13:14, "The ruler of the
synagogue
being angry that
He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment.
He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment.
Summa Theologica
But modesty, which is
reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for
instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term
{epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
moderation.
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OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
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Whether piety is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ
from the virtues, as stated above ([3264]FS, Q[68], A[1]). But piety is
a virtue, as stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a
gift.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues,
above all the moral virtues, as above ([3265]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now
among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if
any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion
should be a gift rather than piety.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as
stated above ([3266]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of piety cannot
remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the
inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be
no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30],
A[1]]. Therefore piety is not a gift.
On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter
of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English
word "pity," which is the same as mercy. ]
I answer that, As stated above ([3267]FS, Q[68], A[1]; [3268]FS, Q[69],
AA[1],3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the
soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial
affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). " And since
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,
it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay
worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father
in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God
as Father.
Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion
does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the
flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as
Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and
Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the
gift of piety is greater than religion.
Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and
worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his
kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift
of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men
on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to
honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one
understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).
Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.
And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day
of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to
revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this
act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are
numbered among the children of God. " The saints will also mutually
honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints
have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to the
gift of piety?
Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the
meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift
corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude,
"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," or the fifth
beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A[1],
OBJ[3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second
beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of
knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is.
11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since,
then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," corresponds
to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude
corresponds to piety.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and
gifts, as stated above ([3269]FS, Q[70], A[2]). Now among the fruits,
goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness,
which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not
correspond to the gift of piety.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is
becoming to the meek. "
I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they
are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he
assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the
second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another
congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each
gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the
gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and
fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet
the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as
meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to
their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to
knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order,
different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity
may be observed, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be
directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it
removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
(3) Of the second;
(4) Of the third;
(5) Of the fourth;
(6) Of the other six.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not
precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the
citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii,
1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all
acts of all virtues. " Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first.
principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially
the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as
stated above ([3270]FS, Q[99], A[4]). But the precepts of the decalogue
are moral precepts, as stated above ([3271]FS, Q[100], A[3]). Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of
justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers
and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not
properly belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into
two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our
neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are
directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts
of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore
all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles
of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to
principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the
notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice,
which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate
to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and
that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it
appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another
that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs
pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts
of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is
about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six
remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among
equals.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the law is to make all men
virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them
precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the
moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just
as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in
so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are
contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the
precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be
administered in different ways according to the difference of men.
Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the
decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity
as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is
charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer
immediately to acts of justice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father
in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg. :
'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live? " Now the
precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed
affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother. " Much
more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all
honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is
naturally prior to negation.
Objection 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to
religion, as stated above [3272](A[1]). Now religion, since it is one
virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden:
since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me";
secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and
thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them. " Therefore the
first precept is unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the
first precept forbids the sin of superstition. " But there are many
wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above ([3273]Q[92],
A[2]). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it
behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the
order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two
things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that
the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the
generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and
in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and
in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the
result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness.
Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end.
Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law,
the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of
religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of
man's will.
The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in
the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the
farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according
to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon
thorns. " Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in
religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief
obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to
Mat. 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon. " Therefore in the first
precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.
Reply to Objection 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept
about religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day. "
Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their
means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though
affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of
generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as
stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning
God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our
insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
Reply to Objection 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For
some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to
images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans
worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first
forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods. " Among
others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images:
and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words,
"Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship
of those same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.
Reply to Objection 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some
compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood
to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name
of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: "Thou
shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it forbids an
error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, " adds, i. e. "by
giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they forbade a
false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief.
Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion.
Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby
superstition is forbidden.
Objection 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes ---for
instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking
in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, "All
whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the
Lord. " Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in
vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding
superstition, and thus should have preceded it.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by swearing
to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing,
that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is
without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much
more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden
them.
Objection 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult
to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and
other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
Objection 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not
have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy
God in vain. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary
to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true
religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First,
by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to
others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition.
Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is
contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above
(Q[97], in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now
superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God
so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue
worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according
to Is. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i. e.
either the true God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, "and
a short covering cannot cover both. " On the other hand, irreligion
hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has
acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view
to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.
For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before
the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal
explanation is that which is given Dt. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take the
name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is
not [*Vulg. : 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon
a vain thing']. "
Reply to Objection 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the
name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a
man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name
more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in
consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by
this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the
explanation quoted in the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which
is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called
perjury, as stated above ([3274]Q[98], A[1], ad 3). For when a man
swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it
is not supported by the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears
without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no
vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the
swearer.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science,
we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,
which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the
decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by
prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common
occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the
decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent
occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the
latter sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part
of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the
signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the
singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain":
since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the
Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue,
concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For
this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in
commenting on Lk.
13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry that
He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law forbids,
not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works," i. e. "to
burden oneself with sin. " Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept,
for it is written (Ex. 31:13): "See that you keep My Sabbath: because
it is a sign between Me and you in your generations. " Now the precepts
of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is
unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain
"sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated
above ([3275]FS, Q[101], A[4]). Now sacred things comprised not only
sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on.
Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore
it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to
mention only that of the Sabbath.
Objection 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins.
But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did
not sin---for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth
day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also
Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God,
Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried
the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, must be
understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Lk.
13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or
his ass . . . and lead them to water? " Therefore it is unfittingly
placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed
also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not
observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's
day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like
things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is
unfittingly expressed.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the
first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above
([3276]AA[2],3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby
man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give
worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior
worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external
worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for
the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in
prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a
precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that
consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so
to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the
third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as
the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was
the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to
have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to
keep holy seventh day---that is, to set it aside as a day to be given
to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the
reason for it is given: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth
. . . and rested on the seventh day. "
Reply to Objection 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath,
understood literally, is partly oral and partly ceremonial. It is a
moral precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to
be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to
set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment
of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of
reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by
which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time
set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a
moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a
sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial
precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical
signification, as representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the
seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation
from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too,
it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its
analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in
heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among
the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of
certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is
representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all
creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the
general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial
precept of the Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of
the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy
himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember
that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. " For in the Law those things are
said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other
thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex.
20:11), "On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work. " The kind of
work meant appears from Lev. 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on
that day [*Vulg. : 'You shall do no work on that day']. " Now servile
work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One,
whereby man is the servant of sin, according to Jn. 8:34, "Whosoever
committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful
acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another.
Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as
stated above ([3277]Q[104], AA[5],6, ad 1). Wherefore in this respect
those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The
third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship,
which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In
this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because
that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man
abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may
occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this
reason, according to Jn. 7:23, "a man [*Vulg. : 'If a man,' etc. ]
receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not
be broken": and for this reason too we read (Mat. 12:5), that "on the
Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath," i. e. do
corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are without blame. " Accordingly,
the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the
precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it is not contrary to
the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as
teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num 28 says that
"smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or
teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes
not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,
and are without blame. " On the other hand, those works that are called
servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of
the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to
Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to
Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it
follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to
do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem
chord. iii): "It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his
farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their
womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be
dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon. " It is not,
however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because
venial sin does not destroy holiness.
Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God,
are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants;
while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to
those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he
servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and
for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the
well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11, "Deliver them that
are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one's
property, according to Dt. 22:1, "Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest
thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back
to thy brother. " Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation
of one's own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is
not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as
preserve the health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not
profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day
(1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the
Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord (Mat. 12:3) excused His
disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which
they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the
bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the
Sabbath: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me
because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day? " And again, a
bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external
thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Mat.
12:11): "What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if
the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on
it and lift it up? "
Reply to Objection 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day
took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the
precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of
Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the
observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work
on the Lord' day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works
are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the Sabbath,
such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in the New Law,
dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of
certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the
figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to
omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are
changeable in point of place and time.
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Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents, is fittingly
expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's
parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining
to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance,
gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ[101],102, seq. ).
Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.
Objection 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but
also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the
well-wishers of our country, as stated above ([3278]Q[101], AA[1],2).
Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the
honoring of one's father and mother.
Objection 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also
support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly
prescribed.
Objection 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die
young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time.
Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise,
"That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love
of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors,
we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the
precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing
us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just
as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain
affinity to the precepts of the First Table.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3279]Q[101], A[2]), piety
directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common
to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general
precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to
the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt.
Reply to Objection 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to
one's kindred and country since it is because we are born of our
parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the
precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they
direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred.
Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to
command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as
secondary matter included in the principal matter.
Reply to Objection 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as
such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for
instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated
above ([3280]Q[101], A[2] ). And since that which belongs to a thing by
nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the
first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue,
there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and this honor, as
a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever
else is due to our parents.
Reply to Objection 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their
parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present
life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety
[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the
life that now is and of that which is to come. " And with reason.
Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain
congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is
ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of
bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his
parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful
for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be
deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However,
present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except
in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above (FS,
Q[114], A[12]). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden
design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward,
some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life,
while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.
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Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one
refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one pay
one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
dues. " Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's
neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.
Objection 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing
and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on
one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above
(QQ[72], seq. ). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are
unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as
denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire
[concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom":
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, "From
whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your
concupiscences which war in your members? " Now the concupiscence of the
sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise
first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a
precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will
forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting
for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid
concupiscence.
Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or
theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.
Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire
of theft and of adultery.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is
due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special
reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due
to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to
religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth
precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his
parents---which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any
special reason---it was necessary in due sequence to give certain
precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all
indifferently what is due to them.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to
inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the
doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to
be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the
decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are
paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove to
include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts of
the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our
neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts,
as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.
For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are
understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with
one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of
damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with
theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions,
insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the
bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not
include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do
not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of
their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed
or pleasure.
Reply to Objection 4: Murder in itself is an object not of
concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of
good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of
good, i. e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good,
i. e. of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of
something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery
had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of
murder.
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TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)
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OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude.
We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3)
the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.
Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude
itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to
fortitude.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?
(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?
(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?
(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?
(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?
(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?
(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?
(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?
(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
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Whether fortitude is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity. " But fortitude
is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the
theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be
gathered from what we have said above ([3281]FS, Q[57], A[2]; [3282]FS,
Q[62], A[3]). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral
virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): "Some
seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as
soldiers," both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to
moral virtue, "and some are called brave on account of certain
passions"; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor,
or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does
not act from passion but from choice, as stated above ([3283]FS, Q[55],
A[4]). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since
it is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7,8).
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from
the temperament of the body.
reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for
instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term
{epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
moderation.
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OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
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Whether piety is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ
from the virtues, as stated above ([3264]FS, Q[68], A[1]). But piety is
a virtue, as stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a
gift.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues,
above all the moral virtues, as above ([3265]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now
among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if
any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion
should be a gift rather than piety.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as
stated above ([3266]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of piety cannot
remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the
inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be
no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30],
A[1]]. Therefore piety is not a gift.
On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter
of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English
word "pity," which is the same as mercy. ]
I answer that, As stated above ([3267]FS, Q[68], A[1]; [3268]FS, Q[69],
AA[1],3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the
soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial
affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). " And since
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,
it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay
worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father
in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God
as Father.
Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion
does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the
flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as
Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and
Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the
gift of piety is greater than religion.
Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and
worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his
kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift
of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men
on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to
honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one
understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).
Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.
And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day
of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to
revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this
act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are
numbered among the children of God. " The saints will also mutually
honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints
have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to the
gift of piety?
Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the
meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift
corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude,
"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," or the fifth
beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A[1],
OBJ[3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second
beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of
knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is.
11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since,
then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," corresponds
to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude
corresponds to piety.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and
gifts, as stated above ([3269]FS, Q[70], A[2]). Now among the fruits,
goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness,
which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not
correspond to the gift of piety.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is
becoming to the meek. "
I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they
are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he
assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the
second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another
congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each
gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the
gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and
fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet
the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as
meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to
their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to
knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order,
different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity
may be observed, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be
directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it
removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
(3) Of the second;
(4) Of the third;
(5) Of the fourth;
(6) Of the other six.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not
precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the
citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii,
1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all
acts of all virtues. " Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first.
principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially
the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as
stated above ([3270]FS, Q[99], A[4]). But the precepts of the decalogue
are moral precepts, as stated above ([3271]FS, Q[100], A[3]). Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of
justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers
and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not
properly belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into
two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our
neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are
directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts
of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore
all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles
of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to
principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the
notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice,
which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate
to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and
that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it
appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another
that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs
pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts
of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is
about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six
remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among
equals.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the law is to make all men
virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them
precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the
moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just
as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in
so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are
contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the
precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be
administered in different ways according to the difference of men.
Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the
decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity
as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is
charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer
immediately to acts of justice.
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Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father
in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg. :
'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live? " Now the
precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed
affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother. " Much
more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all
honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is
naturally prior to negation.
Objection 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to
religion, as stated above [3272](A[1]). Now religion, since it is one
virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden:
since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me";
secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and
thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them. " Therefore the
first precept is unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the
first precept forbids the sin of superstition. " But there are many
wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above ([3273]Q[92],
A[2]). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it
behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the
order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two
things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that
the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the
generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and
in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and
in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the
result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness.
Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end.
Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law,
the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of
religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of
man's will.
The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in
the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the
farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according
to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon
thorns. " Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in
religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief
obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to
Mat. 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon. " Therefore in the first
precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.
Reply to Objection 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept
about religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day. "
Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their
means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though
affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of
generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as
stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning
God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our
insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
Reply to Objection 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For
some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to
images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans
worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first
forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods. " Among
others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images:
and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words,
"Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship
of those same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.
Reply to Objection 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some
compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood
to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name
of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: "Thou
shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it forbids an
error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, " adds, i. e. "by
giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they forbade a
false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief.
Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion.
Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby
superstition is forbidden.
Objection 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes ---for
instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking
in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, "All
whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the
Lord. " Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in
vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding
superstition, and thus should have preceded it.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by swearing
to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing,
that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is
without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much
more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden
them.
Objection 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult
to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and
other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
Objection 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not
have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy
God in vain. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary
to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true
religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First,
by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to
others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition.
Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is
contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above
(Q[97], in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now
superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God
so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue
worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according
to Is. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i. e.
either the true God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, "and
a short covering cannot cover both. " On the other hand, irreligion
hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has
acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view
to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.
For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before
the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal
explanation is that which is given Dt. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take the
name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is
not [*Vulg. : 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon
a vain thing']. "
Reply to Objection 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the
name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a
man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name
more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in
consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by
this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the
explanation quoted in the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which
is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called
perjury, as stated above ([3274]Q[98], A[1], ad 3). For when a man
swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it
is not supported by the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears
without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no
vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the
swearer.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science,
we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,
which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the
decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by
prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common
occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the
decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent
occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the
latter sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part
of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the
signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the
singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain":
since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the
Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue,
concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For
this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in
commenting on Lk.
13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry that
He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law forbids,
not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works," i. e. "to
burden oneself with sin. " Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept,
for it is written (Ex. 31:13): "See that you keep My Sabbath: because
it is a sign between Me and you in your generations. " Now the precepts
of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is
unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain
"sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated
above ([3275]FS, Q[101], A[4]). Now sacred things comprised not only
sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on.
Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore
it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to
mention only that of the Sabbath.
Objection 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins.
But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did
not sin---for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth
day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also
Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God,
Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried
the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, must be
understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Lk.
13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or
his ass . . . and lead them to water? " Therefore it is unfittingly
placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed
also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not
observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's
day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like
things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is
unfittingly expressed.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the
first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above
([3276]AA[2],3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby
man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give
worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior
worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external
worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for
the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in
prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a
precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that
consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so
to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the
third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as
the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was
the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to
have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to
keep holy seventh day---that is, to set it aside as a day to be given
to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the
reason for it is given: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth
. . . and rested on the seventh day. "
Reply to Objection 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath,
understood literally, is partly oral and partly ceremonial. It is a
moral precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to
be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to
set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment
of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of
reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by
which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time
set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a
moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a
sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial
precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical
signification, as representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the
seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation
from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too,
it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its
analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in
heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among
the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of
certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is
representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all
creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the
general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial
precept of the Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of
the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy
himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember
that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. " For in the Law those things are
said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other
thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex.
20:11), "On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work. " The kind of
work meant appears from Lev. 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on
that day [*Vulg. : 'You shall do no work on that day']. " Now servile
work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One,
whereby man is the servant of sin, according to Jn. 8:34, "Whosoever
committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful
acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another.
Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as
stated above ([3277]Q[104], AA[5],6, ad 1). Wherefore in this respect
those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The
third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship,
which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In
this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because
that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man
abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may
occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this
reason, according to Jn. 7:23, "a man [*Vulg. : 'If a man,' etc. ]
receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not
be broken": and for this reason too we read (Mat. 12:5), that "on the
Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath," i. e. do
corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are without blame. " Accordingly,
the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the
precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it is not contrary to
the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as
teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num 28 says that
"smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or
teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes
not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,
and are without blame. " On the other hand, those works that are called
servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of
the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to
Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to
Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it
follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to
do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem
chord. iii): "It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his
farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their
womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be
dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon. " It is not,
however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because
venial sin does not destroy holiness.
Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God,
are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants;
while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to
those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he
servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and
for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the
well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11, "Deliver them that
are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one's
property, according to Dt. 22:1, "Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest
thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back
to thy brother. " Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation
of one's own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is
not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as
preserve the health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not
profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day
(1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the
Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord (Mat. 12:3) excused His
disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which
they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the
bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the
Sabbath: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me
because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day? " And again, a
bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external
thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Mat.
12:11): "What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if
the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on
it and lift it up? "
Reply to Objection 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day
took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the
precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of
Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the
observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work
on the Lord' day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works
are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the Sabbath,
such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in the New Law,
dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of
certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the
figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to
omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are
changeable in point of place and time.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents, is fittingly
expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's
parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining
to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance,
gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ[101],102, seq. ).
Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.
Objection 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but
also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the
well-wishers of our country, as stated above ([3278]Q[101], AA[1],2).
Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the
honoring of one's father and mother.
Objection 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also
support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly
prescribed.
Objection 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die
young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time.
Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise,
"That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love
of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors,
we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the
precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing
us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just
as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain
affinity to the precepts of the First Table.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3279]Q[101], A[2]), piety
directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common
to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general
precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to
the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt.
Reply to Objection 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to
one's kindred and country since it is because we are born of our
parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the
precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they
direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred.
Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to
command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as
secondary matter included in the principal matter.
Reply to Objection 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as
such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for
instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated
above ([3280]Q[101], A[2] ). And since that which belongs to a thing by
nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the
first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue,
there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and this honor, as
a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever
else is due to our parents.
Reply to Objection 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their
parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present
life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety
[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the
life that now is and of that which is to come. " And with reason.
Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain
congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is
ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of
bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his
parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful
for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be
deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However,
present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except
in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above (FS,
Q[114], A[12]). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden
design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward,
some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life,
while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one
refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one pay
one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
dues. " Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's
neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.
Objection 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing
and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on
one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above
(QQ[72], seq. ). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are
unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as
denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire
[concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom":
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, "From
whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your
concupiscences which war in your members? " Now the concupiscence of the
sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise
first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a
precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will
forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting
for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid
concupiscence.
Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or
theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.
Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire
of theft and of adultery.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is
due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special
reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due
to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to
religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth
precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his
parents---which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any
special reason---it was necessary in due sequence to give certain
precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all
indifferently what is due to them.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to
inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the
doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to
be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the
decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are
paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove to
include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts of
the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our
neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts,
as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.
For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are
understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with
one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of
damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with
theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions,
insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the
bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not
include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do
not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of
their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed
or pleasure.
Reply to Objection 4: Murder in itself is an object not of
concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of
good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of
good, i. e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good,
i. e. of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of
something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery
had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of
murder.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)
__________________________________________________________________
OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude.
We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3)
the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.
Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude
itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to
fortitude.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?
(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?
(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?
(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?
(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?
(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?
(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?
(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?
(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fortitude is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity. " But fortitude
is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the
theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be
gathered from what we have said above ([3281]FS, Q[57], A[2]; [3282]FS,
Q[62], A[3]). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral
virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): "Some
seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as
soldiers," both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to
moral virtue, "and some are called brave on account of certain
passions"; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor,
or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does
not act from passion but from choice, as stated above ([3283]FS, Q[55],
A[4]). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since
it is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7,8).
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from
the temperament of the body.
