We are walking
in darkness—we do not distinctly see whither we are going.
in darkness—we do not distinctly see whither we are going.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
London control of foreign policy .
Dost Muhammad
The Afghan war of succession
The policy of masterly inactivity
Russian expansion
The purposes of Russia
Diplomatic discussions .
Mayo and Sher 'Ali
Northbrook and Argyll
Seistan Boundary Commission
Non-recognition of the Afghan heir
Sher 'Ali and Kaufmann
Salisbury's policy :
The occupation of Quetta
The proposed Afghan mission
The European situation
Stolietoff's mission
Chamberlain's mission
Attitude of the home government
The Second Afghan War
Cavagnari's murder at Kabul
The reoccupation of Kabul .
Abd-ur-rahman
Liberal policy
Ripon's settlement
Policy of the Second Afghan War
Russia and Mr Gladstone
412
412
414
415
416
417
417
.
418
.
419
419
420
420
421
421
422
422
.
## p. xx (#22) ##############################################
XX
CONTENTS
PAGE
423
424
The Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission
The Panjdeh incident
Delimitation of the northern Afghan frontier
Tibet
The Russian railways
Habib-ullah.
The Anglo-Russian Entente
The Third Afghan War
426
426
428
428
429
430
CHAPTER XXIV
THE CONQUEST OF UPPER BURMA
By G. E. HARVEY, I. C. S.
432
433
433
434
435
435
436
437
438
King Mindon
British agents in Burma
Yunnan trade
Withdrawal of the residency
Thibaw's accession
The massacre of the kinsmen
The attempts of rivals.
The Franco-Burmese treaty.
The Third Burmese War
The annexation of Upper Burma
The effects of the annexation
The government of Lower Burma
District administration
Recruitment among the Burmese
Judicial administration
Public works department
Education
Dacoity
Immigration
Crime
Employment of the Burmese
439
440
441
442
442
443
444
444
445
446
446
447
CHAPTER XXV
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
By C. C. Davies, Ph. D.
448
The Sind frontier .
Jacob's policy
The Panjab frontier
Early Panjab policy and organisation
Dera Ghazi Khan, the meeting-place of the two systems
Reforms, 1872-8
Relations with Kalat
Sandeman and Baluchistan
Possible lines of defence
The Indus line
449
449
450
452
453
454
'455
456
457
.
## p. xxi (#23) #############################################
CONTENTS
xxi
The administrative and Durand lines .
Quetta
Kandahar
Difficulties of tribal control
The forward policy
Influence of the amir
The Durand agreement
Chitral
Tribal risings of 1897
Curzon's policy
The North-West Frontier Province
Tribal customs and the jirga system
Land tenures
The arms traffic
The frontier during the late
PAGE
458
458
459
460
461
461
462
463
465
466
467
470
472
473
war
.
.
475
CHAPTER XXVI
INDIA AND THE WAR
By L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, M. A. , Foreign Minister
to H. H. the Maharaja of Patiala.
476
477
478
The functions of the Indian army
Attitude of the princes and the people
Failure to take advantage of the initial enthusiasm
Services overseas
Consequent difficulties of administration
Indian recruitment
Provision of officers and medical personnel
Munitions and supplies
Financial help
Revolutionary attempts
The crisis of 1918
Attitude of the educated classes
The declaration of 1917
The effects of the war
479
480
481
482
483
483
485
485
486
488
488
.
.
CHAPTER XXVII
THE RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA WITH THE INDIAN STATES, 1858-1918
By H. H. DODWELL, M. A.
Position in 1858.
Peculiarities of the Indian treaties
Their constructive interpretation .
Their confirmation in 1858 .
Attitude of the early viceroys
The proclamation and the sanads of adoption
The position of the crown
489
490
491
492
493
493
494
.
## p. xxii (#24) ############################################
xxii
CONTENTS
Kashmir
Successions in the Indian states
Their military forces
Examples of internal interference: Alwar, Jabwa, Tank and Kalat
The case of Malhar Rao Gaekwar
The rendition of Mysore
Common economic interests
Obsolescence of the treaties
Curzon's policy
Attitude of the princes .
The Imperial Service Troops
The Chamber of Princes
Minto's change of policy
PAGE
495
496
497
498
499
50r
503
503
504
506
507
507
509
.
.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1858–1919
CHAPTER XXVIII
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
By J. H. LINDSAY, M. A.
.
The ancient village self-government
Village organisation
The village headman
The village police
Famine relief
Rural boards
The Bengal ferry committees
Local committees elsewhere .
Mayo's reforms
Ripon's reforms
The Bengal Local Self-Government Act
Comparative failure of the rural boards
The presidency towns
Justices of the peace
The question of conservancy
Changes, 1863-7
Reform in Bombay
Reform in Calcutta
Reform in Madras
Early committees in the district towns
The Municipal Act of 1850
Later provincial legislation
Ripon's reforms in the municipalities
Octroi duties
Non-official chairmen
511
512
513
514
515
516
516
517
517
518
520
521
523
523
524
.
.
525
.
526
527
528
.
529
530
531
534
535
537
## p. xxiii (#25) ###########################################
CONTENTS
xxiii
CHAPTER XXIX
THE NATIONAL CONGRESS AND EARLY
POLITICAL LITERATURE
By SIR RICHARD BURN, C. S. I.
Social reforms
Surendranath Banerjee
The Ilbert Bill
The Arya Samaj and Theosophy
The National Congress
The Muslim attitude
Dufferin's policy
The Act of 1892
The principle of election
.
PAGE
538
538
539
539
540
541
541
543
545
548
CHAPTER XXX
THE RISE OF AN EXTREMIST PARTY
By Sir H. VERNEY LOVETT, K. C. S. I.
The influence of the press
Reactionary Hinduism.
B. G. Tilak .
The murders at Poona
The partition agitation in Bengal
The appearance of terrorism
Unrest in the Panjab
The India House conspiracy
Attitude of the moderates
Restrictions on the press
The split of the congress
The prosecution of Tilak
Outrages in Bengal
Gokhale accepts the reforms
Hindu character of the extremist movement
549
549
550
551
552
553
553
554
554
555
555
556
557
559
CHAPTER XXXI
THE REFORMS OF 1909
By SIR RICHARD BURN, C. S. I.
Lord Minto's appointment
Congress proposals
Discussions with Morley
Repressive measures
Minto's proposals
Morley's criticisms
The King's message of 1908
The Muslims demand separate representation
Discussions in parliament
Indian members of council
Method of election
Budget procedure
560
560
561
562
563
565
565
566
567
569
570
572
.
ม
## p. xxiv (#26) ############################################
xxiv
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXXII
POLITICAL MOVEMÉNTS, 1909–1917.
PAGE
574
575
575
576
By Sir RICHARD BURN, C. S. I.
Further restrictions on the press
Political crime
The Delhi Durbar
The change of capital and revocation of the partition of Bengal
Muslim dissatisfaction
Attempt on Lord Hardinge and the spread of revolutionary crime
Working of the new councils
Proposed executive councils in the United Provinces
Indians in South Africa
Revolutionary attempts during the war
The Khilafat agitation
The Home Rule League
Criticism of the Press Act
The Rowlatt Committee and consequent legislation
576
578
579
579
581
582
583
584
584
585
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE REFORMS OF 1919
By SIR RICHARD BURN, C. S. I.
Sir S. P. Sinha's views
Lord Chelmsford's questions
The Declaration of 1917
The Commonwealth of India scheme
Mr Curtis's activities
Montagu's visit to India
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report
The heads of provinces scheme
The Southborough Committee
The Act of 1919
Dyarchy and finance
Changes in the Government of India
The Council of State
The size of the new councils
Con. nunal representation
Position of the secretary of state
The high Commissioner for India
Rules under the act
Importance of the reforms
.
587
587
589
589
591
592
592
594
595
595
596
598
599
599
600
601
602
602
603
## p. xxv (#27) #############################################
CONTENTS
XXV
CHAPTER XXXIV
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
BY VIDYA DHAR MAHAJAN, M. A. (HONS. ), LL. B. , Ph. D.
to 1935
Government of India Act, 1919
Dyarchy in the Provinces
Estimate of the Reforms of 1919
Constitutional Development from 1919
Muddiman Committee Report
The Simon Commission
The Nehru Report
Jinnah's Fourteen Points (1929)
Simon Commission Report (1920)
Round Table Conferences (1930-31)
Communal Award (1932)
Poona Pact (1932)
The White Paper Proposals (1933)
Government of India Act, 1935
Nature of Provincial Autonomy
Defects in the Act of 1935
Estimate of the Act of 1935
The August Offer (1940)
The Cripps Proposals (1942)
Rajagopalachariar Formula (1941)
Desai-Liaquat Formula (1945)
The Wavell Plan (1945)
Labour Party in Office
The Cabinet Mission (1946)
The Calcutta Killing (August, 1946)
Attlee's Statement of February, 1947
June 3 Plan (1947)
The Indian Independence Act, 1917
Demand for Constituent Assembly
Work of Constituent Assembly of India
The Constitution of India (1950)
Amendments of the Constitution
PAGES
604
608
615
616
618
620
621
627
630
632
634
637
640
641
649
656
661
663
665
670
673
674
677
679
683
684
686
688
689
696
698
701
CHAPTER XXXV
THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN INDIA
BY VIDYA DHAR MAHAJAN, M. A. (Hons. ), LL. B. , Ph. D.
Causes of the Rise of Nationalism in India
Political Organisations Before 1885
Foundation of the Indian National Congress
Annual Sessions of the Congress
Rise of Extremism
Home Rule Movement
Terrorist and Revolutionary Movements
712
722
727
731
736
745
746
1
## p. xxvi (#28) ############################################
xxvi
CONTENTS
India and World War I
Non-cooperation Movement
The Swarajist Party
Quit India Movement
Why England Gave India Independence?
PAGES
763
770
775
778
783
CHAPTER XXXVI
PAKISTAN
BY VIDYA DHAR MAHAJAN, M. A. (HONS. ), LL. B. , Ph. D.
r
Work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khar.
Principal Beck and the Muslims
Partition of Bengal
Lord Minto and the Muslims
Foundation of the Muslim League
The Lucknow Pact
The Khilafat Movement
The Nehru Report and the Muslims
Sir Mohammed Iqbal and Pakistan
The Cominunal Award and the Muslims
Rahmat Ali and Pakistan
Formation of Congress Ministries and Muslim League
League Propaganda against Congress Ministries
The Second World War and the Muslim League
Tentative Proposals of Jinnah (1940)
Pakistan Resolution (1940)
The August Offer and Muslim League
The Cripps Mission and the Muslims (1912)
Muslim League and Quit India Movement
Propaganda for Pakistan
Rajaji's Formula
Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (1914)
Liaquat-Desai Pact (1945)
The Simla Conference and Mr. Jinnah
Parliamentary Delegation to India
The Cabinet Mission
Formation of Interim Government
Muslim League joins Interim Govemment
Mountbatten and Partition of India
3 June Plan
Partition of India
Pakistan since 1947
Constitution of Pakistan (1956)
General Ayub takes over
Constitution of 1962
Reforms under lyub Khan
Pakistan Democratic Movement
General Yaliva Khan Takes over
Foreign Policy of Pakistan
788
790
792
793
795
798
799
807
809
811
812
814
817
822
825
828
835
836
837
838
815
816
817
818
852
852
856
860
863
867
870
875
879
882
886
892
894
896
897
## p. xxvii (#29) ###########################################
CONTENTS
xxvii
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
BY VIDYA DHAR MAHAJAN, M. A. (HONS. ), LL. B. , Ph. D.
Chamber of Princes
The Butler Committee Report
Government of India Act, 1935 and Indian States
Cripps and Indian States
Cabinet Mission and Indian States
Attitude of Indian States towards Free India
Indian States after June 3 Plari
State of Junagadh
State of Hyderabad
State of Jammu & Kashmir
Integration and Democratisation of States
The States Reorganisation Commission
The States Reorganisation Act, 1956
The Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
Border Disputes between Maharashtra and Mysore
The Mahajan Report
PAGES
901
903
907
909
910
912
914
916
921
927
934
937
940
942
944
945
CHAPTER XXXVIII
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1919
BY VIDYA DHAR MAHAJAN, M. A. (HONS. ), LL. B. Ph. D.
Inauguration of Montagu-Chelmsford Reformas
The Sikh Gurdwaras Act
The Meston Settlement
The Les Commission
Hindu-Muslim Riots
The Sarda Act
Trade Union Movement
The Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931
The ll'orld War II
The Bengal Famine
INI. Trial
Mountbatten and Partition of India
Press Lirws Enquiry Committee
Radhakrislınan University Commission
Five Year Plans
Agrarian Legislation
Foreign Settlements in India
Nehru's Foreign Policy
India and the United States
India and the Soviet Union
India and Communist China
India and Pakistan
India Today
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(TIROXOLOGICAL TABLE
INDEX
946
949
949
950
953
954
955
958
961
962
969
972
977
978
980
981
983
984
990
994
998
1008
1018
1019
1063
1071
## p. xxviii (#30) ##########################################
## p. 1 (#31) ###############################################
CHAPTER I
IMPERIAL LEGISLATION AND THE SUPERIOR
GOVERNMENTS, 1818-1857
The imperial legislation relating to India in the first half of the
nineteenth century is above all remarkable for the consistency of its
course and the steady development of the policy which it was designed
to promote. From the great India act of 1784 down to the statute
which at last in 1858 abolished the administrative functions of the
East India Company, there was a gradual, persistent evolution, in-
spired by a common group of ideas, directed to a common object, and
founded on principles in origin free alike from heady enthusiasm and
obstinate fear of reformation. The principles were derived from Burke,
but greatly modified by Whig traditions. Burke, of course, though
long a follower of the party, had never been a real Whig. He lacked
the background—the orderly conduct of a great estate—which was
essential to the formation of the true Whig character. His zeal and
sympathy were not balanced by the practical experience of directing
men and managing great affairs. He was a poor judge of character,
unable to detect the shallowness of Francis, and a poor judge of events,
unable to gauge the nature of Indian developments. Neither his
mistaken enthusiasm, nor Fox's party spirit, nor Sheridan's venal
rhetoric, was in fact capable of forming a system on which the nation's
Indian affairs might well and wisely be controlled. That was left to
men who, no longer of the party, had carried with them' much more
of its spirit than remained behind. The ideas and purposes of the
legislation carried through by Pitt and Dundas and Buckinghamshire
have already been described. 1 But it will be convenient here to begin
with the ideas of 1813, for these appear and reappear not only in
legislative principles but also in the actual administration of the period,
so that they form the most appropriate introduction to the present
volume.
H)
The most notable expression given to the ideas current in 1813 was
assuredly the great speech delivered by Lord Grenville, to which
cven forty ycars later men turned back for inspiration and guidance.
Like his successors, he was struck by the strangeness of the task. “On
prcccdents we can here have no reliance. The situation is new; the
subject on which we are to legislate knows no example. Our former
measures would be deceitful guides. ” Nor had the time come for any
final regulation of this most perplexing matter. Three points, he
i Vide v, 313 599. , supra.
• Hansard, xxv, 710 599.
CHIVI
1
## p. 2 (#32) ###############################################
2
LEGISLATION AND SUPERIOR GOVERNMENTS
said, required special attention. The first was the need of declaring
the sovereignty of the British crown in India, as
the only solid basis on which we can either discharge our duties or maintain our
rights. . . . The British crown is de facto sovereign in India. How it became so it is
needless to enquire. This sovereignty cannot now be renounced without still greater
evils, both to that country and to this, than even the acquisition of power has ever
yet produced. It must be maintained. . . That sovereignty which we hesitate to
assert, necessity compels us to exercise.
But it should be exercised first to provide for the welfare of the Indian
population, next, but ranking far below the first, to promote the
interests of Great Britain. In Grenville's eyes there was no conflict
between the two. “Pursued with sincerity and on the principles of
a just and liberal policy, there exists between them a close connection,
a necessary and mutual dependence. ” Oppression must be prevented,
light and knowledge must be diffused. The government must be
separated “from all intermixture with mercantile interests". But it
would be fatal to the constitution of Great Britain if the Company's
patronage were ever vested in the crown or exercised by any political
party. Perhaps, he suggested, writers might be chosen “by free com-
petition and public examination from our great schools and univer-
sities".
The act then passed was far less comprehensive than the speaker
desired. The Company was again entrusted for a further period of
twenty years with the administration of the Indian territories. Its
trade was continued. But it lost the monopoly of the Indian trade;
British-born subjects were to be admitted under less arbitrary re-
strictions; the sovereignty of the British crown was asserted; and
provision was made for the development of an educational policy.
Then with an easier conscience the legislature abandoned for twenty
years the difficult and unfamiliar study of Indian problems. One might
suppose that the words of Grenville had been forgotten. But it was
not so. The general ideas which he expressed continued to dominate
the minds of legislators not only in 1833, but in 1853 as well. The
sovereignty of the crown was not only asserted but was reinforced.
The Company was maintained in its functions, but its structure was
transformed, and its mercantile interests eliminated. Great efforts
were made to improve the administration in India; and at last the
method of selecting the administrative service first advocated by
Gre ville was adopted.
But this consistency of effort exhibited also the defects of its qualities.
Admirable as were the ideas of Grenville in their time and place, they
were liable to exhaustion by the development of affairs. The time was
to come when they would be inadequate guides, when they would
need to be replaced by a new set of ideas, when the changes intro-
duced by this consistent policy would require recognition. But un-
luckily the act of 1853 exhibits no inclination to set off on a new
## p. 3 (#33) ###############################################
THE REFORMS OF 1833
3
departure. Its changes were few, stereotyped, imperfect. The motive
powers of the ideas underlying it were in fact exhausted, and no new
ideas were as yet powerful enough to take their place.
Neither of the acts of 1833 and 1853 was in any way intended to
be definitive. The need of caution was still deeply felt. As Macaulay
said in the debates on the bill of 1833, “We are trying. . . to give a
good government to a people to whom we cannot give a free govern-
ment”. Even James Mill, that zealot of representative institutions,
had declared them to be utterly out of the question. Therefoie
we have to engraft on despotism the natural fruits of liberty. In these circumstances,
Sir, it behoves us to be cautious even to the verge of timidity. . . .
We are walking
in darkness—we do not distinctly see whither we are going. It is the wisdom of
a man so situated to feel his way, and not to plant his foot till he is well assured that
the ground before him is firm. 1
Twenty years later he was still the advocate of reform with caution.
“Such a bill”, he declared, “ought to make alterations, and yet it
ought not to be final. The bill. . . ought to be a large yet cautious step
in the path of progress. ”. He seems not to have noticed that the steps
were becoming shorter, or that the rate of progress was slowing down.
The ideas underlying the bill of 1833 were most clearly expressed
in the speech of Charles Grant, afterwards Lord Glenelg, and at
that time president of the Board of Control. The first point which
he emphasised was the need of abolishing the Company's trading
activities and reducing it to a purely administrative body. The union
of the characters of sovereign and trader, he observed, was “calcu-
lated to give a false impression of the character of the government”. 3
In the second place he put the need of improvement in the govern-
mental machinery in India. The presidency of Fort William was
overgrown and should be divided into two. Perhaps the governor-
general should not be required to supervise the whole conduct of
affairs and at the same time to administer a particular government;
certainly he ought to be invested with higher powers of control over
the subordinate presidencies. In the third place the laws should be
amended, the legislatures improved, the anomalous and conflicting
judicatures reformed. Slavery should be abolished, and Europeans
admitted freely into the country.
To a large extent these projects were carried into law. “This
political monster of two natures-subject in one hemisphere, sovereign
in another”, was made much less anomalous by being required with
all convenient speed after 12 April, 1834, to close down its commercial
business, and to pension or otherwise provide for its commercial
servants, under the superintendence of the Board of Control. Its
capital became a charge on the territorial revenues and provision was
· Hansard, 3rd Ser. XIX, 512-13.
2 Idem, CXXVIII, 741.
: Idem, XVIII, 705.
• Idem, XVIII, 727 599.
5 Macaulay, idem, XIX, 509.
3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, ss. 4, 6.
6
1-2
## p. 4 (#34) ###############################################
4
LEGISLATION AND SUPERIOR GOVERNMENTS
!
1
1
1
made for its repayment in forty years, or earlier should the govern-
ment of the Indian territories be taken away from it. 1 This was in
fact making leisurely provision for the time when the Company might
at last be abolished. But at the moment abolition was regarded as
premature, for the old jealousy of the executive was still strong.
Macaulay expressed the general attitude with customary point and
vigour. Authority ought not to be vested in the crown alone, for in
such matters parliament could not provide the necessary criticism and
control.
That this house is, or is ever likely to be, an efficient check on abuses practised in
India, I altogether deny. . . . What we want is a body independent of the govern-
ment, and no more than independent—not a tool of the Treasury, not a tool of the
opposition. . . . The Company. . . is such a body. ?
The problems connected with the Indian governments were less
easy of solution. The original bill declared that “the whole civil and
military government of all the said territories and revenues in India
shall be. . . vested in a governor-general and counsellors. . . ”. . But
this proposal met with criticism in both the Commons and the Lords.
It was felt that it would overwhelm the Supreme Government with
unnecessary detail and strip the subordinate governments of all
authority and credit. It was therefore decided to moderate the
section, so as to give the governor-general and council, not the whole
government, but “the superintendence direction and control”. 5
Another proposal directed to the same end had also to be materially
modified. The bill proposed that in future the subordinate pre-
sidencies should be administered by governors only, though per-
mitting the Company to appoint councillors where necessary. At the
same time an additional Company's servant was to be added to the
governor-general's council, making four in all, designed (it seems)
to permit the appointment of a representative from each of the four
contemplated presidencies. This last change would have been a
great improvement, for the governor-general's council possessed no
personal knowledge of the subordinate presidencies. But it was
thought that the change would lead to too much interference on the
part of the central government. The connected proposal to abolish
the subordinate councils was eminently distasteful to the Company,
for it would have diminished the value of its patronage. The addi-
tional Company's servant on the supreme council was therefore
dropped, while the existing form of presidency government was
continued, though the Company was empowered to suspend the
councils or diminish the number of councillors. ?
1
3 Bill, s. 30.
3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, ss. 11-17.
2 Hansard, 3rd Ser. xix, 513, 516.
* Hansard, 3rd Ser. xix, 543; cf. xx, 322.
3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, s. 39; cf. s. 65.
6 Hansard, 3rd Ser. XVIII, 750; Bill, ss. 37, 39, 55, 56.
3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, ss. 40, 56, 57.
5
7
## p. 5 (#35) ###############################################
LEGAL ANOMALIES
5
The draft provisions regarding legislation were more successful in
procuring parliamentary adoption. At this time each of the three
presidencies enjoyed equal legislative powers; though the governor-
general possessed a legal right of veto over the legislation of the
subordinate governments, it had in fact been little exercised. 1 Thus
had come into existence three series of regulations, as these enactments
were called, frequently ill-drawn, for they had been drafted by
inexperienced persons with little skilled advice; frequently conflicting,.
in some cases as a result of varying conditions, but in others merely
by accident; and in all cases enforceable only in the Company's courts
because they had never been submitted to and registered by the king's
courts. Besides these were the uncertain bodies of Muslim and Hindu
law, uncertain because of a variety of texts and interpretations, and
still more uncertain because of the varying application which they
received in the courts themselves. Lastly came English statute and
common law and equity, applied by the king's courts. These con-
flicting series of laws were enforceable by two different and generally
hostile judicatures, with ill-defined jurisdictions. In general the king's
courts exercised jurisdiction within the limits of the presidency towns
of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, while the Company's courts
exercised jurisdiction over the dependent territories. But apart from
this territorial jurisdiction, the king's courts possessed a personal
jurisdiction over British-born subjects, in some cases involving juris-
diction over Indian-born subjects. This particular aspect of the
matter was clearly destined to be of growing importance. The doors
of India, as the directors said, were to be "unsealed for the first time
to British subjects of European birth”. Englishmen, who had till then
resided in India on sufferance, were to acquire a right to reside and
even to acquire land there. Since the Company's trade was to cease,
a large number of merchants and traders were expected to settle in
India to take advantage of the change. It was evidently inexpedient
that the two classes of subjects, Indian and English, should continue
to live under separate laws administered by separate courts or that the
latter when accused of wronging the former, or accusing the former
of wrong, should be able to insist on the issue being tried by a strange,
unsuitable and probably very distant court.
For these various and cogent reasons it was resolved to modify the
legislative authority in India, to extend its legislative competence,
and to prepare for a general reform of the judicial system. The
subordinate governments, it was felt, should lose their legislative
authority altogether-a measure which appears the more natural
when it is remembered that it was also intended at first to abolish
their councils. The existence of three legislatures had added much to
the complexity of the legal system, the simplification of which would
1 Hansard, 3rd Ser. XVUI, 727.
• Dispatch to the Guvernment of India, 10 December, 1834 (Ilbert, ist ed. Appendix).
## p. 6 (#36) ###############################################
6
LEGISLATION AND SUPERIOR GOVERNMENTS
be aided by concentrating all legislative authority in a single body.
This change was also supported by the proposed extension of power,
which parliament would concede least unreadily to the governor-
general and his council. It was therefore decided to transfer all power
of making laws to them; and it was thought that the need of special
laws to suit local peculiarities would be sufficiently met by empowering
the presidency governments to submit to the governor-general and
council draft laws to be enacted or not as might scem best.
The powers granted to the governor-general and council were much
wider than any till then entrusted to an Indian legislature. They
could make laws to repeal, amend or alter
any laws or regulations whatever now in force or hereafter to be in force in the said
territories. . . , and to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British
or native, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice, whether established by
His Majesty's charters or otherwise, and the jurisdiction thereof,
except that they could not modify the new act, the mutiny act, any
future act of parliament relating to India, or the sovereignty of the
crown. But apart from this limitation all their acts should possess
“the same force and effect” as any act of parliament, and “shall be
taken notice of by all courts of justice whatsoever within the said
territories". 2
These were full powers for a dependent legislature. Their particular
importance lay, however, in one main point. Till 1833 no Indian
legislation had the least effect in the Supreme Courts. It is true that
provision had been made by which an Indian regulation would
become binding on those courts once it had been registered by them.
But such registration had lain wholly within the pleasure of the courts
themselves; and the Indian governments had steadily refused to
recognise the veto in effect entrusted to the courts by refusing to
submit their acts for registration. Their legislation had thus been
binding on Indian residents outside the presidency towns and on the
Company's courts established in the Mufassal, but not binding on
either Indian or European residents at government headquarters or
the king's courts established there. Now it became equally binding
on all classes of inhabitants, whatever their place of residence, and
on all courts of law, whatever the authority by which they were
constituted. In order to complete its powers the new legislature was
authorised to modify or define the jurisdiction even of courts esta-
blished by royal charter, though the latter might not be abolished
without the previous sanction of the home authorities. 3
One object of the earlier statutes requiring regulations to be
registered in the Supreme Courts before becoming enforceable in the
presidency towns had been to secure the criticism of the respective
benches before the laws adopted by the Company's governments
3 & Will. IV, c. 85, ss. 59, 65.
? Idem, ss. 43, 45.
3 Idem, s. 46.
1
4
## p. 7 (#37) ###############################################
THE LAW MEMBER
7
became universally valid. Experience had indeed shown that the
presidency governments needed more expert advice on legislative
drafts than could be provided by law officers chosen from the local
bar. The new act for the first time made provision for this. An
additional member of council was to be appointed by the Company
with the approval of the crown. The definition of his qualifications
was purely negative. He was not to be a member of the Company's
civil or military service. The only formal indication of the part he
was to play consisted in the declaration that he was to have rights
of speech and vote only at meetings of the council for the consideration
of legislative business. The office thus obscurely defined was that of
law member. The appointment was important in two ways. It con-
stituted the first step taken in India towards the establishment of a
legislature separate from the executive; and it provided the council
with a legal expert to criticise, amend or draft legislative proposals.
“The concurrence of the fourth member of council may be wanting to a law”, wrote
the directors, "and the law may be good still; even his absence at the time of
enactment will not vitiate the law; but parliament manifestly intended that the
whole of his time and attention, and all the resources of knowledge or ability
which he may possess, should be employed in promoting the due discharge of the
legislative functions of the council. "He has indeed no pre-eminent control over
the duties of this department, but he is peculiarly charged with them in all their
ramifications. "
And although he was entitled to sit and vote only when laws were
under consideration, the Company advised that he should be per-
mitted to sit at the executive meetings of the council.
"An intimate knowledge”, it wrote, "of what passes in council will be of essential
service to him in the discharge of his legislative functions. Unless he is in the habit
of constant communication and entire confidence with his colleagues; unless he is
familiar with the details of internal administration, with the grounds on which the
government acts and with the information by which it is guided, he cannot
possibly sustain his part in the legislative conferences or measures, with the know-
ledge, readiness and independence essential to a due performance of his duty. "
The advice was followed. Macaulay (the first law member) and his
successors were summoned to the ordinary as well as to the legislative
meetings.
The third measure taken in this connection was the creation of an
entirely new body. The governor-general in council was directed
to appoint “Indian law commissioners”, who were to enquire into
the jurisdiction, powers and rules of all courts and police-establish-
ments, all forms of judicial procedure, and the nature and operation
of all laws, civil and criminal, written or customary, and to propose
any necessary alterations, due regard being had to the rules of caste,
and the religions and manners of the people. They were to follow
such instructions as they should receive from the governor-general
in council, and to draw the pay that the latter should appoint in the
13 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, S. 40. · Dispatch, 10 December, 1834, ut supra.
• Idem.
## p. 8 (#38) ###############################################
8
LEGISLATION AND SUPERIOR GOVERNMENTS
scale next below that enjoyed by members of council. 1 Thus came
into existence the first Indian Law Commission. It was designed to
fulfil a double object-to unravel the tangle of existing laws and to
advise on new projects of legislation. In both points the new body
(over which Macaulay and his successors presided without additional
pay) achieved much. It was employed by the new legislature to
consider and report on projected laws submitted by the subordinate
governments, and its reports form an interesting and very valuable
part of the legislative proceedings of the period. But its other and
indeed its principal object proved more difficult than had been
expected. Macaulay in 1833, with his usual lucid and specious gift
of statement, persuaded himself and the House of Commons that the
ideal moment had come in which to codify the Indian laws, and that
codification would be a relatively easy, rapid process, which should
be undertaken without delay. When he became law member, and
presided over the commission, he laboured hard to fulfil his promises.
He produced the first draft of the Penal Code. But that remained
a project until, having been reconsidered, amended, and much
improved, it was at last enacted in 1861. The first Indian Law Com-
mission thus only laid foundations on which other legislators were to
build.
The act of 1833 dealt with two other matters of great importance
-the mode of administering the presidency of Fort William and the
position and recruitment of the Company's civil service. Reform of the
government of Bengal was long overdue. The conquests and policy
of Wellesley had greatly expanded the territories of a province already
over-large. The Agra districts not only lay at a great distance from
the centre of government but also included the imperial city of
Delhi adjacent to the powerful state of Ranjit Singh in the Panjab.
Need therefore existed of a strong and vigilant local authority. Nor
was this all. The governor-general in council was responsible for
the general administration and policy of all British India as well as
for the particular administration of Bengal. This burden was in fact
more than he could bear. The detail of Bengal administration tended
therefore to be relegated to subordinate authorities. The Bengal
Board of Revenue acted largely as the government of the province.
A great part of the administration was thus entrusted to revenue
servants bred up in a revenue system which more than any other
discouraged familiarity with the customs and life of the people
To this unfortunate system, the evils of which were at the time but
partially recognised, the act applied two palliatives. It declared that
the territories under the presidency of Fort William were to be divided
int) two governments. 2 This involved the appointment of a separate
governor, but did not necessitate the appointment of a council. 3
& 4 Will. IV, c. 85, s. 53-5.
2 Idem, s. 38.
3 Idem, ss. 56, 57.
