By his own oath Philip
had admitted that, if he violated it, no service or obedience
should be rendered to him.
had admitted that, if he violated it, no service or obedience
should be rendered to him.
Thomas Carlyle
law. 1 In the second place, Buchanan contends that any
private person had the right to appeal to the courts of law in
a dispute between himself and the king about his property;
and that it makes no difference in principle whether it is the
king himself or his " Procurator " whom he calls into court. 2
When we turn to the French Huguenot writers we find
some very important assertions of the same principles. The
"Eemonstrance" says that the Courts of "Parlement"
were once above the kings, and opposed themselves to their
absolute power, while "to-day" they submitted servilely to
the commands of these from whom they hoped for advantage. 3
The other Huguenot tracts are clear and emphatic in asserting
the principle that the king could only take action against his
subjects by process of law. In the tract ' Archon et Politic,'
"Archon " asks indignantly whether the king has not got the
power of life and death over his subjects, and "Politic"
1 George Buchanan, 'De Jure
Regni' (p. 14): "B. sed tu mibi
regum nomine plus postulate videris,
quam qui eorum imporiosissimi sunt
sibi sumant. Scis enim ad judieec
rejici solere hoc genus questionum,
cum aliud lex dicere, aliud legis auctor
voluisse videtur, perinde atque illas
quae de ambiguo jure aut legum inter
se diacordia oriuntur . . . cum regi
legum interpretionem concedis, hanc
tribuis ei licentiam, ut lex non dicat
quod lator sentit, aut quod in com-
mune sit aequum et bonum, sed quod
in rem sit interprets; utque is ad
onmes eam actionee, commodi sui
causa, velut Lesbiam regulam in-
flee tat. . . .
Vides, opinor, quoniam uno versu
des principi licentiam: nempe ut
quod vult ille, dicat lex; quod
nolit, non dicat. Id si semel recipia-
mus, nihil proderit bonas leges condere,
quae principem bonum sui officii
admoneant, malum circumscribant.
Imo, ut dicam apertius, nullas omnino
leges habere proestarot, quam liberum
latrocinium, atque etiam honoratum,
sub legis praetextu, toUerari. "
* Id. id. (p. 35): "B. Si privatus
quispiam praedium, aut agri sui
partem, contra quam aequum est, a
rege teneri contendat, quid hie privato
faciendum censis 1 Cedetne agro,
quoniam regi judicem ferre non
poterit?
M. 'Minime. ' Sed non re gem, sed
procuratorem ejus adesse jubebit.
B. Jam istud perfugium, quo tu
uteris quam vim ha beat, vide, mea
enim nihil refert, an ipse rex advenit,
an ejus procurator; utroque enim
modo regis periculo litigabitur: ei,
non procuratori, ex eventu judicii
damnum aut lucrum accedet. Ipse
denique reus est, id est, is cujus res
agitur. "
s 'Remonstrance aux Seigneurs,'
Ac. (p. 74): "Les cours de Parlement
qui anciennement estoyent par dessus
les roys, et s'opposoyent avec grande
? ? integrite a leur puissance absolue,
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? chap, n. ]
381
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
answers that they have this power, bat only " avec conoissance
de cause, et informations valables," that is, if one may ven-
ture a paraphrase, by legal process and on proper evidence. 1
The author of the 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos' contends
that even to-day the "Senatus Lutetiarum" (the Parlement
of Paris) is set in a certain sense as a judge between the king
and the people, even between the king and any private
person; and he adds that, lest the Parlement should be afraid
of the king, the judges could not formerly be appointed except
with the nomination of the Parlement, or removed from their
office except for a legitimate (legal) cause. 2
It may indeed again be suggested that Buchanan and the
Huguenot pamphleteers represented an extreme and revolu-
tionary position; and it is therefore very important to
observe that Bodin, who certainly asserted the doctrine of
the absolute authority of the king of France in the strongest
terms (as we shall see in a later chapter), sets out a conception
of the relation of the courts of law to the king, which is at
least analogous to that of Buchanan and the Huguenots.
In the first place, it should be observed that Bodin considers
at some length the question whether the prince should him-
self act as a judge, and he is very clear that the prince should
not do so. 3 In the second place, Bodin discusses at length
the question whether the judges should be perpetual or
removable at the pleasure of the prince. He admits that
there had been different opinions about this, and even refers
to Michel l'Hopital as having been in favour of their being
removable. 4 He admits that under a monarchy certain
1 'Archon et Politie' (p. 120):
"Archon. Quoy, los rods, n'ont ila
pas puissance sur la mort et sur la vie
de leurs sujets? Politie. Ouy, bien,
in lis avec connaissance de cause, et
informations valables et non autre-
ment. "
* 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' Q.
HI. (p. 97): "Hinc etiam hodie
Senatus Lutetiarum qui curia Parium,
seu Patriciorum nuncupatur; quasi
judex inter regem et populum quadam-
tenus constitutus, imo inter Regem et
privatum quomlibet, singulos ad versus
regis procuratorem asserere, si quid
contra jus invadat quasi obligatione
tenetur. . . . (p. 98): Ne vero regem
metuerent Senatores, neque olim in
eum gradum, nisi a Senatu nominati
co-optabantur, neque absque ejusdem
auctoritate, legitima de causa exauc-
torari poterant. ''
* Bodin, 'Do Republica,' iv. 6
(p. 450).
? Id. id. , iv. 4 (p. 438).
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? 382
[PABT IV.
THE LATEK SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
offices, such as those of the governor of the provinces, should
be terminable; but, with regard to the judges, his opinion is
very different: the judges, and especially those who have to
decide on the life, the reputation, and the fortunes of the
citizens, and from whom there is no appeal, should hold by
a perpetual tenure. 1 He gives an interesting account of the
history of the actual practice in France, with reference
especially to a law of Louis XI. He admits that the practice
had varied, and that by long custom the document appointing
judges contained a clause which said that they should hold
their office at the king's pleasure; but this clause, he holds,
was merely formal. 2 Again, he admits that some maintained
that it would be better that the tenure of magistrates should
be terminable, but this he says is false, and would be per-
nicious, for it is evident that princes are beset by flatterers
and courtiers, and would make merchandise of the magis-
tracies or take them away from the best men, who hate such
courtiers and their vices. 3 This custom of appointing ter-
minable magistracies, Bodin says, savours of a tyranny or
1 Id. id. , iv. 4 (p. 439): "Cum
autem juris dicendi aoqualitate civi.
tates et imperia maxima omnium
egere videantur, collegia judicum per-
petua creabantur, ea potiasimum quibus
de capite, fama ac fortunis omnibus
civium judicandi sit potestas, provoea-
tiono semota: non solum ut diuturno
usu judicandi prudentiam ac peritiam
sibi compare ret, verum etiam ut plures
oadem potestate oonjugati, perinde ut
magna vis aquarum, dilRcilius corrum-
pantur. "
> Id. id. , iv. 4 (p. 441): "Magis-
trate omnes et ministros magis-
tratuum sua lege perpetuos esse
(Louis XI. ) jussit . . . sed ilia de
toto genere omcialium lata lex, ne
cuiquam imporium nisi volenti, aut
morte, aut scelere admisso eriperetur,
immobilis hactenus extitit: cui etiam
subrogatum est uno capite quo cavetur,
magistratus abdicare cogendum nemi-
nem cujuscunque criminalis causa,
nisi judicatus et damnatus sit: cui
legi locum esse jussit, non solum se
vivo ac spirante, verum etiam Caroli
filii principatu: quod etsi jure non po'
terat, succossores tamen legi paruerint:
tametsi ma jorum formula magistratuum
tabulis insoritur, ut imporio vol munero
fruantur quoad rogi Iibuerit. . . .
Clausula tamen res tat inanis ilia
quidem. "
? Id. id. , iv. 4 (p. 442): "Putant
plerique magistratus meliores futuros
ac imperia sanctiora, si more ma jorum
precaria darentur, id tamen falsum
esse docuimus, et, ut verum sit, per.
niuiosum tamen esset: quia satis
unicuiquo porspiouum est principes
adulatoribus et canibus aulicis fere
semper obsessos, turpissimum questum
ac mercaturam magistratus facturoe:
aut imperia optimis quibusque qui
fere semper aulicorum hominum vitam
vitare, vitiis omnibus inquinatum
? ? oderunt, identidem erepturos. "
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? CHAP. II. ]
383
THE PRINCE TINDER THE LAW.
"domination," not of a monarchy, for a kingdom must, so
far as possible, bo governed by laws, not by the caprice or
mere will of the prince. 1
(4) The Conception of a Contract between the Euler and
the People. --We can now approach the consideration of this
subject, for we have considered its presuppositions; that is,
first, that the authority of the ruler was derived from the
community; second, the theory of the sovereignty of the
community; third, the principle that the person and rights
of the individual members of the community were protected
even against the ruler by the courts of law.
It is even more necessary to remember that the conception
of a contractual relation was the fundamental principle of
all feudal society, and was therefore an important part of
the normal political tradition of the Middle Ages. We have
endeavoured to set this out in previous volumes. 2 It will
therefore be convenient to begin our consideration of the
development of the theory of a contract between ruler and
people in the later sixteenth century by observing the terms
in which the resistance of the Low Countries to Philip II. of
Spain was justified by William of Orange. We are not here
concerned with the great religious movements of that time,
nor with the complex or economic conditions and national
feeling which no doubt had their place in that resistance; we
are concerned with the constitutional principles which were
set forward in justification of it; and, in the first place, in the
'Apologie ' of William of Orange.
1 Id. id. , iv. 4 (p. 142): "Hsec
autem precaria tribuendorum magis-
tratuum ratio, tyrannidom aut domi-
nationem non regalem monarchicam
sapit. Regnum enim legibus oportot
(quantum fieri potent), non principis
arbitrio ao voluntate gubernari; ut
quidem domino licet, quem subditi
velut aliquem Deum de coelo delapsum,
adorant ac metuunt, eiusque arbitria
pro naturae legibus habent. De rv<ro
alitor statuendum est, quom a sub-
ditis amari potius quam metui oportet:
eius autem amandi ratio compendiaria
futura est, si praemia idem omnia,
omnes item bonores et ac magistratus,
paucis quae denotavimus exceptis, ab
eo tribuantur, nec nisi judicio con-
stituto eripiantur. Quibus enim jure
ac legibus erepta potestas est, de
principe qucri non possunt. "
>> Cf. especially vo . iii. part 1 chaps.
2 and 4; part 2 chaps. 5 and 6;
vol. v. part 1 chaps. 7 and 8.
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? 384
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [pabt IV.
It should be clearly understood that to William, Philip was
simply the Duke of Brabant, and lord of the other provinces
of the Netherlands, that is, that he conceived of their relations
to him as the relations of feudal vassals to their feudal lord,
bound to each other by mutual obligations and mutual oaths.
William sets out this conception in one passage in specific
and detailed terms. Does Philip, he says, not know the
condition on which he holds his authority? Does he not
remember the oath which he took before they swore allegiance
to him, for he has no such power to do whatever he wishes, as
he has in the Indies. He cannot violently constrain any one
of his subjects, except so far as the customs of his " domicile"
allow; he cannot change the "esta^t " of the country by his
ordinance; he cannot impose taxation without the express
consent of the country; he cannot bring soldiers into the
country without the consent of the country; he cannot
arrest any of his subjects without inquiry by the magis-
trate of the place; and when he has made him prisoner he
cannot send him out of the country. 1 William not only
set out these and other conditions on which, as he maintained,
Philip II. held his authority in the Netherlands, but he also
made it plain that these conditions were, if necessary, to be
enforced. If the nobles do not fulfil their oath and compel
the Duke to do right to the country, they should be con-
demned as guilty of perjury, faithlessness, and rebellion
1 William of Orange, 'Apologie,' leur domicile le permettent. Ne peult
(p. 46): "Ne scait-il pas a` quoi il est par aulcune ordonnance ou decret en
oblige? a moi, mes fre`res et mes compag- fac? on quelconque alterer l'estat du
nons et aux bonnes villes du pais? pais. So doibt contenter de ses revenues
A quelle condition il tient cest estat? ordinaires. Ne peult faire lever ni
Ne se souvient-il non plus de son exiger auccunes impositions, sans lo
serment? . . . Il no serait pas besoing, gre? et du consentement expres du
messieurs, que je vous representasse ce pais, et selon les privileges dicelui.
qu'il nous a promis devant que nous Ne peult faire entrer gens de guerre
lui aions donne? le serment. . . . Vous au pais, sans le consentement d'icelui.
scavez, messieurs, a` quoi il est oblige? , Ne peult toucher a` l'evaluation des
ot comme qu'il n'est en sa disposition monnoies sans le consentement des
de faire ce que bon lui semble, ainsi Estats du pais. Il ne peult faire appro-
qu'il faict es Indes. Car il ne peust par bendre aulcun subjet sans information
violence contraindre un seul de ses faicte par le magistrat du lieu. L'aiant
subjects a` chose quelconque, sinon que prisonnier il ne peult l'envoyer hors du
les coustumes du Banc Justicial de pais. "
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? CHAP. II. ]
385
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
against the estates of the country.
By his own oath Philip
had admitted that, if he violated it, no service or obedience
should be rendered to him. Certainly between lords and
vassals there is a mutual obligation, and among other rights
the vassals have the right of the Bphors in Sparta, that is to
maintain the royal authority of a good prince, and to bring to
reason the prince who violates his oath. 1
It is clear that William of Orange looked upon the relation
between Philip and the Netherlands in the terms of the tra-
ditions of feudal law, as founded upon contractual conditions;
these were embodied in their mutual oaths, and the com-
munity had not only the right but the duty of enforcing
these conditions.
We find the same conceptions expressed in the declaration
of the Netherlands to the Diet of the Empire at Worms in
1578. Their representatives, suspecting the intentions of Don
John of Austria, proposed to put the government of the
Netherlands in the hands of the Archduke Matthias of Austria,
and they maintained that they were within their legal rights,
for it had been provided by the "Privileges de Brabant"
that if the prince or his lieutenant violated the laws and
rights of the country, it was lawful for the Estates, and also
for those to whom the duty specially belonged, to refuse him
homage and obedience until he had amended and conformed
to that which was prescribed by the laws. They cited his-
torical examples of such action, and added that these " Privi-
leges," which had originally belonged particularly to Brabant,
had been extended to all the Low Countries in the time of
1 Id. id. (p. 47): "Si, dis-je, les
nobles suivants leur eermont et obliga-
tion, no contraignent le Duo a faire
raison au pais, no doibventils pas
eua mesmes estre condamnez de per-
jure, infidelite et rebellion envers les
Kstats du pais. . . . (p. 48): En
somme, par son serment, il veult qu'en
cas de contravention nous ne lui soyons
plus obligez, nous ne lui rendions
aucun service ou obeissance, comme
appert par Particle dernier . . . Cer-
VOL. VI.
tainement outre tous seigneurs et vas-
saux y a obligation mutuollc, et lo
dire du Senateur a un Consul sera
toujoura loue; si tu ne mo tions pour
Senateur, aussi je ne te tiendrai pour
Consul. . . . Entre aultres droits,
nous avons ce privilege de servir a
nos Dues, ce que les Ephors servoient a
Sparte a leur Rois, e'est de tenir la
roiaute ferme en la main du bon
Prince, et faire venir a la raison celui
qui contrevient a son serment. "
2B
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? 386 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART IV.
the Duchess Mary. 1 We are not hero concerned with the
historical validity of these contentions, but with the nature
of the conception which they represented. It is obvious that
while there is no direct reference to a contract, it was implied
that the prince who violated the laws was liable to be suspended
or deposed; that is, that there was an implicit contract.
It is significant that in the Articles of Agreement which
were laid before the Duke of Anjou in the year 1581 by the
envoys of the Estates sent to offer him the government, it is
clearly stated that, if the Duke or his successors were at any
time to violate the terms of the Agreement, the estates would
be ipso facto released from their fidelity and would be at
liberty to appoint another prince or to make such other
arrangements as they might think suitable. 2
1 Philip Marnix de Ste. Aldegonde
OEuvres, vol. vii. , 'Oraison des
Ambassadeurs du Serenissime Prince
Matthias Archiduo d'Autriche'(p. 134):
"En tant que par les privileges de
Brabant est expressement pourvue et
dicte, que si, je ne di point le lieu-
tenant du prince, mais aussi le prince
mesme, viole les loix et droictes du
pays, il est en ce cas loisible, non seule-
ment aux Estate en general, mais
aussi particulierement, a` ceux aux-
quels appartiendra, de quelques con-
ditions qu'ils soyent, de refuser au
roi tout homage et obeissance, si
longuement et jusque a` tant qu'il ait
cogner et amende? sa faute, et qu'il
ait en tout satisfait a` ce qui est pre-
script et limite? par les loix et ordon-
nances.
Au reste, si quelqu'un, estant
au nom du prince establi au gouverne-
ment du pays, alloit a` l'encontre
desdictes privileges, il est par le mesme
faict declare? estre decheu de son gou-
vernement et dignite? , et doibt estre de
tous tenu pour depose? , de maniere
qu'aucun ne se peut-joindre a` luy,
comme a celuy qui de faict et sans
aucune forme de droict ou solemnite?
de loix, doibt etre juge? non idoine a`
exercer aucun office en la Republique,
mais aussi tenu pour inhabile a` faire
testament et infame. "
(They give as an example the deposi-
tion by the Estates of John, Duke of
Brabant, grand-nephew of Philip le
Hardi, Duke of Burgundy, and the
appointment of his brother Philip,
until John should amend; and they
say that John recognised by letters
under his seal that this action was
legitimate. )
"Laquelle loy estant particulie`re au
pays de Brabant au temps de la serenis-
sime Marie, espouse de Maximilian. . . .
Empereur Auguste . . . fut, partraicte?
et couvenant public, faicte commun et
universel par tout le pais bas, ainsi
qu'il se trouve par ecrit e`s annales
publiques.
Semblable manie`re de faire a este?
jadis practique? e, par les Hollandais et
Zelandais et souvent usurpe? e en
? ? Flandres, comme la fidelite? des his-
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? CHAP. II. ]
387
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
We think that it is with the impression of such a survival
in the sixteenth century of the contractual conceptions of the
feudal state in our minds that we shall best understand the
treatment of the contract between ruler and people in other
writers of the century.
George Buchanan asserts the conception of a contract in
precise and dogmatic terms, in a discussion of the right to
depose a king who becomes a tyrant. Maitland urged that
subjects are bound by their oath of obedience to obey the
king. Buchanan admits this, but replies that kings also
promise to administer the law " ex aequo et bono," and that
there is therefore a mutual contract between the king and the
citizens. A contract is void if one of the parties violates its
provisions, and therefore if the king breaks the bond which
united him to the people, he loses whatever rights he had by
the contract, and the people is free as it was before the
agreement. 1
The Huguenot pamphlets assert the principles of the
contract with equal emphasis. The 'Droit des Magistrats'
contends that so far from its being true that the people had
wholly surrendered their liberty to the king, it is rather true
that they only accepted him on certain conditions, and thus
it follows that, if these conditions were violated, those who
had power to give this authority had the right also to with-
draw it. And again, it was on certain promises and conditions
that a king was accepted by his people, conditions founded
on equity and natural reason, that he should conduct the
government according to the laws, of which he is or ought to
be the supreme protector. 2 It is again worth observing that
prendre un autre prince, ou autrement
pourvoir aux affaires, comme ils
trouveront oonvonir. "
1 George Buchanan, 'De Jure
Regni ' (p. 38): "B. Obstricti sumus;
sed ill) (the kings) contra, priores pro-
mittunt se ex aequo et bono jus
dicturos. . . . Mutua igitur regi cum
civibus est pactio. . . . Qui prius a
conventis recedit, contraque quam
pectus est facit, nam is pacta et con-
vent* solvit! . . . Soluto igitur
vinculo, quod regem cum populo con-
tinebat, quicquid juris ex pactiono
ad eum qui pacta solvit, pcrtinebat,
id, reor, amittitur. . . . Is etiam, cum
quo erat conventum, aequo fit, atque
ante stipulationem erat, liber. "
* 'Droit des Magistrats' (p. 753):
"Je nie qu'il puisso apparoir d'une
telle quittance (the contention that the
people had wholly surrendered their
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? 388
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
the 'Droit des Magistrats,' in a passage to which we have
already referred, in which it speaks of kingdoms and empires
as fiefs of the "Souverainete? ," refers to the feudal law as
declaring that the lord loses his fief if he commits "felonie"
against his vassals, and applies this to the case of an emperor
or king in his relations to his subjects. 1
The 'Archon et Politie' speaks of the reciprocal pacts
and conventions between the prince and the people which
may not be violated by either party. 2 The 'Vindiciae Contra
Tyrannos ' sets out the principle of a "foedus" between king
and people. It was the people who made the king, and the
people imposed a condition which the king promised to ob-
serve. The condition was that the king should reign justly
and according to the laws, and when he had promised to do
this the people promised that they would faithfully obey him,
but, if the king did not fulfil his promise, they would be free
from all obligation to him. There are indeed two contracts,
one between God and the king and people, the other between
the king and the people. God is the avenger if the king does
liberty), et dis au contraire, que les
nations, tant que le droit et equite? a
eu lieu, n'ont cree? ni accepte? leur
Roys qu'a` certaines conditions, les-
quelles estans manifestement violees
par eux, ils s'ensuit que ceux qui ont
en puissance de leur bailler telle auto-
rite n'ont en moin de puissance de les
en priver. "
Id. (p. 769) (After citing the terms
of the Treaty of Arras between Charles
VII. and the Duko of Burgundy, that
if Charles violated the Treaty his
vassals and subjects would be absolved
from their oath of allegiance to him):
"Devons-nous en moins estimer
d'une promesse et condition sous
laquelle un Roy aura este? accepte? par
son peuple, et qui eet mesme fondee
sur equite? et raison naturelle, assavoir
do reigler son administration selon
les loiz, desquels il est ou doit estre
le souverain protecteur. "
>> Id. (p. 778): "Outre tout cela,
puisque les royaumes et empires
mesmes sont fiefs, devons hommages
et services a` la souverainete? , venons
a` considerer ce quo porte les droits des
fiefs. Il est dit au livre II. Tit. xxvi.
Par. 24, et Tit. 47, que le seigneur
commet felonnie contre son vassal
comme le vassal contre son seigneur.
. . . Je di donc au cas ou` nous sommes,
qu'un Roi ou mesme un Empereur,
rele? vant de la souverainte? commettant
felonie contre ses vassaux, a savoir sos
sujets (ce que jamais ne puisse advenir)
perd son fief, non pour estre adjuge?
aux vassaux, mais pour y est re pourvou
par ceux qui repre? sentent la souve-
rainete? . "
* 'Archon et Politie' (p. 114):
"Politie. Mais il y a loi entre les deux
parties qui ordonne actions et con-
venances reciproques, qui ne se peuvent,
ni par le Prince, ni par les sujets, sans
? ? justice violer. "
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? chap. n. J
389
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
not keep the first pact, while the whole people and those persons
who are responsible for the protection of the people have the
same authority if the king does not fulfil his contract with
them. 1 It is, however, perhaps more important that the
author of the 'Vindiciae ' maintains that a contract of this
kind was a part of the constitution of almost all contemporary
states (imperia) which were worthy to be called states; and
he illustrates this from the Empire and other elective
monarchies, and then from hereditary monarchies like France,
England, and Spain, and smaller states like Brabant. He
finds the essential expression of this in the coronation cere-
monies and especially in the coronation oaths, and concludes
that no one can deny that there is a mutual and binding
contract between kings and their subjects. 2
The author of the ' Vindiciae' sums up the whole matter by
declaring emphatically that the king who violates the contract
is perjured and unworthy of his office, and that the people
who refuse obedience to him have violated no obligation, and
he appeals to the principle of the feudal law that the vassal
is free from the service if the lord has committed "felonie"
against him. And finally he says that even if there were no
ceremonies of coronation, if the king had taken no oaths,
nature itself would teach men that kings were created by the
people that they should rule justly, and that if they do not
1 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' Q.
III. (p. 159): "Diximus in con-
stituency rege duplex foedus initum
fuisse; primum inter Dcum et regem
et populum, de qua super: secundum
inter regem et populum do quo nobis
jam agendum est. . . . (P. 160): In
eo pacto agebatur de creando Rege.
Populus enim regem faciebat, non
Rex populum. Itaque non dubium
est quin populus stipularetur, Rex
promitteret Stipulabatur
ille a rege, an non juste et secundum
leges regnaturus esset 1 Hie facturum
spondebat. Populus demum se juste
imperanti fideliter obsequuturum re-
spondebat. Itaque promittebat rex
pure, populus sub conditione; quae si
non impleretur, populus ipso jure
omni obligatione solutus censeretur.
In primo foedere seu pacto p>etas in
obligationem venit; in socundo justitia ,
illo promittit rex, se pie obediturum
Deo: hoc so juste imperaturum
populo; illo, se gloriam Dei; hoe*
utilitatom populi curat urum; in
illo inest conditio, si legem meam
observaris; in hoc, si jus unicuique
suum tribueris. Illius, ni impleatur
Deus proprie v index est; hujus legi-
time universus populus, quive univer-
sum populum tuendum susceperint,
regni proceros. "
* Id. id. (p. 162): "Quod si vero
hodierna imperia spectemus, nullum
sane est, quod eo nomine dignum oon-
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? 390
[pabt rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
do this they are no longer kings and should not be acknow-
ledged by the people. 1
seatur, in quo inter principem et
subditos pactum ejusmodi non inter-
cedat. "
He cites the oath of the Emperor
Charles V. : "Leges latas custodit-
urum; novas, inconsultis electoribus
non laturum; publica publico consilio
curaturum; nil alienaturum oppig-
neraturumvo ex iis, quae ad imperium
pertinent, et caetera.
