Here is an approximate, but
reliable, statistical estimate of the main
179
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reliable, statistical estimate of the main
179
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Jabotinsky - 1917 - Turkey and the War
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? XI
The Straits
Constantinople is claimed by Russia,
Greece and Bulgaria. The part Bulgaria
has chosen in this war does not fit her for
the role of a pretender to a town which
belongs to one of her allies. The partition
of Turkey implies a victory of the Entente,
and we can hardly imagine such victory
resulting in a reward for Bulgaria. Be-
sides, the Bulgarian pretence is not backed
by any serious argument of either ethnical
or economical character. Constantinople has
no more than 15,000 inhabitants of Bul-
garian race and speech, out of a total
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
population of 1,125,000 ; another 10,000
could be found perhaps in the environs
of the city. The commercial interests of
Ferdinand's kingdom have been completely
settled since the conquest of Dedeagatch :
Bulgaria possesses what is denied to Rou-
mania and to Russia -- an ice-free port on
the right side of the Straits. The Bul-
garian claim on Constantinople is a rare
example of a political pretence absolutely
void of any plausible justification, being
an outcome of mere ambition and mania
grandiosa.
The Greek case has much better founda-
tions. It may be questioned whether the
so-called historical rights have any prac-
tical value in our prosaic days ; but it is
undeniable that the historical rights on
Byzantium can be claimed by none but
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? THE STRAITS
Greece. In addition Constantinople has
a Greek population of more than 200,000,
who play prominent parts in every vital
branch of local life. That is no small
matter -- but that is all. Greece cannot
support her claim by any argument show-
ing on her side a real practical need for
Constantinople. Her maritime position is
ideal without the Golden Horn. And even
the racial argument cannot be accepted
without objection. A town or a country
can be claimed on purely ethnical grounds
only if the majority of the population
belong to the claimant's race. This is not
the case in Constantinople where the Greeks
are only one-fifth of the inhabitants. So
the only title which indeed cannot be
questioned in itself is the historical
right as aforementioned. It is a great
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
factor, but it can hardly stand against
a claim based upon vital economical
interests.
Such is Russia's claim. Its unpopu-
larity with the English public must be
mainly attributed to the fact that it was
always considered as a mere product of
Panslavistic ideas. It may be true psy-
chologically or it may not : we leave it
undiscussed because it really does not
matter. Whatever may have been the
motives of him who first formulated " By-
zantium for Russia " and of those who
supported or inherited this battlecry, it
is now strongly supported by people who
have nothmg to do with Panslavism. Even
if there were no Slavs at all in the Balkan
Peninsula, or if Russia were not a Slav
but a Latin or a Chinese Empire, its push
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? THE STRAITS
towards the Straits would remain what
it is -- a natural and obvious necessity,
We hardly think it worth while to
indulge in proving this commonplace truth.
A look at the map would be sufficient, even
if the well-known events of the war had
not previously brought this fact to the
consciousness of every impartial observer.
Still a few figures may be useful to recall
some experiences in the good old days of
peace -- experiences which were in their
own way not much sweeter than those
of war-time. Russia's export of cereals
amounted in 1910, for instance, to
847,100,000 pounds, of which more than
a half were forwarded through the Black
Sea and Azov Sea ports. The part which
these ports play in Russia's shipping traffic
can also be seen from the following dis-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
tribution of tonnage (entered and cleared)
between the three sea-shores of European
Russia in the same year, 1910 :
Entered. Cleared.
Tons. Tons.
White Sea - 830,000 829,000
Baltic Sea - - - 5,547,000 5,629,000
Black and Azov Seas - 7>555,ooo 7,424,000
Total - - 13,932,000 13,882,000
Thus more than a half of Russia's ex-
ports is under the absolute and unlimited
control of the ruler of the Straits. Worse
than that : Russian commerce depends
upon the goodwill not only of the Turk
but of any of his innumerable enemies,
big or small. Every complication in the
Near East is bound to result in the closing
of the Dardanelles. So in the three years
preceding the war the Straits were closed
twice. The result can be clearly shown
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? THE STRAITS
by figures illustrating the effect which
the Tripoli and Balkan wars had on the
Russian exports. The grain exports sunk
from 847,100,000 pounds in 1910 to
547,900,000 pounds in 1912 ; the shipping
traffic in the Black and Azov Seas de-
creased from 7,555,000 tons entered and
7,424,000 cleared in 1910 to respectively
5,712,000 and 5,575,000 in 1912. What
it means for Russia can be seen in the
instance of Odessa. The two successive
closings of the Straits resulted in com-
pletely shattering the economic health of
this once flourishing town. Since then
Odessa is visibly declining, and many of
Russia's leading authorities on trade matters
doubt whether she will be able to recover
from her wounds.
We do, however, notice even now a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
strong instinctive aversion in the average
English mind to Russia having Constan-
tinople and the Straits. It is time to
insist upon a fair and thorough revision
of this almost hereditary feeling. We in-
sist upon it not because Russia is Britain's
ally, but because a durable peace can only
be built on bases which will satisfy the
vital necessities of each among the great
leading Powers. The British public must
realize once and for always that a State of
Russia's size and resources cannot be
indefinitely held away from the ice-free
sea. The new ice-free haven on the Mur-
man coast, now completed and connected
with the main Russian railway lines, will be
not more than a provisional remedy good
for war-time, faute de mieux ; but it is of
no value as a permanent solution. It is
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? THE STRAITS
situated in the interesting region of the
famous midnight-sun, so dear to the hearts
of the Scandinavian poets : that is to say,
it has plenty of sunlight by day and by
night in the summer months, when this
port is not needed, and no sunlight at all,
even by day, just in those winter months
when the other havens of Russia are ice-
bound. Imagine Liverpool being com-
pelled to perform all the operations of
piloting, loading and unloading at night-
time only, and ask any expert whether it
can be considered as a relief for a country
of Russia's magnitude and riches. In
addition, the Murman port is a port in a
desert -- in a desert that is doomed to
remain a desert for all eternity. Such a
port is an absurdum. And even a bigger
absurdum is to think that the Russian
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Empire can declare itself satisfied with this
makeshift. Russia will strive for the free
sea in spite of the world's and her own
pacifist tendencies, impelled by irresistible
necessity.
Her way to Port Arthur was barred
eleven years ago by the events of Liaoian
and Tsushima, and everybody in Russia
is definitely reconciled to the idea that
it is barred for ever and that the attempt
was itself a mistake. So there are only
three ways for Russia. She must look
for a free sea port either on the western
coast of Norway, or on the southern coast
of Persia, or on the Mediterranean. Geo-
graphy does not allow of any other choice.
Let the British public think over this
choice, having in mind not Russia's but
Britain's interests. Should Russia be com-
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? THE STRAITS
pelled to look for a footing on the Scandi-
navian coast, it would mean a Russian
base just facing the British Isles, and not
even too distant from the Firth of Forth.
Sven Hedin, the famous Swedish traveller
and the intellectual leader of Swedish
" Activism/' said, among too many ex-
aggerations, one sensible thing : he showed
that, if Russia chose to establish herself
on the Norwegian coast, the northern
fjords of Norway -- Narvik for instance --
would be of no use to her for the same
reasons which depreciate the Murman port
-- midnight - sun and desert. In Sven
Hedin's opinion Russia would then prefer
some harbour on this side of the Polar
circle, blessed by darkness at midnight
and sun at midday all through the year
and leading into a populated country :
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Trondheim, for instance. This Trondheim
is only 648 nautical miles from the Firth of
Forth. Of course we firmly believe in the
complete harmony of Russian and British
interests. Bui the balance of forces in
the North Sea is already such a delicate
and complicated thing that many common-
sense Englishmen will prefer it to remain
as it is without further complications.
The alternative is, as we said, a port on
the Persian Gulf. This perspective, we
suppose, is even less alluring to English
opinion. Instead of explaining why, let
us repeat the good French proverb : A
bon entendeur, peu de paroles.
From the British point of view the
solution which means the least inconveni-
ence or apprehension for the future is to
see Russia established on the Eastern
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? THE STRAITS
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea is
an open sea leading freely to any part of
the world's ocean. But God and History
shaped it into a form very convenient to
British Imperial interests. The way to
India from the Mediterranean leads through
the Suez Canal which is controlled by
Britain, and the way to the British Isles
from the Mediterranean leads through the
Straits of Gibraltar which are also controlled
by Britain. We refuse to admit that
England's past policy towards Russia was
ever inspired by the desire to prevent the
free development of her natural maritime
possibilities. We interpret the shade of
diffidence, felt and expressed on this matter
by the English public in days past and
forgotten, as a legitimate anxiety to keep
the control of the seas in the hands of a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
nation to whom sea-power means every-
thing. We choose to believe that even
in those days English opinion would gladly
have agreed to any settlement conciliating
Russia's right to an access to the free sea
with England's natural jealousy of the
ocean. The Dardanelles solution serves
both purposes in a most admirablejway.
We use, indiscriminately, the names
Constantinople and the Dardanelles be-
cause they express the same thing. The
possession of the Golden Horn would be
of no use without that of Gallipoli. Timid
people suggest the compromise of sub-
mitting the Bosphorus to one rule and the
Dardanelles to another. But what is the
good of free traffic through the Bosphorus
if the Dardanelles shall remain liable to
be closed as before at the least shadow of
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? THE STRAITS
a quarrel in which Russia has nothing to
say ? The possession of the Straits im-
plies the possession of both passages on
both sides, Anatolian and Roumelian, in-
cluding Constantinople and Scutari, Princes'
and Marmora Isles, Gallipoli and Dar-
danelles-city.
We do not see why this scheme should
be considered an odious annexation
clashing with the principle of nationality,
holy to the Allies. This principle, as
already said, can be fully applied only
where there is a clear and decisive pre-
dominance of one race, in numbers as well
as in cultural value, over the others. Such
is by no means the case of the territories
indispensable to assure Russia's control
of the Straits.
Here is an approximate, but
reliable, statistical estimate of the main
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
elements of the population in the region
including Constantinople with its Asiatic
dependencies (the suburbs of Kanlidja,
Scutari, Kadikeuy, the cazas of Princes'
Isles, Ghezb6, Beykos, Kartal, and Shile),
the sandjaks of Chataldja and Gallipoli,
and the mutessarriflik of Dardanelles :
Turks - 600,000
Greeks ------ 325,000
Armenians ----- 200,000
Levantines ----- 75,000
Jews 70,000
Bulgarians ----- 30,000
Foreigners - 130,000
Total (including smaller groups) - 1,450,000
This motley composition absolutely re-
fuses to support any claim based on ethnical
grounds. The Straits cannot be annexed
to a State " of their own race " because
they have no race of their own. Their
destinies can only be discussed and decided
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? THE STRAITS
from the standpoint of economical neces-
sity and political efficiency.
Of course we know that a strong party,
especially in Roumania, suggests a com-
promise : neutralization of the Straits and
of Constantinople. At the first glance this
project seems alluring as all compromises
do ; but, as almost all of them, it is an
utterly inefficient scheme, bound to create
a precarious and dangerous state of things.
Russia needs a passage completely and
absolutely free, independent of the good
will of her neighbours, big and small, near
and far. What neutralization means, the
world has learnt on the first day of this
war. This lesson will never be forgotten.
The " neutralized " Straits could be seized
and occupied in spite of scraps of paper
before Russia could oppose it by force,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
and all that would remain to her would
be the moral comfort of writing diplomatic
notes. Would England ever agree to a
neutralization of the Suez Canal without
having secured for herself the control --
the military control -- of its approaches ?
The situation at the Dardanelles is quite
analogous. Even more : the Suez Canal
after all is not the only way to India, whilst
the Dardanelles are indeed the only access
to Russia's South. Some international
agreement concerning the free use of the
Straits may prove indispensable and would
certainly not be opposed by Russian opinion
in principle ; but Russia could accept it
only as a corollary in a settlement which
should leave to her the full sovereignty,
the military and administrative control of
the two shores of the Bosphorus and of the
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? THE STRAITS
two shores of the Dardanelles. * Any other
decision of the half-way sort would in-
evitably lead to this one result : that
Russia would seize the first opportunity
to help herself out of a precarious " neutral-
ization" which would leave her, just as
now, under the sword of Damocles.
On the other side, there is no need to
complicate the question by alleging that,
in order to secure her future position on
* The Rech of Petrograd, the leading daily of the
Constitutional-Democratic Party, wrote in 1915 :
" With the idea of neutralization the discussion is
not yet closed for us. . . . The forms and degrees of
neutralization can be extremely various, from that
applied to the Strait of Magellan to that of the
Panama Canal where the United States has the
right to raise fortifications just for the security of
the Canal. . . . If this problem has been settled for
Panama, there is no reason to think that it could
not be settled with the same success for the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles. " -- (Quoted, in a French transla-
tion, by M. N. Dascovici, " La question du Bosphore
et des Dardanelles," 1915, p. 293. )
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the Straits, Russia must claim an unin-
terrupted land approach from Batum to
Scutari. England and France keep their
over-sea dominions without land ap-
proaches. The Russian Black Sea fleet,
under future conditions, will be completely
equal to the task of connecting the little
colony to the great metropolis.
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? XII-- SYRIA AND PALESTINE
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? XII
Syria and Palestine
If we eliminate the Drang nach Osten,
France has practically no competitors as
far as Syria is concerned. True, Colonel
Churchill wrote in the 'sixties that Syria
is geographically and historically the
indispensable corollary of Egypt, and that
both ought to belong to England. But,
although one-half of this prophetic wish
has been fulfilled, we think that nobody
in Britain would press for the execution
of the second moiety.
If such a tendency can be discovered
anywhere in our days, it is perhaps among
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
a section of Arab Nationalists in Egypt
and Syria. Their argument may be
worth mentioning. It presents a new
feature in the development of Arab political
opinion. Until recent times the Arabs,
especially those of Syria, were understood
to be strongly Francophil -- inasmuch as
they did not consider the possibility of
complete independence. It was a natural
result of their education, as most of the
modern-taught Arabs passed through the
numerous French schools of Syria. But
since the beginning of this war several
symptoms pointed to a notable change in
this attitude, at least among a section of
Syrian leaders. One of them, who lives
in Paris, gave us the following explanation
of this new departure.
" Before the war broke out it had always
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
been an axiom with us that England did
not want Syria. So the only alternative
to Turkish rule, for those who did not
believe in independence, was France. The
Turkish menace to Egypt changed the
whole situation. My friends from Cairo
write me that now on all sides the con-
viction is growing that England will not
be able to remain indifferent to the future
of Syria. They think England will claim
for herself the southern part of the Syrian
coast, if not the whole of it. If it is true,
then we Arabs have to reconsider our
attitude. If we really have a choice be-
tween France and England, many of us
would prefer England. We do not feel
any particular love for either ; as a matter
of feeling, our instinctive sympathy goes
rather to the French than to the English.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
But the French rule is centralistic and
tends to impose on the native population
the French language and customs. Eng-
land is incomparably more liberal. We
have two examples before our eyes : Tunis
and Egypt were occupied at the same time.
Tunis has been completely " frenchified *
in everything -- administration, tribunals,
schools, even religious education ; whilst
in Egypt our national language plays a
prominent role in schools and public life.
This difference is eloquent enough. Be-
sides, there is another consideration of no
less importance. The populations of the
southern and eastern Mediterranean coasts,
who all speak Arab dialects and could
form in the future a great united nation,
have been cut up into sections under
different rule : Morocco, Algeria and Tunis
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
are French, Tripoli is Italian, Egypt is
British, and now they are speaking of
Syria about to become French. I think
it is trop de morcellement. Many of us
will certainly prefer Egypt and Syria to
be one, under the same rule, and so to
constitute a powerful nucleus of Arab
nationhood. " *
* Cf. also the impressions of a French observer
close at the eve of the war : "De toutes les puissances
qui cherchent a ? tendre leur influence sur la Syrie
et la Palestine, l'Angleterre est avec la France la
seule vers qui aillent les aspirations des populations
desireuses d'echapper de quelque maniere an gou-
vernement des Turcs. . . . Sans vouloir mettre en
doute la bonne foi du gouvernement anglais lorsqu'il
declara l'annee derniere n'avoir ' ni intention d'agir,
ni dessein, ni aspiration politique dans ces regions,'
il n'en est pas moins vrai que les musulmans se tour-
nent vers lui et qu'il ne fait rien pour les decourager.
Certes, aucune propagande omcielle n'est faite par
l'Angleterre en Syrie, mais il faut que les musulmans
aient ete, comme on dit, fortement ' travailles '
precddemment par ses agents pour qu'ils la regardent
comme leur protect rice naturelle. On vit au prin-
temps dernier les notables musulmans reclamer au
i9 i
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
These ideas did not 'pass unnoticed. In
the early spring of 1915 they formed the
subject of a lively polemic between some
leading vernacular papers of Cairo. A
little later, one of the most important
Paris dailies spoke with some anxiety of
" a section among the Syrian Arabs who
are said to turn their eyes towards a
Power other than France/' and tried to
persuade them that France is still the
fittest alternative for them.
We think that this last opinion is en-
tirely shared by all responsible men in
consul d'Angleterre a Beyrouth aide et assistance
contre les autorit6s ottomanes, et les journaux de
France epiloguerent longuement sur l'incident. Que
les diplomates anglais n'agissent plus aujourd'hui
sur les musulmans de Palestine et de Syrie, il n'en
reste pas moins que l'Angleterre a conserve sur eux
une influence politique dont ils sont devenus eux-
memes les propagateurs. " -- (Andre Dubosq, " Syrie,
Tripolitaine, Albanie," 1914, pp. 32, 33. )
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
British politics and press. The only ques-
tion that remains and really concerns
vital English interests is to know where
the southern frontier of the future French
Syria should be drawn. In other terms :
Syria must unquestionably go to France,
but what shall be the fate of that southern
part of the Syrian coast which bears the
historic name of Palestine ?
This question has met with little interest
on the part of the British public, with the
exception of some official circles in this
country and in Egypt. Not so in France.
The question of Palestine is vividly dis-
cussed in papers and at public meetings ;
the battlecry is " il nous faut la Syrie
integrate. " Among the leaders of this pro-
paganda we find many prominent names --
for one instance, that of Senator Leygues.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Although not in the least supported by
the Government, which keeps a correct
silence on the whole matter, this movement
shows that French political sentiment is
almost as keen on Palestine as on the
rest of Syria.
Analysing, however, this part of the
French claim, one cannot help seeing that
it is hardly supported by anything but
sentiment.
? XI
The Straits
Constantinople is claimed by Russia,
Greece and Bulgaria. The part Bulgaria
has chosen in this war does not fit her for
the role of a pretender to a town which
belongs to one of her allies. The partition
of Turkey implies a victory of the Entente,
and we can hardly imagine such victory
resulting in a reward for Bulgaria. Be-
sides, the Bulgarian pretence is not backed
by any serious argument of either ethnical
or economical character. Constantinople has
no more than 15,000 inhabitants of Bul-
garian race and speech, out of a total
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
population of 1,125,000 ; another 10,000
could be found perhaps in the environs
of the city. The commercial interests of
Ferdinand's kingdom have been completely
settled since the conquest of Dedeagatch :
Bulgaria possesses what is denied to Rou-
mania and to Russia -- an ice-free port on
the right side of the Straits. The Bul-
garian claim on Constantinople is a rare
example of a political pretence absolutely
void of any plausible justification, being
an outcome of mere ambition and mania
grandiosa.
The Greek case has much better founda-
tions. It may be questioned whether the
so-called historical rights have any prac-
tical value in our prosaic days ; but it is
undeniable that the historical rights on
Byzantium can be claimed by none but
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? THE STRAITS
Greece. In addition Constantinople has
a Greek population of more than 200,000,
who play prominent parts in every vital
branch of local life. That is no small
matter -- but that is all. Greece cannot
support her claim by any argument show-
ing on her side a real practical need for
Constantinople. Her maritime position is
ideal without the Golden Horn. And even
the racial argument cannot be accepted
without objection. A town or a country
can be claimed on purely ethnical grounds
only if the majority of the population
belong to the claimant's race. This is not
the case in Constantinople where the Greeks
are only one-fifth of the inhabitants. So
the only title which indeed cannot be
questioned in itself is the historical
right as aforementioned. It is a great
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
factor, but it can hardly stand against
a claim based upon vital economical
interests.
Such is Russia's claim. Its unpopu-
larity with the English public must be
mainly attributed to the fact that it was
always considered as a mere product of
Panslavistic ideas. It may be true psy-
chologically or it may not : we leave it
undiscussed because it really does not
matter. Whatever may have been the
motives of him who first formulated " By-
zantium for Russia " and of those who
supported or inherited this battlecry, it
is now strongly supported by people who
have nothmg to do with Panslavism. Even
if there were no Slavs at all in the Balkan
Peninsula, or if Russia were not a Slav
but a Latin or a Chinese Empire, its push
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? THE STRAITS
towards the Straits would remain what
it is -- a natural and obvious necessity,
We hardly think it worth while to
indulge in proving this commonplace truth.
A look at the map would be sufficient, even
if the well-known events of the war had
not previously brought this fact to the
consciousness of every impartial observer.
Still a few figures may be useful to recall
some experiences in the good old days of
peace -- experiences which were in their
own way not much sweeter than those
of war-time. Russia's export of cereals
amounted in 1910, for instance, to
847,100,000 pounds, of which more than
a half were forwarded through the Black
Sea and Azov Sea ports. The part which
these ports play in Russia's shipping traffic
can also be seen from the following dis-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
tribution of tonnage (entered and cleared)
between the three sea-shores of European
Russia in the same year, 1910 :
Entered. Cleared.
Tons. Tons.
White Sea - 830,000 829,000
Baltic Sea - - - 5,547,000 5,629,000
Black and Azov Seas - 7>555,ooo 7,424,000
Total - - 13,932,000 13,882,000
Thus more than a half of Russia's ex-
ports is under the absolute and unlimited
control of the ruler of the Straits. Worse
than that : Russian commerce depends
upon the goodwill not only of the Turk
but of any of his innumerable enemies,
big or small. Every complication in the
Near East is bound to result in the closing
of the Dardanelles. So in the three years
preceding the war the Straits were closed
twice. The result can be clearly shown
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? THE STRAITS
by figures illustrating the effect which
the Tripoli and Balkan wars had on the
Russian exports. The grain exports sunk
from 847,100,000 pounds in 1910 to
547,900,000 pounds in 1912 ; the shipping
traffic in the Black and Azov Seas de-
creased from 7,555,000 tons entered and
7,424,000 cleared in 1910 to respectively
5,712,000 and 5,575,000 in 1912. What
it means for Russia can be seen in the
instance of Odessa. The two successive
closings of the Straits resulted in com-
pletely shattering the economic health of
this once flourishing town. Since then
Odessa is visibly declining, and many of
Russia's leading authorities on trade matters
doubt whether she will be able to recover
from her wounds.
We do, however, notice even now a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
strong instinctive aversion in the average
English mind to Russia having Constan-
tinople and the Straits. It is time to
insist upon a fair and thorough revision
of this almost hereditary feeling. We in-
sist upon it not because Russia is Britain's
ally, but because a durable peace can only
be built on bases which will satisfy the
vital necessities of each among the great
leading Powers. The British public must
realize once and for always that a State of
Russia's size and resources cannot be
indefinitely held away from the ice-free
sea. The new ice-free haven on the Mur-
man coast, now completed and connected
with the main Russian railway lines, will be
not more than a provisional remedy good
for war-time, faute de mieux ; but it is of
no value as a permanent solution. It is
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? THE STRAITS
situated in the interesting region of the
famous midnight-sun, so dear to the hearts
of the Scandinavian poets : that is to say,
it has plenty of sunlight by day and by
night in the summer months, when this
port is not needed, and no sunlight at all,
even by day, just in those winter months
when the other havens of Russia are ice-
bound. Imagine Liverpool being com-
pelled to perform all the operations of
piloting, loading and unloading at night-
time only, and ask any expert whether it
can be considered as a relief for a country
of Russia's magnitude and riches. In
addition, the Murman port is a port in a
desert -- in a desert that is doomed to
remain a desert for all eternity. Such a
port is an absurdum. And even a bigger
absurdum is to think that the Russian
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Empire can declare itself satisfied with this
makeshift. Russia will strive for the free
sea in spite of the world's and her own
pacifist tendencies, impelled by irresistible
necessity.
Her way to Port Arthur was barred
eleven years ago by the events of Liaoian
and Tsushima, and everybody in Russia
is definitely reconciled to the idea that
it is barred for ever and that the attempt
was itself a mistake. So there are only
three ways for Russia. She must look
for a free sea port either on the western
coast of Norway, or on the southern coast
of Persia, or on the Mediterranean. Geo-
graphy does not allow of any other choice.
Let the British public think over this
choice, having in mind not Russia's but
Britain's interests. Should Russia be com-
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? THE STRAITS
pelled to look for a footing on the Scandi-
navian coast, it would mean a Russian
base just facing the British Isles, and not
even too distant from the Firth of Forth.
Sven Hedin, the famous Swedish traveller
and the intellectual leader of Swedish
" Activism/' said, among too many ex-
aggerations, one sensible thing : he showed
that, if Russia chose to establish herself
on the Norwegian coast, the northern
fjords of Norway -- Narvik for instance --
would be of no use to her for the same
reasons which depreciate the Murman port
-- midnight - sun and desert. In Sven
Hedin's opinion Russia would then prefer
some harbour on this side of the Polar
circle, blessed by darkness at midnight
and sun at midday all through the year
and leading into a populated country :
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Trondheim, for instance. This Trondheim
is only 648 nautical miles from the Firth of
Forth. Of course we firmly believe in the
complete harmony of Russian and British
interests. Bui the balance of forces in
the North Sea is already such a delicate
and complicated thing that many common-
sense Englishmen will prefer it to remain
as it is without further complications.
The alternative is, as we said, a port on
the Persian Gulf. This perspective, we
suppose, is even less alluring to English
opinion. Instead of explaining why, let
us repeat the good French proverb : A
bon entendeur, peu de paroles.
From the British point of view the
solution which means the least inconveni-
ence or apprehension for the future is to
see Russia established on the Eastern
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? THE STRAITS
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea is
an open sea leading freely to any part of
the world's ocean. But God and History
shaped it into a form very convenient to
British Imperial interests. The way to
India from the Mediterranean leads through
the Suez Canal which is controlled by
Britain, and the way to the British Isles
from the Mediterranean leads through the
Straits of Gibraltar which are also controlled
by Britain. We refuse to admit that
England's past policy towards Russia was
ever inspired by the desire to prevent the
free development of her natural maritime
possibilities. We interpret the shade of
diffidence, felt and expressed on this matter
by the English public in days past and
forgotten, as a legitimate anxiety to keep
the control of the seas in the hands of a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
nation to whom sea-power means every-
thing. We choose to believe that even
in those days English opinion would gladly
have agreed to any settlement conciliating
Russia's right to an access to the free sea
with England's natural jealousy of the
ocean. The Dardanelles solution serves
both purposes in a most admirablejway.
We use, indiscriminately, the names
Constantinople and the Dardanelles be-
cause they express the same thing. The
possession of the Golden Horn would be
of no use without that of Gallipoli. Timid
people suggest the compromise of sub-
mitting the Bosphorus to one rule and the
Dardanelles to another. But what is the
good of free traffic through the Bosphorus
if the Dardanelles shall remain liable to
be closed as before at the least shadow of
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? THE STRAITS
a quarrel in which Russia has nothing to
say ? The possession of the Straits im-
plies the possession of both passages on
both sides, Anatolian and Roumelian, in-
cluding Constantinople and Scutari, Princes'
and Marmora Isles, Gallipoli and Dar-
danelles-city.
We do not see why this scheme should
be considered an odious annexation
clashing with the principle of nationality,
holy to the Allies. This principle, as
already said, can be fully applied only
where there is a clear and decisive pre-
dominance of one race, in numbers as well
as in cultural value, over the others. Such
is by no means the case of the territories
indispensable to assure Russia's control
of the Straits.
Here is an approximate, but
reliable, statistical estimate of the main
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
elements of the population in the region
including Constantinople with its Asiatic
dependencies (the suburbs of Kanlidja,
Scutari, Kadikeuy, the cazas of Princes'
Isles, Ghezb6, Beykos, Kartal, and Shile),
the sandjaks of Chataldja and Gallipoli,
and the mutessarriflik of Dardanelles :
Turks - 600,000
Greeks ------ 325,000
Armenians ----- 200,000
Levantines ----- 75,000
Jews 70,000
Bulgarians ----- 30,000
Foreigners - 130,000
Total (including smaller groups) - 1,450,000
This motley composition absolutely re-
fuses to support any claim based on ethnical
grounds. The Straits cannot be annexed
to a State " of their own race " because
they have no race of their own. Their
destinies can only be discussed and decided
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? THE STRAITS
from the standpoint of economical neces-
sity and political efficiency.
Of course we know that a strong party,
especially in Roumania, suggests a com-
promise : neutralization of the Straits and
of Constantinople. At the first glance this
project seems alluring as all compromises
do ; but, as almost all of them, it is an
utterly inefficient scheme, bound to create
a precarious and dangerous state of things.
Russia needs a passage completely and
absolutely free, independent of the good
will of her neighbours, big and small, near
and far. What neutralization means, the
world has learnt on the first day of this
war. This lesson will never be forgotten.
The " neutralized " Straits could be seized
and occupied in spite of scraps of paper
before Russia could oppose it by force,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
and all that would remain to her would
be the moral comfort of writing diplomatic
notes. Would England ever agree to a
neutralization of the Suez Canal without
having secured for herself the control --
the military control -- of its approaches ?
The situation at the Dardanelles is quite
analogous. Even more : the Suez Canal
after all is not the only way to India, whilst
the Dardanelles are indeed the only access
to Russia's South. Some international
agreement concerning the free use of the
Straits may prove indispensable and would
certainly not be opposed by Russian opinion
in principle ; but Russia could accept it
only as a corollary in a settlement which
should leave to her the full sovereignty,
the military and administrative control of
the two shores of the Bosphorus and of the
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? THE STRAITS
two shores of the Dardanelles. * Any other
decision of the half-way sort would in-
evitably lead to this one result : that
Russia would seize the first opportunity
to help herself out of a precarious " neutral-
ization" which would leave her, just as
now, under the sword of Damocles.
On the other side, there is no need to
complicate the question by alleging that,
in order to secure her future position on
* The Rech of Petrograd, the leading daily of the
Constitutional-Democratic Party, wrote in 1915 :
" With the idea of neutralization the discussion is
not yet closed for us. . . . The forms and degrees of
neutralization can be extremely various, from that
applied to the Strait of Magellan to that of the
Panama Canal where the United States has the
right to raise fortifications just for the security of
the Canal. . . . If this problem has been settled for
Panama, there is no reason to think that it could
not be settled with the same success for the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles. " -- (Quoted, in a French transla-
tion, by M. N. Dascovici, " La question du Bosphore
et des Dardanelles," 1915, p. 293. )
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the Straits, Russia must claim an unin-
terrupted land approach from Batum to
Scutari. England and France keep their
over-sea dominions without land ap-
proaches. The Russian Black Sea fleet,
under future conditions, will be completely
equal to the task of connecting the little
colony to the great metropolis.
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? XII-- SYRIA AND PALESTINE
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? XII
Syria and Palestine
If we eliminate the Drang nach Osten,
France has practically no competitors as
far as Syria is concerned. True, Colonel
Churchill wrote in the 'sixties that Syria
is geographically and historically the
indispensable corollary of Egypt, and that
both ought to belong to England. But,
although one-half of this prophetic wish
has been fulfilled, we think that nobody
in Britain would press for the execution
of the second moiety.
If such a tendency can be discovered
anywhere in our days, it is perhaps among
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
a section of Arab Nationalists in Egypt
and Syria. Their argument may be
worth mentioning. It presents a new
feature in the development of Arab political
opinion. Until recent times the Arabs,
especially those of Syria, were understood
to be strongly Francophil -- inasmuch as
they did not consider the possibility of
complete independence. It was a natural
result of their education, as most of the
modern-taught Arabs passed through the
numerous French schools of Syria. But
since the beginning of this war several
symptoms pointed to a notable change in
this attitude, at least among a section of
Syrian leaders. One of them, who lives
in Paris, gave us the following explanation
of this new departure.
" Before the war broke out it had always
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
been an axiom with us that England did
not want Syria. So the only alternative
to Turkish rule, for those who did not
believe in independence, was France. The
Turkish menace to Egypt changed the
whole situation. My friends from Cairo
write me that now on all sides the con-
viction is growing that England will not
be able to remain indifferent to the future
of Syria. They think England will claim
for herself the southern part of the Syrian
coast, if not the whole of it. If it is true,
then we Arabs have to reconsider our
attitude. If we really have a choice be-
tween France and England, many of us
would prefer England. We do not feel
any particular love for either ; as a matter
of feeling, our instinctive sympathy goes
rather to the French than to the English.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
But the French rule is centralistic and
tends to impose on the native population
the French language and customs. Eng-
land is incomparably more liberal. We
have two examples before our eyes : Tunis
and Egypt were occupied at the same time.
Tunis has been completely " frenchified *
in everything -- administration, tribunals,
schools, even religious education ; whilst
in Egypt our national language plays a
prominent role in schools and public life.
This difference is eloquent enough. Be-
sides, there is another consideration of no
less importance. The populations of the
southern and eastern Mediterranean coasts,
who all speak Arab dialects and could
form in the future a great united nation,
have been cut up into sections under
different rule : Morocco, Algeria and Tunis
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
are French, Tripoli is Italian, Egypt is
British, and now they are speaking of
Syria about to become French. I think
it is trop de morcellement. Many of us
will certainly prefer Egypt and Syria to
be one, under the same rule, and so to
constitute a powerful nucleus of Arab
nationhood. " *
* Cf. also the impressions of a French observer
close at the eve of the war : "De toutes les puissances
qui cherchent a ? tendre leur influence sur la Syrie
et la Palestine, l'Angleterre est avec la France la
seule vers qui aillent les aspirations des populations
desireuses d'echapper de quelque maniere an gou-
vernement des Turcs. . . . Sans vouloir mettre en
doute la bonne foi du gouvernement anglais lorsqu'il
declara l'annee derniere n'avoir ' ni intention d'agir,
ni dessein, ni aspiration politique dans ces regions,'
il n'en est pas moins vrai que les musulmans se tour-
nent vers lui et qu'il ne fait rien pour les decourager.
Certes, aucune propagande omcielle n'est faite par
l'Angleterre en Syrie, mais il faut que les musulmans
aient ete, comme on dit, fortement ' travailles '
precddemment par ses agents pour qu'ils la regardent
comme leur protect rice naturelle. On vit au prin-
temps dernier les notables musulmans reclamer au
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
These ideas did not 'pass unnoticed. In
the early spring of 1915 they formed the
subject of a lively polemic between some
leading vernacular papers of Cairo. A
little later, one of the most important
Paris dailies spoke with some anxiety of
" a section among the Syrian Arabs who
are said to turn their eyes towards a
Power other than France/' and tried to
persuade them that France is still the
fittest alternative for them.
We think that this last opinion is en-
tirely shared by all responsible men in
consul d'Angleterre a Beyrouth aide et assistance
contre les autorit6s ottomanes, et les journaux de
France epiloguerent longuement sur l'incident. Que
les diplomates anglais n'agissent plus aujourd'hui
sur les musulmans de Palestine et de Syrie, il n'en
reste pas moins que l'Angleterre a conserve sur eux
une influence politique dont ils sont devenus eux-
memes les propagateurs. " -- (Andre Dubosq, " Syrie,
Tripolitaine, Albanie," 1914, pp. 32, 33. )
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
British politics and press. The only ques-
tion that remains and really concerns
vital English interests is to know where
the southern frontier of the future French
Syria should be drawn. In other terms :
Syria must unquestionably go to France,
but what shall be the fate of that southern
part of the Syrian coast which bears the
historic name of Palestine ?
This question has met with little interest
on the part of the British public, with the
exception of some official circles in this
country and in Egypt. Not so in France.
The question of Palestine is vividly dis-
cussed in papers and at public meetings ;
the battlecry is " il nous faut la Syrie
integrate. " Among the leaders of this pro-
paganda we find many prominent names --
for one instance, that of Senator Leygues.
193
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 07:17 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc2. ark:/13960/t9f503c3n Public Domain / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd
? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Although not in the least supported by
the Government, which keeps a correct
silence on the whole matter, this movement
shows that French political sentiment is
almost as keen on Palestine as on the
rest of Syria.
Analysing, however, this part of the
French claim, one cannot help seeing that
it is hardly supported by anything but
sentiment.
