"
When the king enters any province
for the first time, he confirms and swears
to observe its privileges--e.
When the king enters any province
for the first time, he confirms and swears
to observe its privileges--e.
Thomas Carlyle
VI.
tainement outre tous seigneurs et vas-
saux y a obligation mutuollc, et lo
dire du Senateur a un Consul sera
toujoura loue; si tu ne mo tions pour
Senateur, aussi je ne te tiendrai pour
Consul. . . . Entre aultres droits,
nous avons ce privilege de servir a
nos Dues, ce que les Ephors servoient a
Sparte a leur Rois, e'est de tenir la
roiaute ferme en la main du bon
Prince, et faire venir a la raison celui
qui contrevient a son serment. "
2B
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? 386 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART IV.
the Duchess Mary. 1 We are not hero concerned with the
historical validity of these contentions, but with the nature
of the conception which they represented. It is obvious that
while there is no direct reference to a contract, it was implied
that the prince who violated the laws was liable to be suspended
or deposed; that is, that there was an implicit contract.
It is significant that in the Articles of Agreement which
were laid before the Duke of Anjou in the year 1581 by the
envoys of the Estates sent to offer him the government, it is
clearly stated that, if the Duke or his successors were at any
time to violate the terms of the Agreement, the estates would
be ipso facto released from their fidelity and would be at
liberty to appoint another prince or to make such other
arrangements as they might think suitable. 2
1 Philip Marnix de Ste. Aldegonde
OEuvres, vol. vii. , 'Oraison des
Ambassadeurs du Serenissime Prince
Matthias Archiduo d'Autriche'(p. 134):
"En tant que par les privileges de
Brabant est expressement pourvue et
dicte, que si, je ne di point le lieu-
tenant du prince, mais aussi le prince
mesme, viole les loix et droictes du
pays, il est en ce cas loisible, non seule-
ment aux Estate en general, mais
aussi particulierement, a` ceux aux-
quels appartiendra, de quelques con-
ditions qu'ils soyent, de refuser au
roi tout homage et obeissance, si
longuement et jusque a` tant qu'il ait
cogner et amende? sa faute, et qu'il
ait en tout satisfait a` ce qui est pre-
script et limite? par les loix et ordon-
nances.
Au reste, si quelqu'un, estant
au nom du prince establi au gouverne-
ment du pays, alloit a` l'encontre
desdictes privileges, il est par le mesme
faict declare? estre decheu de son gou-
vernement et dignite? , et doibt estre de
tous tenu pour depose? , de maniere
qu'aucun ne se peut-joindre a` luy,
comme a celuy qui de faict et sans
aucune forme de droict ou solemnite?
de loix, doibt etre juge? non idoine a`
exercer aucun office en la Republique,
mais aussi tenu pour inhabile a` faire
testament et infame. "
(They give as an example the deposi-
tion by the Estates of John, Duke of
Brabant, grand-nephew of Philip le
Hardi, Duke of Burgundy, and the
appointment of his brother Philip,
until John should amend; and they
say that John recognised by letters
under his seal that this action was
legitimate. )
"Laquelle loy estant particulie`re au
pays de Brabant au temps de la serenis-
sime Marie, espouse de Maximilian. . . .
Empereur Auguste . . . fut, partraicte?
et couvenant public, faicte commun et
universel par tout le pais bas, ainsi
qu'il se trouve par ecrit e`s annales
publiques.
Semblable manie`re de faire a este?
jadis practique? e, par les Hollandais et
Zelandais et souvent usurpe? e en
? ? Flandres, comme la fidelite? des his-
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? CHAP. II. ]
387
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
We think that it is with the impression of such a survival
in the sixteenth century of the contractual conceptions of the
feudal state in our minds that we shall best understand the
treatment of the contract between ruler and people in other
writers of the century.
George Buchanan asserts the conception of a contract in
precise and dogmatic terms, in a discussion of the right to
depose a king who becomes a tyrant. Maitland urged that
subjects are bound by their oath of obedience to obey the
king. Buchanan admits this, but replies that kings also
promise to administer the law " ex aequo et bono," and that
there is therefore a mutual contract between the king and the
citizens. A contract is void if one of the parties violates its
provisions, and therefore if the king breaks the bond which
united him to the people, he loses whatever rights he had by
the contract, and the people is free as it was before the
agreement. 1
The Huguenot pamphlets assert the principles of the
contract with equal emphasis. The 'Droit des Magistrats'
contends that so far from its being true that the people had
wholly surrendered their liberty to the king, it is rather true
that they only accepted him on certain conditions, and thus
it follows that, if these conditions were violated, those who
had power to give this authority had the right also to with-
draw it. And again, it was on certain promises and conditions
that a king was accepted by his people, conditions founded
on equity and natural reason, that he should conduct the
government according to the laws, of which he is or ought to
be the supreme protector. 2 It is again worth observing that
prendre un autre prince, ou autrement
pourvoir aux affaires, comme ils
trouveront oonvonir. "
1 George Buchanan, 'De Jure
Regni ' (p. 38): "B. Obstricti sumus;
sed ill) (the kings) contra, priores pro-
mittunt se ex aequo et bono jus
dicturos. . . . Mutua igitur regi cum
civibus est pactio. . . . Qui prius a
conventis recedit, contraque quam
pectus est facit, nam is pacta et con-
vent* solvit! . . . Soluto igitur
vinculo, quod regem cum populo con-
tinebat, quicquid juris ex pactiono
ad eum qui pacta solvit, pcrtinebat,
id, reor, amittitur. . . . Is etiam, cum
quo erat conventum, aequo fit, atque
ante stipulationem erat, liber. "
* 'Droit des Magistrats' (p. 753):
"Je nie qu'il puisso apparoir d'une
telle quittance (the contention that the
people had wholly surrendered their
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? 388
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
the 'Droit des Magistrats,' in a passage to which we have
already referred, in which it speaks of kingdoms and empires
as fiefs of the "Souverainete? ," refers to the feudal law as
declaring that the lord loses his fief if he commits "felonie"
against his vassals, and applies this to the case of an emperor
or king in his relations to his subjects. 1
The 'Archon et Politie' speaks of the reciprocal pacts
and conventions between the prince and the people which
may not be violated by either party. 2 The 'Vindiciae Contra
Tyrannos ' sets out the principle of a "foedus" between king
and people. It was the people who made the king, and the
people imposed a condition which the king promised to ob-
serve. The condition was that the king should reign justly
and according to the laws, and when he had promised to do
this the people promised that they would faithfully obey him,
but, if the king did not fulfil his promise, they would be free
from all obligation to him. There are indeed two contracts,
one between God and the king and people, the other between
the king and the people. God is the avenger if the king does
liberty), et dis au contraire, que les
nations, tant que le droit et equite? a
eu lieu, n'ont cree? ni accepte? leur
Roys qu'a` certaines conditions, les-
quelles estans manifestement violees
par eux, ils s'ensuit que ceux qui ont
en puissance de leur bailler telle auto-
rite n'ont en moin de puissance de les
en priver. "
Id. (p. 769) (After citing the terms
of the Treaty of Arras between Charles
VII. and the Duko of Burgundy, that
if Charles violated the Treaty his
vassals and subjects would be absolved
from their oath of allegiance to him):
"Devons-nous en moins estimer
d'une promesse et condition sous
laquelle un Roy aura este? accepte? par
son peuple, et qui eet mesme fondee
sur equite? et raison naturelle, assavoir
do reigler son administration selon
les loiz, desquels il est ou doit estre
le souverain protecteur. "
>> Id. (p. 778): "Outre tout cela,
puisque les royaumes et empires
mesmes sont fiefs, devons hommages
et services a` la souverainete? , venons
a` considerer ce quo porte les droits des
fiefs. Il est dit au livre II. Tit. xxvi.
Par. 24, et Tit. 47, que le seigneur
commet felonnie contre son vassal
comme le vassal contre son seigneur.
. . . Je di donc au cas ou` nous sommes,
qu'un Roi ou mesme un Empereur,
rele? vant de la souverainte? commettant
felonie contre ses vassaux, a savoir sos
sujets (ce que jamais ne puisse advenir)
perd son fief, non pour estre adjuge?
aux vassaux, mais pour y est re pourvou
par ceux qui repre? sentent la souve-
rainete? . "
* 'Archon et Politie' (p. 114):
"Politie. Mais il y a loi entre les deux
parties qui ordonne actions et con-
venances reciproques, qui ne se peuvent,
ni par le Prince, ni par les sujets, sans
? ? justice violer. "
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? chap. n. J
389
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
not keep the first pact, while the whole people and those persons
who are responsible for the protection of the people have the
same authority if the king does not fulfil his contract with
them. 1 It is, however, perhaps more important that the
author of the 'Vindiciae ' maintains that a contract of this
kind was a part of the constitution of almost all contemporary
states (imperia) which were worthy to be called states; and
he illustrates this from the Empire and other elective
monarchies, and then from hereditary monarchies like France,
England, and Spain, and smaller states like Brabant. He
finds the essential expression of this in the coronation cere-
monies and especially in the coronation oaths, and concludes
that no one can deny that there is a mutual and binding
contract between kings and their subjects. 2
The author of the ' Vindiciae' sums up the whole matter by
declaring emphatically that the king who violates the contract
is perjured and unworthy of his office, and that the people
who refuse obedience to him have violated no obligation, and
he appeals to the principle of the feudal law that the vassal
is free from the service if the lord has committed "felonie"
against him. And finally he says that even if there were no
ceremonies of coronation, if the king had taken no oaths,
nature itself would teach men that kings were created by the
people that they should rule justly, and that if they do not
1 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' Q.
III. (p. 159): "Diximus in con-
stituency rege duplex foedus initum
fuisse; primum inter Dcum et regem
et populum, de qua super: secundum
inter regem et populum do quo nobis
jam agendum est. . . . (P. 160): In
eo pacto agebatur de creando Rege.
Populus enim regem faciebat, non
Rex populum. Itaque non dubium
est quin populus stipularetur, Rex
promitteret Stipulabatur
ille a rege, an non juste et secundum
leges regnaturus esset 1 Hie facturum
spondebat. Populus demum se juste
imperanti fideliter obsequuturum re-
spondebat. Itaque promittebat rex
pure, populus sub conditione; quae si
non impleretur, populus ipso jure
omni obligatione solutus censeretur.
In primo foedere seu pacto p>etas in
obligationem venit; in socundo justitia ,
illo promittit rex, se pie obediturum
Deo: hoc so juste imperaturum
populo; illo, se gloriam Dei; hoe*
utilitatom populi curat urum; in
illo inest conditio, si legem meam
observaris; in hoc, si jus unicuique
suum tribueris. Illius, ni impleatur
Deus proprie v index est; hujus legi-
time universus populus, quive univer-
sum populum tuendum susceperint,
regni proceros. "
* Id. id. (p. 162): "Quod si vero
hodierna imperia spectemus, nullum
sane est, quod eo nomine dignum oon-
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? 390
[pabt rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
do this they are no longer kings and should not be acknow-
ledged by the people. 1
seatur, in quo inter principem et
subditos pactum ejusmodi non inter-
cedat. "
He cites the oath of the Emperor
Charles V. : "Leges latas custodit-
urum; novas, inconsultis electoribus
non laturum; publica publico consilio
curaturum; nil alienaturum oppig-
neraturumvo ex iis, quae ad imperium
pertinent, et caetera. "
Tho Archbishop of Cologne requires
the emperor at his coronation to swear
to defend the Church, to administer
justice, &c, and when tho emperor has
done this, he asks the princes whether
they will take the oath to him. He
refers to Poland, and tho recent corona-
tion of the Duke of Anjou; to Bo-
hemia and to Hungary; and maintains
that the same practice obtained even
in hereditary kingdoms liko France.
(p. 164): "Rex Franciae, quando
inauguraiur, rogant primo Laudunensis
et Bollovacencis, Pares Ecclosiastici.
populum qui adest universum, eum ne
regem esse cupiat, jubeatque? Unde
etiam a populo tunc eligi in ipsa in-
augurationis formula, dicitur. Ubi
populus consensisse videatur, jurat se
leges Franciae privilegiaque ac jura
in universum omnia et tuiturum,
domanium non alienaturum et cetera.
. . . Nec vero prius accingitur gladio,
ungitur, coronatur a paribus . . . aut
Rex proclamatur, quam populus jus-
serit: neque etiam prius ei pares
jurant, quam ipsis fidem dederit, se
leges accurate custoditurum. Eae vero
sunt, ne patrimonium publicum dila-
pidet, ne vectigalia, portoria, tributa
suopte arbitrio imponat, iudicatve, ne
bellum decernat, pacemve faciat:
denique ne quid in publicum, nisi
publico consilio statuat. Item sua
senatui, sua Comitiis, sua regni offi-
ciariis constet auctoritas; et cotera,
quae perpetuo in regno Franoico
obeervata fuere.
"
When the king enters any province
for the first time, he confirms and swears
to observe its privileges--e. g. , Toulouse,
Dauphine? , Brittany, Provence.
The conditions in England, Scotland,
Sweden, and Denmark were much the
same as in France, while in Spain they
wero even more definite, and he cites
the tradition that in Aragon the
"Proceres " addressed the king at his
coronation as follows :--
(p. 166) "Nos qui tantum valemus
quantum vos, et plus possumus
quam vos, regem vos eligimus cum
his et his conditionibus. Inter vos et
nos unus imperat magis quam vos"
? ? (referring, no doubt, to the Justiza).
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? CHAP. II. ]
391
THE PRINOE UNDER THE LAW.
We find a . writer of the Catholic League like Boucher setting
out the same conception of the contractual relation between
the prince and the people; and again with relation to the
tradition of the feudal law as to the mutual obligations of
lord and vassal, and the doctrine of the feudal law books that
the lord would lose his rights for the same offences as those for
which the vassal would lose his fief. 1 And, in justification of
the deposition of Henry III. , Boucher contended that the
royal authority depended upon the mutual contract between
king and people, in such a sense that, if the king were to vio-
late it, he could not be recognised as king. 2
It may again be urged that the works which we have just
cited were the outcome of violent and revolutionary move-
ments and it is therefore very important to observe that
Eichard Hooker, in a passage of which we have already
quoted part, affirms the same principle of the "compact"
between the ruler and the community.
"The case thus standing," he says, "albeit we judge it a
thing most true that kings, even inheritors, do hold the right
conditionem, quae implore debuit et
potuit, negligenti, legemque, in quam
juravit, violanti, obsequium denoget?
Quis vero contra, eum regem foedi-
tragum, perjurum, eo beneficio prorsus
indignum non censeat.
(p. 169): Etenim, si vassallum
clientelae Darn lex liberat, in quem
senior feloniam commisit, etsi sane
senior fidem proprie non dat vassallo,
sed vassallus ipse. . . . An non multo
magis solutus erit populus ea fide, quam
regi praestitit, si rex, qui primus ipsi
tamquamdomino procurator, solemniter
juravit, fidem fregerit.
An non vero etiam si non isti ritus,
non ea sacra, non ea sacrament a inter-
venirent; satis tamen ipsa natura
docet, reges ea conditione a populo
constitui, ut bene imperent? Judices
ut jus dicant? Duces belli, ut exercitus
adversus hoe tee educant? Quodsi
vere saeviunt, injuriam inferunt, hostes
ipsi fiunt; ut reges non sunt ita neo
agnosci a populo debere. "
1 J. Boucher, 'De justa abdicatione
Henrici HI,' i. 19.
>> Id. id. , iii. 8: "Adde quod cum
Rege publica fides necessario con-
junota est, ut ne Rex quidem sine ea
esse posset. Pendet enim id ex mutuo
contractu illo, quo Rex populo fidem
suam, huic vicissem suam populus
obligavit. Mutuumque adeo promis-
sum est, ut dum populus summum ei
imperium defert, et ut in publicum
commodum vertat obtestatur, id,
vicissim princeps facturum se recipiat,
ac iuramento fir met, tanto existima-
tionis studio, ut fidei nomine ac laude,
nihil antiquius reges habere perpetuo
velint. . . . Ex quo fit, ut qui fidem
illam semel abjiceret, ei reliquum
nihil sit, quo regis nomine tueri iure
posset, ut ob id, titulo isto merit o sit
? ? privandus. "
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? 392
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
to the power of dominion, with dependency upon the whole
entire body politic over which they rule as kings, yet so it
may not be understood, as if such dependency did grow, for
that every supreme governor doth personally take from them
his power by way of gift, bestowed upon him at his entrance
into his said place of sovereign government. But the cause of
this dependency is in that first original conveyance, when
power was devised by the whole unto the one; to pass from
him unto them, whom out of him nature by lawful birth
should produce, and no natural or legal inability make
uncapable. Neither can any man with reason think but that
the first institution of kings is a sufficient consideration
wherefore this power should always depend on that from
which they flow. Original influence of power from the body
into the king is the cause of the king's dependency in power
upon the body.
By dependency we mean subordination and subjection.
. . . May then a body politic at all times withdraw in whole
or in part that influence of dominion which passeth from it,
if inconvenience doth grow thereby? It must be presumed
that supreme governors will not in such case oppose them-
selves and be stiff in detaining that, the use whereof is with
public detriment: but surely without their consent I see not
how this body should be able by any just means to help
itself, saving when dominion doth escheat. Such things must,
therefore, be thought upon beforehand, that power must be
limited ere it be granted, which is the next thing we are to
consider. In power of dominion all kings have not an equal
latitude. Kings by conquest make their own charter. . . .
Kings by God's own special appointment have also that
largeness of power, which he doth assign or permit with
approbation. Touching kings which were first instituted by
agreement and composition made with them over whom they
reign, how far this power may lawfully extend, the articles of
compact between them must show, not the articles only of
compact at the first beginning, which for the most part are
either clean worn out of knowledge, or else known unto very
few, but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluntary
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? CHAP. II. ]
393
THE PHINCE UNDER THE LAW.
manner condescended unto, whether by express consent,
whereof positive laws are witnesses, or else by silent allowance
famously notified through custom reaching beyond the
memory of man. " 1
It will be observed how careful and how precise is the
statement of the theory of " compact " between the ruler and
the community. It rests ultimately upon the principle that
normally the power of the king is derived from the com-
munity, not necessarily immediately in the case of the indi-
vidual king, but by grant to a particular family; this implies
what Hooker calls "subordination and subjection" of the
king. He does not admit that this implies the power to
revoke the authority granted to the ruler, without his consent,
but it does imply that his powers as such must be limited
from the outset and throughout by the terms of the "com-
pact. " Further, and this is a notable conception, the
"compact " does not mean merely some original or primitive
agreement, but all the laws and customs of the constitution
that has gradually grown up and been accepted. Hooker, in
saying this, is not running counter to the conception of the
contract, as embodied especially in the coronation oaths of
king and people; but he is bringing this into closer relation
to the principles of the supremacy of the law, that law which
is the living expression of the custom and life of the com-
munity. The "compact " is on the king's part the promise
to obey the law, and we therefore once again cite a passage
in which his relation to the law is expressed.
"In which respect, I cannot choose but commend highly
their wisdom by whom the foundations of this common-
wealth have been laid; wherein, though no manner of person
or cause be unsubject to the king's power, yet so is the power
of the king over all and in all limited, that unto all his pro-
ceedings the law itself is a rule. The axioms of our regal
government are these: 'Lex facit regem,' the king's grant of
any favour made contrary to the law is void; 'Eex nihil
potest, nisi quod jure potest. ' Our kings, therefore, when
they take possession of the room they are called unto, have
> Hooker, ' Ecclesiastical Polity,' viii. 2, 9, 10, 11. Cf. p. 370.
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? 394
[past rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
it painted out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities
and rites of their inauguration, to what affairs by the said law
their supreme authority and power reacheth. " 1
We turn again to Althusius; for he states the principles of
a contract between the prince and the community from whom
he draws his authority, very precisely and emphatically.
By the establishment of the supreme magistrate the members
of the kingdom bind themselves to obedience to him, for he
receives from the community the rule (imperium) of the
kingdom, but the people and the supreme magistrate enter
into an agreement with each other with regard to certain
laws and conditions to which they bind themselves by an
oath; and this cannot be recalled or violated either by the
magistrates or the subjects. 2
And again, in terms both general and emphatic, Althusius
declares that no kingdom or commonwealth was ever created
without a contract between the subjects and the prince,
which was to be kept religiously by both, and that if this were
violated, all the authority founded upon it would fall to the
ground. 3
The supreme magistrate has only so much power as was
expressly granted to him by the members of the community,
while that which was not granted remains with the people.
An absolute power, or what is called " plenitudo potestatis,"
cannot be granted to the supreme magistrate, for to grant
this would destroy that justice without which kingdoms are
mere bands of robbers; an absolute power is not directed
1 Id. id. , viii. 2, 13. Cf. p. 357.
>> Althusius, 'Politics,' adx. 6:
"Constitutio magistratus summi est,
qua ills imperium et administrationem
regni, a corpore consociationis univer-
salis delatam suscipienti, regni membra
se ad obsequia obligant. Seu, qua
populus et magistratus summus inter
so mutuo certis legibus et constitu-
tionibus de subjectionis et imperii
forma, ao modo paciscuntur, jura-
mento ultro citroque fide data et
accepta promissave.
Pactum hoc, seu contractum man-
dati . . . cum magistratu summo ini-
tum, utramque partem contrahentium
obligare dubium non est, adeo ut
revocare ilium, vel violare neque
magistratui neque subditis concedatur. "
* Id. id. , xi. \. 15: "Itaque nullum
unquam regnum, nullavo respublioa
instituta fundataque fuit, nisi ultro
citroque habito initoque contractu,
pactisque inter subditos et futurum
eorum principem conventis, et obliga-
tione mutua statuta, quam utrique
religiose conservarent; et qua violata
potestas ilia evanesceret ao tolleretur. "
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? CHAP, n. ]
395
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
to the good of the subjects, but to a private satisfaction.
The right (that is, jus) granted to the magistrate by the
people is less than that of the people, and belongs to another
(i. e. , the people), it is not his own. 1
Althusius does not, however, set out this principle of the
contract merely as a theory. Like the author of the 'Vindiciae,'
he maintains that it could be found in almost all modern
kingdoms, whether elective or hereditary, in France, England,
Sweden, Spain, and the German Empire; and he relates it
to the form of oath taken by the princes on their accession. 2
We venture to think that we have said enough to show
that the conception of a contract between king and people
was not merely archaeological nor unimportant in the six-
teenth century. It was set out with force and clearness by
the most sober and dispassionate writers like Hooker and
Althusius, and it was clearly founded, first, on the relation of
the king to the law, second, on the conception embodied in
the coronation orders, and third, on the continuing influence
of the feudal tradition of the Middle Ages.
(5) The Eight of Eesistance and Deposition. --In discussing
the conception of the sovereignty of the community and of
the contract between ruler and people, we have already
touched upon this, but the subject is of so much importance
that we must deal with it in more detail.
We need hardly repeat the emphatic terms in which William
of Orange in his 4 Apologie' and the other documents we
have cited with regard to the revolt of the Netherlands,
1 Id. id. , xix. 7: "Tantum autem humana societas porfringit. Deindo
juris habet hie summus magi stratus. per absolutam potestatem tollitur
quantum illi a corporibus consociatis, justitia, qua sublata, regna fuerint
sou membris regni, est expresse con- latrocinia. . . . Tertio; talis potestas
cessum; ut quod non datum ipsi absoluta, non respicit utilitatem et
est, id penes populum, seu universam aalutom subditorum. aed voluptotom
privatorum. . . .
est. . . . 13. Deindo apparet ex hoc con.
9. Absoluta potestas, seu plenitudo 1 raetu, jus summo magistratui a populo
potestatis, quam vocant, summo magis- datum, esse minus populi jure et
tratui dari non potest. . . . alienum non ipsius proprium. "
10. Nam qui plenitudine potestatis * Id. id. , xix. 38-42.
utitur, repagula, quibus est obserata
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? 396
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
declare that Philip II. had forfeited his authority, as he had
violated the agreements upon which it rested. 1
The question of the right of resistance and deposition was
raised in Scotland also, not merely as theory but as a practical
question, even earlier; and it was discussed by one of the
best known writers and scholars of that time in Europe, that
is, by George Buchanan. But behind George Buchanan there
was a greater and more powerful figure, that is, John Knox,
who not only defended the right of resistance and deposition
in principle, but did much to carry it out in fact. We must
therefore take account of some of the principles laid down,
especially by Knox in the course of that triumphant revolt
which Buchanan defends. We are not here concerned to
discuss the merits of that conflict, or the character of those
who took part in it, least of all of the Scottish nobles, the most
unscrupulous and politically incompetent representatives of
that class in Europe; but we are greatly concerned with the
formulation and development of the principles of the revolt.
tainement outre tous seigneurs et vas-
saux y a obligation mutuollc, et lo
dire du Senateur a un Consul sera
toujoura loue; si tu ne mo tions pour
Senateur, aussi je ne te tiendrai pour
Consul. . . . Entre aultres droits,
nous avons ce privilege de servir a
nos Dues, ce que les Ephors servoient a
Sparte a leur Rois, e'est de tenir la
roiaute ferme en la main du bon
Prince, et faire venir a la raison celui
qui contrevient a son serment. "
2B
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? 386 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART IV.
the Duchess Mary. 1 We are not hero concerned with the
historical validity of these contentions, but with the nature
of the conception which they represented. It is obvious that
while there is no direct reference to a contract, it was implied
that the prince who violated the laws was liable to be suspended
or deposed; that is, that there was an implicit contract.
It is significant that in the Articles of Agreement which
were laid before the Duke of Anjou in the year 1581 by the
envoys of the Estates sent to offer him the government, it is
clearly stated that, if the Duke or his successors were at any
time to violate the terms of the Agreement, the estates would
be ipso facto released from their fidelity and would be at
liberty to appoint another prince or to make such other
arrangements as they might think suitable. 2
1 Philip Marnix de Ste. Aldegonde
OEuvres, vol. vii. , 'Oraison des
Ambassadeurs du Serenissime Prince
Matthias Archiduo d'Autriche'(p. 134):
"En tant que par les privileges de
Brabant est expressement pourvue et
dicte, que si, je ne di point le lieu-
tenant du prince, mais aussi le prince
mesme, viole les loix et droictes du
pays, il est en ce cas loisible, non seule-
ment aux Estate en general, mais
aussi particulierement, a` ceux aux-
quels appartiendra, de quelques con-
ditions qu'ils soyent, de refuser au
roi tout homage et obeissance, si
longuement et jusque a` tant qu'il ait
cogner et amende? sa faute, et qu'il
ait en tout satisfait a` ce qui est pre-
script et limite? par les loix et ordon-
nances.
Au reste, si quelqu'un, estant
au nom du prince establi au gouverne-
ment du pays, alloit a` l'encontre
desdictes privileges, il est par le mesme
faict declare? estre decheu de son gou-
vernement et dignite? , et doibt estre de
tous tenu pour depose? , de maniere
qu'aucun ne se peut-joindre a` luy,
comme a celuy qui de faict et sans
aucune forme de droict ou solemnite?
de loix, doibt etre juge? non idoine a`
exercer aucun office en la Republique,
mais aussi tenu pour inhabile a` faire
testament et infame. "
(They give as an example the deposi-
tion by the Estates of John, Duke of
Brabant, grand-nephew of Philip le
Hardi, Duke of Burgundy, and the
appointment of his brother Philip,
until John should amend; and they
say that John recognised by letters
under his seal that this action was
legitimate. )
"Laquelle loy estant particulie`re au
pays de Brabant au temps de la serenis-
sime Marie, espouse de Maximilian. . . .
Empereur Auguste . . . fut, partraicte?
et couvenant public, faicte commun et
universel par tout le pais bas, ainsi
qu'il se trouve par ecrit e`s annales
publiques.
Semblable manie`re de faire a este?
jadis practique? e, par les Hollandais et
Zelandais et souvent usurpe? e en
? ? Flandres, comme la fidelite? des his-
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? CHAP. II. ]
387
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
We think that it is with the impression of such a survival
in the sixteenth century of the contractual conceptions of the
feudal state in our minds that we shall best understand the
treatment of the contract between ruler and people in other
writers of the century.
George Buchanan asserts the conception of a contract in
precise and dogmatic terms, in a discussion of the right to
depose a king who becomes a tyrant. Maitland urged that
subjects are bound by their oath of obedience to obey the
king. Buchanan admits this, but replies that kings also
promise to administer the law " ex aequo et bono," and that
there is therefore a mutual contract between the king and the
citizens. A contract is void if one of the parties violates its
provisions, and therefore if the king breaks the bond which
united him to the people, he loses whatever rights he had by
the contract, and the people is free as it was before the
agreement. 1
The Huguenot pamphlets assert the principles of the
contract with equal emphasis. The 'Droit des Magistrats'
contends that so far from its being true that the people had
wholly surrendered their liberty to the king, it is rather true
that they only accepted him on certain conditions, and thus
it follows that, if these conditions were violated, those who
had power to give this authority had the right also to with-
draw it. And again, it was on certain promises and conditions
that a king was accepted by his people, conditions founded
on equity and natural reason, that he should conduct the
government according to the laws, of which he is or ought to
be the supreme protector. 2 It is again worth observing that
prendre un autre prince, ou autrement
pourvoir aux affaires, comme ils
trouveront oonvonir. "
1 George Buchanan, 'De Jure
Regni ' (p. 38): "B. Obstricti sumus;
sed ill) (the kings) contra, priores pro-
mittunt se ex aequo et bono jus
dicturos. . . . Mutua igitur regi cum
civibus est pactio. . . . Qui prius a
conventis recedit, contraque quam
pectus est facit, nam is pacta et con-
vent* solvit! . . . Soluto igitur
vinculo, quod regem cum populo con-
tinebat, quicquid juris ex pactiono
ad eum qui pacta solvit, pcrtinebat,
id, reor, amittitur. . . . Is etiam, cum
quo erat conventum, aequo fit, atque
ante stipulationem erat, liber. "
* 'Droit des Magistrats' (p. 753):
"Je nie qu'il puisso apparoir d'une
telle quittance (the contention that the
people had wholly surrendered their
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? 388
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
the 'Droit des Magistrats,' in a passage to which we have
already referred, in which it speaks of kingdoms and empires
as fiefs of the "Souverainete? ," refers to the feudal law as
declaring that the lord loses his fief if he commits "felonie"
against his vassals, and applies this to the case of an emperor
or king in his relations to his subjects. 1
The 'Archon et Politie' speaks of the reciprocal pacts
and conventions between the prince and the people which
may not be violated by either party. 2 The 'Vindiciae Contra
Tyrannos ' sets out the principle of a "foedus" between king
and people. It was the people who made the king, and the
people imposed a condition which the king promised to ob-
serve. The condition was that the king should reign justly
and according to the laws, and when he had promised to do
this the people promised that they would faithfully obey him,
but, if the king did not fulfil his promise, they would be free
from all obligation to him. There are indeed two contracts,
one between God and the king and people, the other between
the king and the people. God is the avenger if the king does
liberty), et dis au contraire, que les
nations, tant que le droit et equite? a
eu lieu, n'ont cree? ni accepte? leur
Roys qu'a` certaines conditions, les-
quelles estans manifestement violees
par eux, ils s'ensuit que ceux qui ont
en puissance de leur bailler telle auto-
rite n'ont en moin de puissance de les
en priver. "
Id. (p. 769) (After citing the terms
of the Treaty of Arras between Charles
VII. and the Duko of Burgundy, that
if Charles violated the Treaty his
vassals and subjects would be absolved
from their oath of allegiance to him):
"Devons-nous en moins estimer
d'une promesse et condition sous
laquelle un Roy aura este? accepte? par
son peuple, et qui eet mesme fondee
sur equite? et raison naturelle, assavoir
do reigler son administration selon
les loiz, desquels il est ou doit estre
le souverain protecteur. "
>> Id. (p. 778): "Outre tout cela,
puisque les royaumes et empires
mesmes sont fiefs, devons hommages
et services a` la souverainete? , venons
a` considerer ce quo porte les droits des
fiefs. Il est dit au livre II. Tit. xxvi.
Par. 24, et Tit. 47, que le seigneur
commet felonnie contre son vassal
comme le vassal contre son seigneur.
. . . Je di donc au cas ou` nous sommes,
qu'un Roi ou mesme un Empereur,
rele? vant de la souverainte? commettant
felonie contre ses vassaux, a savoir sos
sujets (ce que jamais ne puisse advenir)
perd son fief, non pour estre adjuge?
aux vassaux, mais pour y est re pourvou
par ceux qui repre? sentent la souve-
rainete? . "
* 'Archon et Politie' (p. 114):
"Politie. Mais il y a loi entre les deux
parties qui ordonne actions et con-
venances reciproques, qui ne se peuvent,
ni par le Prince, ni par les sujets, sans
? ? justice violer. "
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? chap. n. J
389
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
not keep the first pact, while the whole people and those persons
who are responsible for the protection of the people have the
same authority if the king does not fulfil his contract with
them. 1 It is, however, perhaps more important that the
author of the 'Vindiciae ' maintains that a contract of this
kind was a part of the constitution of almost all contemporary
states (imperia) which were worthy to be called states; and
he illustrates this from the Empire and other elective
monarchies, and then from hereditary monarchies like France,
England, and Spain, and smaller states like Brabant. He
finds the essential expression of this in the coronation cere-
monies and especially in the coronation oaths, and concludes
that no one can deny that there is a mutual and binding
contract between kings and their subjects. 2
The author of the ' Vindiciae' sums up the whole matter by
declaring emphatically that the king who violates the contract
is perjured and unworthy of his office, and that the people
who refuse obedience to him have violated no obligation, and
he appeals to the principle of the feudal law that the vassal
is free from the service if the lord has committed "felonie"
against him. And finally he says that even if there were no
ceremonies of coronation, if the king had taken no oaths,
nature itself would teach men that kings were created by the
people that they should rule justly, and that if they do not
1 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' Q.
III. (p. 159): "Diximus in con-
stituency rege duplex foedus initum
fuisse; primum inter Dcum et regem
et populum, de qua super: secundum
inter regem et populum do quo nobis
jam agendum est. . . . (P. 160): In
eo pacto agebatur de creando Rege.
Populus enim regem faciebat, non
Rex populum. Itaque non dubium
est quin populus stipularetur, Rex
promitteret Stipulabatur
ille a rege, an non juste et secundum
leges regnaturus esset 1 Hie facturum
spondebat. Populus demum se juste
imperanti fideliter obsequuturum re-
spondebat. Itaque promittebat rex
pure, populus sub conditione; quae si
non impleretur, populus ipso jure
omni obligatione solutus censeretur.
In primo foedere seu pacto p>etas in
obligationem venit; in socundo justitia ,
illo promittit rex, se pie obediturum
Deo: hoc so juste imperaturum
populo; illo, se gloriam Dei; hoe*
utilitatom populi curat urum; in
illo inest conditio, si legem meam
observaris; in hoc, si jus unicuique
suum tribueris. Illius, ni impleatur
Deus proprie v index est; hujus legi-
time universus populus, quive univer-
sum populum tuendum susceperint,
regni proceros. "
* Id. id. (p. 162): "Quod si vero
hodierna imperia spectemus, nullum
sane est, quod eo nomine dignum oon-
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? 390
[pabt rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
do this they are no longer kings and should not be acknow-
ledged by the people. 1
seatur, in quo inter principem et
subditos pactum ejusmodi non inter-
cedat. "
He cites the oath of the Emperor
Charles V. : "Leges latas custodit-
urum; novas, inconsultis electoribus
non laturum; publica publico consilio
curaturum; nil alienaturum oppig-
neraturumvo ex iis, quae ad imperium
pertinent, et caetera. "
Tho Archbishop of Cologne requires
the emperor at his coronation to swear
to defend the Church, to administer
justice, &c, and when tho emperor has
done this, he asks the princes whether
they will take the oath to him. He
refers to Poland, and tho recent corona-
tion of the Duke of Anjou; to Bo-
hemia and to Hungary; and maintains
that the same practice obtained even
in hereditary kingdoms liko France.
(p. 164): "Rex Franciae, quando
inauguraiur, rogant primo Laudunensis
et Bollovacencis, Pares Ecclosiastici.
populum qui adest universum, eum ne
regem esse cupiat, jubeatque? Unde
etiam a populo tunc eligi in ipsa in-
augurationis formula, dicitur. Ubi
populus consensisse videatur, jurat se
leges Franciae privilegiaque ac jura
in universum omnia et tuiturum,
domanium non alienaturum et cetera.
. . . Nec vero prius accingitur gladio,
ungitur, coronatur a paribus . . . aut
Rex proclamatur, quam populus jus-
serit: neque etiam prius ei pares
jurant, quam ipsis fidem dederit, se
leges accurate custoditurum. Eae vero
sunt, ne patrimonium publicum dila-
pidet, ne vectigalia, portoria, tributa
suopte arbitrio imponat, iudicatve, ne
bellum decernat, pacemve faciat:
denique ne quid in publicum, nisi
publico consilio statuat. Item sua
senatui, sua Comitiis, sua regni offi-
ciariis constet auctoritas; et cotera,
quae perpetuo in regno Franoico
obeervata fuere.
"
When the king enters any province
for the first time, he confirms and swears
to observe its privileges--e. g. , Toulouse,
Dauphine? , Brittany, Provence.
The conditions in England, Scotland,
Sweden, and Denmark were much the
same as in France, while in Spain they
wero even more definite, and he cites
the tradition that in Aragon the
"Proceres " addressed the king at his
coronation as follows :--
(p. 166) "Nos qui tantum valemus
quantum vos, et plus possumus
quam vos, regem vos eligimus cum
his et his conditionibus. Inter vos et
nos unus imperat magis quam vos"
? ? (referring, no doubt, to the Justiza).
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? CHAP. II. ]
391
THE PRINOE UNDER THE LAW.
We find a . writer of the Catholic League like Boucher setting
out the same conception of the contractual relation between
the prince and the people; and again with relation to the
tradition of the feudal law as to the mutual obligations of
lord and vassal, and the doctrine of the feudal law books that
the lord would lose his rights for the same offences as those for
which the vassal would lose his fief. 1 And, in justification of
the deposition of Henry III. , Boucher contended that the
royal authority depended upon the mutual contract between
king and people, in such a sense that, if the king were to vio-
late it, he could not be recognised as king. 2
It may again be urged that the works which we have just
cited were the outcome of violent and revolutionary move-
ments and it is therefore very important to observe that
Eichard Hooker, in a passage of which we have already
quoted part, affirms the same principle of the "compact"
between the ruler and the community.
"The case thus standing," he says, "albeit we judge it a
thing most true that kings, even inheritors, do hold the right
conditionem, quae implore debuit et
potuit, negligenti, legemque, in quam
juravit, violanti, obsequium denoget?
Quis vero contra, eum regem foedi-
tragum, perjurum, eo beneficio prorsus
indignum non censeat.
(p. 169): Etenim, si vassallum
clientelae Darn lex liberat, in quem
senior feloniam commisit, etsi sane
senior fidem proprie non dat vassallo,
sed vassallus ipse. . . . An non multo
magis solutus erit populus ea fide, quam
regi praestitit, si rex, qui primus ipsi
tamquamdomino procurator, solemniter
juravit, fidem fregerit.
An non vero etiam si non isti ritus,
non ea sacra, non ea sacrament a inter-
venirent; satis tamen ipsa natura
docet, reges ea conditione a populo
constitui, ut bene imperent? Judices
ut jus dicant? Duces belli, ut exercitus
adversus hoe tee educant? Quodsi
vere saeviunt, injuriam inferunt, hostes
ipsi fiunt; ut reges non sunt ita neo
agnosci a populo debere. "
1 J. Boucher, 'De justa abdicatione
Henrici HI,' i. 19.
>> Id. id. , iii. 8: "Adde quod cum
Rege publica fides necessario con-
junota est, ut ne Rex quidem sine ea
esse posset. Pendet enim id ex mutuo
contractu illo, quo Rex populo fidem
suam, huic vicissem suam populus
obligavit. Mutuumque adeo promis-
sum est, ut dum populus summum ei
imperium defert, et ut in publicum
commodum vertat obtestatur, id,
vicissim princeps facturum se recipiat,
ac iuramento fir met, tanto existima-
tionis studio, ut fidei nomine ac laude,
nihil antiquius reges habere perpetuo
velint. . . . Ex quo fit, ut qui fidem
illam semel abjiceret, ei reliquum
nihil sit, quo regis nomine tueri iure
posset, ut ob id, titulo isto merit o sit
? ? privandus. "
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? 392
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
to the power of dominion, with dependency upon the whole
entire body politic over which they rule as kings, yet so it
may not be understood, as if such dependency did grow, for
that every supreme governor doth personally take from them
his power by way of gift, bestowed upon him at his entrance
into his said place of sovereign government. But the cause of
this dependency is in that first original conveyance, when
power was devised by the whole unto the one; to pass from
him unto them, whom out of him nature by lawful birth
should produce, and no natural or legal inability make
uncapable. Neither can any man with reason think but that
the first institution of kings is a sufficient consideration
wherefore this power should always depend on that from
which they flow. Original influence of power from the body
into the king is the cause of the king's dependency in power
upon the body.
By dependency we mean subordination and subjection.
. . . May then a body politic at all times withdraw in whole
or in part that influence of dominion which passeth from it,
if inconvenience doth grow thereby? It must be presumed
that supreme governors will not in such case oppose them-
selves and be stiff in detaining that, the use whereof is with
public detriment: but surely without their consent I see not
how this body should be able by any just means to help
itself, saving when dominion doth escheat. Such things must,
therefore, be thought upon beforehand, that power must be
limited ere it be granted, which is the next thing we are to
consider. In power of dominion all kings have not an equal
latitude. Kings by conquest make their own charter. . . .
Kings by God's own special appointment have also that
largeness of power, which he doth assign or permit with
approbation. Touching kings which were first instituted by
agreement and composition made with them over whom they
reign, how far this power may lawfully extend, the articles of
compact between them must show, not the articles only of
compact at the first beginning, which for the most part are
either clean worn out of knowledge, or else known unto very
few, but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluntary
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? CHAP. II. ]
393
THE PHINCE UNDER THE LAW.
manner condescended unto, whether by express consent,
whereof positive laws are witnesses, or else by silent allowance
famously notified through custom reaching beyond the
memory of man. " 1
It will be observed how careful and how precise is the
statement of the theory of " compact " between the ruler and
the community. It rests ultimately upon the principle that
normally the power of the king is derived from the com-
munity, not necessarily immediately in the case of the indi-
vidual king, but by grant to a particular family; this implies
what Hooker calls "subordination and subjection" of the
king. He does not admit that this implies the power to
revoke the authority granted to the ruler, without his consent,
but it does imply that his powers as such must be limited
from the outset and throughout by the terms of the "com-
pact. " Further, and this is a notable conception, the
"compact " does not mean merely some original or primitive
agreement, but all the laws and customs of the constitution
that has gradually grown up and been accepted. Hooker, in
saying this, is not running counter to the conception of the
contract, as embodied especially in the coronation oaths of
king and people; but he is bringing this into closer relation
to the principles of the supremacy of the law, that law which
is the living expression of the custom and life of the com-
munity. The "compact " is on the king's part the promise
to obey the law, and we therefore once again cite a passage
in which his relation to the law is expressed.
"In which respect, I cannot choose but commend highly
their wisdom by whom the foundations of this common-
wealth have been laid; wherein, though no manner of person
or cause be unsubject to the king's power, yet so is the power
of the king over all and in all limited, that unto all his pro-
ceedings the law itself is a rule. The axioms of our regal
government are these: 'Lex facit regem,' the king's grant of
any favour made contrary to the law is void; 'Eex nihil
potest, nisi quod jure potest. ' Our kings, therefore, when
they take possession of the room they are called unto, have
> Hooker, ' Ecclesiastical Polity,' viii. 2, 9, 10, 11. Cf. p. 370.
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? 394
[past rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
it painted out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities
and rites of their inauguration, to what affairs by the said law
their supreme authority and power reacheth. " 1
We turn again to Althusius; for he states the principles of
a contract between the prince and the community from whom
he draws his authority, very precisely and emphatically.
By the establishment of the supreme magistrate the members
of the kingdom bind themselves to obedience to him, for he
receives from the community the rule (imperium) of the
kingdom, but the people and the supreme magistrate enter
into an agreement with each other with regard to certain
laws and conditions to which they bind themselves by an
oath; and this cannot be recalled or violated either by the
magistrates or the subjects. 2
And again, in terms both general and emphatic, Althusius
declares that no kingdom or commonwealth was ever created
without a contract between the subjects and the prince,
which was to be kept religiously by both, and that if this were
violated, all the authority founded upon it would fall to the
ground. 3
The supreme magistrate has only so much power as was
expressly granted to him by the members of the community,
while that which was not granted remains with the people.
An absolute power, or what is called " plenitudo potestatis,"
cannot be granted to the supreme magistrate, for to grant
this would destroy that justice without which kingdoms are
mere bands of robbers; an absolute power is not directed
1 Id. id. , viii. 2, 13. Cf. p. 357.
>> Althusius, 'Politics,' adx. 6:
"Constitutio magistratus summi est,
qua ills imperium et administrationem
regni, a corpore consociationis univer-
salis delatam suscipienti, regni membra
se ad obsequia obligant. Seu, qua
populus et magistratus summus inter
so mutuo certis legibus et constitu-
tionibus de subjectionis et imperii
forma, ao modo paciscuntur, jura-
mento ultro citroque fide data et
accepta promissave.
Pactum hoc, seu contractum man-
dati . . . cum magistratu summo ini-
tum, utramque partem contrahentium
obligare dubium non est, adeo ut
revocare ilium, vel violare neque
magistratui neque subditis concedatur. "
* Id. id. , xi. \. 15: "Itaque nullum
unquam regnum, nullavo respublioa
instituta fundataque fuit, nisi ultro
citroque habito initoque contractu,
pactisque inter subditos et futurum
eorum principem conventis, et obliga-
tione mutua statuta, quam utrique
religiose conservarent; et qua violata
potestas ilia evanesceret ao tolleretur. "
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? CHAP, n. ]
395
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
to the good of the subjects, but to a private satisfaction.
The right (that is, jus) granted to the magistrate by the
people is less than that of the people, and belongs to another
(i. e. , the people), it is not his own. 1
Althusius does not, however, set out this principle of the
contract merely as a theory. Like the author of the 'Vindiciae,'
he maintains that it could be found in almost all modern
kingdoms, whether elective or hereditary, in France, England,
Sweden, Spain, and the German Empire; and he relates it
to the form of oath taken by the princes on their accession. 2
We venture to think that we have said enough to show
that the conception of a contract between king and people
was not merely archaeological nor unimportant in the six-
teenth century. It was set out with force and clearness by
the most sober and dispassionate writers like Hooker and
Althusius, and it was clearly founded, first, on the relation of
the king to the law, second, on the conception embodied in
the coronation orders, and third, on the continuing influence
of the feudal tradition of the Middle Ages.
(5) The Eight of Eesistance and Deposition. --In discussing
the conception of the sovereignty of the community and of
the contract between ruler and people, we have already
touched upon this, but the subject is of so much importance
that we must deal with it in more detail.
We need hardly repeat the emphatic terms in which William
of Orange in his 4 Apologie' and the other documents we
have cited with regard to the revolt of the Netherlands,
1 Id. id. , xix. 7: "Tantum autem humana societas porfringit. Deindo
juris habet hie summus magi stratus. per absolutam potestatem tollitur
quantum illi a corporibus consociatis, justitia, qua sublata, regna fuerint
sou membris regni, est expresse con- latrocinia. . . . Tertio; talis potestas
cessum; ut quod non datum ipsi absoluta, non respicit utilitatem et
est, id penes populum, seu universam aalutom subditorum. aed voluptotom
privatorum. . . .
est. . . . 13. Deindo apparet ex hoc con.
9. Absoluta potestas, seu plenitudo 1 raetu, jus summo magistratui a populo
potestatis, quam vocant, summo magis- datum, esse minus populi jure et
tratui dari non potest. . . . alienum non ipsius proprium. "
10. Nam qui plenitudine potestatis * Id. id. , xix. 38-42.
utitur, repagula, quibus est obserata
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? 396
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
declare that Philip II. had forfeited his authority, as he had
violated the agreements upon which it rested. 1
The question of the right of resistance and deposition was
raised in Scotland also, not merely as theory but as a practical
question, even earlier; and it was discussed by one of the
best known writers and scholars of that time in Europe, that
is, by George Buchanan. But behind George Buchanan there
was a greater and more powerful figure, that is, John Knox,
who not only defended the right of resistance and deposition
in principle, but did much to carry it out in fact. We must
therefore take account of some of the principles laid down,
especially by Knox in the course of that triumphant revolt
which Buchanan defends. We are not here concerned to
discuss the merits of that conflict, or the character of those
who took part in it, least of all of the Scottish nobles, the most
unscrupulous and politically incompetent representatives of
that class in Europe; but we are greatly concerned with the
formulation and development of the principles of the revolt.
