St Thomé is not four miles from Madras, so
that its possession was a vital matter for the English.
that its possession was a vital matter for the English.
Cambridge History of India - v5 - British India
12.
3 Lettres édifiantes et curieuses (ed. Martin), , 701.
4 Madras to the Company [ ], February, 1742; Pondichery to the French
Company; 1 October, 1741.
## p. 119 (#147) ############################################
CONFUSION IN THE CARNATIC
119
demanding a contribution from his cousin Murtaza 'Ali, who was
the commandant of the place. Murtaza 'Ali thought the time ripe
for the transfer of power into his own more crafty hands. He first
attempted to poison his cousin; that failing, he put him to death by
violence, and attempted to seize the government of Arcot. But he
lacked the nerve to carry through what he had begun. Alarmed by
the attitude of the people and troops, he suddenly abandoned the
capital and disguised as a woman made his way hurriedly back to
Vellore with its crocodile-defended moat. For the moment Safdar's
young son, who had been left for safety's sake by his father at Madras
with the English, was recognised as nawab, and the administration
was carried on by his father's ministers. But these disorders had
attracted the attention of Nizam-ul-mulk. He appointed a nawab, and
early in 1743 entered the Carnatic in person to restore order. He
expelled the garrison which the Marathas had left in Trichinopoly;
and finally, his first nominee having died, he appointed an old servant
of his, Anwar-ud-din Khan, to the government of Arcot. But the task
of restoring order was beyond any but the most vigorous. Relatives
of the old family still held most of the chief fortresses and enjoyed
large jagirs; and although Safdar 'Ali's son was opportunely murdered
at Arcot, Anwar-ud-din's position seemed hardly more secure than
Safdar 'Ali's had been. The whole country was in a state of uncer-
tainty, expecting some great event, though none knew what.
Following on these ominous events came the news of the decla-
ration of war between France and England. Four years earlier it
would have opened very much to the advantage of the French in the
eastern seas. At that time, when war seemed close at hand, La
Bourdonnais, the governor of Mauritius, had been sent out with a
squadron intended to operate against the English trade; but when
the crisis passed, the squadron was recalled; and so it happened that,
when war really broke out, the French had no ships of force in Indian
waters, and the small squadron equipped by the English immediately
after the declaration of war? found nothing on its arrival at the close
of the year capable of resisting it. Dupleix, who had become governor
of Pondichery in 1742, had hoped to be able to arrange one of those
irregular understandings such as had been reached between Madras
and Pondichery in the previous war, for a neutrality in India. He
addressed the three English presidencies in this sense before any news
of the English squadron had been received. In this he was following
the policy of his masters, the French directors, who had announced
their willingness to enter into an understanding with the English
Company. But a proposal so calculated to favour the interests of the
weaker naval power had been rejected; and the English in India,
while willing enough to disclaim hostile designs, which indeed they
1 Madras Consultations, 26 June, 1744. Cf. Orme MSS, Various, xv, 74.
2 Minute of 22 March, 1743/4 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 33004, f. 78).
## p. 120 (#148) ############################################
120
THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
1
had not the power to execute, warned Dupleix that they would have
no control over any king's ships that might arrive. His sanguine mind
interpreted this answer as an acceptance of his proposals; and when
the news came that English ships under Barnett had not only captured
the Company's China fleet but also some richly laden country vessels
in which he was largely interested, he felt very unreasonably that he
had been tricked by the English.
But if the French had thus lost the first hand in the game, they
still had something in reserve. It might be impossible to fit and equip
ships on the harbourless coast of Coromandel; but at Mauritius they
had an excellent harbour, and governor of genius. Dupleix had at
first desired a policy of neutrality because it was well adapted to the
interests of himself and of his settlement. But since neutrality could
not be had, the next best thing was to call on La Bourdonnais to come
to the rescue. There were a number of French Company's ships at
Port Louis; and these, though not swift sailers, were stout vessels
quite capable of taking their place in a line of battle. The deficiency
of men was made good by sending a number of coffrees from Mada.
gascar on board; and with one or two country ships to act as frigates,
La Bourdonnais, after some delay and one or two mishaps, succeeded
in reaching the coast with his improvised squadron. He found the
English ships weakened by their long absence from the dockyard,
with their crews depleted by the climate, and above all with their
original leader dead and succeeded by his senior captain, Peyton, the
most unenterprising of seamen. Moreover, one of his four ships of
the line, the Medway, which had been leaky even before she left
England, had to keep her pumps perpetually going. Against them
La Bourdonnais could place eight ships in the line. But the odds
were not nearly so heavy as that. The English ships were the better
sailers and more heavily armed. The French thus might have been
out-sailed and out-ranged. But Peyton failed to use his advantages.
After an indecisive action on 25 June, 1746, he made off for Ceylon,
partly in the hopes of refitting, partly in the hopes of meeting with
reinforcements and perhaps a senior captain to take the responsibility.
In August he returned to the coast, and again sighted La Bourdon-
nais's squadron. The latter had taken advantage of the interval to
increase his armament from the stores of Pondichery; and this so
alarmed the English commodore that after a hasty visit to Pulicat,
which he made in error for Madras, he left the coast and sailed for
safety to the Hugli, where he lay until the arrival of reinforcements
took the command out of his hands.
His departure delivered Madras into the hands of the French.
A besieging force could only be collected by taking a large number
of men out of the ships; so that had Peyton even resolved to remain
1 Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive, pp. 5 sqq.
2 Orders to Sir Charles Hardy, 19 March, 1743/4 (P. R. O. Adm. 2-61, f. 103).
## p. 121 (#149) ############################################
CAPTURE OF MADRAS
12)
upon the coast
without coming to action, his presence would have
prevented the French from making any considerable attempt. But
his absence freed them from all apprehensions. La Bourdonnais
appeared with his ships and a part of the Pondichery garrison before
Madras on 4/15 September; it surrendered to him, after two English-
men and four others had been killed by the fire of the besiegers, on
the 10/21. Thus the military conduct of the English on this occasion
was about on a level with their conduct at sea. But it should be
added that the defences of Madras were built rather to protect the
place from incursions of horse than to resist a siege in form; and the
garrison was weak, untrained, and commanded by officers who did
not know their business. 2
This resounding success led immediately to disputes between the
two French governors, Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, about the dis-
posal of the place. It had surrendered under an informal promise of
ransom; and in the discussions about the sum that should be paid,
mention had certainly been made of a present to La Bourdonnais;
but if that scheme were carried out, Dupleix and his friends at Pon-
dichery would reap no advantages from the assistance they had
given to the expedition. They therefore put forward a proposal that
the place should be kept. Although the matter has often been argued
as though national interests had been at stake, the question was really,
Who was to make money out of Madras? 3 La Bourdonnais insisted
on carrying out his original plan, and concluded a ransom treaty with
the Madras council. Dupleix, after trying to seize the captured city
by force, appeared to give way. But their discussions had prolonged
the stay of the French vessels at Madras. On 2/13 October, a hurri-
cane broke on the coast; crippling La Bourdonnais's squadron, and
obliging him to leave behind him a considerable number of men
who thus passed under the command of Dupleix. On his departure
Dupleix denounced the treaty which had been made; and the garrison
and company's servants of Pondichery secured the opportunity for
which they had hoped of plundering Madras from top to bottom. *
Meanwhile, on his arrival in France, La Bourdonnais was imprisoned
on the charges which Dupleix had sent home against him; and seems
at last to have secured his release by the influence of the Pompadour. "
The nawab Anwar-ud-din had not regarded these events with
unconcern. Indeed, his interference had been asked by each of the
two nations in turn. At first it was Dupleix who wanted him to
prevent the English from seizing French ships at sea; and in order if
possible to scare their men-of-war into inaction, he procured permis-
sion for a country ship in which he was interested to sail under the
1 Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, II, 425.
2 Barnett to Anson, 16 September, 1745 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 15955, f. 113).
8 Dodwell, op. cit. pp. 15 sqq.
4 Idem, pp. 18-19.
B Correspondance de Mme de Pompadour, p. 5.
## p. 122 (#150) ############################################
122
THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
nawab's flag. Barnett, of course, treated such devices as they deserved.
The nawab addressed letters of complaint to the Madras council, who
explained that they had no power to control the conduct of the com-
mander of the king's ships. After a while the matter was dropped;
and as Dupleix had no more ships to send to sea, it could not recur.
Then, when the French had secured control of the sea, and were
preparing to attack Madras, it was the turn of the English to invoke
the help of Arcot. It has been said that their application failed, be-
cause they neglected to send a proportionable present with their
request; but I have elsewhere shown that that account is not war-
ranted by the facts. The nawab sent a warning to Dupleix which he
ignored. When La Bourdonnais was still before Madras, the nawab
demanded that the French troops should be recalled; and Dupleix
coolly replied that he was only conquering the place in order to put
it into the nawab's hands. When La Bourdonnais had just entered
Fort St George, the nawab again demanded his withdrawal, and
finally sent troops to compel obedience to his commands. It was as
vigorous and prompt action as could have been expected by the most
sanguine; and had Madras made a good defence, the French would
still have been lying before the walls when the nawab's troops arrived.
As it was they found the French flag flying, and all they could do was
to attempt to starve the French into evacuation. But as soon as the
latter found themselves inconvenienced by the blockade, a sally was
made under La Tour, who scattered his assailants and made them
retire to St Thomé. Similar success was obtained by Paradis, who was
marching up with reinforcements. The nawab's troops, still in St
Thomé, tried to bar his way on the little Adyar river; but were hustled
out of the way as unceremoniously by Paradis as they had been by La
Tour. By this time musketry and field artillery had developed so far
that cavalry could make no impression on troops that kept their ranks
and reserved their fire. The terror of Asiatic armies had disappeared.
The capture of Madras marked the limit of French achievements
in the course of this war. For eighteen months after the fall of Madras
Dupleix tried in vain to capture Fort St David, only a few miles south
of Pondichery, and certainly no more capable of defence than Madras
had been. But he tried in vain. On one occasion even the French
troops broke and fled on the apprehension that the nawab's horse,
sent to assist the English, were moving to threaten their retreat.
Dupleix came to terms with the nawab; he gave him considerable
presents, and even agreed to allow the nawab's flag to fly for a week
over Madras in token of his submission. But even then when the
nawab's sons had retired from the neighbourhood of Fort St David,
Dupleix still could not take the place. The fact was, that with the
departure of La Bourdonnais the command of the sea had returned
.
1 Dodwell, ap. cit. p. 13.
2 Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, m, 394.
## p. 123 (#151) ############################################
SIEGE OF PONDICHERY
123
to the English; a new commander, Griffin, had arrived; and as soon
as Dupleix approached the English settlement, his topmasts were sure
to appear above the horizon, and the French would hurriedly retreat
lest he should make an attempt on Pondichery in their absence.
But for such fruitless episodes the year 1747, and the first half of
1748, passed away without incident. In June, however, affairs began
to move. First there appeared a French squadron, under Bouvet,
which lured Griffin from before. Fort St David, where he was lying,
only to disappear altogether from the coast after landing treasure for
the French at Madras, while the English ships lay before Pondichery
to prevent the enemy from landing there. Then early in August came
in gradually the large expedition which had been fitted out in England
in order to avenge the capture of Madras. It was commanded by
Rear-admiral Boscawen, and consisted of not only six ships of the
line and as many smaller vessels, but also of land forces some 1000
strong. Together with the vessels already in the East Indies this was
ample on the naval side; but the land forces were of inferior metal.
They had been hastily got together for the occasion; the companies
into which they were divided had been raised in part by drafts from
regiments in Ireland, in part by officers specially commissioned on
condition of raising a certain number of men in Scotland. These had
found it very difficult to comply with their promises; and in the long-
run their companies had to be completed by deserters, criminals, or
rebels pardoned on condition of enlistment, so that, although by
landing his marines and parties of his sailors, Boscawen could assem-
ble a large force of men, they were not trained military material. ”
It was decided to begin operations by besieging Pondichery; and
had the siege been skilfully conducted, it should have succeeded. But
it was managed with a singular want of skill. Unluckily the only
officers of experience were disabled or taken prisoner before the siege
itself was formed; and the survey made by the engineers was con-
ducted from so safe a distance that th . y could not judge the strength
of the works or the nature of the ground. So it came to pass that the
besiegers formed their camp on ground westward of the city, whither
all the stores had to be carried with great labour, instead of beginning
their approaches on the shore where they would have been covered
by the guns of their own squadron. Then also they began their
trenches at so great a distance from the town that they were unable
to batter the walls, and on ground separated from it by a swamp, so
that their works could not be advanced near enough to begin to batter
in breach. The attack on Pondichery was scarcely managed with
more skill than the defence of Madras. The French on the other
hand defended themselves with vigour. Their sorties harassed the
besiegers. Their fire remained stronger everywhere than that brought
1 Fox to Pitt, 6 June, 1747 (P. R. O. , W. O. 4-43); same to Capt. Forbes, 7
July, 1747 (idem); same to Calcraft, 21 September, 1747 (idem).
## p. 124 (#152) ############################################
124
THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
to bear on them. Finding the land siege progress so slowly, Boscawen
resolved to try the effect of bombarding the place with his squadron
But his fire was ineffective; the weather was evidently breaking up
for the monsoon; many of his men were in hospital; and at last, at the
beginning of October, he decided to raise the siege and return to Fort
St David, where his men could be placed under cover. It was a con-
spicuous success for Dupleix, and a conspicuous failure for the English.
While Boscawen was lying at Fort St David waiting for the
weather to allow his recommencing operations, news arrived that the
preliminaries of peace had been signed in Europe. This naturally
brought all operations to an end; all prisoners were released on their
parole; and when at last copies of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle
arrived with the necessary papers and instructions, Madras was
solemnly handed back to the English, and Boscawen sailed back to
Europe. But in spite of this trivial ending affairs were in a very
different state from that in which they had been at the beginning of
the war. The English, for instance, held Madras under the terms of
a treaty, and never again paid for it the stipulated quit-rent of 1200
pagodas a year, of which they speedily procured a discharge from the
claimant to the Carnatic whose cause they espoused. The French
had secured a high and deserved reputation for their military con-
duct. They had defied Anwar-ud-din, and he had been unable to
coerce them into doing as he demanded. So that while the events
which had just preceded the war showed how uncertain and unsettled
the Indian government of South India had become, the events of the
war itself showed that the Europeans were quite equal to taking a
decisive part in Indian affairs, and that they had little to fear from
any armies that Indian princes were likely at that time to bring
against them. The power which was preponderant at sea might thus
become preponderant on land. And the fertile and ingenious mind of
Dupleix had for the first time been set to the serious consideration of
the Indian political problem. Moreover, the storm which had obliged
La Bourdonnais to leave behind him a considerable body of his men
had in that manner augmented the forces at the disposal of Dupleix.
So that the war did indeed set the stage for the great projects which
he began to develop in the very year in which he gave back Madras
to the English.
## p. 125 (#153) ############################################
CHAPTER VI
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
AL
LTHOUGH by the terms of the peace Madras had been handed
back to the English, it did not become once more the seat of their
government until 6/17 April, 1752. Till then their affairs continued
to be directed from Fort St David, close to Pondichery. One would
have thought that so exhausting a war would have imposed on both
the neighbours an equal need of living well together; the necessity of
reviving trade must have been felt as much by the English governor
Floyer as by the French governor Dupleix, and Floyer was not the
man to seek quarrels for their own sake. But good will is not always
enough to avoid or prevent conflict. Blind forces, which we sometimes
call chance and sometimes destiny, may suddenly produce new causes
of rivalry that seem innocent until the future has proved their venom.
The English had not even re-entered Madras before. both governors
had each on his own account engaged in relations with Indian princes
closely similar in nature but quite distinct, and which were with
little delay to bring them into direct collision.
Quite independently Floyer and Dupleix had taken sides in local
quarrels at almost the same moment and in common defiance of the
policy laid down with similar emphasis alike at Paris and at London.
Peace had left both with unemployed bodies of troops who were
expensive to maintain but who could not be sent back to Europe
because the shipping season had not arrived. Neither governor there-
fore was sorry to relieve himself of heavy charges by temporarily
placing these troops at the disposal of princes who would contribute
to their maintenance.
It was Floyer who in all seeming led the way. Early in 1749
Shahji, a dispossessed claimant of the throne of Tanjore, offered the
English Devikottai on condition of their helping him to recover the
throne. 1 Devikottai was a little place of small importance at the
mouth of the Coleroon. The English fancied that its possession would
make them masters of the navigable part of the river and enable
them to control the inland trade. A first expedition sent in April .
under Captain Cope failed; the troops of the legitimate sovereign,
Pratab Singh, offered an unexpected resistance. But a second, better
prepared and led by Major Lawrence in person, succeeded; after a
few days of siege Devikottai surrendered (23 June). The English
kept it with the country belonging to it; and as for Shahji no one
thought of restoring him to his throne. This occupation of Devikottai
1 Fort St David Consultations. 10 April, 1749.
## p. 126 (#154) ############################################
126
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
was nothing more than a belated and rather futile reply to the occu-
pation of Karikal by Governor Dumas some ten years earlier. It
restored in that part of the Carnatic the balance which had inclined
in the favour of the French.
Quite other was the importance of the expedition that Dupleix
was contemplating and preparing to execute at the same time. In the
month of March he had learnt that Chanda Sahib, who had been a
prisoner with the Marathas for the last seven years, had just been set
free and was preparing to recover the possessions of his family in
concert with Muzaffar Jang (grandson of Nizam-ul-mulk who had
died in 1748) who laid claim to the succession of his grandfather. The
two princes were making common cause, and Chanda Sahib had sent
his son, Raza Sahib, to Pondichery to obtain from Dupleix the assist-
ance of troops whom the confederates agreed to pay. Dupleix had
a grievance against the actual nawab, Anwar-ud-din Khan, who had
assisted his enemies during the siege of Pondichery. He therefore
accepted with the utmost secrecy the offers made to him on condition
of not taking the field until the two princes were themselves prepared
to begin hostilities. At last, on 13 July, matters reached the point at
which a public agreement could be made, and three days later the
troops under d'Auteuil began their march on Vellore, where the allies
were to concentrate. Dupleix hoped to conclude matters quickly
enough to be able to confront the Company with fortunately accom-
plished facts, so that there would be room for nothing but praise
of his initiative.
All at first went well. The French having joined their allies
defeated and slew Anwar-ud-din Khan at the battle of Ambur, south-
east of Vellore, on 3 August. After this victory Muzaffar Jang and
Chanda Sahib, grateful for the help accorded them, came to offer
their thanks to Dupleix at Pondichery, and granted him in full righ!
the territories of Villiyanallur and Bahur, which more than doubled
the French Company's possessions round Pondichery, and they added
to this on the Orissa Coast the province of Masulipatam and the
island of Divy.
In indirect
answer to these grants Admiral Boscawen took pos-
session of St Thomé, where he suspected Dupleix also meant to
establish his authority.
St Thomé is not four miles from Madras, so
that its possession was a vital matter for the English. Already men
were not paying too much attention to the question, who was the
rightful owner of desirable territory? Dupleix held that St Thomé
belonged to Chanda Sahib; Boscawen to Muhammad 'Ali, son and
heir of Anwar-ud-din Khan, though he had inherited little power
enough. After the battle of Ambur, he had taken refuge at Trichino-
poly, where he was preparing to oppose Chanda Sahib and his allies.
The English, feeling that it was in their interest to support him, from
October onwards sent him help. Dupleix too understood that he
would never be the real master of the Carnatic under Chanda' Sahib's
## p. 127 (#155) ############################################
NASIR JANG
127
name until he had got rid of Muhammad 'Ali. In November, there
fore, he sent troops against Trichinopoly under the command of his
brother-in-law d'Auteuil; but instead of finishing the war by reducing
that town as quickly as possible, the French, at the suggestion of their
allies, turned off against Tanjore, whence they hoped to draw a large
tribute for the maintenance of their forces a consideration not
lacking importance. That town, the capital of the kingdom of the
same name, resisted all attacks, and kept the allies before it for three
months. The English openly encouraged the king in his resistance,
and led him to expect prompt help from Nasir Jang, the rival subahdar
of the Deccan.
Nasir Jang was Nizam-ul-mulk's son and so Muzaffar Jang's uncle.
As at the time of his father's death he had been able to seize the
treasury, he had also been able to secure his accession, and was pre-
paring to dispute his nephew's claims, both of them resting their
rights on a real or alleged investiture by the Moghul. Nasir Jang
had not at first understood all the importance of the battle of Ambur,
and, in spite of the English invitations, had hesitated to take part in
a war which after all was not being fought in the Deccan. He only
made up his mind when the danger seemed to threaten himself, and
at the beginning of 1750 he appeared on the borders of the Carnatic.
His approach compelled the French and Chanda Sahib to raise the
siege of Tanjore and to retire on Pondichery; while the English took
advantage of this retreat to occupy Tiruvendipuram, which adjoins
Cuddalore.
The opposing armies found themselves face to face at the end of
March, on the banks of the Jinji river, near Valudavur. Nasir Jang
had been joined by a few English under Captain Cope, and a battle
seemed inevitable, when thirteen French officers, struck with panic,
fled to Pondichery on the night of 4 April, and Muzaffar Jang cast
himself on the generosity of his uncle, who made him prisoner. The
French army was also obliged to withdraw, but nevertheless Dupleix
was able to offer his enemy an unbroken front at the bounds of Pon-
dichery, After some short and fruitless negotiations, Dupleix suddenly
decided on a night attack on Nasir Jang's camp, which was thrown
into panic. That prince, having secured his nephew, thought nothing
more was to be gained by fighting with the French, and so quietly
retired to Arcot, where for the next six months he lay inactive. In
vain did the English and Muhammad 'Ali implore him again to take
the field. He only decided to do so when he learnt that Dupleix had
occupied Tiruviti, Villupuram, and Jinji, and was moving towards
Arcot. The capture of Jinji, thought impregnable but which Bussy
took by a brilliant feat of arms, 12 September, 1750, profoundly
disquieted him. The English, as they had already done at St Thomé
and Tiruvendipuram, replied to the occupation of these places by
procuring for themselves a more or less regular cession of Poonamallee
## p. 128 (#156) ############################################
128
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
near Madras. As for Nasir Jang, after having painfully set out, he
was surprised on the night of 16 December by the French army under
La Touche. To this had contributed the treachery of the nawabs of
Karnul, Savanur, and Cuddapah, and certain other nobles. Aban-
doned by some of his troops, Nasir Jang was slain on the field of
battle, and Muzaffar Jang, who had been brought prisoner with him,
was at once recognised as subahdar. Legitimacy had once more
changed sides.
Muzaffar Jang returned to Pondichery as if to receive a sort of
investiture from Dupleix, whose power increased daily. To the grants
already made was added the province of Nizampatam on the Orissa
Coast; Dupleix was recognised as governor of all India south of the
Krishna; and, certain of not being allowed to reign over his own
states in peace, Muzaffar Jang demanded a few Europeans to accom-
pany him to his capital and aid him to consolidate his power. Dupleix
reckoned that his triumphs permitted him now to ignore Muhammad
'Ali, whom he could settle with either by treaty or by force, and so
consented. On 15 January, 1751, Bussy, his best officer, set out for
the Deccan, with orders to support at any cost the prince to whom
the French owed the titles on which they relied for the legitimate
possession of the country. Dupleix thought, with a certain naïveté,
that the English and Muhammad 'Ali would bow before his claims
and allow him to regulate the affairs of the Carnatic at his pleasure.
Unluckily for him Floyer was no longer governor of Fort St David.
He had been replaced (28 September, 1750) by Saunders, formerly
chief of Vizagapatam. Saunders was a man cold, silent, and reserved,
a man of action rather than of speech. Like his predecessors he had
orders to keep aloof from political affairs; but he felt that, if he left
Dupleix free to act, it would be all over with British trade. Having
adopted a formal resolution in council, he encouraged Muhammad
'Ali not to accept the proposals then being made to him from Pondi-
chery, and on his advice that prince conducted himself with such
seeming frankness that he deceived Dupleix himself while the English
were making ready their men and munitions.
At last in May, 1751, before the French had made any movement,
Captain Gingens set out with 800 or 900 Europeans to support
Muhammad 'Ali. Dupleix, understanding that he had been tricked,
as indeed he had half suspected, dispatched in his turn a little army
with orders to capture Trichinopoly. Then began a long, fatiguing,
and commonly monotonous war for the possession of that town, before
which the French wasted their strength. The two European armies
of course did not appear as principals, but only as auxiliaries, the one
of Chanda Sahib, the other of Muhammad 'Ali; but that concession
to appearances did not prevent them from killing one another or
1
. 1. Madras County Correspondence, 1751, p. 4.
## p. 129 (#157) ############################################
LAW AT TRICHINOPOLY
129
taking one another prisoners. At first neither side displayed great
qualities. D'Auteuil, the French leader, had gout and could not
maintain discipline; the English troops were still more unruly, and
Gingens himself was not worth much. The march towards Trichi-
nopoly was extremely slow. The English, having been beaten at
Valikondapuram, crossed the Kavari on 28 July, and it was only
on 25 September that the French, having in turn crossed the river,
found themselves before the city.
The English and Muhammad 'Ali once more sought to amuse
their opponents with negotiations, in the sincerity of which Dupleix
once more seems to have believed. But the fact was that Muhammad
’Ali wanted to gain time. In the course of these discussions the English
claimed that their ally had mortgaged Trichinopoly to them in July,
1750, careless of the fact that, were the act authentic, it could have
had no value, as he was not the subahdar of the Deccan. At last the
siege began. The French were no longer commanded by d'Auteuil,
whose health compelled his resignation, but by a young captain,
great in name if not in action, Jacques Law, nephew of the famous
financier of the Regency. But he did not justify his selection. If the
town did not yield to his summons, he had only two courses open-
to take it by assault or to subject it to a strict blockade. Neither was
easy to execute, for the town was large and the French troops, even
with their allies, few in number. Law never attempted more than to
prevent provisions from being brought into the town by cutting off
convoys. He never completely succeeded; light parties were always
bringing in victuals by some unexpected route; and nothing more
serious took place than actions of scouts and outposts. Then allies
who had been secured by clever negotiations came to strengthen the
English position. At the end of the year Muhammad 'Ali secured the
help of the raja of Mysore by promising the cession of Trichinopoly,
and of the famous Maratha chief Morari Rao by taking him into pay;
and soon afterwards the king of Tanjore joined the coalition. More-
over, the English had struck a serious blow at French prestige by
Clive's bold seizure of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, the defence
of which (September-October) first brought him into prominence.
All the efforts of Dupleix to recover the place had been checked by
a carefully organised resistance, and in the four or five following
months his troops, without encountering an actual disaster, failed to
obtain any appreciable success. In that area fortune was evidently
turning against him.
This change of situation, though not as yet alarming, nevertheless
made an impression on Law, and struck him with a sort of paralysis.
He dared no make the smallest movement. Profiting by this timid
inaction, the English in April brought into Trichinopoly a large
convoy which secured that place for several months, and then, as Law
had crossed the Coleroon and taken refuge in the island of Srirangam,
9
## p. 130 (#158) ############################################
130
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
they set to work to block him up there. This plan was proposed by
Clive, who had returned from the northward, and warmly approved
by Lawrence. Dupleix, seeing the danger of leaving his army besieged
in Srirangam, sent reinforcements, but d'Auteuil who led them was
forced to surrender (9 June) at Valikondapuram, and three days later
Law, demoralised and helpless, became a prisoner with all his troops,
600 according to Lawrence, 780 according to Orme. At the same
time Chanda Sahib, trusting to the generosity of his enemies, gave
himself up, but was beheaded by the Tanjorean general, Lawrence
not caring to interfere. This disaster, news of which reached Europe
early in the following January, largely contributed to determine the
French court to recall Dupleix and reverse his Indian policy. But in
India nothing could shake Dupleix's energy and confidence, or change
his resolute attitude. He was indeed at his best amid calamities; he
never admitted defeat, and found within himself unexpected resources
for the continuance of his struggle with misfortune.
On the morrow of Srirangam, when by a sudden return to the
coast the English and their allies could have threatened the French
settlements, the Mysoreans and Morari Rao, already sounded by
Dupleix, withdrew from the coalition, and Tanjore returned to
neutrality. Meanwhile the English, after hesitating a month about
their future course, returned to the coast, leaving only a small detach-
ment as a precaution against the defection of the Mysoreans whom
they already suspected. They easily took Tiruviti and Villupuram,
but failed before Jinji (6 August), and Major Kineer, who was com-
manding while Lawrence was disabled by sickness, was beaten at
Vikravandi by Kerjean, Dupleix's nephew. But this led to nothing.
Lawrence recovered, reassumed the command and pursued the
enemy as far as the Great Tank, some eight miles west of Pondichery,
in French territory. There an indecisive action was fought; but five
days later (5 September) the over-confident Kerjean'was surprised
and completely defeated beyond Aryankuppam, losing some hundred
European prisoners and himself being severely wounded. But for the
state of peace between the two nations, the English might then have
attacked Pondichery; but, being restrained by the national treaties
and not daring to confide the task to Muhammad 'Ali, they went into
winter quarters, the rainy season having arrived, at Tiruviti and
Fort St David.
Elsewhere, too, the French had encountered checks which, though
less striking, had greatly contributed to weaken their authority and
prestige. After the affair of Arcot, and when Dupleix perceived that
he could not recover the place, he attempted a diversion against
Madras, and in January, 1752, Brenier in command of a French force
camped at Vandalur; but he only succeeded in plundering the country
round St Thomas Mount and Poonamallee; some trifling engage
ments took place near Conjeeveram; but at last, 12 March, the French
## p. 131 (#159) ############################################
SIEGE OF TRICHINOPOLY
131
force underwent complete defeat at Kavaripak; and all hope of
seriously threatening Madras had to be given up. Law's surrender
further weakened the French forces; and while Lawrence took ad-
vantage of his success to threaten Pondichery, Clive cleared the
country round Madras by seizing Covelong and Chingleput, which the
French had occupied as advance posts beyond the Palliar. Clive,
fortunate as ever, took these places on 21 September and 1 October,
and then the French held in the Carnatic only Pondichery and Jinji
with their limited territories.
In these grave but not desperate circumstances, Dupleix stili
found means of counteracting the English success. After five or six
months of laborious discussion, Morari Rao passed over to the French
service, and less than two months later Mysore agreed to join the
French, pay their troops until Trichinopoly had been taken, and then
pay Dupleix thirty lakhs of rupees in return for the possession of the
town. Dupleix re-opened operations, 31 December, 1752. But du
Saussay, who was placed at the head of the troops, was not the right
man for the conduct of war, and at the end of a month Dupleix re-
placed him by Maissin, on whom he placed the greatest reliance. The
new chief besieged Tiruviti, but could not carry the place until 7
May. Meanwhile the Mysoreans had tried to invest Trichinopoly. In
mid-April Lawrence suddenly learnt that the town was threatened
by lack of provisions. Abandoning Tiruviti, he marched at once. A
party of French troops followed him and on 8 May appeared before
the place under Captain Astruc. Financial difficulties hindered close
co-operation between him and the Mysorean commandant, Nandi
Raja; while Morari Rao, making war in his own fashion, was rather
plundering on his own account than helping the French; and the new
siege of Trichinopoly dragged on as in the time of Law, with futile.
attack and counter-attack. In July, Dupleix replaced Astruc first by
Brenier, a conscientious leader but self-distrustful and unenterprising,
who was beaten on 9 August, and then by Maissin, already discouraged
by his campaign round Tiruviti and by the failure of his two prede-
cessors. He soon fell sick, and Astruc, who succeeded to the command:
during his illness, was in turn beaten on 21 September, being himself
made prisoner with 111 Europeans. But these were fruitless victories
for the English. The French did not repeat the mistake of shutting
themselves up in Srirangam and continued to face their enemies. At
last on 14 October a new leader arrived. This was Mainville, lately
returned from the Deccan.
Mainville was a man of resolution. He believed in Dupleix's plans
and was prepared to execute them. After restoring discipline he
prepared to carry Trichinopoly by surprise. The attack was prepared
with the greatest secrecy for a month and took place on the night of
the 27-28 November. The French easily secured the outer wall; but
aroused the English by an act of imprudence and were driven back
## p. 132 (#160) ############################################
132
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
as they attempted to climb the inner rampart. A large part of them
became prisoners. But instead of being discouraged by this series of
misfortunes, luckily discounted by the steady success of Bussy in the
Deccan, Dupleix resolved to sacrifice something to ill-luck and agreed
to discuss with Saunders terms of peace. Indeed, the authorities at
home were weary of this unceasing war, and every packet contained
advice and even orders to bring these troubles to an end. A conference
was therefore held at Sadras 21-25 January, 1754. As a preliminary
the English commissaries, Palk and Vansittart, demanded that their
French colleagues, Lavaur, Delarche, and du Bausset, should recog-
nise Muhammad 'Ali as nawab of the Carnatic. The French did
not choose thus to derogate from the authority of the subahdar of the
Deccan; and after three meetings full of chicane over the validity of
the titles of Muhammad 'Ali and those of Dupleix, the negotiations
were broken off and war was renewed. It had, indeed, never been
actually suspended, but had slackened down as if peace were near.
Under Mainville the French troops experienced no further checks.
On 15 February they even secured a conspicuous success over the .
English, taking 134 European prisoners. But like the English vic-
tories, this, too, led to nothing. The French still found themselves
before Trichinopoly, with too small an army to invest or storm it, and
with auxiliaries too unskilled or timid to afford material help. All
they could attempt was to cut off the town from the neighbouring
country which supplied it with victuals. Mainville therefore carried
the war into Tanjore and the Pudukottai country; but achieved no
more than fruitless raids, as the enemy declined action. Moreover, the
conduct of Mysore gave rise to grave anxiety. By failing to pay the
promised sums, Nandi Raja was exposing the French commander to
the danger of finding himself one pay-day deserted by his troops.
Mainville was thus busier soothing the discontent of his own men
than attacking the enemy. He could never rely on the morrow. The
coalition was evidently breaking up. Nandi Raja talked of returning
to Mysore; and in June Morari Rao quitted the French camp though
he did not positively break with them. Mainville met all these diffi-
culties with great firmness, and, like Dupleix, never despaired of
taking Trichinopoly, when news came that Godeheu had landed at
Pondichery on 1 August.
That meant the recall of Dupleix and the reversal of his policy.
Godeheu replaced Mainville, whom he thought over-anxious to
continue the war, by Maissin, less self-willed and more pacific. Soon
after he concluded a truce, followed by a provisional peace, which
ruined all French hopes in the Carnatic. But the whole of Dupleix's
policy was not condemned. As we shall see, in spite of their desire
for peace, neither the Company nor the ministry at Paris was willing
to sacrifice the decisive advantages that had been obtained in the
Deccan. But before turning to that region, in which the French
fortunes had shone with their greatest lustre, we will attempt to
## p. 133 (#161) ############################################
CAUSES OF DUPLEIX'S FAILURE
133
disengage in a few lines the causes of Dupleix's failure in the Carnatic.
It has been seen that Dupleix espoused the cause of Chanda Sahib
and Muzaffar Jang without consulting the Company, convinced
doubtless that it would not authorise him any more than his prede-
cessors to engage in the politics of the country. Swift success would
have relieved him from the necessity of embarrassing explanations.
And when he saw that event deferred, he concealed the facts by
saying that the war cost nothing and would leave plenty of money
free for the purposes of trade. The French Company, though with
some scepticism, accepted these roseate prophecies, and sent no money,
since Dupleix asked for none. But finance was his stumbling-block
from first to last. His reverses, which began in September, 1751,
prevented the collection of the revenues he had reckoned on; and he
was hard put to it to maintain his army. Each month he could only
just secure enough to prevent his troops from disbanding. To meet
these urgent needs he used over £350,000 of his own money and that
of his friends. It was not, however, lack of money alone that hind-
ered his success; in this respect the English were not much better off
than he. What ruined him was his excessive belief in the justice of
his cause. Full of the belief that, as Muhammad 'Ali was a rebel, the
English government could not support him, he really thought that
the English Company would disavow Saunders and leave him free
to carry out his policy. All his letters show a confidence that is almost
disconcerting. ' He should have remembered that men do not sacrifice
too much to theory and ideals, and that, in view of their threatened
trade, the English were justified in resisting his plans. Trusting too
much to legal formulas, he did not accommodate himself to the facts;
and, while he displayed marvellous skill in negotiating with Indian
princes, in his relations with the English he showed an unaccommo-
dating spirit which did much to provoke opposition in Europe quite
as much as in India.
Whether the Company ought to have supported him is quite
another matter. In truth it could not do so without understanding
his plans; but Dupleix, who at first had perhaps been uncertain of
being able to carry them through, began by half-concealing them,
and did not until 16 October, 1753, formally expound the advantages
of possessing extensive territories in India, yielding a fixed, constant
and abundant revenue that would relieve the Company from sending
funds. But when he was developing this doctrine, which till then he
had only sketched, Godeheu already was about to embark for India.
No doubt if the Company had entered into the ideas of Dupleix, it
could have established at the necessary cost in men and money the
empire which he hoped to found; but besides the hesitation always
felt before novel and daring ideas-ignoti nulla cupido—the Company,
1 Dupleix to Saunders, 16 February, 1752 (French Correspondence, 1752,
pp. 1-41).
## p. 134 (#162) ############################################
134
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
or rather the king, had other motives for caution. Disputes were
already arising between French and English on the Ohio and Missis-
sippi; the preservation of that region seemed more important than
hypothetical conquests in India, and this constituted another motive
for not endangering the peace for the sake of Asiatic domains which
after four years of war Dupleix had not succeeded in subduing. And
if a more distant future is taken into consideration, perhaps the king
and Company were right.
But in the Deccan affairs wore a different appearance. Peace is
usually discussed on the basis of accomplished facts, not of those hopes
which the war has either destroyed or realised. The French position
at Hyderabad was too strong in 1754 for the English to insist on the
ruin of Bussy's work, however much they might desire it. I have
already mentioned the terms on which Dupleix had lent his help to
Muzaffar Jang; by protecting the legitimate ruler of South India, he
hoped above all to secure the rights he had acquired in the Carnatic.
Bussy's activities did not lead to direct competition with the English;
but his achievements are too important to be neglected. When shortly.
after setting out a conspiracy of dissatisfied nawabs cost Muzaffar
Jang his life (14 February, 1751), Bussy's prompt action avoided any
break in the succession and danger to públic order; Salabat Jang,
uncle of the dead prince and brother of Nasir Jang, was recognised as
subahdar; but he needed even more than his predecessor the support
of French troops to establish his power, thus born of disorder, and
Bussy, who was to have gone only to Hyderabad, in the centre of the
Deccan, accompanied him to Aurangabad at its extremity. There he
was more than 900 miles from Pondichery. It was a magnificent raid,
accomplished with hardly a shot. From the first Bussy had under-
stood how to manage Indian princes, showing due deference and
doing nothing without permission. His manners gave no hint of his
power; he never seemed to despise the weak or the vanquished. In
his hand was armed force; but he always thought that gentleness was
better than severity, negotiation than battle, human life than the
laurel of victory. As he himself said, he was more of a statesman than
a soldier; he was a born diplomatist. But his resolutions were firm,
his action bold. When a decision had to be taken, Bussy saw straight
to the heart of things, and carried his purpose into effect though
without brutality or offence. More than anything else these rare and
happy talents established French supremacy at Hyderabad, which
reacted on the work of Dupleix by setting up a counterpoise to those
sometimes unlucky but always indecisive events of the Carnatic.
Dupleix could not sufficiently express his gratitude to his lieutenant.
Most of his letters to Bussy are full of thanks and admiration. In order
to cement the friendship and confidence between them, Dupleix had
hoped to marry Bussy to one of his wife's daughters familiarly known
as Chonchon; they were actually betrothed; but Bussy's remoteness
and Dupleix's sudden departure prevented the completion of the
## p. 135 (#163) ############################################
AFFAIRS IN THE DECCAN
135
· marriage. Thus the administration of affairs in the Deccan was pecu-
liar, being treated on both sides as a family business quite as much as
an affair of state. Bussy, however, was independent enough not to
approve blindly all the projects of Dupleix, and he could oppose them
when they sacrificed too much to ideals or conflicted too sharply
with facts.
After the French reached Aurangabad (18 June), Dupleix dreamt
for a moment of pushing his successes in the north, and planned by
Bussy's means to place Salabat Jang at the head of the subah of
Bengal. He would thus have dominated the greater part of India.
But, just when this bold plan was to have been put into action, the
Marathas attacked the Deccan, and Bussy had to march against them.
In less than a month he had driven them back; a night attack on
4 December, which threw the enemy into confusion, has become
famous. Balaji Rao, the Peshwa, at once entered into negotiations,
and peace was made at Ahmadnagar, 17 January, 1752. Dupleix then
thought of bringing a part of the subahdar's troops against Trichi-
nopoly, and Bussy was to co-operate by attacking Mysore in the rear.
But the diwan Ramdas Pandit, who was murdered at that time
(4 May), proved to have been in communication with Muhammad
'Ali and the English; and it was believed that the nobles, no longer
fearing the Marathas, were seeking the expulsion of the French. The
subahdar, whose influence was small, alone was interested in keeping
them. Bussy was inclined to recognise this state of things by aban-
doning the Deccan. What use could be made of people so ungrateful
and a prince so powerless? Dupleix thought otherwise. To him the
Deccan meant the protection of his rights and authority; and he
implored Bussy not to forsake the work which he had begun. At this
moment news arrived that Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-
ul-mulk and holding high office at Delhi, was claiming his father's
territories and marching thither with a large army and the expecta-
tion of support from Balaji Rao. Bussy remained to encounter this
invasion; but had no need of fighting. Ghazi-ud-din was poisoned by
one of his father's wives, and Salabat Jang's throne was thus secured:
But that prince was always exposed to underhand attacks from his
nobles, who disliked his dependence on the French. The new diwan,
Saiyid Lashkar Khan, constantly intrigued against Bussy's influence,
and had agreed with Balaji Rao in some mysterious plan in which
the interests of his master can have had little part. Bussy, who
followed closely all these Indian intrigues, succeeded in avoiding a
new war which in November was on the point of breaking out with
the Marathas, and having, under the guise of mediator, come to terms
on his own account with Balaji Rao, he prepared to enter Mysore in
order to assist in Dupleix's plans against Trichinopoly; but now he
was checked by the refusal of the subahdar's troops to move; they
Duplex to Bussy, 4 August, 1751 (Archieves de Versailles; E 3738).
3 Lettres édifiantes et curieuses (ed. Martin), , 701.
4 Madras to the Company [ ], February, 1742; Pondichery to the French
Company; 1 October, 1741.
## p. 119 (#147) ############################################
CONFUSION IN THE CARNATIC
119
demanding a contribution from his cousin Murtaza 'Ali, who was
the commandant of the place. Murtaza 'Ali thought the time ripe
for the transfer of power into his own more crafty hands. He first
attempted to poison his cousin; that failing, he put him to death by
violence, and attempted to seize the government of Arcot. But he
lacked the nerve to carry through what he had begun. Alarmed by
the attitude of the people and troops, he suddenly abandoned the
capital and disguised as a woman made his way hurriedly back to
Vellore with its crocodile-defended moat. For the moment Safdar's
young son, who had been left for safety's sake by his father at Madras
with the English, was recognised as nawab, and the administration
was carried on by his father's ministers. But these disorders had
attracted the attention of Nizam-ul-mulk. He appointed a nawab, and
early in 1743 entered the Carnatic in person to restore order. He
expelled the garrison which the Marathas had left in Trichinopoly;
and finally, his first nominee having died, he appointed an old servant
of his, Anwar-ud-din Khan, to the government of Arcot. But the task
of restoring order was beyond any but the most vigorous. Relatives
of the old family still held most of the chief fortresses and enjoyed
large jagirs; and although Safdar 'Ali's son was opportunely murdered
at Arcot, Anwar-ud-din's position seemed hardly more secure than
Safdar 'Ali's had been. The whole country was in a state of uncer-
tainty, expecting some great event, though none knew what.
Following on these ominous events came the news of the decla-
ration of war between France and England. Four years earlier it
would have opened very much to the advantage of the French in the
eastern seas. At that time, when war seemed close at hand, La
Bourdonnais, the governor of Mauritius, had been sent out with a
squadron intended to operate against the English trade; but when
the crisis passed, the squadron was recalled; and so it happened that,
when war really broke out, the French had no ships of force in Indian
waters, and the small squadron equipped by the English immediately
after the declaration of war? found nothing on its arrival at the close
of the year capable of resisting it. Dupleix, who had become governor
of Pondichery in 1742, had hoped to be able to arrange one of those
irregular understandings such as had been reached between Madras
and Pondichery in the previous war, for a neutrality in India. He
addressed the three English presidencies in this sense before any news
of the English squadron had been received. In this he was following
the policy of his masters, the French directors, who had announced
their willingness to enter into an understanding with the English
Company. But a proposal so calculated to favour the interests of the
weaker naval power had been rejected; and the English in India,
while willing enough to disclaim hostile designs, which indeed they
1 Madras Consultations, 26 June, 1744. Cf. Orme MSS, Various, xv, 74.
2 Minute of 22 March, 1743/4 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 33004, f. 78).
## p. 120 (#148) ############################################
120
THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
1
had not the power to execute, warned Dupleix that they would have
no control over any king's ships that might arrive. His sanguine mind
interpreted this answer as an acceptance of his proposals; and when
the news came that English ships under Barnett had not only captured
the Company's China fleet but also some richly laden country vessels
in which he was largely interested, he felt very unreasonably that he
had been tricked by the English.
But if the French had thus lost the first hand in the game, they
still had something in reserve. It might be impossible to fit and equip
ships on the harbourless coast of Coromandel; but at Mauritius they
had an excellent harbour, and governor of genius. Dupleix had at
first desired a policy of neutrality because it was well adapted to the
interests of himself and of his settlement. But since neutrality could
not be had, the next best thing was to call on La Bourdonnais to come
to the rescue. There were a number of French Company's ships at
Port Louis; and these, though not swift sailers, were stout vessels
quite capable of taking their place in a line of battle. The deficiency
of men was made good by sending a number of coffrees from Mada.
gascar on board; and with one or two country ships to act as frigates,
La Bourdonnais, after some delay and one or two mishaps, succeeded
in reaching the coast with his improvised squadron. He found the
English ships weakened by their long absence from the dockyard,
with their crews depleted by the climate, and above all with their
original leader dead and succeeded by his senior captain, Peyton, the
most unenterprising of seamen. Moreover, one of his four ships of
the line, the Medway, which had been leaky even before she left
England, had to keep her pumps perpetually going. Against them
La Bourdonnais could place eight ships in the line. But the odds
were not nearly so heavy as that. The English ships were the better
sailers and more heavily armed. The French thus might have been
out-sailed and out-ranged. But Peyton failed to use his advantages.
After an indecisive action on 25 June, 1746, he made off for Ceylon,
partly in the hopes of refitting, partly in the hopes of meeting with
reinforcements and perhaps a senior captain to take the responsibility.
In August he returned to the coast, and again sighted La Bourdon-
nais's squadron. The latter had taken advantage of the interval to
increase his armament from the stores of Pondichery; and this so
alarmed the English commodore that after a hasty visit to Pulicat,
which he made in error for Madras, he left the coast and sailed for
safety to the Hugli, where he lay until the arrival of reinforcements
took the command out of his hands.
His departure delivered Madras into the hands of the French.
A besieging force could only be collected by taking a large number
of men out of the ships; so that had Peyton even resolved to remain
1 Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive, pp. 5 sqq.
2 Orders to Sir Charles Hardy, 19 March, 1743/4 (P. R. O. Adm. 2-61, f. 103).
## p. 121 (#149) ############################################
CAPTURE OF MADRAS
12)
upon the coast
without coming to action, his presence would have
prevented the French from making any considerable attempt. But
his absence freed them from all apprehensions. La Bourdonnais
appeared with his ships and a part of the Pondichery garrison before
Madras on 4/15 September; it surrendered to him, after two English-
men and four others had been killed by the fire of the besiegers, on
the 10/21. Thus the military conduct of the English on this occasion
was about on a level with their conduct at sea. But it should be
added that the defences of Madras were built rather to protect the
place from incursions of horse than to resist a siege in form; and the
garrison was weak, untrained, and commanded by officers who did
not know their business. 2
This resounding success led immediately to disputes between the
two French governors, Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, about the dis-
posal of the place. It had surrendered under an informal promise of
ransom; and in the discussions about the sum that should be paid,
mention had certainly been made of a present to La Bourdonnais;
but if that scheme were carried out, Dupleix and his friends at Pon-
dichery would reap no advantages from the assistance they had
given to the expedition. They therefore put forward a proposal that
the place should be kept. Although the matter has often been argued
as though national interests had been at stake, the question was really,
Who was to make money out of Madras? 3 La Bourdonnais insisted
on carrying out his original plan, and concluded a ransom treaty with
the Madras council. Dupleix, after trying to seize the captured city
by force, appeared to give way. But their discussions had prolonged
the stay of the French vessels at Madras. On 2/13 October, a hurri-
cane broke on the coast; crippling La Bourdonnais's squadron, and
obliging him to leave behind him a considerable number of men
who thus passed under the command of Dupleix. On his departure
Dupleix denounced the treaty which had been made; and the garrison
and company's servants of Pondichery secured the opportunity for
which they had hoped of plundering Madras from top to bottom. *
Meanwhile, on his arrival in France, La Bourdonnais was imprisoned
on the charges which Dupleix had sent home against him; and seems
at last to have secured his release by the influence of the Pompadour. "
The nawab Anwar-ud-din had not regarded these events with
unconcern. Indeed, his interference had been asked by each of the
two nations in turn. At first it was Dupleix who wanted him to
prevent the English from seizing French ships at sea; and in order if
possible to scare their men-of-war into inaction, he procured permis-
sion for a country ship in which he was interested to sail under the
1 Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, II, 425.
2 Barnett to Anson, 16 September, 1745 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 15955, f. 113).
8 Dodwell, op. cit. pp. 15 sqq.
4 Idem, pp. 18-19.
B Correspondance de Mme de Pompadour, p. 5.
## p. 122 (#150) ############################################
122
THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
nawab's flag. Barnett, of course, treated such devices as they deserved.
The nawab addressed letters of complaint to the Madras council, who
explained that they had no power to control the conduct of the com-
mander of the king's ships. After a while the matter was dropped;
and as Dupleix had no more ships to send to sea, it could not recur.
Then, when the French had secured control of the sea, and were
preparing to attack Madras, it was the turn of the English to invoke
the help of Arcot. It has been said that their application failed, be-
cause they neglected to send a proportionable present with their
request; but I have elsewhere shown that that account is not war-
ranted by the facts. The nawab sent a warning to Dupleix which he
ignored. When La Bourdonnais was still before Madras, the nawab
demanded that the French troops should be recalled; and Dupleix
coolly replied that he was only conquering the place in order to put
it into the nawab's hands. When La Bourdonnais had just entered
Fort St George, the nawab again demanded his withdrawal, and
finally sent troops to compel obedience to his commands. It was as
vigorous and prompt action as could have been expected by the most
sanguine; and had Madras made a good defence, the French would
still have been lying before the walls when the nawab's troops arrived.
As it was they found the French flag flying, and all they could do was
to attempt to starve the French into evacuation. But as soon as the
latter found themselves inconvenienced by the blockade, a sally was
made under La Tour, who scattered his assailants and made them
retire to St Thomé. Similar success was obtained by Paradis, who was
marching up with reinforcements. The nawab's troops, still in St
Thomé, tried to bar his way on the little Adyar river; but were hustled
out of the way as unceremoniously by Paradis as they had been by La
Tour. By this time musketry and field artillery had developed so far
that cavalry could make no impression on troops that kept their ranks
and reserved their fire. The terror of Asiatic armies had disappeared.
The capture of Madras marked the limit of French achievements
in the course of this war. For eighteen months after the fall of Madras
Dupleix tried in vain to capture Fort St David, only a few miles south
of Pondichery, and certainly no more capable of defence than Madras
had been. But he tried in vain. On one occasion even the French
troops broke and fled on the apprehension that the nawab's horse,
sent to assist the English, were moving to threaten their retreat.
Dupleix came to terms with the nawab; he gave him considerable
presents, and even agreed to allow the nawab's flag to fly for a week
over Madras in token of his submission. But even then when the
nawab's sons had retired from the neighbourhood of Fort St David,
Dupleix still could not take the place. The fact was, that with the
departure of La Bourdonnais the command of the sea had returned
.
1 Dodwell, ap. cit. p. 13.
2 Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, m, 394.
## p. 123 (#151) ############################################
SIEGE OF PONDICHERY
123
to the English; a new commander, Griffin, had arrived; and as soon
as Dupleix approached the English settlement, his topmasts were sure
to appear above the horizon, and the French would hurriedly retreat
lest he should make an attempt on Pondichery in their absence.
But for such fruitless episodes the year 1747, and the first half of
1748, passed away without incident. In June, however, affairs began
to move. First there appeared a French squadron, under Bouvet,
which lured Griffin from before. Fort St David, where he was lying,
only to disappear altogether from the coast after landing treasure for
the French at Madras, while the English ships lay before Pondichery
to prevent the enemy from landing there. Then early in August came
in gradually the large expedition which had been fitted out in England
in order to avenge the capture of Madras. It was commanded by
Rear-admiral Boscawen, and consisted of not only six ships of the
line and as many smaller vessels, but also of land forces some 1000
strong. Together with the vessels already in the East Indies this was
ample on the naval side; but the land forces were of inferior metal.
They had been hastily got together for the occasion; the companies
into which they were divided had been raised in part by drafts from
regiments in Ireland, in part by officers specially commissioned on
condition of raising a certain number of men in Scotland. These had
found it very difficult to comply with their promises; and in the long-
run their companies had to be completed by deserters, criminals, or
rebels pardoned on condition of enlistment, so that, although by
landing his marines and parties of his sailors, Boscawen could assem-
ble a large force of men, they were not trained military material. ”
It was decided to begin operations by besieging Pondichery; and
had the siege been skilfully conducted, it should have succeeded. But
it was managed with a singular want of skill. Unluckily the only
officers of experience were disabled or taken prisoner before the siege
itself was formed; and the survey made by the engineers was con-
ducted from so safe a distance that th . y could not judge the strength
of the works or the nature of the ground. So it came to pass that the
besiegers formed their camp on ground westward of the city, whither
all the stores had to be carried with great labour, instead of beginning
their approaches on the shore where they would have been covered
by the guns of their own squadron. Then also they began their
trenches at so great a distance from the town that they were unable
to batter the walls, and on ground separated from it by a swamp, so
that their works could not be advanced near enough to begin to batter
in breach. The attack on Pondichery was scarcely managed with
more skill than the defence of Madras. The French on the other
hand defended themselves with vigour. Their sorties harassed the
besiegers. Their fire remained stronger everywhere than that brought
1 Fox to Pitt, 6 June, 1747 (P. R. O. , W. O. 4-43); same to Capt. Forbes, 7
July, 1747 (idem); same to Calcraft, 21 September, 1747 (idem).
## p. 124 (#152) ############################################
124
THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
to bear on them. Finding the land siege progress so slowly, Boscawen
resolved to try the effect of bombarding the place with his squadron
But his fire was ineffective; the weather was evidently breaking up
for the monsoon; many of his men were in hospital; and at last, at the
beginning of October, he decided to raise the siege and return to Fort
St David, where his men could be placed under cover. It was a con-
spicuous success for Dupleix, and a conspicuous failure for the English.
While Boscawen was lying at Fort St David waiting for the
weather to allow his recommencing operations, news arrived that the
preliminaries of peace had been signed in Europe. This naturally
brought all operations to an end; all prisoners were released on their
parole; and when at last copies of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle
arrived with the necessary papers and instructions, Madras was
solemnly handed back to the English, and Boscawen sailed back to
Europe. But in spite of this trivial ending affairs were in a very
different state from that in which they had been at the beginning of
the war. The English, for instance, held Madras under the terms of
a treaty, and never again paid for it the stipulated quit-rent of 1200
pagodas a year, of which they speedily procured a discharge from the
claimant to the Carnatic whose cause they espoused. The French
had secured a high and deserved reputation for their military con-
duct. They had defied Anwar-ud-din, and he had been unable to
coerce them into doing as he demanded. So that while the events
which had just preceded the war showed how uncertain and unsettled
the Indian government of South India had become, the events of the
war itself showed that the Europeans were quite equal to taking a
decisive part in Indian affairs, and that they had little to fear from
any armies that Indian princes were likely at that time to bring
against them. The power which was preponderant at sea might thus
become preponderant on land. And the fertile and ingenious mind of
Dupleix had for the first time been set to the serious consideration of
the Indian political problem. Moreover, the storm which had obliged
La Bourdonnais to leave behind him a considerable body of his men
had in that manner augmented the forces at the disposal of Dupleix.
So that the war did indeed set the stage for the great projects which
he began to develop in the very year in which he gave back Madras
to the English.
## p. 125 (#153) ############################################
CHAPTER VI
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
AL
LTHOUGH by the terms of the peace Madras had been handed
back to the English, it did not become once more the seat of their
government until 6/17 April, 1752. Till then their affairs continued
to be directed from Fort St David, close to Pondichery. One would
have thought that so exhausting a war would have imposed on both
the neighbours an equal need of living well together; the necessity of
reviving trade must have been felt as much by the English governor
Floyer as by the French governor Dupleix, and Floyer was not the
man to seek quarrels for their own sake. But good will is not always
enough to avoid or prevent conflict. Blind forces, which we sometimes
call chance and sometimes destiny, may suddenly produce new causes
of rivalry that seem innocent until the future has proved their venom.
The English had not even re-entered Madras before. both governors
had each on his own account engaged in relations with Indian princes
closely similar in nature but quite distinct, and which were with
little delay to bring them into direct collision.
Quite independently Floyer and Dupleix had taken sides in local
quarrels at almost the same moment and in common defiance of the
policy laid down with similar emphasis alike at Paris and at London.
Peace had left both with unemployed bodies of troops who were
expensive to maintain but who could not be sent back to Europe
because the shipping season had not arrived. Neither governor there-
fore was sorry to relieve himself of heavy charges by temporarily
placing these troops at the disposal of princes who would contribute
to their maintenance.
It was Floyer who in all seeming led the way. Early in 1749
Shahji, a dispossessed claimant of the throne of Tanjore, offered the
English Devikottai on condition of their helping him to recover the
throne. 1 Devikottai was a little place of small importance at the
mouth of the Coleroon. The English fancied that its possession would
make them masters of the navigable part of the river and enable
them to control the inland trade. A first expedition sent in April .
under Captain Cope failed; the troops of the legitimate sovereign,
Pratab Singh, offered an unexpected resistance. But a second, better
prepared and led by Major Lawrence in person, succeeded; after a
few days of siege Devikottai surrendered (23 June). The English
kept it with the country belonging to it; and as for Shahji no one
thought of restoring him to his throne. This occupation of Devikottai
1 Fort St David Consultations. 10 April, 1749.
## p. 126 (#154) ############################################
126
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
was nothing more than a belated and rather futile reply to the occu-
pation of Karikal by Governor Dumas some ten years earlier. It
restored in that part of the Carnatic the balance which had inclined
in the favour of the French.
Quite other was the importance of the expedition that Dupleix
was contemplating and preparing to execute at the same time. In the
month of March he had learnt that Chanda Sahib, who had been a
prisoner with the Marathas for the last seven years, had just been set
free and was preparing to recover the possessions of his family in
concert with Muzaffar Jang (grandson of Nizam-ul-mulk who had
died in 1748) who laid claim to the succession of his grandfather. The
two princes were making common cause, and Chanda Sahib had sent
his son, Raza Sahib, to Pondichery to obtain from Dupleix the assist-
ance of troops whom the confederates agreed to pay. Dupleix had
a grievance against the actual nawab, Anwar-ud-din Khan, who had
assisted his enemies during the siege of Pondichery. He therefore
accepted with the utmost secrecy the offers made to him on condition
of not taking the field until the two princes were themselves prepared
to begin hostilities. At last, on 13 July, matters reached the point at
which a public agreement could be made, and three days later the
troops under d'Auteuil began their march on Vellore, where the allies
were to concentrate. Dupleix hoped to conclude matters quickly
enough to be able to confront the Company with fortunately accom-
plished facts, so that there would be room for nothing but praise
of his initiative.
All at first went well. The French having joined their allies
defeated and slew Anwar-ud-din Khan at the battle of Ambur, south-
east of Vellore, on 3 August. After this victory Muzaffar Jang and
Chanda Sahib, grateful for the help accorded them, came to offer
their thanks to Dupleix at Pondichery, and granted him in full righ!
the territories of Villiyanallur and Bahur, which more than doubled
the French Company's possessions round Pondichery, and they added
to this on the Orissa Coast the province of Masulipatam and the
island of Divy.
In indirect
answer to these grants Admiral Boscawen took pos-
session of St Thomé, where he suspected Dupleix also meant to
establish his authority.
St Thomé is not four miles from Madras, so
that its possession was a vital matter for the English. Already men
were not paying too much attention to the question, who was the
rightful owner of desirable territory? Dupleix held that St Thomé
belonged to Chanda Sahib; Boscawen to Muhammad 'Ali, son and
heir of Anwar-ud-din Khan, though he had inherited little power
enough. After the battle of Ambur, he had taken refuge at Trichino-
poly, where he was preparing to oppose Chanda Sahib and his allies.
The English, feeling that it was in their interest to support him, from
October onwards sent him help. Dupleix too understood that he
would never be the real master of the Carnatic under Chanda' Sahib's
## p. 127 (#155) ############################################
NASIR JANG
127
name until he had got rid of Muhammad 'Ali. In November, there
fore, he sent troops against Trichinopoly under the command of his
brother-in-law d'Auteuil; but instead of finishing the war by reducing
that town as quickly as possible, the French, at the suggestion of their
allies, turned off against Tanjore, whence they hoped to draw a large
tribute for the maintenance of their forces a consideration not
lacking importance. That town, the capital of the kingdom of the
same name, resisted all attacks, and kept the allies before it for three
months. The English openly encouraged the king in his resistance,
and led him to expect prompt help from Nasir Jang, the rival subahdar
of the Deccan.
Nasir Jang was Nizam-ul-mulk's son and so Muzaffar Jang's uncle.
As at the time of his father's death he had been able to seize the
treasury, he had also been able to secure his accession, and was pre-
paring to dispute his nephew's claims, both of them resting their
rights on a real or alleged investiture by the Moghul. Nasir Jang
had not at first understood all the importance of the battle of Ambur,
and, in spite of the English invitations, had hesitated to take part in
a war which after all was not being fought in the Deccan. He only
made up his mind when the danger seemed to threaten himself, and
at the beginning of 1750 he appeared on the borders of the Carnatic.
His approach compelled the French and Chanda Sahib to raise the
siege of Tanjore and to retire on Pondichery; while the English took
advantage of this retreat to occupy Tiruvendipuram, which adjoins
Cuddalore.
The opposing armies found themselves face to face at the end of
March, on the banks of the Jinji river, near Valudavur. Nasir Jang
had been joined by a few English under Captain Cope, and a battle
seemed inevitable, when thirteen French officers, struck with panic,
fled to Pondichery on the night of 4 April, and Muzaffar Jang cast
himself on the generosity of his uncle, who made him prisoner. The
French army was also obliged to withdraw, but nevertheless Dupleix
was able to offer his enemy an unbroken front at the bounds of Pon-
dichery, After some short and fruitless negotiations, Dupleix suddenly
decided on a night attack on Nasir Jang's camp, which was thrown
into panic. That prince, having secured his nephew, thought nothing
more was to be gained by fighting with the French, and so quietly
retired to Arcot, where for the next six months he lay inactive. In
vain did the English and Muhammad 'Ali implore him again to take
the field. He only decided to do so when he learnt that Dupleix had
occupied Tiruviti, Villupuram, and Jinji, and was moving towards
Arcot. The capture of Jinji, thought impregnable but which Bussy
took by a brilliant feat of arms, 12 September, 1750, profoundly
disquieted him. The English, as they had already done at St Thomé
and Tiruvendipuram, replied to the occupation of these places by
procuring for themselves a more or less regular cession of Poonamallee
## p. 128 (#156) ############################################
128
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
near Madras. As for Nasir Jang, after having painfully set out, he
was surprised on the night of 16 December by the French army under
La Touche. To this had contributed the treachery of the nawabs of
Karnul, Savanur, and Cuddapah, and certain other nobles. Aban-
doned by some of his troops, Nasir Jang was slain on the field of
battle, and Muzaffar Jang, who had been brought prisoner with him,
was at once recognised as subahdar. Legitimacy had once more
changed sides.
Muzaffar Jang returned to Pondichery as if to receive a sort of
investiture from Dupleix, whose power increased daily. To the grants
already made was added the province of Nizampatam on the Orissa
Coast; Dupleix was recognised as governor of all India south of the
Krishna; and, certain of not being allowed to reign over his own
states in peace, Muzaffar Jang demanded a few Europeans to accom-
pany him to his capital and aid him to consolidate his power. Dupleix
reckoned that his triumphs permitted him now to ignore Muhammad
'Ali, whom he could settle with either by treaty or by force, and so
consented. On 15 January, 1751, Bussy, his best officer, set out for
the Deccan, with orders to support at any cost the prince to whom
the French owed the titles on which they relied for the legitimate
possession of the country. Dupleix thought, with a certain naïveté,
that the English and Muhammad 'Ali would bow before his claims
and allow him to regulate the affairs of the Carnatic at his pleasure.
Unluckily for him Floyer was no longer governor of Fort St David.
He had been replaced (28 September, 1750) by Saunders, formerly
chief of Vizagapatam. Saunders was a man cold, silent, and reserved,
a man of action rather than of speech. Like his predecessors he had
orders to keep aloof from political affairs; but he felt that, if he left
Dupleix free to act, it would be all over with British trade. Having
adopted a formal resolution in council, he encouraged Muhammad
'Ali not to accept the proposals then being made to him from Pondi-
chery, and on his advice that prince conducted himself with such
seeming frankness that he deceived Dupleix himself while the English
were making ready their men and munitions.
At last in May, 1751, before the French had made any movement,
Captain Gingens set out with 800 or 900 Europeans to support
Muhammad 'Ali. Dupleix, understanding that he had been tricked,
as indeed he had half suspected, dispatched in his turn a little army
with orders to capture Trichinopoly. Then began a long, fatiguing,
and commonly monotonous war for the possession of that town, before
which the French wasted their strength. The two European armies
of course did not appear as principals, but only as auxiliaries, the one
of Chanda Sahib, the other of Muhammad 'Ali; but that concession
to appearances did not prevent them from killing one another or
1
. 1. Madras County Correspondence, 1751, p. 4.
## p. 129 (#157) ############################################
LAW AT TRICHINOPOLY
129
taking one another prisoners. At first neither side displayed great
qualities. D'Auteuil, the French leader, had gout and could not
maintain discipline; the English troops were still more unruly, and
Gingens himself was not worth much. The march towards Trichi-
nopoly was extremely slow. The English, having been beaten at
Valikondapuram, crossed the Kavari on 28 July, and it was only
on 25 September that the French, having in turn crossed the river,
found themselves before the city.
The English and Muhammad 'Ali once more sought to amuse
their opponents with negotiations, in the sincerity of which Dupleix
once more seems to have believed. But the fact was that Muhammad
’Ali wanted to gain time. In the course of these discussions the English
claimed that their ally had mortgaged Trichinopoly to them in July,
1750, careless of the fact that, were the act authentic, it could have
had no value, as he was not the subahdar of the Deccan. At last the
siege began. The French were no longer commanded by d'Auteuil,
whose health compelled his resignation, but by a young captain,
great in name if not in action, Jacques Law, nephew of the famous
financier of the Regency. But he did not justify his selection. If the
town did not yield to his summons, he had only two courses open-
to take it by assault or to subject it to a strict blockade. Neither was
easy to execute, for the town was large and the French troops, even
with their allies, few in number. Law never attempted more than to
prevent provisions from being brought into the town by cutting off
convoys. He never completely succeeded; light parties were always
bringing in victuals by some unexpected route; and nothing more
serious took place than actions of scouts and outposts. Then allies
who had been secured by clever negotiations came to strengthen the
English position. At the end of the year Muhammad 'Ali secured the
help of the raja of Mysore by promising the cession of Trichinopoly,
and of the famous Maratha chief Morari Rao by taking him into pay;
and soon afterwards the king of Tanjore joined the coalition. More-
over, the English had struck a serious blow at French prestige by
Clive's bold seizure of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, the defence
of which (September-October) first brought him into prominence.
All the efforts of Dupleix to recover the place had been checked by
a carefully organised resistance, and in the four or five following
months his troops, without encountering an actual disaster, failed to
obtain any appreciable success. In that area fortune was evidently
turning against him.
This change of situation, though not as yet alarming, nevertheless
made an impression on Law, and struck him with a sort of paralysis.
He dared no make the smallest movement. Profiting by this timid
inaction, the English in April brought into Trichinopoly a large
convoy which secured that place for several months, and then, as Law
had crossed the Coleroon and taken refuge in the island of Srirangam,
9
## p. 130 (#158) ############################################
130
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
they set to work to block him up there. This plan was proposed by
Clive, who had returned from the northward, and warmly approved
by Lawrence. Dupleix, seeing the danger of leaving his army besieged
in Srirangam, sent reinforcements, but d'Auteuil who led them was
forced to surrender (9 June) at Valikondapuram, and three days later
Law, demoralised and helpless, became a prisoner with all his troops,
600 according to Lawrence, 780 according to Orme. At the same
time Chanda Sahib, trusting to the generosity of his enemies, gave
himself up, but was beheaded by the Tanjorean general, Lawrence
not caring to interfere. This disaster, news of which reached Europe
early in the following January, largely contributed to determine the
French court to recall Dupleix and reverse his Indian policy. But in
India nothing could shake Dupleix's energy and confidence, or change
his resolute attitude. He was indeed at his best amid calamities; he
never admitted defeat, and found within himself unexpected resources
for the continuance of his struggle with misfortune.
On the morrow of Srirangam, when by a sudden return to the
coast the English and their allies could have threatened the French
settlements, the Mysoreans and Morari Rao, already sounded by
Dupleix, withdrew from the coalition, and Tanjore returned to
neutrality. Meanwhile the English, after hesitating a month about
their future course, returned to the coast, leaving only a small detach-
ment as a precaution against the defection of the Mysoreans whom
they already suspected. They easily took Tiruviti and Villupuram,
but failed before Jinji (6 August), and Major Kineer, who was com-
manding while Lawrence was disabled by sickness, was beaten at
Vikravandi by Kerjean, Dupleix's nephew. But this led to nothing.
Lawrence recovered, reassumed the command and pursued the
enemy as far as the Great Tank, some eight miles west of Pondichery,
in French territory. There an indecisive action was fought; but five
days later (5 September) the over-confident Kerjean'was surprised
and completely defeated beyond Aryankuppam, losing some hundred
European prisoners and himself being severely wounded. But for the
state of peace between the two nations, the English might then have
attacked Pondichery; but, being restrained by the national treaties
and not daring to confide the task to Muhammad 'Ali, they went into
winter quarters, the rainy season having arrived, at Tiruviti and
Fort St David.
Elsewhere, too, the French had encountered checks which, though
less striking, had greatly contributed to weaken their authority and
prestige. After the affair of Arcot, and when Dupleix perceived that
he could not recover the place, he attempted a diversion against
Madras, and in January, 1752, Brenier in command of a French force
camped at Vandalur; but he only succeeded in plundering the country
round St Thomas Mount and Poonamallee; some trifling engage
ments took place near Conjeeveram; but at last, 12 March, the French
## p. 131 (#159) ############################################
SIEGE OF TRICHINOPOLY
131
force underwent complete defeat at Kavaripak; and all hope of
seriously threatening Madras had to be given up. Law's surrender
further weakened the French forces; and while Lawrence took ad-
vantage of his success to threaten Pondichery, Clive cleared the
country round Madras by seizing Covelong and Chingleput, which the
French had occupied as advance posts beyond the Palliar. Clive,
fortunate as ever, took these places on 21 September and 1 October,
and then the French held in the Carnatic only Pondichery and Jinji
with their limited territories.
In these grave but not desperate circumstances, Dupleix stili
found means of counteracting the English success. After five or six
months of laborious discussion, Morari Rao passed over to the French
service, and less than two months later Mysore agreed to join the
French, pay their troops until Trichinopoly had been taken, and then
pay Dupleix thirty lakhs of rupees in return for the possession of the
town. Dupleix re-opened operations, 31 December, 1752. But du
Saussay, who was placed at the head of the troops, was not the right
man for the conduct of war, and at the end of a month Dupleix re-
placed him by Maissin, on whom he placed the greatest reliance. The
new chief besieged Tiruviti, but could not carry the place until 7
May. Meanwhile the Mysoreans had tried to invest Trichinopoly. In
mid-April Lawrence suddenly learnt that the town was threatened
by lack of provisions. Abandoning Tiruviti, he marched at once. A
party of French troops followed him and on 8 May appeared before
the place under Captain Astruc. Financial difficulties hindered close
co-operation between him and the Mysorean commandant, Nandi
Raja; while Morari Rao, making war in his own fashion, was rather
plundering on his own account than helping the French; and the new
siege of Trichinopoly dragged on as in the time of Law, with futile.
attack and counter-attack. In July, Dupleix replaced Astruc first by
Brenier, a conscientious leader but self-distrustful and unenterprising,
who was beaten on 9 August, and then by Maissin, already discouraged
by his campaign round Tiruviti and by the failure of his two prede-
cessors. He soon fell sick, and Astruc, who succeeded to the command:
during his illness, was in turn beaten on 21 September, being himself
made prisoner with 111 Europeans. But these were fruitless victories
for the English. The French did not repeat the mistake of shutting
themselves up in Srirangam and continued to face their enemies. At
last on 14 October a new leader arrived. This was Mainville, lately
returned from the Deccan.
Mainville was a man of resolution. He believed in Dupleix's plans
and was prepared to execute them. After restoring discipline he
prepared to carry Trichinopoly by surprise. The attack was prepared
with the greatest secrecy for a month and took place on the night of
the 27-28 November. The French easily secured the outer wall; but
aroused the English by an act of imprudence and were driven back
## p. 132 (#160) ############################################
132
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
as they attempted to climb the inner rampart. A large part of them
became prisoners. But instead of being discouraged by this series of
misfortunes, luckily discounted by the steady success of Bussy in the
Deccan, Dupleix resolved to sacrifice something to ill-luck and agreed
to discuss with Saunders terms of peace. Indeed, the authorities at
home were weary of this unceasing war, and every packet contained
advice and even orders to bring these troubles to an end. A conference
was therefore held at Sadras 21-25 January, 1754. As a preliminary
the English commissaries, Palk and Vansittart, demanded that their
French colleagues, Lavaur, Delarche, and du Bausset, should recog-
nise Muhammad 'Ali as nawab of the Carnatic. The French did
not choose thus to derogate from the authority of the subahdar of the
Deccan; and after three meetings full of chicane over the validity of
the titles of Muhammad 'Ali and those of Dupleix, the negotiations
were broken off and war was renewed. It had, indeed, never been
actually suspended, but had slackened down as if peace were near.
Under Mainville the French troops experienced no further checks.
On 15 February they even secured a conspicuous success over the .
English, taking 134 European prisoners. But like the English vic-
tories, this, too, led to nothing. The French still found themselves
before Trichinopoly, with too small an army to invest or storm it, and
with auxiliaries too unskilled or timid to afford material help. All
they could attempt was to cut off the town from the neighbouring
country which supplied it with victuals. Mainville therefore carried
the war into Tanjore and the Pudukottai country; but achieved no
more than fruitless raids, as the enemy declined action. Moreover, the
conduct of Mysore gave rise to grave anxiety. By failing to pay the
promised sums, Nandi Raja was exposing the French commander to
the danger of finding himself one pay-day deserted by his troops.
Mainville was thus busier soothing the discontent of his own men
than attacking the enemy. He could never rely on the morrow. The
coalition was evidently breaking up. Nandi Raja talked of returning
to Mysore; and in June Morari Rao quitted the French camp though
he did not positively break with them. Mainville met all these diffi-
culties with great firmness, and, like Dupleix, never despaired of
taking Trichinopoly, when news came that Godeheu had landed at
Pondichery on 1 August.
That meant the recall of Dupleix and the reversal of his policy.
Godeheu replaced Mainville, whom he thought over-anxious to
continue the war, by Maissin, less self-willed and more pacific. Soon
after he concluded a truce, followed by a provisional peace, which
ruined all French hopes in the Carnatic. But the whole of Dupleix's
policy was not condemned. As we shall see, in spite of their desire
for peace, neither the Company nor the ministry at Paris was willing
to sacrifice the decisive advantages that had been obtained in the
Deccan. But before turning to that region, in which the French
fortunes had shone with their greatest lustre, we will attempt to
## p. 133 (#161) ############################################
CAUSES OF DUPLEIX'S FAILURE
133
disengage in a few lines the causes of Dupleix's failure in the Carnatic.
It has been seen that Dupleix espoused the cause of Chanda Sahib
and Muzaffar Jang without consulting the Company, convinced
doubtless that it would not authorise him any more than his prede-
cessors to engage in the politics of the country. Swift success would
have relieved him from the necessity of embarrassing explanations.
And when he saw that event deferred, he concealed the facts by
saying that the war cost nothing and would leave plenty of money
free for the purposes of trade. The French Company, though with
some scepticism, accepted these roseate prophecies, and sent no money,
since Dupleix asked for none. But finance was his stumbling-block
from first to last. His reverses, which began in September, 1751,
prevented the collection of the revenues he had reckoned on; and he
was hard put to it to maintain his army. Each month he could only
just secure enough to prevent his troops from disbanding. To meet
these urgent needs he used over £350,000 of his own money and that
of his friends. It was not, however, lack of money alone that hind-
ered his success; in this respect the English were not much better off
than he. What ruined him was his excessive belief in the justice of
his cause. Full of the belief that, as Muhammad 'Ali was a rebel, the
English government could not support him, he really thought that
the English Company would disavow Saunders and leave him free
to carry out his policy. All his letters show a confidence that is almost
disconcerting. ' He should have remembered that men do not sacrifice
too much to theory and ideals, and that, in view of their threatened
trade, the English were justified in resisting his plans. Trusting too
much to legal formulas, he did not accommodate himself to the facts;
and, while he displayed marvellous skill in negotiating with Indian
princes, in his relations with the English he showed an unaccommo-
dating spirit which did much to provoke opposition in Europe quite
as much as in India.
Whether the Company ought to have supported him is quite
another matter. In truth it could not do so without understanding
his plans; but Dupleix, who at first had perhaps been uncertain of
being able to carry them through, began by half-concealing them,
and did not until 16 October, 1753, formally expound the advantages
of possessing extensive territories in India, yielding a fixed, constant
and abundant revenue that would relieve the Company from sending
funds. But when he was developing this doctrine, which till then he
had only sketched, Godeheu already was about to embark for India.
No doubt if the Company had entered into the ideas of Dupleix, it
could have established at the necessary cost in men and money the
empire which he hoped to found; but besides the hesitation always
felt before novel and daring ideas-ignoti nulla cupido—the Company,
1 Dupleix to Saunders, 16 February, 1752 (French Correspondence, 1752,
pp. 1-41).
## p. 134 (#162) ############################################
134
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
or rather the king, had other motives for caution. Disputes were
already arising between French and English on the Ohio and Missis-
sippi; the preservation of that region seemed more important than
hypothetical conquests in India, and this constituted another motive
for not endangering the peace for the sake of Asiatic domains which
after four years of war Dupleix had not succeeded in subduing. And
if a more distant future is taken into consideration, perhaps the king
and Company were right.
But in the Deccan affairs wore a different appearance. Peace is
usually discussed on the basis of accomplished facts, not of those hopes
which the war has either destroyed or realised. The French position
at Hyderabad was too strong in 1754 for the English to insist on the
ruin of Bussy's work, however much they might desire it. I have
already mentioned the terms on which Dupleix had lent his help to
Muzaffar Jang; by protecting the legitimate ruler of South India, he
hoped above all to secure the rights he had acquired in the Carnatic.
Bussy's activities did not lead to direct competition with the English;
but his achievements are too important to be neglected. When shortly.
after setting out a conspiracy of dissatisfied nawabs cost Muzaffar
Jang his life (14 February, 1751), Bussy's prompt action avoided any
break in the succession and danger to públic order; Salabat Jang,
uncle of the dead prince and brother of Nasir Jang, was recognised as
subahdar; but he needed even more than his predecessor the support
of French troops to establish his power, thus born of disorder, and
Bussy, who was to have gone only to Hyderabad, in the centre of the
Deccan, accompanied him to Aurangabad at its extremity. There he
was more than 900 miles from Pondichery. It was a magnificent raid,
accomplished with hardly a shot. From the first Bussy had under-
stood how to manage Indian princes, showing due deference and
doing nothing without permission. His manners gave no hint of his
power; he never seemed to despise the weak or the vanquished. In
his hand was armed force; but he always thought that gentleness was
better than severity, negotiation than battle, human life than the
laurel of victory. As he himself said, he was more of a statesman than
a soldier; he was a born diplomatist. But his resolutions were firm,
his action bold. When a decision had to be taken, Bussy saw straight
to the heart of things, and carried his purpose into effect though
without brutality or offence. More than anything else these rare and
happy talents established French supremacy at Hyderabad, which
reacted on the work of Dupleix by setting up a counterpoise to those
sometimes unlucky but always indecisive events of the Carnatic.
Dupleix could not sufficiently express his gratitude to his lieutenant.
Most of his letters to Bussy are full of thanks and admiration. In order
to cement the friendship and confidence between them, Dupleix had
hoped to marry Bussy to one of his wife's daughters familiarly known
as Chonchon; they were actually betrothed; but Bussy's remoteness
and Dupleix's sudden departure prevented the completion of the
## p. 135 (#163) ############################################
AFFAIRS IN THE DECCAN
135
· marriage. Thus the administration of affairs in the Deccan was pecu-
liar, being treated on both sides as a family business quite as much as
an affair of state. Bussy, however, was independent enough not to
approve blindly all the projects of Dupleix, and he could oppose them
when they sacrificed too much to ideals or conflicted too sharply
with facts.
After the French reached Aurangabad (18 June), Dupleix dreamt
for a moment of pushing his successes in the north, and planned by
Bussy's means to place Salabat Jang at the head of the subah of
Bengal. He would thus have dominated the greater part of India.
But, just when this bold plan was to have been put into action, the
Marathas attacked the Deccan, and Bussy had to march against them.
In less than a month he had driven them back; a night attack on
4 December, which threw the enemy into confusion, has become
famous. Balaji Rao, the Peshwa, at once entered into negotiations,
and peace was made at Ahmadnagar, 17 January, 1752. Dupleix then
thought of bringing a part of the subahdar's troops against Trichi-
nopoly, and Bussy was to co-operate by attacking Mysore in the rear.
But the diwan Ramdas Pandit, who was murdered at that time
(4 May), proved to have been in communication with Muhammad
'Ali and the English; and it was believed that the nobles, no longer
fearing the Marathas, were seeking the expulsion of the French. The
subahdar, whose influence was small, alone was interested in keeping
them. Bussy was inclined to recognise this state of things by aban-
doning the Deccan. What use could be made of people so ungrateful
and a prince so powerless? Dupleix thought otherwise. To him the
Deccan meant the protection of his rights and authority; and he
implored Bussy not to forsake the work which he had begun. At this
moment news arrived that Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-
ul-mulk and holding high office at Delhi, was claiming his father's
territories and marching thither with a large army and the expecta-
tion of support from Balaji Rao. Bussy remained to encounter this
invasion; but had no need of fighting. Ghazi-ud-din was poisoned by
one of his father's wives, and Salabat Jang's throne was thus secured:
But that prince was always exposed to underhand attacks from his
nobles, who disliked his dependence on the French. The new diwan,
Saiyid Lashkar Khan, constantly intrigued against Bussy's influence,
and had agreed with Balaji Rao in some mysterious plan in which
the interests of his master can have had little part. Bussy, who
followed closely all these Indian intrigues, succeeded in avoiding a
new war which in November was on the point of breaking out with
the Marathas, and having, under the guise of mediator, come to terms
on his own account with Balaji Rao, he prepared to enter Mysore in
order to assist in Dupleix's plans against Trichinopoly; but now he
was checked by the refusal of the subahdar's troops to move; they
Duplex to Bussy, 4 August, 1751 (Archieves de Versailles; E 3738).
