No More Learning

. . If I am equally
successful with Cæsar, whose ship is now sailing under full canvas,
shall I have done great harm to the State? ”[1080] Cicero, like all men
whose strength lies in eloquence, felt that he could play no important
part, or even secure his own personal safety, unless he allied himself
with men of the sword.

Whilst at Rome the masters of the world were wasting their time in mean
quarrels, alarming news came suddenly to create a diversion in political
intrigue. Information was brought that the Gaulish allies on the banks
of the Saône had been defeated by the Germans, that the Helvetii were in
arms, and making raids beyond the frontiers. The terror was universal.
Fears were entertained of a fresh invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones;
and, as always happened on such occasions, a general levy, without
exception, was ordered. [1081] The consuls of the previous year drew lots
for their provinces, and it was decided to dispatch commissioners to
come to an understanding with the Gaulish tribes, with a view to resist
foreign invasions. The names of Pompey and Cicero were at once
pronounced; but the Senate, influenced by different motives, declared
that their presence was too necessary in Rome to allow them to be sent
away. They were unwilling to give the former an opportunity of again
distinguishing himself, or to deprive themselves of the concurrence of
the latter.


[Sidenote: Alliance of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus. ]

III. News of a more re-assuring character having been received from
Gaul, the fear of war ceased for a time, and things had returned to
their customary course when Cæsar came home from Spain. In the midst of
conflicting opinions and interests, the presence of a man of steady
purpose and deeply-rooted convictions, and illustrious through recent
victories, was, without any doubt, an event. He did not require long to
form his estimate of the situation; and, as he could not as yet unite
the masses by the realisation of a grand idea, he thought to unite the
chiefs by a common interest.

All his endeavours from that time were devoted to making Pompey,
Crassus, and Cicero share his ideas. The first had been rather ill
disposed towards him. On his return from his campaign against
Mithridates, Pompey had called Cæsar his Egistheus,[1082] in allusion to
the intrigue which he had had with his wife Mutia, whilst he, like
Agamemnon, was making war in Asia. Resentment, on this account, usually
slight enough among the Romans, soon disappeared before the exigencies
of political life. As for Crassus, who had long been separated from
Pompey by a jealous feeling of rivalry, it needed all Cæsar’s tact, and
all the seduction of his manners, to induce him to become reconciled
with his rival. But, to bring them both to follow the same line of
conduct, it was necessary, over and above this, to tempt them with such
powerful motives as would ensure conviction. The historians, in general,
have given no other reason to account for the agreement of these three
men than personal interest. Doubtless, Pompey and Crassus were not
insensible to a combination that favoured their love of power and
wealth; but we ought to lend Cæsar a more elevated motive, and suppose
him inspired by a genuine patriotism.

The condition of the Republic must have appeared thus to his
comprehensive grasp of thought:--The Roman dominion, stretched, like
some vast figure, across the world, clasps it in her sinewy arms; and
whilst her limbs are full of life and strength, the heart is wasting by
decay. Unless some heroic remedy be applied, the contagion will soon
spread from the centre to the extremities, and the mission of Rome will
remain unfinished! --Compare with the present the prosperous days of the
Republic. Recollect the time when envoys from foreign nations, doing
homage to the policy of the Senate, declared openly that they preferred
the protecting sovereignty of Rome to independence itself. Since that
period, what a change has taken place! All nations execrate the power of
Rome, and yet that power preserves them from still greater evils. Cicero
is right, “Let Asia think well of it: there is not one of the woes that
are bred of war and civil strife, that she would not experience did she
cease to live under our laws. ”[1083] And this advice may be applied to
all the countries whither the legions have penetrated. If, then, fate
has willed that the nations are to be subject to the sway of a single
people, it is the duty of that people, as charged with the execution of
the eternal decrees, to be, towards the vanquished, as just and
equitable as the Divinity, since he is as inexorable as destiny. How are
we to fix a limit to the arbitrary conduct of proconsuls and proprætors,
which all the laws promulgated for so many years have been powerless to
check? How put a stop to the exactions committed at all points of the
empire, if a firmer and stronger direction do not emanate from the
central power? --The Republic pursues an irregular system of
encroachment, which will exhaust its resources; it is impossible for her
to fight against all nations at once, and at the same time to maintain
her allies in their allegiance, if, by unjust treatment, they are driven
to revolt. The enemies of the Republic must be diminished in number by
restoring their freedom to the cities which are worthy of it,[1084] and
acknowledging as friends of the Roman people those nations with whom
there is a chance of living in peace. [1085] Our most dangerous enemies
are the Gauls, and it is against this turbulent and warlike nation that
all the strength of the State ought to be directed. --In Italy, and under
this name Cisalpine Gaul must be included, how many citizens are
deprived of political rights! At Rome, how many of the proletaries are
living on the charity either of the rich or of the State! Why should we
not extend the Roman commune as far as the Alps, and why not augment the
race of labourers and soldiers by making them landowners? The Roman
people must be raised in its own eyes, and the Republic in the eyes of
the world! --Absolute liberty of speech and of vote was a great benefit,
when, modified by morality, and restrained by a powerful aristocracy, it
gave scope to individual faculties without damaging the general
well-being; but, ever since the morality of ancient days disappeared
with the aristocracy, we have seen the laws become weapons of war for
the use of parties, the elections a traffic, the forum a battle-field;
while liberty is nothing more than a never-ending cause of weakness and
decay. --Our institutions cause such uncertainty in our councils, and
such independence in our offices of State, that we search in vain for
that spirit of order and control which are indispensable elements in the
maintenance of so vast an empire. Without overthrowing institutions
which have given five centuries of glory to the Republic, it is
possible, by a close union of the most worthy citizens, to establish in
the State a moral authority, which governs the passions, tempers the
laws, gives a greater stability to power, directs the elections,
maintains the representatives of the Roman people in their duty, and
frees us from the two most serious dangers of the present: the
selfishness of the nobles and the turbulence of the mob. This is what
they may realise by their union; their disunion, on the contrary, will
only encourage the fatal conduct of these men who are endangering the
future equally, some by their opposition, the others by their headlong
violence.

These considerations must have been easily understood by Pompey and
Crassus, who had themselves been actors in such great events, witnesses
of so much blood shed in civil wars, of so many noble ideas, triumphing
at one moment and overthrown the next. They accepted Cæsar’s proposal,
and thus was concluded an alliance which is wrongly termed the First
Triumvirate. [1086] As for Cicero, Cæsar tried to persuade him to join
the compact which had just been formed, but he refused to become one of
what he termed a party of friends. [1087] Always uncertain in his
conduct, always divided between his admiration for those who held the
sovereign power, and his engagements with the oligarchy, and uneasy for
the future which his foresight could not penetrate, he set his mind to
work to prevent the success of every measure which he approved as soon
as it had succeeded. The alliance which these three persons ratified by
their oaths,[1088] remained long a secret; and it was only during
Cæsar’s consulship that it became matter of public notoriety from the
unanimity they displayed in all their political resolutions. Cæsar,
then, set energetically to work to unite in his own favour every chance
that could render his election certain.


[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Election. ]

IV. Among the candidates was L. Lucceius. Cæsar was desirous of
attaching to his cause this person, who was distinguished alike by his
writings and his character,[1089] and who, possessed of vast wealth, had
promised to make abundant use of it for their common profit, in order to
command the majority of votes in the centuries. “The aristocratic
faction,” says Suetonius, “on learning this arrangement, was seized with
fear. They thought that there was nothing which Cæsar would not attempt
in the exercise of the sovereign magistracy, if he had a colleague who
agreed with him, and who would support all his designs. ”[1090] The
nobles, unable to eject him, resolved to give him Bibulus for a
colleague, who had already been his colleague in the edileship and the
prætorship, and had constantly shown himself his opponent. They all made
a pecuniary contribution to influence the elections; Bibulus spent large
sums,[1091] and the incorruptible Cato himself, who had solemnly sworn
to impeach any one who should be guilty of bribery, contributed his
quota, owning that for the interest of the State his principles must for
once yield. [1092] Neither was Cicero more inflexible: some time before,
he expressed to Atticus the necessity of purchasing the concurrence of
the equestrian order. [1093] We can see how even the most honourable were
swept along, by the force of events, in the current of a corrupt
society.

By the force of public opinion, and by the support of the two men of
greatest influence, Cæsar was elected consul unanimously, and conducted,
according to custom, from the Campus Martius to his own house by an
enthusiastic crowd of his fellow-citizens, and a vast number of
senators. [1094]

If the party opposed to Cæsar had been unable to stand in the way of his
becoming consul, it did not despair of preventing his playing the
important part he had a right to expect as proconsul. To effect this,
the Senate determined to evade the law of Caius Gracchus, which, to
prevent the assignment of provinces from personal considerations,
provided that it should take place before the comitia were held. The
assembly, therefore, departing from the rule, assigned to Cæsar and his
colleague, by an act of flagrant ill-will, the supervision of the public
roads and forests; an office somewhat similar, it is true, to that of
governor of a province. [1095] This humiliating appointment, proof as it
was of a persevering hostility, wounded him deeply; but the duties of
his new office imposed silence upon his resentments. Cæsar the consul
would forget the wrongs done to Cæsar the man, and generously attempt a
policy of conciliation.




CHAPTER V.

CONSULSHIP OF CÆSAR AND BIBULUS.

(695. )


[Sidenote: Attempts at Conciliation. ]

I. Cæsar has arrived at the first magistracy of the Republic. Consul
with Bibulus at the age of forty-one, he has not yet acquired the just
celebrity of Pompey, nor does he enjoy the treasures of Crassus, and yet
his influence is perhaps greater than that of those two personages.
Political influence, indeed, does not depend solely on military
successes or on the possession of immense riches; it is acquired
especially by a conduct always in accord with fixed convictions. Cæsar
alone represents a principle. From the age of eighteen, he has faced the
anger of Sylla and the hostility of the aristocracy, in order to plead
unceasingly the grievances of the oppressed and the rights of the
provinces.

So long as he is not in power, being exempt from responsibility, he
walks invariably in the way he has traced, listens to no compromise,
pursues unsparingly the adherents of the opposite party, and maintains
his opinions energetically, at the risk of wounding his adversaries;
but, once consul, he lays aside all resentment, and makes a loyal appeal
to all who will rally round him; he declares to the Senate that he will
not act without its concurrence, that he will propose nothing contrary
to its prerogatives. [1096] He offers his colleague Bibulus a generous
reconciliation, conjuring him, in the presence of the senators, to put a
term to differences of opinion, the effects of which, already so much to
be regretted during their common edileship and prætorship, would become
fatal in their new position. [1097] He makes advances to Cicero, and,
after sending Cornelius Balbus to him in his villa of Antium to assure
him that he is ready to follow his counsels and those of Pompey, offers
to take him as an associate in his labours. [1098]

Cæsar must have believed that these offers of co-operation would be
embraced. In face of the perils of a society deeply agitated, he
supposed that others had the same sentiments which animated himself.
Love of the public good, and the consciousness of having entirely
devoted himself to it, gave him that confidence without reserve in the
patriotism of others which admits neither mean rivalries nor the
calculations of selfishness: he was deceived. The Senate showed nothing
but prejudices, Bibulus, but rancours, Cicero, but a false pride.

It was essential for Cæsar to unite Pompey, who was wanting in firmness
of character, more closely with his destinies; he gave him in marriage
his daughter Julia, a young woman of twenty-three years of age, richly
endowed with graces and intelligence, who had already been affianced to
Servilius Cæpio. To compensate the latter, Pompey promised him his own
daughter, though she also was engaged to another, to Faustus, the son of
Sylla. Soon afterwards Cæsar espoused Calpurnia, the daughter of Lucius
Piso. [1099] Cato protested energetically against these marriages, which
he qualified as disgraceful traffics with the common weal. [1100] The
nobles, and especially the two Curios, made themselves the echoes of
this reprobation. Their party, nevertheless, did not neglect to
strengthen themselves by such alliances. Doubtless, when Cato gave his
daughter to Bibulus, it was for a political motive; and when he ceded
his own wife to Hortensius,[1101] although the mother of three children,
to take her back again when enriched by the death of her last husband,
there was also an interest hardly honourable, which Cæsar subsequently
unveiled in a book entitled _Anti-Cato_. [1102]

The first care of the new consul was to establish the practice of
publishing daily the acts of the Senate and those of the people, in
order that public opinion might bear with all its weight upon the
resolutions of the conscript fathers, whose deliberations had previously
been often secret. [1103] The initiative taken by Cæsar from the
commencement of his consulship, in questioning the senators on the
projects of laws, is an evidence that he had the fasces before Bibulus.
We know, in fact, that the consuls enjoyed this honour alternately for a
month, and it was in the period when they were invested with the signs
distinctive of power that they were permitted to ask the advice of the
senators. [1104]


[Sidenote: Agrarian Laws. ]

II. He proposed next, in the month of January, an agrarian law founded
upon wise principles, and which respected all legitimate rights. The
following were its principal provisions:--

Partition of all the free part of the _ager publicus_, except that of
Campania and that of Volaterræ; the first excepted originally on account
of its great fertility,[1105] and the second guaranteed to all those who
had got it into their possession. [1106]--In case of insufficiency of
territory, new acquisitions, by means either of money coming from
Pompey’s conquests, or from the overplus of the public
revenues. --Prohibition of all appropriation by force. --The nomination of
twenty commissioners to preside at the distribution of the lands, with
exclusion of the author of the proposal. --Estimate of private lands for
sale, made according to the declaration at the last census, and not
according to the valuation of the commissioners. --Obligation upon each
senator to swear obedience to the law, and to engage never to propose
anything contrary to it.

It was, as may be seen, the project of Rullus, relieved from the
inconveniences pointed out with so much eloquence by Cicero. In fact,
instead of ten commissioners, Cæsar proposed twenty, in order to
distribute among a greater number a power of which men feared the abuse.
He himself, to avoid all suspicion of personal interest, excluded
himself from the possibility of forming part of it. The commissioners
were not, as in the law of Rullus, authorised to act according to their
will, and tax the properties arbitrarily. Acquired rights were
respected; those territories only were distributed of which the State
had still the full disposal. The sums arising from Pompey’s conquests
were to be employed in favour of the old soldiers; and Cæsar said
himself that it was just to give the profit of that money to those who
had gained it at the peril of their lives. [1107] As to the obligation of
the oath imposed upon the senators, it was not an innovation, but an
established custom. In the present case, the law having been voted
before the elections, all the candidates, and especially the tribunes of
the following year, had to take the engagement to observe it. [1108]

“Nobody,” says Dio Cassius,[1109] “had reason for complaint on this
subject. The population of Rome, the excessive increase of which had
been the principal aliment of seditions, was called to labour and a
country life; the greater part of the countries of Italy, which had lost
their inhabitants, were re-peopled. This law insured means of existence
not only to those who had supported the fatigues of the war, but also to
all the other citizens, without causing expenditure to the State or
loss to the nobles; on the contrary, it gave to several honours and
power. ”

Thus, while some historians accuse Cæsar of seeking in the populace of
Rome the point of support for his ambitious designs, he, on the
contrary, obtains a measure, the effect of which is to transport the
turbulent part of the inhabitants of the capital into the country.

Cæsar, then, read his project to the Senate; after which, calling the
senators by their names, one after the other, he asked the opinion of
each, declaring his readiness to modify the law, or withdraw it
altogether, if it were not agreeable to them. But, according to Dio
Cassius, “It was unassailable, and, if any disapproved of it, none dared
to oppose it; what afflicted its opponents most was, that it was drawn
up in such a manner as to leave no room for a complaint. ”[1110] So the
opposition was limited to adjourning from time to time, under frivolous
pretexts. Cato, without making a direct opposition, alleged the
necessity of changing nothing in the constitution of the Republic, and
declared himself the adversary of all kind of innovation; but, when the
moment came for voting, he had recourse again to his old tactics, and
rendered all deliberation impossible by speaking the entire day, by
which he had already succeeded in depriving Cæsar of the triumph. [1111]
The latter lost patience, and sent the obstinate orator to prison; Cato
was followed by a great number of senators, and M. Petreius, one of
them, replied to the consul, who reproached him for withdrawing before
the meeting was closed: “I would rather be in prison with Cato than here
with thee. ” Regretting, however, this first movement of anger, and
struck by the attitude of the assembly, Cæsar immediately restored Cato
to liberty; then he dismissed the Senate, addressing them in the
following words: “I had made you supreme judges and arbiters of this
law, in order that, if any one of its provisions displeased you, it
should not be referred to the people; but, since you have refused the
previous deliberation, the people alone shall decide it. ”

His attempt at conciliation having failed with the Senate, he renewed it
towards his colleague, and, in the assembly of the tribes, adjured
Bibulus to support his proposal. On their side, the people joined their
entreaties with those of Cæsar; but Bibulus, inflexible, merely said:
“You will not prevail with me, though you were all of one voice; and, as
long as I shall be consul, I will suffer no innovation. ”[1112]

Then Cæsar, judging other influences necessary, appealed to Pompey and
Crassus. Pompey seized happily this opportunity for speaking to the
people: he said that he not only approved the agrarian law, but that the
senators themselves had formerly admitted the principle, in decreeing,
on his return from Spain, a distribution of lands to his soldiers and to
those of Metellus; if this measure had been deferred, it was on account
of the penury of the treasury, which, thanks to him, had now ceased.
Then, replying to Cæsar, who asked him if he would support the law in
case it were opposed by violence, “If any one dared to draw his sword,”
he cried, “I would take even my buckler;” meaning by that, that he would
come into the public place armed as for the combat. This bold
declaration of Pompey, supported by Crassus and Cæpio,[1113] silenced
all opposition except that of Bibulus, who, with three tribunes his
partisans, called an assembly of the Senate in his own house, where it
was resolved that at all risk the law should be openly rejected. [1114]

The day of meeting of the comitia having been fixed, the populace
occupied the Forum during the night. Bibulus hurried with his friends to
the temple of Castor, where his colleague was addressing the multitude;
he tried in vain to obtain a hearing, was thrown down from the top of
the steps, and obliged to fly, after seeing his fasces broken to pieces
and two tribunes wounded. Cato, in his turn, tried to mount the rostra;
expelled by force, he returned, but, instead of treating of the
question, seeing that nobody listened to him, he attacked Cæsar with
bitterness, until he was dragged a second time from the tribune. Calm
being restored, the law was adopted. Next day Bibulus tried to propose
to the Senate its abrogation; but nobody supported him, such was the
effect of this burst of popular enthusiasm;[1115] from this moment he
took the part of shutting himself up at home during the residue of
Cæsar’s consulship. When the latter presented a new law on the days of
the comitia, he contented himself with protesting, and with sending by
his lictors to say that he was observing the sky, and that consequently
all deliberation was illegal. [1116] This was to proclaim loudly the
political aim of this formality.

Cæsar was far from yielding to this religious scruple, which, indeed,
had lost its authority. At this very time Lucullus wrote a bold poem
against the popular credulity, and for some time the observation of the
auspices had been regarded as a puerile superstition; two centuries and
a half before, a great captain had given a remarkable proof of this.
Hannibal, then a refugee at the court of King Prusias, engaged the
latter to accept his plans of campaign against the Romans; the king
refused, because the auspices had not been favourable. “What! ” cried
Hannibal, “have you more confidence in a miserable calf’s liver than in
the experience of an old general like me? ”[1117]

Be this as it may, the obligation not to hold the comitia while the
magistrate was observing the sky was a law; and to excuse himself for
not having observed it, as well as to prevent his acts from being
declared null, Cæsar, before quitting his office, brought the question
before the Senate, and thus obtained a legal ratification of his
conduct.

The law being adopted by the people, each senator was called to take his
oath to observe it. Several members, and, among others, Q. Metellus
Celer, M. Cato, and M. Favonius,[1118] had declared that they would
never submit to it; but when the day of taking the oath arrived, their
protests vanished before the fear of the punishment decreed against
those who abstained, and, except Laterensis, everybody, even Cato, took
the oath. [1119]

Irritated at the obstacles which he had encountered, and sure of the
approval of the people, Cæsar included, by a new law, in the
distribution of the public domain, the lands of Campania and of Stella,
omitted before out of deference to the Senate. [1120]

In carrying the law into effect, Pompey’s veterans received lands at
Casilinum, in Campania;[1121] at Minturnæ, Lanuvium, Volturnum, and
Aufidena, in Samnium; and at Bovianum; Clibæ, and Veii, in
Etruria;[1122] twenty thousand fathers of families having more than
three children were established in Campania, so that about a hundred
thousand persons became husbandmen, and re-peopled with free men a great
portion of the territory, while Rome was relieved from a populace which
was inconvenient and debased. Capua became a Roman colony, which was a
restoration of the democratic work of Marius, destroyed by Sylla. [1123]
It appears that the _ager_ of Leontinum, in Sicily, was also comprised
in the agrarian law. [1124] The nomination of the twenty commissioners,
chosen among the most commendable of the consulars, was next proceeded
with. [1125] Of the number were C. Cosconius and Atius Balbus, the
husband of Cæsar’s sister. Clodius could not obtain admission among
them,[1126] and Cicero, after the death of Cosconius, refused to take
his place. [1127] The latter, in his letters to Atticus, blames
especially the distribution of the territory of Capua, as depriving the
Republic of an important revenue; and inquires what will remain to the
State, unless it be the twentieth on the enfranchisement of slaves,
since the rights of toll had already been abandoned through the whole of
Italy; but it was objected with reason that, on the other hand, the
State was relieved from the enormous charges imposed by the necessity of
distributing wheat to all the poor of Rome.

Nevertheless, the allotment of the _ager Campanus_ and of the _ager_ of
Stella met with many delays; it was not yet terminated in 703, since at
that epoch Pompey was advised to hasten the distribution of the
last-mentioned lands, in order that Cæsar, on his return from Gaul,
might not have the merit of it. [1128]


[Sidenote: Cæsar’s various Laws. ]

III. We have seen how, in previous years, Cato was instrumental in
refusing the request of those who farmed the taxes of Asia to have the
terms of their leases lowered. By this rigorous measure, the Senate had
estranged from itself the equestrian order, whose complaints had been
far from unreasonable. In fact, the price paid for the farming of the
revenues of Asia had been heavy during the war against Mithridates, as
may be learnt from the speech of Cicero against the Manilian Law; and
the remission of a portion of the money due to the State was a measure
not without some show of justice to excuse it. Cæsar, when he became
consul, influenced by a sense of justice no less than by policy, lost no
time in proposing a law to remit to the farmers of the revenue one-third
of the sums for which they were responsible. [1129] He first addressed
himself to the Senate; but that body having refused to deliberate on the
question, he found himself compelled to submit it to the people,[1130]
who adopted his opinion. This liberality, so far beyond what they had
hoped for, filled the farmers of the revenue with joy, and rendered them
devoted to the man who showed himself so generous: he advised them,
however, publicly, to be more careful in future, and not overbid in an
inconsiderate manner at the time of the sale of the taxes. [1131]

The agrarian law, and the law concerning the rents, having satisfied the
interests of the proletaries, the veterans, and the knights, it became
important to settle the just demands of Pompey. Therefore Cæsar obtained
from the people their approbation of all the acts of the conqueror of
Mithridates. [1132] Lucullus had been till then one of the most earnest
adversaries of this measure. He could not forget the glory of which
Pompey had frustrated him; but his dread of a prosecution for peculation
was so great, that he fell at Cæsar’s feet, and forswore all
opposition. [1133]

The activity of the consul did not confine itself to internal reforms;
it extended to questions which were raised abroad. The condition of
Egypt was precarious: King Ptolemy Auletes, natural son of Ptolemy
Lathyrus, was afraid lest, in virtue of a forged will of Ptolemy
Alexander, or Alexas, to whose fall he had contributed, his kingdom
might be incorporated with the Roman Empire. [1134] Auletes, perceiving
his authority shaken in Alexandria, had sought the support of Pompey
during the war in Judæa, and had sent him presents, and a large sum of
money, to engage him to maintain his cause before the Senate. [1135]
Pompey had offered himself as his advocate; and Cæsar, whether from
policy, or from a wish to please his son-in-law, caused Ptolemy Auletes
to be declared a friend and ally of Rome. [1136] At his demand, the same
favour was granted to Ariovistus, king of the Germans, who, after having
made war upon the Ædui, had withdrawn from their country at the
invitation of the Senate, and had expressed a desire to become an ally
of Rome. It was entirely the interest of the Republic to conciliate the
Germans, and send them to the other bank of the Rhine, whatever might be
the views of the consul regarding his future command in Gaul. [1137]
Next, he conferred some privileges on certain municipia and satisfied
many ambitions; “for,” says Suetonius, “he granted everything that was
asked of him: no man dared oppose him, and, if any one attempted, he
knew how to intimidate him. ”[1138]

Among the cares of the consul was the nomination of tribunes devoted to
him, since it was they generally who proposed the laws for the people to
ratify.

Clodius, on account of his popularity, was one of the candidates who
could be most useful to him; but his rank of patrician obliged him to
pass by adoption into a plebeian family before he could be elected, and
that he could only do in virtue of a law. Cæsar hesitated in bringing it
forward; for if, on the one hand, he sought to conciliate Clodius
himself, on the other, he knew his designs of vengeance against Cicero,
and was unwilling to put into his hands an authority which he might
abuse. But when, towards the month of March, at the trial of C.
Antonius, charged with disgraceful conduct in Macedonia, Cicero, in
defending his former colleague, indulged in a violent attack upon those
in power, on that same day Clodius was received into the ranks of the
plebeians,[1139] and soon afterwards became, together with Vatinius,
tribune-elect. [1140] There was a third tribune, whose name is unknown,
but who was equally won over to the interests of the consul. [1141]

Thus Cæsar, as even Cicero admits, was alone more powerful already than
the Republic. [1142] Of some he was the hope; of others, the terror; of
all, master irrevocably. The inactivity of Bibulus had only served to
increase his power. [1143] Thus it was said in Rome, as a jest, that men
knew of no other consulship than that of Julius and Caius Cæsar, making
two persons out of a single name; and the following verses were handed
about:--

“Non Bibulo quidquam nuper sed Cæsare factum est:
Nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini. ”[1144]

And as popular favour, when it declares itself in favour of a man in a
conspicuous position, sees something marvellous in everything that
concerns his person, the populace drew a favourable augury from the
existence of an extraordinary horse born in his stables. Its hoofs were
forked, and shaped like fingers. Cæsar was the only man who could tame
this strange animal, the docility of which, it was said, foreboded to
him the empire of the world. [1145]

During his first consulship, Cæsar caused a number of laws to be passed,
the greater part of which have not descended to us. Some valuable
fragments, however, of the most important ones have been preserved, and
among others, the modifications in the sacerdotal privileges. The
tribune Labienus, as we have seen, in order to secure Cæsar’s election
to the office of pontiff, had granted the right of election to seventeen
tribes selected by lot. Although this law seemed to authorise absentees
to become candidates for the priesthood, the people and the priests
disputed the right of those who did not solicit the dignity in person.
Endless quarrels and disturbances were the result. To put an end to
these, Cæsar, while confirming the law of Labienus, announced that not
only those candidates who appeared in person, but those at a distance
also, who had any title whatever to that honour, might offer themselves
as candidates. [1146]

He turned his attention next to the provinces, whose condition had
always excited his sympathy. The law intended to reform the vices of the
administration (_De provinciis ordinandis_) is of uncertain date; it
bears the same title as that of Sylla, and resembles it considerably.
Its provisions guaranteed the inhabitants against the violence, the
arbitrary conduct, and the corruption of the proconsuls and proprætors,
and fixed the allotments to which these were entitled. [1147]

It released the free states, _liberæ civitates_, from dependence upon
governors, and authorised them to govern themselves by their own laws
and their own magistrates.
[1148] Cicero himself considered this measure
as the guarantee of the liberty of the provinces;[1149] for, in his
speech against Piso, he reproaches him with having violated it by
including free nations in his government of Macedonia. [1150] Lastly, a
separate proviso regulated the responsibility and expenses of the
administration, by requiring that on going out of office the governors
should deliver, at the end of thirty days, an account explaining their
administration and their expenses, of which three copies were to be
deposited, one in the treasury (_ærarium_) at Rome, and the others in
the two principal towns of the province. [1151] The proprætors were to
remain one year, and the proconsuls two, at the head of their
governments. [1152]

The generals were in the habit of burdening the people they governed
with exorbitant exactions. They extorted from them crowns of gold
(_aurum coronarium_), of considerable value, under pretence of the
triumph, and obliged the countries through which they passed to bear the
expenses of themselves and their attendants. Cæsar remedied these
abuses, by forbidding the proconsuls to demand the crown before the
triumph had been decreed,[1153] and by subjecting to the most rigorous
restrictions the contributions in kind which were to be furnished. [1154]
We may judge how necessary these regulations were from the fact that
Cicero, whose government was justly considered an honest one, admits
that he drew large sums from his province of Cilicia eight years after
the passing of the law Julia. [1155]

The same law forbad all governors to leave their provinces, or to send
their troops out of them to interfere in the affairs of any neighbouring
State, without permission of the Senate and the people,[1156] or to
extort any money from the inhabitants of the provinces. [1157]

The law by similar provisions diminished the abuse of free legations
(_legationes liberæ_). This was the name given to the missions of
senators, who, travelling into the provinces on their own affairs,
obtained by an abuse the title of envoy of the Roman people, to which
they had no right, in order to be defrayed the expenses and costs of
travelling. These missions, which were for an indefinite time, were the
subject of incessant[1158] complaints. Cicero had limited them to a
year: Cæsar prescribed a still narrower limit, but its exact length is
unknown. [1159]

As a supplement to the preceding measures he brought in a law (_De
pecuniis repetundis_), the provisions of which have often been
confounded with those of the law _De provinciis ordinandis_. Cicero
boasts of its perfection[1160] and justice. It contained a great number
of sections. In a letter from Cœlius to Cicero, the 101st chapter of
the law is referred to. Its object was to meet all cases of peculation,
out of Italy as well as in Rome. Persons who had been wronged could
demand restitution before a legal tribunal of the sums unjustly
collected. [1161] Though the principal provisions of it were borrowed
from the law of Sylla on the same subject, the penalty was more severe
and the proceedings more expeditious. For instance, as the rich
contrived, by going into voluntary exile before the verdict, to elude
the punishment, it was provided that in that case their goods should be
confiscated, in part or wholly, according to the nature of the
crime. [1162] If the fortune of the defendant was not sufficient for the
repayment of the money claimed, all those who had profited by the
embezzlement were sought out and jointly condemned. [1163] Finally,
corruption was attacked in all its forms,[1164] and the law went so far
as to watch over the honesty of business transactions. One article
deserves special remark, that which forbad a public work to be accepted
as completed if it were not absolutely finished. Cæsar had doubtless in
mind the process which he had unsuccessfully instituted against Catulus
for his failure to complete the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus.

We may for the most part consider as Cæsar’s laws those which were
passed at his instigation, whether by the tribune P. Vatinius, or the
prætor Q. Fufius Calenus. [1165]

One of the laws of the former authorised the accuser in a suit, as well
as the accused, to challenge for once all the judges: down to this time
they had only been permitted to challenge a certain number. [1166] Its
object was to give to all the same guarantee which Sylla had reserved
exclusively to the senators, since for the knights and plebeians he
limited the challenge to three. [1167] Vatinius had also conferred on
five thousand colonists, established at Como (_Novum Comum_), the rights
of a Roman city. This measure[1168] flattered the pride of Pompey, whose
father, Pompeius Strabo, had rebuilt the town of Comum; and it offered
to other colonists the hope of obtaining the qualification of Roman
citizens, which Cæsar subsequently granted to them. [1169]

Another devoted partisan of the consul, the prætor Q. Fufius
Calenus,[1170] proposed a law which in judicial deliberations laid the
responsibility upon each of the three orders of which the tribunal was
composed: the senators, the knights, and the tribunes of the treasury.
Instead of pronouncing a collective judgment, they were called upon to
express their opinion separately. Dio Cassius explains the law in these
terms: “Seeing that in a process all the votes were mixed together, and
that each order took to itself the credit of the good decisions, and
threw the bad ones to the account of the others, Calenus had a law made
that the different orders should vote independently, in order to know
thus, not the opinion of individuals, since the vote was secret, but
that of each order. ”[1171]

All the laws of Cæsar were styled “Julian laws;” they received the
sanction of the Senate, and were adopted without opposition,[1172] and
even Cato himself did not oppose them; but when he became prætor, and
found himself obliged to put them into execution, he was little-minded
enough to object to call them by their name. [1173]

We may be convinced by the above facts, that, during his first
consulship, Cæsar was animated by a single motive, the public interest.
His ruling thought was to remedy the evils which afflicted the country.
His acts, which several historians have impeached as subversive and
inspired by boundless ambition, we find, on an attentive examination, to
be the result of a wise policy, and the carrying out of a well-known
plan, proclaimed formerly by the Gracchi, and recently by Pompey
himself. Like the Gracchi, Cæsar desired a distribution of the public
domain, the reform of justice, the relief of the provinces, and the
extension of the rights of city; like them, he had protected the
knightly order, so that he might oppose it to the formidable resistance
of the Senate; but he, more fortunate, accomplished that which the
Gracchi had been unable to realise. Plutarch, in the life of
Crassus,[1174] pronounces a eulogium on the wisdom of his government,
although an intemperate judgment had led that writer, elsewhere, to
compare his conduct to that of a factious tribune. [1175]

Following the taste of the age, and especially as a means of popularity,
Cæsar gave splendid games, shows, and gladiatorial combats, borrowing
from Pompey and Atticus considerable sums to meet his love of display,
his profusion, and his largesses. [1176] Suetonius, ever ready to record,
without distinction, the reports, true and false, current at the time,
relates that Cæsar had taken from the treasury three thousand pounds of
gold, for which he substituted gilt metal; but his high character is
sufficient to refute this calumny. Cicero, who had not, at this time,
any reason to spare him, makes no mention of it in his letters, where
his ill-humour displays itself, nor in his speech against Vatinius, one
of Cæsar’s devoted friends. On the other hand, Pliny[1177] mentions a
similar fact which happened during Pompey’s consulate.


[Sidenote: Cæsar receives the Government of the Gauls. ]

IV. Cæsar did not confine his ambition to discharging the functions of a
consul and legislator: he desired to obtain a command worthy of the
elevation of his genius, to extend the frontiers of the Republic, and to
preserve them from the invasion of their most powerful enemies. It will
be remembered that at the time of the election of the consuls, the
Senate had conferred upon them the superintendence of the woods and
public roads. He had, therefore, slender grounds to expect a return of
friendly feeling on the part of that assembly, and, if the distribution
of governments was vested in them, history offered examples of provinces
given by vote of the people. Numidia was assigned to Marius on the
proposal of the tribune L. Manlius; and L. Lucullus, having received
Cisalpine Gaul from the Senate, obtained Cilicia from the people. [1178]
It was thus that the command of Asia had been conferred upon Pompey.
Strong in these precedents, Vatinius proposed to the people to confer
upon Cæsar, for five years, the command of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria,
with three legions. [1179] Pompey supported this proposal with all his
influence. The friends of Crassus,[1180] Claudius[1181] and L. Piso,
gave their votes in favour of this law.

At first, it appeared strange that the proposal of the tribune only
included Cisalpine Gaul, without reference to the other side of the
Alps, which alone offered chances of acquiring glory. But, on
reflection, we discover how skilful and politic was this manner of
putting the question. To solicit at the same time the government of both
the Gauls might have seemed exorbitant, and likely to expose him to
failure. To demand the government of Gaul proper was dangerous, for if
he had obtained it without Cisalpine Gaul, which would have devolved
upon another proconsul, Cæsar would have found himself completely
separated from Italy, inasmuch as it would have been impossible for him
to repair thither during the winter, and so preserve continuous
relations with Rome. The proposal of Vatinius, on the contrary, having
for its object only Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria, they could scarcely
refuse a command limited to the ordinary bounds, and Cæsar acquired
thereby a solid basis for operations in the midst of devoted
populations, where his legions could be easily recruited. As to the
province beyond the Alps, it was probable that some fortuitous
circumstance, or new proposal, would place it under his orders. This
happened sooner than he expected, for the Senate, by a skilful, but at
this time unusual, determination, added to his command a third province,
Gallia Comata, or Transalpine, and a fourth legion. The Senate thus
obtained for itself the credit of an initiative, which the people would
have taken of itself had it not been anticipated. [1182]

Transported with joy at this news, Cæsar, according to Suetonius,
exclaimed in the full Senate, that now, having succeeded to the utmost
of his desire in spite of his enemies, he would march over their
heads. [1183] This story is not probable. He was too prudent to provoke
his enemies in their face at the moment he was going to a distance from
Rome. “Always master of himself,” says an old writer, “he never
needlessly ran against anybody. ”[1184]


[Sidenote: Opposition of the Patricians. ]

V. Whilst, contending with the most serious difficulties, Cæsar
endeavoured to establish the Republic on the securest foundations, the
aristocratic party consoled itself for its successive defeats by a petty
war of sarcasm and chicanery. At the theatre they applauded all the
injurious allusions of Pompey, and received Cæsar with coldness. [1185]
Bibulus, the son-in-law of Cato, published libels containing the
grossest attacks. He renewed the accusation of plotting against the
Republic, and of the pretended shameful relations with Nicomedes. [1186]
People rushed to read and copy these insulting placards. Cicero gladly
sent them to Atticus. [1187] The party, too, to which Bibulus belonged,
extolled him to the skies, and made him a great man. [1188] His
opposition, however, had only succeeded in postponing the consular
comitia until the month of October. This prorogation was made in the
hope of preventing the election of consuls friendly to the triumvirs.
Cæsar, on this occasion, attacked him in a violent speech, and Vatinius
proposed to arrest him. Pompey, on his part, moved by invectives to
which he was unaccustomed, complained to the people of the animosity of
which he was the object; but his speech does not appear to have been
attended with much success.

It is sad to see the accomplishment of great things often thwarted by
the little passions of short-sighted men, who only know the world in the
small circle to which their life is confined. By seconding Cæsar,
Bibulus might have obtained an honourable reputation. He preferred being
the hero of a coterie, and sought to obtain the interested applause of a
few selfish senators, rather than, with his colleague, to merit public
gratitude. Cicero, on his part, mistook for a true expression of opinion
the clamours of a desperate faction. He was, moreover, one of those who
find that all fares well while they are themselves in power, and that
everything is endangered when they are out. In his letters to Atticus he
speaks of the general hatred to these new kings, predicts their
approaching fall, and exclaims,[1189] “What murmurs! what irritation!
what hatred against our friend Pompey! His name of _great_ is growing
old like that of _rich_ Crassus. ”[1190]

He explains, with a perfect naïveté, the consolation which his self-love
finds in the abasement of him who was formerly the object of his
admiration. “I was tormented with fear that the services which Pompey
rendered to our country should hereafter appear greater than mine. I
have quite recovered from it. He is so low, so very low, that Curius
himself appears to me a giant beside him. ”[1191] And he adds, “Now there
is nothing more popular than to hate the popular men; they have no one
on their side. They know it, and it is this which makes me fear a resort
to violence. I cannot think without shuddering of the explosions which
are inevitable. ”[1192] The hatred which he bore to Clodius and Valerius
misled his judgment.

Whilst Cæsar laboriously pursued the course of his destiny, the genius
of Cicero, instead of understanding the future and hastening progress by
his co-operation, resisted the general impulse, denied its evidence, and
could not perceive the greatness of the cause through the faults of
certain adherents to power.

Cæsar bore uneasily the attacks of Cicero; but, like all who are guided
by great political views, superior to resentment, he conciliated
everything which might exercise an ascendency over people’s minds; and
the eloquence of Cicero was a power. Dio Cassius thus explains the
conduct of Cæsar: “He did not wound Cicero either by his words or his
acts. He said that often many men designedly throw vain sarcasm against
those who are above them in order to drive them to dispute, in the hope
of appearing to have some resemblance to them, and be put in the same
rank if they succeed in being abused in return. Cæsar therefore judged
that he ought not to enter the lists with anybody. Such was his rule of
conduct towards those who insulted him, and, as he saw very well that
Cicero sought less to offend him than to provoke him to make some
injurious reply, from the desire which he had to be looked upon as his
equal, he took no notice of him, made no account of what he said, and
even allowed Cicero to insult him as he liked, and to praise himself
beyond measure. However, he was far from despising him, but, naturally
gentle, his anger was not easily aroused. He had much to punish, as must
be the case with one mixed up with great affairs, but he never yielded
to passion. ”[1193]

An incident occurred which showed all the animosity of a certain party.
L. Vettius, an old spy of Cicero’s in the Catiline conspiracy, punished
for having falsely accused Cæsar, was arrested on suspicion of wishing
to attempt his life, as well as that of Pompey. A poniard was found upon
him; and, being interrogated before the Senate, he denounced, as the
instigators of his crime, the young Curio, Cæpio, Brutus, Lentulus,
Cato, Lucullus, Piso, son-in-law of Cicero, Cicero himself, M.
Laterensis, and others. He also named Bibulus, which removed all air of
probability from his accusations, Bibulus having already warned Pompey
to be on his guard. [1194] Historians, such as Dio Cassius, Appian, and
Plutarch, treat this plot seriously; the first maintains expressly that
Cicero and Lucullus had armed the hand of the assassin. Suetonius, on
the contrary, reproaches Cæsar with having suborned Vettius in order to
throw the blame upon his adversaries.

In face of these contradictory informations, it is best, as in the case
of an ordinary lawsuit, to estimate the worth of the charge according to
the previous character of the accused. Now, Cicero, notwithstanding his
instability, was too honest to have a hand in a plot for assassination,
and Cæsar had too elevated a character and too great a consciousness of
his power to lower himself so far as to seek, in a miserable intrigue,
the means of augmenting his influence. A _senatus-consultum_ caused
Vettius to be thrown into prison; but Cæsar, interested in, and resolved
on, the discovery of the truth, referred the matter to the people, and
forced Vettius to mount the tribune of the orators. He, with a
suspicious versatility, denounced those whom he had before acquitted,
and cleared those whom he had denounced, and among others, Brutus. With
regard to the latter, it was pretended that this change was due to
Cæsar’s connection with his mother. Vettius was remanded to prison, and
found dead next day. Cicero accused Vatinius of killing him;[1195] but,
according to others, the true authors of his death were those who had
urged him into this disgraceful intrigue, and were in fear of his
revelations. [1196]

The comparison of these various accounts leads us to conclude that this
obscure agent of dark intrigues had made himself the instigator of a
plot, in order to have the merit of revealing it, and to attract the
favour of Cæsar by pointing to his political adversaries as accomplices.
Nevertheless, the event turned to the profit of Cæsar, and the people
permitted him to take measures for his personal safety. [1197] It was
doubtless at this period that the ancient custom was re-established of
allowing a consul, during the month when he had not the fasces, the
right of being preceded by a beadle (_accensus_) and followed by
lictors. [1198]

Without changing the fundamental laws of the Republic, Cæsar had
obtained a great result: he had replaced anarchy by an energetic power,
ruling at the same time the Senate and the comitia; by the mutual
understanding between the three most important men, he had substituted
for personal rivalries a moral authority which enabled him to establish
laws conducive to the prosperity of the empire. But it was essential
that his departure should not entail the fall of the edifice so
laboriously raised. He was not ignorant of the number and power of his
enemies; he knew that if he abandoned to them the forum and the curia,
not only would they reverse his enactments, but they would even deprive
him of his command. If there was any doubt of the degree of hatred of
which he was the object, it would be sufficient to be reminded, that a
year afterwards Ariovistus confessed to him, in an interview on the
banks of the Rhine, that many of the important nobles of Rome had
designs against his life. [1199] Against such animosities he had the
task, no easy one, of directing the elections. The Roman constitution
caused new candidates to spring up every year for honours; and it was
indispensable to have partisans amongst the two consuls, the eight
prætors, and the ten tribunes named in the comitia. At all epochs, even
at the time when the aristocracy exercised the greatest influence, it
could not prevent its opponents from introducing themselves into the
public offices. Moreover, the three who had made common cause had reason
to fear the ambition and ingratitude of the men whom they had raised,
and who would soon seek to become their equals. There was still a last
danger, and perhaps the most serious: it was the impatience and want of
discipline of the democratic party, of which they were the chiefs.

In face of these dangers, the triumvirs agreed to cause L. Piso, the
father-in-law of Cæsar, and A. Gabinius, the devoted partisan of Pompey,
to be elected to the consulship the following year. They were, in fact,
designated consuls on the 18th of October, in spite of the efforts of
the nobles and the accusation of Cato against Gabinius.

At the end of the year 695, Cæsar and Bibulus ceased their functions.
The latter, in reporting his conduct according to custom, endeavoured to
paint in the blackest colours the state of the Republic; but Clodius
prevented him from speaking. [1200] As for Cæsar, his presentiment of the
attacks to which he was to be subjected was only too well founded; for
he had hardly quitted office, when the prætor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus,
and C. Memmius, friends of Cicero,[1201] proposed to the Senate to
prosecute him for the acts committed during his consulate, and
especially for not having paid attention to the omens. From this
proposal the Senate recoiled. [1202] Still, they brought Cæsar’s questor
to trial. He himself was cited by the tribune L. Antistius. But the
whole college refused to entertain the charge, in virtue of the law
Memmia, which forbad an accusation to be entertained against a citizen
while absent on the public service. [1203]

Cæsar found himself once more at the gates of Rome, invested with the
_imperium_, and, according to Cicero’s letters,[1204] at the head of
numerous troops, composed apparently of veteran volunteers. [1205] He
even remained there more than two months, in order to watch that his
departure should not become the signal for the overthrow of his work.


[Sidenote: Law of Clodius. Exile of Cicero. ]

VI. During this time, Clodius, a restless and turbulent spirit,[1206]
proud of the support which he had lent the triumvirs, as well as of
that he had received from them, listened only to his passion, and caused
laws to be enacted, some of which, flattering the populace and even the
slaves, menaced the State with anarchy. In virtue of these laws, he
re-established political associations (_collegia_), clubs dangerous to
public tranquillity,[1207] which Sylla had dissolved, but which were
subsequently reorganised to be again suppressed in 690;[1208] he made
gratuitous distributions of wheat to the people; took from the censors
the right of excluding from the Senate anybody they wished, allowing
them only to reject those who were under condemnation;[1209] forbad the
magistrates taking omens, or observing the sky on the day of the
deliberation of the comitia;[1210] and, lastly, he inflicted severe
penalties on those who had condemned Roman citizens to death unheard.
This last enactment was evidently directed against Cicero, although his
name was not mentioned in it. In order to ensure its adoption, its
author desired the acquiescence of Cæsar, who was detained at the gates
of Rome by the military command, which forbad him to enter. Clodius then
convoked the people outside the walls, and when he asked the proconsul
his opinion, the latter replied that it was well known by his vote in
the affair of the accomplices of Catiline; that, nevertheless, he
disapproved of a law which pronounced penalties upon facts which
belonged to the past. [1211]

On this occasion the Senate went into mourning, in order to exhibit its
discontent to all eyes; but the consuls Gabinius and Piso obliged the
Senate to relinquish this ill-timed demonstration.

Cæsar, in order to defend Cicero from the danger which threatened him,
offered to take him with him to Gaul as his lieutenant. [1212] Cicero
rejected the offer, deceiving himself through his confidence in his own
influence,[1213] and reckoning, moreover, on the protection of Pompey.
It appears positive from this that Clodius exceeded Cæsar’s views, a new
proof that such instruments when employed are two-edged swords, which
even the most skilful hands find it difficult to direct. It is thus that
later, Vatinius, aspiring to become prætor, received from his old patron
this strong warning: “Vatinius has done nothing gratuitously during his
tribuneship; he who only looks for money ought to dispense with
honours. ”[1214] In fact, Cæsar, whose efforts to re-establish the
popular institutions had never slackened, desired neither anarchy nor
democratic laws; and just as he had not approved of the proposal of
Manilius for the emancipation of the freedmen, so he opposed the
reorganisation of the corporations, the gratuitous distributions of
wheat, and the projects of vengeance entertained by Clodius, who,
however, continually boasted of his support.

Crassus, on his part, desiring to be useful to Cicero without
compromising himself,[1215] engaged his son to go to his aid. As for
Pompey, wavering between fear and friendship, he devised a pretext not
to receive Cicero when he came to seek his support. Deprived of this
last resource, the great orator abandoned his delusions, and after some
show of resistance voluntarily withdrew. Scarcely had he quitted Rome
when the law against him was passed without opposition, with the
concurrence of those whom Cicero had looked upon as his friends. [1216]
His goods were confiscated, his house razed, and he was exiled to a
distance of four hundred miles.

Cæsar had skilfully taken precautions that his influence should be felt
at Rome during his absence, as much as the instability of the magistracy
would permit. By the aid of his daughter Julia, whose charms and mental
accomplishments captivated her husband, Cæsar retained his influence
over Pompey. By his favours to the son of Crassus, a young man of great
merit, who was appointed his lieutenant, he assured himself of his
father. Cicero is removed, but soon Cæsar will consent to his return,
and will conciliate him again by taking into his favour his brother
Quintus. There remains the opposition of Cato. Clodius undertakes to
remove him under the pretence of an honourable mission: he is sent to
Cyprus to dethrone King Ptolemy, whose irregularities excited the hatred
of his subjects. [1217] Finally, all the men of importance who had any
chance of obtaining employment are gained to the cause of Cæsar; some
even engage themselves to him by writing. [1218] He can thus proceed to
his province; Destiny is about to open a new path; immortal glory awaits
him beyond the Alps, and this glory, reflected upon Rome, will change
the face of the world.


[Sidenote: The Explanation of Cæsar’s Conduct. ]

VII. We have shown Cæsar obeying only his political convictions, whether
as the ardent promoter of all popular measures, or as the declared
partisan of Pompey; we have shown him aspiring with a noble ambition to
power and honours; but we are not ignorant that historians in general
give other motives for his conduct. They represent him, in 684, as
having already his plans defined, his schemes arranged, his instruments
all prepared. They attribute to him an absolute prescience of the
future, the faculty of directing men and things at his will, and of
rendering each one, unknowingly, the accomplice of his profound designs.
All his actions have a hidden motive, which the historian boasts of
having discovered. If Cæsar raises up again the standard of Marius,
makes himself the defender of the oppressed, and the persecutor of the
hired assassins of past tyranny, it is to acquire a concurrence
necessary to his ambition; if he contends with Cicero in favour of
legality in the trial of the accomplices of Catiline, or to maintain an
agrarian law of which he approves the political aim, or if, to repair a
great injustice of Sylla, he supports the restoration of the children of
the proscribed to their rights, it is for the purpose of compromising
the great orator with the popular party. If, on the contrary, he places
his influence at the service of Pompey; if, on the occasion of the war
against the pirates, he contributes to obtain for him an authority
considered exorbitant; if he seconds the plebiscitum which further
confers upon him the command of the army against Mithridates; if
subsequently he causes extraordinary honours to be awarded him, though
absent, it is still with the Machiavellian aim of making the greatness
of Pompey redound to his own profit. So that, if he defends liberty, it
is to ruin his adversaries; if he defends power, it is to accustom the
Romans to tyranny. Finally, if Cæsar seeks the consulate, like all the
members of the Roman nobility, it is, say they, because he already
foresees, beyond the fasces of the consul and the dust of battles, the
dictatorship and even the throne. Such an interpretation results from
the too common fault of not being able to appreciate facts in
themselves, but according to the complexion which subsequent events have
given them.

Strange inconsistency, to impute to great men at the same time mean
motives and superhuman forethought! No, it was not the miserable thought
of checking Cicero which guided Cæsar; he had not recourse to a tactic
more or less skilful: he obeyed a profound conviction, and what proves
it indisputably is, that, once elevated to power, his first acts are to
execute, as consul or dictator, what as a citizen he had supported:
witness the agrarian law and the restoration of the proscribed. No, if
he supports Pompey, it is not because he thinks that he can degrade him
after having once elevated him, but because this illustrious captain had
embraced the same cause as himself; for it would not have been given to
any one to read so far into the future as to predict the use which the
conqueror of Mithridates would make of his triumphs and veritable
popularity. In fact, when he disembarked in Italy, Rome was in anxiety:
will he disband his army? [1219] Such was from all quarters the cry of
alarm. If he returns as a master, no one is able to resist him. Contrary
to the general expectation, Pompey disbanded his troops. How then could
Cæsar foresee beforehand a moderation then so unusual?

Is it truer to say that Cæsar, having become proconsul, aspired to the
sovereign power? No; in departing for Gaul, he could no more have
thought of reigning over Rome, than could General Buonaparte, starting
for Italy in 1796, have dreamed of the Empire. Was it possible for
Cæsar to foresee that, during a sojourn of ten years in Gaul, he would
there link Fortune to him for ever, and that, at the end of this long
space of time, the public mind at Rome would still be favourable to his
projects? Could he foresee that the death of his daughter would break
the ties which attached him to Pompey?