tamon ligatur lege conven-
gatur non solum naturaliter sed civiliter tionis et contractus quae sunt de jure
ex contractu.
gatur non solum naturaliter sed civiliter tionis et contractus quae sunt de jure
ex contractu.
Thomas Carlyle
.
.
Tertio solvit Inno quod
leges primae loquuntur de consuetudine
generali, quae ex certa scientia legis-
latoris s. principis inducitur. . . .
Quinto, solvit Inno, distinguendo, an
consuetudo praeceeserit legem, et tuno
lex ei derogat, an e contrario, et tunc
ipsa derogat legi, nisi lex consuetu-
dinem prohibeat, ut in usuris et re-
verentia. . . . (fol. 87). Ex hoo
infertur quod consuetudo ecclesiastics
non potest induci contra legem canoni-
cam, sine tacito consensu Papae, sicut
et nemo citra Papam potest statuere
contra canones. . . . Die verius quod
aliquo casu contra canonem potest
valere consuetudo, sine consensu tacito
principis. "
'Panormitanus: Comm. on Decre-
tals I. iv. 11 (vol. i. fol. 103): "Note
in ? licet, quod consuetudo praevalet
juri positivo, si est rationabilis et
praescripta, e contrario consuetudo
rat iuno carens non derogat juri, et
ratio est quia consuetudo, cum sit
quoddam lex, debet habere rationem
in se, alias non est lex. . . . Si ergo
amittit substantialia legis, non potest
praejudicare legi. . . . (fol. 105).
? ? Quarto, requiritur, quod consuetudo
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? CHAP, n. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS. 153
influenced by the profound treatment of the subject by St
Thomas Aquinas. We shall discuss his general conception of
political authority in another place, here we are concerned
with an important passage in which he treats the relation of
law to custom.
We may, he says, consider the authority of law from two
points of view, the " firmitas authoritatis " and the " firmitas
8tabilitatis. " Laws derive the first from the authority of the
legislator, the second from its correspondence with the con-
ditions and customs of those who are subject to it; and laws
are therefore void unless are confirmed by their custom. 1
We must, however, observe that in a later passage he seems
to maintain that, even when the multitude has not the power
of making law, its custom obtains the force of law, but subject
to the condition that this is allowed by those who have the
authority of imposing laws on the multitude. 2
We have considered these references to the relation of law
and custom, because the subject is one of great importance, but
we think that while the jurists are conscious of the great
importance of the question it is not easy to derive from
them clear and complete conclusions.
There is, however, another conception of the relation of the
Prince to the Law, of which we must take account, and with
regard to which there is a general agreement among the
1 Turrecremata: Comm. on Gratian
Decretum D. iv. part iii. (p. 64):
"Leges instituuntur . . . Rospondeo
notaudum, quod duplieiter possum us
de firmitate legum loqui, aut de
firmitato auctoritatis, aut de firmitate
stabilitatis. Si de firmitate auctori-
tatis, istam ha bet lox ab instituente,
a quo robur et auctoritatem susoipit. Si
vero loquamur de firmitate stabilitatis,
istam habet lex ex convenientia et
aptatione ad mores subditorum. Quia
enim ut dictum est in C. ent autem lex.
(Gratian Decretum D. iv. 2. ); oportet
quod lex sit possibilis secundum
loco temporiquo conveniens; dicimus
quod leges fiimantur firmitate stabili-
tatis et permanenciae, quum moribus
utentium approbantur, sive cum
moribus subditorum leges adapt ant in-.
Deficiunt autem, tolluntur et abro-
gantur quum utentium moribus non
conformantur. "
1 Td. id. , D. xi. 1 (p. 121): "Si
vero multitudo non habeat liberam
potestatem condendi sibi legem . . .
nihilominus tamen ipsa consuetudo in
tali multitudine prevalens optinet vim
legis, in quantum tolleratur per eos ad
quos pertinet multitudini legem im-
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? 154
[PART II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
Civilians. This is the conception that the Prince is bound
by any contract which he has made with his subjects. We have
dealt with this as it appears in the Civilians of the fourteenth
century, but it has also an important place in the fifteenth
century.
John of Imola, in one place, says that while the Emperor and
the Pope are not bound by "positive" laws, they are bound by
the divine and natural law, and therefore by their " Contract. "
for this is founded upon natural law. And in another place
the Prince is bound by a contract with his subjects, "natur-
aliter," though not " civiliter. " 1
Paulus de Castro, also, sets out the same general principle,
and cites Cynus as having said that if the Prince makes any
contract with his subjects he is bound to keep it, just like any
private person, and that this also applies to his successor;
and he also cites Bartolus as having said that when a Statute
passes into a contract, it cannot be revoked by those who
made it. 2
Franciscus Accoltis, while asserting in the same way that
the Prince was bound by his contract with his subjects, re-
pudiates emphatically the opinion which he attributes to the
"Doctors" (we have just seen that it was held by John of
Imola) that the Prince was only bound "naturaliter" and not
"civiliter," and he cites Baldus as having maintained the
same opinion as himself. 3
1 John of Imola: Commentary on
Decretals i. 2, 2 (fol. 13): "Item
adverte quia licet Papa t Imperator
non ligantur suis legibus positivis . . .
(amen ligantur lege Divina et naturali.
. . . Et per predicta patet quod Papa
et Imperator etiam suo contractu
ligantur: quia etiam jure naturali id
proceditur. "
Id. id. , ii. 19,1 (Ex Epistola), fol. 54:
"Nota quod ex contractu principis cum
subjecto, princcps obligatur saltim
naturaliter. Civiliter eum obligari
non videtur quum ilia deeoendat ex
legibus qui bus est sol tit us. "
>> Paulus de Castro: Comm. on
Cod. i. 14, 4 (fol. 26): '' Ultimo, per
istam legem determinantur duo. Primo
secundum Cynum quod si prinoeps f arit
aliquem contractum cum subditis,
debet illud obeervare et non rumpcrc,
vel frangere, vel contravenire, sicut
quilibet alius privatus, et eodem modo
eius successor observare tenetur, quum
afficit ipeam dignitatem cujus ipse est
administrator.
Per hoc etiam determinat Bartolus
in 1. omnes populi (Dig. i. 1, 9) quod
quum statutum transit io contractu
non potest a statuentibus revocari. "
Cf. pp. 15 and 19.
1 Franciscus Accoltis: Comm. on
Decretals ii. 19 (fol. 49): "Ex Epis-
tola. Nota primo secundum Doc. :
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? CHAP. II. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
155
Bertachinus says simply, the Emperor can revoke a " Privi-
legium " given by his predecessors, unless he received money
for it, bat he cannot revoke his contract, and cites Cynus and
Bartolns. 1
Jason de Mayno sets out the same principle with some
important distinctions. He treats the making of a con-
tract by the Prince as one of the modes of legislation, for
his contract has the force of law; and he cites Bartolus and
Paulus, as holding that it has even more force than the Law,
for though the Prince is not bound by the Law, he is bound
by agreement and contract, which belong to the "jus gen-
tium "; and he cites Baldus as saying that the Pope and the
Emperor are bound by the agreements (pacta) which they have
made with the " Civitates. " He then cites Bartolus as main-
taining that while contracts are binding on the Prince who
made them, they do not bind his successors, unless they
belonged to the nature and custom of his office, as in feudal
matters. He himself distinguishes, he agrees with Bartolus
in the case of the Emperor and Pope, for they succeeded by
election and not by inheritance, but when the King, or other
Prince, succeeded by inheritance the successor was bound
to maintain all the contracts of his predecessors. 2
quod imperator faciens contractum cum 1 Bertachinus, 'Repertorium Juris,'
subdito, obligatur saltem naturaliter vol. iii. fol. 10, r. : "Imperator potest
ad observantium pacti, et sic sentiunt revocare privilegum sui antecessors . . .
in dictis suis, quod princeps subdito nisi receperit pecuniam pro eo; sed
non obligatur civiliter, sed naturaliter contractum suum non potest revocare. "
tantum per 1. digna vox (Code i. 14, 4). Id. id. id. , fol. 12, r. : "Imperator
. . . Nam quum obligatio civilis oriatur tenetur servare conventiones et pacta
a lege civili . . . si lex civilis non bgat et contracta. Cy. et Bar. in D. 1.
principem, ergo non potest obligari digna vox " (Cod. i. 14, 4).
civiliter; naturaliter autem obligatur s Jason do Mayno: Comm. on
quia ipsa naturnalis obligatio sumit Digest i. iv. 1 (fol. 25 v. ): "Adde
originem a jure naturali. . . . Jus quint um modum (of making laws by the
autem naturale non potest tolli per Prince); s. per viam contractus, quia
principem, nee limitari sine causa. . . . contractus principis habent vim legis.
Tu, autem, adverte, ad primum dictum, . . . Imo fortius secundum Baldum et
quia Baldus in 1. princeps fl. De Legibus Paulum hie, licet princeps non ligetur
(Dig. i. 3, 31) dicit quod princeps obli- lego . . .
tamon ligatur lege conven-
gatur non solum naturaliter sed civiliter tionis et contractus quae sunt de jure
ex contractu. . . . Ego autem dico gentium. . . . Ubi Baldus de natura
indubitanter quod princeps contra- Feudi, ubi etiam per eum, an princeps
hendo obligatur civiliter et naturaliter. " teneatur suas eonsuetudines observare,
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? 156
[PART II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
Philip Decius, a Civilian of the later years of the fifteenth
century and the early years of the sixteenth century, asserts
that the Prince is bound by his contract, and cannot violate
it even " de plenitudine potestatis "; and he cites Baldus and
Paulus and Peter de Anchorano. 1
It may appear to some that these discussions of the binding
nature of the " Contract " of the Prince are of little more than
technical significance, but that is hardly true. The conception
was not new in the fifteenth century, but had a considerable
place in the work of the great Civilians of the fourteenth century,
and it reappears in the sixteenth century in the theory of
Bodin. We venture to suggest that the question arose natur-
ally in Italy, in connection with the great treaties which deter-
mined the relation of the Emperor to the Italian cities, but
it has also a more general significance, as indicating a limit to
the theory of the unrestrained authority of the Prince.
We began this chapter by drawing attention to the sharp
distinction which was made by Christopher Porcius between
the opinions of the " Citra Montani " and the " Ultra Montani"
nam licet Deus subjeoit priucipi leges,
tamen non subjeoit contractus. . . .
Et dicit Baldus . . . quod pacta que
faciunt Papa et Imperator cum civitati-
bus sunt servanda. Subdit autem
Baldus hie, quod licet pacta et con-
tracta principis ligent principem, non
tamen ligent ejus successorem: . . . et
quia jus non transit ad sucessorem sed
de novo creatur per electionen. . . .
Nisi essent de natura vel consuetudine
sue dignitatis, prout est in feudo. . . .
Puto, licet alii non tangant, quod ista
distinctio sic indistinct* non sit vera;
verum intelligo dictum Baldi procedere
in Imperatore vel Papa, quia tales
dignitatis non deferuntur successione
sed per electionem. . . . Tunc quum
successor non habeat dignitatem a pre-
decossore, sed nova electione conse-
quatur, puto verum esse quod dicit
Baldus, quod non teneatur pactis. Sed
in regibus, ducibus, marchionibus, et
similibus, quum regna deferantur per
successionem quia primogenitus sue-
oedit in regno ducato vel comitatu . . .
saltem attenta generali consuetudine,
credo quod successor teneatur servare
omnem contractum et quamcunque
conventionem sicut quilibet successor
privati. ''
1 Philippus Decius, 'Consilium' (in
Goldast, Monarchia, vol. iii. , edition
1621), C. xix. : "Et hoc bene facit, quia
quum prineops ex contractu obligatur,
etiam de plemtudine potestatis con-
travenire non potest, ut notanter dicit
Paulus de Castro in 1. Digna vox.
Cod. de legibus et idem Baldus in C. i.
? ad hoc, col. 5 in ver. item nut aim, ex
Gl. de pace juramento firmata, idem
tenet Paulus de Castro in Consil, 420,
'Videtur in antiquis,' et hoc idem in
termine hujus questionis tradit Petrus
de Anch. in Consil. 65, pro declarationo
? ? dubiorum col. 2. "
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? CHAP, n. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
157
on the question of the continuing authority of the Eoman
people in making laws. We have, however, not been able to
find much which illustrates this distinction. This may be due
to the fact that the Civilians whose work we have been able to
examine, are all of them Italian; that is what Porcius pre-
sumably means by " Citra Montani. " It is true, however, that
if we take account not merely of Civilians or even Canonists,
but of the great political writers of other European countries,
such as John Gerson in France, Nicolas of Cusa in Germany,
or Sir John Fortescue in England, we should find that they held
that legislative authority belonged properly and normally
not to the Prince alone, but to the whole community. How
far we may think that Porcius is referring to this, we are, how-
ever, quite unable to say.
If we endeavour to summarise our conclusions about the
position of those Civilians with whom we have dealt here, it
seems to us true to say that they were clear that the Eoman
Emperor had an absolute and unconditional authority in
making " positive " law and that the people of the Empire had
no legislative authority in the general sense, and that even if
they recognised a certain authority in their custom, this rested
upon the sanction of the Prince or Pope. (We are, it must be
carefully observed, not dealing with the powers of the great
Italian cities to establish municipal laws for themselves; this
is a great and complex subject and has been dealt with in
detail by many learned writers. )
Whether they would all have accepted the somewhat ex-
treme terms cited by Jason de Mayno from Baldus, that the
Pope and the Prince could do anything " supra jus et contra
jus, et extra jus," may possibly be doubted. They are all,
including Jason himself, clear that when the Prince has entered
into a " contract" with his subjects, his authority is limited
by the " contract. "
It is evident that there was a very sharp contrast between
the political theory of most of the writers we have dealt with
in this chapter and the general tendencies of the fifteenth
century.
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? 158
CHAPTER III.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRINCE: ITS SOURCE
AND NATURE. POLITICAL WRITERS.
We turn from the conception of the authority of the law to
that of the authority of the Prince or Euler, and we find a
number of important writers, who in different countries deal
with the subject in some detail; and as we shall see, they
show a remarkable agreement in their judgments.
We begin with Gerson, for he was earliest in time and cer-
tainly was not less representative than the others. We cannot
here discuss his place in the great conciliar movement, but it
seems to us reasonable to say that his attitude to political
authority is related to his conception of the authority of
General Councils.
In one treatise ascribed to Gerson there is a discussion of
the origin of political society, which is interesting as illustrating
his relation to the Patristic and Stoic tradition. In the state
of innocence man had no laws or coercive justice, it was sin
which compelled men to submit to these, and he enumerates
in technical language the causes of coercive authority. 1
Gerson, however, adds, a little further on, that man is by
1 J. Gerson: 'Sermo pro Justitia ad
Regom' (Opera, vol. iv. col. 855):
"Meditemur etiam hominem creatum
iuitwe sine peccato, et in justitia pro
statu innocontiao. Fecit Deus hominem
rectum ete. Homo in illo statu non
indigebat logibus aut justitia activa
coerciva ut ad bonum converteretur.
Non igitur requirebatur dominatio
civilis aut politica. . . . Accidit autem
quod propter transgressionem legis
quae impoeita orat homini et denun-
ciats, et propter inobodientiam, mox
regnum hominis ot dominium in tyran-
nidem et subjectionem vorsum ait, ac
omino veluti infirmatum et pur vorsum.
. . . Et hie radicem habemus et causae
dominationis et ooercivi dominii. "
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? CHAP, in. ] POLITICAL WRITERS. 159
nature "Civilis," and needs the help of his fellow men, and
was therefore driven to the life of society. The Commonwealth
is a society in which men have to command and to obey to
the end that they may live in peace and sufficiency, and as the
principles of Natural Law are not sufficient for the government
of the temporal life, human laws were established; but these
must not be contrary to the Natural Law. 1
This is interesting, as illustrating what we have before
suggested, that in spite of the great authority of St Thomas
Aquinas, the Aristotelian conceptions had not made any very
profound impression.
We turn to Gerson's treatment of our immediate subject, the
source and nature of the authority of the King or Prince.
In a work described as ' Sermo ad Eegem Franciae nomine
Universitatis Parisiensis,' which is obviously a short treatise
on the nature of Kingship, Gerson describes the monarchy as
having been originally created by the common consent of men,
and for the good of the whole community. 2 And, he goes on,
it is an error and contrary to natural equity and the true
character of lordship to say that the lord is not bound by any
obligation to his subjects; as the subjects owe their lord help
and service, he owes them his protection and defence. 3 The
1 Id. id. , vol. iv. col. 856: '' Adji- sive temporalis sit sive spiritualis. Et
ciamus insuper et dicamus quod postea- quoniam principia juris aut naturalis
quam homo natura sua civilis est et ordinationis non sumciunt ad tempora-
communicativus, et talem habet indi- lem vitam gubernandam, ordinatae
gentiam cui convenienter succurrere fuore et institutao humaaae quae dam
non potest absque alterius subsidio, ordinationes et veluti voluntariae,
homo inductus fuit et veluti compulsus naturali juri minime obviantee. "
in communi vivere cum aliis, et opus * Id. : 'Sermo ad Rogem Franciae
fuit instituere ao ordinare aliquas nomine universitatis Parisiensis/
convivendi modos. Et virtus justitiae, (Opera, vol. iv. col. 798): "Propterea
quae ad hoc faciendum inclinat, nomi- rex aliquis persona privata non est, sed
natur civilis aut politica. Politia (ut est una potestas publica ordinata pro
dictum est) est hominum societas ad totius communitatis salute. Sicuti ab
bonum ordinata, ad recte praecipien- uno capite desceudit, et dependit
dum et obediendum, ut in pace vivatur totius corporis vita, et ad hoo roges
et tranquillitate et sufficientia, aut ordinati fuerunt, et prinoipes in prin-
quoad vitam banc temporalem, aut cipio per communem hominum consen-
quoad spiritualem. Justitia politica sum, et eo modo perseverare debent. "
eat virtus quae inclinat reddere uni- * Id. id. id. , col. 799: "Haec Veritas
cuique quod suum est secundum ordi- est contra horum errorem qui dicere
nationos et finem politiae ubi ipsa fuerit, ausi sunt dominum in nullo subjectis
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? 160 FIFTEENTH CENTURY. [PAST II.
words seem to be reminiscent of the principle of the mutual
obligations of feudal law.
Gerson's conception of monarchy is clearly that of an autho-
rity derived from the community, and limited by obligations
to the community. He repudiates very emphatically the error
of those who said that all things belonged to the lord and that
he could do whatever he pleased,1 and the contention of those
who misapplied the description of the conduct of the King
by Samuel, and neglected the principles of Kingship set out
in Deuteronomy, and the sound judgment of natural reason
which is never contradicted by the divine law. 2
This brings Gerson to a discussion of tyranny, which he
describes as a poison which tends to destroy all political life;
men ought, according to their position, to resist it. He warns
them indeed against unreasonable and unjustifiable sedition
which may produce results worse than tyranny itself, but he
asserts that the tyrant has lost all right to his authority, that he
is hated by God and by man, and rarely dies a natural death. 3
He therefore argues that it would be well that the royal
authority should be limited and restrained; and he cites the
reply of Theopompus to his wife when she complained that he
was leaving a diminished authority to his children; that it
might be diminished but it would be more permanent. It
would be more permanent, because it would be more reasonable
suis teneri aut obligari, quod est contra
jus divinum et naturalem aequitatem,
et veram dominii fidem; quemadmo-
dum subditi fidem, subsidium et servi-
tmm eorum superiori debent, sic
superior fidem, protectionem et defen-
sionem suis debet subjectis; bonitas
una aliam requirit. "
1 Id. id. id. , col. 799: "Hie mani-
festum est bos err are qui dicunt
dominia omnia ad ipsos spec tare, et
quod agere possunt ad eorum arbitrium
et voluntatem, omnia quae subjectorum
sunt absque ullo titulo ad se trahendo,
quid hoc sibi vult. "
Cf. id. : "Kogulae Moralis. " (Opera,
vol. i. part ii. col. 22): "Omnia sunt
principis, non quidem proprietario jure,
nec pro se, sed pro necessitate reipub-
licae. "
2 Id. , 'Son no ad Regem Franciae'
(vol. iv. col. 800): "Hie apparet ulte-
rius, quod devius ille perperam et
perverse intilligeret textum Bibliae, qui
contra veritatem vortere vellet verba
scripta, 1 Reg. viii. cap. 'Hoc est jus
regis,' quia verus sensus literalis alibi
est et specialitor, Deut. xviii. , omnino
his contrarius; et etiam omne bonum
rationis naturalis judicium, cui nun-
quam contrariatur ius Divinum. "
? Id. id. id. , col.
leges primae loquuntur de consuetudine
generali, quae ex certa scientia legis-
latoris s. principis inducitur. . . .
Quinto, solvit Inno, distinguendo, an
consuetudo praeceeserit legem, et tuno
lex ei derogat, an e contrario, et tunc
ipsa derogat legi, nisi lex consuetu-
dinem prohibeat, ut in usuris et re-
verentia. . . . (fol. 87). Ex hoo
infertur quod consuetudo ecclesiastics
non potest induci contra legem canoni-
cam, sine tacito consensu Papae, sicut
et nemo citra Papam potest statuere
contra canones. . . . Die verius quod
aliquo casu contra canonem potest
valere consuetudo, sine consensu tacito
principis. "
'Panormitanus: Comm. on Decre-
tals I. iv. 11 (vol. i. fol. 103): "Note
in ? licet, quod consuetudo praevalet
juri positivo, si est rationabilis et
praescripta, e contrario consuetudo
rat iuno carens non derogat juri, et
ratio est quia consuetudo, cum sit
quoddam lex, debet habere rationem
in se, alias non est lex. . . . Si ergo
amittit substantialia legis, non potest
praejudicare legi. . . . (fol. 105).
? ? Quarto, requiritur, quod consuetudo
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? CHAP, n. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS. 153
influenced by the profound treatment of the subject by St
Thomas Aquinas. We shall discuss his general conception of
political authority in another place, here we are concerned
with an important passage in which he treats the relation of
law to custom.
We may, he says, consider the authority of law from two
points of view, the " firmitas authoritatis " and the " firmitas
8tabilitatis. " Laws derive the first from the authority of the
legislator, the second from its correspondence with the con-
ditions and customs of those who are subject to it; and laws
are therefore void unless are confirmed by their custom. 1
We must, however, observe that in a later passage he seems
to maintain that, even when the multitude has not the power
of making law, its custom obtains the force of law, but subject
to the condition that this is allowed by those who have the
authority of imposing laws on the multitude. 2
We have considered these references to the relation of law
and custom, because the subject is one of great importance, but
we think that while the jurists are conscious of the great
importance of the question it is not easy to derive from
them clear and complete conclusions.
There is, however, another conception of the relation of the
Prince to the Law, of which we must take account, and with
regard to which there is a general agreement among the
1 Turrecremata: Comm. on Gratian
Decretum D. iv. part iii. (p. 64):
"Leges instituuntur . . . Rospondeo
notaudum, quod duplieiter possum us
de firmitate legum loqui, aut de
firmitato auctoritatis, aut de firmitate
stabilitatis. Si de firmitate auctori-
tatis, istam ha bet lox ab instituente,
a quo robur et auctoritatem susoipit. Si
vero loquamur de firmitate stabilitatis,
istam habet lex ex convenientia et
aptatione ad mores subditorum. Quia
enim ut dictum est in C. ent autem lex.
(Gratian Decretum D. iv. 2. ); oportet
quod lex sit possibilis secundum
loco temporiquo conveniens; dicimus
quod leges fiimantur firmitate stabili-
tatis et permanenciae, quum moribus
utentium approbantur, sive cum
moribus subditorum leges adapt ant in-.
Deficiunt autem, tolluntur et abro-
gantur quum utentium moribus non
conformantur. "
1 Td. id. , D. xi. 1 (p. 121): "Si
vero multitudo non habeat liberam
potestatem condendi sibi legem . . .
nihilominus tamen ipsa consuetudo in
tali multitudine prevalens optinet vim
legis, in quantum tolleratur per eos ad
quos pertinet multitudini legem im-
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? 154
[PART II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
Civilians. This is the conception that the Prince is bound
by any contract which he has made with his subjects. We have
dealt with this as it appears in the Civilians of the fourteenth
century, but it has also an important place in the fifteenth
century.
John of Imola, in one place, says that while the Emperor and
the Pope are not bound by "positive" laws, they are bound by
the divine and natural law, and therefore by their " Contract. "
for this is founded upon natural law. And in another place
the Prince is bound by a contract with his subjects, "natur-
aliter," though not " civiliter. " 1
Paulus de Castro, also, sets out the same general principle,
and cites Cynus as having said that if the Prince makes any
contract with his subjects he is bound to keep it, just like any
private person, and that this also applies to his successor;
and he also cites Bartolus as having said that when a Statute
passes into a contract, it cannot be revoked by those who
made it. 2
Franciscus Accoltis, while asserting in the same way that
the Prince was bound by his contract with his subjects, re-
pudiates emphatically the opinion which he attributes to the
"Doctors" (we have just seen that it was held by John of
Imola) that the Prince was only bound "naturaliter" and not
"civiliter," and he cites Baldus as having maintained the
same opinion as himself. 3
1 John of Imola: Commentary on
Decretals i. 2, 2 (fol. 13): "Item
adverte quia licet Papa t Imperator
non ligantur suis legibus positivis . . .
(amen ligantur lege Divina et naturali.
. . . Et per predicta patet quod Papa
et Imperator etiam suo contractu
ligantur: quia etiam jure naturali id
proceditur. "
Id. id. , ii. 19,1 (Ex Epistola), fol. 54:
"Nota quod ex contractu principis cum
subjecto, princcps obligatur saltim
naturaliter. Civiliter eum obligari
non videtur quum ilia deeoendat ex
legibus qui bus est sol tit us. "
>> Paulus de Castro: Comm. on
Cod. i. 14, 4 (fol. 26): '' Ultimo, per
istam legem determinantur duo. Primo
secundum Cynum quod si prinoeps f arit
aliquem contractum cum subditis,
debet illud obeervare et non rumpcrc,
vel frangere, vel contravenire, sicut
quilibet alius privatus, et eodem modo
eius successor observare tenetur, quum
afficit ipeam dignitatem cujus ipse est
administrator.
Per hoc etiam determinat Bartolus
in 1. omnes populi (Dig. i. 1, 9) quod
quum statutum transit io contractu
non potest a statuentibus revocari. "
Cf. pp. 15 and 19.
1 Franciscus Accoltis: Comm. on
Decretals ii. 19 (fol. 49): "Ex Epis-
tola. Nota primo secundum Doc. :
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? CHAP. II. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
155
Bertachinus says simply, the Emperor can revoke a " Privi-
legium " given by his predecessors, unless he received money
for it, bat he cannot revoke his contract, and cites Cynus and
Bartolns. 1
Jason de Mayno sets out the same principle with some
important distinctions. He treats the making of a con-
tract by the Prince as one of the modes of legislation, for
his contract has the force of law; and he cites Bartolus and
Paulus, as holding that it has even more force than the Law,
for though the Prince is not bound by the Law, he is bound
by agreement and contract, which belong to the "jus gen-
tium "; and he cites Baldus as saying that the Pope and the
Emperor are bound by the agreements (pacta) which they have
made with the " Civitates. " He then cites Bartolus as main-
taining that while contracts are binding on the Prince who
made them, they do not bind his successors, unless they
belonged to the nature and custom of his office, as in feudal
matters. He himself distinguishes, he agrees with Bartolus
in the case of the Emperor and Pope, for they succeeded by
election and not by inheritance, but when the King, or other
Prince, succeeded by inheritance the successor was bound
to maintain all the contracts of his predecessors. 2
quod imperator faciens contractum cum 1 Bertachinus, 'Repertorium Juris,'
subdito, obligatur saltem naturaliter vol. iii. fol. 10, r. : "Imperator potest
ad observantium pacti, et sic sentiunt revocare privilegum sui antecessors . . .
in dictis suis, quod princeps subdito nisi receperit pecuniam pro eo; sed
non obligatur civiliter, sed naturaliter contractum suum non potest revocare. "
tantum per 1. digna vox (Code i. 14, 4). Id. id. id. , fol. 12, r. : "Imperator
. . . Nam quum obligatio civilis oriatur tenetur servare conventiones et pacta
a lege civili . . . si lex civilis non bgat et contracta. Cy. et Bar. in D. 1.
principem, ergo non potest obligari digna vox " (Cod. i. 14, 4).
civiliter; naturaliter autem obligatur s Jason do Mayno: Comm. on
quia ipsa naturnalis obligatio sumit Digest i. iv. 1 (fol. 25 v. ): "Adde
originem a jure naturali. . . . Jus quint um modum (of making laws by the
autem naturale non potest tolli per Prince); s. per viam contractus, quia
principem, nee limitari sine causa. . . . contractus principis habent vim legis.
Tu, autem, adverte, ad primum dictum, . . . Imo fortius secundum Baldum et
quia Baldus in 1. princeps fl. De Legibus Paulum hie, licet princeps non ligetur
(Dig. i. 3, 31) dicit quod princeps obli- lego . . .
tamon ligatur lege conven-
gatur non solum naturaliter sed civiliter tionis et contractus quae sunt de jure
ex contractu. . . . Ego autem dico gentium. . . . Ubi Baldus de natura
indubitanter quod princeps contra- Feudi, ubi etiam per eum, an princeps
hendo obligatur civiliter et naturaliter. " teneatur suas eonsuetudines observare,
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? 156
[PART II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
Philip Decius, a Civilian of the later years of the fifteenth
century and the early years of the sixteenth century, asserts
that the Prince is bound by his contract, and cannot violate
it even " de plenitudine potestatis "; and he cites Baldus and
Paulus and Peter de Anchorano. 1
It may appear to some that these discussions of the binding
nature of the " Contract " of the Prince are of little more than
technical significance, but that is hardly true. The conception
was not new in the fifteenth century, but had a considerable
place in the work of the great Civilians of the fourteenth century,
and it reappears in the sixteenth century in the theory of
Bodin. We venture to suggest that the question arose natur-
ally in Italy, in connection with the great treaties which deter-
mined the relation of the Emperor to the Italian cities, but
it has also a more general significance, as indicating a limit to
the theory of the unrestrained authority of the Prince.
We began this chapter by drawing attention to the sharp
distinction which was made by Christopher Porcius between
the opinions of the " Citra Montani " and the " Ultra Montani"
nam licet Deus subjeoit priucipi leges,
tamen non subjeoit contractus. . . .
Et dicit Baldus . . . quod pacta que
faciunt Papa et Imperator cum civitati-
bus sunt servanda. Subdit autem
Baldus hie, quod licet pacta et con-
tracta principis ligent principem, non
tamen ligent ejus successorem: . . . et
quia jus non transit ad sucessorem sed
de novo creatur per electionen. . . .
Nisi essent de natura vel consuetudine
sue dignitatis, prout est in feudo. . . .
Puto, licet alii non tangant, quod ista
distinctio sic indistinct* non sit vera;
verum intelligo dictum Baldi procedere
in Imperatore vel Papa, quia tales
dignitatis non deferuntur successione
sed per electionem. . . . Tunc quum
successor non habeat dignitatem a pre-
decossore, sed nova electione conse-
quatur, puto verum esse quod dicit
Baldus, quod non teneatur pactis. Sed
in regibus, ducibus, marchionibus, et
similibus, quum regna deferantur per
successionem quia primogenitus sue-
oedit in regno ducato vel comitatu . . .
saltem attenta generali consuetudine,
credo quod successor teneatur servare
omnem contractum et quamcunque
conventionem sicut quilibet successor
privati. ''
1 Philippus Decius, 'Consilium' (in
Goldast, Monarchia, vol. iii. , edition
1621), C. xix. : "Et hoc bene facit, quia
quum prineops ex contractu obligatur,
etiam de plemtudine potestatis con-
travenire non potest, ut notanter dicit
Paulus de Castro in 1. Digna vox.
Cod. de legibus et idem Baldus in C. i.
? ad hoc, col. 5 in ver. item nut aim, ex
Gl. de pace juramento firmata, idem
tenet Paulus de Castro in Consil, 420,
'Videtur in antiquis,' et hoc idem in
termine hujus questionis tradit Petrus
de Anch. in Consil. 65, pro declarationo
? ? dubiorum col. 2. "
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? CHAP, n. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
157
on the question of the continuing authority of the Eoman
people in making laws. We have, however, not been able to
find much which illustrates this distinction. This may be due
to the fact that the Civilians whose work we have been able to
examine, are all of them Italian; that is what Porcius pre-
sumably means by " Citra Montani. " It is true, however, that
if we take account not merely of Civilians or even Canonists,
but of the great political writers of other European countries,
such as John Gerson in France, Nicolas of Cusa in Germany,
or Sir John Fortescue in England, we should find that they held
that legislative authority belonged properly and normally
not to the Prince alone, but to the whole community. How
far we may think that Porcius is referring to this, we are, how-
ever, quite unable to say.
If we endeavour to summarise our conclusions about the
position of those Civilians with whom we have dealt here, it
seems to us true to say that they were clear that the Eoman
Emperor had an absolute and unconditional authority in
making " positive " law and that the people of the Empire had
no legislative authority in the general sense, and that even if
they recognised a certain authority in their custom, this rested
upon the sanction of the Prince or Pope. (We are, it must be
carefully observed, not dealing with the powers of the great
Italian cities to establish municipal laws for themselves; this
is a great and complex subject and has been dealt with in
detail by many learned writers. )
Whether they would all have accepted the somewhat ex-
treme terms cited by Jason de Mayno from Baldus, that the
Pope and the Prince could do anything " supra jus et contra
jus, et extra jus," may possibly be doubted. They are all,
including Jason himself, clear that when the Prince has entered
into a " contract" with his subjects, his authority is limited
by the " contract. "
It is evident that there was a very sharp contrast between
the political theory of most of the writers we have dealt with
in this chapter and the general tendencies of the fifteenth
century.
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? 158
CHAPTER III.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRINCE: ITS SOURCE
AND NATURE. POLITICAL WRITERS.
We turn from the conception of the authority of the law to
that of the authority of the Prince or Euler, and we find a
number of important writers, who in different countries deal
with the subject in some detail; and as we shall see, they
show a remarkable agreement in their judgments.
We begin with Gerson, for he was earliest in time and cer-
tainly was not less representative than the others. We cannot
here discuss his place in the great conciliar movement, but it
seems to us reasonable to say that his attitude to political
authority is related to his conception of the authority of
General Councils.
In one treatise ascribed to Gerson there is a discussion of
the origin of political society, which is interesting as illustrating
his relation to the Patristic and Stoic tradition. In the state
of innocence man had no laws or coercive justice, it was sin
which compelled men to submit to these, and he enumerates
in technical language the causes of coercive authority. 1
Gerson, however, adds, a little further on, that man is by
1 J. Gerson: 'Sermo pro Justitia ad
Regom' (Opera, vol. iv. col. 855):
"Meditemur etiam hominem creatum
iuitwe sine peccato, et in justitia pro
statu innocontiao. Fecit Deus hominem
rectum ete. Homo in illo statu non
indigebat logibus aut justitia activa
coerciva ut ad bonum converteretur.
Non igitur requirebatur dominatio
civilis aut politica. . . . Accidit autem
quod propter transgressionem legis
quae impoeita orat homini et denun-
ciats, et propter inobodientiam, mox
regnum hominis ot dominium in tyran-
nidem et subjectionem vorsum ait, ac
omino veluti infirmatum et pur vorsum.
. . . Et hie radicem habemus et causae
dominationis et ooercivi dominii. "
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? CHAP, in. ] POLITICAL WRITERS. 159
nature "Civilis," and needs the help of his fellow men, and
was therefore driven to the life of society. The Commonwealth
is a society in which men have to command and to obey to
the end that they may live in peace and sufficiency, and as the
principles of Natural Law are not sufficient for the government
of the temporal life, human laws were established; but these
must not be contrary to the Natural Law. 1
This is interesting, as illustrating what we have before
suggested, that in spite of the great authority of St Thomas
Aquinas, the Aristotelian conceptions had not made any very
profound impression.
We turn to Gerson's treatment of our immediate subject, the
source and nature of the authority of the King or Prince.
In a work described as ' Sermo ad Eegem Franciae nomine
Universitatis Parisiensis,' which is obviously a short treatise
on the nature of Kingship, Gerson describes the monarchy as
having been originally created by the common consent of men,
and for the good of the whole community. 2 And, he goes on,
it is an error and contrary to natural equity and the true
character of lordship to say that the lord is not bound by any
obligation to his subjects; as the subjects owe their lord help
and service, he owes them his protection and defence. 3 The
1 Id. id. , vol. iv. col. 856: '' Adji- sive temporalis sit sive spiritualis. Et
ciamus insuper et dicamus quod postea- quoniam principia juris aut naturalis
quam homo natura sua civilis est et ordinationis non sumciunt ad tempora-
communicativus, et talem habet indi- lem vitam gubernandam, ordinatae
gentiam cui convenienter succurrere fuore et institutao humaaae quae dam
non potest absque alterius subsidio, ordinationes et veluti voluntariae,
homo inductus fuit et veluti compulsus naturali juri minime obviantee. "
in communi vivere cum aliis, et opus * Id. : 'Sermo ad Rogem Franciae
fuit instituere ao ordinare aliquas nomine universitatis Parisiensis/
convivendi modos. Et virtus justitiae, (Opera, vol. iv. col. 798): "Propterea
quae ad hoc faciendum inclinat, nomi- rex aliquis persona privata non est, sed
natur civilis aut politica. Politia (ut est una potestas publica ordinata pro
dictum est) est hominum societas ad totius communitatis salute. Sicuti ab
bonum ordinata, ad recte praecipien- uno capite desceudit, et dependit
dum et obediendum, ut in pace vivatur totius corporis vita, et ad hoo roges
et tranquillitate et sufficientia, aut ordinati fuerunt, et prinoipes in prin-
quoad vitam banc temporalem, aut cipio per communem hominum consen-
quoad spiritualem. Justitia politica sum, et eo modo perseverare debent. "
eat virtus quae inclinat reddere uni- * Id. id. id. , col. 799: "Haec Veritas
cuique quod suum est secundum ordi- est contra horum errorem qui dicere
nationos et finem politiae ubi ipsa fuerit, ausi sunt dominum in nullo subjectis
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? 160 FIFTEENTH CENTURY. [PAST II.
words seem to be reminiscent of the principle of the mutual
obligations of feudal law.
Gerson's conception of monarchy is clearly that of an autho-
rity derived from the community, and limited by obligations
to the community. He repudiates very emphatically the error
of those who said that all things belonged to the lord and that
he could do whatever he pleased,1 and the contention of those
who misapplied the description of the conduct of the King
by Samuel, and neglected the principles of Kingship set out
in Deuteronomy, and the sound judgment of natural reason
which is never contradicted by the divine law. 2
This brings Gerson to a discussion of tyranny, which he
describes as a poison which tends to destroy all political life;
men ought, according to their position, to resist it. He warns
them indeed against unreasonable and unjustifiable sedition
which may produce results worse than tyranny itself, but he
asserts that the tyrant has lost all right to his authority, that he
is hated by God and by man, and rarely dies a natural death. 3
He therefore argues that it would be well that the royal
authority should be limited and restrained; and he cites the
reply of Theopompus to his wife when she complained that he
was leaving a diminished authority to his children; that it
might be diminished but it would be more permanent. It
would be more permanent, because it would be more reasonable
suis teneri aut obligari, quod est contra
jus divinum et naturalem aequitatem,
et veram dominii fidem; quemadmo-
dum subditi fidem, subsidium et servi-
tmm eorum superiori debent, sic
superior fidem, protectionem et defen-
sionem suis debet subjectis; bonitas
una aliam requirit. "
1 Id. id. id. , col. 799: "Hie mani-
festum est bos err are qui dicunt
dominia omnia ad ipsos spec tare, et
quod agere possunt ad eorum arbitrium
et voluntatem, omnia quae subjectorum
sunt absque ullo titulo ad se trahendo,
quid hoc sibi vult. "
Cf. id. : "Kogulae Moralis. " (Opera,
vol. i. part ii. col. 22): "Omnia sunt
principis, non quidem proprietario jure,
nec pro se, sed pro necessitate reipub-
licae. "
2 Id. , 'Son no ad Regem Franciae'
(vol. iv. col. 800): "Hie apparet ulte-
rius, quod devius ille perperam et
perverse intilligeret textum Bibliae, qui
contra veritatem vortere vellet verba
scripta, 1 Reg. viii. cap. 'Hoc est jus
regis,' quia verus sensus literalis alibi
est et specialitor, Deut. xviii. , omnino
his contrarius; et etiam omne bonum
rationis naturalis judicium, cui nun-
quam contrariatur ius Divinum. "
? Id. id. id. , col.
