No More Learning

We
it was who introduced the unalterable, taking it
from metaphysics as usual, Mr. Chemist. It is a mere
superficial judgment to declare that the diamond,
graphite, and carbon are identical. Why? Simply
because no loss of substance can be traced in the
scales! Well then, at least they have something
in common; but the work of the molecules in the


## p. 112 (#142) ############################################

I 12
THE WILL TO POWER.
process of changing from one form to the other, an
action we can neither see nor weigh, is just exactly
what makes one material something different-with
specifically different qualities.
>
624.
Against the physical atom. -In order to under-
stand the world, we must be able to reckon it up;
in order to be able to reckon it up, we must be
aware of constant causes; but since we find no
such constant causes in reality, we invent them for
ourselves and call them atoms. This is the origin
of the atomic theory.
The possibility of calculating the world, the
possibility of expressing all phenomena by means
of formulæ — is that really "understanding”?
-
What would be understood of a piece of music, if
all that were calculable in it and capable of being
expressed in formulæ, were reckoned up ? Thus
“ constant causes," things, substances, something
“ unconditioned,” were therefore invented ;-what
has been attained thereby ?
625.
The mechanical concept of "movement is
already a translation of the original process into the
language of symbols of the eye and the touch.
The concept atom, the distinction between the
“ seat of a motive force and the force itself,” is a
language of symbols derived from our logical and
cpsyhical world.
It does not lie within our power to alter our
a


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
113
means of expression: it is possible to understand
to what extend they are but symptomatic. To
demand an adequate means of expression is non-
sense: it lies at the heart of a language, of a medium
of communication, to express relation only.
The concept“ truth” is opposed to good sense. The
whole province of “truth--falseness” only applies
to the relations between beings, not to an "abso-
lute. ” There is no such thing as a "being in
itself” (relations in the first place constitute being),
any more than there can be “knowledge in itself. ”
626.
The feeling of force cannot proceed from move-
ment: feeling in general cannot proceed from
movement. ”
“Even in support of this, an apparent experi-
ence is the only evidence: in a substance (brain)
feeling is generated through transmitted motion
(stimuli). But generated? Would this show that
the feeling did not yet exist there at all? so that
its appearance would have to be regarded as the
creative act of the intermediary-motion? The
feelingless condition of this substance is only an
hypothesis ! not an experience ! Feeling, therefore
is the quality of the substance: there actually are
substances that feel. ”
“ Do we learn from certain substances that they
have no feeling? No, we merely cannot tell that
they have any. It is impossible to seek the origin
of feeling in non-sensitive substance. ”-Oh what
hastiness!
H
-
VOL. II.


## p. 114 (#144) ############################################

114
THE WILL TO POWER.
9
627
“To attract” and “to repel," in a purely
mechanical sense, is pure fiction: a word. We
cannot imagine an attraction without a purpose. -
Either the will to possess one's self of a thing, or the
will to defend one's self from a thing or to repel it-
that we“ understand”: that would be an interpreta-
tion which we could use.
In short, the psychological necessity of believ-
ing in causality lies in the impossibility of imagining
a process without a purpose: but of course this says
nothing concerning truth or untruth (the justifica-
tion of such a belief)! The belief in causæ col-
lapses with the belief in téan (against Spinoza and
his causationism).
628.
It is an illusion to suppose that something is
known, when all we have is a mathematical formula
of what has happened: it is only characterised,
described; no more!
629.
If I bring a regularly recurring phenomenon into
a formula, I have facilitated and shortened my task
of characterising the whole phenomenon, etc. But
I have not thereby ascertained a “law," I have
only replied to the question: How is it that some-
thing recurs here? It is a supposition that the
formula corresponds to a complex of really
unknown forces and the discharge of forces: it is


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE. .
115
pure mythology to suppose that forces here obey
a law, so that, as the result of their obedience, we
have the same phenomenon every time.
630.
I take good care not to speak of chemical“ laws":
to do so savours of morality. It is much more a
question of establishing certain relations of power :
the stronger becomes master of the weaker, in so
far as the latter cannot maintain its degree of
independence,-here there is no pity, no quarter,
and, still less, any observance of “law. "
631.
The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena
does not prove any “law," but a relation of power
between two or more forces. To say, “But it is
precisely this relation that remains the same! ” is
no better than saying, “One and the same force
cannot be another force. ”—It is not a matter of
sequence,—but a matter of interdependence, a pro-
cess in which the procession of moments do not
determine each other after the manner of cause
and effect. . . .
Theseparation of the "action" from the "agent";
of the phenomenon from the worker of that pheno-
menon; of the process from one that is not process,
but lasting, substance, thing, body, soul, etc. ; the
attempt to understand a life as a sort of shifting
of things and a changing of places; of a sort of
“ being” or stable entity: this ancient mythology


## p. 116 (#146) ############################################

116
THE WILL TO POWER.
<C
G
a
"
established the belief in “cause and effect," once it
had found a lasting form in the functions of speech
and grammar.
632.
The "regularity of a sequence is only a
metaphorical expression, not a fact, just as if a rule
were followed here ! And the same holds good of
"conformity to law. " We find a formula in order
to express an ever-recurring kind of succession of
phenomena: but that does not show that we have
discovered a law; much less a force which is the
cause of a recurrence of effects. The fact that
something always happens thus or thus, is inter-
preted here as if a creature always acted thus or
thus as the result of obedience to a law or to a law-
giver: whereas apart from the “law" it would be
free to act differently. But precisely that in-
ability to act otherwise might originate in the
creature itself, it might be that it did not act thus
or thus in response to a law, but simply because
it was so constituted. It would mean simply:
that something cannot also be something else; that
it cannot be first this, and then something quite
different; that it is neither free nor the reverse, but
merely thus or thus. The fault lies in thinking a
subject into things.
633.
To speak of two consecutive states, the first as
cause," and the second as "effect," is false. The
first state cannot bring about anything, the second
has nothing effected in it.
"


## p. 117 (#147) ############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
117
"
It is a question of a struggle between two
elements unequal in power : a new adjustment is
arrived at, according to the measure of power each
possesses. The second state is something funda-
mentally different from the first (it is not its effect):
the essential thing is, that the factors which engage
in the struggle leave it with different quanta of
power.
634.
A criticism of Materialism. -Let us dismiss the
two popular concepts, “Necessity” and “Law,"
from this idea : the first introduces a false con-
straint, the second a false liberty into the world.
" Things” do not act regularly, they follow no rule:
there are no things (that is our fiction); neither do
they act in accordance with any necessity. There
is no obedience here: for, the fact that something
is as it is, strong or weak, is not the result of
obedience or of a rule or of a constraint.
The degree of resistance and the degree of
superior power—this is the question around which
all phenomena turn: if we, for our own purposes
and calculations, know how to express this in
formulæ and "laws," all the better for us! But
that does not mean that we have introduced any
“morality” into the world, just because we have
fancied it as obedient.
There are no laws: every power draws its last
consequence at every moment. Things are calcul-
able precisely owing to the fact that there is no
possibility of their being otherwise than they are.
A quantum of power is characterised by the
a


## p. 118 (#148) ############################################

118
THE WILL TO POWER.
a
effect it produces and the influence it resists. The
adiaphoric state which would be thinkable in itself,
is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to vio-
lence and a will to defend one's self against violence.
It is not self-preservation : every atom exercises
its influence over the whole of existence-it is
thought out of existence if one thinks this radia-
tion of will-power away. That is why I call it a
quantum of “ Will to Power"; with this formula one
can express the character which cannot be ab-
stracted in thought from mechanical order, without
suppressing the latter itself in thought.
The translation of the world of effect into a
visible world—a world for the eye—is the concept
“ movement. " Here it is always understood that
something has been moved, whether it be the
fiction of an atomic globule or even of the abstrac-
tion of the latter, the dynamic atom, something is
always imagined that has an effect—that is to say,
we have not yet rid ourselves of the habit into
which our senses and speech inveigled us. Subject
and object, an agent to the action, the action and
that which does it separated : we must not forget
that all this signifies no more than semeiotics and
nothing real. Mechanics as a teaching of movement
is already a translation of phenomena into man's
language of the senses.
9)
635
We are in need of “unities” in order to be
able to reckon: but this is no reason for supposing
that “unities” actually exist. We borrowed the


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
119
C
C
concept“ unity” from our concept“ ego,"—our very
oldest article of faith. If we did not believe our-
selves to be unities we should never have formed
the concept "thing. " Now, that is to say, some-
what late in the day, we are overwhelmingly
convinced that our conception of the concept
“ego" is no security whatever for a real entity.
In order to maintain the mechanical interpretation
of the world theoretically, we must always make
the reserve that it is with fictions that we do so:
the concept of movement (derived from the language
of our senses) and the concept of the atom (=entity,
derived from our psychical experience) are based
upon a sense-prejudice and a psychological prejudice.
Mechanics formulates consecutive phenomena,
and it does so semeiologically, in the terms of the
senses and of the mind (that all influence is move-
ment; that where there is movement something is
at work moving): it does not touch the question of
the causal force.
The mechanical world is imagined as the eye
and the sense of touch alone could imagine a
world (as “moved "),—in such a way as to be
calculable,—as to simulate causal entities "things "
(atoms) whose effect is constant (the transfer of
the false concept of subject to the concept atom).
The mixing together of the concept of numbers,
of the concept of thing (the idea of subject), of
the concept of activity (the separation of that
which is the cause, and the effect), of the concept
of movement: all these things are phenomenal;
our eye and our psychology are still in it all.
If we eliminate these adjuncts, nothing remains
-
"


## p. 120 (#150) ############################################

I 20
THE WILL TO POWER.
over but dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension
to all other dynamic quanta : the essence of which
resides in their relation to all other quanta, in their
“ influence" upon the latter. The will to power,
not Being, not Becoming, but a pathos—is the
elementary fact, from these first results a Becoming,
an influencing.
636.
The physicists believe in a "true world” after
their own kind; a fixed systematising of atoms to
perform necessary movements, and holding good
equally of all creatures,—so that, according to
them, the "world of appearance" reduces itself to
the side of general and generally-needed Being,
which is accessible to every one according to his
kind (accessible and also adjusted,-made “sub-
jective"). But here they are in error. The atom
which they postulate is arrived at by the logic of
that perspective of consciousness; it is in itself
therefore a subjective fiction. This picture of the
world which they project is in no way essentially
different from the subjective picture: the only
difference is, that it is composed simply with more
extended senses, but certainly with our senses.
And in the end, without knowing it, they left
something out of the constellation : precisely the
necessary perspective factor, by means of which
every centre of power
and not man alone-con-
structs the rest of the world from its point of view
-that is to say, measures it, feels it, and moulds
it according to its degree of strength. . . . They
forgot to reckon with this perspective-fixing power,


## p. 121 (#151) ############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
I21
»
in “true being,"—or, in school-terms, subject-
being. They suppose that this was "evolved ”
and added ;- but even the chemical investigator
needs it: it is indeed specific Being, which de-
termines action and reaction according to circum-
stances.
Perspectivity is only a complex form of specific-
ness. My idea is that every specific body strives
to become master of all space, and to extend its
power (its will to power), and to thrust back
everything that resists it. But inasmuch as it is
continually meeting the same endeavours on the
part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to
terms with those (by "combining” with those)
which are sufficiently related to it-and thus they
conspire together for power. And the process
continues.
637.
Even in the inorganic world all that concerns
an atom of energy is its immediate neighbourhood :
distant forces balance each other. Here is the
root of perspectivity, and it explains why a living
organism is "egoistic" to the core.
$
638.
Granting that the world disposed of a quantum
of force, it is obvious that any transposition of
force to any place would affect the whole system-
thus, besides the causality of sequence, there would
also be a dependence, contiguity, and coincidence.


## p. 122 (#152) ############################################

122
THE WILL TO POWER.
"
639.
The only possible way of upholding the sense
of the concept “God” would be: to make Him
not the motive force, but the condition of maximum
power, an epoch; a point in the further develop-
ment of the Will to Power; by means of which
subsequent evolution just as much as former
evolution—up to Him-could be explained.
Viewed mechanically, the energy of collective
Becoming remains constant; regarded from the
economical standpoint, it ascends to its zenith and
then recedes therefrom in order to remain eternally
rotatory. This “ Will to Power” expresses itself
in the interpretation, in the manner in which the
strength is used. The conversion of energy into life;
“life in its highest power” thenceforward appears
as the goal. The same amount of energy,at different
stages of development, means different things.
That which determines growth in Life is the
economy which becomes ever more sparing and
methodical, which achieves ever more and more
with a steadily decreasing amount of energy. . . .
The ideal is the principle of the least possible
expense.
The only thing that is proved is that the world
is not striving towards a state of stability. Con-
sequently its zenith nust not be conceived as a
state of absolute equilibrium.
The dire necessity of the same things happening
in the course of the world, as in all other things,
is not an eternal determinism reigning over all
phenomena, but merely the expression of the fact


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
123
that the impossible is not possible; that a given
force cannot be different from that given force;
that given quantity of resisting force does not
manifest itself otherwise than in conformity with
its degree of strength;—to speak of events as
being necessary is tautological.
2. THE WILL TO POWER AS LIFE.
1
(a) The Organic Process.
640.
Man imagines that he was present at the
generation of the organic world: what was there
to be observed, with the eyes and the touch, in
regard to these processes ? How much of it can
be put into round numbers? What rules are
noticeable in the movements ? Thus, man would
fain arrange all phenomena as if they were for the
eye and for the touch, as if they were forms of
motion : he will discover formula wherewith to
simplify the unwieldy mass of these experiences.
The reduction of all phenomena to the level of
men with senses and with mathematics.
It is a
matter of making an inventory of human experiences:
granting that man, or rather the human eye and
the ability to form concepts, have been the eternal
witnesses of all things.
641.
A plurality of forces bound by a common
nutritive process we call “ Life. ” To this nutritive


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124
THE WILL TO POWER.
process all so-called feeling, thinking, and imagining
belong as means—that is to say, (1) in the form
of opposing other forces; (2) in the form of an
adjustment of other forces according to mould and
rhythm; (3) in the form of a valuation relative to
assimilation and excretion.
642.
The bond between the inorganic and the
organic world must lie in the repelling power
exercised by every atom of energy. “Life”
might be defined as a lasting form of force-estab-
lishing processes, in which the various contending
forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what
extent does counter-strife exist even in obedience ?
Individual power is by no means surrendered
through it. In the same way, there exists in the
act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the
fact that the absolute power of the adversary
has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated.
“ Obedience," and "command," are forms of the
game of war.
643.
The Will to Power interprets (an organ in
the process of formation has to be interpreted):
it defines, it determines gradations, differences of
Mere differences of power could not be
aware of each other as such: something must be
there which will grow, and which interprets all
other things that would do the same, according to
the value of the latter. In sooth, all interpreta-
power.


## p. 125 (#155) ############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
125
tion is but a means in itself to become master of
something (Continual interpretation is the first
principle of the organic process. )
644.
66
Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the
contiguity of the developed organs and functions,
with the disappearance of intermediate members-
if that is perfection, then there is a Will to Power
apparent in the organic process by means of whose
dominating, shaping, and commanding forces it is
continually increasing the sphere of its power, and
persistently simplifying things within that sphere:
it grows imperatively,
Spirit” is only a means and an instrument in
the service of higher life, in the service of the
elevation of life.
645.
"Heredity," as something quite incomprehens-
ible, cannot be used as an explanation, but only
as a designation for the identification of a problem.
And the same holds good of "adaptability. ” As
a matter of fact, the account of morphology, even
supposing it were perfect, explains nothing; it
merely describes an enormous fact.
How a given
organ gets to be used for any particular purpose
is not explained. There is just as little explained
in regard to these things by the assumption of
causæ finales as by the assumption of causæ effici-
entes. The concept causa” is only a means of
expression, no more; a means of designating a
thing.


## p. 126 (#156) ############################################

126
THE WILL TO POWER
646.
There are analogies; for instance, our memory
may suggest another kind of memory which makes
itself felt in heredity, development, and forms.
Our inventive and experimentative powers suggest
another kind of inventiveness in the application of
instruments to new ends, etc.
That which we call our "consciousness," is quite
guiltless of any of the essential processes of our
preservation and growth; and no human brain
could be so subtle as to construct anything more
than a machine to which every organic process
is infinitely superior.
647
Against Darwinism. —The use of an organ does
not explain its origin, on the contrary! During
the greater part of the time occupied in the forma-
tion of a certain quality, this quality does not help
to preserve the individual; it is of no use to him,
and particularly not in his struggle with external
circumstances and foes.
What is ultimately " useful”? It is necessary
to ask, " Useful for what? "
For instance, that which promotes the lasting
powers of the individual might be unfavourable to
his strength or his beauty; that which preserves
him might at the same time fix him and keep him
stable throughout development. On the other
hand, a deficiency, a state of degeneration, may be
of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it acts
as a stimulus to other organs.
In the same way,


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
127
a state of need may be a condition of existence, in-
asmuch as it reduces an individual to that modicum
of means which, though it keeps him together, does
not allow him to squander his strength. The in-
dividual himself is the struggle of parts (for
nourishment, space, etc. ): his development involves
the triumph, the predominance, of isolated parts;
the wasting away, or the "development into
organs," of other parts.
The influence of “environment” is nonsensically
overrated in Darwin : the essential factor in the
process of life is precisely the tremendous inner
power to shape and to create forms, which
merely uses, exploits “environment. "
The new forms built up by this inner power
are not produced with a view to any end; but, in
the struggle between the parts, a new form does
not exist long without becoming related to some
kind of semi-utility, and, according to its use,
develops itself ever more and more perfectly.
648.
"Utility” in respect of the acceleration of the
speed of evolution, is a different kind of "utility"
from that which is understood to mean the greatest
possible stability and staying power of the evolved
creature.
649.
“ Useful” in the sense of Darwinian biology
means: that which favours a thing in its struggle
with others. But in my opinion the feeling of


## p. 128 (#158) ############################################

128
THE WILL TO POWER.
being surcharged, the feeling accompanying an
increase in strength, quite apart from the utility of
the struggle, is the actual progress: from these
feelings the will to war is first derived.
650.
Physiologists should bethink themselves before
putting down the instinct of self-preservation as
the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living
thing seeks above all to discharge its strength:
“self-preservation” is only one of the results
thereof. Let us beware of superfluous teleological
principles ! -one of which is the whole concept of
"self-preservation. " *
651.
The most fundamental and most primeval activ-
ity of a protoplasm cannot be ascribed to a will
to self-preservation, for it absorbs an amount of
material which is absurdly out of proportion with
the needs of its preservation : and what is more,
it does not "preserve itself” in the process, but
actually falls to pieces. The instinct which
rules here, must account for this total absence
in the organism of a desire to preserve itself :
"hunger" is already an interpretation based upon
the observation of a more or less complex organ-
isin (hunger is a specialised and later form of
the instinct; it is an expression of the system of
divided labour, in the service of a higher instinct
which rules the whole).
.
.
* See Beyond Good and Evil, in this edition, Aph. 13.


## p. 129 (#159) ############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
129
652.
be so.
It is just as impossible to regard hunger as the
primum mobile, as it is to take self-preservation to
Hunger, considered as the result of in-
sufficient nourishment, means hunger as the result
of a will to power which can no longer dominate.
It is not a question of replacing a loss,—it is only
later on, as the result of the division of labour,
when the Will to Power has discovered other and
quite different ways of gratifying itself, that the
appropriating lust of the organism is reduced to
hunger to the need of replacing what has been
lost.
653
We can but laugh at the false “Altruism" of
biologists : propagation among the amabæ ap-
pears as a process of jetsam, as an advantage to
them. It is an excretion of useless matter.
654
The division of a protoplasm into two takes
place when its power is no longer sufficient to
subjugate the matter it has appropriated: pro-
creation is the result of impotence.
In the cases in which the males seek the females
and become one with them, procreation is the re-
sult of hunger.
655.
The weaker vessel is driven to the stronger from
a need of nourishment; it desires to get under it,
I
VOL. II.


## p. 130 (#160) ############################################

130
THE WILL TO POWER.
if possible to become one with it.
The stronger,
on the contrary, defends itself from others; it refuses
to perish in this way; it prefers rather to split itself
into two or more parts in the process of growing.
One may conclude that the greater the urgency
seems to become one with something else, the
more weakness in some form is present. The
greater the tendency to variety, difference, inner
decay, the more strength is actually to hand.
The instinct to cleave to something, and the
instinct to repel something, are in the inorganic as
in the organic world, the uniting bond. The whole
distinction is a piece of hasty judgment.
The will to power in every combination of forces,
defending itself against the stronger and coming
down unmercifully upon the weaker, is more correct.
N. B. -All processes may be regarded as “ beings. "
)
656.
The will to power can manifest itself only
against obstacles; it therefore goes in search of
what resists it—this is the primitive tendency of
the protoplasm when it extends its pseudopodia
and feels about it. The act of appropriation and
assimilation is, above all, the result of a desire
to overpower, a process of forming, of additional
building and rebuilding, until at last the subjected
creature has become completely a part of the
superior creature's sphere of power, and has in-
creased the latter. -If this process of incorporation
does not succeed, then the whole organism falls to
pieces; and the separation occurs as the result of the
will to power : in order to prevent the escape of that
-


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
131
which has been subjected, the will to power falls into
two wills (under some circumstances without even
abandoning completely its relation to the two).
“Hunger" is only a more narrow adaptation,
once the fundamental instinct of power has won
power of a more abstract kind.
.
657.
What is "passive"? To be hindered in the
outward movement of
grasping: it is thus an
act of resistance and
reaction.
What is “active"? . To stretch out for power.
Nutrition"
Is only a derived pheno-
menon; the primitive
form of it was the will
to stuff everything in-
side one's own skin.
Procreation" :: Only derived; originally,
in those cases in which
one will was unable to
organise the collective
mass it had appropri-
ated, an opposing will
came into power, which
undertook to effect the
separation and estab-
lish a new centre of
organisation, after a
struggle with the ori-
ginal will.
9


## p. 132 (#162) ############################################

132
THE WILL TO POWER.
“ Pleasure”
Is a feeling of power
(presupposing the ex-
istence of pain).
658.
(1) The organic functions shown to be but forms
of the fundamental will, the will to power, and
buds thereof.
(2) The will to power specialises itself as will to
nutrition, to property, to tools, to servants (obedi-
ence), and to rulers: the body as an example. —
The stronger will directs the weaker. There is no
other form of causality than that of will to will.
It is not to be explained mechanically.
(3) Thinking, feeling, willing, in all living organ-
isms. What is a desire if it be not: a provoca-
tion of the feeling of power by an obstacle (or, better
still, by rhythmical obstacles and resisting forces)
-so that it surges through it? Thus in all plea-
sure pain is understood. -If the pleasure is to be
very great, the pains preceding it must have been
very long, and the whole bow of life must have
been strained to the utmost.
(4) Intellectual functions. The will to shaping,
forming, and making like, etc.
(6) Man.
659.
With the body as clue. -Granting that the" soul”
was only an attractive and mysterious thought,


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
133
-wer
ex-
ms
nd
to
i-
o
1.
from which philosophers rightly, but reluctantly,
separated themselves—that which they have since
learnt to put in its place is perhaps even more
attractive and even more mysterious. The human
body, in which the whole of the most distant and
most recent past of all organic life once more
becomes living and corporal, seems to flow through
this past and right over it like a huge and inaud-
ible torrent: the body is a more wonderful thought
than the old " soul. " In all ages the body, as our
actual property, as our most certain being, in short,
as our ego, has been more earnestly believed in
than the spirit (or the "soul,” or the subject, as
the school jargon now calls it). It has never
occurred to any one to regard his stomach as a
strange or a divine stomach; but that there is a
tendency and a predilection in man to regard all
his thoughts as "inspired,” all his values as “im-
parted to him by a God," all his instincts as
dawning activities—this is proved by the evidence
of every age in man's history. Even now, especi-
ally among artists, there may very often be noticed
a sort of wonder, and a deferential hesitation to
decide, when the question occurs to them, by what
means they achieved their happiest work, and
from which world the creative thought came down
to them: when they question in this way, they
are possessed by a feeling of guilelessness and
childish shyness. They dare not say: “That came
from me; it was my hand which threw that die. ”
Conversely, even those philosophers and theolo-
gians, who in their logic and piety found the most
imperative reasons for regarding their body as a
:
!


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134
THE WILL TO POWER.
deception (and even as a deception overcome and
disposed of), could not help recognising the foolish
fact that the body still remained : and the most
unexpected proofs of this are to be found partly in
Pauline and partly in Vedantic philosophy. But
what does strength of faith ultimately mean?
Nothing ! -A strong faith might also be a foolish
faith There is food for reflection.
And supposing the faith in the body were ulti-
mately but the result of a conclusion; supposing
it were a false conclusion, as idealists declare it is,
would it not then involve some doubt concerning
the trustworthiness of the spirit itself which thus
causes us to draw wrong conclusions ?
Supposing the plurality of things, and space,
and time, and motion (and whatever the other
first principles of a belief in the body may be)
were errors—what suspicions would not then be
roused against the spirit which led us to form such
first principles ? Let it suffice that the belief in
the body is, at any rate for the present, a much
stronger belief than the belief in the spirit, and he
who would fain undermine it assails the authority
of the spirit most thoroughly in so doing!
660.
The Body as an Empire.
The aristocracy in the body, the majority of the
rulers (the fight between the cells and the tissues).
Slavery and the division of labour : the higher
type alone possible through the subjection of the
lower to a function.


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
135
Pleasure and pain, not contraries. The feeling
of power.
"Nutrition” only a result of the insatiable lust
of appropriation in the Will to Power.
“ Procreation ": this is the decay which super-
venes when the ruling cells are too weak to organ-
ise appropriated material.
It is the moulding force which will have a con-
tinual supply of new material (more" force ”). The
masterly construction of an organism out of an egg.
“The mechanical interpretation”: recognises
only quantities: but the real energy is in the
quality. Mechanics can therefore only describe
processes; it cannot explain them.
Purpose. ” We should start out from the
sagacity” of plants.
The concept of “meliorism”: not only greater
complexity, but greater power it need not be only
greater masses).
Conclusion concerning the evolution of man:
the road to perfection lies in the bringing forth of
the most powerful individuals, for whose use the
great masses would be converted into mere tools
(that is to say, into the most intelligent and flex-
ible tools possible).
66
661.
Why is all activity, even that of a sense, associ-
ated with pleasure? Because, before the activity
was possible, an obstacle or a burden was done
away with. Or, rather, because all action is a
process of overcoming, of becoming master of, and
of increasing the feeling of power ? — The pleasure


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136
THE WILL TO POWER.
of thought. —Ultimately it is not only the feeling
of power, but also the pleasure of creating and of
contemplating the creation : for all activity enters
our consciousness in the form of “works. ”
662.
Creating is an act of selecting and of finishing
the thing selected. (In every act of the will, this
is the essential element. )
663
All phenomena which are the result of intentions
may be reduced to the intention of increasing power,
664.
When we do anything, we are conscious of a
feeling of strength; we often have this sensation
before the act—that is to say, while imagining the
thing to do (as, for instance, at the sight of an
enemy, of an obstacle, which we feel equal to): it
is always an accompanying sensation. Instinc-
tively we think that this feeling of strength is the
cause of the action, that it is the “motive force. ”
Our belief in causation is the belief in force and
its effect; it is a transcript of our experience: in
which we identify force and the feeling of force. -
Force, however, never moves things; the strength
which is conscious “ does not set the muscles mov-
ing. " "Of such a process we have no experience,
no idea. ” “We experience as little concerning
)


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
WILL
137
>
force as a motive power, as concerning the necessity
of a movement. ” Force is said to be the con-
straining element ! “ All we know is that one
thing follows another ;-we know nothing of
either compulsion or arbitrariness in regard to the
one following the other. ” Causality is first in-
vented by thinking compulsion into the sequence
of processes. A certain "understanding" of the
“”
thing is the result—that is to say, we humanise
the process a little, we make it more “ familiar”;
the familiar is the known habitual fact of human
compulsion associated with the feeling of force.
665.
I have the intention of extending my arm;
taking it for granted that I know as little of the
physiology of the human body and of the mechani-
cal laws of its movements as the man in the street,
what could there be more vague, more bloodless,
more uncertain than this intention compared with
what follows it? And supposing I were the
astutest of mechanics, and especially conversant
with the formulæ which are applicable in this case,
I should not be able to extend my arm one whit
the better. Our“ knowledge” and our "action”
"
in this case lie coldly apart: as though in two
different regions. --Again: Napoleon carries out
a plan of campaign—what does that mean? In
this case, everything concerning the consummation
of the campaign is known, because everything must
be done through words of command: but even
here subordinates are taken for granted, who apply
-


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138
THE WILL TO POWER.
and adapt the general plan to the particular emer-
gency, to the degree of strength, etc.
666.
.
For ages we have always ascribed the value of
an action, of a character, of an existence, to the
intention, to the purpose for which it was done,
acted, or lived: this primeval idiosyncrasy of taste
ultimately takes a dangerous turn-provided the
lack of intention and purpose in all phenomena
comes ever more to the front in consciousness.
With it a general depreciation of all values seems
to be preparing: “All is without sense. ”—This
melancholy phrase means: “All sense lies in the
intention, and if the intention is absolutely lacking,
then sense must be lacking too. " In conformity
with this valuation, people were forced to place the
value of life in a “ life after death,” or in the pro-
gressive development of ideas, or of mankind, or of
the people, or of man to superman; but in this
way the progressus in infinitum of purpose had
been reached : it was ultimately necessary to find
one's self a place in the process of the world
(perhaps with the disdæmonistic outlook, it was
a process which led to nonentity).
In regard to this point, “purpose" needs a some-
what more severe criticism : it ought to be recog-
nised that an action is never caused by a purpose;
that an object and the means thereto are inter-
pretations, by means of which certain points in a
phenomena are selected and accentuated, at the
cost of other, more numerous, points; that every


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
139
a
time something is done for a purpose, something
fundamentally different, and yet other things
happen; that in regard to the action done with a
purpose, the case is the same as with the so-called
purposefulness of the heat which is radiated from
the sun: the greater part of the total sum is squan-
dered; a portion of it, which is scarcely worth
reckoning, has a "purpose," has “sense"; that
an “ end" with its “means is an absurdly in-
definite description, which indeed may be able to
command as a precept, as “ will,” but presupposes
a system of obedient and trained instruments,
which, in the place of the indefinite, puts forward
a host of determined entities (i. e. we imagine a
system of clever but narrow intellects who postu-
late end and means, in order to be able to grant
our only known “end,” the role of the cause of
an action,”—a proceeding to which we have no
right: it is tantamount to solving a problem by
placing its solution in an inaccessible world which
we cannot observe).
Finally, why could not an "end" be merely an
accompanying feature in the series of changes
among the active forces which bring about the
action-a pale stenographic symbol stretched in
consciousness beforehand, and which serves as a
guide to what happens, even as a symbol of what
happens, not as its cause ? —But in this way we
criticise will itself: is it not an illusion to regard
that which enters consciousness as will-power. as
a cause ? Are not all conscious phenomena only
final phenomena—the lost links in a chain, but
apparently conditioning one another in their


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140
THE WILL TO POWER.
sequence within the plane of consciousness? This
might be an illusion.
6
667.
Science does not inquire what impels us to
will: on the contrary, it denies that willing takes
place at all, and supposes that something quite
different has happened-in short, that the belief in
« will ” and “end” is an illusion. It does not in-
quire into the motives of an action, as if these had
been present in consciousness previous to the
action : but it first divides the action up into a
group of phenomena, and then seeks the previous
history of this mechanical movement, but not in
the terms of feeling, perception, and thought; from
this quarter it can never accept the explanation:
perception is precisely the matter of science, which
has to be explained. The problem of science is
precisely to explain the world, without taking
perceptions as the cause: for that would mean
regarding perceptions themselves as the cause of
perceptions. The task of science is by no means
accomplished.
Thus: either there is no such thing as will,—
the hypothesis of science, or the will is free. The
latter assumption represents the prevailing feeling,
of which we cannot rid ourselves, even if the hypo-
thesis of science were proved.
The popular belief in cause and effect is founded
on the principle that free will is the cause of every
effect : thereby alone do we arrive at the feeling
of causation. And thereto belongs also the feeling
that every cause is not an effect, but always only


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
14L
a cause
-if will is the cause, “Our acts of will
are not necessary"—this lies in the very concept of
« will. " The effect necessarily comes after the
cause that is what we feel. It is merely a
hypothesis that even our willing is compulsory in
every case.
668.
“To will ” is not “to desire," to strive, to aspire
to; it distinguishes itself from that through the
passion of commanding.
There is no such thing as "willing," but only the
willing of something: the aion must not be severed
from the state—as the epistemologists sever it.
“Willing," as they understand it, is no more OS-
sible than " thinking": it is a pure invention.
It is essential to willing that something should
be commanded (but that does not mean that the
will is carried into effect).
The general state of tension, by virtue of which
a force seeks to discharge itself, is not “willing. ”.