For
intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the
truth [*Cf.
intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the
truth [*Cf.
Summa Theologica
In this way
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence
whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a
multitude, which differ specifically as stated above ([2767]Q[47],
A[11]). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided
into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There
is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose;
thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that
governs this is called "military. " There is also the multitude that is
united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home
or family, and this is ruled by "domestic prudence": and such again is
the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is
"regnative prudence" in the ruler, and "political prudence," simply so
called, in the subjects.
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above ([2768]Q[47], A[2], ad 2) then
its parts include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics," according to
three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the
attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to "physics" (if
physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The
second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and
this belongs to "dialectics. " The third method is to employ conjectures
in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and
this belongs to "rhetoric. " It may be said, however, that these three
belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes
from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes
from conjectures.
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as
it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts
of prudence are "good counsel," which concerns counsel, "synesis,"
which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and "gnome,"
which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while
"prudence" is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.
Reply to Objection 1: The various enumerations differ, either because
different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under
"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under
"understanding. "
Reply to Objection 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be
taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the
reply may be gathered from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence,
not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with
things pertaining to prudence.
Reply to Objection 4: Right command and right use always go together,
because the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of
the lower powers, which pertain to use.
Reply to Objection 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
__________________________________________________________________
OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Memory;
(2) Understanding or Intelligence;
(3) Docility;
(4) Shrewdness;
(5) Reason;
(6) Foresight;
(7) Circumspection;
(8) Caution.
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Whether memory is a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For
memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the
sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,
whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards
future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among
the parts of prudence.
I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated
above ([2769]Q[47], A[5]). Now in such like matters a man can be
directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but
by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must
be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from
like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to
discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered
and fostered by experience and time. " Now experience is the result of
many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence
requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted
a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2770]Q[47], AA[3],6), prudence
applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense:
hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite
for prudence, and memory is one of them.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature,
while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully
says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not
only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a
man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet
somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us
more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the
mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were
children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these
illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions
easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some
corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible
objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of
the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he
must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily
from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et
Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason
being that we pass quickly from the one to the other. " Thirdly, we must
be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because
the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to
slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de
Arte Rhet. iii. ] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire. "
Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves
memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second
nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly
call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of
natural order.
Reply to Objection 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the
future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in
order to take good counsel for the future.
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Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition;
Aristotle's word is {nous}]
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of
prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of
the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and
prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not
be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q[8], AA[1],8).
But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has
been said above (Q[4], A[8]; [2771]FS, Q[62], A[2]). Therefore
understanding does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action
(Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and
immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a
part of prudence.
On the contrary, Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8]
mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power,
but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as
self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of
demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain
statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of
reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since
prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of
prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that
understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a
conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated
above ([2772]Q[47], AA[3],6), it applies the knowledge of some
universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a
universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of
prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is
cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is
an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative
principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One
should do evil to no man," as shown above ([2773]Q[47], A[6]). The
other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an
extreme, i. e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter,
viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism
of prudence, as stated above ([2774]Q[47], AA[3],6). Now this primary
singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore
the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of
some particular end.
Reply to Objection 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy
Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above
([2775]Q[8], AA[1],2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a
part of prudence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The right estimate about a particular end is
called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle,
and "sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the
Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need
to have the sense, and this is understanding. " But this is to be
understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know
proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a
particular.
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Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part
of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every
intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But
docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it
should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our
power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised
or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is
befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is
not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence,
since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are
also called "preceptors. " Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion
of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1;[2776] Q[47], A[3]) prudence
is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters
are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently;
nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in
matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by
others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding
of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the
undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are
experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their
demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into
principles. " Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own
prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the ancients"
(i. e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to
their wisdom. " Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught:
and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence
Reply to Objection 1: Although docility is useful for every
intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason
given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as
for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for
much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully,
frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the
learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them
through pride.
Reply to Objection 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for
others, but also for himself, as stated above ([2777]Q[47], A[12], ad
3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place
for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned
should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether
self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
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Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence.
For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for
demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of
prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies.
Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to
Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness
[*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of {eustochia}, i. e. "a
happy conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas
counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore
shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above ([2778]Q[48]) is a
"happy conjecture. " Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of
conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to
prudence.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who
is shrewd and alert [solers citus]. " But solicitude belongs to
prudence, as stated above ([2779]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore shrewdness
does also.
I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of
action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both
in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it
oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility
consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from
another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right
estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for {eustochia},
of which it is a part. For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any
matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding
the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher
[*Andronicus; Cf. Q[48], OBJ[1]] who calls shrewdness a part of
prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in general, hence he says:
"Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly. "
Reply to Objection 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the
middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical
syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they
are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic.
vi, 9) to prove that {euboulia}, i. e. good counsel, is not {eustochia},
which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man
may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet
this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good
counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance,
something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that
shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters,
wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and
prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense
in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all
matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of
prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But
prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be
reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should
be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and
science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should
not be reckoned a part of prudence
Objection 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially
from the intelligence, as stated above ([2780]FP, Q[79], A[8]). If
therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is
superfluous to add reason.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion
of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain
things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is
requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since
the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite
or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be
numbered among these parts.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but
its good use.
Reply to Objection 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect.
Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those
things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need
for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as
do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action,
wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things
intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and
fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless
more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for
counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more
certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be
an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to
particulars, which latter are various and uncertain.
Reply to Objection 3: Although intelligence and reason are not
different powers, yet they are named after different acts.
For
intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the
truth [*Cf. [2781]SS, Q[8], A[1]], while reason is so called from being
inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as
explained above [2782](A[2]; Q[47], A[2] ,3).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? [*"Providentia,"
which may be translated either "providence" or "foresight. "]
Objection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a
part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to
be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a
prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also
the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De
Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may
be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to
foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore
foresight is not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while
its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these
seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not
part of prudence.
On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number
foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above ([2783]Q[48]).
I answer that, As stated above ([2784]Q[47], A[1], ad 2, AA[6],13),
prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is
to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are
necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet
nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of
actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a
kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like
manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is
necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by
man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of
these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the
notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present
has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity,
one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are
subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and
predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the
principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required
for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be
rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence
is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part.
Reply to Objection 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary
things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are
everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we
fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to
speculative, but only to practical matters.
Reply to Objection 3: Right order to an end which is included in the
notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and
command, without which no right order to the end is possible.
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Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of
prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's
surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be
considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral
virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote
nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection
apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see
things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant
things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of
prudence in addition to foresight.
On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above
([2785]Q[48]).
I answer that, As stated above [2786](A[6]), it belongs to prudence
chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done
aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
Since, however, prudence, as stated above ([2787]Q[47], A[3]) is about
singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of
circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable
to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by
reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love
to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse
love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his
heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need
of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the
circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be
infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment
of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in
number
Reply to Objection 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence,
because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the
concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by
the fixing of circumstances.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that
which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to
circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of
the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own,
and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now
no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb.
ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the
same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health.
Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to
avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of
prudence, distinct from foresight.
Objection 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution
does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']. "
I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of
these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and
evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so
that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be
on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to
avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is
different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they
both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules
himself (Q[47], seqq. ), it remains for us to discuss the species of
prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
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Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is
the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of
prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are
"aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii,
10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy. " Therefore neither should a
regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part
of prudence to be "legislative. " Therefore it is not becoming to
substitute regnative prudence in its place.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence
is a virtue which is proper to the prince. " Therefore a special kind of
prudence is regnative.
I answer that, As stated above ([2788]Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to
prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find
a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind
of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind
of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the
perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the
more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more
matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and
most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the
government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence
is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q[47], A[5], ad 1; [2789]FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common
good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of
prudence. Hence these two virtues---prudence and justice---belong most
properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and
shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth. "
Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to
his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence
which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as
stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after
the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
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Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above [2790](A[1]). But a part should not be
reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should
not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what
the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the
subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from
regnative prudence.
Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly
so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence
called political.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals. "
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate
beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion,
since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own
actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their
power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are
slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in
such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some
kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may
direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that
species of prudence which is called political.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect
species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls
short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political
prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the
essence of a thing retains the name of "proper. "
Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
species of a habit, as stated above ([2791]Q[47], A[5]). Now the same
actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as
by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so
called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of
which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
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Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?
Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence
is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is
directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1.
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([2792]Q[47], A[13]) prudence is
only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked
people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household.
Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and
subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like
political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal
corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence.
Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of
prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of
which is domestic, another legislative, and another political. "
I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,
diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of
virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a
household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom,
since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the
household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence
commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from
political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.
Reply to Objection 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as
its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the
other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"
as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher
speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example
and in accordance with the opinion of many.
Reply to Objection 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters
of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in
regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the
household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.
Reply to Objection 3: The father has in his household an authority like
that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full
power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a
distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
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Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,
according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of
warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore
military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, just as military business is contained under
political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of
tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of
prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore
should any be assigned to military business.
Objection 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than
to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels. " Now
it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need
in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military. "
I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature,
and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold
tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand
outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has
provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they
are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with
the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant.
Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason,
there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a
suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a
"military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.
Reply to Objection 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it
has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as
arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it
belongs rather to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the
profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed
to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of
the entire common good.
Reply to Objection 3: The execution of military service belongs to
fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
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OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
(3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?
(4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?
[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law
{synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome},
respectively. ]
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Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man
makes evil use of virtue. " Now some make evil use of {euboulia}
(deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty
counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may
give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii.
But {euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which
implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([2793]FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not
connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel,
and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia}
(deliberating well) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia}
(deliberating well) "is a right counselling. " Now the perfection of
virtue consists in right reason.
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence
whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a
multitude, which differ specifically as stated above ([2767]Q[47],
A[11]). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided
into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There
is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose;
thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that
governs this is called "military. " There is also the multitude that is
united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home
or family, and this is ruled by "domestic prudence": and such again is
the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is
"regnative prudence" in the ruler, and "political prudence," simply so
called, in the subjects.
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above ([2768]Q[47], A[2], ad 2) then
its parts include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics," according to
three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the
attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to "physics" (if
physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The
second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and
this belongs to "dialectics. " The third method is to employ conjectures
in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and
this belongs to "rhetoric. " It may be said, however, that these three
belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes
from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes
from conjectures.
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as
it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts
of prudence are "good counsel," which concerns counsel, "synesis,"
which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and "gnome,"
which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while
"prudence" is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.
Reply to Objection 1: The various enumerations differ, either because
different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under
"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under
"understanding. "
Reply to Objection 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be
taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the
reply may be gathered from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence,
not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with
things pertaining to prudence.
Reply to Objection 4: Right command and right use always go together,
because the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of
the lower powers, which pertain to use.
Reply to Objection 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
__________________________________________________________________
OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Memory;
(2) Understanding or Intelligence;
(3) Docility;
(4) Shrewdness;
(5) Reason;
(6) Foresight;
(7) Circumspection;
(8) Caution.
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Whether memory is a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For
memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the
sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,
whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards
future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among
the parts of prudence.
I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated
above ([2769]Q[47], A[5]). Now in such like matters a man can be
directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but
by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must
be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from
like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to
discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered
and fostered by experience and time. " Now experience is the result of
many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence
requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted
a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2770]Q[47], AA[3],6), prudence
applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense:
hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite
for prudence, and memory is one of them.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature,
while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully
says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not
only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a
man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet
somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us
more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the
mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were
children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these
illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions
easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some
corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible
objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of
the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he
must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily
from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et
Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason
being that we pass quickly from the one to the other. " Thirdly, we must
be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because
the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to
slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de
Arte Rhet. iii. ] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire. "
Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves
memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second
nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly
call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of
natural order.
Reply to Objection 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the
future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in
order to take good counsel for the future.
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Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition;
Aristotle's word is {nous}]
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of
prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of
the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and
prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not
be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q[8], AA[1],8).
But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has
been said above (Q[4], A[8]; [2771]FS, Q[62], A[2]). Therefore
understanding does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action
(Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and
immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a
part of prudence.
On the contrary, Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8]
mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power,
but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as
self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of
demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain
statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of
reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since
prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of
prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that
understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a
conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated
above ([2772]Q[47], AA[3],6), it applies the knowledge of some
universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a
universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of
prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is
cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is
an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative
principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One
should do evil to no man," as shown above ([2773]Q[47], A[6]). The
other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an
extreme, i. e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter,
viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism
of prudence, as stated above ([2774]Q[47], AA[3],6). Now this primary
singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore
the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of
some particular end.
Reply to Objection 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy
Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above
([2775]Q[8], AA[1],2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a
part of prudence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The right estimate about a particular end is
called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle,
and "sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the
Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need
to have the sense, and this is understanding. " But this is to be
understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know
proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a
particular.
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Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part
of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every
intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But
docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it
should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our
power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised
or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is
befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is
not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence,
since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are
also called "preceptors. " Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion
of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1;[2776] Q[47], A[3]) prudence
is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters
are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently;
nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in
matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by
others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding
of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the
undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are
experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their
demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into
principles. " Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own
prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the ancients"
(i. e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to
their wisdom. " Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught:
and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence
Reply to Objection 1: Although docility is useful for every
intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason
given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as
for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for
much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully,
frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the
learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them
through pride.
Reply to Objection 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for
others, but also for himself, as stated above ([2777]Q[47], A[12], ad
3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place
for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned
should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether
self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
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Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence.
For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for
demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of
prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies.
Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to
Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness
[*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of {eustochia}, i. e. "a
happy conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas
counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore
shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above ([2778]Q[48]) is a
"happy conjecture. " Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of
conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to
prudence.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who
is shrewd and alert [solers citus]. " But solicitude belongs to
prudence, as stated above ([2779]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore shrewdness
does also.
I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of
action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both
in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it
oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility
consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from
another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right
estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for {eustochia},
of which it is a part. For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any
matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding
the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher
[*Andronicus; Cf. Q[48], OBJ[1]] who calls shrewdness a part of
prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in general, hence he says:
"Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly. "
Reply to Objection 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the
middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical
syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they
are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic.
vi, 9) to prove that {euboulia}, i. e. good counsel, is not {eustochia},
which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man
may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet
this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good
counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance,
something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that
shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters,
wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and
prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense
in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all
matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
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Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of
prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But
prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be
reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should
be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and
science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should
not be reckoned a part of prudence
Objection 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially
from the intelligence, as stated above ([2780]FP, Q[79], A[8]). If
therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is
superfluous to add reason.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion
of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain
things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is
requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since
the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite
or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be
numbered among these parts.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but
its good use.
Reply to Objection 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect.
Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those
things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need
for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as
do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action,
wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things
intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and
fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless
more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for
counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more
certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be
an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to
particulars, which latter are various and uncertain.
Reply to Objection 3: Although intelligence and reason are not
different powers, yet they are named after different acts.
For
intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the
truth [*Cf. [2781]SS, Q[8], A[1]], while reason is so called from being
inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as
explained above [2782](A[2]; Q[47], A[2] ,3).
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Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? [*"Providentia,"
which may be translated either "providence" or "foresight. "]
Objection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a
part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to
be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a
prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also
the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De
Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may
be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to
foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore
foresight is not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while
its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these
seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not
part of prudence.
On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number
foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above ([2783]Q[48]).
I answer that, As stated above ([2784]Q[47], A[1], ad 2, AA[6],13),
prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is
to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are
necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet
nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of
actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a
kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like
manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is
necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by
man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of
these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the
notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present
has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity,
one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are
subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and
predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the
principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required
for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be
rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence
is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part.
Reply to Objection 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary
things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are
everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we
fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to
speculative, but only to practical matters.
Reply to Objection 3: Right order to an end which is included in the
notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and
command, without which no right order to the end is possible.
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Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of
prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's
surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be
considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral
virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote
nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection
apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see
things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant
things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of
prudence in addition to foresight.
On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above
([2785]Q[48]).
I answer that, As stated above [2786](A[6]), it belongs to prudence
chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done
aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
Since, however, prudence, as stated above ([2787]Q[47], A[3]) is about
singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of
circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable
to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by
reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love
to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse
love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his
heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need
of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the
circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be
infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment
of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in
number
Reply to Objection 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence,
because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the
concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by
the fixing of circumstances.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that
which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to
circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of
the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own,
and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
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Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now
no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb.
ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the
same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health.
Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to
avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of
prudence, distinct from foresight.
Objection 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution
does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']. "
I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of
these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and
evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so
that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be
on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to
avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is
different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they
both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
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OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules
himself (Q[47], seqq. ), it remains for us to discuss the species of
prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
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Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is
the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of
prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are
"aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii,
10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy. " Therefore neither should a
regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part
of prudence to be "legislative. " Therefore it is not becoming to
substitute regnative prudence in its place.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence
is a virtue which is proper to the prince. " Therefore a special kind of
prudence is regnative.
I answer that, As stated above ([2788]Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to
prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find
a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind
of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind
of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the
perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the
more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more
matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and
most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the
government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence
is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q[47], A[5], ad 1; [2789]FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common
good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of
prudence. Hence these two virtues---prudence and justice---belong most
properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and
shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth. "
Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to
his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence
which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as
stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after
the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
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Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above [2790](A[1]). But a part should not be
reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should
not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what
the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the
subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from
regnative prudence.
Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly
so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence
called political.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals. "
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate
beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion,
since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own
actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their
power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are
slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in
such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some
kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may
direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that
species of prudence which is called political.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect
species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls
short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political
prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the
essence of a thing retains the name of "proper. "
Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
species of a habit, as stated above ([2791]Q[47], A[5]). Now the same
actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as
by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so
called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of
which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
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Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?
Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence
is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is
directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1.
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([2792]Q[47], A[13]) prudence is
only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked
people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household.
Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and
subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like
political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal
corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence.
Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of
prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of
which is domestic, another legislative, and another political. "
I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,
diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of
virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a
household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom,
since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the
household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence
commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from
political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.
Reply to Objection 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as
its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the
other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"
as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher
speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example
and in accordance with the opinion of many.
Reply to Objection 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters
of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in
regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the
household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.
Reply to Objection 3: The father has in his household an authority like
that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full
power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a
distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
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Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,
according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of
warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore
military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, just as military business is contained under
political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of
tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of
prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore
should any be assigned to military business.
Objection 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than
to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels. " Now
it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need
in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military. "
I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature,
and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold
tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand
outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has
provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they
are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with
the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant.
Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason,
there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a
suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a
"military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.
Reply to Objection 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it
has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as
arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it
belongs rather to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the
profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed
to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of
the entire common good.
Reply to Objection 3: The execution of military service belongs to
fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
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OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
(3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?
(4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?
[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law
{synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome},
respectively. ]
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Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man
makes evil use of virtue. " Now some make evil use of {euboulia}
(deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty
counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may
give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii.
But {euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which
implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([2793]FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not
connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel,
and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia}
(deliberating well) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia}
(deliberating well) "is a right counselling. " Now the perfection of
virtue consists in right reason.
