But Thebes
was more hateful to an average Athenian than Sparta
had ever been.
was more hateful to an average Athenian than Sparta
had ever been.
Demosthenese - 1869 - Brodribb
?
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? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY 13. 0. 5
period she contrived to make herself thoroughly hated.
Her system was to rule by means of Oligarchical factions
in the different states. These factions she supported
by military garrisons. There was a garrison for a
time in the Cadmea, or the citadel of Thebes. It was
forced into the city, and subsequently maintained there
with a flagrant disregard of justice and equity. The
Spartan king Agesilaus coolly asserted that if it was for
Sparta's interest it was right. Altogether, the Spartan
rule was much more galling than the Athenian had
been. Sparta, indeed, always seems to have been a
more selfish state than Athens. It is true that Athens
in her greatness had been spoken of as " a despot city,"
but there was at the same time a feeling that she
worthily represented Greece. This could hardly be
said of Sparta She was now cultivating friendly re-
lations with Persia, and had procured the conclusion of
a peace with that power, the terms of which were by
no means honourable to Greece. This was the peace
of Antalcidas in 387 B. o. --one of the landmarks, so to
say, in Greek history. It had ever been a Greek tra-
dition that the freedom and independence of the Greeks
in Asia ought to be upheld. By the peace of Antel-
cidas they were put under the dominion of Persia.
Athens would hardly have yielded such a point, and
in the days of her maritime supremacy she could and
would have made it impossible. Sparta was respon-
sible for this disgraceful concession. She made matters
worse by seeking to convert her headship of Greece
into a downright despotism. In doing this she wrought
infinite mischief, and may be almost said to have pre-
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? 6 DEMOSTHENES.
pared the way for the subsequent calamities of Greece
and its subjection to Macedon. She endeavoured per-
sistently to break up the Greek world into a number
of petty dependencies, which she might hold under
her absolute control. Her systematic policy was to
reduce Greece to a collection of separate towns and
even villages, each of which should be completely in
her own power. The idea which lay at the root of
Greek strength and greatness was, that Greece should
be made up of federations, with the leading cities at
the head of them. In the face of a common foe these
federations, it was hoped and believed, would be at-
tracted to each other, and would feel that they had a
common cause. This was Panhellenism. Sparta, by
her methods of rule, weakened this idea, and thereby
undermined the foundations of the Greek world. The
feebleness and disunion of Greece in the fourth century
13. 0. , which were so favourable to Macedon, were, in
part at least, due to Sparta's influence. In one in-
stance she inflicted the most direct and positive mischief
upon Greece. At the head of the Gulf of Torone, in
the peninsula of Ghalcidice, was the prosperous city of
Olynthus, round which had grown up a confederacy
of Greek towns that might have been an effectual
barrier against Macedon, or any other northern power.
This confederacy Sparta, true to her policy, broke up
in 379 B. (:. , and thus gave a heavy blow to Greek in-
_terests on the coasts of Macedon and Thrace. But for
this, the ZEgean and the Propontis might never have
known the presence of Macedonian cruisers, and Philip's
kingdom might have remained a poor and barbarous
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? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C'u 7
territory. Olynthus, indeed, to a certain extent re-
covered herself, and became again a flourishing and
independent city; but the mischief which had been
already done was past re? medy.
With the great battle of Leuctra in 371 13. 0. Sparta's
ascendancy ceased. Thebes was now raised by the
illustrious Epameinondas into the first place in Greece.
North of the Peloponnese she could do as she pleased.
She had Thessaly quite under her control, and Macedon
was little better than a dependency. Her next step,
after Leuctra, was to strengthen herself in the Pelopon-
Iiese, and to complete the humiliation of Sparta. This _
was done by the founding of the two cities Megalopolis
:indMessene, under the direction of Epameinondas.
Sparta, as we have seen, aimed at breaking up and dis-
solving federations; Thebes, on the contrary, formed
the Arcadian townships, forty in number, into a con-
federacy, of which Megalopolis, the Great City, was
made the centre. Messeno was then founded on Mount
Ithome, and became the rallying-place of a population
Which had long been unwillingly subject to Sparta.
What had hitherto been Spartan territory was actually
annexed to it. Sparta's limits were thus greatly nar-
rowed. On the north and on the west she was con-
fronted by independent mmmunities, and her position
in the Peloponnese was wellnigh destroyed. Though
Thebes soon fell back from the pre-eminence to which
the genius of Epameinondas had lifted her, Sparta was
never able to regain her ancient prestige.
Athens, from some cause or other, had much more
elasticity and power of recovery than Sparta. There
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? 8 DEMOSTHENES. _ _ '
was a life and sprightliness about her citizens which
made them quickly forget calamities and rise to new
hopes and aspirations. So it was with them after
Leuetra. Athens at once was fired with the ambition
of winning back her old empire; and she actually suc-
ceeded in again becoming the head of a powerful con-
federacy. The disgust which Sparta had provoked
throughout the Greek world was no doubt a great help
to Athens. Once more her fleet sailed supreme over
the . /Egean. As a matter of course, the chief islands
joined her alliance. A synod of deputies from her allies
and dependents obeyed her summons, and contribu-
tions were voted for the common cause. She had able.
men--such as Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Chabrias---
to command her forces. At the time of Philip's acces-
sion to the throne of Macedon in 359 B. o. , Athens was
the first state in Greece. She was not specially well
fitted for war on land, and was in this respect inferior
to Thebes, which could send out an army in the highest
efficiency. But by sea she was, beyond comparison,
the first power. Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and the important_
cities of Perinthus and Byzantium, were her allies. -
Samos, off the coast of Lydia, and Thasos, Lemnos,
Imbros in the north of the ]Egean, had been recently
conquered by her; she was in possession of the Thra-
cian Chersonese, of Pydna and Methone on the coast
of Macedon, and of Potideea and other towns in the
peninsula of Chalcidice. The waters of the ZEgean
were thus an Athenian lake. But she could not hold
together this confederation. She had no proper control
over her generals. They were not in fact the servants
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? GREECE IN THE 'FOURTH CENTURY RC'. 9
of the state, but men of the " Condottieri" type. As a
rule, they commanded mercenaries, for whom they could
not provide pay without systematically plundering the
allies. These generals really maintained their troops
by means of "forced benevolences. " It could hardly
be expected that all this would be patiently endured.
In 358 B. 0. the Social War, as it was termed, broke
out--Rhodes and Byzantium, it would seem, leading
the revolt. It lasted two years. The efforts of Athens
appear to have been rather fitful and wanting in vigour.
When a rumour came that Persia was about to support
the revolted allies with a fleet of 300 ships, Athens
gave up the struggle and acknowledged their indepen-
dence. The confederation, of which for a brief space
she had been the head, was thus at an end.
This was a great blow to Athens. She was still
powerful by sea, but she was very much impoverished,
a large part of her revenue having been lost to her
through the secession of several of her richest allies.
VVas it not now best for her to rest from her ambition,
and to think no more of " a spirited foreign policy '''I So
argued one of her citizens, the famous orator Isocrates.
He complains that his countrymen "were so infatuated
that while they themselves wanted the means of sub-
sistence they were undertaking to maintain mercenaries,
and were maltreating their allies and levying tribute
from them, in order that they might provide pay for
the common enemies of mankind. " By these he means
the generals, of whom also Demosthenes, his political
opponent, says, in one of his speeches, that "they go
ranging about and behaving everywhere as the common
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? 10 DEMOSTHENES.
enemies of all who wish to live in freedom according to
their own laws. " Athens, he contends, might recover
from the losses and disasters of the Social War, if
she would only eschew for the future a meddling and
aggressive policy, be prepared for self-defence, and de-
vote herself to commerce and to the arts of peace. In
this way she would, with the great natural advantages
she possessed, very soon again become rich and pros-
perous. This was the advice of Isocrates. It might well
seem sensible and timely. And, as a matter of fact, it
suited the temper of many of the citizens. There was
a disposition to shrink from personal efforts, and, if
war became a necessity, to leave it more and more to
' meicenaries. 'In such a mood there were dangers, as
the event proved, to the cause both of Athens and of
Greece.
' A peace party was the natural result. It was in
power at Athens for some years after the conclusion of
the Social war, the critical period during which Philip
of Macedon was step'by step advancing to the position
he ultimately attained. It had the advocacy of the
speeches and pamphlets of Isocrates, who had the com-
mand, not undeservedly, of the public ear. It was
thus supported by the ablest journalism' of the day.
Again, it had an eminently respectable man as one
of its leaders. This was Phocion, whose integrity was
proverbial. Forty-five times was he chosen general,
and he gained several victories for Athens. He was
alone sufficient to give strength to a political party.
Another of its'leaders was Eubulus, a man of very
inferior type. His great aim was to put the people in
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? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C'. 11
a good humour. There was a singular arrangement at
Athens by which the State defrayed the cost of the
public amusements and dramatic exhibitions for the
'benefit of the poor citizens. A regular fund was pro-
vided for this purpose, and after a time the surplus of
the annual public revenue was added to it. It had
formerly been the law that this surplus should always
during war be paid into the military chest for the
'defence of the State. Eubulus actually induced the
people to pass a law making it a capital offence to pro-
pose that this fund should be so applied on any future
occasion. Consequently, the only method of meeting
the costs of war was the exaction of a property tax
from the rich. War under these circumstances could
not but involve very serious and sorely-felt sacrifices.
We may form some idea of the pressure of the burden
by supposing the case of an income tax of 4s. or 5s. in
the pound among ourselves. No ministry, it is clear,
could venture to declare war except under the most pal-
pable necessity, if such a tax were inevitable. Eubulus
accordingly conciliated the rich by doing his utmost to
save them from the dreaded burden. He was, as we
should say, prime minister of Athens for sixteen years.
His position must have been a very strong one, accept-
able, as we have just seen, to rich and poor alike.
There can hardly be a doubt that his policy impaired
the Athenian character, and made the work of Demos-
thenes peculiarly difficult.
Athens thus entered on a great contest under un-
favourable conditions. She was still, from her exten-
sive trade, the richest city in Greece, and she had the
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? 12 _ DEMOSTHENES.
means of sending out formidable fleets. But her citi-
zens liked ease and comfort, and preferred their cheer-
ful city life to foreign service. Her dominions, too, were
rather vulnerable, not being guarded by any regular
troops. If they were attacked, they had to be defend-
ed by mercenaries, commanded by the sort of general
who has been described. Then, too, her commerce,
with which her prosperity was closely bound up, might
be harassed by an enterprising enemy, and her supplies
of corn from the Black Sea endangered. Thus, in fight-
ing Macedon she was perhaps at some disadvantage,
though we may be inclined to think that a little more
energy and vigour would have carried her successfully
through the struggle. The truth is, she was not for a
long time alive to the real danger, and was conse-
quently remiss in seizing opportunities. There was a
party which urged alliance with Thebes.
But Thebes
was more hateful to an average Athenian than Sparta
had ever been. Such a party seemed untrue to the
old traditions of Athens. Hence it was always com-
paratively weak. Had the danger from Macedon been
distinctly foreseen, the alliance would perhaps have
been effected. Athens and Thebes united might, it
can hardly be doubted, have confined Philip to his
own hereditary kingdom and have saved Greece.
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? CHAPTER II.
HACEDON AND PHILIP.
THE name of Macedon, though it is heard of from
time to time in Greek history, can hardly be said to have
become really famous till the fourth century 13. 0. and
the reign of Philip. It could never have occurred to the
mind of a Greek that this outlying northern kingdom'
might possibly one day be formidable to Greece and its
freedom. There were no signs pointing in this direction;
and it may be fairly assumed that no political sagacity
could have foreseen such a result. The Macedonians
were always looked upon by the Greeks as barbarians,
although their royal family--Temenids, as they were
called, from their legendary ancestor, Temenus--came
from Argos, and the people themselves perhaps had
some distant affinity to the Hellenic race. For a long
period they were nothing better than a collection of
rude tribes, with scarcely any cohesion or organisation,
and before the disciplined army of a Greek state they
would have been utterly powerless. They were sur-
' rounded, too, by fierce and unquiet neighbours--Illyr-
ians to the west, Paeonians to the north, Thracians to
the east,--all savage, warlike peoples, whom they could
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? 14 DEMOSTJIENES.
only just hold in check. The country, indeed, with its
rivers and rich valleys and strips of seaboard, had nat-
ural advantages which a vigorous prince with organis-
ing capacity might develop; and this was partially done
by Archelaus, who reigned from 413 B. 0. to 399. He
was a man of great energy, and he may be said to have
put Macedon in the way to become a flourishing and
powerful kingdom. According to Thucydides,* he had
roads constructed, fortresses erected, and established a
standing army on a greater scale than any of his pre-
decessors had kept up. Probably the last years of the
Pcloponnesian war, which were so disastrous to Athens,
were favourable to Macedon, and enabled it to acquire
an influence on the northern coasts of the [Egean,
which previously Athens had possessed. Still, no
doubt Archelaus deserves the credit of having steadily
applied himself to the work of strengthening and con-
solidating his kingdom. At the same time, he did his
best to civilise his people, and to bring them into con-'
nection with the Greek world. He cultivated the
friendship of Athens, and sought to introduce its
literature and art. He established a grand periodical
festival on the Greek type, with all the humanising
adjuncts of music and poetry. The great poet Euri-'
pides visited his court at his special invitation, and
was treated with such favour and respect that he re-
mained there till his death. The philosopher Socrates
was invited, but it appears that he declined the honour.
The famous painter, Zeuxis of Heracleia, was one of the
king's guests, and he was employed to adorn with pic-
* Thucydides, ii. 100. _
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? MACEDON AND PHILIP. _ 15
tures the royal palace at Pella, the new capital of
Macedonia. In fact, Archelaus was an enlightened
despot; and though he could not eradicate barbarism
and make Macedonians into Greeks, he at least gave
the higher class a varnish of Greek civilisation and
culture.
It was not unusual for the kings of Macedon to perish
by the hands of conspirators and assassins, and this was
the fate of Archelaus. The dynasty was now changed;
and after a few years of disturbance, Amyntas, the _
father of Philip, became king in 394 13. 0. His reign
was not a prosperous one. Macedonia went back, and
its very existence as an independent kingdom was in
jeopardy. According to one account, Amyntas was
obliged to surrender Philip as a hostage to the Illyr-
ians, who were then particularly troublesome. He
left his kingdom at his death, in 370 B. 0. , in an almost
desperate plight. The succession to the throne was
disputed, and the enemies on the border were as for-
midable as ever. Macedon, indeed, seemed on the eve
of being wholly extinguished. The eldest son and
successor of Amyntas, Alexander, was murdered; and
shortly afterwards the Theban Pelopidas was invited
into the country by the friends of the royal family,
with the view probably of securing the throne for the
two younger brothers, Perdiocas and Philip. Pe1opi-
das, it seems, forced on Macedonia the adoption of this
arrangement, and took Philip with him to Thebes, as
a hostage for its being faithfully carried out. Philip
passed three years at Thebes, while his brother Perdic-
cas was king. He then, in 368 11. 0. , was intrusted
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? 16 DEJHOSTHENES.
with the government of a portion of Macedonia under
Perdiccas, and employed his time in equipping and
organising some troops. His brothcr's reign had a dis-
astrous termination. He was defeated with heavy loss
by the Illyrians, and died soon afterwards. And so
Philip, now twenty-three years of age, became king of
Macedon in 359 13. 0. , there being only an infant son
of Perdiceas whose claim to the throne it was not dif-
ficult, under the circumstances, to set aside with the
' national approval.
N 0 prince could have begun his reign with gloomier
prospects than the future conqueror of Greece. He
was encompassed by enemies. There were other claim-
ants of the throne--one of these being Argaeus, who
was supported by Athens. He thus had to fear attack
from barbarian neighbours by land, and from Athenian
fleets by sea. The hostile attitude of the Athenians
was determined by their very prudent desire to recover
the important position of Amphipolis at the mouth of
the Strymon. To Athens the possession of this place
was of the utmost value, as it was the key to a region
rich in gold and silver mines, as well as in forest-timber.
To this the people had an eye, in supporting the pre-
tensions of Argaeus to the throne of Macedon against
Philip. The king, however, met them promptly, and
won a victory over a little force which they had sent
to Methone on the Macedonian coast of the Gulf of
Thermae. He took some Athenian citizens prisoners;
but as he was anxious to conciliate Athens, he treated
them with marked respect, and allowed them at once
to return. He then made peace with Athens, and
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? MA crnoy AND PHILIP. 17
waived all claim to Amphipolis, in which his pro-
decessor had placed a Macedonian garrison. The city
was now left to itself; and the Athenians, had they
been wise, would have spared no effort to secure it.
As it was, they let slip a golden opportunity of regain-
ing a position which might have been in their hands a
barrier against the growing power of Macedon, and
would have certainly enabled them to maintain their
maritime supremacy on the ZEgean.
Philip meanwhile, having freed himself for the
present fromthe fear of Athens, was at liberty to fence
off his kingdom from the attacks of its land enemies.
He had already organised something of a military force,
and with this he prepared to strike a decisive blow at
the Illyrian, Paeonian, and Thracian tribes,l which were
perpetually crossing the Macedonian frontier in plun-
dering expeditions. It seems that these tribes, which
were scattered over what are now the provinces of
Bosnia, Servia, and Albania, were at this time being
pushed southwards by a great movement of the Gauls.
The lllyrians were Macedon's most dangerous neigh-
bours, and they had inflicted many a disastrous defeat
on Philip's predecessors. N ow they were at the height
of their power, and were united for purposes of war
under a chief named Bardylis, an able leader and a
brave warrior. Philip, after thoroughly vanquishing
the Pzeonians, which he seems to have done easily,
turned his arms against the more formidable Illyrians,
and attacked them in western Macedonia, which they
had invaded. He won a hard-fought battle, chiefly
through the efficiency of his cavalry. The Illyrian
. \. o. s. s. vol. iv B
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? 18 _ DEMOSTHENES.
army was utterly discomfited, and their chief was glad
to make peace, and cede whatever portions of Mace
donia he had conquered and occupied. The result of
this victory was, that the Macedonian frontier was
pushed to the lake Lychnitis (now Okridha), and was
made far more secure than it had hitherto been, by the
occupation of mountain-passes through which the
Illyrian invaders used to pour into Macedonia.
The famous phalanx, which we connect specially
with the names of Macedon and Philip and Alexander,
is said to have taken part in this battle. Philip has
been credited with this military invention; but, in
truth, he can be said only to have introduced it. He
may have considerably modified it, but it had always
been an important element in a Greek army. It was
the great Epameinondas of Thebes who seems to have
first organised it in its most powerful and effective
form. He, in fact, it was who brought the science of
war to the highest perfection hitherto known in Greece.
Philip, during his residence as a young man in Thebes,
may well have had opportunities of personal intercourse
with this illustrious general, and have derived from him
many profitable hints and suggestions. At all events, he
had daily under his eyes the inagnificent soldiers who had
fought and conquered at Leuctra. His first military
ideas were thus drawn from the best of all schools, and
we may well suppose that a deep impression was at the
same time made on his young imagination. He would
soon see that the barbarous enemies of Macedon would
never be able to stand against really well-trained troops.
He had also at Thebes the literary and philosophical
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? MA aspen AND PHILIP. 19
teaching which often lays the foundation of able states-
manship. Possibly he may have made the acquaintance
of Plato, and there is certainly ground for believing
that the philosopher conceived a high opinion of his
ability. Nor is it unlikely that he may also at this
time have had his admiration directed by some circum-
stance to Aristotle, whom he afterwards made the
tutor of the young Alexander. It is certain that he
became imbued with some amount of Greek culture,
and that he acquired the power of speaking and writing
the language almost as well as a professed orator or
rhetorician. He liked to look on himself, and to be
regarded by others, as thoroughly a Greek; and this it
was, no doubt, which inclined him to be always con-
siderate towards Athens, as the foremost state of Greece.
Perhaps he was not too young, before he left Thebes,
to imbibe some political notions. In such a city he
would at least have a good opportunity of getting an
insight into the character of Greek politics, and he
might have early learnt some of those weak points in
Greece which his adroitness subsequently enabled him
to turn to such profitable account.
Philip, after his victories over the lllyrians and
Paeonians, which for a time at least made Macedonia
secure on the land side, still reigned over a poor and
half-barbarous kingdom. He had much to do before
he could hope to become a considerable power in the
Greek world. As yet, he did not possess a single town
on the coast. He had, as we have seen, given up
Amphipolis to please the Athenians. He must have
been surprised to find that they did not make haste to
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? 20 . ' 'DEMOSTHENES. "
recover that important place. But they committed the
blunder, and allowed the people of Amphipolis to remain
their own masters. Soon afterwards, in 358 13. 0. , Philip
thought he might as well possess himself of it; and
when the inhabitants refused to surrender, he laid siege
to the city. Envoys were sent to Athens, asking for
help; but it is possible that at this crisis the war with
the allies had just begun, and that the Athenians may
have thus found themselves fully occupied. Philip,
too, promised them in a very civil letter that he would
put them in possession of it as soon as he had taken it.
The Athenians did nothing, though it could not have
been very difficult for them to have saved the place
and secured it for themselves. This was indeed short-
sighted, as they now again had an opportunity of
securing a commanding position, and of nipping Philip's
power in the bud. . It was one of those errors which
can never be retrieved. Athens lost prestige, as well
as a most useful dependency. When Philip took the
city, Olynthus, which was not far distant, and was at
the head of a group of Greek townships in the penin-
sula of Chalcidice, was seriously alarmed, and proposed
an alliance to Athens. The offer was rejected, as the
Athenians, it seems, still wished to look on Philip as
their friend, and were persuaded to trust his promises.
'The cunning prince contrived. not only to buy off the
hostility of Olynthus, but actually to win its friend-
ship and to become its ally by the cession of a
disputed strip of territory near Thessalonica. The
next thing he did was to venture on an openly hostile '
'act against Athens by conquering and _wresting front
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? HACEDON AND PHILIP. 21
her a most important possession, the city of Potidaea,
on the gulf of Thermae. This, too, he gave up to the
Olynthians. Pydna, also, on the shore of the same
gulf, opposite to Potidaea, likewise an Athenian pos-
session, fell_into his hands through internal treachery;
and Athens, it appears, made no effort to save the
place. Thus, in a single year, 358 11.
? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY 13. 0. 5
period she contrived to make herself thoroughly hated.
Her system was to rule by means of Oligarchical factions
in the different states. These factions she supported
by military garrisons. There was a garrison for a
time in the Cadmea, or the citadel of Thebes. It was
forced into the city, and subsequently maintained there
with a flagrant disregard of justice and equity. The
Spartan king Agesilaus coolly asserted that if it was for
Sparta's interest it was right. Altogether, the Spartan
rule was much more galling than the Athenian had
been. Sparta, indeed, always seems to have been a
more selfish state than Athens. It is true that Athens
in her greatness had been spoken of as " a despot city,"
but there was at the same time a feeling that she
worthily represented Greece. This could hardly be
said of Sparta She was now cultivating friendly re-
lations with Persia, and had procured the conclusion of
a peace with that power, the terms of which were by
no means honourable to Greece. This was the peace
of Antalcidas in 387 B. o. --one of the landmarks, so to
say, in Greek history. It had ever been a Greek tra-
dition that the freedom and independence of the Greeks
in Asia ought to be upheld. By the peace of Antel-
cidas they were put under the dominion of Persia.
Athens would hardly have yielded such a point, and
in the days of her maritime supremacy she could and
would have made it impossible. Sparta was respon-
sible for this disgraceful concession. She made matters
worse by seeking to convert her headship of Greece
into a downright despotism. In doing this she wrought
infinite mischief, and may be almost said to have pre-
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? 6 DEMOSTHENES.
pared the way for the subsequent calamities of Greece
and its subjection to Macedon. She endeavoured per-
sistently to break up the Greek world into a number
of petty dependencies, which she might hold under
her absolute control. Her systematic policy was to
reduce Greece to a collection of separate towns and
even villages, each of which should be completely in
her own power. The idea which lay at the root of
Greek strength and greatness was, that Greece should
be made up of federations, with the leading cities at
the head of them. In the face of a common foe these
federations, it was hoped and believed, would be at-
tracted to each other, and would feel that they had a
common cause. This was Panhellenism. Sparta, by
her methods of rule, weakened this idea, and thereby
undermined the foundations of the Greek world. The
feebleness and disunion of Greece in the fourth century
13. 0. , which were so favourable to Macedon, were, in
part at least, due to Sparta's influence. In one in-
stance she inflicted the most direct and positive mischief
upon Greece. At the head of the Gulf of Torone, in
the peninsula of Ghalcidice, was the prosperous city of
Olynthus, round which had grown up a confederacy
of Greek towns that might have been an effectual
barrier against Macedon, or any other northern power.
This confederacy Sparta, true to her policy, broke up
in 379 B. (:. , and thus gave a heavy blow to Greek in-
_terests on the coasts of Macedon and Thrace. But for
this, the ZEgean and the Propontis might never have
known the presence of Macedonian cruisers, and Philip's
kingdom might have remained a poor and barbarous
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? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C'u 7
territory. Olynthus, indeed, to a certain extent re-
covered herself, and became again a flourishing and
independent city; but the mischief which had been
already done was past re? medy.
With the great battle of Leuctra in 371 13. 0. Sparta's
ascendancy ceased. Thebes was now raised by the
illustrious Epameinondas into the first place in Greece.
North of the Peloponnese she could do as she pleased.
She had Thessaly quite under her control, and Macedon
was little better than a dependency. Her next step,
after Leuctra, was to strengthen herself in the Pelopon-
Iiese, and to complete the humiliation of Sparta. This _
was done by the founding of the two cities Megalopolis
:indMessene, under the direction of Epameinondas.
Sparta, as we have seen, aimed at breaking up and dis-
solving federations; Thebes, on the contrary, formed
the Arcadian townships, forty in number, into a con-
federacy, of which Megalopolis, the Great City, was
made the centre. Messeno was then founded on Mount
Ithome, and became the rallying-place of a population
Which had long been unwillingly subject to Sparta.
What had hitherto been Spartan territory was actually
annexed to it. Sparta's limits were thus greatly nar-
rowed. On the north and on the west she was con-
fronted by independent mmmunities, and her position
in the Peloponnese was wellnigh destroyed. Though
Thebes soon fell back from the pre-eminence to which
the genius of Epameinondas had lifted her, Sparta was
never able to regain her ancient prestige.
Athens, from some cause or other, had much more
elasticity and power of recovery than Sparta. There
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? 8 DEMOSTHENES. _ _ '
was a life and sprightliness about her citizens which
made them quickly forget calamities and rise to new
hopes and aspirations. So it was with them after
Leuetra. Athens at once was fired with the ambition
of winning back her old empire; and she actually suc-
ceeded in again becoming the head of a powerful con-
federacy. The disgust which Sparta had provoked
throughout the Greek world was no doubt a great help
to Athens. Once more her fleet sailed supreme over
the . /Egean. As a matter of course, the chief islands
joined her alliance. A synod of deputies from her allies
and dependents obeyed her summons, and contribu-
tions were voted for the common cause. She had able.
men--such as Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Chabrias---
to command her forces. At the time of Philip's acces-
sion to the throne of Macedon in 359 B. o. , Athens was
the first state in Greece. She was not specially well
fitted for war on land, and was in this respect inferior
to Thebes, which could send out an army in the highest
efficiency. But by sea she was, beyond comparison,
the first power. Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and the important_
cities of Perinthus and Byzantium, were her allies. -
Samos, off the coast of Lydia, and Thasos, Lemnos,
Imbros in the north of the ]Egean, had been recently
conquered by her; she was in possession of the Thra-
cian Chersonese, of Pydna and Methone on the coast
of Macedon, and of Potideea and other towns in the
peninsula of Chalcidice. The waters of the ZEgean
were thus an Athenian lake. But she could not hold
together this confederation. She had no proper control
over her generals. They were not in fact the servants
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? GREECE IN THE 'FOURTH CENTURY RC'. 9
of the state, but men of the " Condottieri" type. As a
rule, they commanded mercenaries, for whom they could
not provide pay without systematically plundering the
allies. These generals really maintained their troops
by means of "forced benevolences. " It could hardly
be expected that all this would be patiently endured.
In 358 B. 0. the Social War, as it was termed, broke
out--Rhodes and Byzantium, it would seem, leading
the revolt. It lasted two years. The efforts of Athens
appear to have been rather fitful and wanting in vigour.
When a rumour came that Persia was about to support
the revolted allies with a fleet of 300 ships, Athens
gave up the struggle and acknowledged their indepen-
dence. The confederation, of which for a brief space
she had been the head, was thus at an end.
This was a great blow to Athens. She was still
powerful by sea, but she was very much impoverished,
a large part of her revenue having been lost to her
through the secession of several of her richest allies.
VVas it not now best for her to rest from her ambition,
and to think no more of " a spirited foreign policy '''I So
argued one of her citizens, the famous orator Isocrates.
He complains that his countrymen "were so infatuated
that while they themselves wanted the means of sub-
sistence they were undertaking to maintain mercenaries,
and were maltreating their allies and levying tribute
from them, in order that they might provide pay for
the common enemies of mankind. " By these he means
the generals, of whom also Demosthenes, his political
opponent, says, in one of his speeches, that "they go
ranging about and behaving everywhere as the common
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? 10 DEMOSTHENES.
enemies of all who wish to live in freedom according to
their own laws. " Athens, he contends, might recover
from the losses and disasters of the Social War, if
she would only eschew for the future a meddling and
aggressive policy, be prepared for self-defence, and de-
vote herself to commerce and to the arts of peace. In
this way she would, with the great natural advantages
she possessed, very soon again become rich and pros-
perous. This was the advice of Isocrates. It might well
seem sensible and timely. And, as a matter of fact, it
suited the temper of many of the citizens. There was
a disposition to shrink from personal efforts, and, if
war became a necessity, to leave it more and more to
' meicenaries. 'In such a mood there were dangers, as
the event proved, to the cause both of Athens and of
Greece.
' A peace party was the natural result. It was in
power at Athens for some years after the conclusion of
the Social war, the critical period during which Philip
of Macedon was step'by step advancing to the position
he ultimately attained. It had the advocacy of the
speeches and pamphlets of Isocrates, who had the com-
mand, not undeservedly, of the public ear. It was
thus supported by the ablest journalism' of the day.
Again, it had an eminently respectable man as one
of its leaders. This was Phocion, whose integrity was
proverbial. Forty-five times was he chosen general,
and he gained several victories for Athens. He was
alone sufficient to give strength to a political party.
Another of its'leaders was Eubulus, a man of very
inferior type. His great aim was to put the people in
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? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C'. 11
a good humour. There was a singular arrangement at
Athens by which the State defrayed the cost of the
public amusements and dramatic exhibitions for the
'benefit of the poor citizens. A regular fund was pro-
vided for this purpose, and after a time the surplus of
the annual public revenue was added to it. It had
formerly been the law that this surplus should always
during war be paid into the military chest for the
'defence of the State. Eubulus actually induced the
people to pass a law making it a capital offence to pro-
pose that this fund should be so applied on any future
occasion. Consequently, the only method of meeting
the costs of war was the exaction of a property tax
from the rich. War under these circumstances could
not but involve very serious and sorely-felt sacrifices.
We may form some idea of the pressure of the burden
by supposing the case of an income tax of 4s. or 5s. in
the pound among ourselves. No ministry, it is clear,
could venture to declare war except under the most pal-
pable necessity, if such a tax were inevitable. Eubulus
accordingly conciliated the rich by doing his utmost to
save them from the dreaded burden. He was, as we
should say, prime minister of Athens for sixteen years.
His position must have been a very strong one, accept-
able, as we have just seen, to rich and poor alike.
There can hardly be a doubt that his policy impaired
the Athenian character, and made the work of Demos-
thenes peculiarly difficult.
Athens thus entered on a great contest under un-
favourable conditions. She was still, from her exten-
sive trade, the richest city in Greece, and she had the
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? 12 _ DEMOSTHENES.
means of sending out formidable fleets. But her citi-
zens liked ease and comfort, and preferred their cheer-
ful city life to foreign service. Her dominions, too, were
rather vulnerable, not being guarded by any regular
troops. If they were attacked, they had to be defend-
ed by mercenaries, commanded by the sort of general
who has been described. Then, too, her commerce,
with which her prosperity was closely bound up, might
be harassed by an enterprising enemy, and her supplies
of corn from the Black Sea endangered. Thus, in fight-
ing Macedon she was perhaps at some disadvantage,
though we may be inclined to think that a little more
energy and vigour would have carried her successfully
through the struggle. The truth is, she was not for a
long time alive to the real danger, and was conse-
quently remiss in seizing opportunities. There was a
party which urged alliance with Thebes.
But Thebes
was more hateful to an average Athenian than Sparta
had ever been. Such a party seemed untrue to the
old traditions of Athens. Hence it was always com-
paratively weak. Had the danger from Macedon been
distinctly foreseen, the alliance would perhaps have
been effected. Athens and Thebes united might, it
can hardly be doubted, have confined Philip to his
own hereditary kingdom and have saved Greece.
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? CHAPTER II.
HACEDON AND PHILIP.
THE name of Macedon, though it is heard of from
time to time in Greek history, can hardly be said to have
become really famous till the fourth century 13. 0. and
the reign of Philip. It could never have occurred to the
mind of a Greek that this outlying northern kingdom'
might possibly one day be formidable to Greece and its
freedom. There were no signs pointing in this direction;
and it may be fairly assumed that no political sagacity
could have foreseen such a result. The Macedonians
were always looked upon by the Greeks as barbarians,
although their royal family--Temenids, as they were
called, from their legendary ancestor, Temenus--came
from Argos, and the people themselves perhaps had
some distant affinity to the Hellenic race. For a long
period they were nothing better than a collection of
rude tribes, with scarcely any cohesion or organisation,
and before the disciplined army of a Greek state they
would have been utterly powerless. They were sur-
' rounded, too, by fierce and unquiet neighbours--Illyr-
ians to the west, Paeonians to the north, Thracians to
the east,--all savage, warlike peoples, whom they could
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? 14 DEMOSTJIENES.
only just hold in check. The country, indeed, with its
rivers and rich valleys and strips of seaboard, had nat-
ural advantages which a vigorous prince with organis-
ing capacity might develop; and this was partially done
by Archelaus, who reigned from 413 B. 0. to 399. He
was a man of great energy, and he may be said to have
put Macedon in the way to become a flourishing and
powerful kingdom. According to Thucydides,* he had
roads constructed, fortresses erected, and established a
standing army on a greater scale than any of his pre-
decessors had kept up. Probably the last years of the
Pcloponnesian war, which were so disastrous to Athens,
were favourable to Macedon, and enabled it to acquire
an influence on the northern coasts of the [Egean,
which previously Athens had possessed. Still, no
doubt Archelaus deserves the credit of having steadily
applied himself to the work of strengthening and con-
solidating his kingdom. At the same time, he did his
best to civilise his people, and to bring them into con-'
nection with the Greek world. He cultivated the
friendship of Athens, and sought to introduce its
literature and art. He established a grand periodical
festival on the Greek type, with all the humanising
adjuncts of music and poetry. The great poet Euri-'
pides visited his court at his special invitation, and
was treated with such favour and respect that he re-
mained there till his death. The philosopher Socrates
was invited, but it appears that he declined the honour.
The famous painter, Zeuxis of Heracleia, was one of the
king's guests, and he was employed to adorn with pic-
* Thucydides, ii. 100. _
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? MACEDON AND PHILIP. _ 15
tures the royal palace at Pella, the new capital of
Macedonia. In fact, Archelaus was an enlightened
despot; and though he could not eradicate barbarism
and make Macedonians into Greeks, he at least gave
the higher class a varnish of Greek civilisation and
culture.
It was not unusual for the kings of Macedon to perish
by the hands of conspirators and assassins, and this was
the fate of Archelaus. The dynasty was now changed;
and after a few years of disturbance, Amyntas, the _
father of Philip, became king in 394 13. 0. His reign
was not a prosperous one. Macedonia went back, and
its very existence as an independent kingdom was in
jeopardy. According to one account, Amyntas was
obliged to surrender Philip as a hostage to the Illyr-
ians, who were then particularly troublesome. He
left his kingdom at his death, in 370 B. 0. , in an almost
desperate plight. The succession to the throne was
disputed, and the enemies on the border were as for-
midable as ever. Macedon, indeed, seemed on the eve
of being wholly extinguished. The eldest son and
successor of Amyntas, Alexander, was murdered; and
shortly afterwards the Theban Pelopidas was invited
into the country by the friends of the royal family,
with the view probably of securing the throne for the
two younger brothers, Perdiocas and Philip. Pe1opi-
das, it seems, forced on Macedonia the adoption of this
arrangement, and took Philip with him to Thebes, as
a hostage for its being faithfully carried out. Philip
passed three years at Thebes, while his brother Perdic-
cas was king. He then, in 368 11. 0. , was intrusted
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? 16 DEJHOSTHENES.
with the government of a portion of Macedonia under
Perdiccas, and employed his time in equipping and
organising some troops. His brothcr's reign had a dis-
astrous termination. He was defeated with heavy loss
by the Illyrians, and died soon afterwards. And so
Philip, now twenty-three years of age, became king of
Macedon in 359 13. 0. , there being only an infant son
of Perdiceas whose claim to the throne it was not dif-
ficult, under the circumstances, to set aside with the
' national approval.
N 0 prince could have begun his reign with gloomier
prospects than the future conqueror of Greece. He
was encompassed by enemies. There were other claim-
ants of the throne--one of these being Argaeus, who
was supported by Athens. He thus had to fear attack
from barbarian neighbours by land, and from Athenian
fleets by sea. The hostile attitude of the Athenians
was determined by their very prudent desire to recover
the important position of Amphipolis at the mouth of
the Strymon. To Athens the possession of this place
was of the utmost value, as it was the key to a region
rich in gold and silver mines, as well as in forest-timber.
To this the people had an eye, in supporting the pre-
tensions of Argaeus to the throne of Macedon against
Philip. The king, however, met them promptly, and
won a victory over a little force which they had sent
to Methone on the Macedonian coast of the Gulf of
Thermae. He took some Athenian citizens prisoners;
but as he was anxious to conciliate Athens, he treated
them with marked respect, and allowed them at once
to return. He then made peace with Athens, and
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? MA crnoy AND PHILIP. 17
waived all claim to Amphipolis, in which his pro-
decessor had placed a Macedonian garrison. The city
was now left to itself; and the Athenians, had they
been wise, would have spared no effort to secure it.
As it was, they let slip a golden opportunity of regain-
ing a position which might have been in their hands a
barrier against the growing power of Macedon, and
would have certainly enabled them to maintain their
maritime supremacy on the ZEgean.
Philip meanwhile, having freed himself for the
present fromthe fear of Athens, was at liberty to fence
off his kingdom from the attacks of its land enemies.
He had already organised something of a military force,
and with this he prepared to strike a decisive blow at
the Illyrian, Paeonian, and Thracian tribes,l which were
perpetually crossing the Macedonian frontier in plun-
dering expeditions. It seems that these tribes, which
were scattered over what are now the provinces of
Bosnia, Servia, and Albania, were at this time being
pushed southwards by a great movement of the Gauls.
The lllyrians were Macedon's most dangerous neigh-
bours, and they had inflicted many a disastrous defeat
on Philip's predecessors. N ow they were at the height
of their power, and were united for purposes of war
under a chief named Bardylis, an able leader and a
brave warrior. Philip, after thoroughly vanquishing
the Pzeonians, which he seems to have done easily,
turned his arms against the more formidable Illyrians,
and attacked them in western Macedonia, which they
had invaded. He won a hard-fought battle, chiefly
through the efficiency of his cavalry. The Illyrian
. \. o. s. s. vol. iv B
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? 18 _ DEMOSTHENES.
army was utterly discomfited, and their chief was glad
to make peace, and cede whatever portions of Mace
donia he had conquered and occupied. The result of
this victory was, that the Macedonian frontier was
pushed to the lake Lychnitis (now Okridha), and was
made far more secure than it had hitherto been, by the
occupation of mountain-passes through which the
Illyrian invaders used to pour into Macedonia.
The famous phalanx, which we connect specially
with the names of Macedon and Philip and Alexander,
is said to have taken part in this battle. Philip has
been credited with this military invention; but, in
truth, he can be said only to have introduced it. He
may have considerably modified it, but it had always
been an important element in a Greek army. It was
the great Epameinondas of Thebes who seems to have
first organised it in its most powerful and effective
form. He, in fact, it was who brought the science of
war to the highest perfection hitherto known in Greece.
Philip, during his residence as a young man in Thebes,
may well have had opportunities of personal intercourse
with this illustrious general, and have derived from him
many profitable hints and suggestions. At all events, he
had daily under his eyes the inagnificent soldiers who had
fought and conquered at Leuctra. His first military
ideas were thus drawn from the best of all schools, and
we may well suppose that a deep impression was at the
same time made on his young imagination. He would
soon see that the barbarous enemies of Macedon would
never be able to stand against really well-trained troops.
He had also at Thebes the literary and philosophical
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? MA aspen AND PHILIP. 19
teaching which often lays the foundation of able states-
manship. Possibly he may have made the acquaintance
of Plato, and there is certainly ground for believing
that the philosopher conceived a high opinion of his
ability. Nor is it unlikely that he may also at this
time have had his admiration directed by some circum-
stance to Aristotle, whom he afterwards made the
tutor of the young Alexander. It is certain that he
became imbued with some amount of Greek culture,
and that he acquired the power of speaking and writing
the language almost as well as a professed orator or
rhetorician. He liked to look on himself, and to be
regarded by others, as thoroughly a Greek; and this it
was, no doubt, which inclined him to be always con-
siderate towards Athens, as the foremost state of Greece.
Perhaps he was not too young, before he left Thebes,
to imbibe some political notions. In such a city he
would at least have a good opportunity of getting an
insight into the character of Greek politics, and he
might have early learnt some of those weak points in
Greece which his adroitness subsequently enabled him
to turn to such profitable account.
Philip, after his victories over the lllyrians and
Paeonians, which for a time at least made Macedonia
secure on the land side, still reigned over a poor and
half-barbarous kingdom. He had much to do before
he could hope to become a considerable power in the
Greek world. As yet, he did not possess a single town
on the coast. He had, as we have seen, given up
Amphipolis to please the Athenians. He must have
been surprised to find that they did not make haste to
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? 20 . ' 'DEMOSTHENES. "
recover that important place. But they committed the
blunder, and allowed the people of Amphipolis to remain
their own masters. Soon afterwards, in 358 13. 0. , Philip
thought he might as well possess himself of it; and
when the inhabitants refused to surrender, he laid siege
to the city. Envoys were sent to Athens, asking for
help; but it is possible that at this crisis the war with
the allies had just begun, and that the Athenians may
have thus found themselves fully occupied. Philip,
too, promised them in a very civil letter that he would
put them in possession of it as soon as he had taken it.
The Athenians did nothing, though it could not have
been very difficult for them to have saved the place
and secured it for themselves. This was indeed short-
sighted, as they now again had an opportunity of
securing a commanding position, and of nipping Philip's
power in the bud. . It was one of those errors which
can never be retrieved. Athens lost prestige, as well
as a most useful dependency. When Philip took the
city, Olynthus, which was not far distant, and was at
the head of a group of Greek townships in the penin-
sula of Chalcidice, was seriously alarmed, and proposed
an alliance to Athens. The offer was rejected, as the
Athenians, it seems, still wished to look on Philip as
their friend, and were persuaded to trust his promises.
'The cunning prince contrived. not only to buy off the
hostility of Olynthus, but actually to win its friend-
ship and to become its ally by the cession of a
disputed strip of territory near Thessalonica. The
next thing he did was to venture on an openly hostile '
'act against Athens by conquering and _wresting front
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HACEDON AND PHILIP. 21
her a most important possession, the city of Potidaea,
on the gulf of Thermae. This, too, he gave up to the
Olynthians. Pydna, also, on the shore of the same
gulf, opposite to Potidaea, likewise an Athenian pos-
session, fell_into his hands through internal treachery;
and Athens, it appears, made no effort to save the
place. Thus, in a single year, 358 11.
