No More Learning

This lineage was thus not the one favored from the outset, but it would become favored only by its being expected that it would always bring forth a person qualified for the position of leader. Consequently while the whole family turns into a nobility, it discounted the service and merit that any one member of it might acquire sometime and which, reflected back, as it were, from the future, might procure the ennobling substance for the whole lineage. It is an informative metaphor when one speaks of the 'noble metals,' of the 'nobility' of gold and silver. This aristocracy of the metal exists, so it seems to me, first in its relative indestructibility: It is preserved forever because of its value, and it only changes the shape in its being continually recast, while its capital value is relatively unchangeable. A similar idea is the basis for the feeling of nobility and for the nobility: as if its individual members were only, so to speak, nothing but different castings, nothing but different forms of an enduring substance of value that is preserved through the whole series of being inherited. Hence the relationship that these individuals have to the historical group leading up to them gains a completely special accent. It is, so to speak, an immortality of the value that the nobility claims for itself and seeks to realize its sociological conditions. The reason for the fact that no aristocracy formed as a closed social stratum in Russia, up to Czar Theodore II,13 the predecessor of Peter the Great is this: The honors and dignities of each person depended exclusively on the 'service,' the official activity, from which a classification for the family derived. The unique principle prevailed, that nobody should serve under a superior who had himself, in his turn, served under the father of the candidate; in order to establish the possible rights and positions of each person according to this principle, special registers were consulted. Continual conflicts over facts and rights among the families coming into consideration were the result of this, open and hidden competitions and rivalries. Therefore
13 Czar Theodore II reigned from 1676 to 1682. The immediate predecessor to Peter the Great was Czar Ivan V, 1682-1689--ed.
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the formation of a centripetal social stratum, the consolidation of individual forces and preferences into that common unified and persisting capital, around which the whole social structure of the nobility grows, was stifled.
This structure, as already described so far, lets one recognize without fur- ther ado why the nobility must attach importance to equality. It was already claimed about the ancient clan government that the nobles of different clans belonged to a single stratum, and that while the clan as such is exogamous as a rule (thus it permits no marriage among its members), that stratum always had the inclination to be endogamous, i. e. marrying only within itself. If the nobility presupposes, as it were, a strong foundation, with which each member in it is equipped and which must be passed on to later generations undiminished, each member must also emerge from only this circle; no circle in which privileges are not hereditary, which created that foundation, should be blended into it. Only thus can one be sure by and large that every member would also actually share in the power, attitude, and importance of the whole and that the particular relationship would be realized in which the value of the whole extends through each individual. This self-amplification from within supports the unique solidarity and self-sufficiency of this stratum that, so to speak, cannot need and must not need what lies outside itself. Thus it is like, so to speak, an island in the world comparable to artwork in which every part receives its meaning from the whole and testifies with its frame that the world can do nothing within and that the work is absolutely self-sufficient. This form creates a large part of the aesthetic appeal of the nobility that it exercised throughout time; for it holds not only for the individual, who thus attaches to and depends on good breeding and on the members of the nobility having cared for and cultivated their body and their social form over long generations better than is the case in other social strata, but that kind of appeal hovers in the image of the whole of the nobility, an attraction clearly dependent on the aesthetically satisfying form of the being-for-itself and solidarity-in-itself, the unity of the parts--all of which is analogous to artwork. This amplification of the being of the individual with a psychologically and historically inherited content can admittedly lead directly to a decadent emptiness. It appears as though traditional social contents and significance only become actual life values when they are balanced by the formative strength rising to a certain extent out of the individual. Consequently a self confidence of personal existence, a feeling of equally strong independence, but also a responsibility on the part of the individual, appear in the more excellent manifestations of the nobility. This is the result of the unique narrowness under the social forma- tions with which a dependable essence, extended along the three dimensions of the past, present, and future, merged with the individual existence and has been converted into the consciousness on the part of the individual of a higher life value. But where the individual factor is too weak for the personal form to create the supra-personal essence, decadent phenomena appear, as noted: Then that essence inevitably becomes form; there is no importance to that life but the preservation of the specific honor of the social stratum and 'keeping one's composure'--somewhat as ultimately emerged in the nobility of the ancient re? gime.
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The importance of the 'family tree' for this relationship of the family--as well as for the noble group generally--to the individual is of a deeper symbol- ism: The essential matter that forms the individual must have gone through the single trunk of the whole, just as the matter of the branch and fruit is what also formed the trunk. Perhaps this social constitution explains the aversion to work that the aristocracy manifested through the whole of social history up to the most recent era in which the economy hastened the creation of change through democratization. In real 'work' the subject is devoted to the object every moment, and however much the yield of work returns back to the subject again, the action as such still remains directed to an impersonal structure and finds its fullness in a formation of just this--be it a matter of the construc- tion and reconstruction of ideas in the work of discovery, of the pedagogical formation of a student, or of working on physical materials. However, this is counter to the basic life feeling of the aristocracy as such, since what finds its center in the being of that subject is absolutely personal and emerges in the value of aristocracy alone and in what emerges from that, while work in the most meaningful sense is activity directed onto an exterior determined by the terminus ad quem. Thus Schiller distinguishes the noble natures, who pay with what they are, from the common natures, who pay with what they do. The nobles busy themselves, but they do not work (all such definitions, of course, change a thousand ways in every empirical case and appear misdirected). War and hunting, the historically typical preoccupation of the nobility, are still not 'work' in the real sense, despite all the toil attached to them. The subjective factor has a decidedly greater emphasis over the objective in these activities; the result does not manifest, as in work, an object set apart from the person that absorbed the person's energy into itself, but the emphasis lies in testing the strength of the subject itself. At most, artistic work offers some analogy with the aristocrat's kind of activity; it indeed does not really work on the object; rather, the forming of it is only important for it as the radiating out of a purely subjective movement from within. Only the activity of the artist and its value flow exclusively from the enigmatically unique point of its indi- viduality, beyond which no further authority can be found that would have supported it or that would have been acting in it, while the specific action and consciousness of the aristocrat flows from the traditional essence of the family and the social stratum that found in him only an individual form, one now admittedly self confident and at rest.
A unique exception to this characteristic of the nobility comes about through the accumulation or ideal crystallization of dignities and offices, fortunes and honors, duties and rights that are gained within the family and social stratum and in which every member shared--not pro rata as with a share but as an indivisible property that is, as it were, the a priori of every personal being and act. In China, the rule prevails that the hereditary nobility gradually decreases. What would remain continuously in the family and thus what would make an accumulation of its importance possible is never granted quintessentially to the nobility, but there is an infinitely finely gradated series of honors; we have no expressions corresponding to these levels. And the son always stands on a level, a step lower than the father, so that after a particular succession
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of generations the nobility ends altogether. If I am correctly informed, as the highest noble, the stratum of prince is conferred for twenty-six generations, so that after their course--and this also holds for the descendents of princes of the royal house not coming to power--the family returns again to the com- moner status. This anomaly, which can only happen in an official or paper nobility, amounts to a normal progression with, so to speak, a negative sign. For this, though perhaps also deriving from an original grant, has its meaning in that gradual accumulation of values that were handed down; meanwhile the substance, as it were, is given for a time and is gradually used up. On the other hand a pattern proper to Tahiti manifests the normal form in a very instructive manner. There, if a son is born to a noble, the father abdicates his social position in favor of that of the son and, in fact "because the son has more nobility than the father. " In a satirical poem of Glassbrenner from the middle of the nineteenth century the hollow dignity and inflated paltriness of a noble is depicted with the concluding verse, that he would still rightly have one point of pride:
If on some day he must blessed die As an ancestor yet he will lie.
This is the same basic feeling as in the case in Tahiti, and on the sociological basis that the nobility once secured with the greatest historical success, it can appear in no way as meaningless as certain types of decline and general social circumstances in which that basis can no longer exist.
Now the definition of this basis is allowed to be carried out according to the broadest categories of life. Each person appears as some combination of pre- determination and happenstance, of given material and a unique life-formation, of social inheritance and an individual management of it. In each person we see the prejudices of one's race, social stratum, tradition, family--in short, of what makes one the bearer of pre-existent contents and norms; we see these combined with unpredictability and personality, the free being-for-self--the former, as it were, the a priori, the latter the singular reality that together with the former generates the empirical phenomenon. Now the two are mixed in various ways in the large social type-formations and actually in the nobil- ity in a quite individual way, the scientific establishing of which in abstract concepts, of course, is independent of the complications of reality that allow clouding, distracting, and particularizing forces to have effects in these pure relationships. Here those manifold prejudgments are merged together as in a riverbed: While the collected life contents, upbringing and marriage, occupation and political standpoint, aesthetic inclinations and economic expenditure are 'appropriate for the social stratum,' all become conformances that hand down to the individual the material of life as a byproduct, as it were, led through a single channel. There were certainly binding prejudgments of the same or greater strength everywhere in the guild and priesthoods, in the hereditary occupations and in the constraint of the caste and class entities. But now what is different about the nobility is that at the same time the other element of life--personality, freedom, stability--assumed a form changing into a higher value and meaning than occurs in the other forms since the substance handed
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down in one was not something objective, as it were, transcending the indi- vidual; but the particular form and power of the individual makes this whole traditional material alive in the first place. Although the individual may often experience enough constraint from it, the meaning of the whole configuration is still that this valuable material that the social stratum and the family had accumulated would benefit the autonomous individually directed essence of the individual and would thus undergo no diminution but an enhancement. The self-sufficient, self-responsible, and satisfying existence is not a departure from the general well-being and common property, as in many other structures proper to the society, but their development, protection, and enlargement. This particular synthesis of the nobility stands between the extremes of the individual being engulfed by the group and it facing the individual with an oppositional independence. Through the stricture of the form of life proper to the social stratum it has that which created a very wide meeting ground among its members. Through the insistence on the same level of birth that brings about a physiological guarantee of the qualitative and historical solidarity of the stratum, through the stratagem of its tradition that allows the values and acquisitions of the family and social stratum to flow without loss as into a reservoir--through these social means the nobility, to an otherwise unattainable extent, melted its individuals down into the collectivity. However, the structure so impersonal in origin now has more decidedly than any other its goal and meaning in the existence of the individual, in the power and importance of the individual, and in the freedom and self-sufficiency of the individual's life. While the nobility, in its purest historical manifestation, unites the life values of the individual with unique strength in its collectivity, and while on the other hand its development aims with unconditional unanimity at the formation, growth, and independence of the individual, the nobility provided a histori- cally unique solution to the balance between the whole and the individual, the predetermined realities and the personal arrangements of life.
Finally, the emergence of the money economy provides the greatest example in world history of the correlation between social expansion and the individual emphasis of life in content and form. The natu- ral economy produces small economic circles relatively closed in on themselves; first the difficulty of transportation limits their scope and, accordingly, the technology of the natural economy does not allow much of a differentiation and individualization of activities to come about. The money economy alters this situation in two ways. The general acceptance of money as well as its easy transportability, and finally its transformation into finance and mail-order commerce allow its effects to spread to unlimited distances and ultimately create a single economic circle with interrelated interests, complementary production, and uni- form practices in the general cultural world. On the other hand, money causes an immense individualization of economically active people: The
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form of the money wage makes the worker infinitely more independent than any natural-economic payment; possessing money gives the person a previously unheard of freedom of movement, and the liberal norms that are regularly linked to the money economy place the individual in open competition against every other individual; finally this competition as well as that extension of the economic circle force a specialization of activity otherwise out of the question, at the height of its driven one-sidedness. These are only possible with the closing of transactions in the framework of a rather large circle. Money is the bond within the economy that sets the maximum expansion of the economic group into a relationship with the maximum differentiation of its members on the side of freedom and self-responsibility as well as on that of the qualitative division-of-labor differentiation; or more correctly, money develops the smaller, more closed, more homogeneous groups of the natural economy into a different one whose uniform character divides into the two aspects of expansion and individualization.
Political developments bring this pattern about in a great number of individual areas, admittedly under a manifold variation of the basic relationship. Somewhat in the way that no simultaneous progression occurs from the smaller, narrowly socialized circle to the large group and to the differentiation of the personality but a choice and alter- nation, the accent of the more developed situation falls either on the establishment of a broad general public and growing importance of the central organs or on the individual members becoming independent. Or, the expansion of the circle is not on a par with the development of the personality, even in the context of the circle's members, but with the idea of a highest personage to whom, as it were, the individual's will is submissive. I will cite some examples from the different realms of politics. In the agrarian case, the dissolution of the rural com- mons since the end of the Middle Ages occurred in these forms. The developing centralist states confiscated the commons, the common march, as a public good inside the state property and handed it over to the administrative organs of the whole state; on the other hand, to the extent that this did not happen, it parceled it among those with legitimate rights to it as private property. And in this latter action the two tendencies toward the individual and the most general are again simultaneously notable: For this parceling out was directed on the one hand by Roman legal concepts with their enthronement of individual interest and on the other hand by the idea that the parceling out of the commons would be to the advantage of the best cultivation of the
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land, as well as of the widest community. Under very different mate- rial and collective conditions a phase of the history of the Allmend, the common property in the Swiss communities, still manifested the same form in the nineteenth century. Insofar as the Allmenden are transformed into the property of portions of communities, territorial and village corporations, they are handled in some cantons (Zurich, St. Gallen, among others) by the legislation with the tendency to parcel them out either to the individual neighbors or to allow them to be handed over to the larger territorial communities, because the smallest associations possessed too small a personal and territorial basis for allowing their property to be productive for the public entity.
The form of agrarian political measures highlighted above is gener- ally more widespread in post-medieval development in Germany in the realm of internal politics. The authorities treated the particular circles of the unions set off against each other and against the whole with differentiated tendencies: on the one hand making them purely private legal structures that were a personal matter of the individual share holders, on the other hand elevating them to the status of state institutions. These corporations, which had dominated medieval society, had gradually solidified and narrowed in such a way that public life threatened to disintegrate into an incoherent sum of egoistic factions. Then with the beginning of the modern era, the thought of the all- inclusive universality, in contrast to these and dissolving them, was set by and admittedly in the form of the absolutism of the prince. Accordingly from this came the principle: 'the same law for all,' i. e. , the freeing of the individual on the one hand from the inhibiting of practical activity by the privileges of corporations, and on the other hand the loss by the individual of prerogatives enjoyed as a member of them, but which forced the individual into an often unnatural association with associ- ates. Thus it is quite basically a matter of destroying, so to speak, the narrow, homogeneous, and so to speak middle level associations, the prevalence of which had characterized the earlier situation, in order to lead the development upwards to the state and downwards to the unprecedented freedom of the individual. The fact that on the other hand this state in practice found its effectiveness in the form of the highest personality, the unlimited sovereign, is so little a counter level of authority against the basic pattern that the latter is rather directly realized in an extraordinarily large number of cases, one after the other as well as simultaneously. This is the often emphasized link between republicanism and tyranny, between despotism and leveling, that history
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makes manifest. Any form of government that borrows its character from the aristocracy or business class, that, in short, gives a greater part of social and political consciousness to narrower juxtaposed circles, as soon as it aims beyond itself at all, presses on the one hand toward consolidating in a personal leading authority and on the other hand toward socialism painted over with anarchism, which seeks to produce the absolute right of the free person by erasing all differences. The break up of the narrowly delimited groups within an otherwise unified whole has such a strict relationship with the accentuation of individuality that both the unity of a ruling personage and the individual freedom of all group members are interchangeable, merely as two variations on the same theme. It has been observed of political aristocracies, which are always constructed in the social pattern of closed and strictly restricted circles, that they seldom have great military success in broader contexts; and this may go back to their aversion toward those two authoritative levels, which are set upon replacing them in succession or at the same time: They are afraid on the one hand of rousing the whole population to an uprising and united action; on the other hand they are distrustful of individual generals with broad authority and great successes. Thus the correlation between the volonte? ge? ne? rale and autocracy is so decided that it is used often enough as an official cover for intentions that aim ultimately at the suppression of the former. As the Earl of Leicester was appointed to the general governorship of the Netherlands in 1586, he strove for an unlimited reign far over the heads of the narrower authority of the estates general and the provincial social strata, up to then the governing bodies; and he did so in fact under the pretense of the absolutely democratic principle that the will of the people should be the absolute sovereign, and it had appointed Leicester. But it was thereby expressly emphasized that merchants and attorneys, farmers and crafts persons were not to interfere at all in governance but were to simply obey. Thus the ostensibly leveling democratization was driven so far that both the higher and the lower social strata were disenfranchised and only the ideal unity of the abstract 'people in general' remained; and opponents declared very soon that this newly discovered idea of the 'people' only sought to transfer this unconditional sovereignty to one person.
Our basic relationship gains yet further elaboration in local politics. The relationship is already evident in the Middle Ages in the English cities, with the larger ones being dominated by individual corporations or major nobles while in the smaller ones the people as a whole had
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ruled. A homogeneity of members who uphold the evenness of their share of the governance simply corresponds to the smaller circles, but in the larger ones the shear mass of private individuals was pushed out and left to one side, and the individual ruling personages to the other. In a certain rudimentary form the administration of the North American cities shows the same pattern. As long as the cities are small, their offices being headed by a number of persons would emerge as the most suitable mode; but if they grow into metropolises, it would be more practical to entrust the office to only one person. Large-scale conditions need the individual, a fully responsible person, for their rep- resentation and management; the smaller circle could administer itself in a more undifferentiated way while a greater number of its members were always immediately at the rudder. Thus this social difference cor- responds completely with the development by which the general political tendency of the several states of the union substantiate the basic pattern at issue here: It should begin with a weakening of parliamentarianism in the later decades and replace it in two ways: in one instance with direct plebiscite and in another instance with monarchical institutions, through a transfer of power to individual persons or person.
Finally, church politics provides examples that already find their analogy in purely religious developments. The polytheism of antiquity had many of the traits that I have collected here under the concept of the 'narrower group. ' The cults set themselves apart by sharp inner, though local, boundaries; the groups of adherents were centripetal, often indifferent toward one another, often hostile. Even the deities were often ordered aristocratically, with complex dominations, subor- dinations, and separate spheres of influence. At the beginning of our calendar in classical culture, this situation led to monotheism, to the enthronement of a single and personal God who united in himself the spheres of influence of each singular and separate deity; and this means--insofar as our correlation appears as an almost logical necessity at this point--that the boundaries fell between the circles of adherents, that there would be a shepherd and a flock, that a 'greater circle' existed among the religions, the members of which existed entirely at one level in an 'equality before God. ' The linkage of the religious community to the political one--characteristic of the pre-Christian religiosity--the centering of the religious group around the particular deity proper to it alone, which willingly gave room for many others beside itself, broke off. At the same time there was also the politically homogeneous solidarity of this group, religion as a socio-political
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duty, every member being answerable to their deity for the errors of the whole collectivity. The religious individual with an unconditional self-responsibility emerged, the religiosity of the 'Ka? mmerlein' (cell), the independence from any bond to the world and people other than the one there was in the undivided immediate relationship of the individual soul to its God--the God who was thus no less, indeed precisely thereby 'one's own,' because this was equally the God of all. Within the vast leveled universality, as it arose from the dissolution and amalgamation of all earlier particular groups, individuality was the counterpart of the absolute and unitary personhood of God, who emerged from the same analysis and synthesis of all earlier particular gods. And this form of development, which Christianity manifested in its original purity, was repeated once again in the politics of the Catholic Church. Within her the tendency toward the construction of separate groups, of a sharp demarcation of ranks and interests, also raised up anew an aristocracy of the clergy for the church over the stratum of the laity. But Pope Gregory VII14 already united a decided demagogy with the absoluteness of his individual struggle for power, which brought the sharpest contrasts together and passed over the head of the exclusive aristocratic bishops. Afterwards celibacy reinforced this effort--since the married priest had a backing in a smaller group and thus very quickly generated a united opposition within the church, while in his individual isolation he thus fell prey unconditionally to the unrestricted universal--and Jesuitism took it up with the greatest success. For everywhere it countered the status-inclination of the clergy, emphasized the universal character of the priest, which allows him to feel as one with the faithful of all social strata; and in contrast to every aristocratic system it had as a purpose a uniform leveling of all the faithful on the one hand and a papal absolutism on the other.
Maybe one could express the whole relationship that is meant here and takes shape in the most diverse kinds of simultaneity, sequence,
14 Pope Gregory VII (the monk Hildebrand), reigned 1073-1085. Simmel's is a particularly unsympathetic interpretation of this medieval pope. The secular authori- ties, i. e. nobility, had been controlling ecclesiastical appointments up to 1049, when Emperor Henry III (1039-1056) appointed Pope Leo IX. Leo issued a decree chang- ing the way his successors would be selected--election by the cardinal clergy of the suburbs of Rome, a method that bypassed the Roman nobility and the Emperor. Gregory VII was the first pope elected under the new method. His effort to have the papacy control the appointment of bishops was part of a larger reform project known as the Cluniac Reform--ed.
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and either/or in a way that the smaller group forms, so to speak, a middle proportionality between the expanded group and individuality, so that, closed in on itself and needing no other input, it produces the same result for life chances that emerges from the combination of the latter two. Now I will select some examples from jurisprudence, in fact from fields that are absolutely different in their historical substance. So, for instance, the total power of the Roman concept of the state had as its correlate that next to the ius publcum there was a ius privatum. 15 The legal restraint on the universal whole that was manifest in itself required a corresponding one for individuals inside that whole. There was the community in the broadest sense on the one hand and the individual person on the other; the most ancient Roman law knew no corpora- tions, and in general this spirit remained with it. In contrast, there were no different legal principles for the community and for the individual; however, these publics are not the all-inclusive ones of the Roman state but smaller ones, occasioned by the changing and manifold needs of the individual. In smaller communities that disconnection of public law from private is not necessary since the individual is bound more deeply to the whole. This correlation appears as a unifying development in the right of blood revenge, for example in Arabia. Its essence rests entirely on the solidarity of sharply bounded tribal groups and on their autonomy: It held for the whole tribe or the family of the murderer and was carried out by the whole tribe or the family of the murder victim. Concerning it Mohammed's preference was clearly bound up with the explanation argued above. A national or state universality should transcend the particular groups and be leveling them through the common religion; a legal verdict would come from that universality, which replaced the particular legal interest with a supreme universally recognized authority. And accordingly, the verdict should affect the guilty individual alone and the collective responsibility of the particular group should discontinue: The widest universality and the individually circumscribed person now exist as results, albeit opposite ones, of the differentiation of the intermediary structures. With equal clarity, though with completely different contents, this form type appears in ancient Rome as the resultant stage of a continuous series, as development there broke up the patriarchal family grouping. If civil law and duties in war and peace pertained now to the sons as well as to the father, if
15 Ius publicum . . . ius privatum, Latin: public law . . . private law--ed.
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they could acquire personal importance, influence, booty etc. , a tear thus rent the patria potestas,16 which had to split the patriarchal relation- ship even more, and in fact in favor of the widened state functionality, in favor of the law of the greater whole over that of its members, but also in favor of the person; for the person could gain an importance from the relationship to this whole that the patriarchal relationship had curbed to an incomparable extent. Finally the formally similar process occurs in a particularly mixed phenomenon in which it is ascertained only with a tight grip on the basic idea. Up to the Norman era in England, a community was assigned to the individual sheriff and the royal judge for a long time, so that the jurisdiction had a certain local quality or constraint in which the interest of the community and that of the state were merged. However, the two separated after the middle of the twelfth century: Royal jurisdiction was now exercised by judicial commissions that traveled around great areas and thus apparently in a much more general and locally uninhibited way, while community interests were looked after through the growing importance of the local jury. In its purely internal interests the community represented the role of the individual here in our correlation; it was a social individual that had earlier lived its legal life in an undifferentiated unity with the universal state but now acquired a purer being-for-itself and with that stood next to the now just as clearly developed law of the large universality, or even in opposition to it.
It is only a consequence of the thought of such a relationship between the individual and the social if we say: The more the person comes to the foreground of interest as an individual rather than as a member of society, and therefore as that characteristic that pertains to someone purely as a human, the closer must the bond be that leads someone above the head of one's social group, as it were, toward all that is human in general, and makes the thought of an ideal unity of the human world obvious to a person. It is necessary not to make a discon- nection in this tendency in the comprehension of the latter idea, which is actually required logically, even if it were hindered by all kinds of historical limitations. So we find in Plato on the one hand an interest in the purely individual, in the perfection of the individual person, an interest that is broadened into an ideal of friendship, and on the other hand one in the purely political, with a total neglect of the intervening
16 Latin: fatherland power--ed.
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associations and the interests borne by them. The way in which he emphasized the formation and activity of the individual person and the value of one's soul as an independent separate structure should also have consequently broken down the last barrier, that of the Greek form of the state, as also occurred with other philosophers of the time. It is only the coincidence of his political tendencies and national Greek attitude that kept him from drawing the real conclusion from his ideal construct for the individual: that beyond the individual there need be only the whole of humanity as a collectivity. It is the same if in Chris- tianity the absolute concentration of all values on the soul and its salvation was singled out and thus that bond is still not recognized that is thereby made between Christianity and the whole of human existence, this process of unifying and equalizing (as the equality would also be by degrees, extending out onto the whole of humanity) finds its firm barrier rather in the membership in the church--somewhat as Zwingli explained that all orders, sects, separate associations, etc. must fall away, since all Christians should be brothers--but just only Christians. In a wholly consistent manner, on the other hand, extreme individualism frequently enters into an alliance with the doctrine of the equality of all persons. It is psychologically obvious enough that the terrible inequal- ity into which the individual was born in some epochs of social history unleashed a reaction in two ways: both toward the right of individual- ity and that of general equality, since both tend to come up short for the larger masses to the same degree. A manifestation such as Rousseau is to be understood only from this two-fold relationship. The increasing development of general education shows the same tendency: It seeks to eliminate the sharp differences in mental levels and give each person the possibility, denied earlier, of asserting the individual talent of each precisely by producing a certain equality. I have already spoken above about the form that our correlation has in the concept of 'human rights. ' The individualism of the eighteenth century sought only freedom, only the canceling out of those 'middle' circles and interstitial authorities that separated people from humanity, i. e. of those that hindered the development of that pure humanity that would form the value and core of personal existence in each individual, but covered and made one-sided by historical group separations and separate affiliations. As soon as one is really reliant on the self, on what is ultimate and essen- tial within one, that individual stands on the same basis as any other, and freedom makes equality evident; the individuality that really is just that and not curbed by social repression represents the absolute unity
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of the human race and blends into that unity. It is not necessary to explain how this theoretical-ethical conviction of the eighteenth century was elaborated in thoroughly practical and real conditions and simply acquired an enormous impact on them. That later meaning of indi- vidualism--that the actuality of human nature would entail being different in quality and value with respect to each person, and that the development and growth of this being different would be a moral imperative--this meaning is admittedly the immediate negation of any equality. For it seems altogether inadmissible to me to construct an equality precisely by each being so good as to be someone special and incomparable to any other. For someone to be so is indeed not a positive quality at all for oneself, but originates precisely in the com- parison alone with others who are different only in the judgment of the subject that does not find in one what it has found in others. This is most immediately clear in the comparison of only two objects: The black object and the white object obviously do not have a common quality between them, that one is not white and the other is not black. Thus if there is only a sophistical misuse of words with reference to the equivalence of the human race to a qualitative singularity of the individual, the ideal of the unity of the human race is in no way irrec- oncilable with this assumption. For one can understand the difference of the individuals as a kind of division of labor, even if it means not at all an economic production nor an immediate cooperation of all. Admittedly this changes into the speculations of social metaphysics. The more unique someone is, the more one occupies a place that can be filled only by that person according to one's being, action, and fate and the more that place is reserved for that person alone in the order of the whole, the more is this whole to be grasped as a unity, a meta- physical organism in which every soul is a member, unable to be exchanged with any other, but presupposing all others and their work- ing together for one's own life. Where the need exists to experience the totality of mental existence in the world as a unity, every person will need each other in this individual differentiation where the indi- vidual entities are necessarily complementary; each fills the place that all others allow for--it is more readily sufficient for this need for unity and hence for the grasp of the totality of existence through this than through the equality of natures, by which basically anyone would be able to replace anyone and the individual thus actually appears super- fluous and without a real link with the whole. Meanwhile the ideal of equality, which in a wholly different sense united the utmost individu-
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alization with the utmost expansion of the circle of beings belonging together, has never been furthered more than by the Christian doctrine of the immortality and infinitely valuable soul. The soul in its meta- physical individuality, placed on itself alone before its God, the single absolute value of existence, is like any other in that which alone matters in the end; for in the infinite and in the absolute there are no differ- ences: The empirical differences of people do not come into consider- ation before the eternal and transcendent, in which all are the same. Individuals simply are not only the sums of the qualities whereby they were naturally as different as those qualities are, but apart from those, each one is an absolute entity by virtue of personhood, freedom, and immortality. The sociology of Christianity thus offers the historically greatest and at the same time metaphysical example for the correlation in question here: The soul free from all bonds, from all historical rela- tionships constructed for any purposes whatever, aimed in the absolute being-for-itself only at those powers that are the same for all, comprises with all others a homogeneous being inclusive of all life; the uncondi- tioned personality and the unconditioned expansion of the circle of what is like it are only two expressions for the unity of this religious conviction. And as much as this is at all a metaphysics or one inter- pretation of life, it is still unmistakable in the broad scope as an a priori attitude and feeling that it has influenced the historical relation- ships of people to one another and the attitude with which they encounter one another.
Indeed, the sociological understanding that has the general world view as both cause and effect within the correlation proposed here is evident even if the question of the narrowness or breadth of the world depiction does not even stop at the human world but includes objectivity altogether, the forms of which are so often formed by us as analogous to socially accustomed ones. It can probably be said that antiquity lacked the deepest and precise idea of subjectivity as much as the broadest and clearest idea of objectivity. The idea of natural law as a quintessentially objective and universally impartial control over being, in contrast to all 'values,' was no less foreign to it than the authentic idea of the 'I' with its productivity and freedom, its ambiguity, and its values outweighing the world; the soul neither went so far outside itself nor so far into itself as later occurred through the synthesis, or even antithesis, of the Christian life awareness through natural science and cultural science. This cannot be without an inner and at least indirect connection with the socio-political structure of the Greek world. The
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enormous internal prerogative of the narrower state circle by and large captivated the individual inside a certain middling view of the world and life between the most universal and the most personal, and the whole form of existence produced by this limitation had to subside in order to create room for development on the two more extreme sides.
More directly than in its importance for the cosmic-metaphysical, our correlation becomes clear in the area of ethics. The Cynics already broke up the bond to the narrower social structure, otherwise typical for the Greek world, insofar as they embraced a basically cosmopolitan attitude on the one hand and on the other an individualist or egoistic one and excluded the middle link of patriotism.
The expansion of the circle that the view and interest of the individual fills may perhaps annul the particular form of egoism that generates the real and ideal limitation of the social sphere and may favor a broadmindedness and enthusiastic broadening sweep of the soul that does not allow an approach to combining personal life with a narrow circle of interest of fellows in solidarity; but, significantly enough, where circumstances or the character hinder this result, precisely the extreme opposite will readily appear. To the greatest extent, as I have already mentioned, the money economy and the liberal tendencies associated with it loos- ened and dissolved the narrower affiliations on the one hand from the guild level ones to the national, and inaugurated the world economy, and on the other hand thoughtlessness favored egoism at all levels. The less producers know their consumers because of the enlargement of the economic circle, the more their interest is directed exclusively toward the level of the price that they can get from them; the more impersonally and less qualitatively their public face them, all the more is there a correspondingly exclusive orientation toward the non-quali- tative result of work, toward money. Apart from those highest areas where the energy of the work arises from abstract idealism, workers will invest their person and ethical interests in work as much as their circle of buyers is also personally known to them and stand as close as has a place only in smaller relationships. As the size of the group for which the work grows, as the indifference with which they are able to face it increases, various factors decline that would limit economic egoism. Human nature and human relationships are so positioned in many respects that they turn back on themselves all the more if the individual's relationships exceed a certain perimeter size. Thus it is a matter not only of the purely quantitative extension of the circle that already has to lessen the intrinsic personal interest in each of its points
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down to a minimum, but also of the qualitative variety within it, which prevents the interest from being set at a single point with unambiguous decisiveness and which thus leaves egoism, so to speak, as the logical result of the mutual paralysis of unbearable demands. From this formal theme one has it that, for example, one of the factors contributing to the color and inner heterogeneity of the Hapsburg possessions is that in their politics the Hapsburgs had in view only the interests of their house. Finally, it is the spatial extension of the market--not necessarily coinciding with its actual enlargement--that allows the subject to face at least its narrower circle egoistically. Up to the reigns of Henry III and Edward I, the English social strata were separated by the fact that many times their interests stretched out beyond the homeland: An English noble had a greater interest in a foreign war led by the nobility than in the domestic struggles over the law. A city dweller was more often interested in the situation of Dutch business conditions than in that of the English cities if it was not directly a matter of one's own business. The major church officials felt more like members of an international ecclesiastical entity than they showed specifically English sympathies. Only since the era of the above-mentioned kings did the classes begin to really merge into a united nation, and an end came to the mutual isolation, the egoistic character of which had been thoroughly associ- ated with that expansion of cosmopolitan interests.
Beyond the importance that the expansion of groups has for the dif- ferential setting of wills, there is that for the development of the feeling of the personal 'I. ' Admittedly nobody will fail to recognize that, because of its mass character, its rapid pluralism, its all-boundary transcending evening out of countless previously conserved characteristics, the style of modern life led directly to an unheard of leveling precisely of the personality-form of life. But just as little should the counter tenden- cies to this be unrecognized, as much as they may be deflected and paralyzed in the whole manifest effect. The fact that life in a wider circle and the interaction with it develops a greater consciousness of personhood in and for itself than grows in a narrow circle lies above all in the personality documenting itself directly through the exchange of individual feelings, thoughts, and actions. The more continuously and steadily life progresses, and the less the extremes of the emotional life are remote from their average level, the less starkly the feeling of personhood enters in; but the wider they extend, and the more ener- getically they sprout, the more powerfully do persons sense themselves as personalities. As persistence is only ascertained anywhere in what
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changes, as only change in accidents allows permanence in substance to appear, so then is the 'I' especially experienced apparently as that which remains in all the change of psychological content, even if the latter gives it an especially rich opportunity. The personality is not sim- ply the individual current condition, not the individual quality or the individual, though still such a unique destiny, but something that we feel apart from the details, something matured in consciousness from their experienced reality--if this, as it were, subsequently existing personality is also only the symptom, the ratio cognoscendi17 of an underlying unified individuality that serves as the determining basis of this multiplicity but which cannot become conscious somewhat immediately but only as the gradual result of those multiple contents and eventualities of life. As long as psychological stimulations, especially feelings, occur only in a low number, the 'I' is merged with them and remains latently planted in them; it rises above them only to the extent that it becomes clear in our consciousness through the fullness of the generic differences that the 'I' itself is still common to all this, just as the higher idea of individual phenomena does not arise for us, then, if we know only one or a few of their formations, but only through knowledge of very many of them, and all the more highly and purely, the more clearly the difference in kind correlatively emerges in them. This change of the contents of the 'I,' however, which is actually only present to consciousness as the stationary pole in the transience of psychological phenomena, will be much more extraordinarily vivid within a large circle than in life within a smaller group. Stimulations of the feeling on which it is especially dependent for the subjective consciousness of the 'I' occur precisely where the very differentiated individual stands amidst other very differentiated individuals, and then comparisons, frictions, special- ized relationships precipitate a plethora of reactions that remain latent in the narrower undifferentiated group, but here provoke the feeling of the 'I' as what is quintessentially proper to the self through precisely its fullness and generic difference.
A less direct way in which the relatively large group attains a special freedom within the person and a being-for-self for its members runs through the formation of organs that--as was examined above--lets the original immediate interactions of individuals crystallize in them and transfer to particular persons and structures. The more purely
17 Latin: basis for knowing--ed.
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and more completely this division of labor occurs--obviously with the extent of the enlargement of the group--the more will the individual be freed from the interactions and fusions replaced by it and abandon its centripetal concerns and tendencies. Forming organs is the means of uniting the solidarity of the group to the greatest freedom of the individuals. Admittedly, the organs bind every member to the group itself and thus to each other; but the decisive thing is that the immediate interactions preceding this arrangement drew the totality of the person into specialized activity in a way that brought about a disproportionate expenditure of energy. Whoever is not a judge for a whole life but only when the community is called together is not only hindered in actual practice but is burdened with extraneous concepts and interests in the exercise of the judicial office in an entirely different way from the profes- sional judge. On the other hand once one is concerned with the court in the advanced circumstance, it is only then that one's whole interest is also really engaged in it. So long as every father of the household is a priest, he must function as such whether or not he is the right person for it; if there is a church with a professional priest, he enters into it because he really feels compelled by it and thus is completely into the activity. As long as no division of production exists, the individual must use what is produced just once with perhaps wholly different needs and wishes awakened in the meantime; as soon as there are special products for each need, everyone can choose what is desired so that one need not consume with mixed feelings. Thus the differentiating out of social organs does not mean that the individual would be detached from the bond with the whole but rather direct only the objectively justified portion of the personality to the bond. The point at which one is particularly affected by the whole or the arrangement of the totality now no longer draws the irrelevant portions of one's person into the relationship. With the organ, with the result and characteristics of the growth of the group, the interconnections are dissolved by which one must join in and deal with members in their situations and activities that do not belong to what one is interested in.
Finally, in the area of intellectuality, the interrelationships of our theoretical ideas often develop in the exact same form-type that we have observed here in the interrelationships of individuals with each other and thereby, perhaps more than individual social examples could, confirm this deeper sense stretching out over all details; one would call it its objective meaning which is only realized historically in all empiri- cal cases and only with an approximate purity.
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Excursus on the Analogy of the Individual Psychological and the
Sociological Relationships
This analogy is in and of itself not of a sociological but a social philosophical nature in that its content is not knowledge of society but that of a general interconnection that is only found to be an example of it in social form. That individuals within a society frequently act toward one another in the same forms as the mental elements within an individual intellect is a very old obser- vation. It could be thought psychologically in a general combinatorial analy- sis in regularly repeating forms of relationships among such elements. As the text will also still show for the individual psychological and theoretical devel- opments, so, for example, a relatively narrow homogeneous cluster of elements, of whatever kind, will only find its expansion under the condition that every single element finds greater independence and qualitative difference from every other one. Thus the independence of each element would become incompat- ible with the limitation on its space for existence and activity by others, and a mutual repression thereby appears, some kind of struggle for existence among the individuals. Thus it would thereby directly occur that an individual ele- ment forms a diversity within itself that can turn it as a whole into a counter- part of the surrounding totality; a tendency toward well-roundedness and completeness can appear there that is not compatible with the role of part and member of a whole, and it must come into a conflict between the special or partial character of an element respectively of a province of a whole and its possible or actual character as a unified entity in itself, etc. In short, one may think psychologically of general types of relationship that encompass both the sociological forms as a special case--that is the elements form such in the socialized individual--and encompass even the individual groups of concrete processes of social interaction. Thus, a deeper foundation would be achieved, for example, for one being able to call the state a 'person writ large. ' But the immediate relationships between society and the individual would not be sought apart from this formulation as they bring the mutual similarities about. The question will be posed from two points of view. First, if there is an indi- vidual mind, what effects go out from it to the whole so that they evoke in it the forms of their own conditions of stability and change? Second, if there is a whole, which influences that it exerts on the individual mind generate the relations in it that are parallel to its own ones? Thus, for example, there is the phenomenon of the 'faction. ' The interests within the individual are in conflict countless times, as are the individuals. Others who increase the weight of any one idea thus gather around the ruling ideas, as the party supporters are grouped around the leading personality. Complexes of feelings and thoughts that have nothing really to do with the content of inner conflict are neverthe- less drawn in, are brought in from their previous equilibrium, are colored by one or the other of the incompatible interests, exactly like party conflict, which splits essential parts of a group, and ultimately the entirety parcels out within itself, whether individuals or groups, what are actually strangers to them. All phases of a conflict--the balance of power that at times brings a conflict to a stalemate, the apparent victory of a party that gives the other one only an
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opportunity for reassembling its forces, the influence of the mere hint of the outcome of the actual decision, direction and indirection in the application of forces--all this is the form of the course of both inner and outer conflicts alike. Now at least in order to give an example for both lines of inquiry with respect to this analogy: As the inner experiences of the subject probably form a pat- tern that serves as an a priori for its external experiences, and as the form in which material data are received and in accordance with which the data are interpreted. What 'conflict' is, is an altogether purely inner experience. From outside one sees certain actions of beings, each of which is, so to speak, not to be forced out from its space, by virtue of the impenetrability of the material on which the other cannot in the strict sense encroach. That the particular movements of always two such beings are a 'conflict' is a psychological inter- pretation; the 'intermeshing,' the unity being carried out in counter movements that we call conflict cannot be actually defined and its essence cannot be looked at from outside, but it can only be experienced internally. Therefore, a two-fold context arises: The real one, with which the mental experiences that we describe as the 'against one another' and the 'with one another,' the fusion and dissipation of the imagination, provide the schemata for our exter- nal behavior; the ideal one, with which we interpret, order, and name the externally perceived patterns of behavior of the individual at hand. We can hardly make any decision, achieve any conviction, without an always rudi- mentary, hardly conscious, and quickly sorted out conflict of motives and stimuli leading the way: Our entire mental life is saturated with that; it there- fore suggests the assumption that the inter-individual processes that take place still always borrow a certain portion, both of their form and their meaning, on the basis of individual processes. And now in the other direction: The real conflict that we experience as a participant or as a spectator will provide the schema and meaning for inner processes. This will take place especially where the individual is not exclusively tied to one of the parties entering into a rela- tionship but places some interest in each of them; then will 'two souls in one heart' sympathize and imitate the relationships of conflict and reconciliation, separation and unity, domination and subservience that occur between the targets of interest. The conflict that we see carried out outside ourselves first becomes accessible to us, so to speak, through the relations of our imaginings representing it inside us; the imagining of conflict is often a conflict of imag- inings. And as occurs with the factional relationships briefly sketched here, so with those of the reconciliation and the exclusion, domination and equality, imitation and organization, and many others. The outside is formed and understood through the inside and in turn the inside, through the outside, but also, of course, simultaneously. The relationship between the immanent- subjective and the forms of social interaction stands in the same way as it stands between the former and the spatial-material. It has long been observed that the expressions for the movements of imagination--their rise and fall, fusion and separation, inhibition and recurrence, dejection and grandeur, and many others--take their names like all these from the movements of the outer world, and that we would have no inner insight and no names for such experiences without this symbolism. But if we look more closely, this symbol- izing is no less effective the other way around. All that is really a process, a
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relationship, a characteristic picture in these externals exist for us only as a subjective-mental object and movement that we sense in spatial vividness. The shear changes of place that those determinants of the sensual amount to would never serve as names for internal feelings if they were not already equipped by this with an emphasis and significance, with syntheses, that work below their surface. From the outset, emotional states and sensations of strength and feelings must enter into the events externally projected by us so that we might achieve through them demonstrations and expressions of internal facts. And similar to this mere externality, that third field also behaves toward the pure interiority of the individual subject: society, by means of which the individual mind indeed emerges from within itself, but not into the spatial world but rather into the supra-individuality of the interactions with other minds. Here too the inner behavior should supply the standardization and stimulation for the extra-subjective conditions that, however, return to it the service of giving form and meaning. And one can perhaps complete this with a wholly funda- mental thought. The fact that we reduce a mental event to an 'idea' and comprehend it as its movements and combinations is in no way given thus by the nature of the thing, so obvious and exact as we are accustomed to see it. Rather, it is a continuously flowing process reduced to sharply contrasting elements; the contents of this process, which are given to us exclusively in the form of our consciousness, to some extent become substantial beings that are provided with energy and that act on their own and are acted upon. Where we grasp the life of the mind as a movement of ideas, it is never the immedi- ate description of the data at hand, but is captured by the latter in a symbol and image and placed into categories that are not yet supplied by the data themselves. And, to me it is not improbable that the individual's image of every individual around us would directly prompt us to this objectification and illustration of the inner life. We experience our existence as it takes place among mere beings that move themselves, that come close and that go away, endowed with strengths and weaknesses; the people in our environment form our first world, one essentially interesting to us: It is obvious that we use the form of the transference, of independence, of mutual influence, in which their elements confront us with overpowering meaning that we use them for order- ing and illustrating the world inside ourselves, and that we categorize the movements felt within us; we think of the elements that exist in themselves as so constructed that we see them before ourselves in this outer but mentally defined world. As every person is 'a representation' for us--'one' at a higher level than the others, appearing more than as types, more in the connections of the collective existence of the objects involved--so is every representation for us, so to speak, a person, i. e. our representation appears to us as the play of essences that, as we see them in the people, assert themselves and give way, unite and divide, and put into play sufficient and insufficient forces. That which cannot be immediately grasped by us, the inexpressible unity of the individual and society, is revealed in such a way that the mind is the image of the society and society the image of the mind.
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Our concept formation takes the approach that a certain number of objects are at first gathered together into a category on the basis of very striking characteristics and sharply opposed to a different, although existing, concept. Now to the same degree that one next discovers in addition to those, other conspicuous and decisive qualities that distin- guish the objects contained under the previously conceived idea, the sharp conceptual boundaries must be overcome within it. The history of human culture is full of examples of this process, one of the most outstanding of which is the transformation of the old theory of species into the theory of evolution. The earlier view believed it saw such sharp boundaries between the kinds of organism, so little similarity in essence that it could believe in no common descent but only in separate acts of creation; it satisfied the two-fold need of our mind for combining on the one hand and distinguishing on the other in a way that it included a large sum of similar instances in a unitary concept, but set this concept off all the more sharply from all others and, as it is in accord with the starting point of the formula developed here, which balanced the meager observation of individuality within the group with the all the sharper individualization of them from the others and through an exclusion of a general similarity of large classes or of the whole world of organisms. The new discovery shunts this conduct toward both sides; it satisfies the instinct for combining with the thought of a general unity of all living things, which brings to the fore the abundance of phenomena as related by blood through an original seed. It thus encounters the inclination toward differentiation and speciation through the notion that each individual is as it were, a particular stage of that develop- mental process of all living things. Insofar as it makes the fixed species boundaries fluid, it destroys at the same time the imaginary essential difference between what is purely individual and what is characteristic of a species. Thus it comprehends the general more generally and the individual more individually than could the earlier theory. And this is just the relationship of complementarity that is also established in actual social developments.
Generally the psychological development of our recognition process also manifests this two-fold direction. An unsophisticated level of thought is incapable on the one hand of rising to the highest generalization and comprehending universally valid laws from the intersection of which the particular individual arises. And on the other hand it lacks the sharpness of concept and affectionate devotion by which individuality as such is understood or also only perceived. The higher a spirit stands, the more
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completely it differentiates in both respects; the world's phenomena leave it no rest until it reduces them to general laws, so that any uniqueness is completely missing and the combination of phenomena that are not very distant does not contradict the solution. But as accidental and fleeting as these combinations may be, they are now still there at one time, and whoever is capable of bringing to consciousness the universal and lasting elements of being must also sharply perceive the form of the individual in which they combine, because only the most exact insight into the individual phenomenon precisely allows for ascertaining the general laws and conditions that intersect in it. The blurring of thought counters both since the constituent elements of the phenomenon are neither clear enough to recognize the individual uniqueness nor the higher pattern that they have in common with others. Thus it is so in a deeper context that the anthropomorphism of the worldview retreats to the same degree that the knowledge of the similarity of people to all other beings according to the law of nature emerges for recognition; for when we recognize what is higher, to which we ourselves and every- thing else is subordinate, we thereby dispense with what we constitute to represent and judge the rest of the world's realities according to the particular norms of this accidental complication. The intrinsic impor- tance and legitimacy of the other phenomena and processes in nature get lost in the anthropocentric kind of perspective and are stained by the color of humanness. Only rising toward that which also stands above it, to the most general natural law perspective, creates the legitimacy and worldview that knows and recognizes everything in its being-for-itself and individuality. I am convinced that if all movements in the world were reduced to the all-controlling lawfulness of the mechanics of the atoms, we would recognize more clearly than ever before how every being differs from every other one.
This epistemological and psychological relationship widens, although retaining the same developmental form, as soon as it is a matter of metaphysical universalities instead of natural law. Beside the mind's power of abstraction, here it is the ardor of the soul that derives the metaphysical flowering from its innermost being, the intimacy of life with the phenomena of the world that allows us to guess the most general, supra-empirical driving forces by which the world is held together in innermost being. And the very same depth and accumula- tion of perceptions often instill in us a reverential timidity in front of the instances of inner and outer phenomena, which then prevents us
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precisely from seeking, as it were, an asylum in general concepts and images for the deficiency or even for only the inexplicability of immedi- ate experience. Where this fate comes from and where it goes does not concern what matters to us, but precisely that this unique one in this particular combination is not comparable to anything else. While the highest metaphysical generalizations originate from the refined emo- tional life, such is often enough captured exactly by the perception and consideration of the empirical world of details, it is organized carefully enough to take account of all the vicissitudes, contrasts, and oddities in the relationship of the individuals by which tediousness is overcome, and is content with the mere contemplating and gazing at this fluctuant play of details. I hardly need to say that it is the aesthetic propensity of nature that represents this differentiation most completely; on the one hand it seeks the completion of the earthly and the partial in the building of an ideal world in which the pure-typical forms reside; on the other hand it seeks immersion in what is the most unique, the most individual of all the phenomena and their fates. We escape the nar- rowness of life--the metaphysical-mental counterpart of the 'narrower circle'--on both sides alike. The aesthetic state of mind--the creative as well as the receptive--has an eye for the typical, the quintessentially supra-individual in the most individual, most incomparable phenom- enon, and for the values of the personal life that flow through what is the widest and the absolutely extensive. Therefore the actual opponent of the aesthetic tendency is philistinism, which cleaves to the middle, encloses itself in the small circle and acknowledges neither the right to individuality nor the duty toward the universal.
If the latter, as I have already indicated, are actually social philo- sophical considerations that do not in and of themselves belong here but only as clarifications and confirmations of the assumed sociological relevance, the latter broadens itself out to a still final and most universal aspect. That situation obtains not only within society, but it can include society as a whole. Humanity created social interaction as its form of life--which was not, so to speak, the only logical possibility; rather human species could also have been unsocial, as there are unsocial as well as social species of animals. But once that reality exists, however, it easily tempts the direct and indirect social categories to be thought of as applicable in each and every case under which the contents of human existence would be considered. But this is completely wrong. The fact that we are social beings places these contents under one,
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but by no means the only possible perspective. One can of course--to mention the totally general opposite--behold, recognize, and system- atize the contents living in society and only developed within it, in terms of their purely factual meaning. The inner validity, the coher- ence, the factual meaning of all the sciences, technologies, and arts is completely independent of their being realized within a social life and their finding only within in it the conditions for it, just as their objective meaning is as independent of the psychological processes by which their discoverer found them. They can, of course, also be con- sidered under this psychological or that social angle. It is completely legitimate to investigate under what social circumstances the natural sciences that we have could come about. But the correctness of their statements, their systematic coherence, the adequacy or incompleteness of their methods has no social criterion and is nowhere influenced by the fact of its socio-historical origin, but is subject to exclusively inher- ent and timeless, i. e. purely objective, norms. And thus all contents of life have this two-fold category for themselves: They can be considered as results of social development, as objects of human interaction, but also in its material content with equal justification as elements of logi- cal, technical, aesthetic, metaphysical realms that have their meaning within themselves and not in their social circumstances that depend on historical realizations. However, in addition to these categories two other essential ones still come into play. All those contents of life are borne immediately by individuals. Someone envisages them, they fill the consciousness of someone and they exist for the pleasure or sorrow of someone. While they are social, they are still also simultaneously individual and understandable in the mental processes in this or that individual, teleologically ending in a particular meaning for this or that individual. The fact that they would not have come about if this individual had not lived in society is admittedly true, but they would have actually become social just as little if they were not borne by individuals. On the one hand if I ask: What needs drove this individual to religious activity? What personal destiny persuaded the individual to found a sect? What value did this deed and experience have for the development of the soul? This question does not compete in the least with the other, which considers the same facts from the standpoint of society: What historical milieu allowed that inner need to develop? What interaction forms among individuals and in their relationship to outsiders turn them into a 'sect? ' What enrichment or schisms does the public spirit undergo through such religious movements? The individual
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and the society are methodological concepts for both historical knowledge and for evaluation and formulating laws--whether they apportion the data of events and conditions among themselves or place under two separate perspectives that unity of the data that we cannot comprehend immediately, somewhat like the contemplation of a picture understands it one time as a physiological optical phenomenon and another time as a cultural product, or views it one time from its artistic technique and another time from its content and emotional value. If one can express this with a conceptual radicalism, which, of course, praxis only follows quite fragmentarily, all human mental occurrences and ideal constructs are to be understood totally as contents and norms of the individual life, but also entirely as contents and norms of social interactive exis- tence, as the cosmic-absolute existence for Spinoza is comprehended one time under the attribute of extension and at another time it is also understood entirely under the category of thought--una eademque res, sed duobus modis expressa. 18
Beyond these two, a third perspective on them is coordinated meth- odologically, although its execution of our method before the sum of individual problems broadly succeeds only imperfectly and its theoretical universality is focused on the actual recognition of very few consider- ations. I have emphasized that social interaction would be the only socio-historical form that would have given the human species its life and, for the scientific-conceptual analysis, it is in no way identical with that species. One can therefore seek, independent of their specifically social genesis and significance, the value and the meaning of the data and contents of historical reality, which they have as factors in human life and as stages of its development. The fact that this 'human kind' has no concrete solidarity, no consciousness of unity, no continuous devel- opment, is no objection at all. 'Human kind' is, if one will, an 'idea'; like 'nature,' perhaps also like 'the society,' a category under which isolated phenomena can be considered, without which, its meaning thusly indicated, it would lead an isolated life or it would be preserved as a peculiar quality. However we can ask of every situation, every quality, and every action of a human: What does it mean as a stage of human evolution? What preconditions must the whole species attain before this was possible? What has humanity as a biological, ethical, and mental type gained or lost by that in value? When these questions are
18 Latin: one and the same thing, but expressed in two modalities--ed.
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answered in a certain way, it is by no means ruled out that they can also likewise be answered in a wholly different way from the standpoint of the society to which the acting individual belongs. Should that not regularly be the case, should that which the whole history of humanity turns to its benefit or disadvantage usually hold the same significance for the narrower group, socially bound together, should the socially essential simply also be the essential for the development or for the human system--all this does not prevent the categorizing and appraisal of the perspective of the whole of humanity, for whatever life content, from being a different one in principle from that of the perspective of society; and it does not preclude that both are independent from one another in their basic motives, however much it may always be one and the same fact, one and the same human being, one and the same cultural content that falls under one or the other classification.
Now, although the category of values and developments of types of humanity is methodologically severed from the category of the being and action of the individual, just as from those of the socially interactive life, nevertheless the former two remain in an inner connection in such a way that they encounter, as it were, one portion of the social category when encountering the others. Individuals are the material of the idea of humanity and of the questions raised by it, and it is only a secondary issue for them whether the activity of these individuals contributing to the conditioning and development of humanity is achieved in the form of a social interaction or in a purely personal activity in the thinking, attitude, and artistic formation, in the biological improvement or decline of the race or in the relationship to gods and idols. Admittedly, the existence and activity of the individual must run its course in some such form, and it constitutes the technology or intermediary link through which individuality can in practice become an effective element of humanity. However in all the indispensability of these individual forms that can be hardly discussed, among which social interaction stands at the top, the methodological poles of the consideration of human life remain: humanity and the individual. Objectively and historically this correlation with the fact of society may be of little broad impor- tance--although this chapter has still shown its impact on a series of historical epochs, and modern individualism was traced more than once back to it. But it remains at least the ideal supportive structure by which 'society' is accorded its place in the array of concepts methodologically ordering the consideration of life. As within historical development the narrower 'more societalized' group gains both its inner and historical,
the expansion of the group 675
both its successive and simultaneous antithesis in by expanding itself into the larger group and specializing into the individual element of the society--so society in general appears from the point of view attainable at this juncture as a particular form of aggregation, beyond which the idea of humanity and that of the individual stand, subordinating its contents to other forms of consideration and evaluation.
Alcibiades, 142
Althusius, Johannes, 184 Aristotle, 149, 184, 212, 221, 640 Augustus, 449, 512, 614, 615 Augustus, Philip, 614
Barras, Paul Franc? ois Jean Nicolas, Vicomte de, 391
Bennigsen, Alexander Levin von, 157 Bentham, Jeremy, 158
Bismarck, Otto von, 133, 143, 157, 360,
459, 494, 629
Bodin, Jean, 457, 458
Bonaparte, Napoleon I, 95, 143, 147,
171, 642, 645
Bruno, Giordano, 369, 644 Bryce, James, 91, 635
Caesar Augustus, 449, 512, 615 Carnot, Lazare, 391
Cato, 512
Charlemagne, 288, 349, 507 Charles I (Great Britain), 456 Charles II (Great Britain), 126 Charles IV (Holy Roman Emperor),
469
Cleisthenes, 69
Conrad I (medieval Germany), 468 Conrad II (Holy Roman Emperor),
468
Corvinus, Matthias, 158
Cromwell, Oliver, 157, 214, 381, 458
Dante (Dante Alighieri), 228, 641 Diocletian, 160
Edward I (England), 173, 455, 663 Edward III (England), 509 Euphron of Sikyon, 173
Ferguson, Robert, 238
Fourier, Charles, 54
Francis I (France), 369
Frederick II (Holy Roman Emperor),
463
Frederick William I (Prussia), 469
Gregory VII (Pope), 656
George III (Great Britain), 118, 327 Grotius, 146, 178
Hamilton, Alexander, 148
Henry I ("the Fowler," Holy Roman
Emperor), 468
Henry II (England), 595
Henry II (Holy Roman Emperor), 468 Henry III (Castille), 464
Henry III (England), 108, 656, 663 Herodotus, 463
Hobbes, Thomas, 134
Ivan V (Russia), 647
Jesus, 55, 99, 136, 412
John I (England), 144
Joseph II (Holy Roman Empire), 469
Kant, Immanuel, 40-42, 191, 236 Kleisthenes, 606
Kunigund (Conrad II), 468
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 246 Leicester, Earl of, 654 Livingstone, David, 590
Locke, John, 128
Louis XI (France), 158
Louis XIV (France), 157, 463, 495, 587 Louis Philippe (France), 123
Macauley, Thomas Babington, 239 Madison, James, 148, 586
Maine, Henry Sumner, 161
Marx, Karl, 247
Mazarin (Giulio Mazarini), 495 Mohammed, 563, 657 Montesquieu, Charles, 293
Napoleon (I, France); also see Bonaparte, Napoleon, 143, 147, 172, 642
Napoleon III (France), 126 Napoleon III, 126
Nero, 615
INDEX OF NAMES
678
index of names
Otto the Great, 245
Peter the Great (Russia), 647 Philip II (Spain), 391
Philip Augustus (II, France), 615 Philip the Fair (IV, France), 126 Philip the Good (Burgundy), 145 Plato, 56, 184, 191, 198, 221, 658 Pliny the Younger, 116
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 155, 211
Raphael (Raffaello Santi), 228
Retz, Cardinal, 495
Rewbell, Jean-Franc? ois, 391
Richard II (England), 158
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 155, 180, 659
Schiller, Friedrich, 309, 492, 649 Socrates, 534, 563
Spinoza, Benjamin, 419, 526, 673 Stirner, Max, 212
Strabo, 205
Stubbs, William, 172
Sully, Maximilien de Be? thune, duc de,
463
Tacitus, 616
Theodore I (Russia), 515 Theodore II (Russia), 647 Tiberius, 143
Titus, 470
Trajan, 116
Vasa, Gustav, 237 Voltaire, 96
Walpole, Robert, 290
Wilhelm I (Germany), 133, 143, 157 William II ('Rufus,' England), 465 n. 21 William the Conqueror (England), 465
Xerxes, 120
Zwingli, Huldreich, 659
Abstraction
association of workers, 577
balancing of rights and duties and, 614 complex phenomenon, 52
definition of sociology, 4
distinct from original unity, 63 exactitude of concepts, 145
from group relationships, 505 geometrical, 29
homogeneous structure, 166 hypostasizing of, 27
life large city, 567
logical form in relation to particular
science, 505
managing social tension and potential
for, 566
mind's power, 670
opposed to perception, 423
rare and after-the-fact, 42 relationship at a distance, 568 relevance to sociology, 22, 26 requirement of cognition, 24 scientific, 21, 23
spatially transcending, 567
social reality, 54
spatial distance and capacity for, 568 supra-individual distinctiveness, 393 syndicate as the embodied, 47
sense of smell not open to, 577 territorial sovereignty, 609
universal concepts, 61
Adornment, 331-336
aesthetic structure of, 332 amplification of the self, 336 centripetal and centripetal tendencies
of, 336
essence and meaning of, 331 expression of desire for recognition,
332
highlights personality and radiates
significance, 333
identifies one as member of a class,
629
social purpose of, 334
Adventurer
community of wanderers, 598 as a distinctive type, 597
Southern states as settled by adventurers, 627
Affection
as devotion, 670
as force of cooperation, 231 as function of ambience, 249 toward a third person, 240 in relation to love, 252
in relation to animosity, 233
Age
basis for group division, 368
in relation to rights and duties of
adulthood, 128 Altruism
ambivalence of, 106
as duty, 403
and moral character of, 109 as motive of action, 438 required by society, 187
as source of conscience, 403
Anarchism
related to freedom and domination,
208
and socialism, 654
and subordination, 209
Animosity
comradeship-in-arms, 290
effect on relationship, 233
for the feminine, 365
good conscience, 246
need for and construction of, 240-242 relationship between men and
women, 284 secret society, 355 slavery, 237
Antagonism
forgiveness, 301, 309
towards men, 399
war and peace, 295-299, 399 within a group, 509, 540
Arbitration
commercial court of, 162 form of reconciliation, 106 higher authority, 141
Aristocracy; also see Nobility Austrian, 646
Brahmanic, 644
INDEX OF TOPICS
680
index of topics
clergy, 656
common law, 138
contrasted to democracy, 220, 555,
586, 587
division of labor, 537, 649 government functions, 176, 177, 564 hereditary, 467
in Islam, 642
in relation to the prince, 642, 643 metals, 647
and mixed marriages, 536
in modern era, 473
and monarchy, 156, 159
in Near Eastern Sultanate, 143 prerogatives of, 474
Russian, 289, 642, 647
senatorial, 160
size and nature of, 55, 56, 65,
99 n. 18
social group, 353
social rank, 161, 151, 173, 175, 176 social traits of, 645
Spartan democracy, 197-199
social form, 220, 221, 530, 532, 534 traveling merchants, 590
Aristocrats
class consciousness of, 381, 645 education of, 143
international sympathy of, 622 liberal attitudes of, 381 Russian, 642
Artist(s)
aristocrat, 649
aristocratic inclination of, 220 dominating power, 129 evocation of excitement, 120 function of, 220, 261 marriage, 90 n. 15
mobility, 594, 608
social group, 435, 525
the poor and, 440
Authority
arbitration courts, 162
Catholic priesthood, 226
central, 72, 140, 280, 358, 388, 585,
586
church authority, 197, 390
circuit court judges, 595 combination of three, 93 consciousness of subjugation, 223 distinguished from prestige, 131, 132 divine rights of kings, 224
Eskimos, 280
essence of, 131
group as source of, 510
guilds, 160
higher power, 140-142
impersonal, 117, 359
intermediate versus highest, 172, 175 legitimate, 148
leveling and ranking, 142 mediation, 190
majority, 91, 213 objective, 185
oligarchic rule, 206
personal conscience, 170, 186 personality, 131
personal presence, 567
public opinion, 65
remedial intervention, 206 selecting a person for, 151
self as the ultimate authority, 410 socialism, 209
sovereign, 148, 149, 653
spirit of the clan, 187
subject to, 131, 132, 138
Sultan, 642
supra-individual, 361
third element, 103, 108, 112, 159 unions, 154
weakening through conflict, 214
Beggar
Koran, 596
Parisian Beggars Guild, 381 right to alms, 410, 421 roaming poor, 597
sacred ideal, 502
types of beggars, 427
Boundary
Catholic Church, 474
concept of, 550
frame, 548, 549
flexibility, 238, 430
geographical, 546
legal, 551
marital, 96
methodological, 52
moral, 354, 580
mutual limitation, 551
neutral zone, 619
of nobility, 642
patriarchal family, 76
personal, 316, 591, 626, 633, 663 physical, 549
political, 555, 615
religious community and city, 547 self-preservation of group, 59
secret society, 82
social, 551-554
spatial, 551, 556, 597
social relationships, 318, 319, 321,
322
sociology and psychology, 497 subjectivity, 549
Bureaucracy
Autonomous, 509
conflict with the group, 504 contrasted with provincial system,
505
dangers of, 506
English labor unions, 496 US democracy, 497
Call: see Vocation Canton
Swiss, 57, 164
Thurgau, Switzerland, 643 Ultramontanes, 384
Cartel(s)
Economic, 556, 608 Industrial, 60
Road to cartelization, 273 Task of the cartel, 395, 540
Caste
basis of Indian social system, 230 binding prejudgments, 650
clergy in the Middle Ages, 451 method of selecting ruling class, 137 Napoleon's nobility, 642
relation to class, 151
separation of groups, 635
social level, 137
social relations, 625, 635
Catholic priest
engulfed by the function, 46 influence of higher authority, 226 intersection of all social strata, 374 set apart from others, 375
Causality
concept of, 49
domination and subordination, 209 law of causality, 43
social conditions, 500
Celibacy
advantages for group continuity,
451
clergy during Middle Ages, 451 power struggle, 656
prevented ecclesiastical honors from
being inherited, 465 radical means, 374
Centripetalism
objective outcome of conflict, 282 of the group, 264
sociological, 549
versus centrifugal tendency, 623
Child(children)
blood relationship, 632
Christian children reared as Turks,
520-521
children's play, 617
egoism of the child, 567
emotional bond with the mother, 520 from mixed marriages as opponents
of aristocracy, 536
lack of the "I", 567
number of children and relationship
between parents and children, 631 psychological boundary between
parents and children, 552 sensual attraction, 582
sexual relationship among family
members, 580 unwed mothers, 520
Chivalry, 284 City (cities)
centralized power, 140, 144, 146, 166, 586, 610, 611
city-state, 265, 587
essence and nature of, 562, 563,
563 n. 9, 573, 614
French and German compared, 629 impact of the size of, 57, 62, 437,
573
internationalism, 371, 641, 663 membership in, 180, 376, 377, 405,
453, 557, 614
moneyed classes, 175
place of nobility, 643
relations within the group, 62, 84, 97,
123, 204, 364, 378, 547, 550, 567,
608, 615, 634
religion and, 548, 610
unity of, 446, 448, 468, 472, 473,
476, 496, 544, 547, 548, 551,
556
urban freedoms and rights, 161, 206,
330, 365, 376, 600, 614, 615, 633 Citizenship, 12, 142, 197, 376, 447, 614 Civil service
analogous image of society, 50 aristocracy, 150
exclusion from, 139
organizing center, 270, 480, 493 n. 45 public service, 226
index of topics 681
682
index of topics
Class
bourgeois, 289
consciousness of, 382
clergy, 374
domination, 192
earthly, 213
economic, 25
formation of, 612
judge's, 162
merchant, business, 203, 381, 396,
397, 481, 486, 514, 636, 642, 654 movements, 247
oligarchic, 206
plebian, 207
poor, 441
prejudice, 439
privileges, 204
propertied, 419
ruling, 213, 353
school, 203
social, 3, 19, 29, 32, 58 n. 3, 65, 117,
162, 206, 207, 216, 225, 231, 308, 356, 357, 376, 432, 437, 452, 466, 533, 534, 536, 537, 629
voters, 163, 207
working, 208, 396 Coercion
group power, 280, 389
honor, 389
official, legal, 65, 390
physical proximity, 569
subjugation, 130, 131, 138, 168, 177,
181, 187, 223
voting as way out of, 178
Cohesion; see also solidarity
group, 29, 32, 60, 67, 76, 158, 238,
359, 445, 457, 486, 506, 515, 523,
534, 540, 580, 614, 632 guild system, 449 monarchy, 293 monasticism, 502
secret societies, 357
subordination, 211 Colonization, 68, 405 Community
aliens, 222, 230, 418, 420, 446 business, 289
competition, 8
domination, 137, 235, 236, 389, 606 individual and, 92-94, 158, 165, 178,
179, 190, 200, 221, 254, 341, 387,
433, 665
kinship, 380, 413, 420, 426, 429-432,
540
the role of the poor, 410 and ff. religious, 24, 25, 55, 56, 128, 136,
147, 267, 292, 348, 374, 383, 386,
389, 612, 613, 626, 627
secrecy, 345, 473, 475, 476, 480, 504,
522, 535, 541, 547, 554, 559, 566,
586, 597
sociological formation of, 77, 85, 86,
104, 131, 160, 234, 345, 365, 369, 380, 399, 404, 411, 413, 418, 423, 426, 432, 433, 448, 462, 466, 470, 484, 485, 503, 508, 511, 541, 553, 599, 607, 615, 628, 629, 653, 658
Competition
See, pp. 227, ff.
among individuals, 243, 357, 381,
382, 622
division of labor, 5, 639, 652 domination, 25, 143, 160, 221, 260,
264
economic, 110, 130, 260, 270, 271,
274, 275, 277, 541
familial, 266, 267, 450
form of interaction, 8-11, 25, 27, 29,
60, 99, 111, 258, 279, 383 religious, 267, 268, 277
role of the third, 261, 263
social role, 20, 228, 231, 234, 235,
258, 259, 262, 264, 266, 269,
271-273, 466, 516, 623 Complicity, 130, 213
Compromise, 59, 72, 103, 169, 170,
285, 286, 298-301, 334, 374, 535,
590 Conflict
228 ff.
Contract(s), 130-137, 180, 194, 195,
205, 206, 319, 522, 592, 601, 632 Convention(s), 57, 63, 356, 362 Cooperation, 7, 21, 36, 90, 99, 132,
168, 189, 231, 282, 284, 286, 313, 386, 492, 495, 513, 617, 661
Criminal law, 264, 276, 277, 431, 477 Crowd(s), 58, 59, 76, 78, 79, 92, 120,
166-168, 426, 483, 485, 491-493,
495, 498-500, 556, 576
Cruelty, 134, 164-167, 245, 256, 274,
277
Cultivation, 152, 223, 292, 312, 390,
401, 536, 567, 576, 577, 627, 639,
640, 652
Custom(s), 62-64, 64 n. 5, 65-67, 102,
105, 123, 192, 205, 222, 284, 285,
347, 381, 397, 412, 450, 498, 595, 608
Democratic, 50, 56, 59, 68, 72, 99 n. 8, 148 n. 11, 171, 207, 215, 219, 220, 313, 353, 415, 484, 508, 543 n. 1, 586, 587, 626, 643, 654
Despotism(s), 49, 133, 142, 143, 147, 222, 280, 288, 330, 339, 362, 588, 653
Discretion, 145, 303, 317-321, 324, 330, 390, 430, 436, 484, 552
Distance
intermediary, 101, 106, 119, 131,
570
objectivity, 43, 44, 61, 61 n. 4, 92,
98, 105, 527 n. 60
social, 20, 137, 231-234, 254, 268,
292, 293, 312, 313, 330, 335, 417, 436, 438, 487, 514, 534, 536, 544, 559, 565, 583, 584, 586, 631, 635, 652
spatial, 548, 566-569, 578, 579, 587, 595, 597, 614-616
stranger, 10, 11, 317, 601, 603-605
subordination, 142, 160, 163, 164 Divide et impera, 119
Division of labor
formation of groups, 480, 481, 484, 491, 626
money's role, 652
psychological consequence of, 402,
424
self-preservation of the group, 507,
509, 535-538, 557, 638
senses, 574, 660, 665
specialization of functions, 218, 233,
342, 347, 378, 387, 390, 392, 394,
397, 401, 608, 624 Domination, see pp. 127, ff.
by one person, 136, 137, 140, 142-149
by a group, 149-160, 198, 351, 357, 358
by majority, 164-176
by objective authority, 186-196 fidelity, 518-605
freedom, 81, 130, 131, 133, 201, 203,
204, 206, 208, 210-217
money economy, 472
pattern of group behavior, 25, 28,
36, 134, 197-201, 218-220, 237, 238, 244, 273, 281, 312, 390, 667
political, 112, 117, 330, 641 religious, 655
role of third element, 98, 120
Duality, 48, 75, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 90, 91, 95-97, 113, 167, 234, 246, 367, 375, 384, 385, 393, 435
Duty, 88, 106, 113, 118, 135, 153, 177, 180, 213, 257, 319, 320, 324, 348, 352, 380, 381, 403, 406, 409-412, 414-416, 421-423, 434, 479, 487, 490, 497, 507, 518, 521, 525, 527, 557, 594, 636, 644, 655
Dyad (dyadic), 83-87, 92, 98, 101, 113
Education, 14, 54, 143, 226, 251, 307, 354, 408, 430, 440, 462, 466, 467, 489, 495, 534, 637, 659
Egoism, 81, 86, 92, 129, 182, 186, 191, 248, 355, 412, 438, 449, 467, 508, 540, 567, 575, 662, 663
Endogamy, 663
Enemy, 246, 253, 254, 282, 286, 287,
291, 301, 362, 412, 436, 446, 597 Envy, 227, 254-256, 267, 268, 331, 332,
353 Equality
Conflict, 273, 283, 327, 360, 380, 399, 667
group, 106, 118, 153, 194, 198, 208, 261, 623, 625
social, 7, 36, 49, 56, 65, 142, 144, 152, 199 n. 33, 221, 271, 414, 434, 454, 468, 517, 534, 539 n. 5, 618, 638, 648
universal, 161, 194, 202, 203, 212, 214, 624, 626, 640, 659, 660, 669
Evolution, 506, 511, 514, 631, 669, 673
Exchange, 3, 33, 71, 75, 133, 300, 318, 329, 397, 401, 402, 408, 420, 437, 438, 476, 480, 486, 508, 514, 523, 525, 526, 531, 534, 572, 573, 601, 619, 623-625, 663
Exclusion, 337, 343, 415, 419, 421, 449, 469, 480, 488, 605, 637, 667, 669
Expansion, 29, 53, 55, 56, 59, 66, 82, 97, 150, 157, 207, 217, 242, 262, 266, 325, 329, 330, 335, 371,
394, 425, 438, 449, 457, 482, 485 n. 37, 487, 509, 515, 547, 549, 555, 556, 589, 601, 611, 617, 621, 624, 631, 638, 640, 651, 652, 661-663, 666
index of topics 683
684 index of topics
Exploitation, 81, 110, 114, 115, 117, 129, 172, 174, 206, 243, 263, 284, 319, 352, 353, 398, 617
Face, 83, 94, 100, 121, 145, 444, 502, 510, 512, 517, 572-574, 581, 662, 663
Faction(s), 489, 490, 603, 666, 668 Factionalism, 24, 29, 235, 539, 619 Family
family relations, 96, 104, 111, 322, 340, 363, 365, 367, 370, 398, 399, 402, 406, 420, 437, 443, 450, 462, 476, 478, 480, 481, 483, 488, 607, 630-634, 649, 651, 657
family law and politics, 137, 147, 158, 169, 184, 192, 221, 250, 254, 262, 446, 448, 449, 451, 459, 460, 463, 465, 473, 480, 481, 602, 605, 641, 650
patriarchal, 75, 76, 658
Simmel's family, 12, 13
social circle, 7, 22, 25, 32, 45, 54,
57, 80, 88, 226, 238, 266, 282, 364, 368, 375, 387-389, 413,
439, 482, 612-614, 625, 635, 645, 647
Fashion, iv n. 2, 65, 154, 216, 282, 628, 629, 641
Felon, 46
Feudalism, 136, 152, 153, 172, 200,
466, 610, 636
Fidelity, 517, 519, 523
Forgiveness, 301, 304
Form and content, 5, 6, 22, 25, 29, 393,
591
Frame, 100, 271, 529, 548, 549, 555 Freedom
beings in themselves, 30, 47, 80 conflict, 265, 291
expansion of the group, 637, 638,
644, 650-654, 659, 661, 664, 665 intersection of social circles, 385, 389, 390, 390 n. 16, 391, 397, 399, 400,
427, 448, 452, 457, 458
law and normative structure, 64
n. 5, 66, 72, 79, 333, 342, 349,
350, 358, 364-366
relationships, 81, 82, 89, 111, 130 self-preservation of the group, 467,
468, 472, 476, 478, 483 n. 36, 515,
527, 535, 539, 547, 560, 557 spatial, 565, 578, 602, 603, 605, 614,
623, 625, 626, 629, 631, 633, 636
superior and subordinate, 131, 132, 138, 145-147, 152, 157, 168, 170, 171, 177, 183, 189, 197, 201-206, 208, 209, 221
the poor, 423, 430
Friends, 15, 69, 73, 75, 110, 123, 238,
320, 384, 482, 522, 570, 576 Friendship, 26, 47, 73, 78 n. 12, 80, 84, 85, 89, 93, 95, 124, 232, 233, 256,
257, 263, 296, 320, 321, 357, 369, 411, 517, 521, 566, 569, 580, 584, 611, 658
Gender solidarity, 367 General strike, 394 Geometry, 27, 29, 144 Gift
in caste system, 138
used for divide et impera, 119
that humiliate, 299
as exchange of possessions, 300, 523 as expectation, 324
as reciprocal action, 417, 525-527 quality and value of gift, 437, 438,
524 n. 58 Goal
and competition or conflict, 8, 110, 247, 258, 259, 260 n. 16, 261, 264, 266-268, 289, 291, 297, 298
and socialism, 269-271
and care of the poor, 412, 418 and revolution, 426, 436
of gift, 438
role in group preservation, 479,
503, 505, 525, 528, 532, 554,
555, 562, 608, 640, 651 utopian, 12
knowledge as a goal, 19, 368 of workers' alliances, 59
of aristocracy, 138
of adornment, 332
as ascent, 154
the role of the third, 260
in domination and subordination,
209, 211, 237 God
and sociology, 20, 47, 101, 136, 137, 142, 163, 182, 225, 292, 492, 613, 655, 661
and subordination, 169, 171, 226 and religion, 240, 260 n. 16, 383 and predestination, 267
and proofs of God's existence, 315
n. 3
and the poor, 411, 419, 496 and polytheism, 427
and patriotism, 447
and kingship, 456
and freedom, 644
Gratitude, 12, 33, 299 n. 32, 517,
523-529 Guild
Guild relationships, 23, 371, 375-377, 379, 389, 401, 449, 466, 554, 590, 599, 600, 614, 623, 625, 635, 662
of cologne, 56
guild leader, 69
guild contract, 205, 206
guild constitution, 271, 273, 314
n. 15, 467, 515
guild banner and seal, 468, 469 controlling the guild's power, 473 subordination, 160, 381
guild service, 184, 362
guild's court, 204
Charlemagne and guild, 288
Poor man's Guild, 440, 441
preservation of the guild, 443, 548, 644
Hatred, 36, 139, 140, 205, 236, 248, 249, 251-254, 258, 264, 267, 299, 301, 374, 421
Hereditary office, 461ff.
Hierarchy, 174, 175, 196, 203, 208, 219,
230, 346, 347, 349, 379, 502, 644 Honor
sociological form and types, 65 n. 6, 476-478
leadership and, 176, 206, 210 honor code, 244, 388, 389 family honor, 88, 387, 465
in Indian castes, 151
contest for, 259, 275
gods of, 268
and personal space, 317, 330
of the group, 387, 388
and group's self-preservation, 363,
464, 476, 477, 479, 480, 494, 599,
615, 647
Hostility, 102, 110, 120, 140, 235, 236,
238, 239, 260, 266, 286, 290, 293,
353, 540, 619 Hypnosis, 133
Imitation, 24, 29, 667
Impartial, 29, 102-108, 115, 117, 144,
163, 193, 661 Incest taboo, 583
Inclusion, 24, 60, 92, 98, 99, 285, 348, 433, 452
Individuality
knowledge of others, 7, 43, 44, 48,
50, 51, 316, 372, 573
suspension or suppression of, 58, 72,
94, 95, 164
and group, 65, 66, 73, 74 n. 11,
82-85, 89, 118, 147, 219, 368, 371, 372, 374, 379, 382, 387, 389, 390 n. 16, 463
and majority, 177, 182, 217
and domination, 224, 269, 270 and modern era, 278 n. 23
and adornment, 334, 342
and secret society, 342, 359, 360,
363
and love, 431, 582
in relation to power, 464, 465
and the group's self-preservation, 503,
527
of spatial elements, 562, 564 Expansion of the group and
development of, 621 and ff. Individualization, 517, 561, 565, 623,
624, 627, 628, 630, 641, 651, 652,
669
Intersection, 3, 29, 65 n. 6, 72 n.