No More Learning

[Sidenote: Cæsar Questor (686). ]

III. Neither did Cæsar disdain ceremonial; but he sought to give it a
significance which should make an impression upon the mind. The
opportunity soon presented itself. Soon after he was nominated questor
and admitted to the Senate, he lost his aunt Julia and his wife
Cornelia, and hastened to make a veritable political manifestation of
their funeral oration. [860] It was the custom at Rome to pronounce a
eulogy on women only when they died at an advanced age. Cæsar obtained
public approbation by departing from this usage in favour of his young
wife; they saw in it, according to Plutarch,[861] a proof of sensibility
and softness of manners; but they applauded not the family sentiment
only, they glorified much more the inspiration of the politician who
dared to make a panegyric on the husband of Julia, the celebrated
Marius, whose image, in wax, carried by Cæsar’s orders in the funeral
procession, re-appeared for the first time since the proscription of
Sylla. [862]

After having rendered these last honors to his wife, he accompanied, in
the capacity of questor, the prætor Antistius Vetus, sent into Ulterior
Spain. [863] The peninsula was then divided into two great provinces:
Citerior Spain, since called Tarraconensis, and Ulterior Spain,
comprising Bætica and Lusitania. [864] The positive limits, we may well
believe, were not very exactly determined, but at this epoch the _Saltus
Castulonensis_, which corresponds with the Sierras Nevada and
Cazorla,[865] was considered as such between these two provinces. To the
north, the limitation could not be made any more distinct, the Asturias
not being thoroughly conquered. The capital of Ulterior Spain was
Corduba (_Cordova_), where the prætor resided. [866]

The chief towns, doubtless connected by military roads, formed so many
centres of general meeting, where assizes for the regulation of business
were held. These meetings were called _conventus civium Romanorum_,[867]
because the members who composed them were Roman citizens dwelling in
the country. The prætor, or his delegate, presided over them once a
year. [868] Each province in Spain had several of them. In the first
century of our era, there were three for Lusitania and four for
Bætica. [869]

Cæsar, the delegate of the prætor, visited these towns, presiding over
the assemblies and administering justice. He was noted for his spirit of
conciliation and equity,[870] and showed a lively solicitude for the
interests of the Spaniards. [871] As the character of illustrious men is
revealed in their smallest actions, it is not a matter of indifference
to mention the gratitude which Cæsar always had for the good offices of
Vetus. Plutarch informs us that a strict union reigned between them ever
after, and Cæsar took care to name the son of Vetus questor when he
himself was raised to the prætorship,[872] as sensible of friendship as
he was later forgetful of injuries.

Yet the love of glory and the consciousness of his high faculties made
him aspire to a more important part. He manifested his impatient desire
for this one day when he went to visit the famous temple of Hercules at
Gades, as Hannibal and Scipio had done before. [873] At the sight of the
statue of Alexander, he deplored with a sigh that he had done nothing at
the age when this great man had conquered the whole world. [874] In fact,
Cæsar was then thirty-two years old, nearly the age at which Alexander
died. Having obtained his recall to Rome, he stopped on his return in
Gallia Transpadana (687). [875] The colonies founded in this country
possessed the Latin law (_jus Latii_), which Pompeius Strabo had granted
them, but they vainly demanded the rights of Roman city. The presence of
Cæsar, already known for his friendly feelings towards the provinces,
excited a lively emotion among the inhabitants, who saw in him the
representative of their interests and their cause. The enthusiasm was
such, that the Senate, terrified, thought itself obliged to retain for
some time longer in Italy the legions destined for the army in
Asia. [876]

The ascendency of Pompey still continued, though, since his consulship,
he had remained without command, having undertaken, in 684, not to
accept the government of any province at the expiration of his
magistracy;[877] but his popularity began to disquiet the Senate, so
much is it in the very essence of the aristocracy to distrust those who
raise themselves, and extend their powers beyond itself. This was an
additional motive for Cæsar to connect himself more closely with Pompey;
whereupon he backed him with all his influence; and either to cement
this alliance, or because of his inclination for a beautiful and
graceful woman, shortly after his return he married Pompeia, the
kinswoman of Pompey, and granddaughter of Sylla. [878] He was thus, at
one and the same time, the arbiter of elegance, the hope of the
democratic party, and the only public man whose opinions and conduct had
never varied.


[Sidenote: The Gabinian Law (687). ]

IV. The decadence of a political body is evident when the measures most
useful to the glory of a country, instead of arising from its provident
initiative, are inaugurated by obscure and often disreputable men, the
faithful but dishonoured organs of public opinion. Thus the propositions
made at this epoch, far from being inspired by the Senate, were put
forward by uninfluential individuals, and carried by the violent
attitude of the people. The first referred to the pirates, who, upheld
and encouraged by Mithridates, had long infested the seas, and ravaged
all the coasts; an energetic repression was indispensable. These bold
adventurers, whose number the civil wars had greatly increased, had
become a veritable power. Setting out from Cilicia, their common centre,
they armed whole fleets, and found a refuge in important towns. [879]
They had pillaged the much-frequented port of Caieta (_Gaëta_), dared to
land at Ostia, and carry off the inhabitants to slavery; sunk in mid
seas a Roman fleet under the orders of a consul, and made two prætors
prisoners. [880] Not only strangers deputed to Rome, but the ambassadors
of the Republic, had fallen into their hands, and had undergone the
shame of being ransomed. [881] Finally, the pirates intercepted the
imports of wheat indispensable for the feeding of the city. To remedy so
humiliating a state of things, the tribune of the people, Aulus
Gabinius, proposed to confide the war against the pirates to one sole
general; to give him, for three years, extended powers, large forces,
and to place three lieutenants under his orders. [882] The assembly of
the people instantly accepted this proposition, notwithstanding the
small esteem in which the character of its author was held; and the name
of Pompey was in every mouth; but “the senators,” says Dio Cassius,
“would have preferred to suffer the greatest evils from the pirates,
than to have invested Pompey with such a power;”[883] they were ready to
put to death, in the curia itself, the tribune who was the author of the
motion. Scarcely had the multitude heard of the opposition of the
senators, when they flocked in crowds, invaded the place of meeting, and
would have massacred them, had they not been protected from their
fury. [884]

The projected law, submitted to the suffrages of the people, attacked by
Catulus and Q. Hortensius, energetically supported by Cæsar, is then
adopted; and they confer on Pompey, for three years, the proconsular
authority over all the seas, over all the coasts, and for fifty miles
into the interior; they grant him 6,000 talents (35 millions
[£1,400,000]),[885] twenty-five lieutenants, and the power of taking
such vessels and troops as he should judge necessary. The allies,
foreigners, and the provinces, were called on to concur in this
expedition. They equipped five hundred ships, they levied a hundred and
twenty thousand infantry and five thousand horse. The Senate, in spite
of itself, sanctioned the clauses of this law, the utility of which was
so manifest that its publication alone was sufficient to lower the price
of wheat all through Italy. [886]

Pompey adopted an able plan for putting an end to piracy. He divided the
Mediterranean coasts from the Columns of Hercules to the Hellespont and
the southern shores of the Black Sea into ten separate commands;[887] at
the head of each he placed one of his lieutenants. He himself,
retaining the general surveillance, went to Cilicia with the rest of his
forces. This vast plan protected all the shores, left the pirates no
refuge, and enabled him to destroy their fleet and attack them in their
dens at once. In three months Pompey re-established the safety of the
seas, took a thousand castles or strongholds, destroyed three hundred
towns, took eight hundred ships, and made twenty thousand prisoners,
whom he transferred into the interior of Asia, where he employed them in
building a city, which received the name of Pompeiopolis. [888]


[Sidenote: The Manilian Law (688). ]

V. At these tidings, the enthusiasm for Pompey, then in the island of
Crete, redoubled, and they talked of placing in his hands the fate of
another war. Although Lucullus had obtained brilliant successes over
Mithridates and Tigranes, his military position in Asia began to be
compromised. He had experienced reverses; insubordination reigned among
his soldiers; his severity excited their complaints; and the news of the
arrival of the two proconsuls from Cilicia, Acilius Glabrio and Marcius
Rex, sent to command a part of the provinces until then under his
orders, had weakened respect for his authority. [889] These circumstances
determined Manlius, tribune of the people, to propose that the
government of the provinces trusted to Lucullus should be given to
Pompey, joining to them Bithynia, and preserving to him the power which
he already exercised over all the seas. “It was,” says Plutarch, “to
submit the whole Roman empire to one sole man, and to deprive Lucullus
of the fruits of his victories. ”[890] Never, indeed, had such power been
confided to any citizen, neither to the first Scipio to ruin Carthage,
nor to the second to destroy Numantia. The people grew more and more
accustomed to regard this concentration of power in one hand as the only
means of salvation. The Senate, taxing these proposals with ingratitude,
combated them with all its strength; Hortensius asserted that if all the
authority was to be trusted to one man, no person was more worthy of it
than Pompey, but that so much authority ought not to be centred in one
person. [891] Catulus cried that they had done with liberty, and that,
henceforth to enjoy this, they would be forced to retire to the woods
and mountains. [892] Cicero, on the contrary, inaugurated his entrance
into the Senate by a magnificent oration, which has been preserved to
us; he showed that it was for the best interest of the Republic to give
the conduct of this war to a captain whose noble deeds in the past, and
whose moderation and integrity, vouched for the future. “So many other
generals,” he said at the close, “proceed on an expedition only with the
hope of enriching themselves. Can those who think we ought not to grant
all these powers to one man alone ignore this, and do we not see that
what renders Pompey so great is not only his own virtues, but the vices
of others? ”[893] As to Cæsar, he seconded, with all his power, the
efforts of Cicero[894] for the adoption of the law, which, supported by
public feeling, and submitted to the suffrage of the tribes, was adopted
unanimously.

Certainly, Lucullus had deserved well of his country, and it was cruel
to deprive him of the glory of terminating a war which he had
prosperously begun;[895] but the definitive success of the campaign
demanded his substitution, and the instinct of the people did not
deceive them. Often, in difficult cases, they see more clearly than an
assembly preoccupied with the interests of castes or of persons, and
events soon show that they are right.

Lucullus had announced at Rome the end of the war; yet Mithridates was
far from being conquered. This fierce enemy of the Romans, who had
continued the struggle twenty-four years, and whom evil fortune had
never been able to discourage, would not treat, despite his sixty four
years and recent reverses, save on conditions inadmissible by the
Romans. The fame of Pompey then was not useless against such an
adversary. His ascendency alone could bring back discipline into the
army and intimidate the enemy. In fact, his presence was sufficient to
re-establish order, and retain under their standards the old soldiers
who had obtained their discharge, and wished to return to their
homes;[896] they formed the flower of the army, and were known under the
name of _Valerians_. [897] On the other hand, Tigranes, having learned
the arrival of Pompey, abandoned the party of his father-in-law,
declaring that this general was the only one to whom he would
submit,[898] so much does the prestige of one man, says Dio Cassius,
lord it over that of another. [899]

Manilius then demanded the re-establishment of the law of Caius
Gracchus, by virtue of which the _centuria prærogativa_, instead of
being drawn by lot from the first classes of the tribes, was taken
indiscriminately from all the classes, which destroyed the distinctions
of rank and fortune in the elections, and deprived the richer of their
electoral privileges. [900]

We see that it was generally the tribunes of the people who, obeying the
inspiration of greater men, took the initiative in the more popular
measures. But the major part, without disinterestedness or moderation,
often compromised those who had recourse to their services by their
unruly ardour and subversive opinions. Manilius, in 688, suddenly
re-opened a question which always created great agitation at Rome; this
was the political emancipation of the freedmen. He obtained, by a
surprise, the readoption of the law Sulpicia, which gave a vote to the
freedmen by distributing them among the thirty-five tribes, and asserted
that he had the consent of Crassus and Pompey. But the Senate revoked
the law some time after its adoption, agreeing in this with the chiefs
of the popular party, who did not think it was demanded by public
opinion. [901]


[Sidenote: Cæsar Curule Ædile (689). ]

VI. Whilst all the favours of fortune seemed to have accumulated on the
idol of the moment, Cæsar, remaining at Rome, was chosen inspector
(_curator_) of the Appian Way (687). [902] The maintenance of the
highways brought much popularity to those who undertook the charge with
disinterestedness; Cæsar gained all the more by his, as he contributed
largely to the cost, and even compromised his own fortune thereby.

Two years afterwards (689), nominated curule ædile with Bibulus, he
displayed a magnificence which excited the acclamations of the crowd,
always greedy of sights. The place named _Comitium_, the Forum, the
Basilicæ, the Capitol itself, were magnificently decorated. Temporary
porticoes were erected, under which were exposed a crowd of precious
objects. [903] These expenses were not unusual: since the triumph of the
dictator Papirius Cursor, all the æediles were accustomed to contribute
to the embellishment of the Forum. [904] Cæsar celebrated with great pomp
the Roman games, and the feast of Cybele, and gave the finest shows of
wild beasts and gladiators ever yet beheld. [905] The number of the
combatants amounted to three hundred and twenty couples, according to
Plutarch, a contemptuous expression, which proves the small account made
of the lives of these men. Cicero, writing to Atticus, speaks of them as
we in our day should speak of racehorses;[906] and the grave Atticus
himself had gladiators, as had most of the great people of his time.
These bloody games, which seem so inhuman to us, still preserved the
religious character which at first they so exclusively possessed; they
were celebrated in honour of the dead;[907] Cæsar gave them as a
sacrifice to his father’s memory, and displayed in them an unwonted
pomp. [908] The number of gladiators which he got together terrified the
Senate, and for the future it was forbidden to exceed a given number.
Bibulus, his colleague, it is true, bore half the expense; nevertheless,
the public gave Cæsar all the credit of this sumptuous discharge of the
duties of their office. Thus Bibulus said that he was like the temple of
Castor and Pollux, which, dedicated to the two brothers, was never
called anything but the temple of Castor. [909]

The nobles saw in the sumptuousness of these games only a vain
ostentation, a frivolous desire to shine; they congratulated themselves
on the prodigality of the ædile, and predicted in his near ruin a term
to his influence; but Cæsar, while spending millions to amuse the
multitude, did not make this fleeting enthusiasm the sole basis of his
popularity; he established this on more solid grounds, by re-awakening
in the people the memories of glory and liberty.

Not content with having helped in several healing measures, with having
gained over Pompey to his opinions, and sought for the first time to
revive the memory of Marius, he wished to sound public opinion by an
astounding manifestation. At the moment when the splendour of his
ædileship had produced the most favourable impression on the crowd, he
secretly restored the trophies of Marius, formerly overturned by Sylla,
and ordered them to be placed in the Capitol[910] during the night. The
next day, when they saw these images shining with gold, chiselled with
infinite art, and adorned with inscriptions which recalled the victories
gained over Jugurtha, the Cimbri, and the Teutones, the nobles began to
murmur, blaming Cæsar for having dared to revive seditious emblems and
proscribed remembrances; but the partisans of Marius flocked in large
numbers to the Capitol, making its sacred roof resound with their
acclamations. Many shed tears on seeing the venerated features of their
old general, and proclaimed Cæsar the worthy successor of that great
captain. [911]

Uneasy at these demonstrations, the Senate assembled, and Lutatius
Catulus, whose father had been one of the victims of Marius, accused
Cæsar of wishing to overthrow the Republic, “no longer secretly, by
undermining it, but openly, in attacking it by breach. ”[912] Cæsar
repelled this attack, and his partisans, delighted at his success, vied
with each other in saying “that he would carry it over all his rivals,
and with the help of the people would take the first rank in the
Republic. ”[913] Henceforth the popular party had a head.

The term of his ædileship having expired, Cæsar solicited the mission of
transforming Egypt into a Roman province. [914] The matter in hand was
the execution of the will of King Ptolemy Alexas, or Alexander,[915]
who, following the example of other kings, had left his state to the
Roman peoples. But the will was revoked as doubtful,[916] and it seems
that the Senate shrank from taking possession of so rich a country,
fearing, as did Augustus later, to make the proconsul who should govern
it too powerful. [917] The mission of reducing Egypt to a Roman province
was brilliant and fruitful. It would have given to those who might be
charged with it extensive military power, and the disposal of large
resources. Crassus also placed himself on the list, but after long
debates the Senate put an end to all rival pretensions. [918]

About the same time when Crassus was endeavouring to get the inhabitants
of Gallia Transpadana admitted to the rights of Roman citizens, the
tribune of the people, Caius Papius, caused to be adopted a law for the
expulsion of all foreigners from Rome. [919] For, in their pride, the
Romans thus called those who were not Latins by origin. [920] This
measure would specially affect the Transpadanes, who were devoted to
Cæsar, because he had formerly promised to procure for them the title of
citizen, which had been refused. It was feared that they would get into
the comitia, for, since the emancipation of the Italiotes, it was
difficult to distinguish among those who had the right of voting, since
often even slaves fraudulently participated in the elections. [921]


[Sidenote: Cæsar _judex quæstionis_ (660). ]

VIII. Cæsar soon re-commenced the political struggle against the still
living instruments of past oppression, in which he had engaged at the
beginning of his career. He neglected no opportunity of calling down
upon them the rigours of justice or the opprobrium of public opinion.

The long duration of the civil troubles had given birth to a class of
malefactors called _sicarii_,[922] who committed all sorts of murders
and robberies. In 674 Sylla had promulgated a severe edict against them,
which, however, excepted the executors of his vengeance in the pay of
the treasury. [923] These last were exposed to public animadversion; and
though Cato had obtained the restitution of the sums allotted as the
price of the heads of the proscribed,[924] no one had yet dared to bring
them to justice. [925] Cæsar, notwithstanding the law of Sylla, undertook
their prosecution.

Under his presidency, in his capacity as _judex quæstionis_, L. Luscius,
who, by the dictator’s order, had slain three of the proscribed, and L.
Bellienus, uncle of Catiline and murderer of Lucretius Ofella, were
prosecuted and condemned. [926] Catiline, accused, at the instigation of
L. Lucceius, orator and historian, the friend of Cæsar, of having slain
the celebrated M. Marius Gratidianus, was acquitted. [927]


[Sidenote: Conspiracies against the Senate (690). ]

VIII. Whilst Cæsar endeavoured to react legally against the system of
Sylla, another party, composed of the ambitious and discontented, ruined
by debt, had long sought to arrive at power by plotting. Of this number
had been, since 688, Cn. Piso, P. Sylla, P. Autronius, and Catiline.
These men, with diverse antecedents and different qualities, were
equally decried, yet they did not want for adherents among the lower
class, whose passions they flattered, or among the upper class, to whose
policy or enmity they were serviceable. P. Sylla and Autronius, after
having been made consuls-elect in 688, had been effaced from the
senatorial list for solicitation. Public report mixed up the names of
Crassus and Cæsar with these secret manœuvres; but was it possible that
these two men, in such opposite positions, and even divided between
themselves, should enter into an understanding together for the sake of
a vulgar plot; and was it not a new inconsistency of calumny to
associate in the same conspiracy Cæsar because of his immense debts, and
Crassus because of his immense riches?

Let us remark, besides, that each of the factions then in agitation
necessarily sought to compromise, for the purpose of appropriating to
itself, such a personage as Cæsar, notorious for his name, his
generosity, and his courage.

A matter which has remained obscure, but which then made a great noise,
shows the progress of the ideas of disorder. One of the conspirators,
Cn. Piso, had taken part in the attempt to assassinate the Consuls Cotta
and Torquatus; yet he obtained, through the influence of Crassus, the
post of questor _pro prætore_ into Citerior Spain; the Senate, either to
get rid of him, or in the doubtful hope of finding in him some support
against Pompey, whose power began to appear formidable, consented to
grant him this province. But in 691, on his arrival in Spain, he was
slain by his escort--some say by the secret emissaries of Pompey. [928]
As to Catiline, he was not the man to bend under the weight of the
misfortunes of his friends, or under his own losses; he employed new
ardour in braving the perils of a conspiracy, and in pursuing the
honours of the consulship. He was the most dangerous adversary the
Senate had. Cæsar supported this candidature. In a spirit of opposition,
he supported all that could hurt his enemies and favour a change of
system. Besides, all parties were constrained to deal with those who
enjoyed the popular favour. The nobles accepted as candidate C. Antonius
Hybrida, a worthless man, capable only of selling himself and of
treachery. [929] Cicero, in 690, had promised Catiline to defend
him;[930] and a year before, the Consul Torquatus, one of the most
esteemed chiefs of the Senate, pleaded for the same individual accused
of embezzlement. [931]


[Sidenote: the difficulty of constituting a New Party. ]

IX. We thus see that the misfortunes of the times obliged the most
notable men to have dealings with those whose antecedents seemed to
devote them to contempt.

In times of transition, when a choice must be made between a glorious
past and an unknown future, the rock is, that bold and unscrupulous men
alone thrust themselves forward; others, more timid, and the slaves of
prejudices, remain in the shade, or offer some obstacle to the movement
which hurries away society into new ways. It is always a great evil for
a country, a prey to agitations, when the party of the honest, or that
of the good, as Cicero calls them, do not embrace the new ideas, to
direct by moderating them. Hence profound divisions. On the one side,
unknown men often take possession of the good or bad passions of the
crowd; on the other, honourable men, immovable or morose, oppose all
progress, and by their obstinate resistance excite legitimate impatience
and lamentable violence. The opposition of these last has the double
inconvenience of leaving the way clear to those who are less worthy than
themselves, and of throwing doubts into the minds of that floating mass,
which judges parties much more by the honourableness of men than by the
value of ideas.

What was then passing in Rome offers a striking example of this. Was it
not reasonable, in fact, that men should hesitate to prefer a faction
which had at its head such illustrious names as Hortensius, Catulus,
Marcellus, Lucullus, and Cato, to that which had for its main-stays
individuals like Gabinius, Manilius, Catiline, Vatinius, and Clodius?
What more legitimate in the eyes of the descendants of the ancient
families than this resistance to all change, and this disposition to
consider all reform as Utopian and almost as sacrilege? What more
logical for them than to admire Cato’s firmness of soul, who, still
young, allowed himself to be menaced with death rather than admit the
possibility of becoming one day the defender of the cause of the allies
claiming the rights of Roman citizens? [932] How not comprehend the
sentiments of Catulus and Hortensius obstinately defending the
privileges of the aristocracy, and manifesting their fears at this
general inclination to concentrate all power in the hands of one
individual?

And yet the cause maintained by these men was condemned to perish, as
everything which has had its time. Notwithstanding their virtues, they
were only an additional obstacle to the steady march of civilisation,
because they wanted the qualities most essential for a time of
revolution--an appreciation of the wants of the moment, and of the
problems of the future. Instead of trying what they could save from the
shipwreck of the ancient regime, just breaking to pieces against a
fearful rock, the corruption of political morals, they refuse to admit
that the institutions to which the Republic owed its grandeur could
bring about its decay. Terrified at all innovation, they confounded in
the same anathema the seditious enterprises of certain tribunes, and the
just reclamations of the citizens. But their influence was so
considerable, and ideas consecrated by time have so much empire over
minds, that they would have yet hindered the triumph of the popular
cause, if Cæsar, in putting himself at its head, had not given it a new
glory and an irresistible force. A party, like an army, can only conquer
with a chief worthy to command it; and all those who, since the Gracchi,
had unfurled the standard of reform, had sullied it with blood, and
compromised it by revolts. Cæsar raised and purified it. To constitute
his party, it is true, he had recourse to agents but little estimated;
the best architect can build only with the materials under his hand; but
his constant endeavour was to associate to himself the most trustworthy
men, and he spared no effort to gain by turns Pompey, Crassus, Cicero,
Servilius Cæpio, Q. Fufius Calenus, Serv. Sulpicius, and many others.

In moments of transition, when the old system is at an end, and the new
not yet established, the greatest difficulty consists, not in overcoming
the obstacles which are in the way of the advent of a regime demanded by
the country, but to establish the latter solidly, by establishing it
upon the concurrence of honourable men penetrated with the new ideas,
and steady in their principles.




CHAPTER III.

(691-695. )


[Sidenote: Cicero and Antonius, Consuls (691). ]

I. In the year 690, the candidates for the consulship were Cicero, C.
Antonius Hybrida, L. Cassius Longinus, Q. Cornificius, C. Lucinius
Sacerdos, P. Sulpicius Galba, and Catiline. [933] Informed of the plots
so long in progress, the Senate determined to combat the conspiracies of
the last by throwing all the votes they could dispose of upon Cicero,
who was thus unanimously elected, and took possession of his office at
the beginning of 691. This choice made up for the mediocrity of his
colleague Antonius.

The illustrious orator, whose eloquence had such authority, was born at
Arpinum, of obscure parents; he had served some time in the war of the
allies;[934] afterwards, his orations acquired for him a great
reputation, amongst others the defence of the young Roscius, whom the
dictator would have despoiled of his paternal heritage. After the death
of Sylla, he was appointed questor and sent to Sicily. In 684, he lashed
with his implacable speech the atrocities of Verres; at last, in 688, he
obtained the prætorship, and displayed in this capacity those sentiments
of high probity and of justice which distinguished him throughout his
whole career. But the esteem of his fellow-citizens would not have
sufficed, in ordinary times, to have raised him to the first magistracy.
“The dread of the conspiracy,” says Sallust, “was the cause of his
elevation. Under other circumstances, the pride of the nobility would
have revolted against such a choice. The consulship would have been
considered profaned, if, even with superior merit, a new man[935] had
obtained it; but, on the approach of danger, envy and pride became
silent. ”[936] The Roman aristocracy must have greatly lost its
influence, when, at a critical moment, it allowed a new man to possess
more authority over the people than one from its own ranks.

By birth, as well as by his instincts, Cicero belonged to the popular
party; nevertheless, the irresolution of his mind, sensible to flattery,
and his fear of innovations, led him to serve by turn the rancours of
the great or those of the people.
[937] Of upright heart, but
pusillanimous, he only saw rightly when his self-esteem was not at stake
or his interest in danger. Elected consul, he ranged himself on the side
of the Senate, and resisted all proposals advantageous to the multitude.
Cæsar honoured his talent, but had little confidence in his character;
hence he was averse to his candidature, and hostile during the whole of
his consulship.


[Sidenote: Agrarian Law of Rullus. ]

II. Scarcely had Cicero entered on his functions, when the tribune P.
Servilius Rullus revived one of those projects which, for ages, have had
the effect of exciting to the highest degree both the avidity of the
proletaries and the anger of the Senate: it was an agrarian law.

It contained the following provisions: To sell, with certain
exceptions,[938] the territories recently conquered, and some other
domains but little productive to the State; devoting the proceeds to the
purchase, by private contract, of lands in Italy which were to be
divided among the indigent citizens; to cause to be nominated, according
to the customary mode for the election of grand pontiff--that is, by
seventeen tribes, drawn by lot from the thirty-five--ten commissioners
or decemvirs, to whom should be left, for five years, the power,
absolute and without control, of distributing or alienating the domains
of the Republic and private properties wherever they liked. No one could
be appointed who was not present in Rome, which excluded Pompey, and the
authority of the decemvirs was to be sanctioned by a curiate law. To
them alone was intrusted the right to decide what belonged to the State
and what to individuals. The lands of the public domain which should not
be alienated were to be charged with a considerable impost. [939] The
decemvirs had also the power of compelling all the generals, Pompey
excepted, to account for the booty and money received during war, but
not yet deposited in the treasury, or employed upon some monument. They
were allowed to found colonies anywhere they thought proper,
particularly in the territory of Stella, and in the _ager_ of Campania,
where five thousand Roman citizens were to be established. In a word,
the administration of the revenues and the resources of the State came
almost wholly into their hands; they had, moreover, their lictors; they
could take the omens, and choose amongst the knights two hundred persons
to execute their decrees in the provinces, and these were without
appeal.

This project offered inconveniences, but also great advantages. Rullus,
certainly, was to blame for not designating all the places where he
wished to establish colonies; for making two exemptions, one favourable,
the other unfavourable to Pompey; for assigning to the decemvirs powers
too extensive, tending to arbitrary acts and speculations: nevertheless,
his project had an important political aim. The public domain,
encroached upon by usurpations or by the colonies of Sylla, had almost
disappeared. The law was to re-constitute it by the sale of conquered
territories. On the other side, the lands confiscated in great number by
Sylla, and given or sold at a paltry price to his partisans, had
suffered a general depreciation, for the ownership was liable to be
contested, and they no longer found purchasers. The Republic, while
desirous of relieving the poorer class, had thus an interest in raising
the price of these lands and in securing the holders. The project of
Rullus was, in fact, a veritable law of indemnity. There are injustices
which, sanctioned by time, ought also to be sanctioned by law, in order
to extinguish the causes of dissension, by restoring their security to
existing things, and its value to property.

If the great orator had known how to raise himself above the questions
of person and of party, he would, like Cæsar, have supported the
proposal of the tribune, amending only what was too absolute or too
vague in it; but, overreached by the faction of the great, and desiring
to please the knights, whose interests the law injured, he attacked it
with his usual eloquence, exaggerating its defects. It would only
benefit, he said, a small number of persons. Whilst appearing to favour
Pompey, it deprived him, on account of his absence, of the chance of
being chosen decemvir. It allowed some individuals to dispose of
kingdoms like Egypt, and of the immense territories of Asia. Capua would
become the capital of Italy, and Rome, surrounded by a girdle of
military colonies devoted to ten new tyrants, would lose its
independence. To purchase the lands, instead of apportioning the _ager
publicus_, was monstrous, and he could not admit that they would engage
the people to abandon the capital to go and languish in the fields.
Then, exposing the double personal interest of the author of the law, he
reminded them that the father-in-law of Rullus was enriched with the
spoils of proscripts, and that Rullus himself had reserved the right of
being nominated decemvir.

Cicero, nevertheless, pointed out clearly the political bearing of the
project, although censuring it, when he said; “The new law enriches
those who occupied the domain lands, and withdraws them from public
indignation. How many men are embarrassed by their vast possessions, and
cannot support the odium attached to the largesses of Sylla! How many
would sell them, and find no buyers! How many seek means, of whatever
kind, to dispossess themselves of them! . . . And you, Romans, you are
going to sell those revenues which your ancestors have acquired at the
cost of so much sweat and blood, to augment the fortune and assure the
tranquillity of the possessors of the goods confiscated by Sylla! ”[940]

We see thus that Cicero seems to deny the necessity of allaying the
inquietudes of the new and numerous acquirers of this kind of national
property; and yet, when a short time afterwards another tribune proposed
to relieve from civic degradation the sons of proscripts, he opposed
him, not because this reparation appeared to him unjust, but for fear
the rehabilitation in political rights should carry with it the
reintegration into the properties, a measure, according to his views,
subversive of all interests. [941] Thus, with a strange inconsistency,
Cicero combated these two laws of conciliation; the one because it
re-assured, the other because it disquieted the holders of the effects
of the proscribed. Why must it be that, amongst men of superiority, but
without convictions, talent only too often serves to sustain with the
like facility the most opposite causes? The opinion of Cicero triumphed,
nevertheless, thanks to his eloquence; and the project, despite the
lively adhesion of the people, encountered in the Senate such a
resistance, that it was abandoned without being referred to the comitia.

Cæsar advocated the agrarian law, because it raised the value of the
soil, put an end to the disfavour attached to the national property,
augmented the resources of the treasury, prevented the extravagance of
the generals, delivered Rome from a turbulent and dangerous populace by
wresting it from degradation and misery. He supported the rehabilitation
of the children of proscripts, because that measure, profoundly
reparative, put an end to one of the great iniquities of the past
regime.

There are victories which enfeeble the conquerors more than the
vanquished. Such was the success of Cicero. The rejection of the
agrarian law, and of the claims of the sons of proscripts, augmented
considerably the number of malcontents. A crowd of citizens, driven by
privations and the denial of justice, went over to swell the ranks of
the conspirators, who, in the shade, were preparing a revolution; and
Cæsar, pained at seeing the Senate reject that sage and ancient policy
which had saved Rome from so many agitations, resolved to undermine by
every means its authority. For this purpose he engaged the tribune, T.
Labienus, the same who was afterwards one of his best lieutenants, to
get up a criminal accusation which was a direct attack upon the abuse
of one of the prerogatives of the government. [942]


[Sidenote: Trial of Rabirius (691). ]

III. For a long time, when internal or external troubles were
apprehended, Rome was put, so to speak, in a state of siege, by the
sacramental formula, according to which the consuls were enjoined _to
see that the Republic received no injury_; then the power of the consuls
was unlimited;[943] and often, in seditions, the Senate had profited by
this omnipotence to rid itself of certain factious individuals without
observing the forms of justice. The more frequent the agitations had
become, the more they had used this extreme remedy. The tribunes always
protested ineffectually against a measure which suspended all the
established laws, legalised assassination, and made Rome a battle-field.
Labienus tried anew to blunt in the hands of the Senate so formidable a
weapon.

Thirty-seven years before, as will be remembered, Saturninus, the
violent promoter of an agrarian law, had, by the aid of a riot, obtained
possession of the Capitol; the country had been declared in danger. The
tribune perished in the struggle, and the senator C. Rabirius boasted of
having killed him. Despite this long interval of time, Labienus accused
Rabirius under an old law of _perduellio_, which did not leave to the
guilty, like the law of treason, the power of voluntary exile, but, by
declaring him a public enemy, authorised against him cruel and
ignominious punishments. [944] This procedure provoked considerable
agitation; the Senate, which felt the blow struck at its privileges, was
unwilling to put any one to trial for the execution of an act authorised
by itself. The people and the tribunes, on the contrary, insisted that
the accused should be brought before a tribunal. Every passion was at
work. Labienus claimed to avenge one of his uncles, massacred with
Saturninus; and he had the audacity to expose in the Campus Martius the
portrait of the factious tribune, forgetting the case of Sextus Titius,
condemned, on a former occasion, for the mere fact of having preserved
in his house the likeness of Saturninus. [945] The affair was brought,
according to ancient usage, before the decemvirs. Cæsar, and his cousin
Lucius Cæsar, were designated by the prætor to perform the functions of
judges. The very violence of the accusation, compared with the eloquence
of his defenders, Hortensius and Cicero, overthrew the charge of
_perduellio_. Nevertheless, Rabirius, condemned, appealed to the people;
but the animosity against him was so great that the fatal sentence was
about to be irrevocably pronounced, when the prætor, Metellus Celer,
devised a stratagem to arrest the course of justice; he carried away the
standard planted at the Janiculum. [946] This battered flag formerly
announced an invasion of the country round Rome. Immediately all
deliberation ceased, and the people rushed to arms. The Romans were
great formalists; and, moreover, as this custom left to the magistrates
the power of dissolving at their will the comitia, they had the most
cogent motives for preserving it; the assembly soon separated, and the
affair was not taken up again. Cæsar, nevertheless, had hoped to attain
his object. He did not demand the head of Rabirius, whom, when he was
subsequently dictator, he treated with favour; he only wished to show to
the Senate the strength of the popular party, and to warn it that
henceforth it would no more be permitted, as in the time of the Gracchi,
to sacrifice its adversaries in the name of the public safety.

If, on the one hand, Cæsar let no opportunity escape of branding the
former regime, on the other he was the earnest advocate of the
provinces, which vainly looked for justice and protection from Rome. He
had, for example, the same year accused of peculation C. Calpurnius
Piso, consul in 687, and afterwards governor of Transpadane Gaul, and
brought him to trial for having arbitrarily caused an inhabitant of that
country to be executed. The accused was acquitted through the influence
of Cicero; but Cæsar had shown to the Transpadanes that he was ever the
representative of their interests and their vigilant patron.


[Sidenote: Cæsar Grand Pontiff (691). ]

IV. He soon received a brilliant proof of the popularity he enjoyed. The
dignity of sovereign pontiff, one of the most important in the Republic,
was for life, and gave great influence to the individual clothed with
it, for religion mingled itself in all the public and private acts of
the Romans.

Metellus Pius, sovereign pontiff, dying in 691, the most illustrious
citizens, such as P. Servilius Isauricus, and Q. Lutatius Catulus,
prince of the Senate, put themselves at the head of the ranks of
candidates to replace him. Cæsar also solicited the office, and,
desirous of proving himself worthy of it, he published, at this time
doubtless, a very extensive treatise on the augural law, and another on
astronomy, designed to make known in Italy the discoveries of the
Alexandrian school. [947]

Servilius Isauricus and Catulus, relying on their antecedents, and on
the esteem in which they were held, believed themselves the more sure of
election, because, since Sylla, the people had not interfered in the
nomination of grand pontiff, the college solely making the election.
Labienus, to facilitate Cæsar’s access to this high dignity, obtained a
plebiscitum restoring the nomination to the suffrages of the people.
This manœuvre disconcerted the other competitors without discouraging
them, and, as usual, they attempted to seduce the electors with money.
All who held with the party of the nobles united against Cæsar, who
combated solicitation by solicitation, and sustained the struggle by the
aid of considerable loans; he knew how to interest in his success,
according to Appian, both the poor that he had paid, and the rich from
whom he borrowed. [948] Catulus, knowing Cæsar to be greatly in debt, and
mistaking his character, offered him a large sum to desist. He answered
him that he would borrow a much greater sum of him if he would support
his candidature. [949]

At length the great day arrived which was to decide the future of Cæsar;
when he started to present himself at the comitia, the most gloomy
thoughts agitated his ardent mind, and calculating that if he should not
succeed, his debts would constrain him perhaps to go into exile, he
embraced his mother and said, “To-day thou wilt see me grand pontiff or
a fugitive. ”[950] The most brilliant success crowned his efforts, and
what added to his joy was his obtaining more votes in the tribes of his
adversaries than they had in all the tribes put together. [951]

Such a victory made the Senate fear whether Cæsar, strong in his
ascendency over the people, might not proceed to the greatest excesses;
but his conduct remained the same.

Hitherto he had inhabited a very moderate house, in the quarter called
Suburra; nominated sovereign pontiff, he was lodged in a public building
in the Via Sacra. [952] This new position necessarily obliged him,
indeed, to a sumptuous life, if we may judge by the luxuriousness
displayed at the reception of a simple pontiff, at which he assisted as
king of the sacrifices, and of which Macrobius has preserved to us the
curious details. [953] Moreover, he built himself a superb villa on the
Lake of Nemi, near Aricia.


[Sidenote: Catiline’s Conspiracy. ]

V. Catiline, who has already been spoken of, had twice failed in his
designs upon the consulship; he solicited it again for the year 692,
without abandoning his plans of conspiracy. The moment seemed
favourable. Pompey being in Asia, Italy was bared of troops; Antonius,
associated in the plot, shared the consulship with Cicero. Calm existed
on the surface, whilst passions, half extinguished, and bruised
interests, offered to the first man bold enough, numerous means of
raising commotions. [954] The men whom Sylla had despoiled, as well as
those he had enriched, but who had dissipated the fruits of their
immense plunder, were equally discontented; so that the same idea of
subversion formed a bond of union between the victims and the
accomplices of the past oppression.

Addicted to excesses of every kind, Catiline dreamed, in the midst of
his orgies, of the overthrow of the oligarchy; but we may doubt his
desire to put all to fire and sword, as Cicero says, and as most
historians have repeated after him. Of illustrious birth, questor in
677, he distinguished himself in Macedonia, in the army of Curio; he had
been prætor in 686, and governor of Africa the year following. He was
accused of having in his youth imbrued his hands in Sylla’s murders, of
having associated with the most infamous men, and of having been guilty
of incest and other crimes; there would be no reason for exculpating him
if we did not know how prodigal political parties in their triumph are
of calumnies against the vanquished. Besides, we must acknowledge that
the vices with which he was charged he shared in common with many
personages of that epoch, among others with Antonius, the colleague of
Cicero, who subsequently undertook his defence. Gifted with a high
intelligence and a rare energy, Catiline could not have meditated a
thing so insensate as massacre and burning. It would have been to seek
to reign over ruins and tombs. The truth will present itself better in
the following portrait, traced by Cicero seven years after the death of
Catiline, when, returning to a calmer appreciation, the great orator
painted in less sombre colours him whom he had so disfigured:--“This
Catiline, you cannot have forgotten, I think had, if not the reality, at
least the appearance of the greatest virtues. He associated with a crowd
of perverse men, but he affected to be devoted to men of greatest
estimation. If for him debauchery had powerful attractions, he applied
himself with no less ardour to labour and affairs. The fire of passions
devoured his heart, but he had also a taste for the labours of war. No,
I do not believe there ever existed on this earth a man who offered so
monstrous an assemblage of passions and qualities so varied, so
contrary, and in continual antagonism with each other. ”[955]

The conspiracy, conducted by the adventurous spirit of its chief, had
acquired considerable development. Senators, knights, young patricians,
a great number of the notable citizens of the allied towns, partook in
it. Cicero, informed of these designs, assembles the Senate in the
Temple of Concord, and communicates to it the information he had
received: he informs it that, on the 5th of the calends of November, a
rising was to take place in Etruria; that on the morrow a riot would
break out in Rome; that the lives of the consuls were threatened; that,
lastly, everywhere stores of warlike arms and attempts to enlist the
gladiators indicated the most alarming preparations. Catiline,
questioned by the consul, exclaims, that the tyranny of some men, their
avarice, their inhumanity, are the true causes of the uneasiness which
torments the Republic; then, repelling with scorn the projects of revolt
which they imputed to him, he concludes with this threatening figure of
speech: “The Roman people is a robust body, but without head: I shall be
that head. ”[956] He departed with these words, leaving the Senate
undecided and trembling. The assembly, meanwhile, passed the usual
decree, enjoining the consuls to watch _that the Republic received no
injury_.

The election of consuls for the following year, till then deferred, took
place on the 21st of October, 691, and Silanus having been nominated
with Murena, Catiline was a third time rejected. He then dispatched to
different parts of Italy his agents, and among others, C. Mallius into
Etruria, Septimius to the Picenum, and C. Julius into Apulia, to
organise the revolt. [957] At the mouth of the Tiber, a division of the
fleet, previously employed against the pirates, was ready to second his
projects. [958] At Rome even the assassination of Cicero was boldly
attempted.

The Senate was convened again on the 8th of November. Catiline dared to
attend, and take his seat in the midst of his colleagues. Cicero, in a
speech which has become celebrated, apostrophised him in terms of the
strongest indignation, and by a crushing denunciation forced him to
retire. [959] Catiline, accompanied by three hundred of his adherents,
left the capital next morning to join Mallius. [960] During the following
days, alarming news arriving from all parts threw Rome into the utmost
anxiety. Stupor reigned there. To the animation of fêtes and pleasures
had, all of a sudden, succeeded a gloomy silence. Troops were raised;
armed outposts were placed at various points; Q. Marcius Rex is
dispatched to Fæsulæ (_Fiesole_); Q. Metellus Creticus into Apulia;
Pomponius Rufus to Capua; Q. Metellus Celer into the Picenum; and,
lastly, the consul, C. Antonius, led an army into Etruria. Cicero had
detached the latter from the conspiracy by giving him the lucrative
government of Macedonia. [961] He accepted in exchange that of Gaul,
which he also subsequently renounced, not wishing, after his consulship,
to quit the city and depart as proconsul. The principal conspirators, at
the head of whom were the prætor Lentulus and Cethegus, remained at
Rome. They continued energetically the preparations for the
insurrection, and entered into communication with the envoys of the
Allobroges. Cicero, secretly informed by his spies, among others by
Curius, watched their doings, and, when he had indisputable proofs,
caused them to be arrested, convoked the Senate, and exposed the plan of
the conspiracy.

Lentulus was obliged to resign the prætorship. Out of nine conspirators
convicted of the attempt against the Republic, five only failed to
escape; they were confided to the custody of the magistrates appointed
by the consul. Lentulus was delivered to his kinsman Lentulus Spinther;
L. Statilius to Cæsar; Gabinius to Crassus; Cethegus to Cornificius; and
Cæparius, who was taken in his flight, to the senator Cn.
Terentius. [962] The Senate was on the point of proceeding against them
in a manner in which all the forms of justice would have been violated.
The criminal judgments were not within its competence, and neither the
consul nor the assembly had the right to condemn a Roman citizen without
the concurrence of the people. Be that as it may, the senators assembled
for a last time on the 5th of December, to deliberate on the punishment
of the conspirators; they were less numerous than on the preceding days.
Many of them were unwilling to pass sentence of death against citizens
belonging to the great patrician families. Some, however, were in favour
of capital punishment, in spite of the law Portia. After others had
spoken, Cæsar made the following speech, the bearing of which merits
particular attention:--

“Conscript fathers, all who deliberate upon doubtful matters ought to be
uninfluenced by hatred, affection, anger, or pity. When we are animated
by these sentiments, it is hard to unravel the truth; and no one has
ever been able to serve at once his passions and his interests. Free
your reason of that which beclouds it, and you will be strong; if
passion invade your mind and rules it, you will be without strength. It
would be here the occasion, conscript fathers, to recall to mind how
many kings and peoples, carried away by rage or pity, have taken fatal
resolutions; but I prefer reminding you how our ancestors, unswayed by
prejudice, performed good and just deeds. In our Macedonian war against
King Perseus, the Republic of Rhodes, in its power and pride, although
it owed its greatness to the support of the Roman people, proved
disloyal and hostile to us; but when, on the termination of this war,
the fate of the Rhodians was brought under deliberation, our ancestors
left them unpunished in order that no one should ascribe the cause of
the war to their riches rather than to their wrongs. So, also, in all
the Punic wars, although the Carthaginians had often, both during peace
and during the truces, committed perfidious atrocities, our fathers, in
spite of the opportunity, never imitated them, because they thought more
of their honour than of vengeance, however just.

“And you, conscript fathers, take care that the crime of P. Lentulus and
his accomplices overcome not the sentiment of your dignity, and consult
not your anger more than your reputation. Indeed, if there be a
punishment adequate to their offences, I will approve the new measure;
but if, on the contrary, the vastness of the crime exceeds all that can
be imagined, we should adhere, I think, to that which has been provided
by the laws.

“Most of those who have expressed their opinion before me have deplored
in studied and magniloquent terms the misfortune of the Republic; they
have recounted the horrors of war and the sufferings of the vanquished,
the rapes of young girls and boys, infants torn from the arms of their
parents, mothers delivered to the lusts of the vanquisher, the pillage
of temples and houses, the carnage and burning everywhere; in short,
arms, corpses, blood, and mourning. But, by the immortal gods, to what
tend these speeches? To make you detest the conspiracy? What! will he
whom a plot so great and so atrocious has not moved, be inflamed by a
speech? No, not so; men never consider their personal injuries slight;
many men resent them too keenly. But, conscript fathers, that which is
permitted to some is not permitted to others. Those who live humbly in
obscurity may err by passion, and few people know it; all is equal with
them, fame and fortune; but those who, invested with high dignities,
pass their life in an exalted sphere, do nothing of which every mortal
is not informed. Thus, the higher the fortune the less the liberty; the
less we ought to be partial, rancorous, and especially angry. What, in
others, is named hastiness, in men of power is called pride and cruelty.

“I think then, conscript fathers, that all the tortures known can never
equal the crimes of the conspirators; but, among most mortals, the last
impressions are permanent, and the crimes of the greatest culprits are
forgotten, to remember only the punishment, if it has been too severe.

“What D. Silanus, a man of constancy and courage, has said, has been
inspired in him, I know, by his zeal for the Republic, and in so grave a
matter he has been swayed neither by partiality nor hatred. I know too
well the wisdom and moderation of that illustrious citizen.
Nevertheless, his advice seems to me, I will not say cruel (for can one
be cruel towards such men? ), but contrary to the spirit of our
government. Truly, Silanus, either fear or indignation would have forced
you, consul-elect, to adopt a new kind of punishment. As to fear, it is
superfluous to speak of it, when, thanks to the active foresight of our
illustrious consul, so many guards are under arms. As to the punishment,
we may be permitted to say the thing as it is: in affliction and
misfortune death is the termination of our sufferings, and not a
punishment; it takes away all the ills of humanity; beyond are neither
cares nor joy. But, in the name of the immortal gods, why not add to
your opinion, Silanus, that they shall be forthwith beaten with rods? Is
it because the law Portia forbids it? But other laws also forbid the
taking away the lives of condemned citizens, and prescribe exile. Is it
because it is more cruel to be beaten with rods than to be put to death?
But is there anything too rigorous, too cruel, against men convicted of
so black a design? If, then, this penalty is too light, is it fitting to
respect the law upon a less essential point, and break it in its most
serious part? But, it may be said, who will blame your decree against
the parricides of the Republic? Time, circumstances, and fortune, whose
caprice governs the world. Whatever happens to them, they will have
merited. But you, senators, consider the influence your decision may
have upon other offenders. Abuses often grow from precedents good in
principle; but when the power falls into the hands of men less
enlightened or less honest, a just and reasonable precedent receives an
application contrary to justice and reason.

“The Lacedæmonians imposed upon Athens vanquished a government of thirty
rulers. These began by putting to death without judgment all those whose
crimes marked them out to public hatred; the people rejoiced, and said
it was well done. Afterwards, when the abuses of this power multiplied,
good and bad alike were sacrificed at the instigation of caprice; the
rest were in terror. Thus Athens, crushed under servitude, expiated
cruelly her insensate joy. In our days, when Sylla, conqueror, caused to
be butchered Damasippus and other men of that description, who had
attained to dignities to the curse of the Republic, who did not praise
such a deed? Those villains, those factious men, whose seditions had
harassed the Republic, had, it was said, merited their death. But this
was the signal for a great carnage. For if any one coveted the house or
land of another, or only a vase or vestment, it was somehow contrived
that he should be put in the number of the proscribed. Thus, those to
whom the death of Damasippus had been a subject for joy, were soon
themselves dragged to execution, and the massacres ceased not until
Sylla had gorged all his followers with riches.