No More Learning

THE

Metaphysical Meditations

OF

_Renatus Des-Cartes_, &c.




MEDITAT. I.

_Of Things Doubtful. _


Some years past I perceived how many _Falsities_ I admitted as _Truths_
in my Younger years, and how _Dubious_ those things were which I raised
from thence; and therefore I thought it requisite (if I had a designe
to establish any thing that should prove _firme_ and _permanent_ in
sciences) that once in my life I should clearly cast aside all my former
opinions, and begin a new from some _First principles_. But this seemed a
great Task, and I still expected that maturity of years, then which none
could be more apt to receive Learning; upon which Account I waited so
long, that at last I should deservedly be blamed had I spent that time in
_Deliberation_ which remain’d only for _Action_.

This day therefore I conveniently released my mind from all cares, I
procured to my self a Time Quiet, and free from all Business, I retired
my self Alone; and now at length will I freely and seriously apply my
self to the General overthrow of all my former Opinions.

To the Accomplishment of Which, it will not be necessary for me to prove
them all _false_ (for that perhaps I shall never atcheive) But because my
reason perswades me, that I must withdraw my assent no less from those
opinions which seem _not so very certain_ and _undoubted_, then I should
from those that are _Apparently false_, it will be sufficient if I reject
all those wherein I find any _Occasion_ of doubt.

Neither to effect this is it necessary, that they all should be run
over particularly (which would be an endles trouble) but because the
_Foundation_ being once undermin’d, whatever is built thereon will of
its own accord come to the ground, I shall therefore immediately assault
the very _principle_, on which whatever I have believed was _grounded_.
Viz.

_Whatever I have hitherto admitted as most true, that I received either
from, or by my Senses; but these I have often found to deceive me, and
’tis prudence never certainly to trust those that I have (tho but once)
deceived us. _

1 _Doubt. _ But tho sometimes the _senses_ deceive us being exercised
about _remote_ or _small_ objects, yet there are many other things of
which we cannot doubt tho we know them only by the senses? as that at
present I am in this place, that I am sitting by a fire, that I have a
Winter gown on me, that I feel this Paper with my hands; But how can it
be denied that these hands or this body is mine? Unless I should compare
my self to those mad men, whose brains are disturbed by such a disorderly
melancholick vapour, that makes them continually profess themselves to
be Kings, tho they are very poor, or fancy themselves cloathed in Purple
Robes, tho they are naked, or that their heads are made of Clay as a
bottle, or of glass, _&c. _ But these are mad men, and I should be as mad
as they in following their example by fancying these things as they do.

1 _Solution. _ This truly would seem very clear to those that never
_sleep_, and suffer the same things (and sometimes more unlikely) in
their repose, then these mad men do whilst they are awake; for how often
am I perswaded in a Dream of these usual occurrences, that I am in this
place, that I have a Gown on me, that I am sitting by a fire, _&c. _ Tho
all the while I am lying naked between the Sheets.

But now I am certain that I am awake and look upon this Paper, neither
is this head which I shake asleep, I knowingly and willingly stretch out
this hand, and am sensible that things so distinct could not happen to
one that sleeps. As if I could not remember my self to have been deceived
formerly in my sleep by the like thoughts; which while I consider more
attentively I am so far convinced of the difficulty of distinguishing
sleep from waking that I am amazed, and this very amazement almost
perswades me that I am asleep.

2 _Doubt. _ Wherefore let us suppose our selves _asleep_, and that these
things are not _true_, viz. that we open our eyes, move our heads,
stretch our hands, and perhaps that we have no such things as hands or a
body. Yet we must confess, that what we see in a Dream is (as it were)
_a painted Picture_, which cannot be devised but after the _likeness_ of
some _real_ thing; and that therefore these Generals at least, _viz. _
eyes, head, hands, and the whole body are things _really existent_ and
not _imaginary_; For Painters themselves, (even then when they design
Mermaids and Satyrs in the most unusual shapes) do not give them natures
altogether new, but only add the divers Parts of different Animals
together; And if by chance they invent any thing so new that nothing
was ever seen like it, for that ’tis wholy fictitious and false, yet
the colours at least of which, they make it must be _true Colours_; so
upon the same account, tho these General things as eyes, head, hands,
_&c. _ may be imaginary; yet nevertheless we must of necessity confess
the more _simple_ and _universal_ things to be _True_, of which (as of
true Colours) these _Images_ of things (whether _true_ or _false_) which
are in our minds are made; such as are the nature of a body in General,
and its Extension, also the shape of things extended, with the quantity
or bigness of them; their number also, and place wherein they are, the
time in which they continue, and the like, and therefore from hence we
make no bad conclusion, that _Physick_, both _Natural_, and _Medicinal_,
_Astronomy_, and all other _sciences_, which depend on the consideration
of _compound things_, are _Doubtful_. But that _Arithmetick_, _Geometry_,
and the like (which treat only of the most _simple_, and _General_ things
not regarding whether they really are or not) have in them something
_certain_ and _undoubted_; for whether I sleep or wake, _two_ and _three_
added make five; a _square_ has no more sides than _four_ _&c. _ neither
seems it possible what such _plain truths_ can be _doubted_ off.

2 _Solution. _ But all this While there is rooted in my mind a certain old
opinion of the _being_ of an _Omnipotent God_, by whom I am _created_ in
the state I am in; and how know I but he caused that there should be no
Earth, no Heaven, no Body, no Figure, no Magnitude, no Place, and yet
that all these things should seem to me to be as now they are? And as I
very often judge others to Erre about those things which they think they
_Throughly understand_, so why may not I be _deceived_, whenever I add
_two_ and _three_, or count the sides of a Square, or whatever other easy
Matter can be thought of?

3. _Doubt_. But perhaps _God wills not_ that I should be _deceived_, for
he is said to be _Infinitely Good_.

3. _Solution. _ Yet if it were _Repugnant_ to his _Goodness_ to create
me so that I should be _always deceived_, it seems also _unagreeable_
to his _Goodness_ to permit me to be deceived _at any time_; Which
last no one will affirme: Some there are truely who had rather deny
_Gods Omnipotence_, then beleive all things _uncertain_; but there at
present we may not contradict. And we will suppose all this of _God_ to
be _false_; yet whether they will suppose me to become what _I_ am by
Fate, by _Chance_, by a _continued chain_ of _causes_, or any other way,
because to _erre_ is an _Imperfection_, by how much the less _power_ they
will Assigne to the _Author_ of my _Being_, so much the more Probable it
will be, that I am so _Imperfect_ as to be _alwayes deceived_.

To which Arguments I know not what to answer but am forced to confess,
that there is nothing of all those things which I formerly received as
_Truths_, whereof at present I may not _doubt_; and this doubt shall not
be grounded on inadvertency or Levity, but upon strong and Premeditated
reasons; and therefore I must hereafter (if I designe to discover
any truths) withdraw my assent from them no less then from _apparent
falshoods_.

But ’tis not sufficient to think only _Transiently_ on these things, but
I must take care to _remember_ them; for dayly my old opinions returne
upon me, and much against my Will almost possesse my Beleife tyed to
them, as it were by a continued _use_ and _Right_ of _Familiarity_;
neither shall I ever cease to _assent_ and _trust_ in them, whilst I
suppose them as in themselves they really are, that is to say, _something
doubtful_ (as now I have proved) yet notwithstanding _highly Probable_,
which it is much more Reasonable to beleive then disbeleive.

Wherefore I conceive I should not do amiss, if (with my mind bent clearly
to the contrary side) I should deceive my self, and suppose them for a
While altogether _false_ and _Imaginary_; till at length the Weights of
prejudice being equal in each scale, no ill custome may any more Draw my
Judgement from the _true Conception_ of things, for I know from hence
will follow no dangerous Error, and I can’t too immoderately pamper my
own Incredulity, seeing What I am about, concernes not _Practice_ but
_Speculation_.

To Which end I will suppose, not an _Infinitely perfect God_, the
_Fountain_ of _truth_, but that some _Evil Spirit_ which is very
_Powerful_ and _crafty_ has used all his endeavours to _deceive_ me; I
will conceive, the Heavens, Air, Earth, Colours, Figures, Sounds, and all
outward things are nothing else but the delusions of Dreams, by which he
has laid snares to catch my easy beleif; I will consider my self as not
having hands, Eyes, Flesh, Blood, or Sences, but that _I_ falsely think
that _I_ have all these; _I_ will continue firmly in this Meditation; and
tho it lyes not in my power to _discover any truth_, yet this is in my
power, not to _assent to Falsities_, and with a strong resolution take
care that the _Mighty deceiver_ (tho never so _powerful_ or _cunning_)
impose not any thing on my beleife.

But this is a laborious intention, and a certain sloth reduces me to
the usual course of life, and like a Prisoner who in his sleep perhaps
enjoy’d an imaginary liberty, and when he begins to suppose that he
is asleep is afraid to waken, but is willing to be deceived by the
_Pleasant delusion_; so I willingly fall into my opinions, and am afraid
to be Roused, least a toilsome waking succeeding a pleasant rest I may
hereafter live not in the _light_, but in the confused _darkness_ of the
_doubts_ now raised.




MEDITAT. II.

_~Of the nature of Mans mind~, and that ’tis easier proved to ~be~ then
our ~body~. _


By yesterdays Meditation I am cast into so great _Doubts_, that I shall
never forget them, and yet I know not how to answer them, but being
plunged on a suddain into a deep Gulf, I am so amazed that I can neither
touch the bottome, nor swim at the top.

Nevertheless, I will endeavour once more, and try the way I set on
yesterday, by removing from me whatever is in the _least doubtful_, as if
I had certainly discover’d it to be _altogether false_, and will proceed
till I find out some _certainty_, or if nothing else, yet at least this
_certainty, That there is nothing sure_.

_Archimedes_ required but a _point_ which was _firm_, and _immoveable_
that he might move the _whole Earth_, so in the perfect undertaking Great
things may be expected, if I can discover but the _least thing_ that is
_true_ and _indisputable_.

Wherefore I suppose all things I see are _false_, and believe that
nothing of those things are really existent, which my deceitful memory
represents to me; ’tis evident I have no senses, that a Body, Figure,
Extension, Motion, Place, _&c. _ are meer Fictions; what thing therefore
is there that is _true_? perhaps only _this, That there is nothing
certain. _

[Sidenote: _Doubts and Solutions. _]

But how know I that there is nothing _distinct_ from all these things
(which I have now reckon’d) of which I have no reason to _doubt_? Is
there no _God_ (or whatever other name I may call him) who has put these
thoughts into me? Yet why should I think this? When I my self perhaps
am the _Author_ of them. Upon which Account, therefore must not I be
something? ’tis but just now that I denied that I had any _senses_, or
any _Body_. Hold a while—Am I so tied to a _Body_ and _senses_ that I
cannot _exist_ without them? But I have perswaded my self that there is
nothing in the World, no Heaven, no Earth, no Souls, no Bodies; and then
why not, that I _my self am not_? Yet surely if _I_ could perswade my
self any thing, _I was_.

But there is _I_ know not what sort of _Deceivour_ very _powerful_
and very _crafty_, who always strives to _deceive_ Me; without Doubt
therefore _I am_, if he can _decieve me_; And let him _Deceive_ me as
much as he can, yet he can never make me _not to Be_, whilst _I think
that I am_. Wherefore _I_ may lay this down as a _Principle, that
whenever this sentence I am, I exist, is spoken or thought of by Me, ’tis
necessarily True_.

But _I_ do not yet fully understand _who I am_ that now necessarily
_exist_, and _I_ must hereafter take care, least _I_ foolishly _mistake_
some other thing _for my self_, and by that means be _deceived_ in that
thought, which _I_ defend as the most _certain_ and _evident_ of all.

Wherefore _I_ will again Recollect, what _I_ believed _my self to be_
heretofore, before _I_ had set upon these Meditations, from which _Notion
I_ will withdraw whatever may be _Disproved_ by the _Foremention’d
Reasons_, that in the End, _That_ only may Remain which is _True_ and
_indisputable_.

What therefore have I heretofore thought my self? _A Man. _ But what is a
man? Shall I answer, a _Rational Animal_? By no means; because afterwards
it may be asked, what an _Animal_ is? and what _Rational_ is? And so from
one _question_ I may fall into greater _Difficulties_; neither at present
have I so much time as to spend it about such Niceties.

But I shall rather here Consider, what heretofore represented it self
to my thoughts _freely_, and _naturally_, whenever I set my self to
understand _What I my self was_.

And the first thing I find Representing it self is, that I have _Face_,
_Hands_, _Arms_, and this whole _frame_ of _parts_ which is seen in my
_Body_, and which I call my _Body_.

The next thing represented to me was, that I was _nourish’d_, could
_walk_, had _senses_, and could _Think_; which functions I attributed to
my _Soul_. Yet what this _soul_ of mine was, I did not fully conceive; or
else supposed it a small thing like _wind_, or _fire_, or _aire_, infused
through my _stronger parts_.

As to my _Body_ truly _I_ doubted not, but that _I_ rightly understood
its _Nature_, which (if _I_ should endeavour to describe as _I_ conceive
it) _I_ should thus Explain, _viz. _ By a _Body_ _I_ mean whatever is
_capable_ of _Shape_, or can be _contained_ in a _place_, and so fill’s
a space that it excludes all other _Bodys_ out of the same, that which
may be _touch’d_, _seen_, _heard_, _tasted_, or _smelt_, and that which
is _capable_ of _various_ _Motions_ and _Modifications_, not from it
_self_, but from any _other thing moving_ it, for _I_ judged it _against_
(or rather _above_) the _nature_ of a _Body_ to _move it self_, or
_perceive_, or _think_, But rather admired that _I_ should find these
_Operations_ in certain _Bodys_.

But How now (since _I_ suppose a certain _powerful_ and (if it be lawful
to call him so) _evil deluder_, who useth all his endeavours to deceive
me in all things) can _I_ affirme that I have any of those things,
which I have now said belong to the _nature_ of a _Body_? Hold— Let me
Consider—, Let me think—, Let me reflect— I can find no Answer, and I am
weary with repeating the same things over-again in vain.

But Which of these _Faculties_ did I attribute to my _Soul_, my
_Nutritive_, or _Motive faculty_? yet now seeing I have no _Body_, these
also are _meer delusions_. Was it my _sensitive faculty_? But this also
cannot be perform’d without a _Body_, and I have seem’d to _perceive_
many things in my _sleep_, of which I afterwards understood my self _not_
to be _sensible_. Was it my _Cogitative Faculty_? Here I have discovered
it, ’tis my _Thought_, this alone cannot be separated from Me, I _am_,
I _exist_,⸺_tis true_, but for what time _Am I_? Why _I am_ as long as
_I think_; For it May be that When I cease from _thinking_, I may cease
from being. Now I admit of nothing but what is necessarily true: In
short therefore I _am_ only a _thinking thing_ that is to say, a _mind_,
or a _soul_, or _understanding_, or _Reason_, words which formerly _I_
understood not; I am a _Real thing_, and _Really Existent_, But what sort
of thing? I have just now said it, _A thinking thing_.

[Sidenote: * _Places noted with their Asterisk are refer’d to in the
following Objections. _]

But am I nothing besides? I will consider⸺I am not that _structure_ of
_parts_, which is called a Mans _Body_, neither am I any sort of _thin
Air_ infused into those Parts, nor a _Wind_, nor _Fire_, nor _Vapour_,
nor _Breath_, nor whatever I my self can feign, for all these things I
have supposed _not to Be_. Yet my Position stands firm; _Nevertheless I
am something. _ Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which
I suppose not to exist (because to me _unknown_) are in reallity nothing
_different_ from that very _Self_, which I _know_. I cannot tell, I
dispute it not now, I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I
have some knowledge. I am sure that I exist, I ask who I am whom I thus
know, certainly, the knowledge, of _Me_ (precisely taken) depends not on
those things, whose existence I am yet ignorant of; and therefore not on
any other things that I can _feign_ by my _imagination_.

And this very Word (_feign_) puts me in mind of my _error_, for I
should _feign_ in deed, if I should _imagine_ my self any thing; for to
_imagine_ is nothing else but to think upon the _shape_ or _image_ of
a _corporeal_ thing; but now I certainly know that I _am_, and I know
also that ’tis possible that all these _images_, and generally whatever
belongs to the _Nature_ of a _Body_ are nothing but _deluding Dreams_.
Which things Consider’d I should be no less Foolish in saying, _I will
imagine that I may more throughly understand what I am_, then if I should
say, _at Present I am awake and perceive something true, but because it
appears not evidently enough, I shall endeavour to sleep, that in a Dream
I may perceive it more evidently and truely_.

Wherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by my _imagination_,
can belong to the _Notion_ I have of _my self_, and that I must carefully
withdraw my mind from those things that it may more _distinctly_ perceive
its _own Nature_.

Let me ask therefore _What I am, A Thinking Thing_, but What is That?
That is a thing, _doubting_, _understanding_, _affirming_, _denying_,
_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. These truely are
not a few _Properties_, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not
belong to me? For am not I the very same who at present _doubt_ almost of
All things; yet _understand_ something, which thing onely I _affirm_ to
be true, I _deny_ all other things, I am _willing_ to know more, I _would
not_ be deceived, I _imagine_ many things _unwillingly_, and _consider_
many things as coming to me by my _senses_. Which of all these faculties
is it, which is not as _true_ as that I _Exist_, tho I should _sleep_, or
my _Creatour_ should as much as in him lay, strive to _deceive_ Me? which
of them is it that is _distinct_ from my _thought_? which of them is it
that can be _seperated_ from _me_? For that I am the same that _doubt_,
_understand_, and _will_ is so _evident_, that I know not how to explain
it more _manifestly_, and that I also am the same that _imagine_, for tho
perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be _imagined_ is _true_,
yet the _imaginative Power_ it self is _really_ existent, and makes
up a part of my _Thought_; and last of all that I am the same that am
_sensitive_, or _perceive corporeal_ things as by my _senses_, yet that
I now _see_ light, _hear_ a noise, _feel_ heat, these things are false,
for I suppose my self _asleep_, but I _know_ that I _see_, _hear_, and am
_heated_, that cannot be _false_; and this it is that in me is _properly_
called _Sense_, and this strictly taken is the same with _thought_.

By these Considerations I begin a little better to _understand My self_
what I am; But yet it _seems_, and I cannot but _think_ that _Corporeal
Things_ (whose _Images_ are formed in my _thought_, and which by my
_senses_, I perceive) are much more _distinctly known_, then that
_confused Notion_ of _My Self_ which _imagination_ cannot afford me. And
yet ’tis strange that things _doubtful_, _unknown_, _distinct from Me_,
should be _apprehended_ more _clearly_ by _Me_, then a Thing that is
_True_, then a thing that is _known_, or then _I my self_; But the Reason
is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded
within the strict limits of _Truth_.

Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins,
that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be
more easily Govern’d.

Let me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived
most _evident_, that is to say, _Bodies_ which we touch, which we see,
not bodies in General (for those _General_ Conceptions are usually
_Confused_) but some one _Body_ in particular.

Let us chuse for example this piece of _Bees-wax_, it was lately taken
from the _Comb_, it has not yet lost all the _tast_ of the _Honey_,
it retains something of the _smell_ of the _Flowers_ from whence ’twas
gather’d, its _colour_, _shape_, and _bigness_ are manifest, ’tis _hard_,
’tis _cold_, ’tis _easily felt_, and if you will knock it with your
finger, ’twill _make a noise_: In fine, it hath all things requisite to
the most perfect notion of a _Body_.

But behold whilst I am speaking, ’tis put to the Fire, its _tast_ is
purged away, the _smell_ is vanish’d, the _colour_ is changed, the
_shape_ is alter’d, its _bulk_ is increased, its become _soft_, ’tis
_hot_, it can scarce be _felt_, and now (though you strike it) it makes
no _noise_. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this
all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was
there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things
which I _perceived_ by my _senses_; for what I _smelt_, _tasted_,
have _seen_, _felt_, or _heard_, are all _vanish’d_, and yet the _Wax
remains_. Perhaps ’twas this only that I now think on, _viz. _ that the
_Wax_ it self was not that _tast of Honey_, that _smell of Flowers_,
that _whiteness_, that _shape_, or that _sound_, but it was a _Body_
which awhile before appear’d to me _so_ and _so modified_, but now
_otherwise_. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me
consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me
see what will remain, _viz. _ this only, a _thing extended_, _flexible_,
and _mutable_. But what is this _flexible_, and _mutable_? is it that
I _imagine_ that this Wax from being _round_ may be made _square_, or
from being _square_ can be made _triangular_? No, this is not it; for I
conceive it capable of _innumerable_ such _changes_, and yet I cannot by
my _imagination_ run over these _Innumerables_; Wherefore this notion
of its _mutability_ proceeds not from my _imagination_. What then is
_extended_? is not its _Extension_ also _unknown_? For when it _melts_
’tis _greater_, when it _boils_ ’tis _greater_, and yet _greater_ when
the heat is increas’d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I
not think it capable of more various _Extensions_ than I can _imagine_.
It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot _imagine_ what
this Wax is, but that I _perceive_ with my _Mind_ what it is. I speak
of this _particular_ Wax, for of Wax in _general_ the _notion_ is more
_clear_.

But what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? ’Tis the same
which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same
which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the
_perception_ thereof is not _sight_, the _touch_, or the _imagination_
thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem’d so. But the
_perception_ thereof is the _inspection_ or _beholding_ of the Mind only,
which may be either _imperfect_ and _confused_, as formerly it was; or
_clear_ and _distinct_, as now it is; the _more_ or the _less_ I consider
the Composition of the Wax.

In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for
though I revolve these things with my self _silently_, and _without
speaking_, yet am I intangled in _meer words_, and am almost deceived
by the usual way of _expression_; for we commonly say, _that we see the
Wax it self if it be present_, and not, _that we judge it present by
its colour or shape_; from whence I should immediately thus conclude,
therefore the Wax is known by the _sight_ of the _eye_, and not by the
_inspection_ of the _mind_ only. Thus I should have concluded, had not
I by chance look’d out of my window, and seen men passing by in the
Street; which men I as usually say that I _see_, as I do now, that I
_see_ this Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which
perhaps may cover only _artificial Machines_ and _movements_, but I judge
them to be men; so that what I thought I only _saw_ with my eyes, I
comprehend by my _Judicative Faculty_, which is _my Soul_. But it becomes
not one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter of
_doubt_ from those ways of _expression_, which the Vulgar have invented.

Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more
_perfectly_ and _evidently_ what the Wax was, when I first look’d on’t,
and believed that I knew it by my outward _senses_, or at least by my
_common sense_ (as they call it) that is to say, _by my imagination_; or
whether at present I _better understand_ it, after I have more diligently
enquired both _what it is_, and how it may be _known_. Surely it would be
a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts
are true; What was there in my first _perception_ that was _distinct? _
What was there that seem’d not incident to every other Animal? But now
when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it
as if it were naked, with it’s coverings pull’d off, then I cannot but
really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.

But what shall I now say as to my _mind_, or my _self_? (for as yet
I admit nothing as belonging to me but a _mind_. ) Why (shall I say? )
should not I, who seem to perceive this Wax so _distinctly_, know my
_self_ not only more _truly_ and more _certainly_, but more _distinctly_
and _evidently_? For if I judge that _this Wax exists_, because I _see_
this Wax; surely it will be much more _evident_, that I _my self exist_,
because _I see this Wax_; for it may be that this that I see is not
really Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any
thing; but it cannot be, when I _see_, or (which is the same thing) when
_I think that I see_, that I who _think_ should not _exist_. The same
thing will follow if I _judge that this Wax exists_, because I _touch_,
or _imagine_ it, &c. And what has been said of Wax, may be apply’d to all
other outward things.

Moreover, if the _notion_ of Wax seems more _distinct_ after it is made
known to me, not only by my _sight_ or _touch_, but by more and other
causes; How much the more _distinctly_ must I confess my _self known_
unto my _self_, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in
the _perception_ of _Wax_, or any other _Body_, does also encrease the
proofs of the _nature_ of my _Mind_. But there are so many more things
in the very _Mind_ it self, by which the _notion_ of it may be made more
_distinct_, that those things which drawn from _Body_ conduce to its
knowledge are scarce to be _mention’d_.

And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in;
for seeing I have now discover’d that _Bodies themselves_ are not
_properly perceived_ by our _senses_ or _imagination_, but only by our
_understanding_, and are not therefore _perceived_, because they are
_felt_ or _seen_, but because they are _understood_; it plainly appears
to me, that nothing can possibly be _perceived_ by _me easier_, or more
_evidently_, than my _Mind_.

But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former
Opinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be
better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.




MEDITAT. III.

_Of GOD, and that there is a God. _


Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses,
I will blot out the Images of _corporeal_ things clearly from my mind,
or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to
them, as being _vain_ and _false_, and by discoursing with my self, and
prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by
degrees more known and familiar to my self.

I am a _Thinking Thing_, that is to say, _doubting_, _affirming_,
_denying_, _understanding_ few things, _ignorant_ of many things,
_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. For (as before
I have noted) though perhaps whatever I _imagine_, or am sensible of,
as without me, _Is not_; yet that _manner_ of _thinking_ which I
call _sense_ and _imagination_ (as they are only certain _Modes_ of
_Thinking_) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have
mention’d whatever I _know_, or at least Whatever as yet I _perceive_ my
self to _know_.

Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some
other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That
I am a _Thinking Thing_, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to
make _certain_ of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My _first knowledge_
’tis Nothing but a _clear_, and _distinct perception_ of What I affirm,
Which would not be sufficient to make me _certain_ of the _Truth_ of
a Thing, if it were _Possible_ that any thing that I so _clearly_ and
_distinctly_ Perceive should be _false_. Wherefore I may lay this Down as
a _Principle_. _Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly
True. _

But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very _Certain_ and
_manifest_, Which I afterwards found to be _doubtful_. Therefore What
sort of Things were they? _Viz. _ Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other
things which I perceived by my _Senses_. But What did I Perceive of
These _Clearly? Viz. _ That I had the _Ideas_ or _Thoughts_ of these
things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these _Ideas_
in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm’d, and Which (by
Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I _Clearly_ Perceived;
Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there
were Certain Things _Without Me_ from whence these _Ideas Proceeded_, and
to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either
_Deceived_, or if by Chance I Judged _truly_, yet it Proceeded not from
the strength of my _Perception_.

But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in
Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not
I Perceive them _Clearly_ enough to make me affirm them True? Truly
concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to _Doubt_, but That I
thought Perhaps there may be a _God_ who might have so created me, that
I should be _Deceived_ even in those things which seem’d most _Clear_ to
me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of _Gods great Power_
comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to
Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most _Evidently_ with
my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge
my self to perceive so _Clearly_, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I
easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he
shall never Cause me _Not to Be_ whilst _I think that I Am_, or that it
shall ever be True, _that I never was_, Whilst at Present ’tis True _that
I am_, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five;
for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing
I have no reason to Think any _God_ a _Deceiver_, Nor as yet fully know
Whether there Be _any God_, or _Not_, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may
say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of
which I am not yet Perswaded.

Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought
to Enquire, Whether there _Be a God_, And if there be One, Whether he can
be a _Deceiver_, For whilst I am _Ignorant_ of this, I cannot possibly
be fully _Certain_ of any Other thing.

But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain
Heads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly
Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to
these alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon
a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are
others of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will,
when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever
I think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought,
but in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think
upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some
are called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_.

Now as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in
themselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly
be _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as
_Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t’other. Also in the _Will_ and
_Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for
_evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_
that I Wish for them.

Wherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I
must take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual
_Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that
are _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are
_without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of
my _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford
me an Occasion of _Erring_.

Of these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others
seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_
Is, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my
own _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_
heat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But
Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by
_My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_,
or all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not
as yet discover’d their true _Original_.

But _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count
_Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_,
that I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things
themselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also
I know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_;
for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they
say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat,
and therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated
to me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the
_heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for
me to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me,
rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort
of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.

When I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that
I am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that ’tis
_discover’d_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two
differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the _Light_
of _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I
think_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other
_Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the
_Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things
are _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to
my _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led
by them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing
_one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever
_trust_ them in any other thing.

And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not
therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_.
Yet my Position stands firm; _Nevertheless I
am something. _ Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which
I suppose not to exist (because to me _unknown_) are in reallity nothing
_different_ from that very _Self_, which I _know_. I cannot tell, I
dispute it not now, I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I
have some knowledge. I am sure that I exist, I ask who I am whom I thus
know, certainly, the knowledge, of _Me_ (precisely taken) depends not on
those things, whose existence I am yet ignorant of; and therefore not on
any other things that I can _feign_ by my _imagination_.

And this very Word (_feign_) puts me in mind of my _error_, for I
should _feign_ in deed, if I should _imagine_ my self any thing; for to
_imagine_ is nothing else but to think upon the _shape_ or _image_ of
a _corporeal_ thing; but now I certainly know that I _am_, and I know
also that ’tis possible that all these _images_, and generally whatever
belongs to the _Nature_ of a _Body_ are nothing but _deluding Dreams_.
Which things Consider’d I should be no less Foolish in saying, _I will
imagine that I may more throughly understand what I am_, then if I should
say, _at Present I am awake and perceive something true, but because it
appears not evidently enough, I shall endeavour to sleep, that in a Dream
I may perceive it more evidently and truely_.

Wherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by my _imagination_,
can belong to the _Notion_ I have of _my self_, and that I must carefully
withdraw my mind from those things that it may more _distinctly_ perceive
its _own Nature_.

Let me ask therefore _What I am, A Thinking Thing_, but What is That?
That is a thing, _doubting_, _understanding_, _affirming_, _denying_,
_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. These truely are
not a few _Properties_, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not
belong to me? For am not I the very same who at present _doubt_ almost of
All things; yet _understand_ something, which thing onely I _affirm_ to
be true, I _deny_ all other things, I am _willing_ to know more, I _would
not_ be deceived, I _imagine_ many things _unwillingly_, and _consider_
many things as coming to me by my _senses_. Which of all these faculties
is it, which is not as _true_ as that I _Exist_, tho I should _sleep_, or
my _Creatour_ should as much as in him lay, strive to _deceive_ Me? which
of them is it that is _distinct_ from my _thought_? which of them is it
that can be _seperated_ from _me_? For that I am the same that _doubt_,
_understand_, and _will_ is so _evident_, that I know not how to explain
it more _manifestly_, and that I also am the same that _imagine_, for tho
perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be _imagined_ is _true_,
yet the _imaginative Power_ it self is _really_ existent, and makes
up a part of my _Thought_; and last of all that I am the same that am
_sensitive_, or _perceive corporeal_ things as by my _senses_, yet that
I now _see_ light, _hear_ a noise, _feel_ heat, these things are false,
for I suppose my self _asleep_, but I _know_ that I _see_, _hear_, and am
_heated_, that cannot be _false_; and this it is that in me is _properly_
called _Sense_, and this strictly taken is the same with _thought_.

By these Considerations I begin a little better to _understand My self_
what I am; But yet it _seems_, and I cannot but _think_ that _Corporeal
Things_ (whose _Images_ are formed in my _thought_, and which by my
_senses_, I perceive) are much more _distinctly known_, then that
_confused Notion_ of _My Self_ which _imagination_ cannot afford me. And
yet ’tis strange that things _doubtful_, _unknown_, _distinct from Me_,
should be _apprehended_ more _clearly_ by _Me_, then a Thing that is
_True_, then a thing that is _known_, or then _I my self_; But the Reason
is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded
within the strict limits of _Truth_.

Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins,
that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be
more easily Govern’d.

Let me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived
most _evident_, that is to say, _Bodies_ which we touch, which we see,
not bodies in General (for those _General_ Conceptions are usually
_Confused_) but some one _Body_ in particular.

Let us chuse for example this piece of _Bees-wax_, it was lately taken
from the _Comb_, it has not yet lost all the _tast_ of the _Honey_,
it retains something of the _smell_ of the _Flowers_ from whence ’twas
gather’d, its _colour_, _shape_, and _bigness_ are manifest, ’tis _hard_,
’tis _cold_, ’tis _easily felt_, and if you will knock it with your
finger, ’twill _make a noise_: In fine, it hath all things requisite to
the most perfect notion of a _Body_.

But behold whilst I am speaking, ’tis put to the Fire, its _tast_ is
purged away, the _smell_ is vanish’d, the _colour_ is changed, the
_shape_ is alter’d, its _bulk_ is increased, its become _soft_, ’tis
_hot_, it can scarce be _felt_, and now (though you strike it) it makes
no _noise_. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this
all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was
there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things
which I _perceived_ by my _senses_; for what I _smelt_, _tasted_,
have _seen_, _felt_, or _heard_, are all _vanish’d_, and yet the _Wax
remains_. Perhaps ’twas this only that I now think on, _viz. _ that the
_Wax_ it self was not that _tast of Honey_, that _smell of Flowers_,
that _whiteness_, that _shape_, or that _sound_, but it was a _Body_
which awhile before appear’d to me _so_ and _so modified_, but now
_otherwise_. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me
consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me
see what will remain, _viz. _ this only, a _thing extended_, _flexible_,
and _mutable_. But what is this _flexible_, and _mutable_? is it that
I _imagine_ that this Wax from being _round_ may be made _square_, or
from being _square_ can be made _triangular_? No, this is not it; for I
conceive it capable of _innumerable_ such _changes_, and yet I cannot by
my _imagination_ run over these _Innumerables_; Wherefore this notion
of its _mutability_ proceeds not from my _imagination_. What then is
_extended_? is not its _Extension_ also _unknown_? For when it _melts_
’tis _greater_, when it _boils_ ’tis _greater_, and yet _greater_ when
the heat is increas’d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I
not think it capable of more various _Extensions_ than I can _imagine_.
It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot _imagine_ what
this Wax is, but that I _perceive_ with my _Mind_ what it is. I speak
of this _particular_ Wax, for of Wax in _general_ the _notion_ is more
_clear_.

But what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? ’Tis the same
which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same
which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the
_perception_ thereof is not _sight_, the _touch_, or the _imagination_
thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem’d so. But the
_perception_ thereof is the _inspection_ or _beholding_ of the Mind only,
which may be either _imperfect_ and _confused_, as formerly it was; or
_clear_ and _distinct_, as now it is; the _more_ or the _less_ I consider
the Composition of the Wax.

In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for
though I revolve these things with my self _silently_, and _without
speaking_, yet am I intangled in _meer words_, and am almost deceived
by the usual way of _expression_; for we commonly say, _that we see the
Wax it self if it be present_, and not, _that we judge it present by
its colour or shape_; from whence I should immediately thus conclude,
therefore the Wax is known by the _sight_ of the _eye_, and not by the
_inspection_ of the _mind_ only. Thus I should have concluded, had not
I by chance look’d out of my window, and seen men passing by in the
Street; which men I as usually say that I _see_, as I do now, that I
_see_ this Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which
perhaps may cover only _artificial Machines_ and _movements_, but I judge
them to be men; so that what I thought I only _saw_ with my eyes, I
comprehend by my _Judicative Faculty_, which is _my Soul_. But it becomes
not one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter of
_doubt_ from those ways of _expression_, which the Vulgar have invented.

Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more
_perfectly_ and _evidently_ what the Wax was, when I first look’d on’t,
and believed that I knew it by my outward _senses_, or at least by my
_common sense_ (as they call it) that is to say, _by my imagination_; or
whether at present I _better understand_ it, after I have more diligently
enquired both _what it is_, and how it may be _known_. Surely it would be
a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts
are true; What was there in my first _perception_ that was _distinct? _
What was there that seem’d not incident to every other Animal? But now
when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it
as if it were naked, with it’s coverings pull’d off, then I cannot but
really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.

But what shall I now say as to my _mind_, or my _self_? (for as yet
I admit nothing as belonging to me but a _mind_. ) Why (shall I say? )
should not I, who seem to perceive this Wax so _distinctly_, know my
_self_ not only more _truly_ and more _certainly_, but more _distinctly_
and _evidently_? For if I judge that _this Wax exists_, because I _see_
this Wax; surely it will be much more _evident_, that I _my self exist_,
because _I see this Wax_; for it may be that this that I see is not
really Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any
thing; but it cannot be, when I _see_, or (which is the same thing) when
_I think that I see_, that I who _think_ should not _exist_. The same
thing will follow if I _judge that this Wax exists_, because I _touch_,
or _imagine_ it, &c. And what has been said of Wax, may be apply’d to all
other outward things.

Moreover, if the _notion_ of Wax seems more _distinct_ after it is made
known to me, not only by my _sight_ or _touch_, but by more and other
causes; How much the more _distinctly_ must I confess my _self known_
unto my _self_, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in
the _perception_ of _Wax_, or any other _Body_, does also encrease the
proofs of the _nature_ of my _Mind_. But there are so many more things
in the very _Mind_ it self, by which the _notion_ of it may be made more
_distinct_, that those things which drawn from _Body_ conduce to its
knowledge are scarce to be _mention’d_.

And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in;
for seeing I have now discover’d that _Bodies themselves_ are not
_properly perceived_ by our _senses_ or _imagination_, but only by our
_understanding_, and are not therefore _perceived_, because they are
_felt_ or _seen_, but because they are _understood_; it plainly appears
to me, that nothing can possibly be _perceived_ by _me easier_, or more
_evidently_, than my _Mind_.

But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former
Opinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be
better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.




MEDITAT. III.

_Of GOD, and that there is a God. _


Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses,
I will blot out the Images of _corporeal_ things clearly from my mind,
or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to
them, as being _vain_ and _false_, and by discoursing with my self, and
prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by
degrees more known and familiar to my self.

I am a _Thinking Thing_, that is to say, _doubting_, _affirming_,
_denying_, _understanding_ few things, _ignorant_ of many things,
_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. For (as before
I have noted) though perhaps whatever I _imagine_, or am sensible of,
as without me, _Is not_; yet that _manner_ of _thinking_ which I
call _sense_ and _imagination_ (as they are only certain _Modes_ of
_Thinking_) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have
mention’d whatever I _know_, or at least Whatever as yet I _perceive_ my
self to _know_.

Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some
other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That
I am a _Thinking Thing_, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to
make _certain_ of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My _first knowledge_
’tis Nothing but a _clear_, and _distinct perception_ of What I affirm,
Which would not be sufficient to make me _certain_ of the _Truth_ of
a Thing, if it were _Possible_ that any thing that I so _clearly_ and
_distinctly_ Perceive should be _false_. Wherefore I may lay this Down as
a _Principle_. _Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly
True. _

But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very _Certain_ and
_manifest_, Which I afterwards found to be _doubtful_. Therefore What
sort of Things were they? _Viz. _ Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other
things which I perceived by my _Senses_. But What did I Perceive of
These _Clearly? Viz. _ That I had the _Ideas_ or _Thoughts_ of these
things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these _Ideas_
in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm’d, and Which (by
Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I _Clearly_ Perceived;
Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there
were Certain Things _Without Me_ from whence these _Ideas Proceeded_, and
to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either
_Deceived_, or if by Chance I Judged _truly_, yet it Proceeded not from
the strength of my _Perception_.

But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in
Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not
I Perceive them _Clearly_ enough to make me affirm them True? Truly
concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to _Doubt_, but That I
thought Perhaps there may be a _God_ who might have so created me, that
I should be _Deceived_ even in those things which seem’d most _Clear_ to
me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of _Gods great Power_
comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to
Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most _Evidently_ with
my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge
my self to perceive so _Clearly_, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I
easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he
shall never Cause me _Not to Be_ whilst _I think that I Am_, or that it
shall ever be True, _that I never was_, Whilst at Present ’tis True _that
I am_, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five;
for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing
I have no reason to Think any _God_ a _Deceiver_, Nor as yet fully know
Whether there Be _any God_, or _Not_, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may
say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of
which I am not yet Perswaded.

Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought
to Enquire, Whether there _Be a God_, And if there be One, Whether he can
be a _Deceiver_, For whilst I am _Ignorant_ of this, I cannot possibly
be fully _Certain_ of any Other thing.

But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain
Heads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly
Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to
these alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon
a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are
others of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will,
when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever
I think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought,
but in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think
upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some
are called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_.

Now as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in
themselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly
be _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as
_Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t’other. Also in the _Will_ and
_Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for
_evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_
that I Wish for them.

Wherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I
must take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual
_Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that
are _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are
_without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of
my _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford
me an Occasion of _Erring_.

Of these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others
seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_
Is, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my
own _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_
heat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But
Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by
_My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_,
or all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not
as yet discover’d their true _Original_.

But _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count
_Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_,
that I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things
themselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also
I know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_;
for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they
say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat,
and therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated
to me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the
_heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for
me to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me,
rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort
of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.

When I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that
I am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that ’tis
_discover’d_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two
differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the _Light_
of _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I
think_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other
_Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the
_Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things
are _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to
my _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led
by them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing
_one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever
_trust_ them in any other thing.

And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not
therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_.
For as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention’d) are in me,
yet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there
may be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the
_Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them
to be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External
Object_.

And last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are
_different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be
_like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the
_Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers
_Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly
I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very
_smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is
to say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from
certain _natural notions_) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then
the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun
which is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is
most _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self.

All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a
_true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are
certain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their
_Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other
way.

But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things
(whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me;
And that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I
acknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me
in the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_,
an _other Thing_, ’tis Evident there is a _Great difference_ between
them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_
are something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective
Reallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_;
and again, _That_ by Which I understand a _Mighty God_, _Eternal_,
_Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides
himself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those
_Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited.

But Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be
_as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the
_Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its
_Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that
_Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it?

And from hence it follows, that neither a _Thing_ can be made out of
_Nothing_, Neither a Thing which is _more Perfect_ (that is, Which has in
it self _more Reallity_) _proceed_ from That Which is _Less Perfect_.

And this is _Clearly_ True, not only in those _Effects_ whose _Actual_
or _Formal Reallity_ is Consider’d, But in Those _Ideas_ also, Whose
_Objective Reallity_ is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of
Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which _was not_,
should now begin _to Be_, unless it were produced by _something_, in
Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either _Formally_ or
_Virtually_; neither can _heat_ be Produced in any Thing, which before
was _not hot_, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a _degree_ of
_Perfection_ as _heat_ is; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have
an _Idea_ of Heat, or of a _Stone_, unless it were put into me by some
_Cause_, in which there is at Least as much _Reallity_, as I Conceive
there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that _Cause_ transfers none of its
own _Actual_ or _Formal Reality_ into my _Idea_, I must not from thence
conclude that ’tis _less real_; but I may think that the _nature_ of the
_Idea_ it self is such, that of it self it requires no other _formal
reality_, but what it has from my _thought_, of which ’tis a _mode_. But
that this Idea has _this_ or _that objective reallity_, rather then any
_other_, proceeds clearly from some _cause_, in which there ought to be
at least as much _formal reallity_, as there is of _objective reallity_
in the _Idea_ it self. For if we suppose any thing in the _Idea_, which
was not in its _cause_, it must of necessity have this from _nothing_;
but (tho it be a most _Imperfect manner_ of _existing_, by which the
thing is _objectively_ in the _Intellect_ by an _Idea_, yet) it is not
_altogether nothing_, and therefore cannot proceed from _nothing_.

Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the _reallity_ which I perceive in
my _Ideas_ is only an _objective reallity_, that therefore it must of
necessity follow, that the same _reallity_ should be in the _causes_
of these _Ideas formally_. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient
that this _reallity_ be in the very _causes_ only _objectively_. For as
that _objective manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of
an _Idea_, so that _formal manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very
_nature_ of a _cause_ of _Ideas_, at least to the _first_ and _chiefest
causes_ of them; For tho perhaps one _Idea_ may receive its birth from
an other, yet we cannot proceed in _Infinitum_, but at last we must
arrive at some _first Idea_, whose _cause_ is (as it were) an _Original
copy_, in which all the _objective reallity_ of the _Idea_ is _formally
contain’d_. So that I plainly discover by the _light_ of _nature_, that
the _Ideas_, which are in me, are (as it were) _Pictures_, which may
easily _come short_ of the _perfection_ of those things from whence they
are taken, but cannot _contain_ any thing _greater_ or _more perfect_
then them: And the _longer_ and _more diligently_ I pry into these
things, so much the more _clearly_ and _distinctly_ do I discover them to
be _true_.

But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the _objective
reallity_ of any of my _Ideas_ be _such_, that it cannot be in me either
_formally_ or _eminently_, and that therefore I cannot be the _cause_
of _that Idea_, from hence it necessarily Follows, that _I alone_ do
not only _exist_, but that some other thing, which is _cause_ of that
_Idea_, does _exist also_.

But if I can find no _such Idea_ in me, I have no argument to perswade
me of the _existence_ of any thing besides my self for I have diligently
enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other _perswasive_.

Some of these _Ideas_ there are (besides that which represents _my self_
to _my self_, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent
to me, one of them a _God_, others of them _Corporeal_ and _Inanimate_
things, some of them _Angels_, others _Animals_, and lastly some of them
which exhibite to me _men like my self_.

As touching those that represent _Men_ or _Angels_ or _Animals_, I easily
understand that they may be _made up_ of those _Ideas_ which I have of
_my self_, of _Corporeal_ things, and of _God_, tho there were neither
_man_ (but my self) nor _Angel_, nor _Animal_ in being.

And as to the _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things, I find nothing in them of
that _perfection_, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into
them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday
(_in the second Medit. _) I did the _Idea_ of Wax, I find there are but
few things which I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ in them, viz.
_Magnitude_ or _extension_ in _Longitude_, _Latitude_, and _Profundity_,
the _Figure_ or _shape_ which arises from the _termination_ of that
_Extension_, the _Position_ or _place_ which divers _Figured Bodies_
have in _respect_ of each other, their _motion_ or _change of place_; to
which may be added, their _substance_, _continuance_, and _number_; as to
the other, such as are, _Light_, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smels_, _Tasts_,
_Heat_, and _Cold_, with the other _tactile qualities_, I have but very
_obscure_ and _confused thoughts_ of them, so that I know not, whether
they are _true_ or _false_, that is to say, whether the _Ideas_ I have of
them are the _Ideas_ of _things_ which _really are_, or _are not_. For
altho _falshood formally_ and _properly_ so called, consists only in the
_judgement_ (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of
_material falshood_ in _Ideas_, when they represent a _thing_ as _really
existent_, tho it does _not exist_; so, for example, the _Ideas_ I have
of _heat_ and _cold_ are so _obscure_ and _confused_, that I cannot
collect from them, whether _cold_ be a _privation_ of _heat_, or _heat_ a
_privation_ of _cold_, or whether either of them be a _real quality_, or
whether neither of them be _real_. And since every _Idea_ must be _like_
the thing it represents, if it be _true_ that _cold_ is nothing but the
_privation_ of _heat_, that _Idea_ which represents it to me as a thing
_real_ and _positive_ may deservedly be called _false_. The same may be
apply’d to other Ideas.

And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other _Author_ of
these _Ideas_ but _my self_; for if they are _false_, that is, represent
things that _are not_, I know by the _light_ of _nature_ that they
proceed from _nothing_; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other
account, but because my _nature_ is _deficient_ in something, and
_imperfect_. But if they are _true_, yet seeing I discover so little
_reality_ in them, that that very _reality_ scarce _seems_ to _be realy_,
I see no reason why I my self should not be the _Author_ of them.

But also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are
_clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow’d from the _Idea_ I
have of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like;
For when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing
apt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_,
tho I conceive _my self_ a _thinking substance_ and _not extended_, and
the _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there
is a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_
in this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as
_now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and
since I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from
hence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which
afterwards I apply to other things.

As to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as
_extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in
me, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain
_modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may
seem to be in me _eminently_.

* Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must
consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly
have its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain
_Infinite Substance_, _Independent_, _Omniscient_, _Almighty_, by whom
both _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do
_Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high
nature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive
my self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions.

From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_;
for tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my
self am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite
substance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a
_substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that
I have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the
_negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by
the _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary
I plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite
substance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_
of an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of
a _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or
_desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not
altogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_
then _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own
_Imperfections_.

Neither can it be said that this _Idea_ of _God_ is _false Materialiter_,
and that therefore it _proceeds_ from _nothing_, as before I observed of
the _Ideas_ of _heat_ and _cold_, _&c. _ For on the contrary, seeing this
_notion_ is most _clear_ and _distinct_, and contains in it self more
_objective reality_ then any other _Idea_, none can be more _true_ in
it self, nor in which less _suspition_ of _falshood_ can be found. This
_Idea_ (I say) of a _being infinitely perfect_ is most _true_, for tho
it may be supposed that such a _being_ does _not exist_, yet it cannot
be supposed that the _Idea_ of such a _being_ exhibites to me nothing
_real_, as before I have said of the _Idea_ of _cold_. This _Idea_
also is most _clear_ and _distinct_, for whatever I perceive _clearly_
and _distinctly_ to be _real_, and _true_, and _perfect_, is wholy
_contain’d_ in this _Idea_ of _God_.

Neither can it be objected, that I cannot _comprehend_ an _Infinite_, or
that there are innumerable other things in _God_, which I can neither
_conceive_, nor in the least _think upon_; for it is of the _very
nature_ of an _Infinite_ not to be _apprehendable_ by _me_ who am
_finite_. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my _Idea_ of _God_ to
be the most _true_, the most _clear_, and the most _distinct Idea_ of all
those _Ideas_ I have, upon this _account_, that I understand that _God_
is _not to be understood_, and that I judge that whatever I _clearly_
perceive and know _Implys_ any _perfection_, as also perhaps other
innumerable _perfections_, which I am ignorant of, are in _God_ either
_formally_ or _eminently_.

_Doubt. _ But perhaps _I am_ something _more_ then I take my self to
_be_, and perhaps all these _perfections_ which I attribute to _God_,
are _potentially_ in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and
break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my _Knowledge_ may
be _encreased_, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not _encrease_
by degrees in _Infinitum_, nor why by my _knowledge_ so _encreased_ I
may not attain to the other _perfections_ of _God_; nor lastly, why the
_power_ or _aptitude_ of _having_ these perfections may not be sufficient
to produce the _Idea_ of them in _me_.

_Solution. _ But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that
my _Knowledge_ is capable of being _increased_, and that many things are
in me _potentially_, which _actually_ are not, yet none of these go to
the making an _Idea_ of _God_, in which I conceive nothing _potentially_,
for tis a certain argument of _imperfection_ that a thing _may be
encreased Gradually_. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be _more_ and _more
encreased_, yet I know that it can never be _actually Infinite_, for it
can never arrive to that _height_ of _perfection_, which admits not of
an _higher degree_. But I conceive God to be _actually_ so _Infinite_,
that nothing can be _added_ to his _perfections_. And lastly, I perceive
that the _objective being_ of an _Idea_ cannot be _produced_ only by the
_potential being_ of a _thing_ (which in proper speech is _nothing_) but
requires an _actual_ or _formal being_ to its _production_.

Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not _evident_
by the _light_ of _reason_ to any one that will diligently consider them.
Yet because that (when I am careless, and the _Images_ of _sensible_
things _blind_ my _understanding_) I do not so easily call to mind the
reasons, why the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_ should
of necessity proceed from a _being_ which is _really more perfect_; It
will be requisite to enquire further, whether _I_, who have this _Idea_,
can possibly _be_, unless _such_ a _being_ did _exist_. To which end
let me aske, _from whence_ should I _be_? From _my self_? or from my
_Parents_? or from any other thing _less perfect_ then _God_? for nothing
can be thought or supposed _more perfect_, or _equally perfect_ with
_God_.

But first, If _I_ were from my self, I should neither _doubt_, nor
_desire_, nor _want_ any thing, for I should have given my self all those
_perfections_, of which I have any _Idea_, and consequently I my self
should be _God_; and I cannot think that those things I _want_, are to
be acquired with _greater difficulty_ then those things I _have_; but on
the contrary, ’tis manifest, that it were much more _difficult_ that _I_
(that is, _a substance_ that _thinks_) should _arise_ out of _nothing_,
then that I should _acquire_ the _knowledge_ of many things whereof I
am _Ignorant_, which is only the _accident_ of that _substance_. And
certainly if I had that _greater thing_ (viz _being_) from my self, I
should not have _denyed_ my self (not only, those things which may be
easier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are
contain’d in the _Idea_ of a _God_; and the reason is, for that no other
things _seem_ to me to be _more difficultly_ done, and certainly if they
were _Really more difficult_, they would _seem_ more _difficult_ to me
(if whatever _I have_, I _have_ from my self) for in those things I
should find my _Power_ put to a stop.

Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to
_have alwaies Been, what now I am_, and that therefore I need not seek
for an _Author_ of my _Being_. For the _Duration_ or _Continuance_ of my
life may be _divided_ into _Innumerable Parts_, each of which does not
at all _depend_ on the _Other Parts_; Therefore it will not follow, that
because _a while ago, I was_, I must of necessity _now Be_. I say, this
will not follow, Unless, I suppose some _Cause_ to _Create me_ (as it
were) _anew_ for _this_ Moment (that is, _Conserve me_). For ’tis evident
to one that Considers the Nature of _Duration_, that the same _Power_
and _Action_ is requisite to the _Conservation_ of a Thing each _Moment_
of its _Being_, as there is to the _Creation_ of that Thing _anew_, if
it did _not exist_. So that ’tis one of those _Principles_ which are
_Evident_ by the _Light_ of _Nature_: that the _Act_ of _Conservation_
differs only _Ratione_ (as the Philosophers term it) from the _Act of
Creation_.

Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whether _I_, who _now_
Am; have any _Power_ to _Cause_ my self to _Be hereafter_? (for had I any
such _power_, I should certainly _know_ of it, seeing I am nothing but
a _Thinking Thing_, or at least at present I onely treat of that part
of me, which is a _Thing_ that _Thinks_) to which, I answer, that I can
discover no such _Power_ in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that
_I depend_ on some _Other being distinct_ from _my self_.

But what if _I_ say that perhaps this _Being_ is not _God_, but that
_I_ am produced either by my _Parents_, or some other _Causes less
perfect_ then _God_? In answer to which let me consider (as _I_ have
said before) that ’tis _manifest_ that whatever is in the _effect, so
much_ at least ought to be in the _cause_; and therefore seeing _I_
am a thing that _thinks_, and have in me an _Idea_ of _God_, it will
confessedly follow, that whatever sort of _cause_ I assign of my _own
Being_, it also must be a _Thinking Thing_, and must have an _Idea_ of
all those _Perfections_, which I attribute to _God_; Of which _Cause_
it may be again Asked, whether it be _from it self_, or from any other
_Cause_? If _from it self_, ’tis evident (from what has been said) that
it must be _God_; For seeing it has the _Power_ of _Existing of it self_,
without doubt it has also the _power_ of _actually Possessing_ all those
_Perfections_ whereof it has an _Idea_ in it self, that is, all those
_Perfections_ which I conceive in _God_. But if it Be from an _other
Cause_, it may again be asked of that _Cause_ whether it be _of it self_,
or from an _other_; Till at length We arrive at the _Last Cause_ of All,
Which will Be _God_. For ’tis evident, that this _Enquiry_ will not admit
of _Progressus in Infinitum_, especially when at Present I treat not
only of that Cause which at _first made_ Me; But chiefly of that which
_conserves_ me in this _Instant_ time.

Neither can it be supposed that many _partial Causes_ have _concurred_
to the making Me, and that I received the _Idea_ of one of _Gods
perfections_ from _One_ of them, and from an _other_ of them the _Idea_
of an _other_; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be
found _scattered_ in the World, but not all of them _Joyn’d_ in any
one which may Be _God_. For on the contrary, _Unity_, _Simplicity_,
or the _inseparability_ of All Gods Attributes is one of the _chief
Perfections_ which I conceive in Him; and certainly the _Idea_ of the
_Unity_ of the _Divine Perfections_ could not be _created_ in me by any
other _cause_, then by _That_, from whence I have received the _Ideas_ of
his other _perfections_; For ’tis Impossible to make me conceive these
_perfections_, _conjunct_ and _inseparable_, unless he should also make
me know what _perfections_ these _are_.

Lastly as touching my _having_ my _Being_ from my _Parents_. Tho whatever
Thoughts I have heretofore harbour’d of Them were _True_, yet certainly
they _contribute_ nothing to my _conservation_, neither proceed I from
them as _I am_ a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, for they have onely _predisposed_
that _material Thing_, wherein _I_, that is, _my mind_ (_which_ only
at present I take for _my self_) _Inhabits_. Wherefore I cannot _now_
Question that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude
that because _I am_, and because I have an _Idea_ of a _Being most
perfect_, that is, of _God_, it evidently follows that _there is a God_.

* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this _Idea_
of _God_. For I have neither received it by _means_ of _my Senses_,
neither comes it to me _without_ my _Forethought_, as the _Ideas_ of
_sensible_ things use to do, when such things _Work_ on the Organs of my
_Sense_, or at least _seem_ so to work; Neither is this _Idea_ framed
by _my self_, for I can neither _detract from_, nor _add_ any thing
_thereto_. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is _Innate_, even as
the _Idea_ of me _my self_ is _Natural_ to my self.

And truly ’tis not to be Admired that _God_ in Creating me should
_Imprint_ this _Idea_ in me, that it may there remain as a _stamp
impressed_ by the _Workman God_ on _me_ his _Work_, neither is it
requisite that this _stamp_ should be a Thing _different_ from the _Work_
it self, but ’tis very Credible (from hence only that _God Created_ me)
that I am made as it were according to his _likeness_ and _Image_, and
that the same _likeness_, in which the _Idea_ of God is contain’d, is
_perceived_ by Me with the _same faculty_, with which I _perceive my
Self_; That is to say, whilst _I reflect_ upon my self, _I_ do not only
_perceive_ that I am an _Imperfect_ thing, having my _dependance_ upon
some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires _more_ and _better_
things _Indefinitely_; But also at the same time I understand, that _He_
on whom I _depend_ contains in him all those _wish’d for things_ (not
only _Indefinitely_ and _Potentially_, but) _Really_, _Indefinitely_;
and that therefore he is _God_. The whole stress of which * Argument
lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature
I am, _Viz. _ Having the _Idea_ of a _God_ in me, unless really there
were a _God_, a _God_ (I say) that very _same God_, whose _Idea I_ have
in my _Mind_ (that is, Having all those _perfections_, which I cannot
_comprehend_, but can as it were _think upon them_) and who is not
_subject_ to any _Defects_.

By which ’tis evident that _God_ is no _Deceiver_; for ’tis manifest by
the _Light_ of _Nature_, that all _fraud_ and _deceit_ depends on some
_defect_. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other
_Truthes_ which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and
dwell upon the Contemplation of this _God_, to Consider with my self
His _Divine Attributes_, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of
this _Immense light_, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my
_dark_ Understanding. For as by _Faith_ we _believe_ that the greatest
_happiness_ of the _next Life_ consists alone in the _Contemplation_ of
the _Divine Majesty_, so we _find_ by _Experience_ that now we receive
from thence the greatest _pleasure_, whereof we are capable in _this
Life_; Tho it be much more _Imperfect_ then that in the _Next_.




MEDITAT.