Therefore
honesty is not the same as virtue.
Summa Theologica
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OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the
first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty.
With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
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Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper
to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is clear
from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness
observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii,
7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since
it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of
justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude,
because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while
it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it
a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas
shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows
that shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the
companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a
stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support
of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful. " Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain
vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and
inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to
Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore
from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds
is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.
I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a
broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys.
vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection,
though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now
shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear
of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a base
action. " Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is
fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ([3457]FS,
Q[40], A[1]; [3458]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3459]FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we
were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous
habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to
do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue,
since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness
is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the
notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in
virtue's definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it
be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of
baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated ([3460]Q[142], A[4]) that
the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore
shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by
reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according
to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as
the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that
which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
honesty.
Reply to Objection 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow
that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every
vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
Reply to Objection 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an
acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would
be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
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Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that
"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace. " Now sometimes those who do
nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I
have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face. " Therefore
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to
do virtuous deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, "He that shall be ashamed of
Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc.
Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.
Objection 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a
disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the
action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more
ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most
grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice? "
Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of
doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3461]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3462]FS, Q[42],
A[3]), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an
arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is
twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the
deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the
character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone
does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is
not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the
reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first
and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due
to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness
regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those defects which are
not the result of any fault of his own. "
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains
from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while
doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of
reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say
that he is "ashamed. " Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts
in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced. "
Reply to Objection 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due
to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the
cause. " Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the
Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it
said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from
the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy
to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus. " It is owing to imperfection
of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he
suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the
more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is
written (Is. 51:7): "Fear ye not the reproach of men. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3463]Q[63], A[3]), though honor
is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain
excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly
due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind
of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and
the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as
such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either
because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or
because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
for doing virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful,
either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in
comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain
abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of
cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a
semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.
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Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
him?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who
are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6
that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
approbation. " Now men desire this especially from people of the better
sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not
more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who
perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet.
ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself. "
Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely
connected with him.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take
more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as
jokers and fable-tellers. " But those who are more closely connected
with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame
chiefly from them.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time;
by those whose friends they wish to become. " Now these are less closely
connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who
are more closely united to him.
On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
ashamed by those who are to be continually with him. "
I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence
which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is
shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially
that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's
attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person
ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more
weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its
effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations for
two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in
the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of
being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame.
Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by
reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge
of the matter attested, because "everyone judges well of what is known
to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made
ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted
with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us,
who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.
An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous
of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more
liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm.
And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with
us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their
society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the
harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
Reply to Objection 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the
same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because
just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since
they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments
hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we
live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.
Reply to Objection 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are
connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that
they look upon our defect as disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the
harm they do by making many think ill of us.
Reply to Objection 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make
us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems
greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom
he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The
reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something
for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to
suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing
to become their friends.
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Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?
Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are
not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead,
thou wouldst not blush. " Therefore those who are virtuous are more
inclined to be ashamed.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
Objection 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv,
9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if
they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore
a virtuous man can be ashamed.
Objection 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated
above ([3464]Q[143]). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since
then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
also.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous
man is not shamefaced. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3465]AA[1],2) shamefacedness is fear
of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not
feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one
reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to
avoid.
Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First,
because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him
to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are
without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of
them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to
themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous
are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were
anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
hypothetically. "
Reply to Objection 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst
men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet
are not altogether free from evil.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only
vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1
Thess. 5:22, "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves. " The
Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should
avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are
regarded as evil. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man
despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve,
wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain
extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as
though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it:
wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the
first foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of
whatever is disgraceful.
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OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as
synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum. ]
We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;
(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral
goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];
(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;
(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?
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Whether honesty is the same as virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
desired for its own sake. " Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake,
but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9)
that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue. " Therefore honesty
is not the same as virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state. " Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since
"it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12).
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior
choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, "Let
all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order" among
you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
Objection 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.
According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death
[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are omitted
in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has 'honestas']. But
virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not
the same as virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty
into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided.
Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable
state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy
of honor. Now honor, as stated above ([3466]Q[144], A[2], ad 2), is due
to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according
to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly
speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of
those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for
their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as
happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for
their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in
themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but
also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to
some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for
their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that
"some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own
worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge. " And this suffices to give a
thing the character of honest.
Reply to Objection 2: Some of the things which are honored besides
virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and
such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue
which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the
name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in
so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank,
power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 3) that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it
is only the good man who is worthy of honor. " Now a man is good in
respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the
latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due
to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the
character of honesty.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which
honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as
stated above ([3467]Q[103], AA[1],2). But one attests only to what one
knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external
actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so
far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists
radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the
external conduct.
Reply to Objection 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is
commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes
the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.
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Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?
Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the
beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since
the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent.
Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision
to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the
honest.
Objection 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is
characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
honor and glory differ, as stated above ([3468]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), it
seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.
Objection 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above
[3469](A[1]). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it
is written (Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the
harlot because of thy renown. " Therefore the honest is not the same as
the beautiful.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24): "Those that are
our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness
[honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts have no need. " Now by
uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the
beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are
apparently the same.
I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity
and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as
being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe. " Hence the
beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well
proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner
spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions being well
proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is
what is meant by honesty, which we have stated [3470](A[1]) to be the
same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all
that is connected with man. Wherefore "honesty is the same as spiritual
beauty. " Hence Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 30): "By honesty I mean
intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual," and
further on he adds that "many things are beautiful to the eye, which it
would be hardly proper to call honest. "
Reply to Objection 1: The object that moves the appetite is an
apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon
as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good.
Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good
are beloved by all. " Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies
spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully
says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so
to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as
Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3471]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory
is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a
person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the
same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing
honest and beautiful.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body:
although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to
play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to Ezech.
28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy
wisdom in thy beauty. "
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Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?
Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired
for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes
to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the
honest does not differ from the pleasant.
Objection 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful
good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that
attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very
nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is
money. " Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and
(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship
with one more honorable," i. e. richer, "than himself. " Therefore the
honest differs not from the useful.
Objection 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can
be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Q[83], qu. 30): "The honest is that
which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to
something else. "
I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful
and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated
above [3472](A[2]), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a
certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is
regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man:
and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic.
i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be
becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A
pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his
nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to
something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the
useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.
Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as
having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to
desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the
converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired
for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is
in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it
is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the
opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to
be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing
incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it
follows that it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in
accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some
respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say
that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are
honest.
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Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part
of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole
in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty,"
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not
a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . .
makes all thoughts honest. " But the use of wine, especially in excess,
in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains
to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a
part of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor.
Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to
temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said
as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for
the most venerable and most holy laws. "
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part
of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as
pertaining especially to temperance.
I answer that, As stated above [3473](A[2]), honesty is a kind of
spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and
opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty
belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is
most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by
its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to
which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly
honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is
reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed
virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of
honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is
reckoned a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his
thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems
himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf. [3474] Q[148], A[6]].
Reply to Objection 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude
than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good:
yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it
holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above.
Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule
given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely
parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys whatever
is uncomely.
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OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those
which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about
pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence,
which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically
about drink.
With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1)
Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice
which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
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Whether abstinence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power
[virtute]. " Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for
the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): "The kingdom of God is not meat and
drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11]
observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating. "
Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing
himself to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to
take food as physic. " Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical
art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's
food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but
to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is
not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence
excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience
not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful
seclusion. " Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes the sin
of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," so that abstinence
excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:5,6): "Join with your faith
virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence";
where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence
is a virtue.
I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of
food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as
denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies
neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent.
Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies
either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of
Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we ought "to join
abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining from food a man
should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own
person, and for the requirements of health.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered
in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we
eat not [*Vulg. : 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], shall we
have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i. e.
