"42
France's reduced power was equally apparent to the eastern monarchies.
France's reduced power was equally apparent to the eastern monarchies.
Revolution and War_nodrm
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The French Revolution
ing principles resemble the ideal type set forth in chapter 2. The revolution- aries were confident of their ability to reshape politics, society, and even human nature itself, strongly inclined to consider their opponents inher- ently evil and deserving of extermination, and prone to uphold their own experience as a model for others. As we shall see, these views, which con- tinued to shape perceptions and political debate once the revolution was underway, had a powerful influence on relations between revolutionary France and the rest of Europe.
The Dismantling of the Ancien Regime and the Initial Foreign Response
The immediate cause of the French Revolution was the fiscal crisis trig- gered by French aid to the American colonies during their War of Indepen- dence, which broke the back of the archaic French tax system. 20 The nobility successfully resisted Louis XVI's efforts to impose new taxes in 1787, forcing the king to summon the Estates General for the first time since 1614. Under pressure from liberal nobles and provincial authorities, Louis and his min- isters agreed to double the size of the Third Estate (representing the com-
moners) in January 1789. They resisted demands to grant each deputy a single vote, however, in favor of the traditional practice of each order voting in unison. 21
The first decisive break came when the representatives of the three estates met at Versailles in May. After a month of futile debate over the voting pro- cedure, representatives of the Third Estate designated themselves a new Na- tional Assembly and invited members of the other orders to join. Louis reluctantly accepted this measure on June 23, but he also began assembling troops near the capital in preparation for a coup de main against the defiant deputies. Before he could launch his coup, however, the fear of an aristo- cratic reaction sparked a popular uprising in Paris and began to undermine the loyalty of the royal garrisons. Supporters of the Assembly had already begun to mobilize the Parisian population, and an angry mob stormed the
fortress of the Bastille on July 14. Informed that he could no longer count on his troops' allegiance, Louis agreed to disperse the regiments surrounding Paris and declared his support for the National Assembly on July 17. A new
20 See Doyle, Origins ofthe French Revolution, 43-53; Jean Egret, The French Pre-Revolution, 1787-88, trans. Wesley D. Camp, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and John Fran- cis Bosher, French Finances, 177fr1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
21 The First Estate represented the clergy, the Second Estate the nobility, and the Third Es- tate everyone else. Representatives for each order were chosen through local elections, and the local assemblies drew up petitions of grievances (known as cahiers de do! eances) for con- sideration by the king and Estates General.
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municipal government was formed in Paris, the Marquis de Lafayette be- came commander of the new National Guards, and the first wave of emi- gres departed, including the king's brothers, the comte d'Artois and comte de Provence. 22
The upheaval in Paris was accompanied by similar events in the provinces. The departure of the emigre aristocrats increased concerns about a reactionary conspiracy and helped spark the "Great Fear" that engulfed France from July 20 to August 4? Inspired by reports of armed brigands, food shortages, and aristocratic plots, rural mobs began burning chateaux, destroying manorial records, and seizing noble property. Provincial nota- bles began forming "permanent committees" to restore order, and these bodies began to supplant the municipal institutions of the ancien regime as royal authority waned. 23
Meanwhile, the deputies (now designated the National Constituent As- sembly) were launching a direct assault on the institutions of the ancien regime. The deputies voted to abolish the feudal order "in its entirety" on the night of August 4 and approved the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen on August 27. Over the next twenty-six months, the Assembly abolished noble and clerical privileges and reorganized the insti- tutions of local government and the judiciary. The deputies also voted to confiscate Church property in November 1789, banned religious orders in February 1790, and passed a new Civil Constitution of the Clergy that placed the church under the formal control of the state in July. Clerical op-
position to these measures prompted a further decree in November 1790 that required priests to swear an oath of allegience to the constitution or be removed from office. 24
Predictably, these steps provoked considerable opposition. The king re- fused to sanction the August decrees, and renewed fears of a royalist coup
22 On these events, see William Doyle, The Oxford History ofFrench Revolution (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1988), 107-11; D. M. G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815: Re-ilolution and Counte-revr olution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 47-48, 59-68; George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); and Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution, trans. Elizabeth M. Evanson (vol. 1) and John Hall Stewart and James Friguglietti (vol. 2) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 1964); 1:12o-24. On the dis- integration of the army, see Samuel F. Scott, The Response ofthe Royal Army to the French Revo- lution: The Role and Developmentofthe Line Army, 1787-1793 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 51-59; and Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army ofthe French Revolution:from Citizen-Soldiers to Instru- ment ofPowe-r, trans. Robert R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 22-29.
23 TheclassicanalysisoftheGreatFearisGeorgesLefebvre,TheGreatFearof1789:Rural Panic in Revolutionary France, trans. Joan White (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). On the provincial revolts, see Lynn A. Hunt, "Committees and Communes: Local Politics and National Revolution in 1789,'' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 18, no. 3 (1976); and Sutherland, France, 70'-76.
24 For the texts of these decrees, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, chap. 2; for summaries, see Sutherland, France, 81HJ9; and Michel Vovelle, The Fall of the French Monarchy, 1 787-1792, trans. SusanBurke(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),146-2-6 .
? ? The French Revolution
led an unruly mob to invade Versailles on October 5 and bring the royal family back to Paris, where the king's activities could be monitored more easily. The anticlerical measures angered many priests and parishioners, economic conditions worsened, and the emigre exodus continued. When the king's brothers began to solicit aid for a restoration from the other Euro- pean governments, the rumors of an "aristocratic conspiracy," once entirely a myth, began to acquire a real basis. 25
Over the next ten months, the debate over the constitution saw the emer- gence of several contending factions within the Assembly. These groups were not formal political parties but loose alignments of delegates who shared similar views on salient political issues. The largest faction was that of the moderates, which was eventually centered around a group meeting at the Feuillant Club. Composed primarily of liberal nobles such as the Mar- quis de Lafayette and members of the upper bourgeoisie, the Feuillants fa- vored a constitutional monarchy, the strict protection of property rights, limited suffrage, and a laissez-faire economic policy. The Feuillants' main ri- vals were their former associates in the Societe des Amis de la Constitution, popularly known as the Jacobin Club, from whom they had split in July
1791. The Jacobins were more distrustful of the king and more supportive of popular democracy, although they shared the Feuillants' desire to safeguard private property and were not yet opposed to the institution of the monar- chy. More radical groups included the Societe des? Amis des Oroits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (known as the Cordeliers Club) and the various popular associations that were then emerging among the artisans and poorer classes of Paris. 26
The next phase followed Louis's unsuccessful attempt to flee from Paris in June 1791? 7 The royal family was captured and returned to Paris on June 25, but this new evidence of the king's attitude sparked renewed fears of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy and brought calls by the more radical deputies for the abolition of the monarchy. The moderates still hoped to persuade the king to accept the new constitution, however, and tried to dis- courage foreign intervention by treating Louis leniently. A commission of inquiry accepted the Feuillants' claims that the king had been abducted and declared Louis innocent of treason but suspended his royal functions provi- sionally. The verdict intensified the divisions within the revolutionary
25 See Sutherland, France, 82-85, 124; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1 : 13o-35; and Hampson, Prelude to Terror, 77-81.
26 This account does not do justice to the diverse political groups that emerged after 1789; for a summary, see Jones, Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 170"-91. For back- ground, see Michael Kennedy, TheJacobin Club in the French Revolution: The First Years (Prince- ton: Princeton University Press, 1981), esp. chap. 15; and Patrice Gueniffey and Ran Halevi, "Clubs and Popular Societies," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 458-72.
27 The abortive escape is described in detail in J. M. Thompson, The French Revolution (Ox- ford: Basil Blackwell, 1943}, 198-210.
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movement, and Lafayette and the National Guards were forced to suppress a radical demonstration in the Champ de Mars in August. Louis finally agreed to accept the constitution on September 14, and the Constituent As- sembly disbanded pending the election of a new Legislative Assembly. 28
At first, the main effect of the revolution in the international arena was to isolate France. Both allies and adversaries now discounted French power and influence and tended to focus their attention on other matters. At the same time, there were signs that the revolution might affect other states' in- terests adversely, and this fear grew as the revolution progressed.
The potentially threatening character of the French Revolution to foreign states had become apparent once the National Assembly began drafting a constitution in August 1789. By proclaiming that all men had the right to govern themselves, the universalist language of the Declaration of the Rights of Man constituted an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of the other European states. The decrees abolishing the feudal regime in France also threatened the traditional privileges of several foreign rulers, most no- tably in Alsace and Avignon. 29 The Assembly now claimed these territories on the basis of "popular sovereignty," an innovation that called the legal framework of the European political order into question. If the Assembly could rescind an existing treaty merely by invoking the will of the people, then no prior treaty (including any guaranteeing the present borders) was safe. Moreover, the notion of exclusive sovereignty based on the national will clashed with the heterogeneous and overlapping lines of authority that still held sway in much of Europe, especially in Germany. From the very be- ginning, therefore, the principles of the revolution posed a possible danger to political stability in Europe. 30
These inherent conflicts were magnified by some predictable side-effects of the revolutionary process itself. Not only had the events of 1789 gener- ated an enthusiastic response from intellectuals throughout Europe, but Paris quickly became a magnet for revolutionary sympathizers from other
28 See Sutherland, France, 127-31.
29 Alsace had been ceded t o France b y the Treaty o f Westphalia i n 1648, but the treaty also preserved the feudal rights of several German princes "in perpetuity. " The electors of Trier, Cologne, and Mainz, the bishop of Basel, the duke of Wi. irttemberg, and the margrave of Baden protested the Assembly's action. Leopold II backed their claims in his capacity as Holy Roman Emperor. A rebellion in Avignon in June 1790 ousted the papal authorities, and the population voted to petition the Assembly for absorption by France, which granted the re- questinFebruary 1791. SeeSydneySeymourBiro,TheGermanPolicyofRevolutionaryFrance: A Study in French Diplomacy during the War of the First Coalition, 1 792-1 797, (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, 1957), 1:39-42; and Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 77, and The French Revolulion in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792-1802 (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), 61? 2.
30 SeeDavidArmstrong,RevolutionandWorldOrder:TheRevolutionaryStateinInternational Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 85; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics,
71-'lJ
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? ? The French Revolution
countries. Such men saw events in France as heralding a new age of univer- sal liberty, and they offered their own support for the revolution while seek- ing French assistance for their own ambitions at home. In June 1790, for example, a sympathetic German baron named Jean-Baptiste (Anacharsis) Cloots, self-proclaimed orateur du genre humain, brought an international delegation before the Assembly to praise the revolution as "a trumpet . . . [that] has reached to the four corners of the globe, . . . a choir of 25 million free men [that] has reawakened people entombed in a long slavery. "31 But as Georges Lefebvre notes, "separation from their homeland induced errors of fact and judgment: they easily confused desires with reality and passed on their delusions to their French comrades. " Moreover, their presence in Paris and their activities there came to be seen as threatening by other states. 32
In the same way, the emigres who left France after 1789 sought assistance in restoring the old regime by telling foreign leaders that the revolution was a serious threat to other countries and by portraying the new regime as ille- gitimate, unpopular, and vulnerable. 33 Although they achieved only mixed results, they contributed to the growth of antirevolutionary sentiments in several European capitals. 34 More importantly, their activities fueled the rev- olutionaries' recurring fears of an aristocratic conspiracy, even though for- eign monarchs did not oppose the revolution until the summer of 1791. 35 Thus, just as the migration of foreign revolutionaries exaggerated the dan- ger France seemed to pose to other states, spurring hopes and fears of addi- tional upheavals elsewhere, the emigres simultaneously reinforced foreign fears about the revolution and French perceptions of foreign hostility. 36
Despite these omens, foreign reactions to the revolution were initially rather mild. Some European leaders took steps to contain the spread of rev- olutionary ideas, but they ignored the emigres' calls for action and made lit-
31 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 74? See also Albert Mathiez, La Revolution et les etrangers: cosmopolitisme et difence nationale, (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1918), chaps. 3-4; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:18o; Jacques Godechot, La Grande nation: L'Expansion revo- lutionnaire de Ia France dans le monde de 1 789 ii 1 799, 2d ed. (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1983), 151, 213; and Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:53-55.
32 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:181 and passim; and Robert R. Palmer, The World ofthe French Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 84-86.
33 Thus, the comte d'Artois told Frederick William in January 1790 that the French people were "sighing for foreign help. " Quoted in Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 23-24. Emigre agents also claimed the revolution was the work of an international network (the "Society of Propaganda") whose aim was to foment revolution throughout Europe. As one royalist put it, "If this should not be true, it would at least be worth it to spread the story. " Quoted in Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:51-52.
34 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:188.
35 See Blanning, French Revolution and Germany, 47-58, and French Revolutionary Wars, 85; and Biro, German Policy, 1:36-37.
36 Lefebvre observes that the role the emigres played abroad "bore close resemblance to that of political refugees in France. " French Revolution, 1:188.
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tle or no effort to organize a counterrevolutionary campaign until the revo- . lution was nearly two years old. Emperor Leopold expelled the emigres' emissary in January 1791 and forced d'Artois to depart for Mantua in May. The royal family's own search for foreign support was unsuccessful, despifre the close family connections between Louis and his queen and several rul- ing houses of Europe. Although Marie Antoinette maintained an active cor- respondence and Louis dispatched a personal emissary to negotiate for foreign assistance, their efforts brought only words of encouragement and counsels of patience. 37
One reason for restraint was the favorable reaction that the revolution had produced among many European elites. If men such as Edmund Burke were suspicious, artists and intellectuals such as Kant, Fichte, Blake, and Beethoven all welcomed the apparent triumph of liberty in France. 38 This fa- vorable view was shared by prominent political leaders: Thomas Jefferson described events in France as "the first chapter of the history of European liberty," and the leader of the English Whigs, Charles James Fox, called the fall of the Bastille "the greatest and best event that has happened in the world. " Other Englishmen-including Prime Minister William Pitt-were
reminded of England's own revolution and were flattered that France seemed to be following a similar path. 39 Although elites in Russia, Sweden, and Spain tended to see the revolution as illegitimate and dangerous, liberali monarchs such as Joseph II and Leopold I were more sympathetic. 40
European statesmen also welcomed the revolution because it reduced French power, thereby decreasing the danger that prerevolutionary France had
37 The queen's efforts to enlist foreign support are chronicled in Alfred Ritter von Ameth, ed. , Marie Antoinette, joseph II, und Leopold II: Ihr Briefwechse/ (Leipzig: K. F. Kohler, 1866); and 0. G. de Heidenstam, The Letters ofMarie Antoinette, Fersen, and Barnave (New York: Frank Maurice, n. d. ).
38 On European reactions to the revolution, see Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:179-87; Albert Soboul, The French Revolution, 1 787-1799, trans. Alan Forrest and Colin Jones (New York: Vin? tage, 1975), 216-18; Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:16-27, 53; George Rude, Revolutionary Ew- rope, 1783-1815 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964}, 18o-82; G. P. Gooch, "Germany and the French Revolution," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, ser. 3, no. 10 (1916), esp. 55-56; Vovelle, Fallofthe French Monarchy, 137-41; Alfred Cobban, ed. , The Debate on the French Revolution (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1960); and Philip Anthony Brown, The French Revolution in English History (London: Crosby Lockwood and Son, 1918), 29-50.
39 Pitt told the House of Commons in February 1790 that "whenever the situation of France shall become restored, . . . France will enjoy just that kind of liberty which I venerate; . . . [I cannot] regard with envious eyes, an approximation in neighbouring states to those senti- ments which are the characteristic features of every British subject. " Quotations from Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 98; Brown, French Revolution in English History, 38-39; John Holland Rose, Life of William Pitt (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924}, 1:551; Cobban, Debate on the French Revolution, 68-69.
40 In August 1790, for example, the Spanish foreign minister, Count Floridablanca, de- scribed the French democrats as "a wretched set. . . . If I had my way, I would put a cordon along the frontier, as if for a plague. " Quoted in Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 33-
? ? ? ? TheFrenchRevolution
posed and creating opportunities to profit at French expense. This attitude was nowhere more apparent than in England: to Pitt, France was "an object for compassion," while the duke of Leeds, then foreign secretary, remarked in 1789, "I defy the ablest heads in England to have planned, or its whole Wealth to have purchased, a Situation so fatal to its Rival, as that to which France is now reduced by her own Intestine commotions. " His successor, Lord Grenville, rejoiced that France would not "for many years be in a situation to molest the invaluable peace we now enjoy," and the English ambassador at the Hague, William Eden (later Lord Auckland), judged that France had "ceased
to be an object of alarm" and would be "of little importance with respect to its external politics. " Even Burke, whose worries focused on the spread of sub- versive ideas, referred to the French as "the ablest architects of ruin . . . in the world. "41 Thus, when the emigres offered them colonial concessions in ex- change for Briftish support, England's leaders chose the more immediate ben- efits of neutrality. As James Burges, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, wrote Auckland in December 1790: "We have felt too strongly the immense ad- vantages to be derived by this country from such a state of anarchy and weak- ness as France is at present plunged in to be so mad as to interfere in any measure that may . . . tend to [give] France . . . the power to injure us.
"42
France's reduced power was equally apparent to the eastern monarchies.
Frederick William saw the revolution as a blow to the Franco-Austrian al- liance and began contemplating the acquisition of French territory once the Convention of Reichenbach ended his plans for war against Austria. 43 Simi- larly, Catherine II's hostility toward the revolution did not blind her to its strategic benefits: the revolutionary crisis had left France unable to come to the aid of Poland, Sweden, or Turkey, and Catherine's subsequent denunci- ations of the new regime were partly intended to draw Prussian and Aus- trian attention westwards so as to free Russia's hand in the east. 44 Some
41 See Rose, Life ofPitt, 1:542-43; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 79-Bo, 132; Rude, Rev- olutionary Europe, 181; and Harvey Mitchell, The Underground Waragainst Revolutionary France: The Missions ofWilliam Wickham, 1794-1Boo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 14. Such views were not confined to the English; one French agent reported in May 1790 that "England has nothing more to fear from France and can without qualms and without fear assume the su- premacy of the [New and Old] worlds. " Quoted in Albert Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution
Jranfaise (Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit, 1883-1912), 2:91.
42 QuotedinClapham,CausesoftheWarof1792,16. AucklandsharedBurges'sview,writing
Grenville, "I heartily detest . . . the whole system of the Democrates [sic] . . . but I am not sure that the continued course of their struggles . . . would not be beneficial to our political interests, and the best security to the permanence of our prosperity. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 19.
43 The court in Berlin reportedly believed that "the great popular revolution in France will prevent that country effectually from interfering in any shape in favour of the Imperial courts. " Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
44 In November 1791, Catherine reportedly told her secretary that she was "racking her brains to push the Courts of Vienna and Berlin into the French enterprise, so that she might have her own elbows free. " Quoted in Lord, Second Partition of Poland, 274; and see also Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
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Austrian officials were pleased to watch French power decline, and Leopold began exploring a renewed alliance with England. Thus, the initially mild reaction of the other great powers was partly due to the strategic benefits that each hoped to gain from the disarray in France.
The belief that the revolution posed little danger at first was reinforced by the caution and circumspection that characterized French diplomacy from 1789 to 1791. When the Spanish seizure of English fishing vess? ls in the Nootka Sound brought the two nations to the brink of war in 1790, for ex- ample, the Assembly's de facto refusal to honor the Family Compact left Spain isolated and forced Madrid to beat a hasty retreat. 45 Louis did order the arming of fourteen ships of the line as a precautionary measure in May, but this move led the Assembly to decree that any declaration of war was subject to their approval. In a further burst of idealism, the deputies also voted to renounce "the undertaking of any war with a view of making con-
quests" and declared that France would not use force "against the liberty of any people. "46 By limiting royal authority over the conduct of foreign policy, these measures appeared to reduce French influence even more. The As- sembly was equally unresponsive when Austria suppressed a revolt in the Netherlands later in the year, reinforcing the prevailing image of French im- potence.
In addition, despite having renounced feudalism in August 1789, the As- sembly treated the feudal rights of foreign powers cautiously. It offered to indemnify the Rhenish princes whose lands had been appropriated in Al- sace and refrained from annexing Avignon until the pope had openly de- clared his own opposition to the revolution. Nor was the threat to the existing order that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the renuncia- tion of feudalism embodied as novel or as far-reaching as it first appeared: the French monarchy had violated the rights of foreign princes on numer- ous occasions before the revolution, and other rulers had acted similarly in their own realms. The situation in Avignon was equally muddled, as the French claim to the territory rested on both the notion of popular sover- eignty and a number of traditional legal precedents. Given that annexation was common under the old regime, the Assembly's assertion of French sov- ereignty over a small enclave lying entirely within French borders hardly
45 The tepid French response may have been partly due to English bribes to the comte de Mirabeau, the dominant figure in the Assembly during this period. See John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 1: The Years ofAcclaim (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), 553? 8; Rose, Life of Pitt, 1:577-81; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 198-200.
46 The decree was incorporated in the Constitution of 1791, and the comte de Mirabeau de- clared that "the moment is not far off when liberty will acquit mankind of the crime of war. " Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenburg, "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," in The Origins and Prevention ofMajor Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2o6; and see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 260.
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? ? The French Revolu tion
posed a radical threat to the existing order. Until 1791, in short, the revolu- tion in France simply did not appear that dangerous. 47
Foreign reactions were further muted by the unpopularity of the emigres and the obviously self-serving nature of their testimony. Although the emi- gres were greeted warmly by some rulers (and were subsidized by Cather- ine the Great), their extravagance and vanity won them few friends in foreign courts and made them something of a nuisance in their adopted places of residence. 48 Moreover, the French royal family usually opposed their efforts, fearing that a restoration conducted under the auspices of the emigres would weaken royal authority even more than the Assembly had. 49 Louis repeatedly rejected the emigres' suggestions that he flee, preferring to make his own arrangements, and Louis explicitly warned Leopold not to support the emigres (which the Austrian ruler was loath to do in any case). Contacts with emigre agents did reinforce Prussian revisionism (though Frederick William hardly needed encouragement), but England and Austria remained largely immune from their blandishments. 5? During the Nootka Sound dispute, for example, the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Gower, wrote that "the aristocratical party has little to hope from peace and shews evident signs of wishing to profit by the confusion which a war would cer- tainly occasion. " During the summer, the discovery that counterrevolution- ary groups were trying to provoke a war between England and France by blaming the revolution on English interference led Pitt to send two agents to
France to reassure the Assembly of England's pacific intentions and con- vince it not to support Spain. 51 Thus, the royalists' efforts to sound the alarm generally feB flat at this stage.
Last but by no means least, the revolution in France received modest at- tention because the great powers were preoccupied by more pressing prob- lems elsewhere. Russia was at war with Turkey and Sweden and faced a direct challenge from the Poles, while Prussia was backing the Polish rebels
47 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:196--97; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 76-78; Clapham, Causes ofthe Warof1792, 19-21; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 7J.
48 On the activities of the emigres and foreign responses to them, see Blanning, French Rev- olution in Germany, 52-53, 6o-61; Biro, German Policy, 1:42-45; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:187-88; and Massimo Boffa, "Emigres," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 326-28.
49 Rivalry between the crown and the nobility predated the revolution. The comtes d'Ar- tois and Provence sought to limit royal authority and preserve noble and provincial privi- leges. See Albert Goodwin, "Calonne, the Assembly of French Notables of 1787 and the Origins of the Revolte Nobiliaire," English Historical Review 61, nos. 24o-41 (1946).
50 See Lord, Second Partition ofPoland, 159; and also J. Holland Rose, "The Comte d'Artois and Pitt in December 1789,'' English Historical Review 30, no. 118 (1915).
51 Pitt's instructions convey his desire to remain aloof: "In the present circumstances the ut- most care is necessary to use no language which can lead to an expectation of our taking mea- sures to forward the internal views of any political party. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 17-18.
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and concocting its own schemes for aggrandizement. Austria's army was bogged down against the Turks, unrest at home was spreading, the Nether- lands were in open revolt, and Prussia's restless revisionism remained a se- rious concern. England and Spain were at loggerheads for most of 1790, and Pitt was more concerned about the balance of power in the East than the col- lapse of England's rival across the Channel. Spain, Sweden, and the Rhen- ish princes were genuinely alarmed by the revolution but were too weak to act alone. Although events in France were of great interest, other problems still took precedence.
This analysis suggests that the wars between France and the rest of Eu- rope did not arise from irreconcilable ideological antipathies. Foreign pow- ers took note of the revolution, some with misgivings, but they did not regard it as an immediate threat on either military or ideological grounds. 52
By contrast, the revolutionary forces in France were already worried about a counterrevolutionary conspiracy between the emigres, the papacy, and various foreign monarchs. Their suspicions were partly justified, as both Louis and the emigres had been seeking foreign assistance since the end of 1790. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, and relations between the emigres and the king remained strained and suspicious. In short, genuine fears of an "aristocratic plot" helped drive the revolution in increasingly radical directions, but the alleged conspiracy was a chimera at this point. The stage was set for a spiral into war, partly intended and partly inadvertent.
The Causes ofthe War of1792
Relations between France and the rest of Europe deteriorated dramati- cally in 1791. An underlying cause was the end of the war with Turkey, which allowed Austria and Russia to shift their attention back to European affairs. Another contributing factor was the reform movement in Poland, which helped bring Austria and Prussia together and increased Catherine's desire to regain control in Warsaw. The three main causes of war in 1792, however, were the dynastic ambitions of the other great powers (especially Prussia}, the struggle for power within France, and a series of regrettable miscalculations on both sides. The ideology of the revolution intensified! mutual perceptions of threat and reinforced the belief that the enemy could! be defeated quickly and painlessly. As we shall see, these beliefs turned out to be either erroneous or self-defeating and led to nearly a quarter century of war.
First we turn to Prussia's territorial ambitions? Despite the favorable op- portunities created by the revolution in France, the revolt in Poland, and the
? ? 52 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 12o-23 and passim.
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outbreak of war in the East, Prussia had failed to gain a single inch of terri- tory. When his plans to attack Austria were thwarted, Frederick William re- versed course and sought an alliance with Leopold in order to pursue territorial gains at Russian, Polish, or French expense. In September 1 790, a Prussian envoy proposed that Austria and Prussia act together to restore Louis to the throne, in exchange for territorial compensations in Flanders, Alsace, and Germany. Leopold rejected Prussia's entreaties at this time, and Frederick William turned to other equally unsuccessful schemes. 53 Un- daunted by past failures, he repeated his offer for an alliance with Austria in June 1791, and Leopold was now more receptive. The Austrian monarch had become concerned about the fate of the royal family in France and wanted to convince the Assembly to halt its campaign against them. Leopold was also aware of the royal family's plans to escape, and he in- tended to organize an armed demonstration on the French border in order
to convince the Assembly to adopt a more moderate policy. This plan crum- bled when the royal escape miscarried, but Leopold still believed that for- eign threats would have a moderating effect on the Assembly. 54
Leopold's change of heart led to the signing of a formal convention be- tween Austria and Prussia in July 1791. The convention committed the two states to aid each other in the event of internal rebellion, to support a free constitution in Poland, and to promote a European concert to regulate in- ternal developments in France. But despite its outward appearance, the con- vention was not intended to be the first step toward a counterrevolutionary invasion. Instead, Leopold regarded it as a means of limiting Russian influ- ence in Poland and moderating great power rivalries, and his objectives in France were still quite limited. The emperor aimed neither to start a war nor to undermine the National Assembly; he merely sought to strengthen the moderates and protect the royal family. 55 Frederick William wanted land, not counterrevolution, and he was willing to intervene in France in order to obtain territorial compensations rather than to defend monarchical institu-
53 Frederick Willliam backed an Anglo-Dutch-Prussian effort to force Russia to both restore the status quo ante with the Ottoman Empire and give up its predominant position in Poland, but the ploy failed when Catherine stood firm and the English Parliament refused to support the policy. On this incident {known as the Ochakov affair), see John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 2: The Reluctant Transition {Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1g83), chap. 1.
54 Leopold and his sister corresponded regularly during this period. The queen's pleas heightened his concern over events in France but did not convince him to support a counter- revolutionary invasion. Von Amath, Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, and Leopold II, 143-47, 156-69, I81-82, 188-g3, 20D-203, 24Q-41.
5 5 Leopold supported the Constitution o f 1791, and the Austrian chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, told the Prussian ambassador, "If Louis XVI can come to an agreement with the National As- sembly about the constitution, there must be no war. " When Louis accepted the constitution in September, Leopold declared that the need for a European concert had evaporated. See Heinrich von Sybel, History ofthe French Revolution, trans. Walter C. Perry {London: J. Murray, 1867), 1:362, 368; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, go.
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tions. Although both monarchs used counterrevolutionary rhetoric to justify their actions, neither saw their rapprochement as the beginning of a coun- terrevolutionary crusade. 56
Given these reservations, Leopold's efforts to pressure the Assembly were quite circumspect. He had already invited the other European powers to form a union to defend the French monarchy in July, but despite some stem language, the so-called Padua Circular was a symbolic gesture that did not commit him in any way. Meeting in Pillnitz at the end of the month (with the emigre comte d'Artois in attendance as well), Leopold and Frederick William issued a declaration calling for a European concert against the rev- olution. Like the Padua Circular, the Declaration of Pillnitz was purely sym- bolic, and joint action remained conditional on unanimous participation by the other powers. England was firmly committed to neutrality, however, which rendered the threat to intervene meaningless. This subtlety was lost on the deputies in the Assembly, in part because the Declaration implied that the emigres and the foreign monarchs were in close collaboration. 57
Leopold's attempt to encourage moderation seemed to work perfectly afr first. The threat of foreign intervention strengthened the Feuillants' position in the Assembly and facilitated their efforts to preserve the king's position, while Louis' decision to accept the new constitution seemed to eliminate the need for intervention from abroad. With the Feuillants in control of the As- sembly and the key ministries, the risk of war appeared to be fading by the fall of 1791. 58 Unfortunately, domestic politics in France now erupted and soon drove Europe over the brink.
The second major cause of war was the struggle for power in France and the Girondin campaign for war. The Feuillants' decision to preserve the
56 Leopold did tell the Prussian ambassador, "the Jacobins are stirring up revolts through- out the whole of Italy. It is necessary to root out the evil at once. " He offered no specific pro- posal for doing so, however, and warned, "We must proceed with extreme caution, and allow matters to come to such a pass that the nation itself will feel the necessity of a change in its condition. " Most importantly, he emphasized that intervention would have to be conducted by a general concert of all the European powers, which he knew to be a remote possibility. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:351-52.
57 The declaration stated that the two monarchs "trust that the [European] powers . . . will (employ] the most effective means for enabling the King of France to consolidate . . . the foun- dations of a monarchical government. . . . In which case [alors et dans ce cas] their said Majesties . . . are resolved to act promptly . . . with the forces necessary. " And as Leopold as- sured his chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, "Alors et dans ce cas is for me the Law and the Prophets- if England fails us, the case I have put is nonexistent. " In referring to the monarchs having received "requests and representations of M. le Comte d'Artois," the declaration also con- tributed to French fears of an aristocratic conspiracy. See Stewart, Documentary Survey, 221-26; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 77-79; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 88; Ross, European Diplomatic History, 36-39; Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France," 693-96; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 89-90.
58 The Feuillants obtained 264 seats in the first elections, the Jacobins received 136, and over 350 were uncommitted. See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:213; and Sutherland, France, 132.
? ? The French Revolu tion
monarchy after the flight to Varennes and their suppression of popular forces at the Champs de Mars had further polarized internal politics in France, and the Austro-Prussian rapprochement, the exodus of emigres, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pillnitz all combined to reinforce the fear that an aristocratic conspiracy was bent on crushing the revolution.
To counter these dangers and strengthen their own influence in the As- sembly, a faction of the Jacobin movement known as the Girondins began to advocate war in the fall of 1791. Led by a former journalist, Jean-Pierre Bris- sot de Warville, the Girondins believed that war would either expose the king's disloyalty or force him to break ranks with the emigres once and for all. In eithe1r case, the danger of counterrevolution would be reduced and the Girondins' own positions enhanced. The Girondins also feared the con- sequences of another popular uprising and thought a successful war would consolidate the nation and bring the revolutionary process to an end. 59
The Girondin recipe for war contained several volatile ingredients. Hs centerpiece was the familiar assertion that France faced a vast counterrevo- lutionary conspiracy linking the royal family, the emigres, the dissident clergy, and several foreign powers. 6? France's opponents were portrayed as irrevocably hostile, implying that war was inevitable and France must seize the initiative. As Brissot told the Assembly in October, "It is not merely nec- essary to think of defense, the [counterrevolutionary] attack must be antici- pated; you yourselves must attack. "61 The loyalty of the king was repeatedly questioned, and defenders of the monarchy now risked being labeled ene- mies of the revolution. The Girondins persuaded the Assembly to decree the death penalty for counterrevolutionaries and to issue an ultimatum de-
manding that several neighboring rulers expel the emigres from their terri- tories. These measures were intended to reduce the direct threat of counterrevolution and force the king to reveal his true loyalties. 62 Louis ve-
59 The Girondins (so named because many came from the department of Gironde) were known to contemporaries as "Brissotins," in reference to Brissot de Warville. See M. J. Syden- ham, The Girondins (London: Athlone Press, 1961 ); Alison Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the French Convention of 1792 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1972); and "Girondins" in Jones, Longman Companion, 176-18o.
60 Brissot's first speech on foreign affairs raised the specter of a vast conspiracy against the revolution, and he accused the king of "secret schemes" in December. See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; Clapham, Origins ofthe Warof1792, 135; Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 592-93; and F. L. Kidner, "The Girondists and the 'Propaganda War' of 1792: A Reevaluation of French Revolutionary For- eign Policy from 1791 to 1793," (Ph. D diss. , Princeton University, 1971), 7<>-74?
61 Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 27, 115, 135. On the central place of "plots" in the mindset of the revolution, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 55-'JO.
62 As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791, "The accepted leader of the nation will be forced to rule in accordance with the Constitution. If he does his duty, we will support him wholeheartedly. If he betrays us-the people will be ready.
ing principles resemble the ideal type set forth in chapter 2. The revolution- aries were confident of their ability to reshape politics, society, and even human nature itself, strongly inclined to consider their opponents inher- ently evil and deserving of extermination, and prone to uphold their own experience as a model for others. As we shall see, these views, which con- tinued to shape perceptions and political debate once the revolution was underway, had a powerful influence on relations between revolutionary France and the rest of Europe.
The Dismantling of the Ancien Regime and the Initial Foreign Response
The immediate cause of the French Revolution was the fiscal crisis trig- gered by French aid to the American colonies during their War of Indepen- dence, which broke the back of the archaic French tax system. 20 The nobility successfully resisted Louis XVI's efforts to impose new taxes in 1787, forcing the king to summon the Estates General for the first time since 1614. Under pressure from liberal nobles and provincial authorities, Louis and his min- isters agreed to double the size of the Third Estate (representing the com-
moners) in January 1789. They resisted demands to grant each deputy a single vote, however, in favor of the traditional practice of each order voting in unison. 21
The first decisive break came when the representatives of the three estates met at Versailles in May. After a month of futile debate over the voting pro- cedure, representatives of the Third Estate designated themselves a new Na- tional Assembly and invited members of the other orders to join. Louis reluctantly accepted this measure on June 23, but he also began assembling troops near the capital in preparation for a coup de main against the defiant deputies. Before he could launch his coup, however, the fear of an aristo- cratic reaction sparked a popular uprising in Paris and began to undermine the loyalty of the royal garrisons. Supporters of the Assembly had already begun to mobilize the Parisian population, and an angry mob stormed the
fortress of the Bastille on July 14. Informed that he could no longer count on his troops' allegiance, Louis agreed to disperse the regiments surrounding Paris and declared his support for the National Assembly on July 17. A new
20 See Doyle, Origins ofthe French Revolution, 43-53; Jean Egret, The French Pre-Revolution, 1787-88, trans. Wesley D. Camp, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and John Fran- cis Bosher, French Finances, 177fr1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
21 The First Estate represented the clergy, the Second Estate the nobility, and the Third Es- tate everyone else. Representatives for each order were chosen through local elections, and the local assemblies drew up petitions of grievances (known as cahiers de do! eances) for con- sideration by the king and Estates General.
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municipal government was formed in Paris, the Marquis de Lafayette be- came commander of the new National Guards, and the first wave of emi- gres departed, including the king's brothers, the comte d'Artois and comte de Provence. 22
The upheaval in Paris was accompanied by similar events in the provinces. The departure of the emigre aristocrats increased concerns about a reactionary conspiracy and helped spark the "Great Fear" that engulfed France from July 20 to August 4? Inspired by reports of armed brigands, food shortages, and aristocratic plots, rural mobs began burning chateaux, destroying manorial records, and seizing noble property. Provincial nota- bles began forming "permanent committees" to restore order, and these bodies began to supplant the municipal institutions of the ancien regime as royal authority waned. 23
Meanwhile, the deputies (now designated the National Constituent As- sembly) were launching a direct assault on the institutions of the ancien regime. The deputies voted to abolish the feudal order "in its entirety" on the night of August 4 and approved the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen on August 27. Over the next twenty-six months, the Assembly abolished noble and clerical privileges and reorganized the insti- tutions of local government and the judiciary. The deputies also voted to confiscate Church property in November 1789, banned religious orders in February 1790, and passed a new Civil Constitution of the Clergy that placed the church under the formal control of the state in July. Clerical op-
position to these measures prompted a further decree in November 1790 that required priests to swear an oath of allegience to the constitution or be removed from office. 24
Predictably, these steps provoked considerable opposition. The king re- fused to sanction the August decrees, and renewed fears of a royalist coup
22 On these events, see William Doyle, The Oxford History ofFrench Revolution (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1988), 107-11; D. M. G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815: Re-ilolution and Counte-revr olution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 47-48, 59-68; George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); and Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution, trans. Elizabeth M. Evanson (vol. 1) and John Hall Stewart and James Friguglietti (vol. 2) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 1964); 1:12o-24. On the dis- integration of the army, see Samuel F. Scott, The Response ofthe Royal Army to the French Revo- lution: The Role and Developmentofthe Line Army, 1787-1793 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 51-59; and Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army ofthe French Revolution:from Citizen-Soldiers to Instru- ment ofPowe-r, trans. Robert R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 22-29.
23 TheclassicanalysisoftheGreatFearisGeorgesLefebvre,TheGreatFearof1789:Rural Panic in Revolutionary France, trans. Joan White (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). On the provincial revolts, see Lynn A. Hunt, "Committees and Communes: Local Politics and National Revolution in 1789,'' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 18, no. 3 (1976); and Sutherland, France, 70'-76.
24 For the texts of these decrees, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, chap. 2; for summaries, see Sutherland, France, 81HJ9; and Michel Vovelle, The Fall of the French Monarchy, 1 787-1792, trans. SusanBurke(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),146-2-6 .
? ? The French Revolution
led an unruly mob to invade Versailles on October 5 and bring the royal family back to Paris, where the king's activities could be monitored more easily. The anticlerical measures angered many priests and parishioners, economic conditions worsened, and the emigre exodus continued. When the king's brothers began to solicit aid for a restoration from the other Euro- pean governments, the rumors of an "aristocratic conspiracy," once entirely a myth, began to acquire a real basis. 25
Over the next ten months, the debate over the constitution saw the emer- gence of several contending factions within the Assembly. These groups were not formal political parties but loose alignments of delegates who shared similar views on salient political issues. The largest faction was that of the moderates, which was eventually centered around a group meeting at the Feuillant Club. Composed primarily of liberal nobles such as the Mar- quis de Lafayette and members of the upper bourgeoisie, the Feuillants fa- vored a constitutional monarchy, the strict protection of property rights, limited suffrage, and a laissez-faire economic policy. The Feuillants' main ri- vals were their former associates in the Societe des Amis de la Constitution, popularly known as the Jacobin Club, from whom they had split in July
1791. The Jacobins were more distrustful of the king and more supportive of popular democracy, although they shared the Feuillants' desire to safeguard private property and were not yet opposed to the institution of the monar- chy. More radical groups included the Societe des? Amis des Oroits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (known as the Cordeliers Club) and the various popular associations that were then emerging among the artisans and poorer classes of Paris. 26
The next phase followed Louis's unsuccessful attempt to flee from Paris in June 1791? 7 The royal family was captured and returned to Paris on June 25, but this new evidence of the king's attitude sparked renewed fears of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy and brought calls by the more radical deputies for the abolition of the monarchy. The moderates still hoped to persuade the king to accept the new constitution, however, and tried to dis- courage foreign intervention by treating Louis leniently. A commission of inquiry accepted the Feuillants' claims that the king had been abducted and declared Louis innocent of treason but suspended his royal functions provi- sionally. The verdict intensified the divisions within the revolutionary
25 See Sutherland, France, 82-85, 124; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1 : 13o-35; and Hampson, Prelude to Terror, 77-81.
26 This account does not do justice to the diverse political groups that emerged after 1789; for a summary, see Jones, Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 170"-91. For back- ground, see Michael Kennedy, TheJacobin Club in the French Revolution: The First Years (Prince- ton: Princeton University Press, 1981), esp. chap. 15; and Patrice Gueniffey and Ran Halevi, "Clubs and Popular Societies," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 458-72.
27 The abortive escape is described in detail in J. M. Thompson, The French Revolution (Ox- ford: Basil Blackwell, 1943}, 198-210.
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movement, and Lafayette and the National Guards were forced to suppress a radical demonstration in the Champ de Mars in August. Louis finally agreed to accept the constitution on September 14, and the Constituent As- sembly disbanded pending the election of a new Legislative Assembly. 28
At first, the main effect of the revolution in the international arena was to isolate France. Both allies and adversaries now discounted French power and influence and tended to focus their attention on other matters. At the same time, there were signs that the revolution might affect other states' in- terests adversely, and this fear grew as the revolution progressed.
The potentially threatening character of the French Revolution to foreign states had become apparent once the National Assembly began drafting a constitution in August 1789. By proclaiming that all men had the right to govern themselves, the universalist language of the Declaration of the Rights of Man constituted an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of the other European states. The decrees abolishing the feudal regime in France also threatened the traditional privileges of several foreign rulers, most no- tably in Alsace and Avignon. 29 The Assembly now claimed these territories on the basis of "popular sovereignty," an innovation that called the legal framework of the European political order into question. If the Assembly could rescind an existing treaty merely by invoking the will of the people, then no prior treaty (including any guaranteeing the present borders) was safe. Moreover, the notion of exclusive sovereignty based on the national will clashed with the heterogeneous and overlapping lines of authority that still held sway in much of Europe, especially in Germany. From the very be- ginning, therefore, the principles of the revolution posed a possible danger to political stability in Europe. 30
These inherent conflicts were magnified by some predictable side-effects of the revolutionary process itself. Not only had the events of 1789 gener- ated an enthusiastic response from intellectuals throughout Europe, but Paris quickly became a magnet for revolutionary sympathizers from other
28 See Sutherland, France, 127-31.
29 Alsace had been ceded t o France b y the Treaty o f Westphalia i n 1648, but the treaty also preserved the feudal rights of several German princes "in perpetuity. " The electors of Trier, Cologne, and Mainz, the bishop of Basel, the duke of Wi. irttemberg, and the margrave of Baden protested the Assembly's action. Leopold II backed their claims in his capacity as Holy Roman Emperor. A rebellion in Avignon in June 1790 ousted the papal authorities, and the population voted to petition the Assembly for absorption by France, which granted the re- questinFebruary 1791. SeeSydneySeymourBiro,TheGermanPolicyofRevolutionaryFrance: A Study in French Diplomacy during the War of the First Coalition, 1 792-1 797, (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, 1957), 1:39-42; and Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 77, and The French Revolulion in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792-1802 (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), 61? 2.
30 SeeDavidArmstrong,RevolutionandWorldOrder:TheRevolutionaryStateinInternational Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 85; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics,
71-'lJ
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countries. Such men saw events in France as heralding a new age of univer- sal liberty, and they offered their own support for the revolution while seek- ing French assistance for their own ambitions at home. In June 1790, for example, a sympathetic German baron named Jean-Baptiste (Anacharsis) Cloots, self-proclaimed orateur du genre humain, brought an international delegation before the Assembly to praise the revolution as "a trumpet . . . [that] has reached to the four corners of the globe, . . . a choir of 25 million free men [that] has reawakened people entombed in a long slavery. "31 But as Georges Lefebvre notes, "separation from their homeland induced errors of fact and judgment: they easily confused desires with reality and passed on their delusions to their French comrades. " Moreover, their presence in Paris and their activities there came to be seen as threatening by other states. 32
In the same way, the emigres who left France after 1789 sought assistance in restoring the old regime by telling foreign leaders that the revolution was a serious threat to other countries and by portraying the new regime as ille- gitimate, unpopular, and vulnerable. 33 Although they achieved only mixed results, they contributed to the growth of antirevolutionary sentiments in several European capitals. 34 More importantly, their activities fueled the rev- olutionaries' recurring fears of an aristocratic conspiracy, even though for- eign monarchs did not oppose the revolution until the summer of 1791. 35 Thus, just as the migration of foreign revolutionaries exaggerated the dan- ger France seemed to pose to other states, spurring hopes and fears of addi- tional upheavals elsewhere, the emigres simultaneously reinforced foreign fears about the revolution and French perceptions of foreign hostility. 36
Despite these omens, foreign reactions to the revolution were initially rather mild. Some European leaders took steps to contain the spread of rev- olutionary ideas, but they ignored the emigres' calls for action and made lit-
31 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 74? See also Albert Mathiez, La Revolution et les etrangers: cosmopolitisme et difence nationale, (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1918), chaps. 3-4; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:18o; Jacques Godechot, La Grande nation: L'Expansion revo- lutionnaire de Ia France dans le monde de 1 789 ii 1 799, 2d ed. (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1983), 151, 213; and Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:53-55.
32 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:181 and passim; and Robert R. Palmer, The World ofthe French Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 84-86.
33 Thus, the comte d'Artois told Frederick William in January 1790 that the French people were "sighing for foreign help. " Quoted in Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 23-24. Emigre agents also claimed the revolution was the work of an international network (the "Society of Propaganda") whose aim was to foment revolution throughout Europe. As one royalist put it, "If this should not be true, it would at least be worth it to spread the story. " Quoted in Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:51-52.
34 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:188.
35 See Blanning, French Revolution and Germany, 47-58, and French Revolutionary Wars, 85; and Biro, German Policy, 1:36-37.
36 Lefebvre observes that the role the emigres played abroad "bore close resemblance to that of political refugees in France. " French Revolution, 1:188.
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tle or no effort to organize a counterrevolutionary campaign until the revo- . lution was nearly two years old. Emperor Leopold expelled the emigres' emissary in January 1791 and forced d'Artois to depart for Mantua in May. The royal family's own search for foreign support was unsuccessful, despifre the close family connections between Louis and his queen and several rul- ing houses of Europe. Although Marie Antoinette maintained an active cor- respondence and Louis dispatched a personal emissary to negotiate for foreign assistance, their efforts brought only words of encouragement and counsels of patience. 37
One reason for restraint was the favorable reaction that the revolution had produced among many European elites. If men such as Edmund Burke were suspicious, artists and intellectuals such as Kant, Fichte, Blake, and Beethoven all welcomed the apparent triumph of liberty in France. 38 This fa- vorable view was shared by prominent political leaders: Thomas Jefferson described events in France as "the first chapter of the history of European liberty," and the leader of the English Whigs, Charles James Fox, called the fall of the Bastille "the greatest and best event that has happened in the world. " Other Englishmen-including Prime Minister William Pitt-were
reminded of England's own revolution and were flattered that France seemed to be following a similar path. 39 Although elites in Russia, Sweden, and Spain tended to see the revolution as illegitimate and dangerous, liberali monarchs such as Joseph II and Leopold I were more sympathetic. 40
European statesmen also welcomed the revolution because it reduced French power, thereby decreasing the danger that prerevolutionary France had
37 The queen's efforts to enlist foreign support are chronicled in Alfred Ritter von Ameth, ed. , Marie Antoinette, joseph II, und Leopold II: Ihr Briefwechse/ (Leipzig: K. F. Kohler, 1866); and 0. G. de Heidenstam, The Letters ofMarie Antoinette, Fersen, and Barnave (New York: Frank Maurice, n. d. ).
38 On European reactions to the revolution, see Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:179-87; Albert Soboul, The French Revolution, 1 787-1799, trans. Alan Forrest and Colin Jones (New York: Vin? tage, 1975), 216-18; Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:16-27, 53; George Rude, Revolutionary Ew- rope, 1783-1815 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964}, 18o-82; G. P. Gooch, "Germany and the French Revolution," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, ser. 3, no. 10 (1916), esp. 55-56; Vovelle, Fallofthe French Monarchy, 137-41; Alfred Cobban, ed. , The Debate on the French Revolution (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1960); and Philip Anthony Brown, The French Revolution in English History (London: Crosby Lockwood and Son, 1918), 29-50.
39 Pitt told the House of Commons in February 1790 that "whenever the situation of France shall become restored, . . . France will enjoy just that kind of liberty which I venerate; . . . [I cannot] regard with envious eyes, an approximation in neighbouring states to those senti- ments which are the characteristic features of every British subject. " Quotations from Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 98; Brown, French Revolution in English History, 38-39; John Holland Rose, Life of William Pitt (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924}, 1:551; Cobban, Debate on the French Revolution, 68-69.
40 In August 1790, for example, the Spanish foreign minister, Count Floridablanca, de- scribed the French democrats as "a wretched set. . . . If I had my way, I would put a cordon along the frontier, as if for a plague. " Quoted in Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 33-
? ? ? ? TheFrenchRevolution
posed and creating opportunities to profit at French expense. This attitude was nowhere more apparent than in England: to Pitt, France was "an object for compassion," while the duke of Leeds, then foreign secretary, remarked in 1789, "I defy the ablest heads in England to have planned, or its whole Wealth to have purchased, a Situation so fatal to its Rival, as that to which France is now reduced by her own Intestine commotions. " His successor, Lord Grenville, rejoiced that France would not "for many years be in a situation to molest the invaluable peace we now enjoy," and the English ambassador at the Hague, William Eden (later Lord Auckland), judged that France had "ceased
to be an object of alarm" and would be "of little importance with respect to its external politics. " Even Burke, whose worries focused on the spread of sub- versive ideas, referred to the French as "the ablest architects of ruin . . . in the world. "41 Thus, when the emigres offered them colonial concessions in ex- change for Briftish support, England's leaders chose the more immediate ben- efits of neutrality. As James Burges, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, wrote Auckland in December 1790: "We have felt too strongly the immense ad- vantages to be derived by this country from such a state of anarchy and weak- ness as France is at present plunged in to be so mad as to interfere in any measure that may . . . tend to [give] France . . . the power to injure us.
"42
France's reduced power was equally apparent to the eastern monarchies.
Frederick William saw the revolution as a blow to the Franco-Austrian al- liance and began contemplating the acquisition of French territory once the Convention of Reichenbach ended his plans for war against Austria. 43 Simi- larly, Catherine II's hostility toward the revolution did not blind her to its strategic benefits: the revolutionary crisis had left France unable to come to the aid of Poland, Sweden, or Turkey, and Catherine's subsequent denunci- ations of the new regime were partly intended to draw Prussian and Aus- trian attention westwards so as to free Russia's hand in the east. 44 Some
41 See Rose, Life ofPitt, 1:542-43; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 79-Bo, 132; Rude, Rev- olutionary Europe, 181; and Harvey Mitchell, The Underground Waragainst Revolutionary France: The Missions ofWilliam Wickham, 1794-1Boo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 14. Such views were not confined to the English; one French agent reported in May 1790 that "England has nothing more to fear from France and can without qualms and without fear assume the su- premacy of the [New and Old] worlds. " Quoted in Albert Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution
Jranfaise (Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit, 1883-1912), 2:91.
42 QuotedinClapham,CausesoftheWarof1792,16. AucklandsharedBurges'sview,writing
Grenville, "I heartily detest . . . the whole system of the Democrates [sic] . . . but I am not sure that the continued course of their struggles . . . would not be beneficial to our political interests, and the best security to the permanence of our prosperity. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 19.
43 The court in Berlin reportedly believed that "the great popular revolution in France will prevent that country effectually from interfering in any shape in favour of the Imperial courts. " Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
44 In November 1791, Catherine reportedly told her secretary that she was "racking her brains to push the Courts of Vienna and Berlin into the French enterprise, so that she might have her own elbows free. " Quoted in Lord, Second Partition of Poland, 274; and see also Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
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Austrian officials were pleased to watch French power decline, and Leopold began exploring a renewed alliance with England. Thus, the initially mild reaction of the other great powers was partly due to the strategic benefits that each hoped to gain from the disarray in France.
The belief that the revolution posed little danger at first was reinforced by the caution and circumspection that characterized French diplomacy from 1789 to 1791. When the Spanish seizure of English fishing vess? ls in the Nootka Sound brought the two nations to the brink of war in 1790, for ex- ample, the Assembly's de facto refusal to honor the Family Compact left Spain isolated and forced Madrid to beat a hasty retreat. 45 Louis did order the arming of fourteen ships of the line as a precautionary measure in May, but this move led the Assembly to decree that any declaration of war was subject to their approval. In a further burst of idealism, the deputies also voted to renounce "the undertaking of any war with a view of making con-
quests" and declared that France would not use force "against the liberty of any people. "46 By limiting royal authority over the conduct of foreign policy, these measures appeared to reduce French influence even more. The As- sembly was equally unresponsive when Austria suppressed a revolt in the Netherlands later in the year, reinforcing the prevailing image of French im- potence.
In addition, despite having renounced feudalism in August 1789, the As- sembly treated the feudal rights of foreign powers cautiously. It offered to indemnify the Rhenish princes whose lands had been appropriated in Al- sace and refrained from annexing Avignon until the pope had openly de- clared his own opposition to the revolution. Nor was the threat to the existing order that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the renuncia- tion of feudalism embodied as novel or as far-reaching as it first appeared: the French monarchy had violated the rights of foreign princes on numer- ous occasions before the revolution, and other rulers had acted similarly in their own realms. The situation in Avignon was equally muddled, as the French claim to the territory rested on both the notion of popular sover- eignty and a number of traditional legal precedents. Given that annexation was common under the old regime, the Assembly's assertion of French sov- ereignty over a small enclave lying entirely within French borders hardly
45 The tepid French response may have been partly due to English bribes to the comte de Mirabeau, the dominant figure in the Assembly during this period. See John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 1: The Years ofAcclaim (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), 553? 8; Rose, Life of Pitt, 1:577-81; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 198-200.
46 The decree was incorporated in the Constitution of 1791, and the comte de Mirabeau de- clared that "the moment is not far off when liberty will acquit mankind of the crime of war. " Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenburg, "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," in The Origins and Prevention ofMajor Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2o6; and see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 260.
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posed a radical threat to the existing order. Until 1791, in short, the revolu- tion in France simply did not appear that dangerous. 47
Foreign reactions were further muted by the unpopularity of the emigres and the obviously self-serving nature of their testimony. Although the emi- gres were greeted warmly by some rulers (and were subsidized by Cather- ine the Great), their extravagance and vanity won them few friends in foreign courts and made them something of a nuisance in their adopted places of residence. 48 Moreover, the French royal family usually opposed their efforts, fearing that a restoration conducted under the auspices of the emigres would weaken royal authority even more than the Assembly had. 49 Louis repeatedly rejected the emigres' suggestions that he flee, preferring to make his own arrangements, and Louis explicitly warned Leopold not to support the emigres (which the Austrian ruler was loath to do in any case). Contacts with emigre agents did reinforce Prussian revisionism (though Frederick William hardly needed encouragement), but England and Austria remained largely immune from their blandishments. 5? During the Nootka Sound dispute, for example, the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Gower, wrote that "the aristocratical party has little to hope from peace and shews evident signs of wishing to profit by the confusion which a war would cer- tainly occasion. " During the summer, the discovery that counterrevolution- ary groups were trying to provoke a war between England and France by blaming the revolution on English interference led Pitt to send two agents to
France to reassure the Assembly of England's pacific intentions and con- vince it not to support Spain. 51 Thus, the royalists' efforts to sound the alarm generally feB flat at this stage.
Last but by no means least, the revolution in France received modest at- tention because the great powers were preoccupied by more pressing prob- lems elsewhere. Russia was at war with Turkey and Sweden and faced a direct challenge from the Poles, while Prussia was backing the Polish rebels
47 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:196--97; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 76-78; Clapham, Causes ofthe Warof1792, 19-21; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 7J.
48 On the activities of the emigres and foreign responses to them, see Blanning, French Rev- olution in Germany, 52-53, 6o-61; Biro, German Policy, 1:42-45; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:187-88; and Massimo Boffa, "Emigres," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 326-28.
49 Rivalry between the crown and the nobility predated the revolution. The comtes d'Ar- tois and Provence sought to limit royal authority and preserve noble and provincial privi- leges. See Albert Goodwin, "Calonne, the Assembly of French Notables of 1787 and the Origins of the Revolte Nobiliaire," English Historical Review 61, nos. 24o-41 (1946).
50 See Lord, Second Partition ofPoland, 159; and also J. Holland Rose, "The Comte d'Artois and Pitt in December 1789,'' English Historical Review 30, no. 118 (1915).
51 Pitt's instructions convey his desire to remain aloof: "In the present circumstances the ut- most care is necessary to use no language which can lead to an expectation of our taking mea- sures to forward the internal views of any political party. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 17-18.
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and concocting its own schemes for aggrandizement. Austria's army was bogged down against the Turks, unrest at home was spreading, the Nether- lands were in open revolt, and Prussia's restless revisionism remained a se- rious concern. England and Spain were at loggerheads for most of 1790, and Pitt was more concerned about the balance of power in the East than the col- lapse of England's rival across the Channel. Spain, Sweden, and the Rhen- ish princes were genuinely alarmed by the revolution but were too weak to act alone. Although events in France were of great interest, other problems still took precedence.
This analysis suggests that the wars between France and the rest of Eu- rope did not arise from irreconcilable ideological antipathies. Foreign pow- ers took note of the revolution, some with misgivings, but they did not regard it as an immediate threat on either military or ideological grounds. 52
By contrast, the revolutionary forces in France were already worried about a counterrevolutionary conspiracy between the emigres, the papacy, and various foreign monarchs. Their suspicions were partly justified, as both Louis and the emigres had been seeking foreign assistance since the end of 1790. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, and relations between the emigres and the king remained strained and suspicious. In short, genuine fears of an "aristocratic plot" helped drive the revolution in increasingly radical directions, but the alleged conspiracy was a chimera at this point. The stage was set for a spiral into war, partly intended and partly inadvertent.
The Causes ofthe War of1792
Relations between France and the rest of Europe deteriorated dramati- cally in 1791. An underlying cause was the end of the war with Turkey, which allowed Austria and Russia to shift their attention back to European affairs. Another contributing factor was the reform movement in Poland, which helped bring Austria and Prussia together and increased Catherine's desire to regain control in Warsaw. The three main causes of war in 1792, however, were the dynastic ambitions of the other great powers (especially Prussia}, the struggle for power within France, and a series of regrettable miscalculations on both sides. The ideology of the revolution intensified! mutual perceptions of threat and reinforced the belief that the enemy could! be defeated quickly and painlessly. As we shall see, these beliefs turned out to be either erroneous or self-defeating and led to nearly a quarter century of war.
First we turn to Prussia's territorial ambitions? Despite the favorable op- portunities created by the revolution in France, the revolt in Poland, and the
? ? 52 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 12o-23 and passim.
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outbreak of war in the East, Prussia had failed to gain a single inch of terri- tory. When his plans to attack Austria were thwarted, Frederick William re- versed course and sought an alliance with Leopold in order to pursue territorial gains at Russian, Polish, or French expense. In September 1 790, a Prussian envoy proposed that Austria and Prussia act together to restore Louis to the throne, in exchange for territorial compensations in Flanders, Alsace, and Germany. Leopold rejected Prussia's entreaties at this time, and Frederick William turned to other equally unsuccessful schemes. 53 Un- daunted by past failures, he repeated his offer for an alliance with Austria in June 1791, and Leopold was now more receptive. The Austrian monarch had become concerned about the fate of the royal family in France and wanted to convince the Assembly to halt its campaign against them. Leopold was also aware of the royal family's plans to escape, and he in- tended to organize an armed demonstration on the French border in order
to convince the Assembly to adopt a more moderate policy. This plan crum- bled when the royal escape miscarried, but Leopold still believed that for- eign threats would have a moderating effect on the Assembly. 54
Leopold's change of heart led to the signing of a formal convention be- tween Austria and Prussia in July 1791. The convention committed the two states to aid each other in the event of internal rebellion, to support a free constitution in Poland, and to promote a European concert to regulate in- ternal developments in France. But despite its outward appearance, the con- vention was not intended to be the first step toward a counterrevolutionary invasion. Instead, Leopold regarded it as a means of limiting Russian influ- ence in Poland and moderating great power rivalries, and his objectives in France were still quite limited. The emperor aimed neither to start a war nor to undermine the National Assembly; he merely sought to strengthen the moderates and protect the royal family. 55 Frederick William wanted land, not counterrevolution, and he was willing to intervene in France in order to obtain territorial compensations rather than to defend monarchical institu-
53 Frederick Willliam backed an Anglo-Dutch-Prussian effort to force Russia to both restore the status quo ante with the Ottoman Empire and give up its predominant position in Poland, but the ploy failed when Catherine stood firm and the English Parliament refused to support the policy. On this incident {known as the Ochakov affair), see John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 2: The Reluctant Transition {Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1g83), chap. 1.
54 Leopold and his sister corresponded regularly during this period. The queen's pleas heightened his concern over events in France but did not convince him to support a counter- revolutionary invasion. Von Amath, Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, and Leopold II, 143-47, 156-69, I81-82, 188-g3, 20D-203, 24Q-41.
5 5 Leopold supported the Constitution o f 1791, and the Austrian chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, told the Prussian ambassador, "If Louis XVI can come to an agreement with the National As- sembly about the constitution, there must be no war. " When Louis accepted the constitution in September, Leopold declared that the need for a European concert had evaporated. See Heinrich von Sybel, History ofthe French Revolution, trans. Walter C. Perry {London: J. Murray, 1867), 1:362, 368; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, go.
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tions. Although both monarchs used counterrevolutionary rhetoric to justify their actions, neither saw their rapprochement as the beginning of a coun- terrevolutionary crusade. 56
Given these reservations, Leopold's efforts to pressure the Assembly were quite circumspect. He had already invited the other European powers to form a union to defend the French monarchy in July, but despite some stem language, the so-called Padua Circular was a symbolic gesture that did not commit him in any way. Meeting in Pillnitz at the end of the month (with the emigre comte d'Artois in attendance as well), Leopold and Frederick William issued a declaration calling for a European concert against the rev- olution. Like the Padua Circular, the Declaration of Pillnitz was purely sym- bolic, and joint action remained conditional on unanimous participation by the other powers. England was firmly committed to neutrality, however, which rendered the threat to intervene meaningless. This subtlety was lost on the deputies in the Assembly, in part because the Declaration implied that the emigres and the foreign monarchs were in close collaboration. 57
Leopold's attempt to encourage moderation seemed to work perfectly afr first. The threat of foreign intervention strengthened the Feuillants' position in the Assembly and facilitated their efforts to preserve the king's position, while Louis' decision to accept the new constitution seemed to eliminate the need for intervention from abroad. With the Feuillants in control of the As- sembly and the key ministries, the risk of war appeared to be fading by the fall of 1791. 58 Unfortunately, domestic politics in France now erupted and soon drove Europe over the brink.
The second major cause of war was the struggle for power in France and the Girondin campaign for war. The Feuillants' decision to preserve the
56 Leopold did tell the Prussian ambassador, "the Jacobins are stirring up revolts through- out the whole of Italy. It is necessary to root out the evil at once. " He offered no specific pro- posal for doing so, however, and warned, "We must proceed with extreme caution, and allow matters to come to such a pass that the nation itself will feel the necessity of a change in its condition. " Most importantly, he emphasized that intervention would have to be conducted by a general concert of all the European powers, which he knew to be a remote possibility. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:351-52.
57 The declaration stated that the two monarchs "trust that the [European] powers . . . will (employ] the most effective means for enabling the King of France to consolidate . . . the foun- dations of a monarchical government. . . . In which case [alors et dans ce cas] their said Majesties . . . are resolved to act promptly . . . with the forces necessary. " And as Leopold as- sured his chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, "Alors et dans ce cas is for me the Law and the Prophets- if England fails us, the case I have put is nonexistent. " In referring to the monarchs having received "requests and representations of M. le Comte d'Artois," the declaration also con- tributed to French fears of an aristocratic conspiracy. See Stewart, Documentary Survey, 221-26; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 77-79; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 88; Ross, European Diplomatic History, 36-39; Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France," 693-96; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 89-90.
58 The Feuillants obtained 264 seats in the first elections, the Jacobins received 136, and over 350 were uncommitted. See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:213; and Sutherland, France, 132.
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monarchy after the flight to Varennes and their suppression of popular forces at the Champs de Mars had further polarized internal politics in France, and the Austro-Prussian rapprochement, the exodus of emigres, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pillnitz all combined to reinforce the fear that an aristocratic conspiracy was bent on crushing the revolution.
To counter these dangers and strengthen their own influence in the As- sembly, a faction of the Jacobin movement known as the Girondins began to advocate war in the fall of 1791. Led by a former journalist, Jean-Pierre Bris- sot de Warville, the Girondins believed that war would either expose the king's disloyalty or force him to break ranks with the emigres once and for all. In eithe1r case, the danger of counterrevolution would be reduced and the Girondins' own positions enhanced. The Girondins also feared the con- sequences of another popular uprising and thought a successful war would consolidate the nation and bring the revolutionary process to an end. 59
The Girondin recipe for war contained several volatile ingredients. Hs centerpiece was the familiar assertion that France faced a vast counterrevo- lutionary conspiracy linking the royal family, the emigres, the dissident clergy, and several foreign powers. 6? France's opponents were portrayed as irrevocably hostile, implying that war was inevitable and France must seize the initiative. As Brissot told the Assembly in October, "It is not merely nec- essary to think of defense, the [counterrevolutionary] attack must be antici- pated; you yourselves must attack. "61 The loyalty of the king was repeatedly questioned, and defenders of the monarchy now risked being labeled ene- mies of the revolution. The Girondins persuaded the Assembly to decree the death penalty for counterrevolutionaries and to issue an ultimatum de-
manding that several neighboring rulers expel the emigres from their terri- tories. These measures were intended to reduce the direct threat of counterrevolution and force the king to reveal his true loyalties. 62 Louis ve-
59 The Girondins (so named because many came from the department of Gironde) were known to contemporaries as "Brissotins," in reference to Brissot de Warville. See M. J. Syden- ham, The Girondins (London: Athlone Press, 1961 ); Alison Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the French Convention of 1792 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1972); and "Girondins" in Jones, Longman Companion, 176-18o.
60 Brissot's first speech on foreign affairs raised the specter of a vast conspiracy against the revolution, and he accused the king of "secret schemes" in December. See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; Clapham, Origins ofthe Warof1792, 135; Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 592-93; and F. L. Kidner, "The Girondists and the 'Propaganda War' of 1792: A Reevaluation of French Revolutionary For- eign Policy from 1791 to 1793," (Ph. D diss. , Princeton University, 1971), 7<>-74?
61 Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 27, 115, 135. On the central place of "plots" in the mindset of the revolution, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 55-'JO.
62 As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791, "The accepted leader of the nation will be forced to rule in accordance with the Constitution. If he does his duty, we will support him wholeheartedly. If he betrays us-the people will be ready.
