36); "lightness" is the opposite; "cold" is what
produces
a desire for heat; "hunger" is what produces a desire for food; "thirst" is what produces a desire for drinking.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
relationship with the defilements, because the defilements do not adhere to them.
This point will be explained later in the Fifth Chapter.
What are the pure dharmas?
5a-b. The undefiled truth of the Path and the three uncondi-
20
tioned things are pure.
What are the three unconditioned things?
22 5c. Space and the two types of extinctions.
The two extinctions are pratisamkhyanirodha, extinction due to knowledge, and apratisamkhydnirodha* extinction not due to knowledge.
The three unconditioned things and the truth of the Path are pure dharmas because the defilements do not adhere to them.
5c. Space is "that which does not hinder. "
Space has for its nature not hindering matter which, in fact, takes place freely in space; and also of not being hindered by matter, for
23
space is not displaced by matter.
6a. Pratisamkhyanirodha is disjunction.
(Conscious) disjunction {visamyoga, ii. 57d) from the impure dharmas is pratisamkhyanirodha (ii. 55) [or Nirvana]. Pratisamkhydna or pratisamkhya signifies a certain pure prajnd, the comprehension of the Truths. The "extinction" of which one takes possession by this prajnd is called pratisamkhyanirodha', we could say pratisamkhya- [prdpyaj-nirodha, "the extinction obtained through pratisamkhya, " but the middle word (i. e. , prdpya) is elided, as in the expression "ox- cart," and not "cart hitched to oxen" (goratha = go-[yukta]-ratha).
***
Is there but one single pratisamkhyanirodha from all of the impure dharmas?
21
24
The Dhitus 59
? 60
Chapter One
No.
Why is this?
6b. Each [disjunction occurs] separately.
Each disjunction taken seperately is pratisarhkhyanirodha. The 25
objects of "disjunction" are as numerous as the objects of "junction. "
If it were otherwise, if pratisarhkhyanirodha were single, then a person who has experienced the extinction of the defilement which is abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering, would have obtained at the same time the extinction of the defilements which are abandoned by the Seeing of the other Truths, and by Meditation. It would be useless for him to cultivate the part of the Path which is opposed to these defilements. (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 164cl6).
This does not mean that all extinction is alike, that there is not an
extinction corresponding to another extinction. This means that
extinction does not have a "cause corresponding to its effect
(sabhagahetu)" and that it is not a "cause corresponding to its effect" 26
(ii. 52).
6c-d. A different type of extinction, which consists of the
absolute hindering of arising, is called apratisarhkhyanirodha.
Apratisamkhydnirodha is an extinction which is different from
"disjunction;" it consists of the absolute hindering of the arising of
future dharmas. It is so called because it is obtained, not by the
comprehension of the Truths, but by the insufficiency of the causes of
27 arising.
For example, when the organ of sight and the mental organ are occupied with a certain visible matter, other visible things, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles pass from the present into the past. It follows that the five sense consciousness, the visual consciousness, etc. , which have had for their object other visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles, cannot arise, for the sense consciousnesses are not capable of grasping their object when the object is past. There is thus an absolute hindering of the arising of the said consciousnesses, by reason of the insufficiency of the cause of arising.
? Here we have a four-fold alternative (Vibhdsd, TD 27,p. 164cl6):
1. solely pratisamkhyanirodha of the impure dharmas, past, present, and destined to arise;
2. solely apratisamkhydnirodha of pure, conditioned dharmas, not destined to arise;
3. pratisamkhyanirodha and apratisamkhydnirodha of impure dharmas, not destined to arise; and
4. neither pratisamkhyanirodha nor apratisamkhyanirodha of pure 28
dharmas, past, present or destined to arise.
***
We have said that the impure dharmas are the conditioned dharmas, minus the Path. What are the conditioned dharmas}
7a-b. Conditioned things are the fivefold skandhas, matter, 29
etc.
These are the aggregate of matter, the aggregate of the sensations, the aggregate of ideas, the aggregate of mental formations, and the aggregate of consciousness.
Samkrta, conditioned, is explained etymologically as "that which has been created ikrta) by causes in union and combination. " There is no dharma which is engendered by a single cause (ii. 64).
Even though the expression samskrta signifies "that which has been created . . ," it also applies to future dharmas and to present dharmas, as well as to past dharmas\ in fact, a dharma does not change its nature by changing its time period. In the same way, one calls milk in the udder dugdha, "that which has been drawn," and kindling indhana, or "wood to be burned. "
7c-d. Conditioned things are the paths; they are the founda- tions of discourse; they are "possessed of leaving;" they are "possessed of causes. "
1. Conditioned things are paths--that is to say, the time periods, the past, present and future--because they have for their nature
The Dhatus 61
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having gone, of going, of shall be going. In the same way, one says that a path led somewhere, that it goes, or that it will go to the town.
Or rather conditioned things are called paths (adhvari) because they are devoured (adyante) by impermanence (ii. 45c).
2. Discourse (kathd), means words, or speech (vdkya); discourse 30
has names or words (ndman, ii. 36) for its foundation.
Should one take literally the definition given by the stanza, and say
that conditioned things are words?
No. By "foundations of discourse" one should understand "the
foundations of discourse, that is, words, together with that which the words signify. " If we understand "foundations of discourse" to be only
n
words, we would be at variance with the Prakaranapdda which says;
"The kathavastus, the foundations of discourse, are embraced within 32
the eighteen dhdtus. " (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 74a20).
3. Nihsdra signifies "leaving" (sdra = nihsarana) which is the
Nirvana of all conditioned things. As one should depart from
33 conditioned things, one qualifies them as "endowed with leaving. "
4. Conditioned things are dependent on causes; they are thus 34
qualified as savastuka, that is, "having causes. "
The Vaibhasikas believe that, in the expression savastuka, vastu
35 signifies cause (hetu).
Such are the diverse synonyms of "conditioned things. "
8a-b. When they are impure, they are updddnaskandhas. ^
Impure conditioned things constitute the five updddnaskandhas. Everything that is updddnaskandha is skandha; pure conditioned things are included within the skandhas, but are not included within the updddnaskandhas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 387a9).
The updddnas are defilements {klesas, v. 38).
The updddnaskandhas are so called (1) because they proceed from the defilements, as one says "grass fire" or "straw fire;" (2) or rather because they are governed by the defilements, as one says "the king's man;" (3) or rather because they give rise to the defilements, as one says "flower-bearing tree" or "fruit-bearing tree. "
37 8c. They are called "of battle. "
? The defilements are of battle because they injure oneself and others. Impure conditioned things are qualified "of battle," "in a relationship with battle," because the defilements of battle adhere to them; equally, as we have seen, they are qualified as "impure," "possessing impurity,"because the defilements adhere to them.
8c-d. They are also suffering, arising, the world, the locus of false opinions, existence.
1. Suffering, because they are odious to the Saints (vi. 2).
2. Arising, because suffering arises from them (vi. 2).
3. World, because they are in the process of decomposition.
4. Locus of opinions, because the five opinions abide in them and
adhere to them (v. 7) (Prakarana, p. 33b7). 39
5. Existence, because it exists.
***
We have seen that there are five skandhas (i. 7, 20). Let us first study rilpaskandha (i. 9-14b).
9a-b. Rupa, or matter, is the five sense organs, five objects, and AQ
avijnapti.
The five organs are the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.
The five objects of the five organs are visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles.
And avijnapti (i. 11); such is rilpaskandha. ***
We have enumerated five things, visible matter, sound, etc.
9c-d. The points of support of the consciousnesses of these
things, namely the subtle material elements, are the five
41 organs, the organ of sight, etc.
The Dhatus 63
38
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The five which are the point of support of the consciousnesses of visible matter, sounds, odor, taste and tangibles, and which consist of the suprasensible subtle material elements, are, in this order, the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.
The Blessed One said in fact, "The eye, Oh Bhiksus, an internal 42
ayatana, a subtle matter derived from the primary elements . . . "
Or rather, (the point of support of the consciousnesses of these organs, are) the points of support of the visual consciousness, or eye
43
consciousness, etc. This interpretation is in conformity with the
Prakarana (p. 692cl2) which says: "What is the organ of sight? It is the subtle matter which is the support of the consciousness of sight. "
***
Let us now examine the five objects beginning with visible matter,
rupdyatana.
44 10a. Visible matter is twofold.
1. Visible matter is color and shape. Color is fourfold: blue, red,
yellow, white; other colors proceed from out of these four colors. Shape
(samsthdna, iv. 3c) is eightfold: long, short, square, round, high, low, 45
even, uneven.
10a. Or twentyfold.
2. Or there are some twenty types: the four primary colors, the eight shapes, and eight more colors: cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shade, hot light, light, darkness. Some make a color of the firmament [which appears like a wall of lapiz-lazuli]; this would give us the number twenty-one.
"Even" signifies "of even shape;" "uneven" is the opposite; mist is the vapor which rises from the ground and from water; "hot light" is the light of the sun; "light" is the light of the moon, the stars, fire, grasses and gems; "shade"--arisen from an obstacle to light--is where forms still remain visible; "darkness" is the opposite.
The other terms do not call for any explanation.
? 3. Visible matter can be color without being shape: yellow, white, shade, hot light, light, darkness.
46
blue, red, There can be shapes without there being color: that part of the
47 long, of the short, etc. , which constitutes bodily action (kdyavijnapti,
iv. 2).
There can be color and shape at one and the same time: all the
other categories of visible matter.
Some other Masters maintain that only hot light and light are
exclusively color; for blue, red, etc. , present themselves to the sight under the aspect of long, short, etc.
4. But, say the Sautrantikas, how could a single thing be (yidyate) twofold, [color and shape together? For, in the system of the Vaibhasikas, color and shape are distinct things, dravya, iv. 3. ]
Because color and shape are perceived in a single substance. The root vid has here the sense of "to know," and not the sense of "to exist. "
But, reply the Sautrantikas, you should admit that bodily action is at one and the same time color and shape.
48 10b. Sound is eightfold.
1. It is fourfold: having for its cause present primary elements
forming part of the organs, having for its cause other primary
elements (upattanupattamahabhutahetuka, i. 34c-d), belonging to liv-
49
ing beings, and not belonging to living beings. categories is agreeable or disagreeable.
Each of these four
First category: sound caused by the hand or by the voice.
Second category: sound of the wind, of the trees, of water.
Third category: sound of vocal action (iv. 3d). Fourth category:
every other sound
2. According to other masters, one sound can belong to the first
two categories at one and the same time, for example, a sound produced by the coming together of a hand and a drum. But the School (Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 663cl2) does not admit that one atom [of matter] has for its cause only two tetrades of the primary elements; thus one cannot admit that one atom [of sound] is produced by the four primary
The Dhatus 65
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elements of a hand and the four primary elements of a drum.
50 lOb-c. Taste is of six types.
Sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent.
51 10c. Odor is fourfold.
For good odors and bad odors are either excessive or non-excessive.
But, according to the Prakarana (p. 692c22), odor is threefold: good, bad, and equal or indifferent.
52 lOd. The tangible is of eleven types.
1. Eleven things are tangible things: the four primary elements, softness, hardness, weight, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst.
2. The elements will be explained below (i. 12). "Softness" is smoothness; "hardness" is roughness; "weight" is that by which bodies are susceptible of being weighed (i.
36); "lightness" is the opposite; "cold" is what produces a desire for heat; "hunger" is what produces a desire for food; "thirst" is what produces a desire for drinking. In fact the tangible which produces hunger and thirst is designated by the word hunger: the cause is designated by the name of the effect. In the same way that it is said "The appearance of the Buddha is (the cause of) happiness; the teaching of the religion is happiness; happiness, the harmony of the community; happiness, the austerities of monks who
53 are in agreement. "
54
3. Both hunger and thirst are lacking in Rupadhatu, but the other
tangibles are found there.
It is true that the clothes of the gods of Rupadhatu, individually,
have no weight; but, brought all together, they have weight.
It is true that bothersome cold is lacking in Rupadhatu but beneficent or pleasing cold is found there: such is the opinion of the
Vaibhasikas. [It is the absorption that the gods enjoy, not the cold. ]
55
It is possible for one visual consciousness to arise from a single
thing, from a single category of visible matter: when a characteristic of this thing (blue, etc. ) is separately distinguished. In other cases, one consciousness is produced by many things: when such a distinction is
? lacking; for example, when one sees the multiple colors and shapes that an army or a pile of jewels present at a distance and bunched together. The same remark is applicable to the auditory consciousness, the olfactory consciousnesses, etc.
But one touch consciousness arises from only five things at most, namely the four primary elements and one another of the other tangibles, soft, hard, etc. Such is the opinion of certain masters.
But, according to another opinion, one touch consciousness can arise from eleven tangibles at one and the same time.
[Objection]. According to what you say, each of the five sense consciousnesses bears on a totality, for example the visual conscious- ness bears on blue, red, etc. ; consequently the sense consciousnesses have "general characteristics for their object" and not, as Scripture teaches us, "specific characteristic" (svalaksana).
[The Vaibhasikas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 65cl2) answer that the Scripture] means by specific charaaeristic not the specific charaaeristic
56
of things, but the specific charaaeristic of an ayatana (ii. 62c).
When the organs of touch and of taste attain their objea at the
same time (i. 43c-d), which consciousness is the first to arise?
The one whose object is the strongest. But if the strength of the two objects is equal, the consciousness of taste arise first, because the
desire for food dominates.
***
We have explained the objeas of the five organs of sense consciousness, and how these objects are preceived. Let us now examine the avijnapti, which is the eleventh category of rupaskandha.
11. There is a serial continuity also in a person whose mind is
distracted, or who is without mind, pure or impure, in
dependence on the primary elements: this is called the 57
avijnapti.
"One whose mind is distracted" is one who has a mind different from the mind that provoked the avijnapti,--for example, a bad mind
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when the avijnapti has been provoked by a good mind
"One without mind" is one who has entered into one of the
absorptions of non-consciousness called asamjnisamapatti [and niro- dhasamapatti] (ii. 42).
"Also in a person . . :" the word "also" indicates that avijnapti also exists in a person with a non-distraaed mind, and in a person whose mind is not in the two absorptions.
"A serial continuity" is a flux.
"Pure or impure" means good or bad.
"In dependence on the primary elements:" this in order to
distinguish the avijnapti series from the prapti series (ii. 36). Avijnapti depends on the primary elements, because they are its generating cause, etc. (ii. 65; Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 663a26).
"This is called the avijnapti* in order to indicate the reason for the name avijnapti.
This serial continuity, while being by its nature matter and action,--like vijnapti, bodily and vocal action,--nevertheless does nothing by way of informing another as vijnapti does.
"Is called," in order to show that the author here expresses the opinion of the Vaibhasikas, and not his own.
In short, avijnapti is a rupa, good or bad, arisen from vijnapti or from absorption.
***
What are the primary elements?
12a-b. The primary elements are the elementary substance
"earth," and the elementary substances "water," "fire" and
58 "wind. "
These four are the four dhatus, so called because they bear their own unique characteristics, as well as derived or secondary matter.
They are called "great" (=primary) because they are the point of support for all derived matter. Or it is because they assemble on a large scale in the mass of the earth, the water, the fire and the wind, where
? their modes of activity are manifested together (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 681al7,p. 663all). 59
What activity establishes the existence of these dhatus, and what is their nature?
12c. They are proven to exist by the actions of support, etc.
The elements of earth, water, fire, wind, are, in this order, proven to exist by the actions of support, cohesion, ripening and expansion. Expansion signifies growth and deplacement. These are their actions.
60 12d. They are solidity, humidity, heat and motion.
As for their natures, the earth element is solidity, the water element is humidity, the fire element is heat, and the wind element is
61
motion.
Motion is what causes the series of states which constitutes a 62
thing to reproduce itself in different places; in the same way that one
speaks of the motion of a flame (iv. 2c-d).
63 64
The Prakarana and the Sutra say: "What is the wind element?
It is lightness;" the Prakarana also says: "Lightness is a derived mpa. " Consequently, the dharma which has motion for its nature is the wind
65
element: its nature (lightness) is manifested by its act of motion.
What is the difference between the earth element, and earth, etc?
13a. In common usage, what is designated by the word "earth" is color and shape.
That is, when one sees earth, one sees its color and its shape. As is the case for the earth,
13b. The same for water and fire.
In common usage, that which one designates (by the word water or fire) is color and shape.
13c. Wind is either the wind element,
But the wind element is simply called "wind" in the world.
13d. Or else [color and shape].
66
The Dhatus 69
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What is called "wind" in the world is also the wind element; in fact, one speaks of "black wind," or "circular wind. "
***
Why do all these dharmas, from visibles to avijnapti, receive the name rupa? Why do they together constitute the rupaskandha?
i. The Blessed One said: "Because it is incessantly broken, Oh
Bhiksus, one terms it rupa updddnaskandha. By what it is broken? It is 67
broken by contact with the hand. "
"To be broken" signifies "to be damaged," as stated in the 68
Arthavargtya stanza of the Ksudrakdgama (-Apphakavagga, i. 2): "If the pleasures are lacking in a person who ardently searches out these pleasures, such a person is broken, as a person pierced by an arrow is broken. " (Compare Mbh xiii. 193,48).
But how is rupa damaged?
By deteriorating, by being transformed.
ii. According to other masters, the quality that makes physical
matter rupa, namely rupana, is not cutting off, deterioration, but 69
rather impenetrability, impact or resistance, the obstacle th^t a rupa 70
opposes to its place being occupied by another rupa (see i. 43c-d). [iii. Objections. ]
1. If this is so, the rupa that constitutes an atom, a "monad," will not be rupa, for a monad, not susceptible to deterioration or resistance, is free from rupana.
Without doubt, a monad is devoid of rupana\ but a monad never
71
exists in an isolated state;
agglomerate, it is liable to deterioration and to resistance (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 390al).
2. Rupas of the past and the future are not rupa, for one cannot say that they are now in a state of resistance.
Without doubt, but they have been, and they shall be in this state. Whether past or future, they are of the same nature as the dhanna which is now in a state of resistance. In the same way indhana is not only (presently) kindled wood, but also (future) fuel.
in the state of agglomeration, being an
? 3. Avijnapti is not rupa, for it is devoid of resistance.
Without doubt, but one can justify the quality of rupa attributed to avijnapti:
a. Vijnapti, bodily or vocal action, from whence proceeds avijnapti, is rupa; thus avijnapti is rupa, as the shadow moves when the tree moves.
No. For avijtlapti is not subject to modifications; further, in order that the comparison be exact, the avijnapti should perish when the vijfiapti perishes, as is the case for the shadow and the tree.
b. Second explanation. Avijnapti is rupa, for the primary elements,
72
which constitute its point of support, are rupa
[Objection. ] According to this principle, the five sense conscious-
nesses would be rupa, for their point of support (the organ of sight, etc) is rupa.
This response is not valid. Avijnapti exists dependent upon the primary elements, as a shadow exists dependent on a tree, as the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the jewel. The visual consciousness is not dependent upon an organ which is solely the cause of its arising.
[Answer. ] That the shadow, or the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the tree, or on the jewel, is a hypothesis that does not conform to the principles of the Vaibhasikas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 63c22). The Vaibhasikas hold that each one of the atoms of color which constitute shade and brilliance, exists dependent upon a tetrad of primary elements. And even supposing that: 'The shadow is dependent upon the tree, since the shadow is dependent on the primary elements which are proper to it, and these are dependent upon the tree,"--the comparison to the shadow and avijnapti is
inadmissible. The Vaibhasikas admit that avijnapti does not perish when the primary elements which serve as its point of support perish (iv. 4c-d). Consequently your refutation ("This response is not valid. Avijnapti. . . ") is worthless.
But, we would say, one can refute the objection: "According to this principle, the five sense consciousnesses would be rupa"
In fact, the support of visual consciousness is twofold: 1. the organ
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of sight, which is in a state of "impact" (i. 29b), which is rUpa\ and 2. the mental organ (manas, i. 44c-d) which is not rupa.
Now the same does not hold for avijnapti whose point of support is exclusively rupa. Thus, from the fact that avijnapti is called rupa because its point of support is rupa, one cannot conclude that visual consciousness should be called rupa. Therefore, the second explanation is the right one.
*##
The organs and objects which have been defined as rupaskandha, I4a-b. These same organs and objects are regarded as ten
1 ayatanas, ten dhatus. *
Considered as ayatana, origin of the mind and of the mental states (i. 20), they are ten ayatanas: caksurayatana, rupayatana,. . . kdyaya- tana, sprastavyayatana.
Considered as dhdtu, a mine (i. 20), they are ten dhatus: caksur- dhdtu, rupadhdtu . . . kayadhatu, sprastavyadhdtu.
***
We have explained rupaskandha and how it is distributed into ayatanas and dhdtus. We must now explain the skandhas.
74 14c. Sensation is painful impression, etc.
Vedanaskandha is the threefold mode of feeling or experiencing sensation which is painful, pleasant, neither-painful-nor-pleasant. One should distinguish six classes of sensations: those which arise from the contact of the five material organs, the organ of sight, etc. , with their object; and those which arise from contact with the mental organ (ii. 7 and following).
75 14c-d Ideas consist of the grasping of characteristics.
The grasping of the diverse natures--perceiving that this is blue,
? yellow, long, short, male, female, friend, enemy, agreeable, disagree- able, etc. --is samjndskandha (see i. l6a). One can distinguish six types of samjfid, according to organ, as for sensation.
15a-b. Samkdraskandha are the samskaras different from the 76
The samskaras are everything that is conditioned (samskftajJa); but the name is reserved for those conditioned things which are not included in either the skandhas of rupa, vedana, or samjnd, explained above, or in the skandha of vijndna explained below (i. 16).
other four skandhas.
It is true that the Blessed One said in a Sutra, "The samskd- 77
raskandha is the six classes of volition;" but this definition excludes from samskaraskandha 1. ) all the viprayuktasamskdras (ii. 35), and 2. ) the samprayuktasamskaras (ii. 23b, 34), with the exception of volition itself. But the Sutra expresses itself thus by reason of the capital
78 definition the factor which creates future existence. Also the Blessed
importance of volition, which, being action by its nature,
One said, "The updddnaskandha called samskdra is so called because it
conditions conditioned things,"
determines the five skandhas of future existence.
79
that is to say, because it creates and 80
If we take the definition of the Sutra literally, we would then arrive at the conclusion that the mental dharmas, with the exception of volition, and all of the dharmas of the viprayukta class (ii. 35), do not form part of any skandha. They would thus not form part of the Truths of Suffering and Arising: one would not either know them, nor abandon them. Now the Blessed One said, "If there is a single dharma which is not known and penetrated, I declare that one cannot put an end to suffering" (vi. 33). And again "If there is a single dharma which is not abandoned . . . " (Samyukta TD 2, p. 55b7, b23). Thus the collection of mental states and viprayuktas is included within the samskaraskandha.
15b-d. These three skandhas\ with avijnapti and unconditioned things, are the dharmdyatana, the dharmadhdtu.
Vedanaskandha, samjndskandha, samskaraskandha, plus avijnapti
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(i. ll) and the three unconditioned things (i. 5b), are seven things which are called dharmdyatana or dharmadhdtu.
81 16a. Consciousness is the impression relative to each object.
What are the pure dharmas?
5a-b. The undefiled truth of the Path and the three uncondi-
20
tioned things are pure.
What are the three unconditioned things?
22 5c. Space and the two types of extinctions.
The two extinctions are pratisamkhyanirodha, extinction due to knowledge, and apratisamkhydnirodha* extinction not due to knowledge.
The three unconditioned things and the truth of the Path are pure dharmas because the defilements do not adhere to them.
5c. Space is "that which does not hinder. "
Space has for its nature not hindering matter which, in fact, takes place freely in space; and also of not being hindered by matter, for
23
space is not displaced by matter.
6a. Pratisamkhyanirodha is disjunction.
(Conscious) disjunction {visamyoga, ii. 57d) from the impure dharmas is pratisamkhyanirodha (ii. 55) [or Nirvana]. Pratisamkhydna or pratisamkhya signifies a certain pure prajnd, the comprehension of the Truths. The "extinction" of which one takes possession by this prajnd is called pratisamkhyanirodha', we could say pratisamkhya- [prdpyaj-nirodha, "the extinction obtained through pratisamkhya, " but the middle word (i. e. , prdpya) is elided, as in the expression "ox- cart," and not "cart hitched to oxen" (goratha = go-[yukta]-ratha).
***
Is there but one single pratisamkhyanirodha from all of the impure dharmas?
21
24
The Dhitus 59
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Chapter One
No.
Why is this?
6b. Each [disjunction occurs] separately.
Each disjunction taken seperately is pratisarhkhyanirodha. The 25
objects of "disjunction" are as numerous as the objects of "junction. "
If it were otherwise, if pratisarhkhyanirodha were single, then a person who has experienced the extinction of the defilement which is abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering, would have obtained at the same time the extinction of the defilements which are abandoned by the Seeing of the other Truths, and by Meditation. It would be useless for him to cultivate the part of the Path which is opposed to these defilements. (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 164cl6).
This does not mean that all extinction is alike, that there is not an
extinction corresponding to another extinction. This means that
extinction does not have a "cause corresponding to its effect
(sabhagahetu)" and that it is not a "cause corresponding to its effect" 26
(ii. 52).
6c-d. A different type of extinction, which consists of the
absolute hindering of arising, is called apratisarhkhyanirodha.
Apratisamkhydnirodha is an extinction which is different from
"disjunction;" it consists of the absolute hindering of the arising of
future dharmas. It is so called because it is obtained, not by the
comprehension of the Truths, but by the insufficiency of the causes of
27 arising.
For example, when the organ of sight and the mental organ are occupied with a certain visible matter, other visible things, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles pass from the present into the past. It follows that the five sense consciousness, the visual consciousness, etc. , which have had for their object other visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles, cannot arise, for the sense consciousnesses are not capable of grasping their object when the object is past. There is thus an absolute hindering of the arising of the said consciousnesses, by reason of the insufficiency of the cause of arising.
? Here we have a four-fold alternative (Vibhdsd, TD 27,p. 164cl6):
1. solely pratisamkhyanirodha of the impure dharmas, past, present, and destined to arise;
2. solely apratisamkhydnirodha of pure, conditioned dharmas, not destined to arise;
3. pratisamkhyanirodha and apratisamkhydnirodha of impure dharmas, not destined to arise; and
4. neither pratisamkhyanirodha nor apratisamkhyanirodha of pure 28
dharmas, past, present or destined to arise.
***
We have said that the impure dharmas are the conditioned dharmas, minus the Path. What are the conditioned dharmas}
7a-b. Conditioned things are the fivefold skandhas, matter, 29
etc.
These are the aggregate of matter, the aggregate of the sensations, the aggregate of ideas, the aggregate of mental formations, and the aggregate of consciousness.
Samkrta, conditioned, is explained etymologically as "that which has been created ikrta) by causes in union and combination. " There is no dharma which is engendered by a single cause (ii. 64).
Even though the expression samskrta signifies "that which has been created . . ," it also applies to future dharmas and to present dharmas, as well as to past dharmas\ in fact, a dharma does not change its nature by changing its time period. In the same way, one calls milk in the udder dugdha, "that which has been drawn," and kindling indhana, or "wood to be burned. "
7c-d. Conditioned things are the paths; they are the founda- tions of discourse; they are "possessed of leaving;" they are "possessed of causes. "
1. Conditioned things are paths--that is to say, the time periods, the past, present and future--because they have for their nature
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having gone, of going, of shall be going. In the same way, one says that a path led somewhere, that it goes, or that it will go to the town.
Or rather conditioned things are called paths (adhvari) because they are devoured (adyante) by impermanence (ii. 45c).
2. Discourse (kathd), means words, or speech (vdkya); discourse 30
has names or words (ndman, ii. 36) for its foundation.
Should one take literally the definition given by the stanza, and say
that conditioned things are words?
No. By "foundations of discourse" one should understand "the
foundations of discourse, that is, words, together with that which the words signify. " If we understand "foundations of discourse" to be only
n
words, we would be at variance with the Prakaranapdda which says;
"The kathavastus, the foundations of discourse, are embraced within 32
the eighteen dhdtus. " (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 74a20).
3. Nihsdra signifies "leaving" (sdra = nihsarana) which is the
Nirvana of all conditioned things. As one should depart from
33 conditioned things, one qualifies them as "endowed with leaving. "
4. Conditioned things are dependent on causes; they are thus 34
qualified as savastuka, that is, "having causes. "
The Vaibhasikas believe that, in the expression savastuka, vastu
35 signifies cause (hetu).
Such are the diverse synonyms of "conditioned things. "
8a-b. When they are impure, they are updddnaskandhas. ^
Impure conditioned things constitute the five updddnaskandhas. Everything that is updddnaskandha is skandha; pure conditioned things are included within the skandhas, but are not included within the updddnaskandhas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 387a9).
The updddnas are defilements {klesas, v. 38).
The updddnaskandhas are so called (1) because they proceed from the defilements, as one says "grass fire" or "straw fire;" (2) or rather because they are governed by the defilements, as one says "the king's man;" (3) or rather because they give rise to the defilements, as one says "flower-bearing tree" or "fruit-bearing tree. "
37 8c. They are called "of battle. "
? The defilements are of battle because they injure oneself and others. Impure conditioned things are qualified "of battle," "in a relationship with battle," because the defilements of battle adhere to them; equally, as we have seen, they are qualified as "impure," "possessing impurity,"because the defilements adhere to them.
8c-d. They are also suffering, arising, the world, the locus of false opinions, existence.
1. Suffering, because they are odious to the Saints (vi. 2).
2. Arising, because suffering arises from them (vi. 2).
3. World, because they are in the process of decomposition.
4. Locus of opinions, because the five opinions abide in them and
adhere to them (v. 7) (Prakarana, p. 33b7). 39
5. Existence, because it exists.
***
We have seen that there are five skandhas (i. 7, 20). Let us first study rilpaskandha (i. 9-14b).
9a-b. Rupa, or matter, is the five sense organs, five objects, and AQ
avijnapti.
The five organs are the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.
The five objects of the five organs are visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles.
And avijnapti (i. 11); such is rilpaskandha. ***
We have enumerated five things, visible matter, sound, etc.
9c-d. The points of support of the consciousnesses of these
things, namely the subtle material elements, are the five
41 organs, the organ of sight, etc.
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The five which are the point of support of the consciousnesses of visible matter, sounds, odor, taste and tangibles, and which consist of the suprasensible subtle material elements, are, in this order, the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.
The Blessed One said in fact, "The eye, Oh Bhiksus, an internal 42
ayatana, a subtle matter derived from the primary elements . . . "
Or rather, (the point of support of the consciousnesses of these organs, are) the points of support of the visual consciousness, or eye
43
consciousness, etc. This interpretation is in conformity with the
Prakarana (p. 692cl2) which says: "What is the organ of sight? It is the subtle matter which is the support of the consciousness of sight. "
***
Let us now examine the five objects beginning with visible matter,
rupdyatana.
44 10a. Visible matter is twofold.
1. Visible matter is color and shape. Color is fourfold: blue, red,
yellow, white; other colors proceed from out of these four colors. Shape
(samsthdna, iv. 3c) is eightfold: long, short, square, round, high, low, 45
even, uneven.
10a. Or twentyfold.
2. Or there are some twenty types: the four primary colors, the eight shapes, and eight more colors: cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shade, hot light, light, darkness. Some make a color of the firmament [which appears like a wall of lapiz-lazuli]; this would give us the number twenty-one.
"Even" signifies "of even shape;" "uneven" is the opposite; mist is the vapor which rises from the ground and from water; "hot light" is the light of the sun; "light" is the light of the moon, the stars, fire, grasses and gems; "shade"--arisen from an obstacle to light--is where forms still remain visible; "darkness" is the opposite.
The other terms do not call for any explanation.
? 3. Visible matter can be color without being shape: yellow, white, shade, hot light, light, darkness.
46
blue, red, There can be shapes without there being color: that part of the
47 long, of the short, etc. , which constitutes bodily action (kdyavijnapti,
iv. 2).
There can be color and shape at one and the same time: all the
other categories of visible matter.
Some other Masters maintain that only hot light and light are
exclusively color; for blue, red, etc. , present themselves to the sight under the aspect of long, short, etc.
4. But, say the Sautrantikas, how could a single thing be (yidyate) twofold, [color and shape together? For, in the system of the Vaibhasikas, color and shape are distinct things, dravya, iv. 3. ]
Because color and shape are perceived in a single substance. The root vid has here the sense of "to know," and not the sense of "to exist. "
But, reply the Sautrantikas, you should admit that bodily action is at one and the same time color and shape.
48 10b. Sound is eightfold.
1. It is fourfold: having for its cause present primary elements
forming part of the organs, having for its cause other primary
elements (upattanupattamahabhutahetuka, i. 34c-d), belonging to liv-
49
ing beings, and not belonging to living beings. categories is agreeable or disagreeable.
Each of these four
First category: sound caused by the hand or by the voice.
Second category: sound of the wind, of the trees, of water.
Third category: sound of vocal action (iv. 3d). Fourth category:
every other sound
2. According to other masters, one sound can belong to the first
two categories at one and the same time, for example, a sound produced by the coming together of a hand and a drum. But the School (Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 663cl2) does not admit that one atom [of matter] has for its cause only two tetrades of the primary elements; thus one cannot admit that one atom [of sound] is produced by the four primary
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elements of a hand and the four primary elements of a drum.
50 lOb-c. Taste is of six types.
Sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent.
51 10c. Odor is fourfold.
For good odors and bad odors are either excessive or non-excessive.
But, according to the Prakarana (p. 692c22), odor is threefold: good, bad, and equal or indifferent.
52 lOd. The tangible is of eleven types.
1. Eleven things are tangible things: the four primary elements, softness, hardness, weight, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst.
2. The elements will be explained below (i. 12). "Softness" is smoothness; "hardness" is roughness; "weight" is that by which bodies are susceptible of being weighed (i.
36); "lightness" is the opposite; "cold" is what produces a desire for heat; "hunger" is what produces a desire for food; "thirst" is what produces a desire for drinking. In fact the tangible which produces hunger and thirst is designated by the word hunger: the cause is designated by the name of the effect. In the same way that it is said "The appearance of the Buddha is (the cause of) happiness; the teaching of the religion is happiness; happiness, the harmony of the community; happiness, the austerities of monks who
53 are in agreement. "
54
3. Both hunger and thirst are lacking in Rupadhatu, but the other
tangibles are found there.
It is true that the clothes of the gods of Rupadhatu, individually,
have no weight; but, brought all together, they have weight.
It is true that bothersome cold is lacking in Rupadhatu but beneficent or pleasing cold is found there: such is the opinion of the
Vaibhasikas. [It is the absorption that the gods enjoy, not the cold. ]
55
It is possible for one visual consciousness to arise from a single
thing, from a single category of visible matter: when a characteristic of this thing (blue, etc. ) is separately distinguished. In other cases, one consciousness is produced by many things: when such a distinction is
? lacking; for example, when one sees the multiple colors and shapes that an army or a pile of jewels present at a distance and bunched together. The same remark is applicable to the auditory consciousness, the olfactory consciousnesses, etc.
But one touch consciousness arises from only five things at most, namely the four primary elements and one another of the other tangibles, soft, hard, etc. Such is the opinion of certain masters.
But, according to another opinion, one touch consciousness can arise from eleven tangibles at one and the same time.
[Objection]. According to what you say, each of the five sense consciousnesses bears on a totality, for example the visual conscious- ness bears on blue, red, etc. ; consequently the sense consciousnesses have "general characteristics for their object" and not, as Scripture teaches us, "specific characteristic" (svalaksana).
[The Vaibhasikas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 65cl2) answer that the Scripture] means by specific charaaeristic not the specific charaaeristic
56
of things, but the specific charaaeristic of an ayatana (ii. 62c).
When the organs of touch and of taste attain their objea at the
same time (i. 43c-d), which consciousness is the first to arise?
The one whose object is the strongest. But if the strength of the two objects is equal, the consciousness of taste arise first, because the
desire for food dominates.
***
We have explained the objeas of the five organs of sense consciousness, and how these objects are preceived. Let us now examine the avijnapti, which is the eleventh category of rupaskandha.
11. There is a serial continuity also in a person whose mind is
distracted, or who is without mind, pure or impure, in
dependence on the primary elements: this is called the 57
avijnapti.
"One whose mind is distracted" is one who has a mind different from the mind that provoked the avijnapti,--for example, a bad mind
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when the avijnapti has been provoked by a good mind
"One without mind" is one who has entered into one of the
absorptions of non-consciousness called asamjnisamapatti [and niro- dhasamapatti] (ii. 42).
"Also in a person . . :" the word "also" indicates that avijnapti also exists in a person with a non-distraaed mind, and in a person whose mind is not in the two absorptions.
"A serial continuity" is a flux.
"Pure or impure" means good or bad.
"In dependence on the primary elements:" this in order to
distinguish the avijnapti series from the prapti series (ii. 36). Avijnapti depends on the primary elements, because they are its generating cause, etc. (ii. 65; Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 663a26).
"This is called the avijnapti* in order to indicate the reason for the name avijnapti.
This serial continuity, while being by its nature matter and action,--like vijnapti, bodily and vocal action,--nevertheless does nothing by way of informing another as vijnapti does.
"Is called," in order to show that the author here expresses the opinion of the Vaibhasikas, and not his own.
In short, avijnapti is a rupa, good or bad, arisen from vijnapti or from absorption.
***
What are the primary elements?
12a-b. The primary elements are the elementary substance
"earth," and the elementary substances "water," "fire" and
58 "wind. "
These four are the four dhatus, so called because they bear their own unique characteristics, as well as derived or secondary matter.
They are called "great" (=primary) because they are the point of support for all derived matter. Or it is because they assemble on a large scale in the mass of the earth, the water, the fire and the wind, where
? their modes of activity are manifested together (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 681al7,p. 663all). 59
What activity establishes the existence of these dhatus, and what is their nature?
12c. They are proven to exist by the actions of support, etc.
The elements of earth, water, fire, wind, are, in this order, proven to exist by the actions of support, cohesion, ripening and expansion. Expansion signifies growth and deplacement. These are their actions.
60 12d. They are solidity, humidity, heat and motion.
As for their natures, the earth element is solidity, the water element is humidity, the fire element is heat, and the wind element is
61
motion.
Motion is what causes the series of states which constitutes a 62
thing to reproduce itself in different places; in the same way that one
speaks of the motion of a flame (iv. 2c-d).
63 64
The Prakarana and the Sutra say: "What is the wind element?
It is lightness;" the Prakarana also says: "Lightness is a derived mpa. " Consequently, the dharma which has motion for its nature is the wind
65
element: its nature (lightness) is manifested by its act of motion.
What is the difference between the earth element, and earth, etc?
13a. In common usage, what is designated by the word "earth" is color and shape.
That is, when one sees earth, one sees its color and its shape. As is the case for the earth,
13b. The same for water and fire.
In common usage, that which one designates (by the word water or fire) is color and shape.
13c. Wind is either the wind element,
But the wind element is simply called "wind" in the world.
13d. Or else [color and shape].
66
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What is called "wind" in the world is also the wind element; in fact, one speaks of "black wind," or "circular wind. "
***
Why do all these dharmas, from visibles to avijnapti, receive the name rupa? Why do they together constitute the rupaskandha?
i. The Blessed One said: "Because it is incessantly broken, Oh
Bhiksus, one terms it rupa updddnaskandha. By what it is broken? It is 67
broken by contact with the hand. "
"To be broken" signifies "to be damaged," as stated in the 68
Arthavargtya stanza of the Ksudrakdgama (-Apphakavagga, i. 2): "If the pleasures are lacking in a person who ardently searches out these pleasures, such a person is broken, as a person pierced by an arrow is broken. " (Compare Mbh xiii. 193,48).
But how is rupa damaged?
By deteriorating, by being transformed.
ii. According to other masters, the quality that makes physical
matter rupa, namely rupana, is not cutting off, deterioration, but 69
rather impenetrability, impact or resistance, the obstacle th^t a rupa 70
opposes to its place being occupied by another rupa (see i. 43c-d). [iii. Objections. ]
1. If this is so, the rupa that constitutes an atom, a "monad," will not be rupa, for a monad, not susceptible to deterioration or resistance, is free from rupana.
Without doubt, a monad is devoid of rupana\ but a monad never
71
exists in an isolated state;
agglomerate, it is liable to deterioration and to resistance (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 390al).
2. Rupas of the past and the future are not rupa, for one cannot say that they are now in a state of resistance.
Without doubt, but they have been, and they shall be in this state. Whether past or future, they are of the same nature as the dhanna which is now in a state of resistance. In the same way indhana is not only (presently) kindled wood, but also (future) fuel.
in the state of agglomeration, being an
? 3. Avijnapti is not rupa, for it is devoid of resistance.
Without doubt, but one can justify the quality of rupa attributed to avijnapti:
a. Vijnapti, bodily or vocal action, from whence proceeds avijnapti, is rupa; thus avijnapti is rupa, as the shadow moves when the tree moves.
No. For avijtlapti is not subject to modifications; further, in order that the comparison be exact, the avijnapti should perish when the vijfiapti perishes, as is the case for the shadow and the tree.
b. Second explanation. Avijnapti is rupa, for the primary elements,
72
which constitute its point of support, are rupa
[Objection. ] According to this principle, the five sense conscious-
nesses would be rupa, for their point of support (the organ of sight, etc) is rupa.
This response is not valid. Avijnapti exists dependent upon the primary elements, as a shadow exists dependent on a tree, as the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the jewel. The visual consciousness is not dependent upon an organ which is solely the cause of its arising.
[Answer. ] That the shadow, or the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the tree, or on the jewel, is a hypothesis that does not conform to the principles of the Vaibhasikas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 63c22). The Vaibhasikas hold that each one of the atoms of color which constitute shade and brilliance, exists dependent upon a tetrad of primary elements. And even supposing that: 'The shadow is dependent upon the tree, since the shadow is dependent on the primary elements which are proper to it, and these are dependent upon the tree,"--the comparison to the shadow and avijnapti is
inadmissible. The Vaibhasikas admit that avijnapti does not perish when the primary elements which serve as its point of support perish (iv. 4c-d). Consequently your refutation ("This response is not valid. Avijnapti. . . ") is worthless.
But, we would say, one can refute the objection: "According to this principle, the five sense consciousnesses would be rupa"
In fact, the support of visual consciousness is twofold: 1. the organ
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of sight, which is in a state of "impact" (i. 29b), which is rUpa\ and 2. the mental organ (manas, i. 44c-d) which is not rupa.
Now the same does not hold for avijnapti whose point of support is exclusively rupa. Thus, from the fact that avijnapti is called rupa because its point of support is rupa, one cannot conclude that visual consciousness should be called rupa. Therefore, the second explanation is the right one.
*##
The organs and objects which have been defined as rupaskandha, I4a-b. These same organs and objects are regarded as ten
1 ayatanas, ten dhatus. *
Considered as ayatana, origin of the mind and of the mental states (i. 20), they are ten ayatanas: caksurayatana, rupayatana,. . . kdyaya- tana, sprastavyayatana.
Considered as dhdtu, a mine (i. 20), they are ten dhatus: caksur- dhdtu, rupadhdtu . . . kayadhatu, sprastavyadhdtu.
***
We have explained rupaskandha and how it is distributed into ayatanas and dhdtus. We must now explain the skandhas.
74 14c. Sensation is painful impression, etc.
Vedanaskandha is the threefold mode of feeling or experiencing sensation which is painful, pleasant, neither-painful-nor-pleasant. One should distinguish six classes of sensations: those which arise from the contact of the five material organs, the organ of sight, etc. , with their object; and those which arise from contact with the mental organ (ii. 7 and following).
75 14c-d Ideas consist of the grasping of characteristics.
The grasping of the diverse natures--perceiving that this is blue,
? yellow, long, short, male, female, friend, enemy, agreeable, disagree- able, etc. --is samjndskandha (see i. l6a). One can distinguish six types of samjfid, according to organ, as for sensation.
15a-b. Samkdraskandha are the samskaras different from the 76
The samskaras are everything that is conditioned (samskftajJa); but the name is reserved for those conditioned things which are not included in either the skandhas of rupa, vedana, or samjnd, explained above, or in the skandha of vijndna explained below (i. 16).
other four skandhas.
It is true that the Blessed One said in a Sutra, "The samskd- 77
raskandha is the six classes of volition;" but this definition excludes from samskaraskandha 1. ) all the viprayuktasamskdras (ii. 35), and 2. ) the samprayuktasamskaras (ii. 23b, 34), with the exception of volition itself. But the Sutra expresses itself thus by reason of the capital
78 definition the factor which creates future existence. Also the Blessed
importance of volition, which, being action by its nature,
One said, "The updddnaskandha called samskdra is so called because it
conditions conditioned things,"
determines the five skandhas of future existence.
79
that is to say, because it creates and 80
If we take the definition of the Sutra literally, we would then arrive at the conclusion that the mental dharmas, with the exception of volition, and all of the dharmas of the viprayukta class (ii. 35), do not form part of any skandha. They would thus not form part of the Truths of Suffering and Arising: one would not either know them, nor abandon them. Now the Blessed One said, "If there is a single dharma which is not known and penetrated, I declare that one cannot put an end to suffering" (vi. 33). And again "If there is a single dharma which is not abandoned . . . " (Samyukta TD 2, p. 55b7, b23). Thus the collection of mental states and viprayuktas is included within the samskaraskandha.
15b-d. These three skandhas\ with avijnapti and unconditioned things, are the dharmdyatana, the dharmadhdtu.
Vedanaskandha, samjndskandha, samskaraskandha, plus avijnapti
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(i. ll) and the three unconditioned things (i. 5b), are seven things which are called dharmdyatana or dharmadhdtu.
81 16a. Consciousness is the impression relative to each object.
