Therefore in their
assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.
assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.
Summa Theologica
For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
incorporeal, as was shown above [459](A[1]). Therefore the angels
cannot exist in any great number.
Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore
since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible
number in the angelic nature.
Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances
seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of
the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the
movements of the heavenly bodies.
Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness. " But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
immaterial, as was shown above [460](A[2]). Therefore it seems that the
multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the
requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so
that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
before.
On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him. "
I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things.
Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of
these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are
higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held
(Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to
these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he
strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to
the number of the first movements.
But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
designated as angels.
Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers. " The
reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed
corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire
sphere of things active and passive is something very small in
comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude
that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material
substances as to multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete
quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that
which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is
reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above ([461]Q[30],
A[3]; [462]Q[11]).
Reply to Objection 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto
God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not
so as to be found in few subjects.
Reply to Objection 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text
44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were
made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would
exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in
corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances
exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the
means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this
is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make
use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to
know intelligible ones.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as
hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this
was refuted above ([463]Q[47], A[1]). Accordingly, the multiplication
of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to
bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders
of immaterial substances.
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Whether the angels differ in species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species.
For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things which
agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate
constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species.
But all angels agree in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in
intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.
Objection 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the
angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and
less---namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect.
Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually
from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are
the angels.
Objection 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more
ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but
one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of
one species.
On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as
"first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there
are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).
Therefore the angels are not of the same species.
I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even
souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are
of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the
angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.
But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,
therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said
above [464](A[2]), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to
be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be
several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are
not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if
the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of
one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle
of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the
division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the
diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes
diversity not merely of species, but of genus.
Reply to Objection 1: "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the
determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the
common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it
would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species;
or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the
sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according
to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like
manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse
degrees of intellectual nature.
Reply to Objection 2: More and less change the species, not according
as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but
according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance,
if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the
angels are diversified according to more or less.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of the species preponderates over the
good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be
multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the
one species.
Reply to Objection 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn
out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific
multiplication, as was said above ([465]Q[47], A[3]). Hence the
perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species,
but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species.
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Whether the angels are incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for
Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is
"an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not
by nature. "
Objection 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose
maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature,
yet indissoluble because I so will it. " But gods such as these can only
be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by
their nature
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things
would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved
them. " But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore,
since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are
corruptible of their own nature.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual
substances "have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death,
matter, and generation. "
I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are
incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing
is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence,
since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said
above [466](A[2]), it is impossible for its substance to be
corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can
never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in
relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else
is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never
be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a
bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its
circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for
everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is
an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter
and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the
matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the
angels, as was said above [467](A[2]), it cannot lose its being.
Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is
incorruptible by its own nature.
A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual
operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the
operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and
nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an
intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every
intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality,
which includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of
death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain
perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later [468](Q[62]).
Reply to Objection 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the
heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and
therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever
preserved in existence by the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([469]Q[44], A[1]) there is
a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it
is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for
its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that
all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved
by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle
of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is
dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible
not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing
His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of
corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the
potentiality of matter.
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OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)
We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;
and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of
the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their
comparison with local movement.
Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?
(2) Whether they assume bodies?
(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
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Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to
them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute
alone---that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,
as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any
material substance and without any companionship of corporeal
addition. " Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant. ): "Let us assign
incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature
alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs
the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created
spirit needs corporeal substance. " Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit.
iii): "The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their
nature is akin to that of aerial bodies. " But the nature of demons and
angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to
them.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev. ) calls an angel a rational
animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels
have bodies naturally united to them.
Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls.
But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the
angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
understood to be incorporeal. "
I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For
whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally
in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of
the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to
understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as
will be shown later ([470]Q[75], A[2]), it follows that to have a body
united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as
such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of
something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a
body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of
intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own
nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily
senses, as will be explained later on ([471]Q[84], A[6]; [472]Q[89],
A[1]). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must
presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the
intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances,
which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things.
Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but
some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above ([473]Q[50], A[1]) it was the
opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem
to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing
except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was
the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this
is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above
all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond
the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God,
followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances;
being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following
the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be
explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which
is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be
explained [474](A[2]). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but
merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there
are some aerial animals, which they termed demons.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal
metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply
speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The Lord
killeth, and maketh alive. " But to give life formally belongs to a
substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself
the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which
is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a
body.
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Whether angels assume bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there
is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of
the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the
angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since
his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not
assume a body.
Objection 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union;
because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a
body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated [475](A[1]);
while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not
said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by
the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume
bodies.
Objection 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or
water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire,
otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from
air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not
assume bodies.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared
to Abraham under assumed bodies.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume
bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels
happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to imagination. But
this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in
imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and
consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time
to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all;
just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his
whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the
angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it
is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision,
whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can
accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be
beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they
bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said
[476](A[1]; [477]Q[50], A[1]), it follows that they sometimes assume
bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves,
but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may
give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to
have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies
under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God
would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old
Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in
the flesh.
Reply to Objection 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as
its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the
assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of
intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible,
in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by
angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an
angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of
rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both
be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels
assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is
needful for forming the assumed body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But
it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live
and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.
Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.
Objection 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing
without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the
senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the
angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel
perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of
life.
Objection 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the
functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the
angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was
said (Gn. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had
appeared to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to
the angel (Tob. 5:7,8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city
of Medes? " he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all
the ways thereof. " Therefore the angels often exercise functions of
life in assumed bodies.
Objection 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for
it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed
from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred
Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies.
Therefore in their
assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.
Objection 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the
Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having
resumed life (Lk. 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies
they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored
them as God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies.
Objection 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has
befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: "After
the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth
children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown" (Gn. 6:4).
Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed
bodies.
On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
functions of life through assumed bodies.
I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in
common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so
far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far
as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in
assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such
operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which
has the faculty has the action. " Hence nothing can have a function of
life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such
action.
Reply to Objection 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for
intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible
figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that
intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of
intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through
sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels
that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men,
although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for
this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may
be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not
so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the
properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.
Reply to Objection 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function.
Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through
the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned
in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation
through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual
powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power
of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other
members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. ).
Reply to Objection 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper
function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus
moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved
accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as
movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not
moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is
everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the
movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the
movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change
place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is
there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the
world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but
according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in
the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.
Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through
their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as
they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.
Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to
eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the
substance of the eater.
Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the
substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;
nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be
changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by
angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of
such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was
not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the
angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and
to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (Tob. 12:19).
Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom,
nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).
Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons
affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as
have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk
call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have
sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny
it. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the
deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth,
who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates
those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at
that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants,
albeit there were many more before than after the deluge. " Still if
some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of
such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men
taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a
woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other
things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.
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OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are
three subjects of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel in a place?
(2) Can he be in several places at once?
(3) Can several angels be in the same place?
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Whether an angel is in a place?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom. ): "The common opinion of the learned is that
things incorporeal are not in a place. " And again, Aristotle observes
(Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing which is in
a place, but only a movable body. " But an angel is not a body, as was
shown above [478](Q[50]). Therefore an angel is not in a place.
Objection 2: Further, place is a "quantity having position. " But
everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a
position cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of
quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position.
Therefore an angel is not in a place.
Objection 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be
contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv,
text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a
place, because the container is more formal than the contained; as air
with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not
in a place.
On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline,
Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in
peace. "
I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel
and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body
is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place
according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such
quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an
angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic
power in any manner whatever to any place.
Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed
commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the
continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with
dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this
account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an
incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes
into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body
as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is
said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained,
but as somehow containing it.
And hereby we have the answers to the objections.
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Whether an angel can be in several places at once?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at
once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But
the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part
of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be
in several places at once.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and,
since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he
is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are
various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the
angel operates, there he is. " But occasionally he operates in several
places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn.
19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the
angels are in heaven, they are not on earth. "
I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the
Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,
is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and
is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the
angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one
determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be
compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all
being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one
particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since
the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place,
it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in
only one place.
Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were
unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the
indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently
they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.
But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something
indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is
indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation.
Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one
indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible
or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own
free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the
entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one
place to him.
Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be
everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is
first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there
is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the
Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly
mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers
do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres
immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.
So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite
differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a
place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An
angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is
not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place
in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither
circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.
From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the
entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is
reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
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Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?
Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time
in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the
same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a
place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as
appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several
angels can be in the one place.
Objection 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel
and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body
are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which
is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv,
text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according
to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess
souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon
are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same
reason all other spiritual substances.
On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore
for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.
I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason
of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the
causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every
class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and
there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote
movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat,
since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man's strength
is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover,
in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one
movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact
that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect
container, as was said [479](A[1]), there can be but one angel in one
place.
Reply to Objection 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the
same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason,
as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the
same way; hence the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a
body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its
form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.
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OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which
heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.
(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through
intervening space?
(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?
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Whether an angel can be moved locally?
Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as
the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid
of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is
not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then
already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved,
while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly
in the term "whereto. " But an angel is without parts. Therefore an
angel cannot be moved locally.
Objection 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as
the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not
imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy
angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved
as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said
that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith
that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is
moved locally.
I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to
be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so
likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it
is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence
it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with
the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the
continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and
according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as
commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is
not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate
with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the
place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous
movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as
was said above ([480]Q[52], A[1]), it follows necessarily that the
movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various
contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an
angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above
([481]Q[52], A[2]). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be
continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in
such contacts. Because, as was said above ([482]Q[52], A[1]), there is
nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel
according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to
a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not
all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises
continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively
quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement
will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in
the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus
his movement will not be continuous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold
reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what
is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place
necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which
is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be
said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and
while it is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of
"wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in
whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be
moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing
which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is
not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be
not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly
in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the
angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not
hold good. But according as the angel's movement is held to be
continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement,
he is partly in the term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto"
(yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance,
but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the
angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved;
but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place
which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This
very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the
angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his
power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows
regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is
divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his
power can be applied to something which is divisible.
Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is
the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application
of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is
the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for
any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of
our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are
all [*Vulg. : 'Are they not all . . . ? '] ministering spirits, sent to
minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation. "
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Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through
intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space
first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing
through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is
indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes
through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement:
which is not possible.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul.
But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another
without going through the middle: for I can think of France and
afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands
between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to
another without going through the middle.
On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then,
when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is
changed.
