No More Learning

. ).
3. Doubt in morality is the decisive factor.
The downfall of the moral interpretation of the
universe, which loses its raison d'être once it has
tried to take flight to a Beyond, meets its end
in Nihilism. “Nothing has any purpose” (the
inconsistency of one explanation of the world, to
which men have devoted untold energy,-gives
rise to the suspicion that all explanations may
perhaps be false). The Buddhistic feature : a
yearning for nonentity (Indian Buddhism has
no fundamentally moral development at the back
of it; that is why Nihilism in its case means only
morality not overcome; existence is regarded as
a punishment and conceived as an error; error is
thus held to be punishment—a moral valuation).
Philosophical attempts to overcome the “moral
God” (Hegel, Pantheism). The vanquishing of
popular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard.
Antagonism of "true" and “ beautiful” and
“good. ”
4. Against "purposelessness” on the one hand,
against moral valuations on the other : how far has
all science and philosophy been cultivated hereto-
fore under the influence of moral judgments? And
have we not got the additional factor—the enmity
of science, into the bargain? Or the prejudice
against science? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian
valuations everywhere present as remnants in
socialistic and positivistic systems. A criticism of
Christian morality is altogether lacking.
5. The Nihilistic consequences of present natural


## p. 7 (#29) ###############################################

EUROPEAN NIHILISM.
7
5
S
1
e
0
"S
у
a
science (along with its attempts to escape into a
Beyond). Out of its practice there finally arises a
"certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude
towards itself—a sort of anti-scientificality. Since
Copernicus man has been rolling away from the
centre towards x.
6. The Nihilistic consequences of the political
and politico-economical way of thinking, where all
principles at length become tainted with the atmo-
sphere of the platform: the breath of mediocrity, in-
significance, dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy,
etc. Punishment. Everywhere the deliverer is
missing, either as a class or as a single man-the
justifier.
7. Nihilistic consequences of history and of the
“practical historian," i. e. , the romanticist. The
attitude of art is quite unoriginal in modern life.
Its gloominess. Goethe's so-called Olympian State.
8. Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Roman-
ticism (the conclusion of Wagner's Ring of the
Nibelung).
LS
ik
ly
as
is
1)
al
of
d.
and
ad
nas
co
nd
ity
cice
an
in
0
ral


## p. 8 (#30) ###############################################

I.
NIHILISM.
1. NIHILISM AS AN OUTCOME OF THE
VALUATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF
EXISTENCE WHICH HAVE PREVAILED
HERETOFORE.
2.
What does Nihilism mean? —That the highest
values are losing their value. There is no bourne.
There is no answer to the question : “to what
purpose ? "
3.
Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life
is absurd, in the light of the highest values
already discovered; it also includes the view that
we have not the smallest right to assume the
existence of transcendental objects or things in
themselves, which would be either divine or
morality incarnate.
This view is a result of fully developed "truth-
fulness”: therefore a consequence of the belief in
morality.
4.
What advantages did the Christian hypothesis
of morality offer?
1


## p. 9 (#31) ###############################################

NIHILISM.
9
(1) It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men,
which contrasted with their apparent insignifi-
cance and subordination to chance in the eternal
flux of becoming and perishing.
(2) It served the purpose of God's advocates,
inasmuch as it granted the world a certain perfec-
tion despite its sorrow and evil—it also granted
the world that proverbial “freedom”: evil seemed
full of meaning:
(3) It assumed that man could have a know-
ledge of absolute values, and thus granted him
adequate perception for the most important things.
(4) It prevented man from despising himself as
man, from turning against life, and from being
driven to despair by knowledge: it was a self-
preservative measure.
In short: Morality was the great antidote
against practical and theoretical Nihilism.
5.
But among the forces reared by morality, there
was truthfulness: this in the end turns against
morality, exposes the teleology of the latter, its
interestedness, and now the recognition of this lie
so long incorporated, from which we despaired of
ever freeing ourselves, acts just like a stimulus.
We perceive certain needs in ourselves, implanted
during the long dynasty of the moral interpreta-
tion of life, which now seem to us to be needs
of untruth: on the other hand, those very needs
represent the highest values owing to which we
are able to endure life. We have ceased from
s


## p. 10 (#32) ##############################################

ΙΟ
THE WILL TO POWER.
attaching any worth to what we know, and we
dare not attach any more worth to that with
which we would fain deceive ourselves from this
antagonism there results a process of dissolution.
6.
This is the antinomy:
In so far as we believe in morality, we con-
demn existence.
7.
The highest values in the service of which
man ought to live, more particularly when they
oppressed and constrained him most-these social
values, owing to their tone-strengthening tenden-
cies, were built over men's heads as though they
were the will of God, or “reality," or the actual
world, or even a hope of a world to come, Now
that the lowly origin of these 'values has become
known, the whole universe seems to have been
transvalued and to have lost its significance—but
this is only an intermediate stage.
8.
The consequence of Nihilism (disbelief in all
values) as a result of a moral valuation :- We
have grown to dislike egotism (even though we have
realised the impossibility of altruism);-we have
grown to dislike what is most necessary (although
we have recognised the impossibility of a liberum


## p. 11 (#33) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
II
»
a
Azrbitrium and of an “intelligible freedom" *). We
고
​perceive that we do not reach the spheres in
s's which we have set our values—at the same time
those other spheres in which we live have not
thereby gained one iota in value.
On the contrary,
we are tired, because we have lost the main in-
centive to live. "All in vain hitherto ! "
9.
-
Pessimism as a preparatory state to Nihilism.
IO.
h
у
]-
sy
al
W
he
en
ut
A. Pessimism viewed as strength-in what re-
spect ?
In the energy of its logic, as anarchy,
Nihilism, and analysis.
B. Pessimism regarded as collapse—in what
sense? In the sense of its being a softening
influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a
tout comprendre," and historical spirit.
Critical tension: extremes make their appear-
ance and become dominant.
II.
The logic of Pessimism leads finally to Nihilism :
what is the force at work ? —The notion that there
are no values, and no purpose : the recognition of
the part that moral valuations have played in all
other lofty values.
all
Ve
ve
Eve
gh
* This is a Kantian term. Kant recognised two kinds of
Freedom-the practical and the transcendental kind. The
first belongs to the phenomenal, the second to the intelligible
world. -TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
2111


## p. 12 (#34) ##############################################

12
THE WILL TO POWER.
Result: moral valuations are condemnations, ne-
gations; morality is the abdication of the will to
live. . .
I 2.
THE COLLAPSE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES.
A.
>
»
Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a psycho-
logical condition, first when we have sought in all
that has happened a purpose which is not there :
so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage.
Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness
of the long waste of strength, the pain of “futility,"
uncertainty, the lack of an opportunity to recover
in some way, or to attain to a state of peace
concerning anything—shame in one's own pres-
ence, as if one had cheated oneself too long. .
The purpose above-mentioned might have been
achieved: in the form of a "realisation ” of a most
high canon of morality in all worldly phenomena,
the moral order of the universe ;- or in the form of
the increase of love and harmony in the traffic of
humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general
condition of happiness; or even in the march to-
wards general nonentity—any sort of goal always
constitutes a purpose.
The common factor to all
these appearances is that something will be at-
tained, through the process itself: and now
perceive that Becoming has been aiming at nothing,
and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusion-
ment in regard to a so-called purpose in existence,
as a cause of Nihilism ; whether this be in re-
we


## p. 13 (#35) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
13
1
S
I
spect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into
the recognition that all the hypotheses are false
which have hitherto been offered as to the object
of life, and which relate to the whole of "Evolu-
tion" (man no longer an assistant in, let alone
the culmination of, the evolutionary process).
Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological
condition, in the second place, when man has fixed
a totality, a systematisation, even an organisation
in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul
thirsting for respect and admiration will wallow in
the general idea of a highest ruling and adminis-
trative power (if it be the soul of a logician,
the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning
will suffice to conciliate everything). A kind of
unity, some form of “monism”: and as a result
of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feel-
ing of profound relativity and dependence in the
presence of an All which is infinitely superior to
him, a sort of divinity. “The general good exacts
the surrender of the individual " but lo, there
is no such general good! At bottom, man loses
the belief in his own worth when no infinitely
precious entity manifests itself through him--that
is to say, he conceived such an All, in order to be
able to believe in his own worth.
Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a
third and last form. Admitting these two points
of view: that no purpose can be assigned to Be-
coming, and that no great entity rules behind all
Becoming, in which the individual may completely
lose himself as in an element of superior value;
there still remains the subterfuge which would con-
2
t
•
.
3
f
f
1
S
11
e
€,


## p. 14 (#36) ##############################################

14
THE WILL TO POWER.
hree C
world
ourse!
three
refuse
them
apple
for de
RE
is the
wort
C C
ried
sist in condemning this whole world of Becoming
as an illusion, and in discovering a world which
would lie beyond it, and would be a real world.
The moment, however, that man perceives that
this world has been devised only for the purpose
of meeting certain psychological needs, and that
he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form
of Nihilism comes into being, which comprises a
denial of a metaphysical world, and which forbids
itself all belief in a real world. From this stand-
point, the reality of Becoming is the only reality
that is admitted : all bypaths to back-worlds and
false godheads are abandoned—but this world is no
longer endured, although no one wishes to disown it.
What has actually happened? The feeling of
worthlessness was realised when it was understood
that neither the notion of " Purpose," nor that of
“ Unity," nor that of “Truth,” could be made to
interpret the general character of existence. Noth-
ing is achieved or obtained thereby; the unity
which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is
entirely lacking: the character of existence is not
true,” it is false; there is certainly no longer
any reason to believe in a real world.
In short,
the categories, “Purpose,” “Unity,” “Being," by
means of which we had lent some worth to life,
we have once more divorced from it—and the
world now appears worthless to us.
Our
Sore
been
are.
of
ing
L
thi
nes
ali
tH
B.
CE
Admitting that we have recognised the impos-
sibility of interpreting the world by means of these
DO
1


## p. 15 (#37) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
15
hree categories, and that from this standpoint the
world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask
ourselves whence we derived our belief in these
three categories. Let us see if it is possible to
refuse to believe in them. If we can deprive
them of their value, the proof that they cannot be
applied to the world, is no longer a sufficient reason
for depriving that world of its value.
Result: The belief in the categories of reason *
is the cause of Nihilism—we have measured the
worth of the world according to categories which
can only be applied to a purely fictitious world.
Conclusion: All values with which we have
tried, hitherto, to lend the world some worth, from
our point of view, and with which we have there-
fore deprived it of all worth (once these values have
been shown to be inapplicable)—all these values,
are, psychologically, the results of certain views
of utility, established for the purpose of maintain-
ing and increasing the dominion of certain com-
munities: but falsely projected into the nature of
things. It is always man's exaggerated ingenuous-
ness to regard himself as the sense and measure of
all things.
1
Y
13.
Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological
condition (the vast generalisation, the conclusion
that there is no purpose in anything, is pathological) :
* This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of twelve
categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and
modality, are each provided with three categories. -TRANS-
LATOR'S NOTE.
S
S


## p. 16 (#38) ##############################################

16
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
whether it be that the productive forces are no
yet strong enough-or that decadence still hesi-
tates and has not yet discovered its expedients.
The conditions of this hypothesis :—That there
is no truth; that there is no absolute state of
affairs no "thing-in-itself. ” This itself is only
Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind. It finds
that the value of things consists precisely in the
: fact that these values are not real and never have
been real, but that they are only a symptom of
strength on the part of the valuer, a simplification
serving the purposes of existence.
14.
Values and their modification are related to the
growth of power of the valuer.
The measure of disbelief and of the “ freedom
of spirit " which is tolerated, viewed as an expres.
sion of the growth of power.
“ Nihilism 'viewed as the ideal of the highest
spiritual power, of the over-rich life, partly destruc-
tive, partly ironical.
15.
What is belief? How is a belief born ? All
belief assumes that something is true.
The extremest form of Nihilism would mean
that all belief-all assumption of truth—is false :
because no real world is at hand. It were there.
fore: only an appearance seen in perspective, whose
origin must be found in us (seeing that we are
constantly in need of a narrower, a shortened, and
simplified world).


## p. 17 (#39) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
17
This should be realised, that the extent to
200
esi
which we can, in our heart of hearts, acknowledge
appearance, and the necessity of falsehood, with-
out going to rack and ruin, is the measure of
of strength.
nly In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the nega-
ndi tion of a real world and of Being, might be a
the divine view of the world.
ere
址​。
ave
16.
cio
th
If we are disillusioned, we have not become so
in regard to life, but owing to the fact that our
eyes have been opened to all kinds of " desiderata. "
With mocking anger we survey that which is
called “ Ideal”: we despise ourselves only because
we are unable at every moment of our lives to
quell that absurd emotion which is called “Ideal-
ism. " This pampering by means of ideals is
stronger than the anger of the disillusioned one.
lor
res
ches
ruc
17.
AI
near
Ise
To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism
continue to be the result of the same ideal as that
which gave rise to Christian Theism ? The
amount of certainty concerning the most exalted
desiderata, the highest values and the greatest
degree of perfection, was SO great, that the
philosophers started out from it as if it had been
an a priori and absolute fact: “God” at the head,
as the given quantity-Truth. “ To become like
God," "to be absorbed into the Divine Being "-
B
ere
2056
art
anc
.
VOL. 1.


## p. 18 (#40) ##############################################

18
THE WILL TO POWER.
a
these were for centuries the most ingenuous and
most convincing desiderata (but that which con-
vinces is not necessarily true on that account:
it is nothing more nor less than convincing. An
observation for donkeys).
The granting of a personal-reality to this accre-
tion of ideals has been unlearned: people have
become atheistic. But has the ideal actually been
abandoned ? The latest metaphysicians, as
matter of fact, still seek their true “reality” in it
—the "thing-in-itself” beside which everything
else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that
because our world of appearance is so obviously
not the expression of that ideal, it therefore cannot
be “true”-and at bottom does not even lead
back to that metaphysical world as cause. The
unconditioned, in so far as it stands for that
highest degree of perfection, cannot possibly
be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopen-
hauer, who desired it otherwise, was obliged to
imagine this metaphysical basis as the antithesis
to the ideal, as “an evil, blind will ” : thus it could
be “that which appears," that which manifests
itself in the world of appearance. But even so, he
did not give up that ideal absolute—he circum-
vented it. . .
(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of
intelligible freedom," * in order to relieve the
ens perfectum of the responsibility of having con-
trived this world as it is, in short, in order to
explain evil: scandalous logic for a philosopher ! ).
(
* See Note on p. 11.


## p. 19 (#41) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
19
.
een
ia
ind
18.
on-
nt
The most general sign of modern times: in his
Ar
own estimation, man has lost an infinite amount of
dignity. For a long time he was the centre and
cre. tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavoured
ave to demonstrate at least his relationship to the
most essential and in itself most valuable side of
life—as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold
ini fast to the dignity of man, in their belief that
in moral values are cardinal values. He who has
itha let God go, clings all the more strongly to the
usl belief in morality.
inc
lea
19.
Th
Every purely moral valuation (as, for instance,
tha the Buddhistic) terminates in Nihilism: Europe
ibl must expect the same thing! It is supposed that
pen one can get along with a morality bereft of a
Ht
religious background; but in this direction the road
to Nihilism is opened. There is nothing in religion
noul which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing
fest creatures.
0,1
20.
cum
The question which Nihilism puts, namely," to
is c what purpose ? " is the outcome of a habit, hitherto,
th to regard the purpose as something fixed, given and
con exacted from outside that is to say, by some super-
rt natural authority. Once the belief in this has been
er! unlearned, the force of an old habit leads to the
search after another authority, which would know
how to speak unconditionally, and could point to


## p. 20 (#42) ##############################################

20
THE WILL TO POWER,
N
B
fs
goals and missions. The authority of the conscience
now takes the first place (the more morality is
emancipated from theology, the more imperative
does it become) as a compensation for the personal
authority. Or the authority of reason. Or the
gregarious instinct (the herd). Or history with its
immanent spirit, which has its goal in itself, and to
which one can abandon oneself. One would like
to evade the will, as also the willing of a goal and
the risk of setting oneself a goal. One would like
to get rid of the responsibility (Fatalism would
be accepted). Finally: Happiness, and with a
dash of humbug, the happiness of the greatest
number.
It is said:
(1) A definite goal is quite unnecessary.
(2) Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen.
Precisely now, when will in its fullest strength
were necessary, it is in the weakest and most pusil-
lanimous condition. Absolute mistrust concerning
the organising power of the will.
ma
fem
:-
SU
ex
Si
CO
a
6
21.
The perfect Nihilist. —The Nihilist's eye idealises
—
in an ugly sense, and is inconstant to what it
remembers : it allows its recollections to go astray
and to fade, it does not protect them from that
cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all
that is distant and past. And what it does not do
for itself it fails to do for the whole of the past of
mankind as well—that is to say, it allows it to drop


## p. 21 (#43) ##############################################

232860
NIHILISM.
2I
22.
20
i
iv
20
ch
it
ti
Ekt
no
ik
ul
Nihilism. It may be two things :-
A. Nihilism as a sign of enhanced spiritual
strength : active Nihilism.
B. Nihilism as a sign of the collapse and decline
of spiritual strength: passive Nihilism.
23.
te
>
. .
8
151
Lin
"
Nihilism, a normal condition.
It may be a sign of strength; spiritual vigour
may have increased to such an extent that the
goals toward which man has marched hitherto
(the “convictions," articles of faith) are no longer
suited to it (for a faith generally expresses the
exigencies of the conditions of existence, a submis-
sion to the authority of an order of things which
conduces to the prosperity, the growth and power of
a living creature . . . ); on the other hand, a sign
of insufficient strength, to fix a goal, a "wherefore,”
and a faith for itself.
It reaches its maximum of relative strength, as
a powerful destructive force, in the form of active
Nihilism.
Its opposite would be weary Nihilism, which no
longer attacks: its most renowned form being
Buddhism : as passive Nihilism, a sign of weakness :
spiritual strength may be fatigued, exhausted, so
that the goals and values which have prevailed
hitherto are no longer suited to it and are no longer
believed in so that the synthesis of values and
goals (upon which every strong culturê stands)
lise
it :
tra
tha
sal
td
st
dro


## p. 22 (#44) ##############################################

22
THE WILL TO POWER.
decomposes, and the different values contend with
one another : Disintegration, then everything which
is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies, steps
into the foreground under the cover of various dis-
guises, either religious, moral, political or æsthetic,
etc.
24.
Nihilism is not only a meditating over the “ in
vain ! ”-not only the belief that everything de-
serves to perish; but one actually puts one's
shoulder to the plough ; one destroys. This, if you
will, is illogical; but the Nihilist does not believe
in the necessity of being logical. . . . It is the
condition of strong minds and wills; and to these
it is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of
judgment: the negation by deeds proceeds from
their nature. Annihilation by the reasoning
faculty seconds annihilation by the hand.
25.
Concerning the genesis of the Nihilist. The
courage of all one really knows comes but late
in life. It is only quite recently that I have ac-
knowledged to myself that heretofore I have been
a Nihilist from top to toe. The energy and
thoroughness with which I marched forward as a
Nihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental
fact. When one is progressing towards a goal
it seems impossible that. "aimlessness per se"
should be one's fundamental article of faith.


## p. 23 (#45) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
23
t
26.
E
i
The Pessimism of strong natures. The“ where-
fore" after a terrible struggle, even after victory.
That something may exist which is a hundred
times more important than the question, whether
we feel well or unwell, is the fundamental instinct of
all strong natures and consequently too, whether
the others feel well or unwell. In short, that we
have a purpose, for which we would not even
hesitate to sacrifice men, run all risks, and bend
our backs to the worst: this is the great passion,
2. FURTHER CAUSES OF NIHILISM.
27.
66
!
1
The causes of Nihilism: (1) The higher species is
lacking, i. e. , the species whose inexhaustible fruit-
fulness and power would uphold our belief in Man
(think only of what is owed to Napoleon-almost
all the higher hopes of this century).
(2) The inferior species (“herd,” mass,"
society ") is forgetting modesty, and inflates its
needs into cosmic and metaphysical values. In
this way all life is vulgarised: for inasmuch as the
mass of mankind rules, it tyrannises over the ex-
ceptions, so that these lose their belief in themselves
and become Nihilists.
All attempts to conceive of a new species come to
nothing (“romanticism,” the artist, the philosopher;
against Carlyle's attempt to lend them the highest
moral values)
(
:
1
4


## p. 24 (#46) ##############################################

24
THE WILL TO POWER.
The result is that higher types are resisted.
The downfall and insecurity of all higher types.
The struggle against genius (“popular poetry,"
etc. ). Sympathy with the lowly and the suffering
as a standard for the elevation of the soul.
The philosopher is lacking, the interpreter of
deeds, and not alone he who poetises them.
28.
Imperfect Nihilism-its forms: we are now
surrounded by them.
All attempts made to escape Nihilism, which
do not consist in transvaluing the values that
have prevailed hitherto, only make the matter
worse; they complicate the problem.
29.
The varieties of self - stupefaction. In one's
heart of hearts, not to know, whither ? Empti-
ness. The attempt to rise superior to it all by
means of emotional intoxication : emotional in-
toxication in the form of music, in the form of
, cruelty in the tragic joy over the ruin of the
noblest, and in the form of blind, gushing en-
thusiasm over individual men or distinct periods
(in the form of hatred, etc. ). The attempt to
work blindly, like a scientific instrument; to keep
an eye on the many small joys, like an investi-
gator, for instance (modesty towards oneself); the
mysticism of the voluptuous joy of eternal empti-


## p. 25 (#47) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
25
upe.
Cry,
rin
ness; art "for art's sake" ("le fait "), “ immaculate
investigation,” in the form of narcotics against the
disgust of oneself; any kind of incessant work,
any kind of small foolish fanaticism; the medley
of all means, illness as the result of general pro-
fligacy (dissipation kills pleasure).
(1) As a result, feeble will-power.
(2) Excessive pride and the humiliation of
petty weakness felt as a contrast.
no
hic
tha
atte
one
mpt
11 b
1 in
mo
th
30.
The time is coming when we shall have to pay
for having been Christians for two thousand years :
we are losing the firm footing which enabled us to
live—for a long while we shall not know in what
direction we are travelling. We are hurling our-
selves headlong into the opposite valuations, with
that degree of energy which could only have been
engendered in man by an overvaluation of himself.
Now, everything is false from the root, words
and nothing but words, confused, feeble, or over-
strained.
(a) There is a seeking after a sort of earthly
solution of the problem of life, but in the same
sense as that of the final triumph of truth, love,
justice (socialism : "equality of persons ").
(6) There is also an attempt to hold fast to
the moral ideal (with altruism, self-sacrifice, and
the denial of the will, in the front rank).
(c) There is even an attempt to hold fast to
Beyond”: were it only as an antilogical x;
but it is forthwith interpreted in such a way that
5 en
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t to
keep
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а
i the
npti


## p. 26 (#48) ##############################################

26
THE WILL TO POWER.
3
a kind of metaphysical solace, after the old style,
may be derived from it.
(d) There is an attempt to read the pheno-
mena of life in such a way as to arrive at the
divine guidance of old, with its powers of reward-
ing, punishing, educating, and of generally con-
ducing to a something better in the order of
things.
(e) People once more believe in good and
evil; so that the victory of the good and the
annihilation of the evil is regarded as a duty (this
is English, and is typical of that blockhead, John
Stuart Mill).
(f) The contempt felt for “naturalness," for
the desires and for the ego: the attempt to regard
even the highest intellectuality and art as a result
of an impersonal and disinterested attitude.
(8) The Church is still allowed to meddle in
all the essential occurrences and incidents in the
life of the individual, with a view to consecrat-
ing it and giving it a loftier meaning: we still
have the “Christian State" and the “Christian
marriage. ”
1
31.
There have been more thoughtful and more
destructively thoughtful * times than ours : times
like those in which Buddha appeared, for instance,
in which the people themselves, after centuries of
sectarian quarrels, had sunk so deeply into the
abyss of philosophical dogmas, as, from time to
*zerdachtere,


## p. 27 (#49) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
27
time, European people have done in regard to the
fine points of religious dogma. “Literature " and
the press would be the last things to seduce one
to any high opinion of the spirit of our times :
the millions of Spiritists, and a Christianity
with gymnastic exercises of that ghastly ugliness
which is characteristic of all English inventions,
throw more light on the subject.
European Pessimism is still in its infancy-a
fact which argues against it: it has not yet
attained to that prodigious and yearning fixity of
sight to which it attained in India once upon a
time, and in which nonentity is reflected; there
is still too much of the “ready-made," and not
enough of the "evolved” in its constitution, too
much learned and poetic Pessimism; I mean that
a good deal of it has been discovered, invented,
and "created,” but not caused,
32.
Criticism of the Pessimism which has prevailed
hitherto. The want of the eudæmonological
standpoint, as a last abbreviation of the question :
what is the purpose of it all? The reduction of
gloom.
Our Pessimism: the world has not the value
which we believed it to have our faith itself has
so increased our thirst for knowledge that we are
compelled to say this to-day. In the first place, it
seems of less value: at first it is felt to be of less
value,only in this sense are we pessimists,—that
is to say, with the will to acknowledge this


## p. 28 (#50) ##############################################

28
THE WILL TO POWER.
transvaluation without reserve, and no longer, as
heretofore, to deceive ourselves and chant the old
old story.
It is precisely in this way that we find the
pathos which urges us to seek for new values. In
short : the world might have far more value than
we thought we must get behind the naïveté of
our ideals, for it is possible that, in our conscious
effort to give it the highest interpretation, we have
not bestowed even a moderately just value upon it.
What has been deified ? The valuing instinct
inside the community (that which enabled it to
survive).
What has been calumniated? That which has
tended to separate higher men from their inferiors,
the instincts which cleave gulfs and build barriers.
33
Causes effecting the rise of Pessimism :-
(1) The most powerful instincts and those
which promised most for the future have hitherto
been calumniated, so that life has a curse upon it.
(2) The growing bravery and the more daring
mistrust on the part of man have led him to dis-
cover the fact that these instincts cannot be cut
adrift from life, and thus he turns to embrace
life.
(3) Only the most mediocre, who are not
conscious of this conflict, prosper; the higher
species fail, and as an example of degeneration
tend to dispose all hearts against them on the
other hand, there is some indignation caused by


## p. 29 (#51) ##############################################

NIHILISM,
29
bi
the mediocre positing themselves as the end and
meaning of all things. No one can any longer
reply to the question: "Why? "
(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest,
haste, and confusion are steadily increasing—the
materialisation of all these tendencies, which is
called"civilisation," becomes every day more simple,
with the result that, in the face of the monstrous
machine, the individual despairs and surrenders.
34.
Modern Pessimism is an expression of the use-
lessness only of the modern world, not of the
world and existence as such.
35.
The “preponderance of pain over pleasure," or
the reverse (Hedonism); both of these doctrines
are already signposts to Nihilism. . . .
For here, in both cases, no other final purpose
is sought than the phenomenon pleasure or pain.
But only a man who no longer dares to posit
a will, a purpose, and a final goal can speak in
this way-according to every healthy type of
man, the worth of life is certainly not measured
by the standard of these secondary things. And
a preponderance of pain would be possible and, in
spite of it, a mighty will, a saying of yea to life,
and a holding of this preponderance for necessary.
“ Life is not worth living ”; “Resignation";
“what is the good of tears ? "- this is a feeble and


## p. 30 (#52) ##############################################

30
THE WILL TO POWER.
sentimental attitude of mind. “ Un monstre gui
vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux. "
36.
The philosophic Nihilist is convinced that all
phenomena are without sense and are in vain, and
that there ought to be no such thing as Being
without sense and in vain. But whence comes
this “ There ought not to be? ”—whence this
" sense" and this standard? At bottom the
Nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate,
useless Being is unsatisfying to the philosopher,
and fills him with desolation and despair. This
aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensi.
bilities as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd
conclusion that the character of existence must
perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher if it is to
have any right to subsist.
Now it is easy to understand that happiness
and unhappiness, within the phenomena of this
world, can only serve the purpose of means: the
question yet remaining to be answered is, whether
it will ever be possible for us to perceive the
"object" and "purpose” of life—whether the
problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not
quite beyond our ken.
37,
The development of Nihilism out of Pessimism.
The denaturalisation of Values. Scholasticism
of values. The values isolated, idealistic, instead
.


## p. 31 (#53) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
31
")
of ruling and leading action, turn against it and
condemn it.
Opposites introduced in the place of natural
gradations and ranks. Hatred of the order of
rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian
age, because they are more easy to grasp.
The rejected world is opposed to an artificially
constructed true and valuable” one. At last
we discover out of what material the true
world was built; all that remains, now, is the
rejected world, and to the account of our reasons
for rejecting it we place our greatest disillusionment,
At this point Nihilism is reached; the directing
values have been retained—nothing more!
This gives rise to the problem of strength and
weakness:
(1) The weak fall to pieces upon it;
(2) The strong destroy what does not fall to
pieces of its own accord;
(3) The strongest overcome
overcome the directing
values,
The whole condition of affairs produces the
tragic age.
3. THE NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT AS AN
EXPRESSION OF DECADENCE.
38.
Just lately an accidental and in every way
inappropriate term has been very much misused
everywhere people are speaking of “Pessimism,"
:


## p. 32 (#54) ##############################################

32
THE WILL TO POWER.
and there is a fight around the question to which
some replies must be forthcoming): which is
right—Pessimism or Optimism?
People have not yet seen what is so terribly
obvious—namely, that Pessimism is not a problem
but a symptom,—that the term ought to be re-
placed by “ Nihilism,"—that the question, “to be
or not to be,” is itself an illness, a sign of
degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.
The Nihilistic movement is only an expression
of physiological decadence.
39.
To be understood :That every kind of decline
and tendency to sickness has incessantly been at
work in helping to create general evaluations:
that in those valuations which now dominate,
decadence has even begun to preponderate, that
we have not only to combat the conditions which
present misery and degeneration have brought
into being; but that all decadence, previous to
that of our own times, has been transmitted and
has therefore remained an active force amongst
us. A universal departure of this kind, on the
part of man, from his fundamental instincts, such
universal decadence of the valuing judgment, is
the note of interrogation par excellence, the real
riddle, which the animal “man sets to all
philosophers.
40.
The notion “decadence":--Decay, decline, and
waste, are, per se, in no way open to objection;


## p. 33 (#55) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
33
they are the natural consequences of life and vital
growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just
as necessary to life as advance or progress is : we
are not in a position which enables us to suppress
it. On the contrary, reason would have it retain
its rights.
It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists
to argue that circumstances and social combina-
tions could be devised which would put an end
to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.
But that is tantamount to condemning
Life .
. . . a society is not at liberty to remain
young. And even in its prime it must bring
forth ordure and decaying matter.
The more
energetically and daringly it advances, the richer
will it be in failures and in deformities, and the
nearer it will be to its fall. Age is not deferred by
means of institutions. Nor is illness. Nor is vice.