"170 Such statements reveal that the process of
deradicalization
was still incom- plete.
Revolution and War_nodrm
British aid to the French counterrevolutionaries is described in detail in Mitchell, Under- ground War; and Maurice Hutt, Chouannerie and Counterrevolution: Puisaye, the Princes, and the British Government in the 1790s, 2 vols.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
? ? Revolution and War
called representants en mission to oversee the mobilization effort in the provinces and to suppress counterrevolutionary resistance. 144
Meanwhile, repeated military setbacks during this period brought the struggle between the Girondins and the Montagnards to a climax. The stale- mate between them was finally broken by another popular uprising in Paris: a new Commune was formed on May 31 and thousands of angry sans-culottes surrounded the Convention and forced it to remove and arrest twenty-nine Girondin leaders. The upheaval left the Montagnards in control of the Convention and the government, although their own freedom of ac- tion was constrained by the threat of another popular uprising. 145
The ouster of the Girondins cleared the way for more extreme measures.
The CPS was reorganized and given near-dictatorial powers, and a new and more radical constitution was approved in August. 146 The CPS began a bru- tal campaign against provincial rebels and suspected counterrevolutionar- ies, aided by local revolutionary committees and paramilitary bands knoWll1l as armies revolutionnaires. 147 In August, the CPS proclaimed the famous levee en masse, which made all French citizens eligible for national service. Frenclh armed strength increased to nearly 6oo,ooo men by the fall of 1 793 and more than a million one year later, and new military industries were created and manned. 148 The Law of the General Maximum imposed price controls il! 1l September, a Law on Suspects enhanced the CPS's powers to arrest poten- tial traitors, and the Law of 14 Frimaire, Year II (December 5, 1793}, gave itt authority over all public officials and legislated the denunciation of traitors before revolutionary tribunals. 149
These measures were accompanied by a deliberate effort to transform the symbolic and moral bases of French society. The CPS adopted the metric system in August and replaced the Christian calendar with a revolutionary one as part of an overt campaign of dechristianization. 150 In addition to en-
144 See Hampson, Social History, 168-69.
145 On the fall of the Girondins, see Mathiez, French Revolution, chap. 10.
146 The Constitution of the Year I was suspended until the end of the war and was never im-
plemented. For its text, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 454-68; for its background, see Maoc Bouloiseau, The Jacobin Republic, 1792-1 794, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1983), 67-68; and Thompson, French Revolution, 36o-63.
147 The definitive treatment of. the armees revolutionnaires is Richard Cobb, Tire People's Armies, trans. M. Elliott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). On the revolutionary com- mittees, see John Black Sirich, fhe Revolutionary Commitees in the Departments of France, 1793-94 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943).
148 The text of the decree is in Stewart, Documentary History, 472-74. For discussions of its effects, see Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 56-61; Ross, E u ropean Diplomatic History, 8o; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution.
149 These decrees are in Stewart, Documentary Survey, 477-90.
150 The new calendar dated Year I from the founding of the republic on September 22, 1793. There were twelve months of thirty days each and a five-day festival period. See Mona Ozouf, "Revolutionary Calendar," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 538-47.
? ? The French Revolution
couraging popular patriotism, these efforts reflected the beliefs that the re- public required new symbolic and moral foundations and that direct gov- ernment action should be taken to promote civic virtue.
The establishment of the Jacobin dictatorship did not bring the struggle for power to an end; if anything, factional quarrels became even more in- tense. At one extreme were the so-called Hebertists (after the radical leader Jacques-Rene Hebert), who favored economic policies to benefit the poor, radical dechristianization, rigorous measures against hoarders and political criminals, and the aggressive export of revolution. 151 At the other extreme stood Danton and the Indulgents, who favored a negotiated peace, the re-
laxation of the Terror, and a return to constitutional rule. Between them stood Robespierre, Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just, and their followers, who were increasingly suspicious of both groups and preoccupied with estab- lishing a "Republic of Virtue. "152 Fostering conflict among these groups was a paranoid political climate in which accusations of treason and fears of for- eign plots abounded. Under these conditions, virtually any disagreement could be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. Or as Saint-Just put it in March 1794: "Every faction is then criminal, because it tends to divide the citizens . . . [and] neutralizes the power of public virtue. " In the Jacobin Republic, dissent had become an act of treason. 153
Although the leaders of the Republic did not abandon all of their ideologi- cal aims and continued to rely on unconventional diplomatic means, the CPS abandoned their predecessors' utopian approach to foreign policy in favor of a more hardheaded realpolitik. Evidence of this deradicalization was most apparent in the declining commitment to the universalist goal of "promoting liberty," on the one hand, and the priority given to exploiting other peoples rather than liberating them, on the other. In contrast to its earlier support for foreign revolutionaries, for example, the Convention rejected a request for the formation of an Italian legion in February 1793. 154 The Convention revoked the Decree on Liberty in April and declared that henceforth it would "not in-
151 The Hebertists were also known as "ultras" or "enrages. " See Denis Richet, "He- bertists," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 363-69; and Schama, Citizens, 805-17.
152 The belief that dlomestic opponents constituted the main threat to the revolution was a consistent theme in Robespierre's political thought. David P. Jordan, The Revolutionary Career ofMaximilien Robespierre (New York: Free Press, 1985), 17o-172.
153 Robespierre also warned of the danger of factions in the fall of 1793, telling the Conven- tion that "whoever seeks to debase, divide, or paralyze the Convention is an enemy of our country, whether he sits in this hall or is a foreigner. " Quotations from R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year ofthe Terror in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 71, 291, and also see 263-66.
154 In a report to the Diplomatic Committee, Lazare Carnot suggested that the simplest means of establishing a universal republic would be "to establish within the bounds Nature has traced for us [such] prosperity [that] . . . neighboring peoples . . . will be led to imitate [us]. . . . The first interest to consult is that of the [French] Republic itself. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:220 n. 268.
? ? ? terfere in any manner in the government of other powers. "155 By the fall, Robespierre was insisting the revolution should be spread not by force but by example, telling the Convention that "the French are not afflicted with a mania for rendering any nation happy and free despite itsel? . "156 Similarly, when it became clear that efforts to "promote liberty" via propaganda and
subversion were undermining French relations with several neutral powers (such as the United States and the Swiss Confederation), France's leaders re- called their agents and suspended their subversive efforts. 157
The waning of revolutionary internationalism was accompanied by a growing xenophobia, once again triggered by the pervasive fear of foreign plots. 158 In December, Robespierre accused foreign revolutionaries such as Anacharsis Cloots of dragging France into a dangerous and unprofitable war, informing the Jacobin Club, "! distrust without distinction all those for- eigners . . . who endeavour to appear more republican and energetic than we are. "159 While serving as representant en mission in Alsace in December, Saint-Just disbanded a group of local republicans who advocated universal liberty; one of his assistants advised Robespierre "not to listen to these cos- mopolitan charlatans and to trust only in ourselves. " The CPS denied a pe- tition for assistance from a group 'of Dutch revolutionaries in March, and nt eventually dissolved the foreign legions that the Assembly had created in
1792. Thus, by 1794 the earlier visions of a universal crusade for liberty had faded almost completely. 160
Moderation was also apparent in French policy toward neutral states. De- spite an improving military posture, pressure from local officials, and the
155 As Da11t1 on told the deputies: "In a moment of enthusiasm you passed a decree whose motive was doubtless fine . . . [but) this decree appeared to commit you to support a few p<? ? triots who might wish to start a revolution in China. Above all we need to look to the preser? vation of our own body politic and lay the foundation of French greatness. " Quoted i111 Blanning, French Revolution and Germany, 70; and see also Stewart, Documentary Survey, 426-27.
156 Robespierre also emphasized the need to stop "our generals and our armies [from in- terfering) in [others') political affairs; it is the only means of preventing intrigues which can terminate our glorious revolution. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:18? 9.
157 See Eugene R. Sheridan, "The Recall of Edmund Charles Genet," Diplomatic History 18, no. 4 (1994); and David Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the Robes- pierrist Committee on Public Safety" (Ph. D. diss. , University of Washington, 1974}, 56-65, 94o 96-103.
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? 158 The fear of foreign plots, magnified by Dumouriez's treason, helped lead to the ouster of the Girondin leaders in June. These fears grew in the fall, when a Montagnard deputy in- formed the CPS that the republic faced a vast foreign conspiracy whose members included Convention deputies, foreign ministry officials, and Marie-Joseph Herault de Sechelles, a member of the CPS itself. See Mathiez, Revolution et les etrangers, 164? 6; and Silverman, "In- formal Diplomacy," 106-107.
159 Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 419; and see also Silverman, "Informal Diplo- macy," 130.
160 Quoted in Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 108 n. 5?
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massacre of several French sailors by a group of English seamen, the CPS chose to respect Genoese neutrality during the fall of 1793. When an attempt to undermine English commerce with a discriminatory Navigation Act damaged relations with neutral states and brought French foreign trade to a standstill, the CPS promptly suspended the act and embarked on efforts to rebuild ties with neutral powers. 161
As noted earlier, the exigencies of war had also forced the republic to abandon its idealistic principles and systematically exploit conquered re- gions in order to sustain its war effort. The tension between universal ideals and selfish national interests was already apparent in the fall of 1792, and the decree of December 15, 1792, was the first step toward a more self-serving policy. The issue was moot so long as France was on the defensive, but when its military fortunes improved, the Convention or- dered army commanders to renounce "every philanthropic idea previ- ously adopted by the French people with the intention of making foreign nations appreciate the values and benefits of liberty. " Now, the French armies were to "behave towards the enemies of France in just the same way that the powers of the Coalition have behaved towards them . . . and exercise . . . the customary rights of war. " In a sharp departure from its original ideals, therefore, the republic was now justifying the exploitation of occupied territories on the grounds that other great powers acted the same wayP62 As the French armies continued to advance, the exploitation of conquered territory became a way of life. The CPS established agencies of evacuation to coordinate the exploitation of foreign resources in May 1794, and Carnot, who was responsible for military mobilization, de- clared, "We must live at the expense of the enemy . . . , we are not entering his territory to bring him money. "163 Even measures of apparent restraint masked self-interested motives: prior to the occupation of Holland in Jan- uary 1795, the CPS informed its generals that "the interest of the Republic is to reassure the Dutch so that they do not emigrate with their riches. . . . It is necessary to safeguard the rights of property so that Holland will fur- nish us with provisions. "164
161 See Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 86-8- 7, 92, 135-38.
162 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 72; and see also Biro, German Policy, 1:191-<)2, 207-208.
163 When the French reoccupied Belgium in July, Carnot declared that "all that is found in Belgium must be sent back to France. . . . It is necessary to despoil the country and make it im- possible to furnish means for the enemy to return. " Although Carnot emphasized that French requisitions should be confined to the rich and that the occupiers should respect Belgian cus- toms, these restrictions were usually ignored in practice. See Silverman, "Informal Diplo- macy," 228-30; and Biro, German Policy, 1:230.
164 Quoted in Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 181. French policy in the Rhineland was evell\ more severe, and the winter of 1 793-94 became known as the "Plunder Winter. " See Blan- ning, French Revolution in Germany, chap. 3; and Biro, German Policy, 1 :205-207.
? ? A final sign of deradicalization was France's intermittent effort to im- prove its diplomatic position and negotiate an end to the war. During his tenure on the first CPS, Danton tried unsuccessfully to attract Sweden, Den- mark, the Ottoman Empire, and several other states into an alliance with France, while simultaneously seeking to isolate Austria by courting Prussia. Similarly, Lebrun made an indirect offer to support the Prussian acquisition of several smaller German states in April and extended Prussia a free hand in Poland in May. These concessions led to direct negotiations between French and Prussian agents. The minister of the interior told the Convention that peace might be imminent, but the negotiations were cut off when Dan- ton was removed froiJl the CPS in July. 165
French leaders' efforts to initiate talks with England and Austria were less successful. lebrun made a tentative overture to England through a Welsh tea dealer and intriguer named James Tilly Matthews, and although the Mon- tagnards permitted Lebrun to continue his efforts after his arrest in June, these informal contacts failed to bear fruit. 166 France also sent envoys to sev- eral ltalian courts to see if they would renew an alliance with France in ex- change for the release of Marie Antoinette, but this overly subtle attempt to probe Austrian intentions led nowhere. 167 Danton held private discussions with an English agent in December 1793 (with the apparent approval of the CPS). An agent was instructed to open indirect negotations with England at about the same time, while England made overtures to France via Phillipe Noel, the French envoy at Venice. Foreign Minister Franc;ois Deforgues es- tablished indirect and direct contacts with Prussia in a further attempt to sep- arate it from Vienna, and there is even some evidence that Robespierre sent an agent to explore the possibility of peace with Austria in May 1794. 168
These efforts failed for a number of reasons. France's bargaining position was initially quite weak, and the Coalition had little reason to make peace when its opponent seemed ready to collapse. The domestic climate within France was unfavorable as well, as any effort to pursue peace left one ex- posed to accusations of treason. Indeed, pressure from the Hebertists even- tually led the Convention to outlaw negotiations with states that did not recognize tlhe republic, resulting in the severing of direct diplomatic contacts with all countries except the United States and the Swiss Confederation. 169
165 On these various offers, see Biro, German Policy, 1 : 163-65; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 3:47-53; and Alphonse Aulard, "La diplomatie du premier Comite de salut public," in his Etudes et /e? orns sur Ia rroolutionfran? aise, 3d ser. (Paris: Felix Alcan, H)02), 121-22, 205.
166 Williams, "Missions of Williams and Matthews," 66o-65 and passim.
167 Aulard, "Diplomatie du premier Comite de salut public," 135-36.
168 Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," no--12, 14o-4- 7. Historians remain divided over
whether the latter negotiations actually took place; see Biro, German Policy, 1 :222-36.
169 The April 1793 decree renouncing support for "foreign patriots" had also imposed the death penalty for proposing negotiations with states "which have not previously solemnly rec-
ognized . . . the French nation. . . [and] its sovereignty. " Stewart, Documentary Survey, 426-27.
Revolution and War
? ? ? ? ? The French Revolution
This constraint forced Foreign Minister Deforgues to rely on indirect con- tacts, via neutral agents, and confined subsequent peace overtures to obscure and unreliable back channels. In addition, key members of the Coalition had different aims and interests, making it difficult to devise a settlement that would be acceptable to all. Finally, as a result of a series of French victories in the fall of 1793, an immediate peace seemed less necessary and the republic hardened its diplomatic position. Although states such as Prussia were in- creasingly willing to settle, prominent Jacobins now argued that only all-out war would gain them acceptable terms. As one member of the CPS, Bertrand Barere, told the Convention in January: "In wars of liberty there is only one means: it is to ruin and exterminate the despots. . . . There is neither peace
nor truce, nor armistice, nor any treaty to make with the despots until the Republic is consolidated, triumphant, and dictating peace to the nations.
"170 Such statements reveal that the process of deradicalization was still incom- plete. They also illustrate how domestic divisions prevented France from splitting the alliance even when a separate peace was within reach.
In short, although the French Republic had not abandoned all of its ideo- logical principles, its policies in 1793-94 were a striking departure from the lofty visions that had driven France to war in 1792-93. And by mobilizing its latent potential and moderating its more unrealistic schemes, revolution- ary France escaped defeat once again.
Divisions within the opposing coalition played a key role in the survival of the revolution as well. Austria and Prussia were increasingly at odds; each blamed the other for their. poor performance in 1792, and Frederick William's commitment to the war declined even more after Prussia and Russia signed a secret agreement for a second partition of Poland in January 1793. Once the Allies reconquered Belgium in the summer of 1793, he an- nounced that Prussia would continue the war only if he were granted an- other subsidy. He ordered his generals to leave the French Army intact and to give only limited assistance to his Austrian ally. The allied advance re- sumed after England agreed to provide additional funds, but Prussia's com- mitment to the Coalition remained shaky at best. It vanished entirely after Austria and Russia mended fences and arranged a final partition of Poland in 1794, and Frederick William soon decided to abandon the war with France in order to preserve his gains nn the east. 171
170 Barere also invoked the fear of traitors by asking, "Who then dare to speak of peace? [Only] aristocrats, the rich, . . . the friends of conspirators, . . . bad citizens, false patriots. . . . What we need today is redoubled boldness against conspirators, . . . redoubled scrutiny against men who call themselves patriots. " Quoted in Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 156-59; see Leo Gershoy, Bertrand Barere: A Reluctant Terrorist (Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1962), 157-59; 207-208.
171 In the words of Paul Schroeder, "the allied coalition was wrecked more by internal divi- sions than French victories. " Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 138; also see Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, 27-48.
[971
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England's leaders tried to transform the coalition into a unified alliance, but their own priorities were far from clear and not always compatible with the aims of nts putative allies. Having entered the war solely to halt French expansion, the government gradually came to view the restoration of the
monarchy as an essential strategic objective. 172 English leaders were them- selves divided on what strategy to follow. Like their allies, they proved un- able to resist the lure of territorial acquisitions. Even though the main road to victory lay in the battlefields of the Low Countries and the Rhineland, England sent nearly seven thousand troops to seize the French colonies in the Caribbean and another five thousand to support a counterrevolutionary uprising at Toulon. 173 These diversions weakened the coalition's military ef- fort and rekindled Spanish opposition to English colonial expansion, leav- ing Spain more susceptible to subsequent French blandishments.
Instead of banding together against revolutionary France, in short, the members of the First Coalition were more interested in acquiring territory for themselves than in forging a strategy that might have made such acqui- sitions possible. The combined effects of French mobilization and allied dis- unity were soon apparent: French victories at Hondschoote and Wattignies halted the Alllied advance in the fall of 1793, and an Allied attempt to re- sume the initiative in April 1794 was soundly defeated. The French armies won a decisive victory at Tourcoing in May and had reoccupied Brussels, Antwerp, and Liege by midsummer, along with most of the left bank of the Rhine. The Spaniards and Sardinians were driven back in the south, and the counterrevolutionary rebellions inside France were beginning to subside as well. By the fall of 1794, the threat to the republic had been lifted and France had resumed its expansionist course.
From Thermidor to the Directory. As noted earlier, the easing of the foreign danger in the spring allowed rifts to reemerge within the CPS and the Con- vention. Convinced that the Indulgents and the Hebertists posed threats to the revolution, Robespierre and his followers now took the offensive against both. After mending fences with Danton and cultivating the sans-culottes with a series of generous economic decrees, the CPS brought the Hebertists
m Thus, the commissioners in Toulon were informed that "the acknowledgement of an hereditary monarchy . . . affords the only probable ground for restoring regular government in France," and a royal manifesto in October 1793 invited the French to "join the Standard of an Hereditary Monarchy, . . . in order to unite themselves once more under the Empire of Law, of Morality, and of Religion. " In 1794, Pitt remarked that he "had no idea of any peace being secure, unless France returned to a monarchical system. " Quoted in Mitchell, Under- ground War, 34; Cobban, Debate on the French Revolution, 46o-62; and McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, 27J.
173 See Michael Duffy, Sugar, Soldiers, and Seapower: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); and Ehrman, Reluc- tant Transition, esp. 303.
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before the Paris tribunal and executed them on March 23. Danton and sev- eral associates followed them to the guillotine two weeks later, leaving Robespierre and his supporters free to wage war against suspected counter- revolutionaries in the name of the Republic of Virtue. The law of 22 Prairial (June 10, 1794) streamlined the work of the revolutionary tribunals and broadened the list of capital offenses, and the guillotines claimed over two thousand victims in the next two months alone. 174
The Great Terror marked the final stage of the Jacobin republic. Now con- vinced that Robespierre sought to establish a personal dictatorship, a faction within the CPS organized a coup. Robespierre defended his actions by again invoking the danger of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy, but the deputies had finally turned against him and he was arrested and subsequently exe- cuted on 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794), along with Saint-Just and several others.
The Jacobin dictatorship had saved the republic, but Robespierre's suc- cessors began dismantling it as soon as he was gone. 175 The Jacobin Club was banned in November, and a White Terror soon arose against suspected Jacobins. The end of the revolutionary dictatorship did not bring political stability, however, and food shortages, rising prices, and an extremely cold winter sparked violent demonstrations by the Parisian sans-culottes in Ger- minal and Prairial, Year III (April-May 1795). Unlike in past upheavals, however, the demonstrators were quickly suppressed by government troops. 176 Even more important, the end of the Terror allowed royalists, Girondins, emigres, and loyal Catholics to reenter political life. Given the enduring divisions within French society (which had been exacerbated by the revolution and the Terror), it was now nearly impossible for any gov- ernment to gain broad popular support.
The political weakness of the Thermidorean regime was institutionalized by the Constitution of the Year III. Enacted in September 1795, the new con- stitution established a bicameral Assembly chosen by indirect elections, with suffrage restricted to males over twenty-one and participation in the
174 The ouster of the Hebertists and Dantonists is described in Thompson, French Revolution, 452-60. For Robespierre's vision of the ideal republic, see Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled, 275-77; and Thompson, Robespierre, 45<r-55, 485-96. On the magnitude of the Terror, see Donald Greer, The Incidence ofthe Terror in the French Revolution: A Statistical Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935); and Schama, Citizens, 836-37.
175 The Convention quickly repealed the law of 22 Prairial, curtailed the use of terror, abol- ished price controls, suspended the levee en masse, and abandoned reliance on the represen- tants en mission. Several Girondin deputies were readmitted to the Convention, and the CPS also offered an amnesty to the rebels in the Vendee and partially restored freedom of religion. See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 2:137-42; Stewart, Documentary Survey, 538-552; and Denis Woronoff, The Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, 1 794-1 799, trans. Julian Jackson (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-10, 2<r-22.
176 According to Lefebvre, the government's victory over the popular forces in Paris on 3 Prairial marks "the date which should be taken as the end of the Revolution. Its mainspring was now broken. " French Revolution, 2:144-45.
? [991
? ? second electoral stage limited by strict property qualifications. Executive powers were assigned to a five-man Directory chosen by the two legislative Councils, and one-third of each Council and one of the five directors were to be replaced each year. 177 Intended as a safeguard against dictatorship, these measures deprived the executive of stability and authority. Not only was the executive vulnerable to disputes among the directors, but its membership was constantly changing owing to the rotation of deputies in the Councils. 178 Moreover, by seeking to restore the moderate order envisioned in the Con- stitution of 1791 (minus the monarchy, of course}, the Directory guaranteed its own unpopularity. Royalists rejected it because there was no king, die- hard republicans opposed the property restrictions and preferred the more egalitarian Constitution of 1793, and both groups remained fearful that the other might regain power. Thus, the Directory rested on an extremely nar- row political base and faced repeated challenges from resurgent royalists and unrepentant republicans alike. 179 Even before the constitution was com- pleted, evidence of increasing royalist strength led the leaders of the Con- vention to decree that two-thirds of the seats in the new Councils would be chosen from among their own ranks. This measure, which guaranteed that moderate republicans would control the new Councils, provoked a two-day
uprising by Parisian royalists on 12-13 Vendemiaire , Year IV (October 4-5, 1795). Hardly an auspicious beginning, this turmoil was a clear indication of the Directory's shaky foundation. 180
These problems were compounded by irregular food supplies, growing disparities of income, alternating periods of inflation and deflation, and en- during budgetary problems. Recurrent counterrevolutionary disturbances did nothing to help the French economy, and although the Directory ex- ploited its foreign conquests relentlessly, these gains were negated by the
m For the text of the new Constitution, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 571-612; for analyses of its provisions, see Woronoff, Thermidorean Regime and Directory, 29-31; Martyn Lyons, France under the Directory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 18-20; Sutherland,France,272-'75;andLefebvre,FrenchRevolution,2:16o-4-6 .
178 The director to be replaced each year was chosen by drawing lots. For the changing composition of the Directory, see Jones, Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 82-83; Albert Goodwin, "The French Executive Directory-ARevaluation," in The French Revolution: Conflicting Interpretations, ed. Frank Kafker and James M. Laux, 2d ed. (Malabar, Fla. : Krieger, 1989); and M. J. Sydenham, The First French Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), J2J-41.
179 According to Sutherland, "the Directory has a totally justified reputation as one of the most chaotic periods in modem French history. " France, 279? For a dissenting view, see Good- win, "French Executive Directory. "
180 The Vendemiaire uprising marked the political debut of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose troops fired the "whiff of grapeshot" that helped defeat the royalist groups. See Rude, Crowd in the French Revolution, chap. n; Jacques Godechot, The Counterrevolution: Doctrine and Ac- tion, 1789-1804, trans. Salvator Attanasio (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 26o-62; Sydenham, First French Republic, 76-82; and Harvey Mitchell, "Vendemiaire: A Reval- uation," Journal ofModern History JO, no. 3 (1958), 191-202.
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? [too]
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damage done to French foreign trade. The Directory did much to stabilize French fiscal policy over the longer term, but the short-term costs were se- vere and contributed greatly to the country's political weakness. 181
The Foreign Policy of the Directory. The political divisions within France and the weakness of the new regime had important effects on French foreign policy and its conduct of the war. To begin with, there was no con- sensus on what France's war aims should be. 182 Royalists favored the re- nunciation of prior French conquests, seeing that as the swiftest route to peace and a restoration of the monarchy. Moderates within the Directory sought only limited territorial acquisitions, on the grounds that further ex- pansion would undermine French power and lead to incessant warfare. 183
The dominant position, however, was held by the advocates of "natural borders," whose ranks included most of the leading figures of the Thermi- dorean period and the first Directory. According to this view, France's bor- ders had been "ordained by nature" and consisted of the Atlantic, the Pyrenees, the Alps, and most importantly, the Rhine. To obtain these limits, France would have to annex Belgium and the entire left bank of the Rhine, including German states belonging to Prussia and Austria or falling under Francis II's protection in his capacity as head of the Holy Roman Empire.
To justify prolonging the war, supporters of "les grandes limites" argued that expansion to the Rhine would greatly enhance French security. As Mer- lin de Douai told the Convention in December 1794: "We want [a peace] guaranteed by our own power and the powerlessness of our enemies ever to harm us. " Another member of the CPS, Fran\ois-Antoine Boissy d'Anglas, told the Convention that the borders designated by nature would protect France from "all invasion . . . for a long series of centuries," and Jean-Jacques Cambaceres, a prominent Thermidorean, declared, "When a nation has risen in arms against invasion, . . . it should use its power to ensure that [its rights] will be respected forever. " Others suggested that France required additional territory in order to counter the Prussian and Austrian gains in Poland and
181 Economic conditions and policies under the Directory are summarized in Sydenham, First French Republic, 96-100, 182-86; Goodwin, "French Executive Directory," 326-32; Woronoff, Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, chap. 4; Lyons, France under the Directory, chaps. 4-5, 12; and Michel Bruguiere, "Assignats," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 426-)6.
182 On the different positions, see Ross, European Diplomatic History, no-112; Lyons, France under the Directon;, 19<>-91; Woronoff, Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, 27, 61-63; and Biro, German Policy, 2:488-<)8, 5oo-5o6.
183 Thus, Camot told the CPS in July 1794- "We could, if we so wished, plant the liberty tree on the banks of the Rhine and unite to France all the former territory of the Gauls, but how- ever seductive this system might be, . . . France can only weaken herself and sow the seeds of an endless war by expanding her territory in this way. " It should be noted that Camot's views on this issue fluctuated greatly. See Richet, "Natural Borders," 76o-61; Biro, German Policy, 1 :235, 263, 2:504-505; and Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 75?
[101]
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preserve the balance of power; as Jean-Fran<<;ois Reubell put it, "The object of the pacification of France should be not so much to acquire indemnities, as to restore that equilibrium on which its safety depends. " Supporters of expan- sion also emphasized the wealth of the neighboring regions and argued that
annexation would redeem France's inflated currency, bolster the French economy, and sustain its military effort. And to combat the assertion that oc- cupation or annexation would be unpopular, advocates claimed that the local populations believed "they have all to gain by being French. "184
The advocates of expansion lacked the political power to impose their preferences arbitrarily, and obtaining the "natural borders" would in any case require additional military successes. So long as Reubell was the dom- inant figure in the Directory, however, this group had the greatest influence over French war aims. Reubell was especially interested in protecting the French position in his native Alsace, and his control over foreign policy en- sured that the goal of les grandes limites was never entirely abandoned. 185
Several other factors strengthened the expansionist thrust of French for- eign policy and reduced the prospects for peace. The first was economic: be- cause the ravaged French economy could not keep the army supplied, it had become reliant on requisitions and levies from the occupied territories. Thus, the Directory told General Moreau that he should "nourish the Army with the fruit of its courage" and reminded General Jourdan that "the great art of war is to live at the expense of the enemy. "186
France's dependence on the lands it occupied was compounded by the in- dependence of local representatives and military commanders and also by the opportunities for personal enrichment that occupation afforded. The Di- rectory had abandoned the Jacobin system of central supply and given pri- vate contractors the task of supplying the army. This policy allowed the generals even greater freedom of action and created a powerful domestic constituency whose financial well-being was sustained by war. 187 To make
184 These quotations are from Biro, German Policy, 1:263, 335, 427-38, 2:513; and Blanning, French Revolu tion in Germany, 74?
? ? 185 See Gerlof D. Homan, ]ean-Franfois Reubell: French Revolutionary, Patriot, and Director (1747-1807) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), esp. 89.
186 As Blanning notes, "neither in nature, scope, nor intensity was the exploitation of the Rhineland exceptional. The conditions which dictated exploitation-the penury of the gov- ernment, the size of the armies, the scale of the war-applied with roughly equal force to all other parts of French-occupied Europe. " See his French Revolution in Germany, chap. 3, esp. 127-28; and Biro, German Policy, 2:65o-6o.
181 Thus, one French official admitted, "Our expedition [across) the Rhine . . . was due en- tirely to pecuniary considerations. . . . Our incursion into a rich and defenseless country was to proaire us the money of which we were in such dire need. " Quoted in Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 177o-187o (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92-93. On the growing independence of the army, see lyons, France under the Directory, 155-58. Ac- cording to Woronoff, by 1796 "the war was no longer concerned with national defense, but with conquest-or even merely plunder. " Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, 64? 7, 74?
[102]
? The French Revolu tion
matters worse, the deep divisions within French society and the lack of broad popular support forced the Directory to rely on the army to keep it- self in power. Bonaparte's "whiff of grapeshot" had halted the Vendemiaire uprising, and military support would be needed to defuse the royalist chal- lenge in Fructidor, Year V (September 1797) and the neo-Jacobin resurgence
of Floreal, Year VI (April 1798). Thus, the Directory had become dependent on the goodwill of its generals, and the army and its suppliers had become addicted to expansion, a combination wholly fatal to any serious effort to make peace.
. There is also evidence that the directors feared that peace would bring ad- verse domestic consequences-and greater royalist influence-unless they obtained tangible gains from the war. Abbe Sieyes told a Prussian diplomat in May 1795, "We need to obtain a glorious peace," and he later warned that the Directory "would be lost if peace were made. " Other directors feared that peace would expose them to charges of corruption, force the discharge of proroyalist troops, and reveal that economic hardship in France was due to their own mistakes rather than the war. The danger of direct military in- terference was equally worrisome; as one of the directors put it, "Make peace! And what will you do with the generals? Would they cultivate greens? "188
In short, although several directors recognized that a negotiated settle- ment was desirable, six years of revolution and war had created a formida- ble engine of expansion. Some of the directors now opposed further expansion, and in the words of Martyn Lyons, the foreign policy of the Di- rectory "oscillated between the defence of [the] natural frontiers, . . . and the creation of semi-independent sister republics," depending on shifts of mili- tary fortune and which faction enjoyed the dominant position in the execu- tive. 189 Despite the growing desire for peace and several promising diplomatic opportunities, therefore, the Directory was unable to take France out of the war.
TheCollapseoftheFirstCoalition. France'sinabilitytomakepeacewases- pecially tragic in light of its favorable military position. Amsterdam had fallen to the French in January 1795, and Dutch sympathizers quickly pro- claimed a "Batavian Republic" and signed a one-sided treaty of alliance in May. 190 Tuscany made peace in February, and peace talks between Prussia
?
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called representants en mission to oversee the mobilization effort in the provinces and to suppress counterrevolutionary resistance. 144
Meanwhile, repeated military setbacks during this period brought the struggle between the Girondins and the Montagnards to a climax. The stale- mate between them was finally broken by another popular uprising in Paris: a new Commune was formed on May 31 and thousands of angry sans-culottes surrounded the Convention and forced it to remove and arrest twenty-nine Girondin leaders. The upheaval left the Montagnards in control of the Convention and the government, although their own freedom of ac- tion was constrained by the threat of another popular uprising. 145
The ouster of the Girondins cleared the way for more extreme measures.
The CPS was reorganized and given near-dictatorial powers, and a new and more radical constitution was approved in August. 146 The CPS began a bru- tal campaign against provincial rebels and suspected counterrevolutionar- ies, aided by local revolutionary committees and paramilitary bands knoWll1l as armies revolutionnaires. 147 In August, the CPS proclaimed the famous levee en masse, which made all French citizens eligible for national service. Frenclh armed strength increased to nearly 6oo,ooo men by the fall of 1 793 and more than a million one year later, and new military industries were created and manned. 148 The Law of the General Maximum imposed price controls il! 1l September, a Law on Suspects enhanced the CPS's powers to arrest poten- tial traitors, and the Law of 14 Frimaire, Year II (December 5, 1793}, gave itt authority over all public officials and legislated the denunciation of traitors before revolutionary tribunals. 149
These measures were accompanied by a deliberate effort to transform the symbolic and moral bases of French society. The CPS adopted the metric system in August and replaced the Christian calendar with a revolutionary one as part of an overt campaign of dechristianization. 150 In addition to en-
144 See Hampson, Social History, 168-69.
145 On the fall of the Girondins, see Mathiez, French Revolution, chap. 10.
146 The Constitution of the Year I was suspended until the end of the war and was never im-
plemented. For its text, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 454-68; for its background, see Maoc Bouloiseau, The Jacobin Republic, 1792-1 794, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1983), 67-68; and Thompson, French Revolution, 36o-63.
147 The definitive treatment of. the armees revolutionnaires is Richard Cobb, Tire People's Armies, trans. M. Elliott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). On the revolutionary com- mittees, see John Black Sirich, fhe Revolutionary Commitees in the Departments of France, 1793-94 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943).
148 The text of the decree is in Stewart, Documentary History, 472-74. For discussions of its effects, see Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 56-61; Ross, E u ropean Diplomatic History, 8o; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution.
149 These decrees are in Stewart, Documentary Survey, 477-90.
150 The new calendar dated Year I from the founding of the republic on September 22, 1793. There were twelve months of thirty days each and a five-day festival period. See Mona Ozouf, "Revolutionary Calendar," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 538-47.
? ? The French Revolution
couraging popular patriotism, these efforts reflected the beliefs that the re- public required new symbolic and moral foundations and that direct gov- ernment action should be taken to promote civic virtue.
The establishment of the Jacobin dictatorship did not bring the struggle for power to an end; if anything, factional quarrels became even more in- tense. At one extreme were the so-called Hebertists (after the radical leader Jacques-Rene Hebert), who favored economic policies to benefit the poor, radical dechristianization, rigorous measures against hoarders and political criminals, and the aggressive export of revolution. 151 At the other extreme stood Danton and the Indulgents, who favored a negotiated peace, the re-
laxation of the Terror, and a return to constitutional rule. Between them stood Robespierre, Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just, and their followers, who were increasingly suspicious of both groups and preoccupied with estab- lishing a "Republic of Virtue. "152 Fostering conflict among these groups was a paranoid political climate in which accusations of treason and fears of for- eign plots abounded. Under these conditions, virtually any disagreement could be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. Or as Saint-Just put it in March 1794: "Every faction is then criminal, because it tends to divide the citizens . . . [and] neutralizes the power of public virtue. " In the Jacobin Republic, dissent had become an act of treason. 153
Although the leaders of the Republic did not abandon all of their ideologi- cal aims and continued to rely on unconventional diplomatic means, the CPS abandoned their predecessors' utopian approach to foreign policy in favor of a more hardheaded realpolitik. Evidence of this deradicalization was most apparent in the declining commitment to the universalist goal of "promoting liberty," on the one hand, and the priority given to exploiting other peoples rather than liberating them, on the other. In contrast to its earlier support for foreign revolutionaries, for example, the Convention rejected a request for the formation of an Italian legion in February 1793. 154 The Convention revoked the Decree on Liberty in April and declared that henceforth it would "not in-
151 The Hebertists were also known as "ultras" or "enrages. " See Denis Richet, "He- bertists," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 363-69; and Schama, Citizens, 805-17.
152 The belief that dlomestic opponents constituted the main threat to the revolution was a consistent theme in Robespierre's political thought. David P. Jordan, The Revolutionary Career ofMaximilien Robespierre (New York: Free Press, 1985), 17o-172.
153 Robespierre also warned of the danger of factions in the fall of 1793, telling the Conven- tion that "whoever seeks to debase, divide, or paralyze the Convention is an enemy of our country, whether he sits in this hall or is a foreigner. " Quotations from R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year ofthe Terror in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 71, 291, and also see 263-66.
154 In a report to the Diplomatic Committee, Lazare Carnot suggested that the simplest means of establishing a universal republic would be "to establish within the bounds Nature has traced for us [such] prosperity [that] . . . neighboring peoples . . . will be led to imitate [us]. . . . The first interest to consult is that of the [French] Republic itself. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:220 n. 268.
? ? ? terfere in any manner in the government of other powers. "155 By the fall, Robespierre was insisting the revolution should be spread not by force but by example, telling the Convention that "the French are not afflicted with a mania for rendering any nation happy and free despite itsel? . "156 Similarly, when it became clear that efforts to "promote liberty" via propaganda and
subversion were undermining French relations with several neutral powers (such as the United States and the Swiss Confederation), France's leaders re- called their agents and suspended their subversive efforts. 157
The waning of revolutionary internationalism was accompanied by a growing xenophobia, once again triggered by the pervasive fear of foreign plots. 158 In December, Robespierre accused foreign revolutionaries such as Anacharsis Cloots of dragging France into a dangerous and unprofitable war, informing the Jacobin Club, "! distrust without distinction all those for- eigners . . . who endeavour to appear more republican and energetic than we are. "159 While serving as representant en mission in Alsace in December, Saint-Just disbanded a group of local republicans who advocated universal liberty; one of his assistants advised Robespierre "not to listen to these cos- mopolitan charlatans and to trust only in ourselves. " The CPS denied a pe- tition for assistance from a group 'of Dutch revolutionaries in March, and nt eventually dissolved the foreign legions that the Assembly had created in
1792. Thus, by 1794 the earlier visions of a universal crusade for liberty had faded almost completely. 160
Moderation was also apparent in French policy toward neutral states. De- spite an improving military posture, pressure from local officials, and the
155 As Da11t1 on told the deputies: "In a moment of enthusiasm you passed a decree whose motive was doubtless fine . . . [but) this decree appeared to commit you to support a few p<? ? triots who might wish to start a revolution in China. Above all we need to look to the preser? vation of our own body politic and lay the foundation of French greatness. " Quoted i111 Blanning, French Revolution and Germany, 70; and see also Stewart, Documentary Survey, 426-27.
156 Robespierre also emphasized the need to stop "our generals and our armies [from in- terfering) in [others') political affairs; it is the only means of preventing intrigues which can terminate our glorious revolution. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:18? 9.
157 See Eugene R. Sheridan, "The Recall of Edmund Charles Genet," Diplomatic History 18, no. 4 (1994); and David Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the Robes- pierrist Committee on Public Safety" (Ph. D. diss. , University of Washington, 1974}, 56-65, 94o 96-103.
Revolution and War
? 158 The fear of foreign plots, magnified by Dumouriez's treason, helped lead to the ouster of the Girondin leaders in June. These fears grew in the fall, when a Montagnard deputy in- formed the CPS that the republic faced a vast foreign conspiracy whose members included Convention deputies, foreign ministry officials, and Marie-Joseph Herault de Sechelles, a member of the CPS itself. See Mathiez, Revolution et les etrangers, 164? 6; and Silverman, "In- formal Diplomacy," 106-107.
159 Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 419; and see also Silverman, "Informal Diplo- macy," 130.
160 Quoted in Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 108 n. 5?
? ? The French Revolution
massacre of several French sailors by a group of English seamen, the CPS chose to respect Genoese neutrality during the fall of 1793. When an attempt to undermine English commerce with a discriminatory Navigation Act damaged relations with neutral states and brought French foreign trade to a standstill, the CPS promptly suspended the act and embarked on efforts to rebuild ties with neutral powers. 161
As noted earlier, the exigencies of war had also forced the republic to abandon its idealistic principles and systematically exploit conquered re- gions in order to sustain its war effort. The tension between universal ideals and selfish national interests was already apparent in the fall of 1792, and the decree of December 15, 1792, was the first step toward a more self-serving policy. The issue was moot so long as France was on the defensive, but when its military fortunes improved, the Convention or- dered army commanders to renounce "every philanthropic idea previ- ously adopted by the French people with the intention of making foreign nations appreciate the values and benefits of liberty. " Now, the French armies were to "behave towards the enemies of France in just the same way that the powers of the Coalition have behaved towards them . . . and exercise . . . the customary rights of war. " In a sharp departure from its original ideals, therefore, the republic was now justifying the exploitation of occupied territories on the grounds that other great powers acted the same wayP62 As the French armies continued to advance, the exploitation of conquered territory became a way of life. The CPS established agencies of evacuation to coordinate the exploitation of foreign resources in May 1794, and Carnot, who was responsible for military mobilization, de- clared, "We must live at the expense of the enemy . . . , we are not entering his territory to bring him money. "163 Even measures of apparent restraint masked self-interested motives: prior to the occupation of Holland in Jan- uary 1795, the CPS informed its generals that "the interest of the Republic is to reassure the Dutch so that they do not emigrate with their riches. . . . It is necessary to safeguard the rights of property so that Holland will fur- nish us with provisions. "164
161 See Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 86-8- 7, 92, 135-38.
162 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 72; and see also Biro, German Policy, 1:191-<)2, 207-208.
163 When the French reoccupied Belgium in July, Carnot declared that "all that is found in Belgium must be sent back to France. . . . It is necessary to despoil the country and make it im- possible to furnish means for the enemy to return. " Although Carnot emphasized that French requisitions should be confined to the rich and that the occupiers should respect Belgian cus- toms, these restrictions were usually ignored in practice. See Silverman, "Informal Diplo- macy," 228-30; and Biro, German Policy, 1:230.
164 Quoted in Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 181. French policy in the Rhineland was evell\ more severe, and the winter of 1 793-94 became known as the "Plunder Winter. " See Blan- ning, French Revolution in Germany, chap. 3; and Biro, German Policy, 1 :205-207.
? ? A final sign of deradicalization was France's intermittent effort to im- prove its diplomatic position and negotiate an end to the war. During his tenure on the first CPS, Danton tried unsuccessfully to attract Sweden, Den- mark, the Ottoman Empire, and several other states into an alliance with France, while simultaneously seeking to isolate Austria by courting Prussia. Similarly, Lebrun made an indirect offer to support the Prussian acquisition of several smaller German states in April and extended Prussia a free hand in Poland in May. These concessions led to direct negotiations between French and Prussian agents. The minister of the interior told the Convention that peace might be imminent, but the negotiations were cut off when Dan- ton was removed froiJl the CPS in July. 165
French leaders' efforts to initiate talks with England and Austria were less successful. lebrun made a tentative overture to England through a Welsh tea dealer and intriguer named James Tilly Matthews, and although the Mon- tagnards permitted Lebrun to continue his efforts after his arrest in June, these informal contacts failed to bear fruit. 166 France also sent envoys to sev- eral ltalian courts to see if they would renew an alliance with France in ex- change for the release of Marie Antoinette, but this overly subtle attempt to probe Austrian intentions led nowhere. 167 Danton held private discussions with an English agent in December 1793 (with the apparent approval of the CPS). An agent was instructed to open indirect negotations with England at about the same time, while England made overtures to France via Phillipe Noel, the French envoy at Venice. Foreign Minister Franc;ois Deforgues es- tablished indirect and direct contacts with Prussia in a further attempt to sep- arate it from Vienna, and there is even some evidence that Robespierre sent an agent to explore the possibility of peace with Austria in May 1794. 168
These efforts failed for a number of reasons. France's bargaining position was initially quite weak, and the Coalition had little reason to make peace when its opponent seemed ready to collapse. The domestic climate within France was unfavorable as well, as any effort to pursue peace left one ex- posed to accusations of treason. Indeed, pressure from the Hebertists even- tually led the Convention to outlaw negotiations with states that did not recognize tlhe republic, resulting in the severing of direct diplomatic contacts with all countries except the United States and the Swiss Confederation. 169
165 On these various offers, see Biro, German Policy, 1 : 163-65; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 3:47-53; and Alphonse Aulard, "La diplomatie du premier Comite de salut public," in his Etudes et /e? orns sur Ia rroolutionfran? aise, 3d ser. (Paris: Felix Alcan, H)02), 121-22, 205.
166 Williams, "Missions of Williams and Matthews," 66o-65 and passim.
167 Aulard, "Diplomatie du premier Comite de salut public," 135-36.
168 Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," no--12, 14o-4- 7. Historians remain divided over
whether the latter negotiations actually took place; see Biro, German Policy, 1 :222-36.
169 The April 1793 decree renouncing support for "foreign patriots" had also imposed the death penalty for proposing negotiations with states "which have not previously solemnly rec-
ognized . . . the French nation. . . [and] its sovereignty. " Stewart, Documentary Survey, 426-27.
Revolution and War
? ? ? ? ? The French Revolution
This constraint forced Foreign Minister Deforgues to rely on indirect con- tacts, via neutral agents, and confined subsequent peace overtures to obscure and unreliable back channels. In addition, key members of the Coalition had different aims and interests, making it difficult to devise a settlement that would be acceptable to all. Finally, as a result of a series of French victories in the fall of 1793, an immediate peace seemed less necessary and the republic hardened its diplomatic position. Although states such as Prussia were in- creasingly willing to settle, prominent Jacobins now argued that only all-out war would gain them acceptable terms. As one member of the CPS, Bertrand Barere, told the Convention in January: "In wars of liberty there is only one means: it is to ruin and exterminate the despots. . . . There is neither peace
nor truce, nor armistice, nor any treaty to make with the despots until the Republic is consolidated, triumphant, and dictating peace to the nations.
"170 Such statements reveal that the process of deradicalization was still incom- plete. They also illustrate how domestic divisions prevented France from splitting the alliance even when a separate peace was within reach.
In short, although the French Republic had not abandoned all of its ideo- logical principles, its policies in 1793-94 were a striking departure from the lofty visions that had driven France to war in 1792-93. And by mobilizing its latent potential and moderating its more unrealistic schemes, revolution- ary France escaped defeat once again.
Divisions within the opposing coalition played a key role in the survival of the revolution as well. Austria and Prussia were increasingly at odds; each blamed the other for their. poor performance in 1792, and Frederick William's commitment to the war declined even more after Prussia and Russia signed a secret agreement for a second partition of Poland in January 1793. Once the Allies reconquered Belgium in the summer of 1793, he an- nounced that Prussia would continue the war only if he were granted an- other subsidy. He ordered his generals to leave the French Army intact and to give only limited assistance to his Austrian ally. The allied advance re- sumed after England agreed to provide additional funds, but Prussia's com- mitment to the Coalition remained shaky at best. It vanished entirely after Austria and Russia mended fences and arranged a final partition of Poland in 1794, and Frederick William soon decided to abandon the war with France in order to preserve his gains nn the east. 171
170 Barere also invoked the fear of traitors by asking, "Who then dare to speak of peace? [Only] aristocrats, the rich, . . . the friends of conspirators, . . . bad citizens, false patriots. . . . What we need today is redoubled boldness against conspirators, . . . redoubled scrutiny against men who call themselves patriots. " Quoted in Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 156-59; see Leo Gershoy, Bertrand Barere: A Reluctant Terrorist (Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1962), 157-59; 207-208.
171 In the words of Paul Schroeder, "the allied coalition was wrecked more by internal divi- sions than French victories. " Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 138; also see Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, 27-48.
[971
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England's leaders tried to transform the coalition into a unified alliance, but their own priorities were far from clear and not always compatible with the aims of nts putative allies. Having entered the war solely to halt French expansion, the government gradually came to view the restoration of the
monarchy as an essential strategic objective. 172 English leaders were them- selves divided on what strategy to follow. Like their allies, they proved un- able to resist the lure of territorial acquisitions. Even though the main road to victory lay in the battlefields of the Low Countries and the Rhineland, England sent nearly seven thousand troops to seize the French colonies in the Caribbean and another five thousand to support a counterrevolutionary uprising at Toulon. 173 These diversions weakened the coalition's military ef- fort and rekindled Spanish opposition to English colonial expansion, leav- ing Spain more susceptible to subsequent French blandishments.
Instead of banding together against revolutionary France, in short, the members of the First Coalition were more interested in acquiring territory for themselves than in forging a strategy that might have made such acqui- sitions possible. The combined effects of French mobilization and allied dis- unity were soon apparent: French victories at Hondschoote and Wattignies halted the Alllied advance in the fall of 1793, and an Allied attempt to re- sume the initiative in April 1794 was soundly defeated. The French armies won a decisive victory at Tourcoing in May and had reoccupied Brussels, Antwerp, and Liege by midsummer, along with most of the left bank of the Rhine. The Spaniards and Sardinians were driven back in the south, and the counterrevolutionary rebellions inside France were beginning to subside as well. By the fall of 1794, the threat to the republic had been lifted and France had resumed its expansionist course.
From Thermidor to the Directory. As noted earlier, the easing of the foreign danger in the spring allowed rifts to reemerge within the CPS and the Con- vention. Convinced that the Indulgents and the Hebertists posed threats to the revolution, Robespierre and his followers now took the offensive against both. After mending fences with Danton and cultivating the sans-culottes with a series of generous economic decrees, the CPS brought the Hebertists
m Thus, the commissioners in Toulon were informed that "the acknowledgement of an hereditary monarchy . . . affords the only probable ground for restoring regular government in France," and a royal manifesto in October 1793 invited the French to "join the Standard of an Hereditary Monarchy, . . . in order to unite themselves once more under the Empire of Law, of Morality, and of Religion. " In 1794, Pitt remarked that he "had no idea of any peace being secure, unless France returned to a monarchical system. " Quoted in Mitchell, Under- ground War, 34; Cobban, Debate on the French Revolution, 46o-62; and McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, 27J.
173 See Michael Duffy, Sugar, Soldiers, and Seapower: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); and Ehrman, Reluc- tant Transition, esp. 303.
? ? The French Revolution
before the Paris tribunal and executed them on March 23. Danton and sev- eral associates followed them to the guillotine two weeks later, leaving Robespierre and his supporters free to wage war against suspected counter- revolutionaries in the name of the Republic of Virtue. The law of 22 Prairial (June 10, 1794) streamlined the work of the revolutionary tribunals and broadened the list of capital offenses, and the guillotines claimed over two thousand victims in the next two months alone. 174
The Great Terror marked the final stage of the Jacobin republic. Now con- vinced that Robespierre sought to establish a personal dictatorship, a faction within the CPS organized a coup. Robespierre defended his actions by again invoking the danger of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy, but the deputies had finally turned against him and he was arrested and subsequently exe- cuted on 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794), along with Saint-Just and several others.
The Jacobin dictatorship had saved the republic, but Robespierre's suc- cessors began dismantling it as soon as he was gone. 175 The Jacobin Club was banned in November, and a White Terror soon arose against suspected Jacobins. The end of the revolutionary dictatorship did not bring political stability, however, and food shortages, rising prices, and an extremely cold winter sparked violent demonstrations by the Parisian sans-culottes in Ger- minal and Prairial, Year III (April-May 1795). Unlike in past upheavals, however, the demonstrators were quickly suppressed by government troops. 176 Even more important, the end of the Terror allowed royalists, Girondins, emigres, and loyal Catholics to reenter political life. Given the enduring divisions within French society (which had been exacerbated by the revolution and the Terror), it was now nearly impossible for any gov- ernment to gain broad popular support.
The political weakness of the Thermidorean regime was institutionalized by the Constitution of the Year III. Enacted in September 1795, the new con- stitution established a bicameral Assembly chosen by indirect elections, with suffrage restricted to males over twenty-one and participation in the
174 The ouster of the Hebertists and Dantonists is described in Thompson, French Revolution, 452-60. For Robespierre's vision of the ideal republic, see Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled, 275-77; and Thompson, Robespierre, 45<r-55, 485-96. On the magnitude of the Terror, see Donald Greer, The Incidence ofthe Terror in the French Revolution: A Statistical Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935); and Schama, Citizens, 836-37.
175 The Convention quickly repealed the law of 22 Prairial, curtailed the use of terror, abol- ished price controls, suspended the levee en masse, and abandoned reliance on the represen- tants en mission. Several Girondin deputies were readmitted to the Convention, and the CPS also offered an amnesty to the rebels in the Vendee and partially restored freedom of religion. See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 2:137-42; Stewart, Documentary Survey, 538-552; and Denis Woronoff, The Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, 1 794-1 799, trans. Julian Jackson (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-10, 2<r-22.
176 According to Lefebvre, the government's victory over the popular forces in Paris on 3 Prairial marks "the date which should be taken as the end of the Revolution. Its mainspring was now broken. " French Revolution, 2:144-45.
? [991
? ? second electoral stage limited by strict property qualifications. Executive powers were assigned to a five-man Directory chosen by the two legislative Councils, and one-third of each Council and one of the five directors were to be replaced each year. 177 Intended as a safeguard against dictatorship, these measures deprived the executive of stability and authority. Not only was the executive vulnerable to disputes among the directors, but its membership was constantly changing owing to the rotation of deputies in the Councils. 178 Moreover, by seeking to restore the moderate order envisioned in the Con- stitution of 1791 (minus the monarchy, of course}, the Directory guaranteed its own unpopularity. Royalists rejected it because there was no king, die- hard republicans opposed the property restrictions and preferred the more egalitarian Constitution of 1793, and both groups remained fearful that the other might regain power. Thus, the Directory rested on an extremely nar- row political base and faced repeated challenges from resurgent royalists and unrepentant republicans alike. 179 Even before the constitution was com- pleted, evidence of increasing royalist strength led the leaders of the Con- vention to decree that two-thirds of the seats in the new Councils would be chosen from among their own ranks. This measure, which guaranteed that moderate republicans would control the new Councils, provoked a two-day
uprising by Parisian royalists on 12-13 Vendemiaire , Year IV (October 4-5, 1795). Hardly an auspicious beginning, this turmoil was a clear indication of the Directory's shaky foundation. 180
These problems were compounded by irregular food supplies, growing disparities of income, alternating periods of inflation and deflation, and en- during budgetary problems. Recurrent counterrevolutionary disturbances did nothing to help the French economy, and although the Directory ex- ploited its foreign conquests relentlessly, these gains were negated by the
m For the text of the new Constitution, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 571-612; for analyses of its provisions, see Woronoff, Thermidorean Regime and Directory, 29-31; Martyn Lyons, France under the Directory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 18-20; Sutherland,France,272-'75;andLefebvre,FrenchRevolution,2:16o-4-6 .
178 The director to be replaced each year was chosen by drawing lots. For the changing composition of the Directory, see Jones, Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 82-83; Albert Goodwin, "The French Executive Directory-ARevaluation," in The French Revolution: Conflicting Interpretations, ed. Frank Kafker and James M. Laux, 2d ed. (Malabar, Fla. : Krieger, 1989); and M. J. Sydenham, The First French Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), J2J-41.
179 According to Sutherland, "the Directory has a totally justified reputation as one of the most chaotic periods in modem French history. " France, 279? For a dissenting view, see Good- win, "French Executive Directory. "
180 The Vendemiaire uprising marked the political debut of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose troops fired the "whiff of grapeshot" that helped defeat the royalist groups. See Rude, Crowd in the French Revolution, chap. n; Jacques Godechot, The Counterrevolution: Doctrine and Ac- tion, 1789-1804, trans. Salvator Attanasio (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 26o-62; Sydenham, First French Republic, 76-82; and Harvey Mitchell, "Vendemiaire: A Reval- uation," Journal ofModern History JO, no. 3 (1958), 191-202.
Revolution and War
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damage done to French foreign trade. The Directory did much to stabilize French fiscal policy over the longer term, but the short-term costs were se- vere and contributed greatly to the country's political weakness. 181
The Foreign Policy of the Directory. The political divisions within France and the weakness of the new regime had important effects on French foreign policy and its conduct of the war. To begin with, there was no con- sensus on what France's war aims should be. 182 Royalists favored the re- nunciation of prior French conquests, seeing that as the swiftest route to peace and a restoration of the monarchy. Moderates within the Directory sought only limited territorial acquisitions, on the grounds that further ex- pansion would undermine French power and lead to incessant warfare. 183
The dominant position, however, was held by the advocates of "natural borders," whose ranks included most of the leading figures of the Thermi- dorean period and the first Directory. According to this view, France's bor- ders had been "ordained by nature" and consisted of the Atlantic, the Pyrenees, the Alps, and most importantly, the Rhine. To obtain these limits, France would have to annex Belgium and the entire left bank of the Rhine, including German states belonging to Prussia and Austria or falling under Francis II's protection in his capacity as head of the Holy Roman Empire.
To justify prolonging the war, supporters of "les grandes limites" argued that expansion to the Rhine would greatly enhance French security. As Mer- lin de Douai told the Convention in December 1794: "We want [a peace] guaranteed by our own power and the powerlessness of our enemies ever to harm us. " Another member of the CPS, Fran\ois-Antoine Boissy d'Anglas, told the Convention that the borders designated by nature would protect France from "all invasion . . . for a long series of centuries," and Jean-Jacques Cambaceres, a prominent Thermidorean, declared, "When a nation has risen in arms against invasion, . . . it should use its power to ensure that [its rights] will be respected forever. " Others suggested that France required additional territory in order to counter the Prussian and Austrian gains in Poland and
181 Economic conditions and policies under the Directory are summarized in Sydenham, First French Republic, 96-100, 182-86; Goodwin, "French Executive Directory," 326-32; Woronoff, Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, chap. 4; Lyons, France under the Directory, chaps. 4-5, 12; and Michel Bruguiere, "Assignats," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 426-)6.
182 On the different positions, see Ross, European Diplomatic History, no-112; Lyons, France under the Directon;, 19<>-91; Woronoff, Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, 27, 61-63; and Biro, German Policy, 2:488-<)8, 5oo-5o6.
183 Thus, Camot told the CPS in July 1794- "We could, if we so wished, plant the liberty tree on the banks of the Rhine and unite to France all the former territory of the Gauls, but how- ever seductive this system might be, . . . France can only weaken herself and sow the seeds of an endless war by expanding her territory in this way. " It should be noted that Camot's views on this issue fluctuated greatly. See Richet, "Natural Borders," 76o-61; Biro, German Policy, 1 :235, 263, 2:504-505; and Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 75?
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? Revolution and War
preserve the balance of power; as Jean-Fran<<;ois Reubell put it, "The object of the pacification of France should be not so much to acquire indemnities, as to restore that equilibrium on which its safety depends. " Supporters of expan- sion also emphasized the wealth of the neighboring regions and argued that
annexation would redeem France's inflated currency, bolster the French economy, and sustain its military effort. And to combat the assertion that oc- cupation or annexation would be unpopular, advocates claimed that the local populations believed "they have all to gain by being French. "184
The advocates of expansion lacked the political power to impose their preferences arbitrarily, and obtaining the "natural borders" would in any case require additional military successes. So long as Reubell was the dom- inant figure in the Directory, however, this group had the greatest influence over French war aims. Reubell was especially interested in protecting the French position in his native Alsace, and his control over foreign policy en- sured that the goal of les grandes limites was never entirely abandoned. 185
Several other factors strengthened the expansionist thrust of French for- eign policy and reduced the prospects for peace. The first was economic: be- cause the ravaged French economy could not keep the army supplied, it had become reliant on requisitions and levies from the occupied territories. Thus, the Directory told General Moreau that he should "nourish the Army with the fruit of its courage" and reminded General Jourdan that "the great art of war is to live at the expense of the enemy. "186
France's dependence on the lands it occupied was compounded by the in- dependence of local representatives and military commanders and also by the opportunities for personal enrichment that occupation afforded. The Di- rectory had abandoned the Jacobin system of central supply and given pri- vate contractors the task of supplying the army. This policy allowed the generals even greater freedom of action and created a powerful domestic constituency whose financial well-being was sustained by war. 187 To make
184 These quotations are from Biro, German Policy, 1:263, 335, 427-38, 2:513; and Blanning, French Revolu tion in Germany, 74?
? ? 185 See Gerlof D. Homan, ]ean-Franfois Reubell: French Revolutionary, Patriot, and Director (1747-1807) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), esp. 89.
186 As Blanning notes, "neither in nature, scope, nor intensity was the exploitation of the Rhineland exceptional. The conditions which dictated exploitation-the penury of the gov- ernment, the size of the armies, the scale of the war-applied with roughly equal force to all other parts of French-occupied Europe. " See his French Revolution in Germany, chap. 3, esp. 127-28; and Biro, German Policy, 2:65o-6o.
181 Thus, one French official admitted, "Our expedition [across) the Rhine . . . was due en- tirely to pecuniary considerations. . . . Our incursion into a rich and defenseless country was to proaire us the money of which we were in such dire need. " Quoted in Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 177o-187o (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92-93. On the growing independence of the army, see lyons, France under the Directory, 155-58. Ac- cording to Woronoff, by 1796 "the war was no longer concerned with national defense, but with conquest-or even merely plunder. " Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, 64? 7, 74?
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matters worse, the deep divisions within French society and the lack of broad popular support forced the Directory to rely on the army to keep it- self in power. Bonaparte's "whiff of grapeshot" had halted the Vendemiaire uprising, and military support would be needed to defuse the royalist chal- lenge in Fructidor, Year V (September 1797) and the neo-Jacobin resurgence
of Floreal, Year VI (April 1798). Thus, the Directory had become dependent on the goodwill of its generals, and the army and its suppliers had become addicted to expansion, a combination wholly fatal to any serious effort to make peace.
. There is also evidence that the directors feared that peace would bring ad- verse domestic consequences-and greater royalist influence-unless they obtained tangible gains from the war. Abbe Sieyes told a Prussian diplomat in May 1795, "We need to obtain a glorious peace," and he later warned that the Directory "would be lost if peace were made. " Other directors feared that peace would expose them to charges of corruption, force the discharge of proroyalist troops, and reveal that economic hardship in France was due to their own mistakes rather than the war. The danger of direct military in- terference was equally worrisome; as one of the directors put it, "Make peace! And what will you do with the generals? Would they cultivate greens? "188
In short, although several directors recognized that a negotiated settle- ment was desirable, six years of revolution and war had created a formida- ble engine of expansion. Some of the directors now opposed further expansion, and in the words of Martyn Lyons, the foreign policy of the Di- rectory "oscillated between the defence of [the] natural frontiers, . . . and the creation of semi-independent sister republics," depending on shifts of mili- tary fortune and which faction enjoyed the dominant position in the execu- tive. 189 Despite the growing desire for peace and several promising diplomatic opportunities, therefore, the Directory was unable to take France out of the war.
TheCollapseoftheFirstCoalition. France'sinabilitytomakepeacewases- pecially tragic in light of its favorable military position. Amsterdam had fallen to the French in January 1795, and Dutch sympathizers quickly pro- claimed a "Batavian Republic" and signed a one-sided treaty of alliance in May. 190 Tuscany made peace in February, and peace talks between Prussia
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