Reply to Objection 1: Things
concerning
Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
Summa Theologica
Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had
great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first
grace for another.
I answer that, As shown above ([2250]AA[1],3,4), our works are
meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and
thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from
free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have
congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use
of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher
things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for
another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is
moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence
condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is
moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life
everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head
of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb.
2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the
Author of their salvation. "
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a
man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony
with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation
of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part
of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense
that the passage from Jeremias speaks.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by
congruous and not by condign merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas
condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things
from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice,
according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we
present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy
tender mercies. "
Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive
others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their
forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works,
or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy,
exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting
dwellings.
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Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may
justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be
restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps.
lxx. ], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou
forsake me. " Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.
Objection 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another.
Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after
a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life
everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above [2251](A[2];
Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is
restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself
restoration.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices
which he hath done shall not be remembered. " Therefore his previous
merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future
fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself
condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of
Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin;
hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is
restored, do not fall under merit---the motion of the preceding grace
not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the
first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account
of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more,
therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which
is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these
are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after
a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration
is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that
it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
Reply to Objection 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his
first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of
him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice
after the merit of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits
life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only
"conditionally," i. e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say
this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less
meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of
illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal
life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to
the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as
natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening
impediment.
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Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace
or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other
reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): "They have
received their reward. " Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of
charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been
increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the
principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above
([2252]AA[2], 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity
than he has.
Objection 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act
flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life
everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls
under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man
would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he
infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it
is written (2 Tim. 1:12): "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him. "
Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every
meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times
meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the
increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come
under merit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan. ; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that
"charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected. "
Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.
I answer that, As stated above ([2253]AA[6],7), whatever the motion of
grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover
extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole
progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is
eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of
charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: "But the path of the just as
a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day,"
which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under
condign merit.
Reply to Objection 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a
double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is
both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now
the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their
end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality
of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a
tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its
quantity.
Reply to Objection 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the
increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is
eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its
own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time,
viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.
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Whether a man may merit perseverance?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what
a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that is in
grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it
would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's
Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance
may come under the merit of whoever has grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin.
But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal life,
of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may
we merit not to sin, i. e. to persevere.
Objection 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in
the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of grace,
as was stated above [2254](A[8]). Much more, therefore, may he merit
perseverance in the grace he has already.
On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is
hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain
perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the
impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and
thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to
fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.
I answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good
and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance in
good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate
grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Divine
motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above
([2255]AA[6],7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's
movement directed to God the mover, falls under human merit; and not
what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is
clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid
movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not
fall under merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which
is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good of
perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it.
Reply to Objection 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not
merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins,
which they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in
Joan. ] on Jn. 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners,"
otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God,
be merciful to me a sinner," Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God
in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others,
although it does not fall under merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared
as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the
wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.
In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the
increase of grace, as was explained above.
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Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For
what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit.
Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of
justice, as appears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods
fall under merit.
Objection 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God
bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows
temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written (Ex.
1:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses"; on
which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that "life everlasting
might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on
account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward. " And
it is written (Ezech. 29:18): "The King of Babylon hath made his army
to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no
reward given him," and further on: "And it shall be wages for his army
. . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored for
me. " Therefore temporal goods fall under merit.
Objection 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on
account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal
punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal
goods fall under merit.
Objection 4: On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon
all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike;
according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and
the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the
unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.
I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a
kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the second,
relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according to Ps.
72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and consequently
what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under
merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to
him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and this does not fall
under merit simply, but relatively.
Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are
useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall
directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and
everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first
grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods
to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these temporal
goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For there is
no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I have not seen
the just forsaken," etc.
But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not
man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall under
merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do
temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their purpose. And
thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice
in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above ([2256]AA[3],6), so
have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature of reward,
with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's wills are moved to
undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have not a right
intention in them.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in
these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For
the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life;
and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic. "
Reply to Objection 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely
brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to
the malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon,
since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in
order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will
with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not right,
inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the
wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life
everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not
punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the
wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as
regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude
by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
__________________________________________________________________
OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i. e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
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Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead,
i. e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also
things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the
Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith
is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since
they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth, but also created truth.
Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is
the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of
Faith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about
the simple and everlasting truth. " Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so
to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless,
do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation
to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for
it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of
God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show
further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).
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Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the
symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God .
. . almighty. " Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.
Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. "
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode
of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85],
A[5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the
intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that
are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have
faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on
the part of the thing believed.
Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith
is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge
about things through their means, so is it in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the
First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when
He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by
way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether anything false can come under faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be
the object of faith.
Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see
My day: he saw it, and was glad. " But after the time of Abraham, God
might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He
did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false.
Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of
Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the
preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He
began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated,
and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread.
Therefore something false can come under faith.
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to
the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore
nothing false can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the
formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the
First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but
not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect
the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and
charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be
an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in
itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it
stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of
infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it
is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under
faith, it cannot be false.
Reply to Objection 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to
believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the
time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a
human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false
opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a
false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such
and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of
Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow
that anything false comes under faith.
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Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen.
For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me,
Thomas, thou hast believed. " Therefore vision and faith regard the same
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore what is believed is seen.
Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Objection 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing. " Therefore
faith is of things seen.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not. "
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science).
Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an
act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to
the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear
of the other side, there will be faith.
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
senses or by the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another"
[*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang. ]: he saw the Man, and believing Him
to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my
God. "
Reply to Objection 2: Those things which come under faith can be
considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be
seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in
general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this
way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on
the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought
to be believed.
Reply to Objection 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe.
For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to
a right faith, and not to assent to others.
Reply to Objection 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith,
but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
follow that these things are seen.
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Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science
is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration]?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance,
since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance
of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things
savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in
unbelief. " Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of
science.
Objection 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred
writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore
such things can be an object of science.
Objection 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science. "
Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Objection 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is,
since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion
and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in
Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang. ) that "when a thing
is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception. "
Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception,
whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of
science.
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore
"seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a
fashion, seen.
Now as stated above [2265](A[4]), it is impossible that one and the
same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that
a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by
another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the
Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a
dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess
already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may
happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one
man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of
faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about
the same things.
Reply to Objection 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are
of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad
2,3).
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things
that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible,
or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i. e. from
the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii).
Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of
the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in
the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at
the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
must know them first of all by faith.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i. e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same
object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner,
one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith,
the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same
object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either
opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is
incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason
that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
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Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy
Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude,
cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous
to distinguish certain articles of faith.
Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied
indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the
formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith
cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no
notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of
Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth
concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief. " Now belief is a
voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ), "no man
believes against his will. " Therefore it seems that matters of faith
should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto. " Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes. "
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason,
is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God
suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead,
wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article
of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the
same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists
in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is
the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things
are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life.
Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition
reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc. ], the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to
our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation
of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that
a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like,
which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not
form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be
taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus
there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First
Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are
various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 11:6).
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Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had
great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first
grace for another.
I answer that, As shown above ([2250]AA[1],3,4), our works are
meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and
thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from
free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have
congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use
of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher
things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for
another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is
moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence
condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is
moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life
everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head
of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb.
2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the
Author of their salvation. "
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a
man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony
with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation
of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part
of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense
that the passage from Jeremias speaks.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by
congruous and not by condign merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas
condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things
from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice,
according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we
present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy
tender mercies. "
Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive
others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their
forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works,
or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy,
exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting
dwellings.
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Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may
justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be
restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps.
lxx. ], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou
forsake me. " Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.
Objection 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another.
Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after
a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life
everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above [2251](A[2];
Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is
restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself
restoration.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices
which he hath done shall not be remembered. " Therefore his previous
merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future
fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself
condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of
Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin;
hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is
restored, do not fall under merit---the motion of the preceding grace
not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the
first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account
of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more,
therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which
is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these
are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after
a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration
is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that
it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
Reply to Objection 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his
first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of
him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice
after the merit of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits
life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only
"conditionally," i. e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say
this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less
meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of
illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal
life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to
the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as
natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening
impediment.
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Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace
or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other
reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): "They have
received their reward. " Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of
charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been
increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the
principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above
([2252]AA[2], 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity
than he has.
Objection 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act
flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life
everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls
under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man
would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he
infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it
is written (2 Tim. 1:12): "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him. "
Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every
meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times
meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the
increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come
under merit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan. ; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that
"charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected. "
Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.
I answer that, As stated above ([2253]AA[6],7), whatever the motion of
grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover
extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole
progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is
eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of
charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: "But the path of the just as
a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day,"
which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under
condign merit.
Reply to Objection 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a
double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is
both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now
the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their
end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality
of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a
tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its
quantity.
Reply to Objection 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the
increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is
eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its
own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time,
viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.
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Whether a man may merit perseverance?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what
a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that is in
grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it
would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's
Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance
may come under the merit of whoever has grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin.
But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal life,
of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may
we merit not to sin, i. e. to persevere.
Objection 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in
the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of grace,
as was stated above [2254](A[8]). Much more, therefore, may he merit
perseverance in the grace he has already.
On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is
hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain
perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the
impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and
thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to
fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.
I answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good
and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance in
good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate
grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Divine
motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above
([2255]AA[6],7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's
movement directed to God the mover, falls under human merit; and not
what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is
clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid
movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not
fall under merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which
is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good of
perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it.
Reply to Objection 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not
merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins,
which they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in
Joan. ] on Jn. 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners,"
otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God,
be merciful to me a sinner," Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God
in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others,
although it does not fall under merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared
as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the
wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.
In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the
increase of grace, as was explained above.
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Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For
what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit.
Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of
justice, as appears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods
fall under merit.
Objection 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God
bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows
temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written (Ex.
1:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses"; on
which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that "life everlasting
might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on
account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward. " And
it is written (Ezech. 29:18): "The King of Babylon hath made his army
to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no
reward given him," and further on: "And it shall be wages for his army
. . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored for
me. " Therefore temporal goods fall under merit.
Objection 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on
account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal
punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal
goods fall under merit.
Objection 4: On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon
all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike;
according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and
the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the
unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.
I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a
kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the second,
relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according to Ps.
72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and consequently
what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under
merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to
him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and this does not fall
under merit simply, but relatively.
Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are
useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall
directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and
everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first
grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods
to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these temporal
goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For there is
no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I have not seen
the just forsaken," etc.
But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not
man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall under
merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do
temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their purpose. And
thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice
in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above ([2256]AA[3],6), so
have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature of reward,
with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's wills are moved to
undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have not a right
intention in them.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in
these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For
the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life;
and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic. "
Reply to Objection 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely
brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to
the malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon,
since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in
order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will
with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not right,
inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the
wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life
everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not
punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the
wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as
regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude
by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
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TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
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OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i. e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
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Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead,
i. e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also
things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the
Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith
is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since
they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth, but also created truth.
Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is
the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of
Faith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about
the simple and everlasting truth. " Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so
to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless,
do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation
to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for
it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of
God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show
further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).
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Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the
symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God .
. . almighty. " Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.
Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. "
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode
of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85],
A[5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the
intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that
are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have
faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on
the part of the thing believed.
Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith
is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge
about things through their means, so is it in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the
First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when
He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by
way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether anything false can come under faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be
the object of faith.
Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see
My day: he saw it, and was glad. " But after the time of Abraham, God
might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He
did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false.
Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of
Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the
preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He
began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated,
and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread.
Therefore something false can come under faith.
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to
the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore
nothing false can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the
formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the
First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but
not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect
the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and
charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be
an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in
itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it
stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of
infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it
is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under
faith, it cannot be false.
Reply to Objection 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to
believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the
time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a
human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false
opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a
false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such
and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of
Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow
that anything false comes under faith.
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Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen.
For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me,
Thomas, thou hast believed. " Therefore vision and faith regard the same
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore what is believed is seen.
Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Objection 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing. " Therefore
faith is of things seen.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not. "
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science).
Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an
act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to
the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear
of the other side, there will be faith.
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
senses or by the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another"
[*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang. ]: he saw the Man, and believing Him
to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my
God. "
Reply to Objection 2: Those things which come under faith can be
considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be
seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in
general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this
way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on
the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought
to be believed.
Reply to Objection 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe.
For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to
a right faith, and not to assent to others.
Reply to Objection 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith,
but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
follow that these things are seen.
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Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science
is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration]?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance,
since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance
of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things
savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in
unbelief. " Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of
science.
Objection 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred
writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore
such things can be an object of science.
Objection 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science. "
Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Objection 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is,
since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion
and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in
Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang. ) that "when a thing
is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception. "
Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception,
whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of
science.
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore
"seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a
fashion, seen.
Now as stated above [2265](A[4]), it is impossible that one and the
same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that
a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by
another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the
Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a
dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess
already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may
happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one
man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of
faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about
the same things.
Reply to Objection 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are
of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad
2,3).
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things
that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible,
or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i. e. from
the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii).
Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of
the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in
the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at
the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
must know them first of all by faith.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i. e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same
object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner,
one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith,
the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same
object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either
opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is
incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason
that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
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Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy
Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude,
cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous
to distinguish certain articles of faith.
Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied
indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the
formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith
cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no
notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of
Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth
concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief. " Now belief is a
voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ), "no man
believes against his will. " Therefore it seems that matters of faith
should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto. " Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes. "
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason,
is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God
suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead,
wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article
of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the
same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists
in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is
the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things
are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life.
Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition
reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc. ], the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to
our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation
of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that
a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like,
which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not
form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be
taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus
there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First
Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are
various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 11:6).
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Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb.
