is Ian man ngag gi dg(mgs rgyan in The
Complete
Works of Gsa mdog Pat!
Tsongkhapa-s-Qualms-About-Early-Tibetan-Interpretations-of-Madhyamaka-Philosophy
"What are they?
" [Answer:] For the time being, I shall state the principal ones: (i) The rejection of iilayavijftiirul (foundational consciousness) that is separate from the six categories of con-
cognising, apperceptive faculty of consciousness); and (iii) the rejection of autonomous syllogism as a means of generating insight into the nature of re<llity, thus three negative tenets. (iv) The need to accept the reality of ex- ternal objects as much as the reality of [the world of] consciousness; (v) that the Sriivakas and Pratyekabuddhas cognise the absence of intrinsic being of phenomena; (vi) maintaining that grasping at the self-existen? e of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction; (vii) the cessation [of empirical things] is a conditioned phenomenon; and (viii) because of this, there is a unique presentation of the nature of the three tenses of time. 54
This list should not be confused with another list of eight attributed to Tsongkhapa known as the "eight difficult points (dka' gnad brgyad) of the MUlaktlriktl" found in Gyaltshap Dharma Rinchen's (1364-1438) notes dBu ma rtsa ba'i dka'gnad chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang. 55 In the second list, (vii) and (viii) are omitted and in their place are: rejection of the notion of svabhtlva (rang mtshan khas mi len pa), and a unique way of understanding the Buddha's perception of the relative worid of multiplicity (sangs rgyas kyis ji snyed pa mkhyen tshul). 56 Subsequent Tibetan Madhyamikas have attacked Tsongkhapa for suggesting that Prasangika-Madhyamaka has unique tenets, especially such constructive theories as the acceptance of the cessation of empirical things as a conditioned phenomenon. For example, Gowo Rabjampa (1429-1496) has argued that the acceptance of such a conditioned phenomenon (zhig pa 'dus byas yin pa) is a Vaise$ika tenet thus the view of a tradition outside the fold of the Buddhist
schools. 57 Furthermore, he has rejected Tsongkhapa's claim that Prasallgika-Madhyamaka does not accept the existence of tllayavijfitina (foundational consciousness) and svasamvedana (reflexive awareness). 58 The later Nyingma thinker Ju Mipham Gelek Namgyal (1846-1911) too has
sciousness; (ii) a unique system of refuting the [concept of] svasamvedana (self
-
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 15
argued that the Prasangika need not reject conventional existence of both foundational consciousness and reflexive awareness. 59 In contrast, Tak- tshang agrees with Tsongkhapa that Prasangikas do reject reflexive aware- nesS but maintains that Candrakirti does not negate foundational con- sciousness. 60 Regardless of who is right in these debates, the fact remains that Tsongkhapa seriously attempted to draw out all philosophical and soteriological implications of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's rejection of
intrinsic being (svabhtiva).
III
According to Tsongkhapa, the agnostic and nihilistic tendency can also permeate one's understanding of the nature of the path, and even affect the very conception of "enlightenment". In his Queries, Tsongkhapa points to some opposing trends prevalent in the Tibet of his time concerning the
understanding of the nature of enlightenment. He writes:
Generally speaking, there seem to be many diverse opinions concerning the way in which the "view" [of emptiness] (Ita ba) is perceived as arising. 61 One group of opinions maintains that all forms of conceptuality (mam rtog), be they positive or negative, are to be discarded. Yet others hold the directly opposing view that not only are all forms of conceptuality not to be discarded, but the greater the proliferation ofconcepts the more enhanced one's spiritual realisa- tion (nyams rtog) will become. [They maintain that) this is analogous to fact that the more fuel you bum the larger the size of the flame.
Again, another group of opinions contends that conceptualisation itself is the fundamental ignorance, ma rig pa (avidyti). This view is p rimarily based on
the quote "e_onceptua1I'sab"an 15 m.
deed the great I .
,62
gnorance. , But athers
? maintain the opposite view, that conceptualisation is in actual fact pristine dharmaktiya. These two views represent two opposing sides of the same spec- trum.
Again, some characterise Buddhahood or nirvti1J1l as the state of mind when the mmd abides in natural equilibrium free of distraction (yid 'di ma 'phros par tsm ne gnas pa'i tshe). [And they maintain that] the moment the mind wavers it is in the state of ordinary existence or sarrzsara. Yet others contend that even when conceptual thought-processes occur, no matter how long the processes last, if you observe with a single-pointed mind, dharmaktiya appears vividly. These two views are exact opposites.
Then again, some argue that an emptied vision of nothingness (mthong snang ban bun) arising through a combination of certain conditions, e. g. being situated in a dark room, adopting a specific bodily posture of meditation, and stopping all forms of thought, is the actual dharmaktiya. It is also the "empti- ness endowed with all aspects" (rNam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid), hence even ordinary people can experience direct recognition of dharmakaya. Yet others hold that such expenence does not constitute the totality of dharmaktiya vision but only a partial'glimpse of it. Some contend that this cannot be
? ? ? 16 THE TIBET JOURNAL
understood even as experiencing a partial glimpse of dharmakiiya; rather it represents an experience of mere vacuity or emptiness. Moreover, [they argue that] within emptiness this is not the negative intrinsic emptiness (chad /ta'i rang stong) of Candrakirti and Haribhadra, etc. , but it is the extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong) as accepted by Asanga, the master of great Madhyamaka63 Some assert, however, that it is indeed the intrinsic emptiness. These two views are directly opposite. Some maintain that it is not even a genuine emptiness but only a form (gzugs brnyan tsam) or a reflection of emptiness. Therefore, [accord_ ing to them] it is not dharmakiiya, but a manifestation of it, as the perception of smoke can be indicative of the presence of fire. 64
Tsongkhapa's principal concerns here are actually the soteriological implications of these views. According to him not only do these positions lead to a kind of soteriological dead-end but more importantly, when combined with the anti-rationalist tendencies of certain Tibetan interpreta- tions of Vajrayana, their ramifications in the realm of ethics are deeply disturbing. He saw the moral decline, or moral laxity to be more precise, believed to be rampant at a particular point of history in Tibet as being a natural consequence of many of the philosophical views prevalent at the time. In his view, the various strands of the standpoints which he was arguing against are clearly, and dangerously, a residual legacy from the Chinese master Hva-shang Mahayana whose tenets were, according to Tsongkhapa, comprehensively demonstrated as unsound by the Indian
? master Kamalasila. In fact, Tsongkhapa often uses the term "Hva-shang's view" as a typological label when criticising a host of theories. For example, when criticising one of the positions in his Queries, Tsongkhapa states that IIAs far as I am concerned, I cannot see any difference between your style of meditation and that of Hva-shang's system! ,,65 Note the tone of finality in Tsongkhapa's criticism. Similarly, in LTC, Tsongkhapa criticises a form of meditative quietism on the grounds that by claiming that between Hva-shang and one's own position there is a difference in that their own standpoi? lt puts emphasis on meritorious deeds one is implicitly admitting that so far as philosophy and meditative system are concerned there is no substantial difference between the twO. 6 This, according to Tsongkhapa, is clearly at fault.
A related but distinct concern was what Tsongkhapa saw as a form of meditative quietism. This, he felt, results from an incorrect understanding of the nature of and the relationship between two principal elements in Buddhist meditative praxis, namely tranquil abiding (samatha) and special or penetrative insight (vipasyana). In its extreme form, meditative quietism is best illustrated by the system of Hva-shang Mahayana. The problem directly concerns the role of discursive thought in the soteriological process of the Buddhist path to enlightenment. This is the corollary of
TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 17
anti-rationalism in the realm of meditative practice. Drawing heavily from a pivotal s? ripture Smpdhinirmocanasutra, ? nd also the. three. Bhiivantikran:a of Kamaiaslia, Tsongkhapa argues extensively that discursive thought is as crucial in a spiritual aspirant's path to enlightenment as its counterpart, i. e. deep single-pointedness. 67 If mere quietude, no matter how sophisti- cated, constitutes the core of the process towards enlightenment, not "knowing" but "unknowing" becomes the key towards true awakening. Without discursive analysis no fresh insights can be gained nor can any
awareness of the ultimate nature of reality arise within the individual. Tsongkhapa sees no qualitative difference between such a form of quietude and the naturally occurring states of non-mentation (sems mi 'phro ba) like deep sleep, fainting, or stupor. 68
Tsongkhapa's solution for this problem was to re-emphasise the need for a healthy balance between the important Buddhist trio: study (thos pa), discursive thinking (bsam pa), and meditation (sgom pa). According to him the problem arises from the following situation. Many of those who are inclined towards a single-pointed life of meditative practice perceive study and discursive thinking to be an obstacle on the path to enlightenment; on the other hand, those with scholarly interests seem to be lacking in serious motivation to apply their intellectual understanding to meditative practice, instead they appear to be more keen to expand their scholarly reputation. 69 In other words, one group fails to appreciate fully the signi- ficance of learning while the other neglects the crucially important element, i. e. the meditative praxis.
Underlying the above issues is the crucial question of the exact nature of the relationship between the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (sunyatti) and the ultimate standpoint of Vajrayana Buddhism. Like many of his Tibetan predecessors Tsongkhapa shared the view that Tantra represents the pinnacle of spiritual awakening in Mahayana Buddhism. This is true also of great Tibetan masters like Marpa Lotsawa, Sakya Paw;iita, Buton, and of course many of the Kadam teachers including the Indian master Atisa himself. However, what seriously concerned Tsong- khapa was the widespread misconceptions associated with Tantra which he believed to be pervasive at his time in Tibet. Among these was the widespread relegation-in some cases leading to eventual negation-of ethics on the grounds that the Tantra proposes a standpoint which is non- jUdgmental, and beyond all forms of dichotomy and polarities. Ethics was perceived to be relevant only to those of weak mind, whereas a true spiritual aspirant whose mind was receptive to the mysteries of Tantra could and should transcend the strictures of conventional morality. Such attitudes, according to Tsongkhapa, led to a climate of moral decline in ancient Tibet. From the above, we can surmise that Tsongkhapa saw an
? 18 THE TIBET JOURNAL
intimate link between epistemological scepticism, philosophical nihilism
and moral relativism. Not only does one naturally lead to the other, one could almost say that they are all different aspects of the same coin.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to "reconstruct" what I see as Tsongkha_ pa's key concerns about certain Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy. I have suggested that these qualms can be grouped under three main categories: i) Tsongkhapa's objections against what he sees as nihilistic interpretations of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka thought; ii) Tsongkhapa's objections against Shentong absolutism, and finally iii) Tsongkhapa's fears about residual influences of Hva-shang's quietist anti- rationalism in certain elements of Tibetan thought. Methodologically, I have argued that "listening" to the author's own voice is critical if we are to appreciate the dynamics behind the philosophical works of a historical thinker like Tsongkhapa. One very important consequence of identifying
an author's central concerns underlying his writings is that it gives a greater coherence and cogency to the author's overall project (if there is one). Certainly, in the case of Tsongkhapa, we know that one of the principal objectives underlying his Madhyamaka writings is to demon- strate that the Madhyamaka dialectics do not negate the reality of every- day world, especially ethics and religious activity. Related to this is also the aim of developing a reading of Madhyamaka philosophy in such a way that it can be consistently situated within an integrated system where the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness stands alongside Dharmakirti's epistemology and Asanga and Vasubandhu's ablzidharma psychology and
Vajrayana's meditative praxis. Throughout, I have endeavoured to engage "philosophically" with the issues which were of concern to Tsongkhapa so that they could be not only made comprehensible to us, but can also resonate with phiiosophical and soteriological questions which occupy people's mind to this day.
Notes
1. Jinpa (1997), chapter I, and Jinpa (1998).
2. Khedrup-Je (1385-1438) explicitly draws parallel between Tsongkhapa and
Nagarjuna in terms of their contribution to Buddhism. He writes: "'pftags pa'i yul du 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis rgyal ba'i bstan pa la bya ba chen po mdzad pa de bzhin du/ dus kyi mtha' rna 'di Ita bur gyur pa na/ rje bla rna 'di nyid kyis gangs ri'i khrod 'dir. . . " rNam thar dad pa'i Jugs ngogs, pp. 118-9. All Tibetan namesof people, places and schools are written Il1 phonetics to ensure easy pro- nounciation especially by non-Tibetologist readers. A list of these names with their corresponding Wylie transliterations is provided in the appendix.
bu;
? TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 19
3. The emergence of the Kadam school seems to have coincided with a quest- ioning of many of the tantra" which belong to the so-called earlier dis- semination of Buddhism in Tibet. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor (1704-1788) lists the following works: Lotsawa Rinchen Zangpo's (958-1055) Chos dang chos min mam 'byed, the letters of Lha Lama Yeshe 0, Zhiwa 0, Jhangchup 0, Tsami Lotsawa, and Chak Lotsawa, Ngog Loden Sherap's (1059-1109) gZe ma ra 'go, Sakya Par:l<;jita's (1 182-1251) sDom gsum rab dbye, (Collected Works of the Masters of lhe Sa Skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism), Vol. 5, pp. 297-320. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor also cites Drigong Pelzin and Go Khukpa Lhatse amongst those who quest- ion the authorship of some of the Nyingma tantras. dPag bsam Ijon bzang, pp. 391-406. For an English translation of Zhlwa O's letter and the identifica- tion of some of these objected tantras, see Karmay (1980).
5. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
6. The dates of all Tibetan thinkers are based on Tseten Zhabdrung (1982).
7. On the complex history of the various editions of Kangyur and Tangyur, see
Harrison (1992), introduction. See also Dungkar Lobsang Thrinley's comments
in Deb ther dmar po, n. 489.
8. This debate has been an object of considerable interest in modern Tibetan
? ? 4 Taktshang Lotsawa (b. 1405) makes this observation in his Grub mtha' kun shes, p. 210. Ct. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
Buddhist scholarship. . See Tucci (1958), Demieville (1967), Stein (1987), Houston (1980). Y. lmaeda (1975) Uournal asiatique, 1975, p . 140) has raised doubts about the factuality of the debate. However, I think that the weight of the historical evidence is too great to deny that this event took place. Earliest Tibetan sources which deal extensively with the debate are: sBa bzhed, and its revised version Zhabs btags 1M, Ne'u PaD<;lita's Chos 'byung, Sakya PaQ. <;lita's sDom gsum rab dbye, and ButOn Rinchen Drup's Chos 'byung, and Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa's (1504-1566) Chos 'byung mkhas pa'i dga' stan. For a contemporary discussion of the wider philosophical and religious implications of the debate, see Ruegg (1989), especially parts II, III, and IV.
9. Tibetan sources characterise the dispute as centred on the question of whether or not "enlightenment" is attained through a gradual and prolonged process of reflection and praxis or in the form of an instantaneous experience. A central point at issue here is the role of discursive analysis in one's path to enlightenment. "Simultaneists" reject this, while the "gradualists" insist on its indispensability. Hence, my choice of the terms here.
10. Ruegg (1989), p. 56.
11. bod mams da sian chad Ita ba Niigiirjuna 'i lugs zungsl spyod pa pha rol tu phyin pa
drug la gyis la chos spyod mam pa bcu nyams su longsl sgom pa shes rab rnam gsum la blo siJyongs la thabs dang shes rab zung du chud ring 'brei ba zhi gnas dang Ihag mthong la sgoms shigl. . . The text translated cited here is from mKhas pa'i
dga
sian, pp 3':JO-391. Cf. Ruegg (1989), p. 62. All translations of Tibetan texts are mine unless otherwise stated.
'
? 12. LTC, p. 250: 'di Ia dgongs nas lam stan pa'i bla ma'i mtshan nyid yongs su rdzogs pa la theg pa thams cad la mkhas pa mang du gsungs soil
20 THE TIBET JOURNAL
13. dGe s/lyor f:yi gnad la dri ba snyan bskul ba Ihag bsam rab dlear, TKSB, Val. ka. Interestingly, many of the expressions and arguments found in this letter have close resemblance to several critical sections of Khedrup-Je's ITa khrid
14. ]5.
16. 17.
18.
19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi dris Ian dngos grub phreng ba and Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi Ita sgorn dris laY! in Collected Works, Vol. 2.
Dris Ian blo bzang bzhad pa'i sgra dbyangs Collected Works, Vol. nga.
Thi. i. ken, op. cit. , p. 159.
24. 25.
26.
27. 28.
to Tsongkhapa's rTen 'brcl bstod pa legs bshad snying po, a short ode on depend
mUll sel sgron me, Collected Works, VoLta
byi dol', Collected Works, VoLta. It seems as if Khedrup-Je is repeating many of Tsongkhapa's expressions. Note the pobmical nature of the title of Khedrup_ Je's work.
Byang chub lam rim chen mo. TKSB, Vol. pha.
ThLiken, Grub mtha' shel gyi me Iong, p. 158. Unfortunately, I have failed to locate Jhampa Lingpa's text.
Dri ba ihag /:Jsam rab dkal' gyi d?
is Ian man ngag gi dg(mgs rgyan in The Complete Works of Gsa mdog Pat! chen Stikya mdLOg ldan, Val. 23, pp. 297-358. Phyag Perna Karpo'? short response can be found in the last chapter of his
l'gya chC1l po'i man ngag gi bshad sbyar rgyal ba'i gan mdzod, Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 349-370.
'jam dbyangs bla mas rjes bzung zhes bgyi bas, Queries, p. 41.
Thi. i. ken, pp. 158-9.
Sangye Gyatsho reads the letter as a critique of what he calls the so-called Maham udra that goes by the name of "new Drukpa [Kagyu)" ( 'brug gsar du grags pa'i phyag chen). dGa' ldan Chas 'byung, p. 69. Pawo Tsuglak Threngwa makes the interesting observation that Tsongkhapa wrote this letter as a result of deep disappointment he felt at the level of ignorance among the
meditators at a Kagyu retreat. He writes: "Phyis ri khrod shin tu dben pa
ba lhag bsam rab dkar Ia sogs pa mdzad/. " mKhas pa'i dga ' ston, p . 1 155. Druk Galwang Chaje, in his biography of Tsongkhapa (pp. 489-90), makes a point similar to m[(j1as pa'i dga' ston.
rJe red mda ' ba'i gsung Ian. TKSB, Vol. ka.
rjc l5un jam dpal dbyangs kyi lam gyi gnad riC red mda' ba la shog dril du phil/ ba. TKSB, Vol. pha.
I hope to undertake, as part of a futme project, a critical study of this letter together with some of the main responses from subsequent Tibetan thinkers. As yet, my own translation of the letter remains unpublished.
The traditional Geluk scholarship seems to accord this historically critical role
-
,
and also the last section of Thub bstan
? ? . .
. dri
? ent origination. Thurman (1984, p. 85) asserts that the text was written in 1398. His claim is probably based on Khedrup-Je's rNam thaI' dad pa'i jug ngogs although Thurman does not say so. It is difiicult to discern whether this date is accurate. Even if we were to accept this, it is far from clear whether Tsongkhapa really meant this ode to signal his departure from the main- stream of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought. On the surface, the text appears to be nothing more than a passionate expressIon of admiration of the Buddha for having taught the prinCIples of dependent originatlon
? ? 29. IS, ppA11-15
30. Ratnakara. . ,anti's Prajilaparamitopadesa, P5459 and two Brhattrkil, P5205 and
P5206, which Tsongkhapa attributes to a certain Danstasena, a student 01 Vasubandhu. On the use of the last two texts by Jonangpas and Tsongkha- pa'? crilical com ments, see Ruegg (1969), pp. 325-27. Sakya ChogJen takes issue with Tsongkhapa on the authorship of these two texts and defends the earlier Tibetan ascription of them to Vasubandhu. See Shing rta'i sral 'byed,
nature of phenomena, see Jinpa (1997), chapter 5.
33. Cabezon (1992), p. 7
34. On this so-called "no-thesis" interpretation of Madhyamaka, see later.
35. Sec LTC, pp. 121-145, and LN, pp. 171-73. Robert Thurman, in his fn , bases his
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 21
? ? 31. mchil ma'i thai ba bzhin du dar bar rigs 50// LS, pA15.
32. For a detailed examination of Tsongkhapa's u nderstanding of the illusion-like
? ? idcnlitication of these opponents on Bhaso Chokyi Gyaltsen (1402? 1473) and Lobsang Phuntsok. However, Thurman misreads LN's reference to the LTC (pp. l21-45) where Tsongkhapa states that he had alrEi. ldy dealt L'xlensively with the rdulaliOl,s of the four positions. Thurman takes this to be referring to Tsongkh"pa's rebuttal of four types of objections against the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (LTC, pp. 50-89). Sec Thurman (1984), pp. 326-28, footnotes 1 12, 113 & 1 14. Although related, these are two quill. ' distinct issues. One relates specifically with the refutation of w hat Tsongkhapa sees as four main r;lisreadings of Prasangika-Madhyamaka's ontological nominalism. In contrast, the rebuttal of the four objections in LTC is part of Tsongkhapa's overall argument against those who, when identifying the objection of negation, go beyond the scope of reason's capacity to negate (dgag bya ngos 'dzin khyab che bal. This is dearly an error which must be corrected in future reprints of Thurman's book.
? 36. LC, folio 47.
37. LC does not give any identification of the proponent of this third position.
38. On the problem of identification of these third objects of Tsongkhapa's
critique, see Williams (1985).
39. Naga? una:
If I had posited some theses,
then I would be open to objections. As I do not have any thesis,
I am free of all faults. (VV, 29. )
Aryadeva:
He who does not have a standpoint,
of "is", flis not", I'both" nor "neither",
he cannot be criticised
of any t1aws for a long while. (CS, 16:25. )
Candraklrt i :
He who is a Madhyamlka cannot derive inferences from autonomous reason? ing, for he does not accept the other's thesis. (PSP, p. 11. )
p. 484.
22 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Tsongkhapa's reading of these passages can be found in LTC, pp. 136-144. 40. In LTC, Tsongkhapa identifies four main premises of the "no-thesis" view. that (i) critical reasoning that enquires into the question of whether or no? things exist in terms of their intrinsic being, negates all phenomena; (ii) phenomena such as production, cessation, etc. cannot be objects of valid cognitions for it has been stated in the Madhyamaka scriptures that percept_ ions like visual, auditory, olfactory and so on cannot be accepted as valid; (iii) phenomena such as production, cessation, etc. cannot be accepted as existent even on the conventional level for the reason that negates production on the ultimate level also negates it on the conventional level as well; and (iv) there is nothing that does not fall into the categories of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither, and all these four possibilities have been revealed to be untenable. Tsongkhapa subjects these four premises to detailed criticism in LTC, pp. 23-89. For Khedrup-Je's critique of the "no-thesis" view, see Cabez6n
(1992), pp. 102-112.
41. Interestingly, a number of writers on Madhyamaka in modern scholarship
appear to share the view that the Madhyamika literally has no views of his own. For example, B. K. Matilal characterises the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's standpoint as "non-committal. " See Matilal (1971), p. 164.
42. Ruegg (1983), Thurman (1984), Napper (1989), Williams (1985), and Cabez6n (1994).
43. dBu ma pa'i khyad chos gcig po de khyed kyis bkag pa yin noll LTC, p. 36. Tsongkhapa wrote in eloquent praise of the Buddha in verse called rTen 'breI bstod pa ("In praise of dependent origination"), TKSB, Vol. kha. This piece is a celebration of Tsongkhapa's realisation of the profound convergence between emptiness and dependent origination.
44. Rang gi ngo bos med na med par 'dod par gsal te . . . LTC, p. 38.
45. IHa bdud tu babs pa. LTC, p. 33.
46. LTC, p. 38: de Itar ji srid du myu gu la sogs pa mams yod par 'dod pa de sris du
ranggingobosgrubpa'i yodparsmralaranggingosbosgrubpagtanmedna gtan med du smra na ni mtha: gnyis su ! tung bar gdon mi za bas dngos por smra ba'i go lugs dang khyad med pa yin tel
47. dBu ma pa la med pa pa'am chad Ita ba zhes zer roll LTC, p. 40.
48. LTC, p. 88: des na rgud pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba ni rang bzhin sgro 'dogs pa'j rna rig pa yin lal de dang 'dzin stangs dngos su 'gal ba'j sgo nas de druns 'byin pa ni rang bzhin med pa'am bdag med pa rtogs pa'i shes rab nyag gcig yin . . . Tsongkhapa cites
seen as so antithetical to Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka. He suggests an interest- ing reading of the view whereby a distinction is drawn between an assertion made for the sake of others (gzhan ngo la bltos pa'i khas len) and an assertion from one's own perspective (rang ngo'i khas len). See dBu ma klu sgrub dgongs rgyan, pp. 323-355. Although dBu ma klu sgrub dgongs rgyan does not mention
from CS to make this point. 49. LTC, p. 48.
50. Nai(lSviibhtivyanirvrttau sviibhiivyal]'! hi prasiddha1! 1 syiitll VV, 26b. Rang bzhin med pa nyid log nail rang /Jzhin nyid du rab grub 'gyurll Quoted in LTC, p. 43.
51. Gendun Chophel (1903-1951) argues that the "no-thesis" view need notbe
52. 53.
54.
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 23
its source, this distinction of two types of assertion seems to be based on Rongton Sheja Kunrig. See, for example, his dBu ma la 'jug pa'i mam bshad nges don mam nges, p. 72. RongtOn identifies three types of thesis: 1) thesis that is accepted for the sake of others under special circumstances, 2) thesis accepted both by oneself and others, and 3) thesis accepted only by oneself. I have explored this "negative" approach in detail elsewhere, i. e. Jinpa (1998). For a detailed study of this "constructive" approach, see Jinpa (1997), chapter 5.
GR, p. 226: 'phags pa'i gzhung 'grel tshul la rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa rdul Isam med kyang/ bya byed 'thams cad bzhag pas chog pa'i 'grel tshul gyi lugs thun mong ma yin pa 'di la brtm nasi rnam par dag pa'i grub mtha' 'grel byed gzhan dang thun mong ma yin pa mang du yod tel de gang zhe na re zhig gtso lio mams brjod na/ Ishags drug las ngo bo lha dad pa'i kun gzhi mam shes dang/ rang rig 'gog lugs thun mong rna yin pa dang/ rang rgyud kyi sbyor bas phyir rgol gyi rgyud la de kho 111l nyid kyi Ita ba skyed pa khas mi len pa gsum dang/ shes pa khas len pa bzhin du. phyi rol gyi don yang khas blang dgos pa dang/ nyan rang la dngos po rang l! zhin med par rtogs pa yud pa dang/ chos kyi bdag 'dzin nljon mongs su 'jog
pa dang/ zhig pa dngos pu yin pa dang/ de'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus gsum 'jog tshul thung mong rna yin pa sags yin no//
TKSB, Vol. tsha.
BTP, p. 154.
iTa ba'i shab 'bycd, folio 1%: zhig pa dngos po pa ni chos 'di pa las phyi rol du gyur pa mu stegs bye brag pa'i grub mtha' yin gyi/ nang pa'i grub mtha' la med pas shin III mi 'thad pa'i gyms so// Taktshang Lotsawa too rejects Tsongkhapa's claim that the cL'Ssation of empirical things is a conditioned phenomenon. He arsrues that this as"ertion conctradicts Tsongkhapa's own Madhyamaka analysis whereby things, such as a pot, are shown to be untenable when subjected to critical analysis. See Taktshang, op. cit. p. 235.
Kun gzhi dang/ rang rig mi 'dod cing/ phyi don khas len pa'i t3hul yang dpyad par bya slc/. . . ITa ba'i shan 'byed, p. 28a.
Sher 'grel ke ta ka, p. 31: bde sogs rang gis nyams su myong ba yang tha snyad du ji Itar 'gog stc mi 'gog go/I des na SClns bdm grub lu 'dod pa la rang rig pa mi 'Ihad kyang bden med du 'dod pa la rang rig pa'i tha snyad shin tll 'thad par yang shes par bya stc. . . For an in-depth study of Mipham's views on reflexive aware- ness, see Williams (1998).
cognising, apperceptive faculty of consciousness); and (iii) the rejection of autonomous syllogism as a means of generating insight into the nature of re<llity, thus three negative tenets. (iv) The need to accept the reality of ex- ternal objects as much as the reality of [the world of] consciousness; (v) that the Sriivakas and Pratyekabuddhas cognise the absence of intrinsic being of phenomena; (vi) maintaining that grasping at the self-existen? e of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction; (vii) the cessation [of empirical things] is a conditioned phenomenon; and (viii) because of this, there is a unique presentation of the nature of the three tenses of time. 54
This list should not be confused with another list of eight attributed to Tsongkhapa known as the "eight difficult points (dka' gnad brgyad) of the MUlaktlriktl" found in Gyaltshap Dharma Rinchen's (1364-1438) notes dBu ma rtsa ba'i dka'gnad chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang. 55 In the second list, (vii) and (viii) are omitted and in their place are: rejection of the notion of svabhtlva (rang mtshan khas mi len pa), and a unique way of understanding the Buddha's perception of the relative worid of multiplicity (sangs rgyas kyis ji snyed pa mkhyen tshul). 56 Subsequent Tibetan Madhyamikas have attacked Tsongkhapa for suggesting that Prasangika-Madhyamaka has unique tenets, especially such constructive theories as the acceptance of the cessation of empirical things as a conditioned phenomenon. For example, Gowo Rabjampa (1429-1496) has argued that the acceptance of such a conditioned phenomenon (zhig pa 'dus byas yin pa) is a Vaise$ika tenet thus the view of a tradition outside the fold of the Buddhist
schools. 57 Furthermore, he has rejected Tsongkhapa's claim that Prasallgika-Madhyamaka does not accept the existence of tllayavijfitina (foundational consciousness) and svasamvedana (reflexive awareness). 58 The later Nyingma thinker Ju Mipham Gelek Namgyal (1846-1911) too has
sciousness; (ii) a unique system of refuting the [concept of] svasamvedana (self
-
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 15
argued that the Prasangika need not reject conventional existence of both foundational consciousness and reflexive awareness. 59 In contrast, Tak- tshang agrees with Tsongkhapa that Prasangikas do reject reflexive aware- nesS but maintains that Candrakirti does not negate foundational con- sciousness. 60 Regardless of who is right in these debates, the fact remains that Tsongkhapa seriously attempted to draw out all philosophical and soteriological implications of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's rejection of
intrinsic being (svabhtiva).
III
According to Tsongkhapa, the agnostic and nihilistic tendency can also permeate one's understanding of the nature of the path, and even affect the very conception of "enlightenment". In his Queries, Tsongkhapa points to some opposing trends prevalent in the Tibet of his time concerning the
understanding of the nature of enlightenment. He writes:
Generally speaking, there seem to be many diverse opinions concerning the way in which the "view" [of emptiness] (Ita ba) is perceived as arising. 61 One group of opinions maintains that all forms of conceptuality (mam rtog), be they positive or negative, are to be discarded. Yet others hold the directly opposing view that not only are all forms of conceptuality not to be discarded, but the greater the proliferation ofconcepts the more enhanced one's spiritual realisa- tion (nyams rtog) will become. [They maintain that) this is analogous to fact that the more fuel you bum the larger the size of the flame.
Again, another group of opinions contends that conceptualisation itself is the fundamental ignorance, ma rig pa (avidyti). This view is p rimarily based on
the quote "e_onceptua1I'sab"an 15 m.
deed the great I .
,62
gnorance. , But athers
? maintain the opposite view, that conceptualisation is in actual fact pristine dharmaktiya. These two views represent two opposing sides of the same spec- trum.
Again, some characterise Buddhahood or nirvti1J1l as the state of mind when the mmd abides in natural equilibrium free of distraction (yid 'di ma 'phros par tsm ne gnas pa'i tshe). [And they maintain that] the moment the mind wavers it is in the state of ordinary existence or sarrzsara. Yet others contend that even when conceptual thought-processes occur, no matter how long the processes last, if you observe with a single-pointed mind, dharmaktiya appears vividly. These two views are exact opposites.
Then again, some argue that an emptied vision of nothingness (mthong snang ban bun) arising through a combination of certain conditions, e. g. being situated in a dark room, adopting a specific bodily posture of meditation, and stopping all forms of thought, is the actual dharmaktiya. It is also the "empti- ness endowed with all aspects" (rNam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid), hence even ordinary people can experience direct recognition of dharmakaya. Yet others hold that such expenence does not constitute the totality of dharmaktiya vision but only a partial'glimpse of it. Some contend that this cannot be
? ? ? 16 THE TIBET JOURNAL
understood even as experiencing a partial glimpse of dharmakiiya; rather it represents an experience of mere vacuity or emptiness. Moreover, [they argue that] within emptiness this is not the negative intrinsic emptiness (chad /ta'i rang stong) of Candrakirti and Haribhadra, etc. , but it is the extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong) as accepted by Asanga, the master of great Madhyamaka63 Some assert, however, that it is indeed the intrinsic emptiness. These two views are directly opposite. Some maintain that it is not even a genuine emptiness but only a form (gzugs brnyan tsam) or a reflection of emptiness. Therefore, [accord_ ing to them] it is not dharmakiiya, but a manifestation of it, as the perception of smoke can be indicative of the presence of fire. 64
Tsongkhapa's principal concerns here are actually the soteriological implications of these views. According to him not only do these positions lead to a kind of soteriological dead-end but more importantly, when combined with the anti-rationalist tendencies of certain Tibetan interpreta- tions of Vajrayana, their ramifications in the realm of ethics are deeply disturbing. He saw the moral decline, or moral laxity to be more precise, believed to be rampant at a particular point of history in Tibet as being a natural consequence of many of the philosophical views prevalent at the time. In his view, the various strands of the standpoints which he was arguing against are clearly, and dangerously, a residual legacy from the Chinese master Hva-shang Mahayana whose tenets were, according to Tsongkhapa, comprehensively demonstrated as unsound by the Indian
? master Kamalasila. In fact, Tsongkhapa often uses the term "Hva-shang's view" as a typological label when criticising a host of theories. For example, when criticising one of the positions in his Queries, Tsongkhapa states that IIAs far as I am concerned, I cannot see any difference between your style of meditation and that of Hva-shang's system! ,,65 Note the tone of finality in Tsongkhapa's criticism. Similarly, in LTC, Tsongkhapa criticises a form of meditative quietism on the grounds that by claiming that between Hva-shang and one's own position there is a difference in that their own standpoi? lt puts emphasis on meritorious deeds one is implicitly admitting that so far as philosophy and meditative system are concerned there is no substantial difference between the twO. 6 This, according to Tsongkhapa, is clearly at fault.
A related but distinct concern was what Tsongkhapa saw as a form of meditative quietism. This, he felt, results from an incorrect understanding of the nature of and the relationship between two principal elements in Buddhist meditative praxis, namely tranquil abiding (samatha) and special or penetrative insight (vipasyana). In its extreme form, meditative quietism is best illustrated by the system of Hva-shang Mahayana. The problem directly concerns the role of discursive thought in the soteriological process of the Buddhist path to enlightenment. This is the corollary of
TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 17
anti-rationalism in the realm of meditative practice. Drawing heavily from a pivotal s? ripture Smpdhinirmocanasutra, ? nd also the. three. Bhiivantikran:a of Kamaiaslia, Tsongkhapa argues extensively that discursive thought is as crucial in a spiritual aspirant's path to enlightenment as its counterpart, i. e. deep single-pointedness. 67 If mere quietude, no matter how sophisti- cated, constitutes the core of the process towards enlightenment, not "knowing" but "unknowing" becomes the key towards true awakening. Without discursive analysis no fresh insights can be gained nor can any
awareness of the ultimate nature of reality arise within the individual. Tsongkhapa sees no qualitative difference between such a form of quietude and the naturally occurring states of non-mentation (sems mi 'phro ba) like deep sleep, fainting, or stupor. 68
Tsongkhapa's solution for this problem was to re-emphasise the need for a healthy balance between the important Buddhist trio: study (thos pa), discursive thinking (bsam pa), and meditation (sgom pa). According to him the problem arises from the following situation. Many of those who are inclined towards a single-pointed life of meditative practice perceive study and discursive thinking to be an obstacle on the path to enlightenment; on the other hand, those with scholarly interests seem to be lacking in serious motivation to apply their intellectual understanding to meditative practice, instead they appear to be more keen to expand their scholarly reputation. 69 In other words, one group fails to appreciate fully the signi- ficance of learning while the other neglects the crucially important element, i. e. the meditative praxis.
Underlying the above issues is the crucial question of the exact nature of the relationship between the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (sunyatti) and the ultimate standpoint of Vajrayana Buddhism. Like many of his Tibetan predecessors Tsongkhapa shared the view that Tantra represents the pinnacle of spiritual awakening in Mahayana Buddhism. This is true also of great Tibetan masters like Marpa Lotsawa, Sakya Paw;iita, Buton, and of course many of the Kadam teachers including the Indian master Atisa himself. However, what seriously concerned Tsong- khapa was the widespread misconceptions associated with Tantra which he believed to be pervasive at his time in Tibet. Among these was the widespread relegation-in some cases leading to eventual negation-of ethics on the grounds that the Tantra proposes a standpoint which is non- jUdgmental, and beyond all forms of dichotomy and polarities. Ethics was perceived to be relevant only to those of weak mind, whereas a true spiritual aspirant whose mind was receptive to the mysteries of Tantra could and should transcend the strictures of conventional morality. Such attitudes, according to Tsongkhapa, led to a climate of moral decline in ancient Tibet. From the above, we can surmise that Tsongkhapa saw an
? 18 THE TIBET JOURNAL
intimate link between epistemological scepticism, philosophical nihilism
and moral relativism. Not only does one naturally lead to the other, one could almost say that they are all different aspects of the same coin.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to "reconstruct" what I see as Tsongkha_ pa's key concerns about certain Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy. I have suggested that these qualms can be grouped under three main categories: i) Tsongkhapa's objections against what he sees as nihilistic interpretations of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka thought; ii) Tsongkhapa's objections against Shentong absolutism, and finally iii) Tsongkhapa's fears about residual influences of Hva-shang's quietist anti- rationalism in certain elements of Tibetan thought. Methodologically, I have argued that "listening" to the author's own voice is critical if we are to appreciate the dynamics behind the philosophical works of a historical thinker like Tsongkhapa. One very important consequence of identifying
an author's central concerns underlying his writings is that it gives a greater coherence and cogency to the author's overall project (if there is one). Certainly, in the case of Tsongkhapa, we know that one of the principal objectives underlying his Madhyamaka writings is to demon- strate that the Madhyamaka dialectics do not negate the reality of every- day world, especially ethics and religious activity. Related to this is also the aim of developing a reading of Madhyamaka philosophy in such a way that it can be consistently situated within an integrated system where the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness stands alongside Dharmakirti's epistemology and Asanga and Vasubandhu's ablzidharma psychology and
Vajrayana's meditative praxis. Throughout, I have endeavoured to engage "philosophically" with the issues which were of concern to Tsongkhapa so that they could be not only made comprehensible to us, but can also resonate with phiiosophical and soteriological questions which occupy people's mind to this day.
Notes
1. Jinpa (1997), chapter I, and Jinpa (1998).
2. Khedrup-Je (1385-1438) explicitly draws parallel between Tsongkhapa and
Nagarjuna in terms of their contribution to Buddhism. He writes: "'pftags pa'i yul du 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis rgyal ba'i bstan pa la bya ba chen po mdzad pa de bzhin du/ dus kyi mtha' rna 'di Ita bur gyur pa na/ rje bla rna 'di nyid kyis gangs ri'i khrod 'dir. . . " rNam thar dad pa'i Jugs ngogs, pp. 118-9. All Tibetan namesof people, places and schools are written Il1 phonetics to ensure easy pro- nounciation especially by non-Tibetologist readers. A list of these names with their corresponding Wylie transliterations is provided in the appendix.
bu;
? TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 19
3. The emergence of the Kadam school seems to have coincided with a quest- ioning of many of the tantra" which belong to the so-called earlier dis- semination of Buddhism in Tibet. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor (1704-1788) lists the following works: Lotsawa Rinchen Zangpo's (958-1055) Chos dang chos min mam 'byed, the letters of Lha Lama Yeshe 0, Zhiwa 0, Jhangchup 0, Tsami Lotsawa, and Chak Lotsawa, Ngog Loden Sherap's (1059-1109) gZe ma ra 'go, Sakya Par:l<;jita's (1 182-1251) sDom gsum rab dbye, (Collected Works of the Masters of lhe Sa Skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism), Vol. 5, pp. 297-320. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor also cites Drigong Pelzin and Go Khukpa Lhatse amongst those who quest- ion the authorship of some of the Nyingma tantras. dPag bsam Ijon bzang, pp. 391-406. For an English translation of Zhlwa O's letter and the identifica- tion of some of these objected tantras, see Karmay (1980).
5. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
6. The dates of all Tibetan thinkers are based on Tseten Zhabdrung (1982).
7. On the complex history of the various editions of Kangyur and Tangyur, see
Harrison (1992), introduction. See also Dungkar Lobsang Thrinley's comments
in Deb ther dmar po, n. 489.
8. This debate has been an object of considerable interest in modern Tibetan
? ? 4 Taktshang Lotsawa (b. 1405) makes this observation in his Grub mtha' kun shes, p. 210. Ct. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
Buddhist scholarship. . See Tucci (1958), Demieville (1967), Stein (1987), Houston (1980). Y. lmaeda (1975) Uournal asiatique, 1975, p . 140) has raised doubts about the factuality of the debate. However, I think that the weight of the historical evidence is too great to deny that this event took place. Earliest Tibetan sources which deal extensively with the debate are: sBa bzhed, and its revised version Zhabs btags 1M, Ne'u PaD<;lita's Chos 'byung, Sakya PaQ. <;lita's sDom gsum rab dbye, and ButOn Rinchen Drup's Chos 'byung, and Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa's (1504-1566) Chos 'byung mkhas pa'i dga' stan. For a contemporary discussion of the wider philosophical and religious implications of the debate, see Ruegg (1989), especially parts II, III, and IV.
9. Tibetan sources characterise the dispute as centred on the question of whether or not "enlightenment" is attained through a gradual and prolonged process of reflection and praxis or in the form of an instantaneous experience. A central point at issue here is the role of discursive analysis in one's path to enlightenment. "Simultaneists" reject this, while the "gradualists" insist on its indispensability. Hence, my choice of the terms here.
10. Ruegg (1989), p. 56.
11. bod mams da sian chad Ita ba Niigiirjuna 'i lugs zungsl spyod pa pha rol tu phyin pa
drug la gyis la chos spyod mam pa bcu nyams su longsl sgom pa shes rab rnam gsum la blo siJyongs la thabs dang shes rab zung du chud ring 'brei ba zhi gnas dang Ihag mthong la sgoms shigl. . . The text translated cited here is from mKhas pa'i
dga
sian, pp 3':JO-391. Cf. Ruegg (1989), p. 62. All translations of Tibetan texts are mine unless otherwise stated.
'
? 12. LTC, p. 250: 'di Ia dgongs nas lam stan pa'i bla ma'i mtshan nyid yongs su rdzogs pa la theg pa thams cad la mkhas pa mang du gsungs soil
20 THE TIBET JOURNAL
13. dGe s/lyor f:yi gnad la dri ba snyan bskul ba Ihag bsam rab dlear, TKSB, Val. ka. Interestingly, many of the expressions and arguments found in this letter have close resemblance to several critical sections of Khedrup-Je's ITa khrid
14. ]5.
16. 17.
18.
19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi dris Ian dngos grub phreng ba and Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi Ita sgorn dris laY! in Collected Works, Vol. 2.
Dris Ian blo bzang bzhad pa'i sgra dbyangs Collected Works, Vol. nga.
Thi. i. ken, op. cit. , p. 159.
24. 25.
26.
27. 28.
to Tsongkhapa's rTen 'brcl bstod pa legs bshad snying po, a short ode on depend
mUll sel sgron me, Collected Works, VoLta
byi dol', Collected Works, VoLta. It seems as if Khedrup-Je is repeating many of Tsongkhapa's expressions. Note the pobmical nature of the title of Khedrup_ Je's work.
Byang chub lam rim chen mo. TKSB, Vol. pha.
ThLiken, Grub mtha' shel gyi me Iong, p. 158. Unfortunately, I have failed to locate Jhampa Lingpa's text.
Dri ba ihag /:Jsam rab dkal' gyi d?
is Ian man ngag gi dg(mgs rgyan in The Complete Works of Gsa mdog Pat! chen Stikya mdLOg ldan, Val. 23, pp. 297-358. Phyag Perna Karpo'? short response can be found in the last chapter of his
l'gya chC1l po'i man ngag gi bshad sbyar rgyal ba'i gan mdzod, Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 349-370.
'jam dbyangs bla mas rjes bzung zhes bgyi bas, Queries, p. 41.
Thi. i. ken, pp. 158-9.
Sangye Gyatsho reads the letter as a critique of what he calls the so-called Maham udra that goes by the name of "new Drukpa [Kagyu)" ( 'brug gsar du grags pa'i phyag chen). dGa' ldan Chas 'byung, p. 69. Pawo Tsuglak Threngwa makes the interesting observation that Tsongkhapa wrote this letter as a result of deep disappointment he felt at the level of ignorance among the
meditators at a Kagyu retreat. He writes: "Phyis ri khrod shin tu dben pa
ba lhag bsam rab dkar Ia sogs pa mdzad/. " mKhas pa'i dga ' ston, p . 1 155. Druk Galwang Chaje, in his biography of Tsongkhapa (pp. 489-90), makes a point similar to m[(j1as pa'i dga' ston.
rJe red mda ' ba'i gsung Ian. TKSB, Vol. ka.
rjc l5un jam dpal dbyangs kyi lam gyi gnad riC red mda' ba la shog dril du phil/ ba. TKSB, Vol. pha.
I hope to undertake, as part of a futme project, a critical study of this letter together with some of the main responses from subsequent Tibetan thinkers. As yet, my own translation of the letter remains unpublished.
The traditional Geluk scholarship seems to accord this historically critical role
-
,
and also the last section of Thub bstan
? ? . .
. dri
? ent origination. Thurman (1984, p. 85) asserts that the text was written in 1398. His claim is probably based on Khedrup-Je's rNam thaI' dad pa'i jug ngogs although Thurman does not say so. It is difiicult to discern whether this date is accurate. Even if we were to accept this, it is far from clear whether Tsongkhapa really meant this ode to signal his departure from the main- stream of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought. On the surface, the text appears to be nothing more than a passionate expressIon of admiration of the Buddha for having taught the prinCIples of dependent originatlon
? ? 29. IS, ppA11-15
30. Ratnakara. . ,anti's Prajilaparamitopadesa, P5459 and two Brhattrkil, P5205 and
P5206, which Tsongkhapa attributes to a certain Danstasena, a student 01 Vasubandhu. On the use of the last two texts by Jonangpas and Tsongkha- pa'? crilical com ments, see Ruegg (1969), pp. 325-27. Sakya ChogJen takes issue with Tsongkhapa on the authorship of these two texts and defends the earlier Tibetan ascription of them to Vasubandhu. See Shing rta'i sral 'byed,
nature of phenomena, see Jinpa (1997), chapter 5.
33. Cabezon (1992), p. 7
34. On this so-called "no-thesis" interpretation of Madhyamaka, see later.
35. Sec LTC, pp. 121-145, and LN, pp. 171-73. Robert Thurman, in his fn , bases his
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 21
? ? 31. mchil ma'i thai ba bzhin du dar bar rigs 50// LS, pA15.
32. For a detailed examination of Tsongkhapa's u nderstanding of the illusion-like
? ? idcnlitication of these opponents on Bhaso Chokyi Gyaltsen (1402? 1473) and Lobsang Phuntsok. However, Thurman misreads LN's reference to the LTC (pp. l21-45) where Tsongkhapa states that he had alrEi. ldy dealt L'xlensively with the rdulaliOl,s of the four positions. Thurman takes this to be referring to Tsongkh"pa's rebuttal of four types of objections against the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (LTC, pp. 50-89). Sec Thurman (1984), pp. 326-28, footnotes 1 12, 113 & 1 14. Although related, these are two quill. ' distinct issues. One relates specifically with the refutation of w hat Tsongkhapa sees as four main r;lisreadings of Prasangika-Madhyamaka's ontological nominalism. In contrast, the rebuttal of the four objections in LTC is part of Tsongkhapa's overall argument against those who, when identifying the objection of negation, go beyond the scope of reason's capacity to negate (dgag bya ngos 'dzin khyab che bal. This is dearly an error which must be corrected in future reprints of Thurman's book.
? 36. LC, folio 47.
37. LC does not give any identification of the proponent of this third position.
38. On the problem of identification of these third objects of Tsongkhapa's
critique, see Williams (1985).
39. Naga? una:
If I had posited some theses,
then I would be open to objections. As I do not have any thesis,
I am free of all faults. (VV, 29. )
Aryadeva:
He who does not have a standpoint,
of "is", flis not", I'both" nor "neither",
he cannot be criticised
of any t1aws for a long while. (CS, 16:25. )
Candraklrt i :
He who is a Madhyamlka cannot derive inferences from autonomous reason? ing, for he does not accept the other's thesis. (PSP, p. 11. )
p. 484.
22 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Tsongkhapa's reading of these passages can be found in LTC, pp. 136-144. 40. In LTC, Tsongkhapa identifies four main premises of the "no-thesis" view. that (i) critical reasoning that enquires into the question of whether or no? things exist in terms of their intrinsic being, negates all phenomena; (ii) phenomena such as production, cessation, etc. cannot be objects of valid cognitions for it has been stated in the Madhyamaka scriptures that percept_ ions like visual, auditory, olfactory and so on cannot be accepted as valid; (iii) phenomena such as production, cessation, etc. cannot be accepted as existent even on the conventional level for the reason that negates production on the ultimate level also negates it on the conventional level as well; and (iv) there is nothing that does not fall into the categories of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither, and all these four possibilities have been revealed to be untenable. Tsongkhapa subjects these four premises to detailed criticism in LTC, pp. 23-89. For Khedrup-Je's critique of the "no-thesis" view, see Cabez6n
(1992), pp. 102-112.
41. Interestingly, a number of writers on Madhyamaka in modern scholarship
appear to share the view that the Madhyamika literally has no views of his own. For example, B. K. Matilal characterises the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's standpoint as "non-committal. " See Matilal (1971), p. 164.
42. Ruegg (1983), Thurman (1984), Napper (1989), Williams (1985), and Cabez6n (1994).
43. dBu ma pa'i khyad chos gcig po de khyed kyis bkag pa yin noll LTC, p. 36. Tsongkhapa wrote in eloquent praise of the Buddha in verse called rTen 'breI bstod pa ("In praise of dependent origination"), TKSB, Vol. kha. This piece is a celebration of Tsongkhapa's realisation of the profound convergence between emptiness and dependent origination.
44. Rang gi ngo bos med na med par 'dod par gsal te . . . LTC, p. 38.
45. IHa bdud tu babs pa. LTC, p. 33.
46. LTC, p. 38: de Itar ji srid du myu gu la sogs pa mams yod par 'dod pa de sris du
ranggingobosgrubpa'i yodparsmralaranggingosbosgrubpagtanmedna gtan med du smra na ni mtha: gnyis su ! tung bar gdon mi za bas dngos por smra ba'i go lugs dang khyad med pa yin tel
47. dBu ma pa la med pa pa'am chad Ita ba zhes zer roll LTC, p. 40.
48. LTC, p. 88: des na rgud pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba ni rang bzhin sgro 'dogs pa'j rna rig pa yin lal de dang 'dzin stangs dngos su 'gal ba'j sgo nas de druns 'byin pa ni rang bzhin med pa'am bdag med pa rtogs pa'i shes rab nyag gcig yin . . . Tsongkhapa cites
seen as so antithetical to Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka. He suggests an interest- ing reading of the view whereby a distinction is drawn between an assertion made for the sake of others (gzhan ngo la bltos pa'i khas len) and an assertion from one's own perspective (rang ngo'i khas len). See dBu ma klu sgrub dgongs rgyan, pp. 323-355. Although dBu ma klu sgrub dgongs rgyan does not mention
from CS to make this point. 49. LTC, p. 48.
50. Nai(lSviibhtivyanirvrttau sviibhiivyal]'! hi prasiddha1! 1 syiitll VV, 26b. Rang bzhin med pa nyid log nail rang /Jzhin nyid du rab grub 'gyurll Quoted in LTC, p. 43.
51. Gendun Chophel (1903-1951) argues that the "no-thesis" view need notbe
52. 53.
54.
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 23
its source, this distinction of two types of assertion seems to be based on Rongton Sheja Kunrig. See, for example, his dBu ma la 'jug pa'i mam bshad nges don mam nges, p. 72. RongtOn identifies three types of thesis: 1) thesis that is accepted for the sake of others under special circumstances, 2) thesis accepted both by oneself and others, and 3) thesis accepted only by oneself. I have explored this "negative" approach in detail elsewhere, i. e. Jinpa (1998). For a detailed study of this "constructive" approach, see Jinpa (1997), chapter 5.
GR, p. 226: 'phags pa'i gzhung 'grel tshul la rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa rdul Isam med kyang/ bya byed 'thams cad bzhag pas chog pa'i 'grel tshul gyi lugs thun mong ma yin pa 'di la brtm nasi rnam par dag pa'i grub mtha' 'grel byed gzhan dang thun mong ma yin pa mang du yod tel de gang zhe na re zhig gtso lio mams brjod na/ Ishags drug las ngo bo lha dad pa'i kun gzhi mam shes dang/ rang rig 'gog lugs thun mong rna yin pa dang/ rang rgyud kyi sbyor bas phyir rgol gyi rgyud la de kho 111l nyid kyi Ita ba skyed pa khas mi len pa gsum dang/ shes pa khas len pa bzhin du. phyi rol gyi don yang khas blang dgos pa dang/ nyan rang la dngos po rang l! zhin med par rtogs pa yud pa dang/ chos kyi bdag 'dzin nljon mongs su 'jog
pa dang/ zhig pa dngos pu yin pa dang/ de'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus gsum 'jog tshul thung mong rna yin pa sags yin no//
TKSB, Vol. tsha.
BTP, p. 154.
iTa ba'i shab 'bycd, folio 1%: zhig pa dngos po pa ni chos 'di pa las phyi rol du gyur pa mu stegs bye brag pa'i grub mtha' yin gyi/ nang pa'i grub mtha' la med pas shin III mi 'thad pa'i gyms so// Taktshang Lotsawa too rejects Tsongkhapa's claim that the cL'Ssation of empirical things is a conditioned phenomenon. He arsrues that this as"ertion conctradicts Tsongkhapa's own Madhyamaka analysis whereby things, such as a pot, are shown to be untenable when subjected to critical analysis. See Taktshang, op. cit. p. 235.
Kun gzhi dang/ rang rig mi 'dod cing/ phyi don khas len pa'i t3hul yang dpyad par bya slc/. . . ITa ba'i shan 'byed, p. 28a.
Sher 'grel ke ta ka, p. 31: bde sogs rang gis nyams su myong ba yang tha snyad du ji Itar 'gog stc mi 'gog go/I des na SClns bdm grub lu 'dod pa la rang rig pa mi 'Ihad kyang bden med du 'dod pa la rang rig pa'i tha snyad shin tll 'thad par yang shes par bya stc. . . For an in-depth study of Mipham's views on reflexive aware- ness, see Williams (1998).
