocatos, admonebit
legemque rogabit. At sane non prius
jubebit, quam ab iisdem rite expensa
comprobataque fuerit. "
1 Id. (p. 123): "Imperator rogat pri-
mum in Comitiis. Si probatur, Prin-
cipes, Barones, civitatum legati sub-
signent ac demum lex rata esse solet.
Jurat vero se leges (p. 124) latns serva-
turum, et novas non nisi de communi
consensu, ullas laturum. . . In Francia,
ubi tamen amplissima vulgo censetur
regum auctoritas, ferebantur olim
leges in trium ordinum conventu,
regiove consilio ambulatorio. Ex quo
vero Parlamentum statarium est,
frustra sunt omnia regum edicta, ni
senatus ilia comprobet, cum tamen
senatus seu Parlamenti aresta, si lex
desit, legis vim passim obtinesnt.
Et in Anglico, Hispanico, Hungarico,
et caeteris idem juris est, ut et in
antiquis quoque fuit. . . . Quod si
vero, ut ostendimus, leges regibus
potiores sunt, si reges legibus, ut servi
dominis, parero tenentur; quis non
legi, quam regi parere malit? quia
regi legem violanti obsequatur. Quis
violatae auxilium fcrro recuset? "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 341
the community. They admit that, in the earliest stages of
human life, men may have submitted to the authority of
rulers, uncontrolled by law; but they found long ago that it
was impossible to submit to the arbitrary and capricious
rule of one man, and this only now survives among barbarous
and uncivilised people; and, as we have just seen, the author
of the 'Vindiciae ' asserts this principle of the supremacy of
the Law of the community as representing the normal con-
ception of the greater European countries.
It may be suggested that these writers were Protestants,
though, as we have observed, there is nothing in these con-
tentions which represents an appeal to distinctively Pro-
testant opinions. We turn, therefore, to a group of writers
who belonged to the Order of the Jesuits.
We begin with Molina, an important Spanish Jesuit, whose
work, 'De Justitia et Jure,' was published in 1592. He
maintains that the light of nature teaches that it is in the
power of the commonwealth to entrust authority over itself
to one or more persons, as it judges best. This authority is
greater or less according to its judgment, and if the ruler
endeavours to exercise more authority than is given to him,
he acts tyrannically. 1
Having thus set out clearly the source and limits of the
authority of the ruler, Molina approaches the subject with
which we are here immediately concerned--that is, the con-
ditions of the legislative authority.
One of the functions of the king is to make laws, but the
question must be considered whether the people gave him
the power to make laws only with their approval, or without
1 Molina, 'De Justitia et Jure,'
vol. i. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23: "Lumen
ipsum naturae docet, in reipublicae
arbitrio esse positum, committere
alicui, vel aliquibus, regimen et potes-
tfttem supra se ipsum, prout voluerit,
expedireque judicaverit. . . . (3) Cum
autem potestas a republica in rectores
derivetur, pro ipsius reipublicae arbi-
tratu, poterit sane in unaquaque
reipublicae specie, derivari amplior, et
minus ample, neque est maior in
reipublicae rectoribus quam a republica
fuerit illis concessa. Quin potius, si
rec tores eam extendant, maioremque
sibi usurpant, in tyrannidem per in-
justitiam, quam ea in parte committunt,
degenerant. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 342
[past rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
it; and Molina thinks that if it is the custom that laws have
no force unless they are approved by the people, it must be
assumed that the commonwealth only granted to the king
the legislative power, subject to this condition; for it is more
probable that the king increased his power, the subjects not
venturing to resist, than that they had diminished the power
which they had given him. If, as Castro suggested, the
custom was that the commonwealth should obey all the laws
of the prince which were not actually unjust, it would have
to be concluded that it had granted all its authority to the
king, but it could scarcely be believed that any commonwealth
had done this. 1 Molina's principle seems to be clear, that
it is almost incredible that the commonwealth should have
completely surrendered all that authority, which originally
belonged to it, to the ruler.
It must not indeed be supposed that Molina was an enemy
of monarchy; indeed, he clearly holds that it is the best
form of government, for it tends more to internal peace than
any other form,2 and he maintains that the authority of the
monarch is greater, not merely than that of individuals in
the commonwealth, but than that of the whole commonwealth
--that is, within the limits of the authority which has been
granted to him. 3 But again, it must be observed that this
authority is limited, and if the king attempts to take more
'Id. id. id.
