But human movements are various and multiform, since
they begin to be, whereas previously they were not.
they begin to be, whereas previously they were not.
Summa Theologica
But
the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the
end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of
the means.
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of
the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both
to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in
which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any
way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are
in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the
power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the
means.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as
referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so
far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the
end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known
in themselves, i. e. first principles: but we do not speak of
understanding with regard to things known through first principles,
except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in
morals the end is what principles are in speculative science (Ethic.
viii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in
reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power
of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that
differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color
are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and
sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are
as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another.
Now such like objects are always referred to the same power; for
instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by which
color is seen.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits,
diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of
powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers
both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that
which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers
the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every
practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong
properly to that art.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to
the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one. "
But the will does not will the means save on account of the end.
Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
Objection 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just
as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen
by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby
it wills the end and the means.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which
tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in
comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus.
Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to
the end and to the means.
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But
the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a
useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as
such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be
moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot
be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end
absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the
means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same
movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the
means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to
the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time;
for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards
deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor
to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first
a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he
understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the
conclusions on account of the principles.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being
moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light
is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In
like manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills
the end; but not the conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the
middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural
movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus;
so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But
in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes
to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions
through the principles which are called "means. " Hence it is that
sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence
to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end,
and yet does not proceed to will the means.
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what
has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are
not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for
its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:
wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the
other; but not conversely.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic
principle?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect.
For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows
sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us
not. " But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect:
because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover.
Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object
to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in
representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the
imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes
our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a
picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither
does the intellect move the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the
same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the
intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the
appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover
moved. "
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as
it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in
potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do
this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not
acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight
sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees
white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects,
viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination
of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is
sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part
of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every
agent acts for an end, as was shown above ([1065]Q[1], A[2]), the
principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art
which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is
concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art
of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the
nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this
respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for
we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and
perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the
will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the
universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which
belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the
leader of an army, who intends the common good---i. e. the order of the
whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the
order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the
manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are
specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is
universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as
presenting its object to it.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect
does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the imagination of a form without
estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive
appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the
aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise
of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the
intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But
as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the
object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is
apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.
It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the
same respect.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the
sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the
sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the
intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal
effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause
the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the
universal apprehension of the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not
moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the
sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by
his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. " But man would not
be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the
sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the
sensitive appetite moves the will.
I answer that, As stated above [1066](A[1]), that which is apprehended
as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing
appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from
the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it
is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it
depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being
fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him. "
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is
affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not
seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the
sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and
in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly
the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in
respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is
subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Reply to Objection 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to
singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is
a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the
reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible
and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as
a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic
sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can
nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will moves itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For
every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in
potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not
in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing
moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
Objection 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present.
But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated
above [1067](A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would
follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers;
which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs
to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power
to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
I answer that, As stated above [1068](A[1]), it belongs to the will to
move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object.
Now, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what
the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the
intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from
potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus
it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of
the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will
moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in
potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills
the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the
means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of the will is always actually present
to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not
always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise
than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object:
whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in
respect of the end.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything
exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is
essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,
just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of
the will is not from anything exterior.
Objection 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown
above ([1069]Q[6], A[4]). But the violent act is one "the principle of
which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the
will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Objection 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover,
needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself
sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]
). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the
sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident
that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is
moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by
some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another
time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is
evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it
did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something
to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above [1070](A[3]),
in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of
willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel:
for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be
attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that
he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did
not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have
begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the
will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this
with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this
process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity,
suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the
instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter
of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward
principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though
the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its
first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the
natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
Reply to Objection 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that
its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of
him that suffers violence. " This does not happen when the will is moved
by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved
by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to
the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible;
since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one
respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but
it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it
needs to be moved by another as first mover.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly
body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their
cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved
in Phys. viii, 9.
But human movements are various and multiform, since
they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are
reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is
uniform according to its nature.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the
lower bodies are moved by the higher. " But the movements of the human
body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the
movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were
moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers
foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move
man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts. " But they would be, if
the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
bodies.
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly
bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in
so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered
to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers,
are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the
human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as
to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as
stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason. " Now the reason is a
power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows
that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it
is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the
reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more
formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore
it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect
or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those
who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such
is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods
bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they
understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since
they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the
heavenly bodies, i. e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they
are.
But since it has been stated [1071](A[2]) that the intellectual
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the
movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will;
in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the
sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiform movements of the human will are
reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect
and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior
immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its
cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as
to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the
disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the
influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite
is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as
exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly
bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will
something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to
make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the
object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Cf. [1072]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7)
the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is
no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or
some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just
as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led
by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the
majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the
observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy
says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a
though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will,
which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to
such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when
the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden
inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And
since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the
lying spirits. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as
exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its
superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But
there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God,
namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also,
as exterior principle.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the
intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an
angel.
Objection 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,
according to Gn. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and
they were very good. " If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone,
it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin
and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
us" [Vulg. 'you'] "both to will and to accomplish. "
I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the
movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a
natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that
alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a
natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man,
who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not
natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused
by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys.
vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something
that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an
exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is
evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the
rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated
in the [1073]FP, Q[90], A[2]. Secondly, it is evident from the fact
that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else
can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal
good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some
particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal
inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to
all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be
the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part
of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to
man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a
creature from without, as stated above [1074](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to
the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this
universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself
by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.
Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of
something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He
moves by grace, as we shall state later on ([1075]Q[109], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is
God?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything
naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary
agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is
not moved to anything naturally.
Objection 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as
"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.
Therefore no movement is natural to the will.
Objection 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the
will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
naturally.
On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the
intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.
Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.
I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat. ) and the Philosopher
also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For
sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In
this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in
Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even
for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing
which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of
itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong
to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs
of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking
nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever
belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard
to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are
naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
must be something naturally willed.
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does
each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in
the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of
demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is
all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature.
For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires,
but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also
other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the
knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live
and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which
are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind
of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are
done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is
proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner
proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will
is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to
nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a
previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing,
being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from
the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
Reply to Objection 2: In the case of natural things, that which is
natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as
heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is
not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is
"the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1).
Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard
to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always
move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The
Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven,
i. e. the Empyrean. ] And in like manner it is not necessary that the
will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills
something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it
is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure
act, is always in the act of volition.
Reply to Objection 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,
proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a
genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as
species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the
individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,
therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one
general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as
to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the
true, or being, or "what a thing is. " And under good in general are
included many particular goods, to none of which is the will
determined.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?
Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to
movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be
sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be
moved of necessity by its object.
Objection 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is
the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by
its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
Objection 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or
something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end
necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters,
to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also
necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.
On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9.
Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved,
of necessity, to either of the opposites.
I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise
of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from
the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily,
for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of
it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second
manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by
another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must
consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible
moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore
if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily:
unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the
act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all
respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other
respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored,
and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored is the
object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the
will be offered an object which is good universally and from every
point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything
at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the
will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it
will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever,
is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and
lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it:
and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as
they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from
this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will,
which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
Reply to Objection 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that
object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that
power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not
move of necessity, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an
object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by
that which may be either true or false---viz. by that which is
contingent: as we have said of the good.
Reply to Objection 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because
it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that
end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and
"to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be
gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he
who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the
conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a
passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The
good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do":
and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion.
Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man
is, such does the end seem to him. " But it is not in man's power to
cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to
will that to which the passion inclines him.
Objection 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular
effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as
stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the
particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite.
Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except
through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will
cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust
thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. "
Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
I answer that, As stated above ([1076]Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the
sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by
its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and
such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which
he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence
of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is
wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those
who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious
or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such
like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of
such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of
necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither
movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the
passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,
its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain
degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not
subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does
not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.
Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and
the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the
will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which
I will not, that I do---i. e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the
will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus
it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature,
intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in
respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly
subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is
entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although
reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains
free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by
the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed
according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him
otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those
cases wherein reason resists passion.
the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the
end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of
the means.
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of
the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both
to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in
which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any
way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are
in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the
power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the
means.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as
referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so
far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the
end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known
in themselves, i. e. first principles: but we do not speak of
understanding with regard to things known through first principles,
except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in
morals the end is what principles are in speculative science (Ethic.
viii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in
reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power
of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that
differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color
are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and
sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are
as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another.
Now such like objects are always referred to the same power; for
instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by which
color is seen.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits,
diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of
powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers
both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that
which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers
the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every
practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong
properly to that art.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to
the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one. "
But the will does not will the means save on account of the end.
Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
Objection 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just
as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen
by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby
it wills the end and the means.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which
tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in
comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus.
Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to
the end and to the means.
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But
the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a
useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as
such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be
moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot
be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end
absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the
means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same
movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the
means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to
the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time;
for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards
deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor
to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first
a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he
understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the
conclusions on account of the principles.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being
moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light
is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In
like manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills
the end; but not the conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the
middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural
movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus;
so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But
in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes
to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions
through the principles which are called "means. " Hence it is that
sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence
to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end,
and yet does not proceed to will the means.
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what
has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are
not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for
its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:
wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the
other; but not conversely.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic
principle?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect.
For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows
sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us
not. " But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect:
because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover.
Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object
to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in
representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the
imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes
our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a
picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither
does the intellect move the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the
same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the
intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the
appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover
moved. "
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as
it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in
potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do
this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not
acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight
sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees
white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects,
viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination
of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is
sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part
of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every
agent acts for an end, as was shown above ([1065]Q[1], A[2]), the
principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art
which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is
concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art
of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the
nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this
respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for
we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and
perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the
will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the
universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which
belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the
leader of an army, who intends the common good---i. e. the order of the
whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the
order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the
manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are
specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is
universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as
presenting its object to it.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect
does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the imagination of a form without
estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive
appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the
aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise
of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the
intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But
as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the
object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is
apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.
It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the
same respect.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the
sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the
sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the
intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal
effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause
the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the
universal apprehension of the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not
moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the
sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by
his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. " But man would not
be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the
sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the
sensitive appetite moves the will.
I answer that, As stated above [1066](A[1]), that which is apprehended
as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing
appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from
the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it
is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it
depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being
fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him. "
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is
affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not
seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the
sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and
in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly
the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in
respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is
subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Reply to Objection 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to
singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is
a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the
reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible
and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as
a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic
sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can
nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will moves itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For
every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in
potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not
in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing
moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
Objection 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present.
But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated
above [1067](A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would
follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers;
which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs
to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power
to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
I answer that, As stated above [1068](A[1]), it belongs to the will to
move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object.
Now, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what
the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the
intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from
potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus
it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of
the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will
moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in
potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills
the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the
means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of the will is always actually present
to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not
always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise
than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object:
whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in
respect of the end.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything
exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is
essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,
just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of
the will is not from anything exterior.
Objection 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown
above ([1069]Q[6], A[4]). But the violent act is one "the principle of
which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the
will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Objection 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover,
needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself
sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]
). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the
sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident
that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is
moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by
some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another
time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is
evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it
did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something
to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above [1070](A[3]),
in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of
willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel:
for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be
attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that
he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did
not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have
begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the
will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this
with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this
process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity,
suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the
instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter
of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward
principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though
the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its
first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the
natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
Reply to Objection 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that
its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of
him that suffers violence. " This does not happen when the will is moved
by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved
by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to
the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible;
since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one
respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but
it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it
needs to be moved by another as first mover.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly
body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their
cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved
in Phys. viii, 9.
But human movements are various and multiform, since
they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are
reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is
uniform according to its nature.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the
lower bodies are moved by the higher. " But the movements of the human
body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the
movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were
moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers
foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move
man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts. " But they would be, if
the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
bodies.
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly
bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in
so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered
to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers,
are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the
human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as
to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as
stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason. " Now the reason is a
power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows
that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it
is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the
reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more
formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore
it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect
or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those
who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such
is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods
bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they
understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since
they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the
heavenly bodies, i. e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they
are.
But since it has been stated [1071](A[2]) that the intellectual
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the
movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will;
in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the
sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiform movements of the human will are
reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect
and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior
immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its
cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as
to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the
disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the
influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite
is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as
exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly
bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will
something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to
make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the
object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Cf. [1072]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7)
the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is
no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or
some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just
as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led
by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the
majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the
observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy
says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a
though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will,
which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to
such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when
the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden
inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And
since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the
lying spirits. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as
exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its
superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But
there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God,
namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also,
as exterior principle.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the
intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an
angel.
Objection 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,
according to Gn. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and
they were very good. " If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone,
it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin
and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
us" [Vulg. 'you'] "both to will and to accomplish. "
I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the
movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a
natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that
alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a
natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man,
who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not
natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused
by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys.
vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something
that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an
exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is
evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the
rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated
in the [1073]FP, Q[90], A[2]. Secondly, it is evident from the fact
that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else
can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal
good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some
particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal
inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to
all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be
the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part
of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to
man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a
creature from without, as stated above [1074](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to
the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this
universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself
by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.
Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of
something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He
moves by grace, as we shall state later on ([1075]Q[109], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is
God?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything
naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary
agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is
not moved to anything naturally.
Objection 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as
"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.
Therefore no movement is natural to the will.
Objection 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the
will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
naturally.
On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the
intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.
Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.
I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat. ) and the Philosopher
also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For
sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In
this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in
Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even
for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing
which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of
itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong
to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs
of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking
nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever
belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard
to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are
naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
must be something naturally willed.
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does
each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in
the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of
demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is
all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature.
For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires,
but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also
other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the
knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live
and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which
are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind
of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are
done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is
proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner
proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will
is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to
nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a
previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing,
being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from
the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
Reply to Objection 2: In the case of natural things, that which is
natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as
heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is
not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is
"the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1).
Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard
to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always
move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The
Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven,
i. e. the Empyrean. ] And in like manner it is not necessary that the
will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills
something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it
is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure
act, is always in the act of volition.
Reply to Objection 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,
proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a
genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as
species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the
individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,
therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one
general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as
to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the
true, or being, or "what a thing is. " And under good in general are
included many particular goods, to none of which is the will
determined.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?
Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to
movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be
sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be
moved of necessity by its object.
Objection 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is
the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by
its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
Objection 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or
something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end
necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters,
to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also
necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.
On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9.
Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved,
of necessity, to either of the opposites.
I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise
of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from
the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily,
for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of
it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second
manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by
another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must
consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible
moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore
if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily:
unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the
act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all
respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other
respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored,
and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored is the
object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the
will be offered an object which is good universally and from every
point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything
at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the
will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it
will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever,
is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and
lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it:
and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as
they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from
this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will,
which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
Reply to Objection 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that
object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that
power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not
move of necessity, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an
object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by
that which may be either true or false---viz. by that which is
contingent: as we have said of the good.
Reply to Objection 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because
it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that
end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and
"to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be
gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he
who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the
conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a
passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The
good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do":
and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion.
Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man
is, such does the end seem to him. " But it is not in man's power to
cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to
will that to which the passion inclines him.
Objection 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular
effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as
stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the
particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite.
Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except
through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will
cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust
thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. "
Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
I answer that, As stated above ([1076]Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the
sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by
its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and
such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which
he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence
of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is
wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those
who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious
or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such
like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of
such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of
necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither
movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the
passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,
its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain
degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not
subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does
not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.
Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and
the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the
will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which
I will not, that I do---i. e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the
will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus
it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature,
intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in
respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly
subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is
entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although
reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains
free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by
the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed
according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him
otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those
cases wherein reason resists passion.
