No More Learning

The one was that the Sikhs should
advance on Kabul accompanied by British agents, whilst a demonstra-
tion should be made by a division of the British army occupying
Shikarpur with the Shah Shuja in their company; the British Gov-
ernment advancing him money and lending him officers. The other
was that the maharaja should take his own course against Dost
Muhammad, only using Shah Shuja if success seemed certain, and if
Shah Shuja was agreeable. The governor-general thought the former
plan the more efficient, but the second the simpler, and on the whole.
the more expedient.
There was a good deal of reconsideration, but in the end Ranjit
Singh seems to have got the better of Macnaghten. He agreed to
recognise the independence of the amirs of Sind, and withdrew his
claim to Shikarpur on receiving a money compensation. The inde-
pendence of Herat as a principle was also agreed to. But he clearly
showed that as to Afghanistan he wished to act with the British
Government and not independently. But while it seems clear that
.
Auckland had never contemplated taking the leading part in the
proceedings which were to fcllow, it is equally clear that Ranjit Singh
gradually forted him to do so; thus the Sikh secured the greatest
advantage from the bargain. We do not know all that Macnaghten
did say, but he gave it to be understood that the English would in
certain circumstances advance with their own troops in support cf
Shah Shuja. The point is a very delicate one, but it seems that
Macnaghten told Ranjit Singh, not that if Ranjit Singh would not
co-operate with Shah Shuja the English would restore him then-
selves, but that they might find it necessary to do so. This brought
Ranjit Singh round, and when he ceased to press for Jallalabad,
which he did not really want, the way was open for the famous
"Tripartite. Treaty", signed by the maharaja on 26 June, 1838. "
This treaty, which was a new and enlarged version of that made
between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja in 1833, confirmed the maha-
raja in the possessions which he held on the banks of the Indus wi.
their dependencies, thus assuring to him Kashmir, Peshawar, Bannu,
Dehra Ismail Khan, Dehra Ghazi Khan, and Multan No one was
to cross the Indus or the Satlej without the maharaj $ permission.
As to Shikarpur and the Sind territory lying on the right bank of the
$
112 May, 1838.
2 Aitchison, op. cit. VIII, 154.


## p. 496 (#524) ############################################

496
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Indus, Shah Shuja would agree to what might be determined between
the maharaja and the British. Should the maharaja require any of
the shah's troops to carry out the object of the treaty they were to
be sent, and in the same way Muhammadan troops were to be sent
by the maharaja as far as Kabul. The shah was to give up all claim
on Sindh, which was to belong to the amirs for ever, on such money
payment being made by the amirs as should be decided by the British
and handed over to the maharaja. Payment was to be made by the
shah to the maharaja of two lakhs a year under the guarantee of the
British Government in return for the assistance furnished. When the
shah should have established his authority in Afghanistan he would
not molest his nephew in Herat. The shah bound himself and his
successors not to enter into any negotiations with any foreign state
without the consent of the British and the Sikh governments.
Such was the treaty Auckland before signing it sent it to Shah
Shuja at Ludhiana by the hands of Macnaghten, Wade and Mackeson,
who arrived there on 15 July, 1838. The shah objected to various
articles. He secured, however, various assurances from the British
Government, and on 17 July, 1838, the mission left Ludhiana with
the signed treaty.
Kaye has pointed out that there were three different ideas as to
the projected invasion. Auckland originally wished it to be under-
taken by the Sikhs, aided perhaps by some Afghan levies. Even in the
negotiations with Shah Shuja the project only took the form of an
alliance which the British guaranteed, Shah Shuja, and the Sikhs
each marching into the country his own way. And Shah Shuja
evidently thought that he would take the leading part himself. But
when the matter was finally deliberated at Simla, it was settled,
possibly against the better judgment of Auckland, that the British
should do the work. There was to be a great army employed and it
was to be the force that would set Shah Shuja on the throne. Probably
Macnaghten knew that the maharaja wished to do as little as possible
in the matter; Auckland did not want to displease the maharaja.
We do not know what Burnes advised. He joined Macnaghten at
Lahore when it was too late to oppose the policy of the treaty, and
he certainly told Ranjit Singh that the restoration of Shah Shuja
would be to his advantage. His real opinion is probably to be found
in his well-known letter of 2 June, 1838 :
It remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Mahomed.
He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart high opinions of the British
nation; and if half you must do for others were done for him, and offers made
which he could see conduced to his interests, he would abandon Persia and
Russia tomorrow. It may be said that that opportunity has been given to him;
but I would rather discuss this in person. with you, for I think there is much
to be said for him. Government have admitted that at best he had but a
hoice of difficulties; and it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing,
and Persia and Russia held out a great deal. 1
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 251.


## p. 497 (#525) ############################################

THE ARMY OF THE INDUS
497
And on 22 July he wrote to his brother, "I am not sorry to see Dost
Mahomed ousted by another hand than mine". He was not like Wade
in favour of a turbulent Afghanistan where tribe. constantly fought
with tribe :
"Divide et iinpera”, he wrote, “is a temporising creed at any time; and if
the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance to Persia, and instead of
distant relations we have everything under our eye, and a steadily progressing
influence all along the Indus. ”
Sir Henry Fane, the commander-in-chief, had given very sensible
advice in 1837 :
Every advance you might make beyond the Sutlej to the Westward in my
opinion adds to your military weakness. . . . If you want your Empire to expand,
expand it over Oudh or over Gwalior, and the remains of the Mahratta Empire.
Make yourselves completely sovereigns of all within your bounds. But let
alone the far West.
The selection of Shah Shuja overlooked the claims of Kamran
Shah and made it certain that if Afghanistan was to be a buffer state
of any value we should have to help in reducing Herat also. And
there were not wanting far-seeing critics who realised that active
interference in Afghanistan must necessarily involve the taking of the
Punjab, at all events on the death of Ranjit Singh if not earlier.
However, the decision was taken; it was justified to the directors in
the dispatch of 13 August; and orders were issued for the assembling
of a great army to march upon Kandahar in the ensuing cold weather.
Auckland's frame of mind may be judged from his letter to Hobhouse
of 23 August, 1838 :
I am sensible that my trans-Indus arrangements are in many points open
to objection but I had no time to pause, there was no choice but between them
and the more objectionable danger of remaining passive and a friendly power
and intimate connection in Afghanistan, a peaceful alliance with Lahore and
an established influence in Sinde are objects for which some hazard may well
be ruin.
In the important letter of 13 August, 1838, Auckland gives a long
and clear account of the negotiations with Ranjit Singh. ”
The army of the Indus, which was to rendezvous at Karnal, was
to consist of a brigade of artillery, a brigade of cavalry, and five
brigades of infantry. It was to assemble under Sir Henry Fane with
whom were to serve many officers of great distinction. Another army
under Sir John Keane was to proceed via Bombay and Sind. The
shah's army was being raised at Ludhiana, and it was rapidly losing
its importance. The Sikh force was to move by Peshawar. Mac-
naghten, an unfortunate choice, was the political officer, and under
him, not wholly to his own satisfaction, was Burnes, who now went
away to arrange for the passage of troops through Sind, for the main
army as well as that from Bombay was to go that way. It ought to
1 Brit, Mus. Add. MSS, 37694, f. 21.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 294.
32


## p. 498 (#526) ############################################

498
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
be remembered that Macnaghten wished Pottinger to be appointed
and only accepted the post himself under pressure.
On 1 October, 1838, the governor-general issued from Simla a
long manifesto dealing with the origin and causes of the war and the
policy of the British Government in regard to the whole business.
It was a clever attempt to justify the action of the government, but
it was open to serious criticism. Its greatest fault was that it made
out no sort of case for attacking Dost Muhammad and did not do
justice to the difficult position in which that ruler was placed. Perfect
frankness would have been better, and Auckland seems to have felt
this as he says to Hobhouse (13 October, 1838) in writing about the
manifesto:
It will be for others to judge of my case and I will say nothing of it except'
that I could have made it stronger if I had not had the fear of Downing Street
before my eyes, and thought it right to avoid any direct allusion to Russia.
But I have no want of sufficient grounds of quarrel with Persia, etc. . . . 1
But however ill-advised Auckland may have been, he was carrying
out, in part at least, the wishes of the home authorities. His letters to
them (e. g. that to the Secret Committee in August, 1838) were
perfectly clear, and they evidently approved of what he was doing;
not, however, without reflections and comments which have hardly
perhaps received sufficient attention. Their letter of 10 May, 1838,
was not quite decisive; 2 the dispatch quoted by Sir Auckland Colvin
of 24 October, 1838, sanctions indeed armed intervention but seems
to see possibilities of avoiding it. Their memorandum of 27 October,
1838, where they lay down general conditions, ought to be carefully
studied. There were many outspoken critics. Elphinstone and Sir
Henry Willock pointed out the difficulties of distance and climate,
and the unwisdom of employing Sikhs whom the Afghans hated and
feared, and then asked how, even if Shah Shuja got the throne, he
could keep it. Hobhouse minuted on Willock's letter that its details
were founded on presumption and that he did not think much of it.
The Duke of Wellington, however, said that the consequences of the
advance into Afghanistan would be a "perennial march into that
country". The directors of the East India Company woulá no doubt
have been glad to have been out of the business,4 but they, and most
Englishmen who thought about the matter, looked at it as a question
of Central Asian policy, and they were under an entirely false im-
pression as to the power of Russia and Persia to injure British interests
in the East. It has been said that Auckland's council formally
disclaimed responsibility for the manifesto, but the evidence against
such a protest is strongly martialled by Sir Auckland Colvin, and
the probability seems to be that most of them agreed with him.
A more serious point is that the siege of Herat was abandoned nearly
1 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37694, f. 69, verso.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 292 8 Colvin, op. cit. p. 124.
4 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 267. 5 Colvin, op. cit. p. 122.
5


## p. 499 (#527) ############################################

HOME POLICY
499
a month before the manifesto appeared. Auckland did not know this
at the time, but when the knowledge came, and one of the chief
reasons for the expedition had vanished, there was time to have
abandoned it. This course strangely enough, considering what we
know of his character, Auckland decided not to adopt, and by a
proclamation (8 November, 1838), in which the raising of the siege
was announced, he declared that he would continue to prosecute with
vigour
the measures which have been announced, with a view to the substitution of
a friendly for a hostile power in the Eastern provinces --of Afghanistan, and of
the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression against
the North West Frontier.
In the same sense on 9 February, 1839, he writes to Hobhouse.
Those at the India House were not without misgivings, but public
opinion at home, and to some extent in India, was misled by the
issue of the dishonest blue book in 1839, known as "the garbled
dispatches". This gave an entirely false impression of the views of
both Dost. Muhammad and of Burnes. No defence worth considering
has ever been offered of such an extraordinary performance. The
Thaïveté with which Broughton condemns the “rascality of the Burnes
family in trying to correct the impression made by the government's
own action is almost as incredible as his and Palmerston's denials of
garbling in the House of Commons. A revised edition of the letters
was published in 1859, long after the exposure.
By this time the great expedition was well under weigh. At the
end of November, 1838, the army of the Indus was assembling at
Firozpur where a meeting took place between the governor-general
and Ranjit Singh. Owing to the retreat of the Persians the force
was somewhat reduced, and Sir Henry Fane, who was old and ill,
decided to retire from the command, his place being taken by Sir
John Keane from Bombay. The Bengal column now consisted of some
9500 men of all arms; Shah Shuja's contingent numbered about
6000; the Bombay column would add another 5600. It had been
decided for political reasons (Ranjit Singh did not wish it to traverse
the Panjab) that the march of the force from Firozpur should be by
way of Bahawalpur and Sind, the amirs not having been behaving too
well from Auckland's point of view. Burns, as has been seen, had
gone ahead, and it appears from his correspondence that it had
been already decided to annex Bukkur where the Indus was to be
crossed. The route then to be followed was by Shikarpur and Dadur
to Bolan Pass and so via Quetta to Kandahar. A large money claim
was also to be made upon the amirs, though this claim had been
long abandoned; and it must be remembered that a promise had been
given that no military stores should be conveyed along the Indus.
1Cf. C[abell]'s minute, 14 February, 1839 (Hobhouse MSS); Vernon Smith
to Melvill, 13 April, 1839 (India Office); and Lord Broughton to Fox Maule
(Hobhouse MSS), Cf. Hansard, CLXI, 38 sqq.


## p. 500 (#528) ############################################

500
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
But Auckland treated the situation as a new one, and threatened the
amirs that serious consequences wou! d follow if they did not co-
operate. This course of proceeding can hardly be defended, and
Colonel Pottinger, the resident at Hyderabad, said that we were in
the wrong, and that the communications with Persia alleged on the
part of one of the amirs hardly justified our action. Burnes secured
unwilling co-operation in Upper Sind, but the Talpur amirs were
very reasonably alarmed at the restoration of Shah Shuja, and at the
passage of troops through their territory, largely at their expense.
However, the great force managed to enter Sind on 14 January,
1839. Burnes had obtained Bukkur, and thus the passage of the Indus,
for as long as was necessary. And meanwhile Keane had landed at
Vikkur at the end of November, and after long delays was marching
up the bank of the Indus; his men grumbling that they were treated
as though they were in an enemy's country. Further delay occurred
while the question of the aititude of the amirs was settled at Hydera-
bad, and the Bengal column could not advance because Sir Willoughby
Cotton came down the Indus with unnecessary reinforcements for
Sir Jonn Keane. Macnaghten, who was with Shah Shuja, was much
annoyed and naturally asked as February advanced what was to
become of the expedition when it got to Afghanistan. However, the
amirs gave way, Cotton returned on 20 February, and four days later
the march to Kandahar began; without, however, the shah's contingent,
which remained behind for lack of transport.
In spite of great difficulties as to provisions and much loss of
transport, Sir Willoughby Cotton pushed on at a fair pace. On 16
March he entered the Bolan Pass and on the 26th after considerable
suffering his force reached Quetta. Rations had to be reduced, and
Burnes was sent off to the khan of Kalat who signed a treaty in
return for a subsidy, promised help in the way of supplies and trans-
port, recognised Shah Shuja, and gave Burnes plenty of good advice
which came too late to be of any practical use.
Keane, the shah, and the Bombay army were moving througlı
Sind under great difficulties. The advance of the columns had caused
great dissatisfaction and the Balochis complained bitterly of the
damage to their crops. By 4 April the force was near Quetta. Fron
Cotton they heard nothing but the most dismal forebodings, as well
they might, for his men were on quarter rations, and he saw, what
Macnaghten refused to see, that Shah Shuja was not likely to be
popular amongst his own people. On 6 April, 1839, Sir John Keane
took over the command of the expedition at Quetta and wisely decided
to push on the next day. Macnaghten thought that we ought to
punish the khan of Kalat by annexing Shal, Mastung and Kachhi tu
Shah Shuja's dominions; his letter is almost comic in its fury :
The Khan of Khelat is our implacable enemy, and Sir John Keane is burn-
ing with revenge. There never was such treatment inflicted on human beings
as we have been subjected to on our progress through the Khan's country


## p. 501 (#529) ############################################

STORM OF GHAZNI
501
a
.
Meanwhile the Barakzai sardars in Kandahar were giving up the
game. When the expedition with the shah at its head entered
Afghan territory they fled from the city, and the money Macnaghten
expended did the rest. On 25 April, 1939, Shah Shuja entered Kan-
dahar. In a letter, written a month later (25 May, 1839) to Hobhouse,
Auckland describes the scene and reviews the situation from a
defensive point of view. 1.
Once in Kandahar the task of the British was but commenced.
Shah Shuja was not popular, and his character was not such as to
win men to his side. The Afghans displayed curiosity but little more,
and the fact that their new ruler came in with English aid, and
obviously under English control, prevented them from regarding his
arrival even as a party, much less as a national, triumph. The
Barakzai sardars were far away across the Helmund, but, as Dost
Muhammad had yet to be conquered, Shah Shuja did his best to
conciliate the Durani leaders who might be expected to give him
their support. Dost Muhammad, seeing that the army paused in
Kandahar, thought it was going against Herat, and therefore sent
his son Akbar Khan against Shah Shuja's sor. Taimur, who was
advancing with Captain Wade by way of Jallalabad. Things were in
a bad way certainly at Herat, where Eldred Pottinger was continually
obstructed and even insulted by the adherents of Yar Muhammad
Wazir. But for the moment Macnaghten had no idea of doir. g more
than send a mission to Shah Kamran, and Major Todd left Kandahar
on that errand on 21 June, 1839, reaching Herat about a month later.
On 27 June, 1839, the army, considerably thinned by sickness and
other misadventures, set out for Ghazni which was reached on 21
July. The heavy guns had strangely enough been left behind but,
seemingly by treachery, a weak point was discovered, the Kabul gate
was blown up, and the fortress hitherto regarded as invulnerable
was taken by storm. It was a notable feat and the naines of Dennie,
Thomson, Durand, Macleod, and Peat will live in connection with
it. 2 Sale was cut down in the great struggle at the gate but managed
to escape with his life. Haidar Khan, the son of Dost Muhammad,
who was in command of the fortress, was captured, and the amir's
brother, the Nawab Jabbar Khan, then came to try and make terms.
A remark he made might well serve as a commentary on the tragedy
that was to follow :
"If”, he said, "Shah Shuja is really a king, and come to the kingdom of his
ancestors, what is the use of your army and name? You have brought him by
your money and arms into Afghanistan, leave him now with us Afghans, and
let him rule us if he can. "
Negotiation was fruitless and Dost Muhammad marched out to meet
the invaders. Finding, however, that he could not rely, upon his
1 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37696, f. 31.
2 M. M. Durand, Life of Sir Henry Durand, 1, 52.


## p. 502 (#530) ############################################

502
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
troops, after a last despairing and not ignoble appeal, he rode away
from Arghandab to the country near the Hindu Kush. This was on
2 August, 1839; on the 7th Shah Shuja entered the capital, and the
Barakzai monarchy for the time had perished. The arrival on 3
September of Prince Taimur and the Sikh contingent who had come
througi the Khaibar seemed to complete the triumph. Those chiefly
concerned were duly rewarded, Auckland being made an earl, Sir
John Keane a baron, and Macnaghten a baronet; these amongst
others. Burnes who had already been knighted was annoyed that
no further honour came to him, and it took all Auckland's tact to
comfort him.
Auckland's minute of 20 August, 1839, made it certain that a
considerable force was to be left in Afghanistan, and what was finally
decided upon was larger than what had at first been thought suffi-
cient. It had become abundantly clear that though the Afghanistan
to which Shah Shuja returned was much smaller than that over
which his father had ruled, it was larger than he could manage
unaided. So though the Bombay column left on 18 September, nearly
all the Bengal troops under Sir Willoughby Cotton remained. Keane
returned with those of the Bengal force who were not required. The
main garrisons were at Kabul, Jallalabad, Ghazni and Kandahar,
but the forces were too widely scattered. A detachment followed
Dost Muhammad, and occupied Bamiyan in the hope of his appearing
there.
The country was distracted, the ministers were worthless, and
the native army which was to support the throne and to which Auck-
land looked with almost pathetic hope and eagerness proved equally
unsatisfactory. So that a double system of government, Afghan and
English, was inevitable. The natural result, the only possible result,
was constant sporadic insurrection, or looting that might become
such, at any turn of events. The road to India through the Khaibar
was never safe, and communication that way was only kept up by
force and hribery. Kalat was taken by General Willshire on 13
November, 1839, as he was marching home, because the English terms
were not accepted. The khan himself, Mihrab, was killed and the new
khan Shah Nawaz, who was set up in his place was anything but
popular, the less so as the provinces of Shal, Mastung and Kachhi
were now handed over to Afghanistan.
It may be doubted whether
these proceedings were wise, and it seems certain that they were
unjust
The news now began to filter through of a Russian expedition
under General Peroffsky from Orenburg into Central Asia and parti-
cularly against Khiva. The provocation was the slave trade in Russian
subjects which, there, as at Herat, was actively carried on and had
been so for over a hundred years; this and the constant plundering of
caravans. If proof were needed of the general nervousness as to
Russia, it could be found in a letter from Burnes written in November.
a


## p. 503 (#531) ############################################

THE RUSSIAN EXPEDITION
503
1839. He writes : "Ere 1840 ends, I predict that our frontiers and
those of Russia will touch-that is, the states dependent upon either
of us will—and that is the same thing". Kaye has shown the diffi-
culties of this winter--the Russian scare; trouble at Herat; trouble
with the Uzbegs; trouble in Bokhara where Colonel Stoddart, the
Resident, had been imprisoned under the most humiliating conditions,
and where Dost Muhammad had now found at once a refuge and
a prison; troubles in Kandahar, in Kohistan, and at Kalat; trouble
with the Sikhs who were ceaselessly intriguing with the disturbing
elements in Afghanistan. The tendency in all such cases is to try and
crush the symptoms rather than eradicate the causes of the mischief.
The English officials thought only of expeditions, and Macnaghten
planned one to the Hindu Kush. It is only fair to Auckland to say
that he consistently resisted. all such proposals, and a letter written
by him to Macnaghten on 22 March, 1840, shows what his views
were; 1 there are others of the same nature.
The wisdom of his attitude was shown when, about the middle of
March, 1840, the failure of the Russian expedition was announced.
Auckland had made proper preparations, and he was far from being
blind to the seriousness of the situation, had Russia obtained a hold
on Khiva and still more on Bokhara. But it must be recalled that the
difficulties of the Afghan position had been increased rather than
diminished by the death of Ranjit Singh (27 June, 1839) and the
confusion in the Lahore state which followed it. The matter is alluded
to by Lord Auckland in a letter of 11 May, 1840, to Hobhouse. It
was even suggested that various Sikh magnates were engaged in
treasonable intrigues with various rebels in Afghanistan, and there
is no doubt that the Khalsa and the heir to the throne, Nao Nihal
Singh, were strongly opposed to the passage of British troops through
the Panjab, at which, considering the language of Macnaghten, one
can hardly be surprised. Colvin had written to William Butterworth
Bayley on 23 January, 1840 :
There never was a time when the Sikh Durbar was more dependent upon
us than at present. They are conscious of their many dissensions and real
weakness and are, I imagine, surprised and in some measure distrustful at our
self-denial in taking no advantage of them. A serious quarrel with us at the
present time on the part of the Sikhs I look upon as an impossible thing. 3
With this may be compared his letter to Macnaghten on the following
13 June, which is impressive in its seriousness. There was soon to be
plenty of proof of the correctness of Colvin's suspicions.
The position at Herat was what might have been expected. Major
Todd and his associates did their best to put down the slave trade
there, and Captain Abbot was sent to Khiva with the same end in
view. The latter arranged a treaty which was disavowed, but his
successor, Captain Shakespeare, managed to get 400 Russian slaves
Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37698, f. 89, verso.
2 Idem, 37699, f. 76, verso.
3 Idem, 37698, f. 6.


## p. 504 (#532) ############################################

504
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
set free. Much money was advanced to the ruler of Herat, but he
was far from loyal, and Macnaghten would have annexed the little
state to Afghanistan and Auckland, who was supported by the com-
mander-in-chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls; agreed. Major Todd we learn
afterwards came round to the same view.
The Ghilzais gave constant trouble; their chiefs had taken refuge
during the winter of 1839 in Peshawar, but, when the warm weather
came, they were in arms again between Kandahar and Kabul, and
took a good deal of repressing. There was failure in Kalat, which,
the same summer, was recaptured by Nasir Khan, the son of the
chief who fell when the British took the place. And when later he
was driven out he was not conquered. Quetta was besieged; and
everywhere there were indications that Shah Shuja inspired no sort
of fear or respect. Yet strangely enough Macnaghten wrote to Colvin :
"I have nothing more to say about His Majesty's character than I
have already said. I believe him to be the best and ablest man in
his Kingdom". Auckland in one of his letters to Hobhouse, when
speaking of the suppression of the Ghilzais, throws a little light on
the causes of the trouble :
But the business was ill and discreditably done. Blunders were made and
harshnesses committed. Our officers quarrelled with, and as is too often the
case counteracted, each other, and what as it appeared to me might have been
a business of ease and graciousness, has been very much the reverse.
Macnaghten could not prevail upon the Indian Government to
go to war with the Sikhs or to annex Herat, but he continued to
dream of the further extension of British influence in Central Asia.
In September, 1840, he sent Captain Arthur Conolly--something of a
visionary but a very gallant one-on a mission to Khiva and Kokand.
He subsequently proceeded to Bokhara where he and Colonel Stoddart
were cruelly murdered.
The brightest circumstance of this uncomfortable summer was
the assurance given by Russia that there would be no further attack
on Khiva. And equally important perhaps was the surrender of Dost
Muhammad. In July, 1840, the Nawab Jabbar Khan gave himself
up to the small force stationed at Bamiyan. Dost Muhammad, having
escaped with some difficulty, had taken refuge with his old ally the
wali of Khuium. He soon had a considerable force under him and
drove back the British outposts, a most distressing feature of the
business being the desertion to the enemy of some of the new national
levies raised to support Shah Shuja. There was evidence, as Torrens
wrote to the Resident at Lahore on 1 October, that the Sikhs were
not altogether neutral in the matter, and the government of India
promised considerable reinforcements as soon as possible. Macnaghten
still thought the remedy to be a forward policy, and characterised
as "drivelling" Auckland's sensible suggestion that we could hardly
expect co-operation from potentates whose territory we were always
talking of annexing.
1


## p. 505 (#533) ############################################

SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD
505
On 18 September, 1840, however, Brigadier Dennie defeated the.
forces under Dost Muhammad and the wali of Khulum: near Bamiyan,
and though Dost Muhammad and his son, Afzal Khan, escaped, the
wali came to terms on the 28th and promised not to give refuge or.
help to the ex-amir or any member of his family. Dost Muhammad,
Therefore, fled to Kohistan, where he was followed by Sale and
Burnes. There was some hard fighting in which Edward. Conolly,
Lord and others were killed, but Dost Muhammad, after winning an.
important if small success at Parwandurrah on 2 November, 1840,
galloped to Kabul and gave himself up to. Macnaghten. He was
treated honourably and taken to India.
The few months that followed were restless. Macnaghten was still
anxious for movement and for the break-up of the Tripartite Treaty,
to which Auckland, though he had Hobhouse against him, would not
consent. As he once said to the chairman of the East India Company,
the country was one of clans and tribes, and there was war and
lawlessness in one district whilst there was peace and contentment.
in another. The Ghilzais were seldom quiet, and the Duranis about
Kandahar strongly resented taxation. Shah Shuja showed no signs
of becoming either a capable or a popular rụler, and the cost of
Afghanistan to the Indian Government was becoming unbearably
great. Todd could no longer put up with the demands of Yar
Muhammad at Herat and broke up the mission there in February,
1841; but this could not draw Auckland into an attack upon the little
state, though it produced a very bad impression both in India and
in England. Expeditions quelled the Duranis and the Ghilzais, but
only for a time.
Thus the situation as 1841 wore on was critical: No proper system
of government had been established. The native army was unreliable.
and the only form of executive action, that of the tax-gatherer
increased the tension. The English were the only real authority and
they practically retained their hold by force and by the distribution
of money amongst the chiefs. Macnaghten was now appointed gover-
nor of Bombay and Burnes was designated his successor. The forces
were under the command of General Elphinstone, who in April, 1841,.
succeeded Cotton, and his appointment, made against his own wishes,
constitutes one of the most serious mistakes that Auckland committed. .
In a position requiring above all things activity and physical energy;
was placed an elderly invalid, personally brave, but, as he himself
stated, hardly able to walk. Nott, a man of will and resources, if of
strong temper, would have been a better choice. But those who spoke
of the dangers of the situation, like Brigadier Roberts, had no chance
of promotion. There were no doubt many men in the various garrisons
of talent as well as courage. All they required was capable leading,
and that they never got. There was another mistand. The troops
at Kabul had now been moved to the ill-constructed and ill-fortified
cantonments outside the city next to the mission compound but very


## p. 506 (#534) ############################################

516
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
badly placed; whilst the commissariat stores were placed separately
and some distance away. It has always been maintained that the
placing of the troops in this wretched position instead of in the Bala
Hissar was the chief cause of the subsequent disaster, and for that
Cotton, and to some extent Macnaghten, must bear the blame.
As has been indicated one great difficulty was obviously finance.
Afghanistan was going to cost at the lowest estimate a million and
a quarter a year, and the views of the home authorities on the subject
reached India early in 1841. They were beginning to feel that Shah
Shuja was not worth the money he cost. It was decided in consequ-
ence that economies must be effected, and it was unwisely thought
best to retrench the stipends paid to the various Afghan chiefs by
which alone their adherence was secured. This misplaced economy
produced its natural results. The Ghilzai chiefs, left Kabul and took up
their stand in the country near Jallalabad, plundering those who
came by and entirely preventing regular communication with India
proper. Auckland seems to have understood what was happening
better than Macnaghten, but he hoped for the best; he was misled
and made the most of any trifling success. Sale, who was soon after-
wards wounded, was directed to clear the passes; troops were hurried
out; and Macnaghten hoped that Macgregor, who had been serving
in the district near Jallalabad, would soon have the rising in hand. The
disaffectior. was, however, spreading and Kohistan was beginning to
be disturbed. There was plenty of fighting before Sale reached
Gandammak at the end of October, 1841, but by that time events of a
far more important and tragic nature were preparing in the capital.
It seems to have been known at Kabul that some sort of outbreak
was coming, and warnings were given but not heeded; we must not
press responsibility too far on that account, as wild rumours were
sure to be running round the bazaar. Still it seems extraordinary that
more should not have been known of a conspiracy which included
the heads of nearly all the important tribes in the country. The actual
outbreak seems to have been premature as, had the conspirators
waited a little, Macnaghten and a considerable body of troops would
have left Kabul. On 2 November a revolt broke out in the native
quarter; and, in Burnes' house in the city, Alexander Burnes, his
brother Charles, and William Broadfoot were murdered. The shah's
treasury was looted and the guards killed. Shah Shuja sent a regi.
ment of Hindustani soldiers to suppress the tumult, but they did
nothing, and were with difficulty brought into the Bala Hissar by
Brigadier Shelton who had been sent by Elphinstone. The move-
ment in force which might have restored order never came, and the
question, as Kaye truly says, is : “How came it that an insurrectionary
movement, which might have been vanquished at the outset by a
handful of men, was suffered to grow into a great revolution? " The
responsibility clearly seems to rest with Macnaghten and Elphinstone,
who did not consider the outbreak as serious when they first heard


## p. 507 (#535) ############################################

REVOLT AT KABUL
507
of it, and took no proper steps to quell it. Even the next day but
a trifling attempt was made and that ended in failure. Hurried
messages were sent to Sale and Nott for help, and the position became
more serious than ever when all the commissariat stores fell into the
enemy's hands. Day after day there was the same helpless story.
Almost at once the general took the heart out of everyone by sug-
gesting the possibility of negotiation, and Macnaghten began to give
and to promise money. By this time Muhammad Akbar Khan, the
son of Dost Muhammad, had reached. Bamiyan on his way from
Turkestan.
Elphinstone was worse, far worse, than useless, and on 9 Novem-
ber, 1841, he was persuaded to bring over Brigadier Shelton from the
Bala Hissar to give him charge of the cantonment. But even then
the general would not allow him to be independent; the two did not
agree, and no improvement resulted. Trifling successes at a fearful
cost in valuable lives—there were many brave men in the army of
occupation-brought no relief, and even they ceased about 13 Novem-
ber. On the 15th Pottinger came in from Kohistan, bringing news
of the loss of Charikar, the destruction of a Gurkha regiment, and
the march of Kohistanis to join the Kabul rebels. To add to this
Macnaghten now learned that Sale had gone to Jallalabad. Some
step had to be taken, so he wrote a formal letter on 18 November to
the general recommending that they should hold out in the canton-
ments as long as possible. He was not in favour of a removal to the
Bala Hissar, agreeing in this with Shelton. Both seem to have been
wrong; for though the change would have been attended with loss
and danger, the same could be said of any course decided upon, and
the move there would have been a better plan of action than the
retreat to Jallalabad. On 23 November the Afghans won a victory,
which Eyre thought decisive, over a force sent out to hold the
Bemaru hills, and it was evident from the conduct of the troops that
they were losing heart. Hence on the 24th it was decided to try
negotiation. When, however, the Afghans demanded unconditional
surrender the conference broke up.
From 25 November, 1841, onwards news of these terrible events
began to reach Auckland. He saw at once the real difficulty of the
situation. On 1 December he wrote to the commander-in-chief :
It is however I fear more likely that the national spirit has been] gene.
rally roused and in this case the difficulty will not be one of fighting and
gaining victories but of supplies, of movement, and of carriage. 2
He approved of the sending of reinforcements, but feared that they
would be too late. Sale, he thought, would have to fight his way to
Peshawar. In a letter of the 2nd he asked Anderson at Bombay how
1
1 Eyre, Kabul Insurrection, p. 163.
2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37706, f. 197.


## p. 508 (#536) ############################################

508
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
all this could have come about when he had received nothing but
favourable reports; alluding, no doubt, to the letters, remarkable
enough, which Macnaghten had written just before the outbreak. On
4 December, when he knew of course of the death of Burnes, he wrote
to Macnaghten:
And yet under the most favourable events I would have you share in the
feeling which is growing strongly upon me—that the maintenance of the posi-
tion which we attempted to establish in Afghanistan is no longer to be looked
to, and that after our experience of the last few weeks it must appear to be
if not vain, yet upon every consideration of prudence far too hazardous and
. too costly in money and in life for us to continue to wrestle against the univer-
sal opinion, national and religious, which has been so suddenly and so strongly
brought in array against us. And it will be for you and for this government
to consider in what manner all that belongs to India mav be most immediately
and most honourably withdrawn from the country,
A bolder, even a wiser man would have struck a fiercer note, but
Auckland seems to have come to a decision, perhaps one that he
afterwards regretted, but to which he adhered in principle for the
few sad months which remained to him in India. On 8 December
Colvin wrote to Clerk that the policy of the government would be :
in the event of a reverse at Kabul to maintain indeed a high tone, and to speak
of plans of punishing the Afghan, but in reality to content ourselves with
remaining in collected strength along the line of the Satlej and Indus. '
Meanwhile Muhammad Akbar Khan had arrived in Kabul, and
provided a recognised leader for the rebellious Afghans. He was a
young man of daring and energy, but with all the wild characteristics
of his savage race. He saw that the easiest way to deal with the
English was to starve them out, and that, as provisions became scarce,
the rank and file would become demoralised. This truth was equally
clear to the besieged, and they realised, if there was to be a retreat,
the sooner it began the better. On 8 December, 1841, it was decided
to renew negotiations, and on the 11th Macnaghten's articles were
drawn up and in the main accepted by the Afghans. They provided
for the complete evacuation of Afghanistan by the English. The troops
were to leave as soon as possible and to be allowed to go in safety.
Shah Shuja was either to remain on an allowance or to go to India
with the British troops, and as soon as the British troops reached
Peshawar in safety Dost Muhammad and all the other Afghans were
to be allowed to return. When this had been effected the family of
Shah Shuja should be permitted to join him. Four British officers
were to be left as hostages, and Afghan chiefs were to accompany
the British army. Friendship was to be maintained between the
Afghans and the English, and the Afghans were not to ally themselves
with any other foreign power without the consent of the English. A
resident should be received in Kabul if the two nations so wished.
1 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37706, f. 202, verso.
2 Idem, 37707, f. 14.


## p. 509 (#537) ############################################

MACNAGHTEN'S MURDER
509
>
It is perfectly obvious that the Afghans never drea, ned of carrying
out these articles, but on behalf of Macnaghten it has been said that
he was bound to make some such agreement because he realised that
no sort of reliance could be placed on the Military forces. And this
no doubt is true. But the further and more serious question remains
as to how far the whole position of affairs was not due to his own
previous folly, and to his want of prompt action when the revolt
began. On the whole he was at least as much to blame as the soldiers,
for whose leaders no excuse can be offered. Their plain duty, as
Wellington told Greville, was to have attacked the rebels in the city
the moment they realised what was going on, and those who refused
ör neglected to give orders to that effect involved the many brave
men who served under them, and who asked for nothing better than
to die sword in hand, in undeserved blame.
The evacuation was to begin in three days, and those troops that
were in the Bala Hissar left on the 13th, not without difficulty and
humiliation. The forts round the cantonment were ceded, and now,
amid . every circumstance of discouragement and dishonour, the
retreat towards Jallalabad must commence. While the force delayed
the snow began to fall, and on 19 December the last chance of help
vanished when it was known that the force which had set out from
Kandahar had returned there. The departure was fixed for the 22nd.
But useless, complicated, and not too honourable negotiations still
continued, for Macnaghten never lost the hope, a vain one, of dividing
the enemy. The result of this policy came on the 23rd when he was
murdered by Akbar Khan while at a conference. Shelton accidentally
escaped the same fate: but Trevor was killed and others present were
taken prisoners. It does not seem that Akbar Khan meant at first
to kill Macnaghten; but it is one more token of the envoy's essential
unfitness for the post he occupied that with his experience of the
character of the Afghans he should have trusted them as he did. As
Burnes said, he was an excellent man, but quite out of place in
Afghanistan. When at the end he descended to a policy of intrigue,
he followed the course which has usually led to failure in the East.
As to the murder, he must have known what a trifle a man's life was
in the eyes of an Afghan, and how many of those near at the moment
were thirsting for the blood of every. Englishman in their country.
The event then, while a tribute to Macnaghten's courage, cannot do
anything to clear his memory from the serious mistakes of which
he had been guilty. On 24 December it was known for certain in the
cantonments that he was dead, and yet nothing was done. Fresh
conditions were sent in, more and more humiliating; money, guns,
ammunition, and hostages were demanded, and though Pottinger in
vain protested, there seemed to be no depth of humiliation to which
the general would not descend. On 1 January, 1842, the final treaty
was ratified. English ladies were not to be left as hostages; other-
wise the Afghans had all they wished.


## p. 510 (#538) ############################################

510
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
And now the march through the snow, looked forward to with
dread, was to become a reality. On 6 January the soldiers, refusing
to wait any longer for the promised safeguard from the Afghan chiefs,
marched out of the cantonments. Their leaders would not fight, and
they had to do their best at running away. Sixteen thousand men,
brave men too, were to be sacrified to the utter incapacity of their
commanding officers; already they had become a disorderly rabble.
The sick and wounded were left behind in the Bala Hissar.
Sale has been criticised for not coming, as ordered, to help Elphin-
stone, and it is certainly difficult to understand how anyone in his
position could refuse to do so; but there seems no reason to doubt
his statement that his brigade could not reach Kabul, and certain
it is that with things as they were his force would have been of little
use. He probably could not realise that matters were in such a
desperate condition. Hence he took what he thought was the wisest
course, and fell back on Jallalabad which he surprised on 13 Novem-
ber, 1841, and where he prepared to hold out indefinitely. Broadfoot
especially distinguished himself in the laying out of the fortifications.
On 9 January a message was received from Pottinger, who was now
in political charge at Kabul, and Elphinstone, ordering the evacua-
tion of the fortress, but Macgregor and Sale declined to obey.