For important examples of critical theory
approaches
to international politics, see the ref- erences above in chap.
Revolution and War_nodrm
Although war might have oc-
curred even if the revolution had been averted, the internal turmoil in France was directly responsible for the war that did break out and for its rapid expansion.
Similarly, although the collapse of the Romanov dynasty temporarily lowered the level of conflict by taking Russia out of World War I, the estab- lishment of Soviet Russia ultimately increased it. The revolution encour- aged other states to compete over the lands of former tsarist empire and brought to power a regime that supported the violent overthrow of other states. The tsarist regime would never have acted as Soviet Russia did, and the other great powers would never have seen it as a subversive force. Again, it is safe to infer that the revolution was directly responsible for much of the enmity and insecurity that characterized relations between So- viet Russia and most other powers.
This pattern is even more apparent in the Iranian case. The revolution alarmed Iran's Arab neighbors, led directly to a protracted war with Iraq, and transformed U. S. -Iranian relations from close alliance to bitter rivalry. Relations with most other countries deteriorated as well, leaving the Islamic Republic largely isolated. Although the shah's ambitions had alarmed his neighbors on occasion, they never provoked the level of international en- . mity that the Islamic Republic has. Thus, Iran's present position is simply incomprehensible outside the context of the revolution.
The same effects were present in the other four cases, albeit to varying de- . grees. The United States experienced repeated conflicts with both its former British rulers and its putative French ally, coming close to war with each on one or more occasions. The revolution in Mexico exacerbated the competi- tion for influence between the United States, Britain, and Germany, led the United States to intervene in 1914 and again in 1916, and continued to mar relations between Mexico and the United States until the late 1930s. The Na- tionalist revolution in Turkey challenged European ambitions in the Near East, brought the new regime to the brink of war with Great Britain in 1922, and eventually forced the Entente to withdraw its troops and abandon the Treaty of Sevres. Needless to say, it is hard to imagine the Ottoman sultan achieving like results. Finally, the Communist triumph in China ended
decades of foreign interference, moved Beijing firmly into the socialist camp, and placed the new regime on the path to war in Korea. Once again, it is unlikely that Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD would have acted the same way or provoked similar responses.
? ? Conclusion
Hypothetical scenarios can never be tested, of course, but the possibility that these states would have experienced equally high levels of conflict in the absence of revolution seems remote. Although other causes of conflict were undoubtedly present, these cases show that revolutions have indepen- dent causal effects on the level of security competition and the probability of war.
Balance-of-Threat Theory
Why do revolutions make competition and war more likely? As described in detail in chapter 2, balance-of-threat theory suggests that revolutions cause security competition by altering the perceived level of threat between the revolutionary state and its main adversaries, on one hand, and by en- couraging both sides to believe that the use of force can overcome the threat at an acceptable cost, on the other.
The evidence strongly supports this general argument. The crises or wars that followed each of the revolutions examined here resulted from a combi- nation of opportunism and insecurity, based on misjudgments about the balance of power, overly malign perceptions of intent, and (in the worst cases) exaggerated beliefs about the likelihood of contagion or counterrevo- lution. Compounding the problem were uncertainty and misinformation, which reinforced each side's prior beliefs and made peaceful settlements more elusive.
TheBalanceofPower. IntheFrench,Russian,andIraniancases,therevo- lution's effect on the balance of power was a central cause of war. Yet the im- pact of a revolution on the balance of power does not cause war by itself. In particular, these effects cannot explain why some states try to exploit the op- portunities while others remain aloof, nor can they account for aggressive behavior on the part of the revolutionary state. For example, although Prus- sia saw French weakness after 1789 as a chance for expansion, most Euro- pean states welcomed the erosion of French power and did not use force to exploit it. Instead, the war began when, reacting to Austria's efforts to in- timidate the French, the Girondins convinced the Assembly to declare war
in April 1792. Similarly, Iran's weakness after the revolution does not fully explain why Iraq saw a military attack as desirable or necessary; the appar- ent collapse of Iranian power might just as easily been considered an op- portunity for Iraq to turn its attention to other problems. ' The four cases examined in chapter 6 reinforce this conclusion: although the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions created significant power vacu-
1 Furthermore, focusing on power alone cannot explain why Iraq decided to go to war but ? Iran's other neighbors (the Soviet Union, Turkey, Afghanistan) did not.
? ? ? ? ? Revolution and War
urns and fostered greater security competition between other powers, only China was subsequently involved in war. If the belief that a revolution has weakened its victim is part of the link between revolution and war, it is hardly the whole story.
PerceptionsofIntent. Eachoftheserevolutionsproducedsharpdepartures from the foreign policies of the old regime, in tum creating sharp conflicts of interest with other states. Furthermore, both the revolutionary state and tlhe other great powers tended to exaggerate one another's hostility and aggres- siveness. One of the most characteristic features of postrevolutionary for- eign policy, this tendency is also one of the most pernicious.
These cases also confirm that spirals of suspicion can arise from several distinct sources. The most obvious source is ideology: if the worldview of a revolutionary movement stipulates that certain regimes are inherently hos- tile, the new regime is likely to interpret the behavior of foreign powers in the worst possible light. Asecond source is domestic politics. As the French and Iranian cases suggest, factions within a revolutionary movement may dramatize foreign dangers in order to consolidate their own positions. Spi- raling may also be fueled by testimony from emigres or foreign revolution- aries, whose desire for support gives them an obvious incentive to foster conflicts between the revolutionary state and other powers. This tactic played a modest role in several of these cases; French emigres echoed Euro- pean fears of the revolution in France, Russian exiles stiffened Allied resis- tance against normalizing relations with the Bolshevik regime, and Iranian exiles (including the shah) contributed to the deterioration of Iranian for- eign rellations. The activities of the "China lobby" and the misleading testi- mony provided by some U. S. diplomats after the American Revolution further illustrates this danger.
Offense, Defense, and the Export ofRevolution. The cases examined in this study also confirm that revolutions cause war by affecting perceptions of the offense-defense balance, conceived in both military and political terms. In the French, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese cases, decisions to go to war were encouraged by a combination of fear and overconfidence, usually based on each side's calculations of the likelihood that the revolution will spread or be reversed. Expecting that their example would be contagious, the revolutionary state was more confident, less willing to compromise, and prone to support revolutionary efforts abroad. At the same time, the general belief that the revolution might also be easily reversed made exporting the revolufrion seem necessary to the revolutionary state and helped convince its adversaries that they could eliminate the threat with little effort.
Ironically, history suggests that both these beliefs are usually misguided. Although each of these revolutions was accompanied by evidence of discon-
? ? Conclusion
tent in other societies, none of them spawned successful imitators during the decade after the seizure of power, and efforts to spread the revolution via propaganda or contagion only angered and alarmed other states. The Girondins' predictions of a universal crusade for liberty were disappointed; "Bolshevik" uprisings in Finland, Hungary, and Bavaria collapsed quickly, the Polish proletariat welcomed the Red Army with bayonets instead of flowers; and Soviet attempts to spark Communist revolutions in the Near East and China all failed. Efforts to export the Iranian Revolution have been equally abortive thus far, despite the universalist pretensions of Khomeini's Shiism and Iran's support for fundamentalist groups throughout the Muslim world. We should not be surprised at these results, however, because would- be propagators of revolution face several significant obstacles.
First, although a revolution often comes as a? surprise to virtually every- one (including the revolutionaries themselves), it also provides a timely warning to others. As a result, potential targets will be less prone to the mis- takes that let the old regime be toppled. Thus, the French example alerted the other European powers to keep a close watch on potential "Jacobins" and to make a number of modest reforms. These measures were universally successful except in areas conquered by French troops. Similarly, states fac- ing a Bolshevik challenge acted vigorously to suppress potential uprisings after 1917, just as the Persian Gulf states suppressed, coopted, or expelled anyone suspected of spreading Iran's revolutionary message. Louis XVI in Paris, Nicholas II in St. Petersburg, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Tehran may have dithered their way to their own destruction, but their contempo- raries in other countries seem to have learned from their mistakes.
Second, potential victims of a spreading revolution also learn to balance against this frightening possibility. The growing danger from revolutionary France led to the formation of a large (if unruly) coalition by the summer of 1793, and the Entente maintained a common front against Bolshevism until the mid-192os. In the same way, the threat from Iran prompted greater co- operation between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United States. 2
Third, the failure of revolutions to spread underscores the advantages that incumbent regimes ordinarily enjoy. Even states with severe internal problems usually retain some shreds of legitimacy, as well as a substantial' asymmetry of power over their internal rivals. Moreover, the combination of favorable circumstances and coincidences that make the first revolution possible are unlikely to occur elsewhere in precisely the same fashion. Thus, pro-French radkals in England were quickly overcome by prompt govern- ment action, the German Communists proved to be no match for the Reichs-
2 By contrast, because foreign powers were not especially worried that the U. S. , Mexican, or Turkish revolutions would spread, they did not band together in strong opposing coali- tions.
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wehr in 1919, 1921, and 1923, and the Shiites in Iraq were crushed when their leaders tried to duplicate the Iranian experience. Given the barriers to a revolution's spreading beyond a single state's borders, the real mystery is why anybody believes that it wilV
The evidence also suggests that reversing a revolution is nearly as diffi- cult as spreading one. Revolutionary regimes survive because they are usu- ally adept at mobilizing military power; whatever their other failings, revolutionary movements are especially good at persuading people to run grave risks and make large sacrifices for the sake of an ideal. 4 Foreign inter- ference can facilitate this task by providing the legitimacy that a revolution- ary regime needs, and a foreign threat can make it easier for leaders to eliminate rivals in the name of "national unity. "
When foreign powers do not possess reliable sources of information and do not discount the testimony of emigres sufficiently, they are likely to end up backing far-fetched counterrevolutionary schemes that hold little chance of success-as illustrated by English support for the Quiberon expedition in 1795, British and French aid to the White armies in the Russian Civil War, Iraq's support for various Iranian exile groups in Baghdad, and covert U. S. efforts to support anti-Communist groups in China. Supporting counter- revolutionary forces may be a cost-effective means of pressuring a revolu- tionary regime, but it is unlikely to remove it from power and will almost
certainly fuel its perceptions of threat.
These obstacles do not mean that counterrevolutionary efforts never suc- ceed, but success will be more difficult than other states expect. Foreign in- tervention did reverse the Dutch revolt of 1787 and the Polish "revolt" of 1791, to cite but two examples, and both superpowers intervened to reverse unwanted upheavals in their own spheres of interest throughout the Cold War. 5 These examples suggest that outside intervention can work when
3 Exceptions arise when the new regime is able to defeat and occupy its adversaries and impose its system upon their populations by force. Thus, France's "sister republics" and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe resulted from military expansion rather than the spread of revolutionary ideals. Examples of "spontaneous" Communist revolutions include those in the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nic- aragua, but these "triumphs" occurred decades after the 1917 revolution.
4 See Theda Skocpol, "Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," World Politics 40, no. ? 2 ( 11}88); and Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," Com-
parative Political Studies 21, no. 1 (1988).
5 The Soviet Union intervened in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Polish Army declared martial Jaw (with Soviet support) in 198o, and the Red Army invaded Afghanistan in 19Bo in an attempt to prop up a faltering Marxist regime there. The United States helped topple the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953 and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 and played a subordinate role in removing the Allende regime in Chile in 1968. In 1983, a U. S. invasion ousted the New Jewel Movement in Grenada, and the U. S-backed contras forced the Sandinista government in Nicaragua to agree to new elections (in which they were voted out of office) after a protracted and bloody civil war.
? ? ? Conclusion
there is a large disparity in power between the two states involved. Even in such cases, however, the effort often turns out to be greater than the inter- vening power anticipated.
In short, the perceptions of a mutual offensive advantage that accompany most revolutions are especially dangerous, because the combination of in- security and overconfidence that leads to the use of force is usually ill- founded. In fact, revolutions are hard to export and difficult to reverse, and in most cases, both sides are more secure than they think and would be bet- ter off remaining at peace.
The tendency for revolutions to foster perceptions of offense dominance is not universal, and the absence of this factor is the main reason why the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions did not lead to war. These rev- olutions altered the balance of power and generated both real conflicts of in- terest and spirals of suspicion. Yet in each case, key leaders were aware that the revolution was unlikely to ? pread and that war would be expensive. As a result, both sides ultimately refrained from the large-scale use of force.
UncertaintyandMisinformation. Ifrevolutionsarebothhardtoexportand difficult to reverse, then why do states worry about either possibility? Our cases provide part of the answer: it will be extremely difficult for states to gauge their situation accurately after a revolution, because relations be- tween revolutionary states and other powers will be afflicted by very high levels of uncertainty and misinformation. The problem arises from several different aspects of the revolutionary process, so it will usually be difficult to overcome.
For example, it is hardly surprising that both sides have trouble estimat- ing the balance of military power, because the military capacity of the new state will rest on novel institutions whose effects can only be discovered through battlefield experience. Foreign powers will usually have good rea- sons to discount a revolutionary state's capabilities, if only because the armed forces of the old regime usually deteriorate in the short term. Yet in almost every case examined here, the revolutionary regime managed to use new myths, symbols, and institutions to create an unexpectedly formidable military machine. 6
The political consequences of a revolution are even harder to calculate in advance, because the political appeal of a revolutionary model is virtually impossible to gauge with confidence. Neither the revolutionaries nor their foreign opponents know if the revolution will attract adherents abroad or if foreign intervention will spark a counterrevolutionary upheaval. Faced
6 The United States and Mexico are partial exceptions to this claim, because neither revo- lution faced a large-scale foreign invasion. The rapid mobilization of U. S. naval power dur- ing the Quasi-War and the Constitutionalists' unexpected success in the civil war against Villa are consistent with this argument, however.
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with this uncertainty, elites on both sides will tend to rely on ideology and recent experience and to assume that the initial revolutionary success was a harbinger of things to come. Even relatively modest signs of a sympathetic response elsewhere will be taken as evidence of a rising revolutionary tide, and testimony from foreign revolutionaries or counterrevolutionary exiles can reinforce these erroneous expectations.
Both sides overstate the likelihood of counterrevolution for much the same reason. The danger of an "aristocratic conspiracy" terrified the French from 1789 onward; the Bolsheviks feared their hold on power might lapse at any moment; the Islamic Republic has waged a brutal campaign against for- mer opponents as well. These fears reflect the intrinsic difficulty of accu- rately gauging the loyalty of the population at large. Although signs of dissent will always be present, neither the ruling authorities nor outside powers can know how strong the opposition really is.
To make matters worse, revolutions impede the acquisition of the infor- mation that might help correct these erroneous impressions. The revolution- ary states in France, Russia, and Iran were cut off from normal diplomatic contacts, intensifying their perceptions of threat and making subsequent ef- forts to reach a modus vivendi more difficult. Indeed, a striking feature of most of these cases is the extent to which states were forced. to conduct dipl9- macy through unofficial agents whose expertise and reliability usually left much to be desired.
Lastly, with all the uncertainty, other states will have trouble deciding how to respond to a revolution, and foreign powers will be hard-pressed to agree on a common course of action. 7 If the power of a revolutionary state is unclear, the danger of contagion uncertain, and the prospects for counter- revolution unknown, it will be difficult to obtain a consensus for interven- tion or abstention, and the other states will be more likely to respond in a haphazard and poorly coordinated manner. This problem arose in several of our cases: the European powers were often divided over how to respond to the revolution in France; the Entente could not adopt a unified policy to-
ward the Bolshevik or Turkish revolutions; Britain and the United States disagreed over the proper approach to take toward the revolutionary gov- ernments in Mexico and China; and there was little consensus on how to re- spond to Iran's revolution until its army had crossed into Iraqi soil. The result, unfortunately, may have been the worst of both worlds: other states did enough to antagonize the new regimes but not enough to eliminate them.
7 I identify some other reasons for this tendency in my chapter, "Collective Security and Revolutionary Change: Promoting Peace in the Former Soviet Empire," in Collective Secu- rity after the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
? ? ? ? ? Conclusion
Realism and Revolution
The cases examined in this book both confirm the basic explanatory power of realism and suggest which strands of realist thought are most useful. In particular, realism is most powerful when it goes beyond a nar- row focus on the gross distribution of power and instead examines the bal-
ance of threats. Although the balance of power is hardly irrelevant, the behavior of states is also affected by how national leaders assess the inten- tions of other states and how they perceive the relative advantage to of- fense or defense. The offense-defense balance is not merely a function of
geography or military doctrine, however, but may also be affected by the potential appeal of particular ideas (such as a new revolutionary ideology). Realism gains even more explanatory power by incorporating the possibil- ity that states will misread these factors, and as we have seen repeatedly, such misperceptions are especially common after revolutions. 8 Beliefs about the possibility of revolutionary contagion-which ultimately rest on beliefs about the persuasive power of revolutionary ideas-have been crit- ical in shaping perceptions of the offense-defense balance and help explain why some revolutions led to war and others did not. In short, by incorpo- rating domestic politics and ideas into the anarchic setting depicted by re-
alism, we obtain a more complete picture of the forces that shape state behavior.
This argument points to another insight: realism may tell us more about international behavior in postrevolutionary periods than in more "normal" periods. Some realists depict international politics as a relentless struggle for survival whell"e security is extremely scarce and states must constantly strive for any advantage. 9 Proponents of this perspective are likely to view
revolutionary states as exceptions to realist logic, because their foreign pol- icy objectives are heavily affected by ideology and their leaders are pre- sumed to be less familiar with the subtleties of international diplomacy. Yet in the three main cases examined here, each side saw the other as an immi- nent and intense threat and discounted the possibility of a lasting peace. In other words, relations between these revolutionary states and other powers were virtually identical to the relationships depicted by the more extreme versions of realism. The key point, however, is that the level of conflict is not
8 Stephen Van Evera refers to this as "Type IV Realism. " It differs from other strands of re- alist theory by focusing on what Van Evera calls the "fine-grained structure of power" and by explicating the factors that shape how states perceive that structure. Causes ofWar, vol. 1: The Structure ofPower and the Roots ofWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 1. On the impact of ideas on the offense-defense balance, see George Quester, Offense and De-
fense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977), 67.
9 This view is most clearly expressed in the writings of John J. Mearsheimer: "Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990); and "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-95).
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merely due to the state of anarchy and a particular distribution of capabili- ties (as a neorealist such as John Mearsheimer would have it) but is also heavily influenced by perceptions of intent and beliefs about the likelihood that the revolution will spread or be reversed.
With frhe passage of time, however, each side will acquire a more accurate estimate of the true threat that it faces. The security dilemma between them will ease and each will adopt a less vigilant posture. The relentless competi- tion depicted by some realists will abate, and prospects for cooperation will probably increase. By restricting themselves to examining the gross distri- bution of power, however, neorealists cannot explain why the level of con- flict varies even though the distribution of power is constant. This shortcoming is another reason to prefer balance-of-threat theory to the overly spare world of neorealist balance-of-power theory.
Finally, the neorealist claim that revolutionary states will be "socialized" to the system seems to be only partly correct. Although external pressures did lead all of these regimes to alter their behavior in significant ways, their tendency to cling to counterproductive strategies despite substantial costs was equally striking-especially in the Soviet, Chinese, and Iranian cases, where a commitment to avowedly revolutionary objectives kept these regimes isolated and beleaguered far longer than was necessary. One may speculate that such a tendency will be most severe when, first, the ideology in question is particularly extreme, and second, it has been formally instifru- tionalized within a hegemonic ruling party. Thus, the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutionary leaders adapted quickly because they began with more moderate ideas, and the French were able to abandon the more utopian visions of the Girondins and Montagnards because those had not been enshrined in a formal party ideology and were not central to the legit- imacy of the postrevolutionary state.
Critical Theory, Identity, and Revolutionary Change
The cases examined here also shed light on the relative merits of critical- theory as an approach to international politics. Critical theory emphasizes the role of language and social processes in shaping actors' goals, identities, and collective self-understandings. 10 From this perspective, the interna- tional system is not an independent structure arising from the interactions of preexisting states; rather, it is the product of concrete social practices that reflect the purposes and perceptions of the actors themselves.
Revolutions are crucial cases for critical theorists, because in them state identities are rapidly and radically transformed through changes in the dis-
1?
For important examples of critical theory approaches to international politics, see the ref- erences above in chap. 1, n. 10.
? ? ? Conclusion
cursive practices of a community. 11 A revolution transformed Britain's North American colonies into a "new republic"; the absolutist regime of Louis XVI reemerged as the French nation; the tsarist empire was recast as the world's first "workers' and peasants' state," the multinational Ottoman Empire be- came the secular Republic of Turkey, and the Peacock Throne of the Pahlavis was replaced by Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Because critical theory re- gards the identities of social actors as powerful determinants of behavior,
the behavior of revolutionary states would be expected to differ dramati- cally from the conduct of the old regime and from the practices of other states in the system. And since in this view the identity of a revolutionary state is closely linked to its ideology, foreign policy behavior should con- form closely to its ideological principles. Thus, where realism predicts that the constraining effects of anarchy will force revolutionary states to moder- ate or abandon their more radical objectives, critical theory anticipates both dramatic and enduring change, even in the face of strong external pressures.
Do our seven cases support this view? On the one hand, the evidence does support a limited version of the argument: in each case, the revolutionary elite saw the seizure of power as a decisive break with the past and adopted policies that departed sharply from those of the old regime. In this sense, therefore, one can say that the change in "identity" produced by the revolu- tion was associated with a change in behavior. But this is a very limited claim, roughly akin to arguing that actors with different preferences are likely to pursue different goals. One hardly needs critical theory to make that case.
On the other hand, the cases in this book offer little support for the more ambitious claim that shifts in discursive practices and collective under- standings could produce a far-reaching transformation in the international systemY Although each of these revolutions featured dramatic changes in discourse and each regime made idealistic claims about its own conduct, their utopian visions soon gave way to the familiar principles of realpolitik. Irrespective of their ideological pretensions, each of these states fought wars, formed alliances, made diplomatic compromises, signed treaties of commerce, and in general conformed to most (if not all) norms of interna- tional conduct, while continuing to espouse revolutionary doctrines of one sort or another. Indeed, it is striking how readily these states abandoned many of their initial objectives under pressure: the French repudiated the
11 Thus, Keith Michael Baker defines a revolution as a "transformation of the discursive practice of a community, a moment in which social relations are reconstituted and the dis- course defining the political relations between individuals and groups is radically recast. " In- venting the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18.
12 Forexamplesofthissortofclaim,seeReyKoslowskiandFriedrichKratochwil,"Under- standing Changes in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," and Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Fail- ure of Realism," both in International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? Revolution and War
Decree on Liberty, the Bolsheviks sought trade and investment from the in- ternational class enemy, and even revolutionary Iran was willing to deal with the "Great Satan" in order to wage war against Iraq. In short, these states were willing to do virtually anything that a "normal" state would do, which suggests that systemic pressures had at least as great an impact as their revolutionary identities or ideological underpinnings.
In response, critical theorists might argue that this book offers an unfair test of their perspective, because it focuses primarily on the short- to medium-term effects of a revolution and does not examine the indirect and! long-term impact of revolutions on attitudes, norms, and ideas. And if iso- lated revolutionary states are forced to adjust their behavior to the con- straints of the existing international system, it is still possible that a critical mass of like-minded states would have transformative effects resembling the Westphalian transition between the feudal period and the modem state system. One could also argue that even deradicalized revolutions affect pre- vailing notions of international legitimacy and gradually alter the ends tha? individuals and states deem worthy of pursuit and the means they regard as legitimate.
These are valid points, and this book should not be regarded as offering a definitive challenge to the critical theory approach to international politics. What it does show, however, is that such an approach does not tell us very much about relations between revolutionary states and other powers in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of power. If the question of the long- term transformation of the international systems remains open, these cases suggest that the modified realism of balance-of-threat theory offers a more useful way to think about the practical difficulties that ordinarily follow a revolution.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The evidence assembled here confirms that foreign leaders have ample reason to be worried when a revolution occurs, but it also suggests that the usual prescriptions for dealing with such an event are not very helpful. In particular, neither appeasement nor intervention is an especially promising approach. Appeasement is often recommended as a way to avoid spiraling and promote good relations over time, but this advice ignores the fact that revolutionary states do commit acts of aggression, and convincing them to stop may require the threat or use of force. The case for overt intervention is usually even weaker. Advocates of intervention believe that diplomatic, economic, or military pressure will exert a positive effect on the revolution- ary process, either by helping one faction consolidate its power or by con- vincing the revolutionary government to adopt policies that are consistent
? ? ? ? Conclusion
with foreign interests. But as we have seen, intervention is very often coun- terproductive. Emperor Leopold's attempts to manipulate French domestic politics in 1791? 2 further undermined Louis's position, and Woodrow Wil- son's efforts to shape the revolutionary process in Mexico alienated the var- ious revolutionary factions and reinforced the latent anti-Americanism of the Mexican government. Foreign attempts to guide the course of events in Russia, Iran, and China were equally unsuccessful: foreign powers lacked sufficient leverage or adequate information (or both), and their activities were regarded with suspicion in each case.
Advocates of intervention will usually argue that the revolutionary state is both extremely dangerous and highly vulnerable, justifying active efforts to overthrow it. But as we have seen, this combination of fear and optimism is usually misplacedY Revolutions are usually hard to export-reducing the need to remove the new regime-and intervention will reinforce the rev- olutionaries' own perceptions of threat and push the regime in a more radi- cal direction. Revolutions are also more difficult to reverse than outside p? wers generally expect, and because war is so unpredictable, intervention may actually facilitate the spread of revolution, thereby causing the very process it was intended to prevent. 14
A policy of containment is the best approach toward most revolutions, es- pecially for great powers facing a relatively weak revolutionary state. Such a strategy would aim to prevent the spread of revolution and deter expan- sionist policies by bolstering potential targets and punishing the revolution- ary state for overt acts of aggression, but its practitioners would otherwise eschew the use of force and would not attempt to overthrow the new regime. Foreign powers would also remain open to the idea of establishing normal relations when possible. Containment is not easy and may require patience, however,becauserevolutionarystatesusuallyinterpretthebehaviorofother states in an extremely biased fashion. For this reason, foreign powers should communicate the rationale behind their responses as clearly as possible, tak- ing pains to avoid appearing duplicitous or inconsistent They should also avoid premature or overly enthusiastic efforts to embrace a suspicious revo-
13 A possible exception to this stricture are cases-such as the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1982-where the revolutionary state is so small and inconsequential that intervention is vir- tually certain to succeed. Under these conditions, however, the need to act will be even Jess compelling.
14 There is a paradox here: the greater the perceived danger from a revolution, the more likely other states are to take action to contain or eliminate the threat, thereby diminishing the chance that the danger will be realized. In other words, the fear of revolution is a self-defeat- ing prophecy: a revolution may fail to spread precisely because others are so worried that it will. But vigilance alone does not ensure success; indeed, efforts to overthrow a revolution- ary regime may unwittingly facilitate revolutionary expansion, as they did in the French case and (to a lesser extent) the Iran-Iraq war. As a result, potential victims should focus their ef- forts on containing the revolution instead of trying to overturn it.
? ? ? Revolution and War
lutionary state, as such well-intentioned efforts are likely to be seen as self- interested attempts to manipulate the new regime. A policy of ''benevolent neglect" may be most appropriate in such circumstances, allowing the new regime to set the pace for the resumption of more extensive relations.
How would such an approach have fared in the past? A policy of contain- ment would have prevented war in 1792 and averted the various interventions in Soviet Russia in 1918-21. Containment proved to be an effective long-term response to the Bolshevik Revolution, and Iraq would have been far better off had it refrained from attacking Iran in 19& and concentrated on building bar- riers to Iranian expansion in league with the other gulf states. Sino-American relations would almost certainly have been less acrimonious if the two states could have avoided a direct clash in Korea, and the absence of war after the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions undoubtedly facilitated their rapid reemergence as accepted members of international society.
Finally, the misperceptions found in virtually all of these cases highlight the importance of obtaining accurate information in postrevolutionary situ- ations, as well as the difficulty of doing so. For example, foreign powers need to know if they are dealing with a mass revolution from below, inspired and directed by a universalist ideology, or an elite revolution with more limited aims. Therefore, they should devote much effort to maintaining reliable channels of communication with the new regime, even in the face of consid- erable hostiRity or resistance. National leaders should also recognize that muCh of the information they obtain will be biased, especially when it comes from members of the old regime. Among other things, foreign governments should go to great lengths to avoid breaking relations so they retain some ca- pacity to monitor events and communicate with the new leaders.
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989-1992 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
What does balance-of-threat theory tell us about the international impli- cations of the revolutionary transformation of the former Soviet empire?
Let us begin by making an obvious distinction: the rapid collapse of the Communist governments in Eastern Europe demonstrates that contagion can occur, under certain circumstances. This exception to our rule is not as damning as nt first appears, however, for two reasons. First, the regimes that were overturned by the "velvet revolutions" were artificial creations to begin with, and the catalyst for their overthrow was the recognition that Moscow was no longer willing to enforce orthodoxy within the Warsaw Pact. 15 Second, the contagion observed in Eastern Europe did not arise from
15 Gorbachev's reforms in effect lowered the expected cost of resistance to the existing Communist governments, thereby facilitating collective mobilization against them.
? ? ? Conclusion
a revolutionary state's efforts to export its own universalist principles; rather, the revolutions were essentially nationalist revolts against the uni- versalist hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, where nationalism is ordinarily an obstacle to contagion, it facilitated the spread of revolution in this particular case. This nationalism, together with the unusual features of well-established social networks and relatively high levelsofcommunication, madepossiblearapidandnearlybloodlesstrans- formation. 16
As for its international implications, happily, the revolutions in the former Soviet empire are unlikely to spark intense security competition among the great powers, and certainly not to the degree observed after earlier revolu- tions. Like other revolutions, the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a major shift in the global balance of power and led to the creation of a series of new regimes whose principles and objectives are dramatically different from those of their predecessors. Yet the other great powers have not tried to exploit or reverse these developments through the use of military power. The United States did take advantage of Russian weakness to obtain favor- able concessions on arms control and several other issues; Germany seized this opportunity to reunite; the various constituent republics took the occa- sion to obtain their independence; and a number of foreign powers have begun to compete for economic advantage in the former Soviet bloc. 17 In a sense, therefore, other states did see the Soviet collapse as a chance to en- hance their own positions. Unlike the other revolutions considered in this book, however, the collapse of Communism has not led to increased secu- rity competition either among the other great powers or between the new regimes and the outside world.
From the perspective of balance-of-threat theory, there are at least five reasons why the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989 have been comparatively benign. First, the collapse of the Soviet empire was not the result of a mass revolution. For the most part, it did not involve replac- ing the old elite with new leaders drawn from a different group or class. In- stead, the upheaval began with a "revolution" in the minds of key members of the Soviet elite, many of whom still (or again) hold influential positions in the new order. Like the Nationalistrevolution in Turkey, in short, the col- lapse of the Soviet Union began as an elite revolution intended to transform
16 For an intriguing theoretical analysis of these dynamics, see Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in East Leipzig, 1989-91," World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994). On the question whether these events were "true" revolutions, see Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 2JJ-35 ?
17 By linking economic concessions to nuclear weapons policy, the United States was able to persuade Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to give up the weapons they had inherited when the Soviet Union broke up.
? [3451
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both the internal workings of the state and its relations with the outside world. 18 As discussed in chapters 2 and 6, elite revolutions tend to be less dangerous than mass revolutions, in part becaus? the ideologies that inform them rarely pose a direct threat to other states.
The second reason, which follows from the first, is that the revolution in the former Soviet Union and its satellites was conducted by elites who sought to abandon the existing revolutionary legacy of Marxism-Leninism in favor of the political and economic models that had proven so successful in the West. In other words, the events of 198<r92 were a revolution against a revolutionary state. Instead of bringing to power a movement whose founding principles were at odds with political institutions prevailing in the
? other great powers, the revolutions of 198<r92 created a set of states whose principles and intentions are for the most part compatible with the existing order. Though specific conflicts of interest do exist, the potential for spiral- ing is significantly reduced by the absence of a Manichean ideology that portrays others as intrinsically evil or aggressive. It is hardly surprising, then, that the level of conflict is low between the new regimes and the out- side world.
Third, relations between Russia and the rest of the world continue to be governed by a strong condition of defense dominance, which further re- duces the level of security competition. In addition to the presence of nu- clear weajpons on each side (which creates a powerfuH defensive advantage through deterrence and dampens the impact of shifts in the balance of power), the absence of significant ideological conflict enhances security by eliminating the fear of contagion or counterrevolution. Unlike in previous revolutions, neither side need fear that its rule will be undermined by the
spread of potentially corrosive ideas.
Fourth, access to information about events in Eastern Europe has been much more extensive than in the cases examined in this book. Rapid . changes inevitably introduce greater uncertainty, but foreign powers have maintained their diplomatic connections, and the collapse of the secretive Soviet regime has actually facilitated the ability of other states to monitol! ' events there. Thus, the danger of miscalculation is probably lower than in past revolutions.
Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet empire occurred in extremely favor- able international circumstances. If competition among the other great pow- ers is especially intense when a revolution occurs (as it was in the 1790s and
18 The predominant role of former members of the Communist elite is documented in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New Nations of Eurasia: The Politics of Up- heaval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), app. B. On the "new thinking" that inspired these reforms, see Thomas Risse? Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? ? Conclusion
in 1917, for example), they will be strongly inclined to seek gains for them- selves and to deny potential gains to others. By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, however, most of the other great powers had been close po- litical and military allies for nearly four decades. Because these states did not regard each other as potential security threats, the normal concern with relative position was muted. Instead of debating whether or not to inter- vene-as great powers did after every revolution we have examined-the Western powers have tried to support the new regimes by providing aid and advice. In addition, because the Cold War inhibited the development of extensive economic or political ties between East and West, foreign powers did not have major interests in the Soviet Union (unlike Britain and France in 1917 Russia or the United States in Iran, for example) and could take a more detached view of events there.
For all of these reasons, therefore, postrevolutionary relations between the former Soviet Union and the other major powers have been unusually tranquil. Circumsftances continue to evolve rapidly, however, and relations could easily deteriorate if Russian elites become convinced that the West ei- ther is responsible for their plight or is taking excessive advantage of it. 19 This danger suggests that Western diplomacy must strike a balance between acknowledging tlh. e legitimate interests of the new Eurasian states (espe- cially Russia) and turning a blind eye to internal abuses or resurgent expan- sionism. To date, ! however, the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989-92 have been uncharacteristically benign.
Unfortunately, relations within the former Soviet Union have been more conflictive, and for reasons that are consistent with balance-of-threat theory. First, the collapse of the USSR created an unstable and uncertain balance of power among the constituent republics (or between competing ethnic or na- tional groups within them). As illustrated by the recent wars-between Ar- menia and Azerbaijan and between Russia and the breakaway province of Chechnya-uncertainties about the true balance of power can encourage both sides in such a dispute to go to war confident of success. 20
19 AttheDecember1994summitoftheConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEurope, for example, Russian president Boris Yeltsin charged the West with "sowing the seeds of mis- trust" and complained of excessive U. S. influence, saying that "it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents . . . can somehow be managed from some single cap- ital. " "Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split Continent Again," New York Times, December 6, 1994- At, A4.
20 Although Azerbaijan had reason to believe it was stronger (its gross national product was roughly 6o percent bigger than Armenia's and its population and armed forces more than twice as large), the Armenians turned out to be far more capable on the battlefield. See The Military Balance 1 9 93-94 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993). Sim- ilarly, the Chechens were extremely confident that they could defy Russian pressure despite the enormous odds against them, and their resistance was unexpectedly effective.
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Second, just as revolutionary states usually adopt policies that differ from those of the old regime, the newly independent republics of the former So- viet Union are now free to pursue interests that were forgotten, suppressed, or irrelevant under Soviet domination. Thus, Ukraine has sought to regain control of Crimea; Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought over ethnic en-
claves within their respective territories; and a number of ethnic and na- tional groups have advanced claims for independence from their respective republics. Disputes over how to divide the assets of the former USSR have been frequent as well, and the Soviet legacy of interdependence has compli- cated matters by making each government's situation dependent on policies adopted elsewhere. 21 In short, where Western perceptions of Russian inten- tions have improved since the collapse of Communism, a number of former Soviet republics now view each other with considerable suspicion.
Third, because the newly independent republics face the same problems of legitimacy and order that revolutionary states often confront, the tempta- tion to mobilize support by invoking nationalism has been difficult to resist. Unfortunately, such efforts often involve playing up both real and imagined grievances against others, and because different groups within the former Soviet Union are now free to teach their own versions of history, the danger has increas? d that past quarrels will fuel future conflicts. 22 Needless to say, these are ideal conditions for spiraling. When conflicts of interest arise, each side will be more likely to see its own actions as entirely justified while viewing the actions of others as unwarranted aggression.
These problems will be compounded by the intermingling of ethnic or na- tional groups within and across existing political boundaries, which creates the possibility that isolated ethnic minorities will see themselves as vulner- able to persecution by majorities who regard them as potentially disloyal "fifth columns. "23 When national or ethnic groups are scattered within dif- ferent political units, one community may worry that a nationalist resur- gence in another republic could trigger a sympathetic response from
conationals within its own borders. Thus, nationalist -Ideologies can create fears of contagion similar to those produced by a transnational revolution- ary ideology.
Afinal source of conflict is Russia's growing effort to reassert its influence within the "near abroad," either to protect ethnic Russian populationS, to re-
21 See Dawisha and Parrott, Russia and the New States ofEurasia, 197--98.
22 Onthisgeneralphenomenon,seeVanEvera,CausesofWar,vol. 2:NationalMisperceptions and the Roots oJWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 11; and E. H. Dance, History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
23 See Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993); and Stephen Van Evera, "Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire," Security Studies 1, no. 1 (1992); and "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," Interna- tional Security 18, no. 4 (1994).
? ? ? Conclusion
tain access to valuable resources, or to stabilize the situation along its lengthy border. 24 Increased Russian influence might deter or dampen vio- lence in those areas in the long run, but its immediate impact has been to alarm its neighbors and to reawaken Western concerns. Relations within the former Soviet Union and relations with other powers are thus inextricably linked, and it will be much more difficult for Russia to maintain amicable re- lations with the rest of the world if the level of conflict within its former em- pire is on the rise.
In sum, relations among the newly independent states of Eurasia are characterized by uncertain balances of power, serious conflicts of interest, exaggerated perceptions of hostility, and fears of nationalist contagion. Not surprisingly, therefore, relations within the former Soviet Union have been (and are likely to remain) much less tranquil than relations between Russia and the other major powers.
Thus, balance-of-threat theory does shed light on the likely consquences of the Soviet collapse and helps identify where the probable axes of conflict will be found. These events also underscore the value of a systemic ap- proach, as the absence of great-power conflict in their aftermath is not due solely to the character of the new regimes: it is also due to the benign inter- national context in which the collapse of the Soviet empire took place and the fact the the "revolutions" of 1 989-92 brought these regimes into greater
ideological conformity with the West. Therefore, the events of 1989-92 rein- force a central contention of this entire book: one cannot understand the in- ternational implications of revolutionary change by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also consider the configurations of power and interest in the system as a whole.
THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTION
For some writers, the grand ideological struggles that have rent modern society for nearly four centuries are now fading away, to be replaced by more limited (and for the most part, peaceful) disputes over national inter- ests and an increasingly tranquil world order. This perspective sees mass revolution as inextricably linked to the process of modernization-to the spread of market forces and the transition from hierarchical forms of gov- ernment to political orders based m1 equality, mass participation, and indi- vidual rights. With the collapse of Communism and the apparent triumph of modem liberal capitalism, so the argument runs, the great ideological
24 See Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s," in Russian Secu- rity after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow, ed. Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass. : Center for Science and International Affairs, 1994), 13-20; and Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy 88 (fall 1992).
curred even if the revolution had been averted, the internal turmoil in France was directly responsible for the war that did break out and for its rapid expansion.
Similarly, although the collapse of the Romanov dynasty temporarily lowered the level of conflict by taking Russia out of World War I, the estab- lishment of Soviet Russia ultimately increased it. The revolution encour- aged other states to compete over the lands of former tsarist empire and brought to power a regime that supported the violent overthrow of other states. The tsarist regime would never have acted as Soviet Russia did, and the other great powers would never have seen it as a subversive force. Again, it is safe to infer that the revolution was directly responsible for much of the enmity and insecurity that characterized relations between So- viet Russia and most other powers.
This pattern is even more apparent in the Iranian case. The revolution alarmed Iran's Arab neighbors, led directly to a protracted war with Iraq, and transformed U. S. -Iranian relations from close alliance to bitter rivalry. Relations with most other countries deteriorated as well, leaving the Islamic Republic largely isolated. Although the shah's ambitions had alarmed his neighbors on occasion, they never provoked the level of international en- . mity that the Islamic Republic has. Thus, Iran's present position is simply incomprehensible outside the context of the revolution.
The same effects were present in the other four cases, albeit to varying de- . grees. The United States experienced repeated conflicts with both its former British rulers and its putative French ally, coming close to war with each on one or more occasions. The revolution in Mexico exacerbated the competi- tion for influence between the United States, Britain, and Germany, led the United States to intervene in 1914 and again in 1916, and continued to mar relations between Mexico and the United States until the late 1930s. The Na- tionalist revolution in Turkey challenged European ambitions in the Near East, brought the new regime to the brink of war with Great Britain in 1922, and eventually forced the Entente to withdraw its troops and abandon the Treaty of Sevres. Needless to say, it is hard to imagine the Ottoman sultan achieving like results. Finally, the Communist triumph in China ended
decades of foreign interference, moved Beijing firmly into the socialist camp, and placed the new regime on the path to war in Korea. Once again, it is unlikely that Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD would have acted the same way or provoked similar responses.
? ? Conclusion
Hypothetical scenarios can never be tested, of course, but the possibility that these states would have experienced equally high levels of conflict in the absence of revolution seems remote. Although other causes of conflict were undoubtedly present, these cases show that revolutions have indepen- dent causal effects on the level of security competition and the probability of war.
Balance-of-Threat Theory
Why do revolutions make competition and war more likely? As described in detail in chapter 2, balance-of-threat theory suggests that revolutions cause security competition by altering the perceived level of threat between the revolutionary state and its main adversaries, on one hand, and by en- couraging both sides to believe that the use of force can overcome the threat at an acceptable cost, on the other.
The evidence strongly supports this general argument. The crises or wars that followed each of the revolutions examined here resulted from a combi- nation of opportunism and insecurity, based on misjudgments about the balance of power, overly malign perceptions of intent, and (in the worst cases) exaggerated beliefs about the likelihood of contagion or counterrevo- lution. Compounding the problem were uncertainty and misinformation, which reinforced each side's prior beliefs and made peaceful settlements more elusive.
TheBalanceofPower. IntheFrench,Russian,andIraniancases,therevo- lution's effect on the balance of power was a central cause of war. Yet the im- pact of a revolution on the balance of power does not cause war by itself. In particular, these effects cannot explain why some states try to exploit the op- portunities while others remain aloof, nor can they account for aggressive behavior on the part of the revolutionary state. For example, although Prus- sia saw French weakness after 1789 as a chance for expansion, most Euro- pean states welcomed the erosion of French power and did not use force to exploit it. Instead, the war began when, reacting to Austria's efforts to in- timidate the French, the Girondins convinced the Assembly to declare war
in April 1792. Similarly, Iran's weakness after the revolution does not fully explain why Iraq saw a military attack as desirable or necessary; the appar- ent collapse of Iranian power might just as easily been considered an op- portunity for Iraq to turn its attention to other problems. ' The four cases examined in chapter 6 reinforce this conclusion: although the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions created significant power vacu-
1 Furthermore, focusing on power alone cannot explain why Iraq decided to go to war but ? Iran's other neighbors (the Soviet Union, Turkey, Afghanistan) did not.
? ? ? ? ? Revolution and War
urns and fostered greater security competition between other powers, only China was subsequently involved in war. If the belief that a revolution has weakened its victim is part of the link between revolution and war, it is hardly the whole story.
PerceptionsofIntent. Eachoftheserevolutionsproducedsharpdepartures from the foreign policies of the old regime, in tum creating sharp conflicts of interest with other states. Furthermore, both the revolutionary state and tlhe other great powers tended to exaggerate one another's hostility and aggres- siveness. One of the most characteristic features of postrevolutionary for- eign policy, this tendency is also one of the most pernicious.
These cases also confirm that spirals of suspicion can arise from several distinct sources. The most obvious source is ideology: if the worldview of a revolutionary movement stipulates that certain regimes are inherently hos- tile, the new regime is likely to interpret the behavior of foreign powers in the worst possible light. Asecond source is domestic politics. As the French and Iranian cases suggest, factions within a revolutionary movement may dramatize foreign dangers in order to consolidate their own positions. Spi- raling may also be fueled by testimony from emigres or foreign revolution- aries, whose desire for support gives them an obvious incentive to foster conflicts between the revolutionary state and other powers. This tactic played a modest role in several of these cases; French emigres echoed Euro- pean fears of the revolution in France, Russian exiles stiffened Allied resis- tance against normalizing relations with the Bolshevik regime, and Iranian exiles (including the shah) contributed to the deterioration of Iranian for- eign rellations. The activities of the "China lobby" and the misleading testi- mony provided by some U. S. diplomats after the American Revolution further illustrates this danger.
Offense, Defense, and the Export ofRevolution. The cases examined in this study also confirm that revolutions cause war by affecting perceptions of the offense-defense balance, conceived in both military and political terms. In the French, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese cases, decisions to go to war were encouraged by a combination of fear and overconfidence, usually based on each side's calculations of the likelihood that the revolution will spread or be reversed. Expecting that their example would be contagious, the revolutionary state was more confident, less willing to compromise, and prone to support revolutionary efforts abroad. At the same time, the general belief that the revolution might also be easily reversed made exporting the revolufrion seem necessary to the revolutionary state and helped convince its adversaries that they could eliminate the threat with little effort.
Ironically, history suggests that both these beliefs are usually misguided. Although each of these revolutions was accompanied by evidence of discon-
? ? Conclusion
tent in other societies, none of them spawned successful imitators during the decade after the seizure of power, and efforts to spread the revolution via propaganda or contagion only angered and alarmed other states. The Girondins' predictions of a universal crusade for liberty were disappointed; "Bolshevik" uprisings in Finland, Hungary, and Bavaria collapsed quickly, the Polish proletariat welcomed the Red Army with bayonets instead of flowers; and Soviet attempts to spark Communist revolutions in the Near East and China all failed. Efforts to export the Iranian Revolution have been equally abortive thus far, despite the universalist pretensions of Khomeini's Shiism and Iran's support for fundamentalist groups throughout the Muslim world. We should not be surprised at these results, however, because would- be propagators of revolution face several significant obstacles.
First, although a revolution often comes as a? surprise to virtually every- one (including the revolutionaries themselves), it also provides a timely warning to others. As a result, potential targets will be less prone to the mis- takes that let the old regime be toppled. Thus, the French example alerted the other European powers to keep a close watch on potential "Jacobins" and to make a number of modest reforms. These measures were universally successful except in areas conquered by French troops. Similarly, states fac- ing a Bolshevik challenge acted vigorously to suppress potential uprisings after 1917, just as the Persian Gulf states suppressed, coopted, or expelled anyone suspected of spreading Iran's revolutionary message. Louis XVI in Paris, Nicholas II in St. Petersburg, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Tehran may have dithered their way to their own destruction, but their contempo- raries in other countries seem to have learned from their mistakes.
Second, potential victims of a spreading revolution also learn to balance against this frightening possibility. The growing danger from revolutionary France led to the formation of a large (if unruly) coalition by the summer of 1793, and the Entente maintained a common front against Bolshevism until the mid-192os. In the same way, the threat from Iran prompted greater co- operation between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United States. 2
Third, the failure of revolutions to spread underscores the advantages that incumbent regimes ordinarily enjoy. Even states with severe internal problems usually retain some shreds of legitimacy, as well as a substantial' asymmetry of power over their internal rivals. Moreover, the combination of favorable circumstances and coincidences that make the first revolution possible are unlikely to occur elsewhere in precisely the same fashion. Thus, pro-French radkals in England were quickly overcome by prompt govern- ment action, the German Communists proved to be no match for the Reichs-
2 By contrast, because foreign powers were not especially worried that the U. S. , Mexican, or Turkish revolutions would spread, they did not band together in strong opposing coali- tions.
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wehr in 1919, 1921, and 1923, and the Shiites in Iraq were crushed when their leaders tried to duplicate the Iranian experience. Given the barriers to a revolution's spreading beyond a single state's borders, the real mystery is why anybody believes that it wilV
The evidence also suggests that reversing a revolution is nearly as diffi- cult as spreading one. Revolutionary regimes survive because they are usu- ally adept at mobilizing military power; whatever their other failings, revolutionary movements are especially good at persuading people to run grave risks and make large sacrifices for the sake of an ideal. 4 Foreign inter- ference can facilitate this task by providing the legitimacy that a revolution- ary regime needs, and a foreign threat can make it easier for leaders to eliminate rivals in the name of "national unity. "
When foreign powers do not possess reliable sources of information and do not discount the testimony of emigres sufficiently, they are likely to end up backing far-fetched counterrevolutionary schemes that hold little chance of success-as illustrated by English support for the Quiberon expedition in 1795, British and French aid to the White armies in the Russian Civil War, Iraq's support for various Iranian exile groups in Baghdad, and covert U. S. efforts to support anti-Communist groups in China. Supporting counter- revolutionary forces may be a cost-effective means of pressuring a revolu- tionary regime, but it is unlikely to remove it from power and will almost
certainly fuel its perceptions of threat.
These obstacles do not mean that counterrevolutionary efforts never suc- ceed, but success will be more difficult than other states expect. Foreign in- tervention did reverse the Dutch revolt of 1787 and the Polish "revolt" of 1791, to cite but two examples, and both superpowers intervened to reverse unwanted upheavals in their own spheres of interest throughout the Cold War. 5 These examples suggest that outside intervention can work when
3 Exceptions arise when the new regime is able to defeat and occupy its adversaries and impose its system upon their populations by force. Thus, France's "sister republics" and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe resulted from military expansion rather than the spread of revolutionary ideals. Examples of "spontaneous" Communist revolutions include those in the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nic- aragua, but these "triumphs" occurred decades after the 1917 revolution.
4 See Theda Skocpol, "Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," World Politics 40, no. ? 2 ( 11}88); and Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," Com-
parative Political Studies 21, no. 1 (1988).
5 The Soviet Union intervened in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Polish Army declared martial Jaw (with Soviet support) in 198o, and the Red Army invaded Afghanistan in 19Bo in an attempt to prop up a faltering Marxist regime there. The United States helped topple the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953 and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 and played a subordinate role in removing the Allende regime in Chile in 1968. In 1983, a U. S. invasion ousted the New Jewel Movement in Grenada, and the U. S-backed contras forced the Sandinista government in Nicaragua to agree to new elections (in which they were voted out of office) after a protracted and bloody civil war.
? ? ? Conclusion
there is a large disparity in power between the two states involved. Even in such cases, however, the effort often turns out to be greater than the inter- vening power anticipated.
In short, the perceptions of a mutual offensive advantage that accompany most revolutions are especially dangerous, because the combination of in- security and overconfidence that leads to the use of force is usually ill- founded. In fact, revolutions are hard to export and difficult to reverse, and in most cases, both sides are more secure than they think and would be bet- ter off remaining at peace.
The tendency for revolutions to foster perceptions of offense dominance is not universal, and the absence of this factor is the main reason why the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions did not lead to war. These rev- olutions altered the balance of power and generated both real conflicts of in- terest and spirals of suspicion. Yet in each case, key leaders were aware that the revolution was unlikely to ? pread and that war would be expensive. As a result, both sides ultimately refrained from the large-scale use of force.
UncertaintyandMisinformation. Ifrevolutionsarebothhardtoexportand difficult to reverse, then why do states worry about either possibility? Our cases provide part of the answer: it will be extremely difficult for states to gauge their situation accurately after a revolution, because relations be- tween revolutionary states and other powers will be afflicted by very high levels of uncertainty and misinformation. The problem arises from several different aspects of the revolutionary process, so it will usually be difficult to overcome.
For example, it is hardly surprising that both sides have trouble estimat- ing the balance of military power, because the military capacity of the new state will rest on novel institutions whose effects can only be discovered through battlefield experience. Foreign powers will usually have good rea- sons to discount a revolutionary state's capabilities, if only because the armed forces of the old regime usually deteriorate in the short term. Yet in almost every case examined here, the revolutionary regime managed to use new myths, symbols, and institutions to create an unexpectedly formidable military machine. 6
The political consequences of a revolution are even harder to calculate in advance, because the political appeal of a revolutionary model is virtually impossible to gauge with confidence. Neither the revolutionaries nor their foreign opponents know if the revolution will attract adherents abroad or if foreign intervention will spark a counterrevolutionary upheaval. Faced
6 The United States and Mexico are partial exceptions to this claim, because neither revo- lution faced a large-scale foreign invasion. The rapid mobilization of U. S. naval power dur- ing the Quasi-War and the Constitutionalists' unexpected success in the civil war against Villa are consistent with this argument, however.
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with this uncertainty, elites on both sides will tend to rely on ideology and recent experience and to assume that the initial revolutionary success was a harbinger of things to come. Even relatively modest signs of a sympathetic response elsewhere will be taken as evidence of a rising revolutionary tide, and testimony from foreign revolutionaries or counterrevolutionary exiles can reinforce these erroneous expectations.
Both sides overstate the likelihood of counterrevolution for much the same reason. The danger of an "aristocratic conspiracy" terrified the French from 1789 onward; the Bolsheviks feared their hold on power might lapse at any moment; the Islamic Republic has waged a brutal campaign against for- mer opponents as well. These fears reflect the intrinsic difficulty of accu- rately gauging the loyalty of the population at large. Although signs of dissent will always be present, neither the ruling authorities nor outside powers can know how strong the opposition really is.
To make matters worse, revolutions impede the acquisition of the infor- mation that might help correct these erroneous impressions. The revolution- ary states in France, Russia, and Iran were cut off from normal diplomatic contacts, intensifying their perceptions of threat and making subsequent ef- forts to reach a modus vivendi more difficult. Indeed, a striking feature of most of these cases is the extent to which states were forced. to conduct dipl9- macy through unofficial agents whose expertise and reliability usually left much to be desired.
Lastly, with all the uncertainty, other states will have trouble deciding how to respond to a revolution, and foreign powers will be hard-pressed to agree on a common course of action. 7 If the power of a revolutionary state is unclear, the danger of contagion uncertain, and the prospects for counter- revolution unknown, it will be difficult to obtain a consensus for interven- tion or abstention, and the other states will be more likely to respond in a haphazard and poorly coordinated manner. This problem arose in several of our cases: the European powers were often divided over how to respond to the revolution in France; the Entente could not adopt a unified policy to-
ward the Bolshevik or Turkish revolutions; Britain and the United States disagreed over the proper approach to take toward the revolutionary gov- ernments in Mexico and China; and there was little consensus on how to re- spond to Iran's revolution until its army had crossed into Iraqi soil. The result, unfortunately, may have been the worst of both worlds: other states did enough to antagonize the new regimes but not enough to eliminate them.
7 I identify some other reasons for this tendency in my chapter, "Collective Security and Revolutionary Change: Promoting Peace in the Former Soviet Empire," in Collective Secu- rity after the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
? ? ? ? ? Conclusion
Realism and Revolution
The cases examined in this book both confirm the basic explanatory power of realism and suggest which strands of realist thought are most useful. In particular, realism is most powerful when it goes beyond a nar- row focus on the gross distribution of power and instead examines the bal-
ance of threats. Although the balance of power is hardly irrelevant, the behavior of states is also affected by how national leaders assess the inten- tions of other states and how they perceive the relative advantage to of- fense or defense. The offense-defense balance is not merely a function of
geography or military doctrine, however, but may also be affected by the potential appeal of particular ideas (such as a new revolutionary ideology). Realism gains even more explanatory power by incorporating the possibil- ity that states will misread these factors, and as we have seen repeatedly, such misperceptions are especially common after revolutions. 8 Beliefs about the possibility of revolutionary contagion-which ultimately rest on beliefs about the persuasive power of revolutionary ideas-have been crit- ical in shaping perceptions of the offense-defense balance and help explain why some revolutions led to war and others did not. In short, by incorpo- rating domestic politics and ideas into the anarchic setting depicted by re-
alism, we obtain a more complete picture of the forces that shape state behavior.
This argument points to another insight: realism may tell us more about international behavior in postrevolutionary periods than in more "normal" periods. Some realists depict international politics as a relentless struggle for survival whell"e security is extremely scarce and states must constantly strive for any advantage. 9 Proponents of this perspective are likely to view
revolutionary states as exceptions to realist logic, because their foreign pol- icy objectives are heavily affected by ideology and their leaders are pre- sumed to be less familiar with the subtleties of international diplomacy. Yet in the three main cases examined here, each side saw the other as an immi- nent and intense threat and discounted the possibility of a lasting peace. In other words, relations between these revolutionary states and other powers were virtually identical to the relationships depicted by the more extreme versions of realism. The key point, however, is that the level of conflict is not
8 Stephen Van Evera refers to this as "Type IV Realism. " It differs from other strands of re- alist theory by focusing on what Van Evera calls the "fine-grained structure of power" and by explicating the factors that shape how states perceive that structure. Causes ofWar, vol. 1: The Structure ofPower and the Roots ofWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 1. On the impact of ideas on the offense-defense balance, see George Quester, Offense and De-
fense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977), 67.
9 This view is most clearly expressed in the writings of John J. Mearsheimer: "Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990); and "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-95).
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merely due to the state of anarchy and a particular distribution of capabili- ties (as a neorealist such as John Mearsheimer would have it) but is also heavily influenced by perceptions of intent and beliefs about the likelihood that the revolution will spread or be reversed.
With frhe passage of time, however, each side will acquire a more accurate estimate of the true threat that it faces. The security dilemma between them will ease and each will adopt a less vigilant posture. The relentless competi- tion depicted by some realists will abate, and prospects for cooperation will probably increase. By restricting themselves to examining the gross distri- bution of power, however, neorealists cannot explain why the level of con- flict varies even though the distribution of power is constant. This shortcoming is another reason to prefer balance-of-threat theory to the overly spare world of neorealist balance-of-power theory.
Finally, the neorealist claim that revolutionary states will be "socialized" to the system seems to be only partly correct. Although external pressures did lead all of these regimes to alter their behavior in significant ways, their tendency to cling to counterproductive strategies despite substantial costs was equally striking-especially in the Soviet, Chinese, and Iranian cases, where a commitment to avowedly revolutionary objectives kept these regimes isolated and beleaguered far longer than was necessary. One may speculate that such a tendency will be most severe when, first, the ideology in question is particularly extreme, and second, it has been formally instifru- tionalized within a hegemonic ruling party. Thus, the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutionary leaders adapted quickly because they began with more moderate ideas, and the French were able to abandon the more utopian visions of the Girondins and Montagnards because those had not been enshrined in a formal party ideology and were not central to the legit- imacy of the postrevolutionary state.
Critical Theory, Identity, and Revolutionary Change
The cases examined here also shed light on the relative merits of critical- theory as an approach to international politics. Critical theory emphasizes the role of language and social processes in shaping actors' goals, identities, and collective self-understandings. 10 From this perspective, the interna- tional system is not an independent structure arising from the interactions of preexisting states; rather, it is the product of concrete social practices that reflect the purposes and perceptions of the actors themselves.
Revolutions are crucial cases for critical theorists, because in them state identities are rapidly and radically transformed through changes in the dis-
1?
For important examples of critical theory approaches to international politics, see the ref- erences above in chap. 1, n. 10.
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cursive practices of a community. 11 A revolution transformed Britain's North American colonies into a "new republic"; the absolutist regime of Louis XVI reemerged as the French nation; the tsarist empire was recast as the world's first "workers' and peasants' state," the multinational Ottoman Empire be- came the secular Republic of Turkey, and the Peacock Throne of the Pahlavis was replaced by Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Because critical theory re- gards the identities of social actors as powerful determinants of behavior,
the behavior of revolutionary states would be expected to differ dramati- cally from the conduct of the old regime and from the practices of other states in the system. And since in this view the identity of a revolutionary state is closely linked to its ideology, foreign policy behavior should con- form closely to its ideological principles. Thus, where realism predicts that the constraining effects of anarchy will force revolutionary states to moder- ate or abandon their more radical objectives, critical theory anticipates both dramatic and enduring change, even in the face of strong external pressures.
Do our seven cases support this view? On the one hand, the evidence does support a limited version of the argument: in each case, the revolutionary elite saw the seizure of power as a decisive break with the past and adopted policies that departed sharply from those of the old regime. In this sense, therefore, one can say that the change in "identity" produced by the revolu- tion was associated with a change in behavior. But this is a very limited claim, roughly akin to arguing that actors with different preferences are likely to pursue different goals. One hardly needs critical theory to make that case.
On the other hand, the cases in this book offer little support for the more ambitious claim that shifts in discursive practices and collective under- standings could produce a far-reaching transformation in the international systemY Although each of these revolutions featured dramatic changes in discourse and each regime made idealistic claims about its own conduct, their utopian visions soon gave way to the familiar principles of realpolitik. Irrespective of their ideological pretensions, each of these states fought wars, formed alliances, made diplomatic compromises, signed treaties of commerce, and in general conformed to most (if not all) norms of interna- tional conduct, while continuing to espouse revolutionary doctrines of one sort or another. Indeed, it is striking how readily these states abandoned many of their initial objectives under pressure: the French repudiated the
11 Thus, Keith Michael Baker defines a revolution as a "transformation of the discursive practice of a community, a moment in which social relations are reconstituted and the dis- course defining the political relations between individuals and groups is radically recast. " In- venting the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18.
12 Forexamplesofthissortofclaim,seeReyKoslowskiandFriedrichKratochwil,"Under- standing Changes in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," and Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Fail- ure of Realism," both in International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
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Decree on Liberty, the Bolsheviks sought trade and investment from the in- ternational class enemy, and even revolutionary Iran was willing to deal with the "Great Satan" in order to wage war against Iraq. In short, these states were willing to do virtually anything that a "normal" state would do, which suggests that systemic pressures had at least as great an impact as their revolutionary identities or ideological underpinnings.
In response, critical theorists might argue that this book offers an unfair test of their perspective, because it focuses primarily on the short- to medium-term effects of a revolution and does not examine the indirect and! long-term impact of revolutions on attitudes, norms, and ideas. And if iso- lated revolutionary states are forced to adjust their behavior to the con- straints of the existing international system, it is still possible that a critical mass of like-minded states would have transformative effects resembling the Westphalian transition between the feudal period and the modem state system. One could also argue that even deradicalized revolutions affect pre- vailing notions of international legitimacy and gradually alter the ends tha? individuals and states deem worthy of pursuit and the means they regard as legitimate.
These are valid points, and this book should not be regarded as offering a definitive challenge to the critical theory approach to international politics. What it does show, however, is that such an approach does not tell us very much about relations between revolutionary states and other powers in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of power. If the question of the long- term transformation of the international systems remains open, these cases suggest that the modified realism of balance-of-threat theory offers a more useful way to think about the practical difficulties that ordinarily follow a revolution.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The evidence assembled here confirms that foreign leaders have ample reason to be worried when a revolution occurs, but it also suggests that the usual prescriptions for dealing with such an event are not very helpful. In particular, neither appeasement nor intervention is an especially promising approach. Appeasement is often recommended as a way to avoid spiraling and promote good relations over time, but this advice ignores the fact that revolutionary states do commit acts of aggression, and convincing them to stop may require the threat or use of force. The case for overt intervention is usually even weaker. Advocates of intervention believe that diplomatic, economic, or military pressure will exert a positive effect on the revolution- ary process, either by helping one faction consolidate its power or by con- vincing the revolutionary government to adopt policies that are consistent
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with foreign interests. But as we have seen, intervention is very often coun- terproductive. Emperor Leopold's attempts to manipulate French domestic politics in 1791? 2 further undermined Louis's position, and Woodrow Wil- son's efforts to shape the revolutionary process in Mexico alienated the var- ious revolutionary factions and reinforced the latent anti-Americanism of the Mexican government. Foreign attempts to guide the course of events in Russia, Iran, and China were equally unsuccessful: foreign powers lacked sufficient leverage or adequate information (or both), and their activities were regarded with suspicion in each case.
Advocates of intervention will usually argue that the revolutionary state is both extremely dangerous and highly vulnerable, justifying active efforts to overthrow it. But as we have seen, this combination of fear and optimism is usually misplacedY Revolutions are usually hard to export-reducing the need to remove the new regime-and intervention will reinforce the rev- olutionaries' own perceptions of threat and push the regime in a more radi- cal direction. Revolutions are also more difficult to reverse than outside p? wers generally expect, and because war is so unpredictable, intervention may actually facilitate the spread of revolution, thereby causing the very process it was intended to prevent. 14
A policy of containment is the best approach toward most revolutions, es- pecially for great powers facing a relatively weak revolutionary state. Such a strategy would aim to prevent the spread of revolution and deter expan- sionist policies by bolstering potential targets and punishing the revolution- ary state for overt acts of aggression, but its practitioners would otherwise eschew the use of force and would not attempt to overthrow the new regime. Foreign powers would also remain open to the idea of establishing normal relations when possible. Containment is not easy and may require patience, however,becauserevolutionarystatesusuallyinterpretthebehaviorofother states in an extremely biased fashion. For this reason, foreign powers should communicate the rationale behind their responses as clearly as possible, tak- ing pains to avoid appearing duplicitous or inconsistent They should also avoid premature or overly enthusiastic efforts to embrace a suspicious revo-
13 A possible exception to this stricture are cases-such as the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1982-where the revolutionary state is so small and inconsequential that intervention is vir- tually certain to succeed. Under these conditions, however, the need to act will be even Jess compelling.
14 There is a paradox here: the greater the perceived danger from a revolution, the more likely other states are to take action to contain or eliminate the threat, thereby diminishing the chance that the danger will be realized. In other words, the fear of revolution is a self-defeat- ing prophecy: a revolution may fail to spread precisely because others are so worried that it will. But vigilance alone does not ensure success; indeed, efforts to overthrow a revolution- ary regime may unwittingly facilitate revolutionary expansion, as they did in the French case and (to a lesser extent) the Iran-Iraq war. As a result, potential victims should focus their ef- forts on containing the revolution instead of trying to overturn it.
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lutionary state, as such well-intentioned efforts are likely to be seen as self- interested attempts to manipulate the new regime. A policy of ''benevolent neglect" may be most appropriate in such circumstances, allowing the new regime to set the pace for the resumption of more extensive relations.
How would such an approach have fared in the past? A policy of contain- ment would have prevented war in 1792 and averted the various interventions in Soviet Russia in 1918-21. Containment proved to be an effective long-term response to the Bolshevik Revolution, and Iraq would have been far better off had it refrained from attacking Iran in 19& and concentrated on building bar- riers to Iranian expansion in league with the other gulf states. Sino-American relations would almost certainly have been less acrimonious if the two states could have avoided a direct clash in Korea, and the absence of war after the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions undoubtedly facilitated their rapid reemergence as accepted members of international society.
Finally, the misperceptions found in virtually all of these cases highlight the importance of obtaining accurate information in postrevolutionary situ- ations, as well as the difficulty of doing so. For example, foreign powers need to know if they are dealing with a mass revolution from below, inspired and directed by a universalist ideology, or an elite revolution with more limited aims. Therefore, they should devote much effort to maintaining reliable channels of communication with the new regime, even in the face of consid- erable hostiRity or resistance. National leaders should also recognize that muCh of the information they obtain will be biased, especially when it comes from members of the old regime. Among other things, foreign governments should go to great lengths to avoid breaking relations so they retain some ca- pacity to monitor events and communicate with the new leaders.
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989-1992 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
What does balance-of-threat theory tell us about the international impli- cations of the revolutionary transformation of the former Soviet empire?
Let us begin by making an obvious distinction: the rapid collapse of the Communist governments in Eastern Europe demonstrates that contagion can occur, under certain circumstances. This exception to our rule is not as damning as nt first appears, however, for two reasons. First, the regimes that were overturned by the "velvet revolutions" were artificial creations to begin with, and the catalyst for their overthrow was the recognition that Moscow was no longer willing to enforce orthodoxy within the Warsaw Pact. 15 Second, the contagion observed in Eastern Europe did not arise from
15 Gorbachev's reforms in effect lowered the expected cost of resistance to the existing Communist governments, thereby facilitating collective mobilization against them.
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a revolutionary state's efforts to export its own universalist principles; rather, the revolutions were essentially nationalist revolts against the uni- versalist hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, where nationalism is ordinarily an obstacle to contagion, it facilitated the spread of revolution in this particular case. This nationalism, together with the unusual features of well-established social networks and relatively high levelsofcommunication, madepossiblearapidandnearlybloodlesstrans- formation. 16
As for its international implications, happily, the revolutions in the former Soviet empire are unlikely to spark intense security competition among the great powers, and certainly not to the degree observed after earlier revolu- tions. Like other revolutions, the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a major shift in the global balance of power and led to the creation of a series of new regimes whose principles and objectives are dramatically different from those of their predecessors. Yet the other great powers have not tried to exploit or reverse these developments through the use of military power. The United States did take advantage of Russian weakness to obtain favor- able concessions on arms control and several other issues; Germany seized this opportunity to reunite; the various constituent republics took the occa- sion to obtain their independence; and a number of foreign powers have begun to compete for economic advantage in the former Soviet bloc. 17 In a sense, therefore, other states did see the Soviet collapse as a chance to en- hance their own positions. Unlike the other revolutions considered in this book, however, the collapse of Communism has not led to increased secu- rity competition either among the other great powers or between the new regimes and the outside world.
From the perspective of balance-of-threat theory, there are at least five reasons why the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989 have been comparatively benign. First, the collapse of the Soviet empire was not the result of a mass revolution. For the most part, it did not involve replac- ing the old elite with new leaders drawn from a different group or class. In- stead, the upheaval began with a "revolution" in the minds of key members of the Soviet elite, many of whom still (or again) hold influential positions in the new order. Like the Nationalistrevolution in Turkey, in short, the col- lapse of the Soviet Union began as an elite revolution intended to transform
16 For an intriguing theoretical analysis of these dynamics, see Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in East Leipzig, 1989-91," World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994). On the question whether these events were "true" revolutions, see Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 2JJ-35 ?
17 By linking economic concessions to nuclear weapons policy, the United States was able to persuade Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to give up the weapons they had inherited when the Soviet Union broke up.
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both the internal workings of the state and its relations with the outside world. 18 As discussed in chapters 2 and 6, elite revolutions tend to be less dangerous than mass revolutions, in part becaus? the ideologies that inform them rarely pose a direct threat to other states.
The second reason, which follows from the first, is that the revolution in the former Soviet Union and its satellites was conducted by elites who sought to abandon the existing revolutionary legacy of Marxism-Leninism in favor of the political and economic models that had proven so successful in the West. In other words, the events of 198<r92 were a revolution against a revolutionary state. Instead of bringing to power a movement whose founding principles were at odds with political institutions prevailing in the
? other great powers, the revolutions of 198<r92 created a set of states whose principles and intentions are for the most part compatible with the existing order. Though specific conflicts of interest do exist, the potential for spiral- ing is significantly reduced by the absence of a Manichean ideology that portrays others as intrinsically evil or aggressive. It is hardly surprising, then, that the level of conflict is low between the new regimes and the out- side world.
Third, relations between Russia and the rest of the world continue to be governed by a strong condition of defense dominance, which further re- duces the level of security competition. In addition to the presence of nu- clear weajpons on each side (which creates a powerfuH defensive advantage through deterrence and dampens the impact of shifts in the balance of power), the absence of significant ideological conflict enhances security by eliminating the fear of contagion or counterrevolution. Unlike in previous revolutions, neither side need fear that its rule will be undermined by the
spread of potentially corrosive ideas.
Fourth, access to information about events in Eastern Europe has been much more extensive than in the cases examined in this book. Rapid . changes inevitably introduce greater uncertainty, but foreign powers have maintained their diplomatic connections, and the collapse of the secretive Soviet regime has actually facilitated the ability of other states to monitol! ' events there. Thus, the danger of miscalculation is probably lower than in past revolutions.
Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet empire occurred in extremely favor- able international circumstances. If competition among the other great pow- ers is especially intense when a revolution occurs (as it was in the 1790s and
18 The predominant role of former members of the Communist elite is documented in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New Nations of Eurasia: The Politics of Up- heaval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), app. B. On the "new thinking" that inspired these reforms, see Thomas Risse? Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
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in 1917, for example), they will be strongly inclined to seek gains for them- selves and to deny potential gains to others. By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, however, most of the other great powers had been close po- litical and military allies for nearly four decades. Because these states did not regard each other as potential security threats, the normal concern with relative position was muted. Instead of debating whether or not to inter- vene-as great powers did after every revolution we have examined-the Western powers have tried to support the new regimes by providing aid and advice. In addition, because the Cold War inhibited the development of extensive economic or political ties between East and West, foreign powers did not have major interests in the Soviet Union (unlike Britain and France in 1917 Russia or the United States in Iran, for example) and could take a more detached view of events there.
For all of these reasons, therefore, postrevolutionary relations between the former Soviet Union and the other major powers have been unusually tranquil. Circumsftances continue to evolve rapidly, however, and relations could easily deteriorate if Russian elites become convinced that the West ei- ther is responsible for their plight or is taking excessive advantage of it. 19 This danger suggests that Western diplomacy must strike a balance between acknowledging tlh. e legitimate interests of the new Eurasian states (espe- cially Russia) and turning a blind eye to internal abuses or resurgent expan- sionism. To date, ! however, the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989-92 have been uncharacteristically benign.
Unfortunately, relations within the former Soviet Union have been more conflictive, and for reasons that are consistent with balance-of-threat theory. First, the collapse of the USSR created an unstable and uncertain balance of power among the constituent republics (or between competing ethnic or na- tional groups within them). As illustrated by the recent wars-between Ar- menia and Azerbaijan and between Russia and the breakaway province of Chechnya-uncertainties about the true balance of power can encourage both sides in such a dispute to go to war confident of success. 20
19 AttheDecember1994summitoftheConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEurope, for example, Russian president Boris Yeltsin charged the West with "sowing the seeds of mis- trust" and complained of excessive U. S. influence, saying that "it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents . . . can somehow be managed from some single cap- ital. " "Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split Continent Again," New York Times, December 6, 1994- At, A4.
20 Although Azerbaijan had reason to believe it was stronger (its gross national product was roughly 6o percent bigger than Armenia's and its population and armed forces more than twice as large), the Armenians turned out to be far more capable on the battlefield. See The Military Balance 1 9 93-94 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993). Sim- ilarly, the Chechens were extremely confident that they could defy Russian pressure despite the enormous odds against them, and their resistance was unexpectedly effective.
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Second, just as revolutionary states usually adopt policies that differ from those of the old regime, the newly independent republics of the former So- viet Union are now free to pursue interests that were forgotten, suppressed, or irrelevant under Soviet domination. Thus, Ukraine has sought to regain control of Crimea; Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought over ethnic en-
claves within their respective territories; and a number of ethnic and na- tional groups have advanced claims for independence from their respective republics. Disputes over how to divide the assets of the former USSR have been frequent as well, and the Soviet legacy of interdependence has compli- cated matters by making each government's situation dependent on policies adopted elsewhere. 21 In short, where Western perceptions of Russian inten- tions have improved since the collapse of Communism, a number of former Soviet republics now view each other with considerable suspicion.
Third, because the newly independent republics face the same problems of legitimacy and order that revolutionary states often confront, the tempta- tion to mobilize support by invoking nationalism has been difficult to resist. Unfortunately, such efforts often involve playing up both real and imagined grievances against others, and because different groups within the former Soviet Union are now free to teach their own versions of history, the danger has increas? d that past quarrels will fuel future conflicts. 22 Needless to say, these are ideal conditions for spiraling. When conflicts of interest arise, each side will be more likely to see its own actions as entirely justified while viewing the actions of others as unwarranted aggression.
These problems will be compounded by the intermingling of ethnic or na- tional groups within and across existing political boundaries, which creates the possibility that isolated ethnic minorities will see themselves as vulner- able to persecution by majorities who regard them as potentially disloyal "fifth columns. "23 When national or ethnic groups are scattered within dif- ferent political units, one community may worry that a nationalist resur- gence in another republic could trigger a sympathetic response from
conationals within its own borders. Thus, nationalist -Ideologies can create fears of contagion similar to those produced by a transnational revolution- ary ideology.
Afinal source of conflict is Russia's growing effort to reassert its influence within the "near abroad," either to protect ethnic Russian populationS, to re-
21 See Dawisha and Parrott, Russia and the New States ofEurasia, 197--98.
22 Onthisgeneralphenomenon,seeVanEvera,CausesofWar,vol. 2:NationalMisperceptions and the Roots oJWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 11; and E. H. Dance, History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
23 See Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993); and Stephen Van Evera, "Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire," Security Studies 1, no. 1 (1992); and "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," Interna- tional Security 18, no. 4 (1994).
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tain access to valuable resources, or to stabilize the situation along its lengthy border. 24 Increased Russian influence might deter or dampen vio- lence in those areas in the long run, but its immediate impact has been to alarm its neighbors and to reawaken Western concerns. Relations within the former Soviet Union and relations with other powers are thus inextricably linked, and it will be much more difficult for Russia to maintain amicable re- lations with the rest of the world if the level of conflict within its former em- pire is on the rise.
In sum, relations among the newly independent states of Eurasia are characterized by uncertain balances of power, serious conflicts of interest, exaggerated perceptions of hostility, and fears of nationalist contagion. Not surprisingly, therefore, relations within the former Soviet Union have been (and are likely to remain) much less tranquil than relations between Russia and the other major powers.
Thus, balance-of-threat theory does shed light on the likely consquences of the Soviet collapse and helps identify where the probable axes of conflict will be found. These events also underscore the value of a systemic ap- proach, as the absence of great-power conflict in their aftermath is not due solely to the character of the new regimes: it is also due to the benign inter- national context in which the collapse of the Soviet empire took place and the fact the the "revolutions" of 1 989-92 brought these regimes into greater
ideological conformity with the West. Therefore, the events of 1989-92 rein- force a central contention of this entire book: one cannot understand the in- ternational implications of revolutionary change by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also consider the configurations of power and interest in the system as a whole.
THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTION
For some writers, the grand ideological struggles that have rent modern society for nearly four centuries are now fading away, to be replaced by more limited (and for the most part, peaceful) disputes over national inter- ests and an increasingly tranquil world order. This perspective sees mass revolution as inextricably linked to the process of modernization-to the spread of market forces and the transition from hierarchical forms of gov- ernment to political orders based m1 equality, mass participation, and indi- vidual rights. With the collapse of Communism and the apparent triumph of modem liberal capitalism, so the argument runs, the great ideological
24 See Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s," in Russian Secu- rity after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow, ed. Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass. : Center for Science and International Affairs, 1994), 13-20; and Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy 88 (fall 1992).
