-- Answer: Though there is no valid reason, in the case of a thing which lasts three days, they feel
compelled
to assert that whatever existed before must exist later.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
How can anything which is produced in this way be truly existent?
-- Assertion: The pot is the effect of its components, such as clay, and they are its causes.
73 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
-- Answer: If the pot exists by virtue of its causes, and those causes exist by virtue of other causes, how can that which does not exist by virtue of its own entity produce a disparate effect? Anything, therefore, that needs to rely on causes does not exist by way of its own entity. If it existed by way of its own entity, it follows that it would be causeless. This reasoning which refutes the existence of a pot by way of its own entity should be applied to all effects. )
.
L8: [(b) Briefly refuting that though there are many components, the composite is a truly existent single unit]
.
\ ###
\ 339.
\ Though they meet and come together
\ Form cannot be smell.
\ Therefore like the pot
\ The composite cannot be one.
.
(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - empty parts and characteristics can only define an empty whole: the parts and characteristics keep their own individual parts, characteristics and functions. They do not become "one and the same" with the whole. The whole and its parts, or characteristics, or causes and conditions, are not different or separate, but still not the same. Not two, but still not one. They are interdependent, co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(-- When the components retain their own particular properties, how can their combination form a truly existent unit?
-- Assertion: Though it has many components, the pot is a truly existent single unit.
-- Answer: Though visible form, smell and so forth meet and combine, form cannot be smell, for things that create the composite do not give up their different characteristics. Though form, smell and so forth combine they do not have one nature. Thus just as the pot as a truly existent single unit was refuted by the words [in stanza 332],
~ Because the pot is not separate from
~ Its characteristics, it is not one,
the composite too cannot be a truly existent single unit. ) .
L5: [2. Refuting truly existent components]
L6: [a. Just as a composite does not exist truly apart from visible form, smell and so forth, t here are no truly existent elemental derivatives that do not rely on the elements]
.
\ ###
\ 340.
\ Just as the pot does not exist
\ Apart from form and so forth,
\ Likewise form does not exist
\ Apart from air and so forth.
.
(i. e. Emptiness of basic characteristics or elementary components: Even the most basic elementary components or characteristics we can imagine is also dependently arisen, dependent on its own characteristics, on what it characterize, on other so called elementary characteristics or components . . . There is no basic or primary cause that is not itself an effect, part that have no parts itself, characteristics that are not dependent on something else, or anything that is not dependent on the mind and its accumulated karma. Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. )
.
(-- The components themselves, for instance visual form, depend on their constituents, such as the four elements; the elements too exists only in dependence upon each other and not in and of themselves.
-- Just as the previously explained reasoning shows that there is no truly existent pot apart from form, smell and so forth, there is no truly existent component visible form apart from the great elements such as air, for it is imputed in dependence upon these. )
.
.
\ ###
\ 341.
\ That which is hot is fire but how
\ Can that burn which is not hot?
L6: [b. Refuting truly existent elements]
74 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ Thus so-called fuel does not exist,
\ And without it fire too does not.
.
(i. e. The case of the basic element of fire and its fuel: A fire cannot exist and then have its fuel added to it. We do not call fuel of a fire something that is not already in burning. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(-- Even elemental particles, when subjected to similar scrutiny, are found to depend on their parts and other factors. -- Just as visible form, smell and the like cannot exist without air and so forth, the great elements too do not exist by way of their own entity without relying on each other. Thus fire is that which burns and the other three elements that which is burnt.
Fire burns only fuel whose nature is the other three elements, yet hot fuel is fire and no longer fuel to be burnt. If it is not hot, since it is unrelated to fire how will it burn? Thus fuel independent of fire does not exist by way of its own entity and because of this, fire independent of fuel does not exist by way of its own entity either. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 342.
\ Even if it is hot only when
\ Overpowered, why is it not fire?
\ Yet if not hot, to say fire contains
\ Something else is not plausible.
.
(i. e. see previous verse)
.
( -- Assertion: Fuel is hard and so forth but not hot by nature. When it is overpowered by fire, it grows hot and is that which is burnt.
-- Answer: Even if fuel grows hot only when overpowered by fire, why is it not fire? It follows that it should be fire because it is hot and burns. Yet if fuel is not hot at the same time, it is implausible to claim that something else which is not hot is present in fire. In that case just heat divorced from the other three elements would be fire, but if one of the great elements does not exist the others cannot exist either. Moreover it contradicts the statement, "Things that arise simultaneously are reciprocal effects like the elements. ")
.
L6: [d. Refuting a fire particle as truly existent fire]
.
\ ###
\ 343.
\ If the particle has no fuel
\ Fire without fuel exists.
\ If even it has fuel, a single-natured
\ Particle does not exist.
.
(i. e. Even elementary particles are dependently arisen, and thus empty of inherent existence. )
.
( -- Assertion: Since the other three elements are not present in the smallest substantial fire particle, there is fire even without fuel.
-- Answer: Fire without fuel exists if the smallest fire particle does not have fuel. Since it therefore would follow that uncaused fire exists, one should not assert a smallest substantial particles as do the Vaisesikas. If one admits that even the fire particle has fuel, for fear of the conclusion that it would otherwise be causeless, it follows that there is no single- natured particle since the other elements are certainly present in each particle. )
.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining for singleness or plurality]
L6: [a. Refuting truly existent functional phenomena through the reason of being neither one nor many]
.
\ ###
\ 344.
75 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ When different things are examined
\ None of them have singleness.
\ Because there is no singleness
\ There is no plurality either.
.
(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - a grouping of empty objects can only be an empty plurality: see also verse 332)
.
( -- When functional things like pots and woolen cloth are examined as to whether they are or are not truly existent, these various things, because they have parts, do not have truly existent singleness. Nor do they have truly existent plurality for the very reason by which they are not truly single, since plurality comes about through an accumulation of single units. External and internal phenomena are not truly existent because they are neither one nor many. They are like reflections. )
.
L6: [b. This fallacy equally applies to other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 345.
\ Though they assert that where there are none
\ Of those things there is singleness,
\ Singleness does not exist
\ Since everything is threefold.
.
(i. e. Even the smallest elementary component basis of the whole universe we can imagine is still composed of parts, has characteristics, has functions, is still part of a conceptual system, is still dependent on the mind conceiving it and labeling it, still dependent on accumulated karma, thus empty of inherent existence, like an illusion. )
.
( -- One may think this refutation applies to our own sectarians who assert that the elements and elemental derivatives occur simultaneously, but not to outsiders who assert that a small permanent earth particle which is a single unit exists where there are no functional things apart from the smallest particles such as earth particles and so forth. Yet even in their system the smallest earth particle is threefold in that it has substantial entity, singleness and existence. Attributes have attributiveness, singleness and existence. By virtue of the fact that everything is threefold even in their system, just unaccompanied singleness does not exist. Thus precisely the same fallacies apply to them. )
.
L5: [4. Applying reasoning which negates the four possibilities in [all] other cases [, with any duality. ]] .
\ ###
\ 346.
\ THE APPROACH OF EXISTENCE, NON-EXISTENCE,
\ BOTH EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE, AND NEITHER,
\ SHOULD ALWAYS BE APPLIED BY THOSE
\ WITH MASTERY TO ONENESS [I. E. EMPTINESS] AND SO FORTH.
.
(i. e. The Method: the Middle Way: staying away from the four extremes:
-- Tetralemma: To stay away from the four extreme conceptions of existence, non-existence, both, neither - that is away from thinking that those four, realism, idealism or nihilism, dualism, and monism, are the absolute truth, the final view. Because there is no absolute view, only adapted skillful means. Nirvana is not about doing something or not doing something, getting something or dropping something, seeing something or not seeing something. Nirvana is like space. -- Another way to present it would be: staying away from the four extremes: thinking causes and effects are the same (self-causation), different or separate (other causation), . . .
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking parts and whole are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking characteristics and the characterized are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking the world and the mind are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same . . . etc.
-- The same for the Two Truths, for dependent origination and emptiness, for appearances and emptiness, for body and mind, for stillness and occurrence, for samsara and Nirvana, . . . etc. The same for any duality. For all dualities, all
76 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
opposites, all relations: one side doesn't assimilate the other (one being true and the other false), not are they different or separate (both being true), nor are they the same (both being false). They are all non-dual: not two, not one. They are interdependent, inseparable. - This is the method to apply to all problems.
-- All of these different form of presentation mean the same thing. All duality problems come down to the same problem of inherent existence. Resolving the problem of inherent existence (the perfection of the wisdom of emptiness) is solving the problem of all dualities, of all discriminations, of causality space and time, of the self vs the world, of the whole samsara (the perfection of the wisdom of dependent origination). And perfecting wisdom is to realize their inseparability. All problems comes from ignoring this real non-dual nature of everything. And Nirvana comes only from directly realizing this true non-dual nature of our own mind, and of everything, that is like luminous space - empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional, inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfect Union of The Two Truths. Realizing this emptiness, great compassion arises! )
.
(-- Those who have mastered the art of employing the meaning of suchness always refute oneness, otherness, both and neither by applying the kinds of reasoning which refute the assertions
-- of those like the Samkhyas who claim the effect exists at the time of the cause;
-- of the Sautrantikas who assert that cause and effect truly exist but that the effect does not exist at the time of the cause;
-- of the Nirgranthas who assert both existence and non-existence in that a thing is permanent in nature yet temporarily impermanent;
-- and of those who assert that though things are substantially existent, they neither exist nor do not exist since they cannot be said to be this nor that.
They apply the reasons previously explained in [stanza 265], "For those who assert effects exists . . . "; the reason of dependent arising, the lack of being one or many, the diamond fragments reason and so forth. )
.
L3: [II. Showing the cause for mistaking functional things as permanent and truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 347.
\ When the continuum is misapprehended,
\ Things are said to be permanent.
\ Similarly when composites are
\ Misapprehended, things are said to exist.
.
(i. e. The problem: Because we do not fully understand dependent origination we think it means that there are absolute causes and effects, primary causes like elementary components (internal and external) and relations or absolute causality, space and time. That is the way it is presented in the Abhidharma. But their inherent existence is not necessary to explain karma, dependent origination, the cycle of samsara and the possibility of Liberation (or any conventional truths like morality, laws, sciences). On the contrary they would inhibit any possibility of change, and this mistake still creates subtle grasping and suffering, thus keeping us in samsara. Everything is dependently arisen (dependent on causes and conditions, on parts and characteristics, on the mind and karma perceiving it or labeling it) and thus empty of inherent existence; everything is like an illusion; like a figure on a cloud, like a swirl at the surface of the ocean, merely labeled by the mind, but not from the mind only. And there is no reason to fear this because it doesn't mean complete non-existence, or nihilism. But this is very subtle, hard to understand and usually not presented to beginners as discussed above. )
.
(-- Through inability to understand the continuum of things or the nature of composites correctly, they are thought to be permanent and truly existent. However their lack of true existence should not be confused with non-existence. Things are like magical illusions, in that they appear to exist and of themselves, but actually depend upon each other. Inherent existence implies permanence which precludes the coming into existence of things in dependence on other factors.
-- Question: if things therefore do not have the slightest inherent existence, for what reason do those opponents hold that they are truly existent?
-- Answer: Though there is no valid reason, in the case of a thing which lasts three days, they feel compelled to assert that whatever existed before must exist later. Functional things are said to be permanent when the continuum which is posited through imputation upon former, intermediate and later moments is misapprehended. Similarly when the composite is misapprehended, it is said that there are truly existent functional things. There seem to be even many adherents to the "Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition" who, through not knowing how to posit the composite and the continuum, follow outsiders. )
77 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L3: [III. Briefly showing the reasoning that establishes absence of true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 348.
\ ANYTHING THAT HAS DEPENDENT ARISING
\ IS NOT INDEPENDENT.
\ ALL THESE ARE NOT INDEPENDENT,
\ THEREFORE THERE IS NO SELF.
.
(i. e. In re? sume? : everything is empty of inherent existence because everything is dependently arisen. Everything is empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional. There is no exception. And this doesn't mean complete non-existence or nihilism. Dependent origination and emptiness are not in opposition; one implies the other. They are two complementary antidotes pointing toward transcendence, toward the Union of The Two Truths, toward non- duality. )
.
(The middle way, not truly existent, not non-existent:
-- Objection: Even if our view that things exist were wrong, your view is that things do not exist, since you do not accept functional things. It is unreasonable because it contradicts both what is seen and unseen.
-- Answer: We make no claim that things do not exist for we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: Do you assert that things are truly existent?
-- Answer: No, because we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: What does that mean?
-- Answer: It means that wile things are empty of inherent existence, like magical creations and mirages, they can produce effects.
-- Any relative thing which is found to arise and exist dependently is not found to exist independently. All these phenomena lack an independent mode of existence and thus there is no self of persons or of phenomena. The person and the aggregates do not exist inherently because they arise dependently. )
.
L3: [IV. Showing the need to understand absence of true existence] L4: [A. Inherently existent dependent arising is not seen by the Exalted]
.
\ ###
\ 349.
\ Things do not assemble
\ Unless there is an effect.
\ Aggregation for an effect
\ Is not included for the Exalted.
.
(i. e. The difference between Hinayana and Mahayana - the perfection of dependent origination: So the difference is that the Abhidharma teaches Dependent Origination assuming real causes, effects, causality, real characteristics and direct perception of those, real elementary components (internal and external), real space and time; only the self is not existent, merely conventional; -- while the Mahayana teaches Dependent Origination without any inherently existing dharma at all. It teaches that this is the only way to produce total Liberation, that grasping at the inherent existence of anything is still creating more causes for suffering. It teaches that cause and effect are interdependent; whole and parts are interdependent; characteristics and characterized are interdependent; even elementary particles are interdependent; that consciousnesses, sense organs, perception, and objects perceived are interdependent; that the whole world and the mind are interdependent; that everything is dependent on accumulated karma, and that ignoring this is the root cause of all suffering, while removing this ignorance is total Liberation. )
.
( -- Question: We too accept that effects are not independent, so what is the difference?
-- Answer: The difference is that you do not understand that dependent arising means mutual reliance.
-- Since nothing is produced by way of its own entity, things do not assemble and come together to produce an effect unless there is an effect to produce. Since anything inherently existent would be permanent, it could not rely on an effect. Aggregation for the sake of an effect is not included within the perception of the Exalted during meditative equipoise which sees suchness, because it directly perceives the lack of inherent existence of things. )
78 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [B. Release from worldly existence is gained through understanding emptiness]
.
\ ###
\ 350.
\ THE AWARENESS THAT IS THE SEED OF EXISTENCE
\ HAS OBJECTS AS ITS SPHERE OF ACTIVITY.
\ WHEN SELFLESSNESS IS SEEN IN OBJECTS,
\ THE SEED OF EXISTENCE IS DESTROYED.
.
(i. e. One has to realize the emptiness of all dharmas, without any exception: To really remove completely all grasping to the self, that is the cause of all suffering, one has to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas
without exception. Realizing the three marks: impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and no-self is not enough. If one follows only the teachings of the Hinayana, and still believe in the existence of some basic components as described in the Abhidharma, then there remains some subtle grasping, and there is no total definitive Liberation from samsara. Grasping at any absolute, any view, any method, any path, is still grasping. But that doesn't mean we should drop everything right now. )
.
(-- Only by understanding that things do not exist as perceived by conceptions of true or inherent existence can the seed of cyclic existence be destroyed. We should therefore make a great effort to develop a correct understanding of reality. -- One gains release from cyclic existence when deluded ignorance which conceives things as truly existent ends. This depends on understanding emptiness of inherent existence.
-- The seed of worldly existence is the conception that phenomena are truly existent. Objects such as form are its sphere of activity. The seed of worldly existence is destroyed and one attains liberation by seeing that these objects lack an inherently existent self and by gaining familiarity with this. On becoming a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer or on reaching the eight ground, one achieves the complete elimination of conceptions of true existence. )
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ All who have gained a free and fortunate human body,
\ Following the reasoning of Nagarjuna and his son,
\ SHOULD UNDERSTAND EMPTINESS TO MEAN DEPENDENT ARISING.
\ Who would not make an effort to achieve this end?
.
(i. e. The perfection of wisdom: The Middle Way: while one should not take Dependent Origination as taught in the Abhidharma as an absolute truth (with inherently existing elements in it), one should not fall into the other extreme and think emptiness is the absolute truth. - Those two, dependent origination and emptiness, form two poles of an apparent duality; so we could use the same treatment as for any duality as stated in verse 346. Dependently originated phenomena cannot exist and then be empty of inherent existence. Nor can something empty exist and then be dependently originated. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. Thus both dependent origination and emptiness itself are also empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. They are both conventional truths, even if emptiness is called the ultimate truth, or sacred truth. The real final truth is something else beyond any conceptualization. They are like two complementary antidotes, or skillful means. One fights nihilism or non-existence, the other fights realism or existence. This is the same thing as saying "we need both method and wisdom together all the time". - We cannot say what is the absolute truth beyond conceptualization (so we say there is no absolute truth, only adapted skillful means), but we can say what it is not; and it is not Dependent Origination (conventional truths), not emptiness (ultimate truth), not both together, not neither or something else that those two. That is how we stay away from the four extremes conceptions. The final truth is beyond conceptualization, it cannot be described and has to be directly seen, but it is called the Union of the Two Truths, the inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfection of dependent origination and of emptiness where one realize their non-duality: not two but still not one. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the fourteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions.
79 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
.
This concludes the commentary on the fourteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
80 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2] L2: [Chapter 15 - Refuting Truly Existent Characteristics [of products] -
Production / origination, duration, cessation - P. 277]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF THAT WHICH CONSTITUTES PRODUCTS.
.
-- Refuting the inherent existence of production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products.
-- One of the argument used to assert the true existence of things is based on the supposedly objective observation of their production, duration and disappearance. It may also be assumed that things change into something else.
-- But the exact link between the cause and conditions and the effect is not clear at all. They cannot overlap in time, nor be simultaneous in time. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other. So there is no stopping of the cause, and starting of the effect at all.
-- There is no real production, and so forth, otherwise we would have infinite regress.
-- When we say a thing is in the process of production; it is never absolute. Some conditions can change and there would be no final product as expected. So nothing is absolutely in the process of production; nothing is being produced. -- The process of production itself is unclear; it cannot be found.
-- So the exact time of production cannot be found. And the distinction between past, present and future become blur. Why? Because there is no real production and so forth; it is merely labeled by the mind.
-- So thing are not produced from other things, nor by themselves, nor from non-things, . . . And things do not change.
-- The three characteristics of impermanent things (the product) are not real characteristics either. They cannot exist independently of each other, and of the characterized. Nor are they all the same. Neither simultaneous, nor consecutive.
-- In general, the characteristics and the characterized are not different, not the same. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other.
-- So there is no real cause, production, product. There is no real impermanent things with origination, duration, cessation. Production cannot be used as an argument to prove the existence of things.
-- Nothing is before, during or after production / change.
-- There is no real past, present, future. Why? Because they are relative to the existence of something real, and nothing is real.
-- But, still, there is no effect without a cause. )
.
-- (Assumption: Things exist and change; they have origination, duration and cessation. Because there is this inherent production, things really exist. )
.
L3: [I. Extensively establishing dependent arising which are not inherently produced as existing in the manner of a magicians's illusions]
L4: [A. Specific refutation of inherent production]
L5: [1. Extensive explanation]
L6: [a. Refutation by examining whether that which exists or does not exist is produced] L7: [(1) Reason refuting production of that which exists or does not exist]
.
\ ###
\ 351.
\ How can the non-existent be produced,
\ If what does not exist at the last is produced?
\ How can that which exists be produced,
\ If what exists from the outset is produced?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the effect cannot be existing, nor non-existing at the time of its cause. Examining whether it exists or not at the time of its cause. If they, cause & effect, exist simultaneously then there is no need for production; if they exist sequentially then there is no causal link between the two. So there is no real cause and effect as we think they are, there is no real production as we think there is. It is much more subtle than this. )
.
(-- Inherent production of a thing is impossible, for neither that which exists nor that which does not exist at the time of its causes is produced by way of its own entity.
-- Assertion: Products exist inherently because their characteristics such as production exist.
-- Answer: Products would exist if their characteristics existed, but these do not exist inherently. If production is
81 / 117
.
\ ###
\ 354.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
asserted to produce products, then according to those who propound the non-existence of the effect, the sprout which does not exist at the time of the seed is produced after the final moment of a seed for which the necessary causes and conditions are assembled.
-- A sprout which does not exist during the last moment of the seed cannot be produced by way of its own entity, otherwise it follows that donkey's horn and so forth would also be produced. Thus how can anything which does not exist at the time of its cause be produced by way of its own entity? It cannot. How can anything which exist at the time of its cause be produced? It follows that it will not be produced, since anything existing at the time of its cause was produced from the outset, prior to being itself. The subject, a sprout, is not produced by way of its own entity, for neither that which exists at the time of its cause nor that which does not exist at the time of its cause is produced by way of its own entity. )
.
L7: [(2) Establishing its mode [of operation]]
.
\ ###
\ 352.
\ Since the effect destroys the cause,
\ That which does not exist will not be produced.
\ Nor will that which exists be produced
\ Since what is established needs no establisher.
.
(i. e. The cause and the effect cannot be sequential, not overlapping, because then there is no causal link between the two and it would mean that the effect is without any cause, that anything could be produced from anything else. The cause and the effect cannot overlap either because if the effect is already existing at the time of the cause what need is there to produce it again? )
.
(-- Something non-existent at the time of its causes cannot come into being in and of itself. If it could, even totally non- existent things like rabbits' horns could occur, since they would not depend on producing causes. On the other hand, neither would something already existent at the time of its causes require anything to bring it into existence.
-- ab: Since the sprout cannot be produced unless the seed undergoes change, the process which produces the resultant sprout destroys the causal seed.
-- Assertion: The pot is the effect of its components, such as clay, and they are its causes.
73 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
-- Answer: If the pot exists by virtue of its causes, and those causes exist by virtue of other causes, how can that which does not exist by virtue of its own entity produce a disparate effect? Anything, therefore, that needs to rely on causes does not exist by way of its own entity. If it existed by way of its own entity, it follows that it would be causeless. This reasoning which refutes the existence of a pot by way of its own entity should be applied to all effects. )
.
L8: [(b) Briefly refuting that though there are many components, the composite is a truly existent single unit]
.
\ ###
\ 339.
\ Though they meet and come together
\ Form cannot be smell.
\ Therefore like the pot
\ The composite cannot be one.
.
(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - empty parts and characteristics can only define an empty whole: the parts and characteristics keep their own individual parts, characteristics and functions. They do not become "one and the same" with the whole. The whole and its parts, or characteristics, or causes and conditions, are not different or separate, but still not the same. Not two, but still not one. They are interdependent, co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(-- When the components retain their own particular properties, how can their combination form a truly existent unit?
-- Assertion: Though it has many components, the pot is a truly existent single unit.
-- Answer: Though visible form, smell and so forth meet and combine, form cannot be smell, for things that create the composite do not give up their different characteristics. Though form, smell and so forth combine they do not have one nature. Thus just as the pot as a truly existent single unit was refuted by the words [in stanza 332],
~ Because the pot is not separate from
~ Its characteristics, it is not one,
the composite too cannot be a truly existent single unit. ) .
L5: [2. Refuting truly existent components]
L6: [a. Just as a composite does not exist truly apart from visible form, smell and so forth, t here are no truly existent elemental derivatives that do not rely on the elements]
.
\ ###
\ 340.
\ Just as the pot does not exist
\ Apart from form and so forth,
\ Likewise form does not exist
\ Apart from air and so forth.
.
(i. e. Emptiness of basic characteristics or elementary components: Even the most basic elementary components or characteristics we can imagine is also dependently arisen, dependent on its own characteristics, on what it characterize, on other so called elementary characteristics or components . . . There is no basic or primary cause that is not itself an effect, part that have no parts itself, characteristics that are not dependent on something else, or anything that is not dependent on the mind and its accumulated karma. Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. )
.
(-- The components themselves, for instance visual form, depend on their constituents, such as the four elements; the elements too exists only in dependence upon each other and not in and of themselves.
-- Just as the previously explained reasoning shows that there is no truly existent pot apart from form, smell and so forth, there is no truly existent component visible form apart from the great elements such as air, for it is imputed in dependence upon these. )
.
.
\ ###
\ 341.
\ That which is hot is fire but how
\ Can that burn which is not hot?
L6: [b. Refuting truly existent elements]
74 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ Thus so-called fuel does not exist,
\ And without it fire too does not.
.
(i. e. The case of the basic element of fire and its fuel: A fire cannot exist and then have its fuel added to it. We do not call fuel of a fire something that is not already in burning. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(-- Even elemental particles, when subjected to similar scrutiny, are found to depend on their parts and other factors. -- Just as visible form, smell and the like cannot exist without air and so forth, the great elements too do not exist by way of their own entity without relying on each other. Thus fire is that which burns and the other three elements that which is burnt.
Fire burns only fuel whose nature is the other three elements, yet hot fuel is fire and no longer fuel to be burnt. If it is not hot, since it is unrelated to fire how will it burn? Thus fuel independent of fire does not exist by way of its own entity and because of this, fire independent of fuel does not exist by way of its own entity either. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 342.
\ Even if it is hot only when
\ Overpowered, why is it not fire?
\ Yet if not hot, to say fire contains
\ Something else is not plausible.
.
(i. e. see previous verse)
.
( -- Assertion: Fuel is hard and so forth but not hot by nature. When it is overpowered by fire, it grows hot and is that which is burnt.
-- Answer: Even if fuel grows hot only when overpowered by fire, why is it not fire? It follows that it should be fire because it is hot and burns. Yet if fuel is not hot at the same time, it is implausible to claim that something else which is not hot is present in fire. In that case just heat divorced from the other three elements would be fire, but if one of the great elements does not exist the others cannot exist either. Moreover it contradicts the statement, "Things that arise simultaneously are reciprocal effects like the elements. ")
.
L6: [d. Refuting a fire particle as truly existent fire]
.
\ ###
\ 343.
\ If the particle has no fuel
\ Fire without fuel exists.
\ If even it has fuel, a single-natured
\ Particle does not exist.
.
(i. e. Even elementary particles are dependently arisen, and thus empty of inherent existence. )
.
( -- Assertion: Since the other three elements are not present in the smallest substantial fire particle, there is fire even without fuel.
-- Answer: Fire without fuel exists if the smallest fire particle does not have fuel. Since it therefore would follow that uncaused fire exists, one should not assert a smallest substantial particles as do the Vaisesikas. If one admits that even the fire particle has fuel, for fear of the conclusion that it would otherwise be causeless, it follows that there is no single- natured particle since the other elements are certainly present in each particle. )
.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining for singleness or plurality]
L6: [a. Refuting truly existent functional phenomena through the reason of being neither one nor many]
.
\ ###
\ 344.
75 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ When different things are examined
\ None of them have singleness.
\ Because there is no singleness
\ There is no plurality either.
.
(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - a grouping of empty objects can only be an empty plurality: see also verse 332)
.
( -- When functional things like pots and woolen cloth are examined as to whether they are or are not truly existent, these various things, because they have parts, do not have truly existent singleness. Nor do they have truly existent plurality for the very reason by which they are not truly single, since plurality comes about through an accumulation of single units. External and internal phenomena are not truly existent because they are neither one nor many. They are like reflections. )
.
L6: [b. This fallacy equally applies to other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 345.
\ Though they assert that where there are none
\ Of those things there is singleness,
\ Singleness does not exist
\ Since everything is threefold.
.
(i. e. Even the smallest elementary component basis of the whole universe we can imagine is still composed of parts, has characteristics, has functions, is still part of a conceptual system, is still dependent on the mind conceiving it and labeling it, still dependent on accumulated karma, thus empty of inherent existence, like an illusion. )
.
( -- One may think this refutation applies to our own sectarians who assert that the elements and elemental derivatives occur simultaneously, but not to outsiders who assert that a small permanent earth particle which is a single unit exists where there are no functional things apart from the smallest particles such as earth particles and so forth. Yet even in their system the smallest earth particle is threefold in that it has substantial entity, singleness and existence. Attributes have attributiveness, singleness and existence. By virtue of the fact that everything is threefold even in their system, just unaccompanied singleness does not exist. Thus precisely the same fallacies apply to them. )
.
L5: [4. Applying reasoning which negates the four possibilities in [all] other cases [, with any duality. ]] .
\ ###
\ 346.
\ THE APPROACH OF EXISTENCE, NON-EXISTENCE,
\ BOTH EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE, AND NEITHER,
\ SHOULD ALWAYS BE APPLIED BY THOSE
\ WITH MASTERY TO ONENESS [I. E. EMPTINESS] AND SO FORTH.
.
(i. e. The Method: the Middle Way: staying away from the four extremes:
-- Tetralemma: To stay away from the four extreme conceptions of existence, non-existence, both, neither - that is away from thinking that those four, realism, idealism or nihilism, dualism, and monism, are the absolute truth, the final view. Because there is no absolute view, only adapted skillful means. Nirvana is not about doing something or not doing something, getting something or dropping something, seeing something or not seeing something. Nirvana is like space. -- Another way to present it would be: staying away from the four extremes: thinking causes and effects are the same (self-causation), different or separate (other causation), . . .
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking parts and whole are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking characteristics and the characterized are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking the world and the mind are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same . . . etc.
-- The same for the Two Truths, for dependent origination and emptiness, for appearances and emptiness, for body and mind, for stillness and occurrence, for samsara and Nirvana, . . . etc. The same for any duality. For all dualities, all
76 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
opposites, all relations: one side doesn't assimilate the other (one being true and the other false), not are they different or separate (both being true), nor are they the same (both being false). They are all non-dual: not two, not one. They are interdependent, inseparable. - This is the method to apply to all problems.
-- All of these different form of presentation mean the same thing. All duality problems come down to the same problem of inherent existence. Resolving the problem of inherent existence (the perfection of the wisdom of emptiness) is solving the problem of all dualities, of all discriminations, of causality space and time, of the self vs the world, of the whole samsara (the perfection of the wisdom of dependent origination). And perfecting wisdom is to realize their inseparability. All problems comes from ignoring this real non-dual nature of everything. And Nirvana comes only from directly realizing this true non-dual nature of our own mind, and of everything, that is like luminous space - empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional, inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfect Union of The Two Truths. Realizing this emptiness, great compassion arises! )
.
(-- Those who have mastered the art of employing the meaning of suchness always refute oneness, otherness, both and neither by applying the kinds of reasoning which refute the assertions
-- of those like the Samkhyas who claim the effect exists at the time of the cause;
-- of the Sautrantikas who assert that cause and effect truly exist but that the effect does not exist at the time of the cause;
-- of the Nirgranthas who assert both existence and non-existence in that a thing is permanent in nature yet temporarily impermanent;
-- and of those who assert that though things are substantially existent, they neither exist nor do not exist since they cannot be said to be this nor that.
They apply the reasons previously explained in [stanza 265], "For those who assert effects exists . . . "; the reason of dependent arising, the lack of being one or many, the diamond fragments reason and so forth. )
.
L3: [II. Showing the cause for mistaking functional things as permanent and truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 347.
\ When the continuum is misapprehended,
\ Things are said to be permanent.
\ Similarly when composites are
\ Misapprehended, things are said to exist.
.
(i. e. The problem: Because we do not fully understand dependent origination we think it means that there are absolute causes and effects, primary causes like elementary components (internal and external) and relations or absolute causality, space and time. That is the way it is presented in the Abhidharma. But their inherent existence is not necessary to explain karma, dependent origination, the cycle of samsara and the possibility of Liberation (or any conventional truths like morality, laws, sciences). On the contrary they would inhibit any possibility of change, and this mistake still creates subtle grasping and suffering, thus keeping us in samsara. Everything is dependently arisen (dependent on causes and conditions, on parts and characteristics, on the mind and karma perceiving it or labeling it) and thus empty of inherent existence; everything is like an illusion; like a figure on a cloud, like a swirl at the surface of the ocean, merely labeled by the mind, but not from the mind only. And there is no reason to fear this because it doesn't mean complete non-existence, or nihilism. But this is very subtle, hard to understand and usually not presented to beginners as discussed above. )
.
(-- Through inability to understand the continuum of things or the nature of composites correctly, they are thought to be permanent and truly existent. However their lack of true existence should not be confused with non-existence. Things are like magical illusions, in that they appear to exist and of themselves, but actually depend upon each other. Inherent existence implies permanence which precludes the coming into existence of things in dependence on other factors.
-- Question: if things therefore do not have the slightest inherent existence, for what reason do those opponents hold that they are truly existent?
-- Answer: Though there is no valid reason, in the case of a thing which lasts three days, they feel compelled to assert that whatever existed before must exist later. Functional things are said to be permanent when the continuum which is posited through imputation upon former, intermediate and later moments is misapprehended. Similarly when the composite is misapprehended, it is said that there are truly existent functional things. There seem to be even many adherents to the "Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition" who, through not knowing how to posit the composite and the continuum, follow outsiders. )
77 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L3: [III. Briefly showing the reasoning that establishes absence of true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 348.
\ ANYTHING THAT HAS DEPENDENT ARISING
\ IS NOT INDEPENDENT.
\ ALL THESE ARE NOT INDEPENDENT,
\ THEREFORE THERE IS NO SELF.
.
(i. e. In re? sume? : everything is empty of inherent existence because everything is dependently arisen. Everything is empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional. There is no exception. And this doesn't mean complete non-existence or nihilism. Dependent origination and emptiness are not in opposition; one implies the other. They are two complementary antidotes pointing toward transcendence, toward the Union of The Two Truths, toward non- duality. )
.
(The middle way, not truly existent, not non-existent:
-- Objection: Even if our view that things exist were wrong, your view is that things do not exist, since you do not accept functional things. It is unreasonable because it contradicts both what is seen and unseen.
-- Answer: We make no claim that things do not exist for we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: Do you assert that things are truly existent?
-- Answer: No, because we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: What does that mean?
-- Answer: It means that wile things are empty of inherent existence, like magical creations and mirages, they can produce effects.
-- Any relative thing which is found to arise and exist dependently is not found to exist independently. All these phenomena lack an independent mode of existence and thus there is no self of persons or of phenomena. The person and the aggregates do not exist inherently because they arise dependently. )
.
L3: [IV. Showing the need to understand absence of true existence] L4: [A. Inherently existent dependent arising is not seen by the Exalted]
.
\ ###
\ 349.
\ Things do not assemble
\ Unless there is an effect.
\ Aggregation for an effect
\ Is not included for the Exalted.
.
(i. e. The difference between Hinayana and Mahayana - the perfection of dependent origination: So the difference is that the Abhidharma teaches Dependent Origination assuming real causes, effects, causality, real characteristics and direct perception of those, real elementary components (internal and external), real space and time; only the self is not existent, merely conventional; -- while the Mahayana teaches Dependent Origination without any inherently existing dharma at all. It teaches that this is the only way to produce total Liberation, that grasping at the inherent existence of anything is still creating more causes for suffering. It teaches that cause and effect are interdependent; whole and parts are interdependent; characteristics and characterized are interdependent; even elementary particles are interdependent; that consciousnesses, sense organs, perception, and objects perceived are interdependent; that the whole world and the mind are interdependent; that everything is dependent on accumulated karma, and that ignoring this is the root cause of all suffering, while removing this ignorance is total Liberation. )
.
( -- Question: We too accept that effects are not independent, so what is the difference?
-- Answer: The difference is that you do not understand that dependent arising means mutual reliance.
-- Since nothing is produced by way of its own entity, things do not assemble and come together to produce an effect unless there is an effect to produce. Since anything inherently existent would be permanent, it could not rely on an effect. Aggregation for the sake of an effect is not included within the perception of the Exalted during meditative equipoise which sees suchness, because it directly perceives the lack of inherent existence of things. )
78 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [B. Release from worldly existence is gained through understanding emptiness]
.
\ ###
\ 350.
\ THE AWARENESS THAT IS THE SEED OF EXISTENCE
\ HAS OBJECTS AS ITS SPHERE OF ACTIVITY.
\ WHEN SELFLESSNESS IS SEEN IN OBJECTS,
\ THE SEED OF EXISTENCE IS DESTROYED.
.
(i. e. One has to realize the emptiness of all dharmas, without any exception: To really remove completely all grasping to the self, that is the cause of all suffering, one has to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas
without exception. Realizing the three marks: impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and no-self is not enough. If one follows only the teachings of the Hinayana, and still believe in the existence of some basic components as described in the Abhidharma, then there remains some subtle grasping, and there is no total definitive Liberation from samsara. Grasping at any absolute, any view, any method, any path, is still grasping. But that doesn't mean we should drop everything right now. )
.
(-- Only by understanding that things do not exist as perceived by conceptions of true or inherent existence can the seed of cyclic existence be destroyed. We should therefore make a great effort to develop a correct understanding of reality. -- One gains release from cyclic existence when deluded ignorance which conceives things as truly existent ends. This depends on understanding emptiness of inherent existence.
-- The seed of worldly existence is the conception that phenomena are truly existent. Objects such as form are its sphere of activity. The seed of worldly existence is destroyed and one attains liberation by seeing that these objects lack an inherently existent self and by gaining familiarity with this. On becoming a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer or on reaching the eight ground, one achieves the complete elimination of conceptions of true existence. )
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ All who have gained a free and fortunate human body,
\ Following the reasoning of Nagarjuna and his son,
\ SHOULD UNDERSTAND EMPTINESS TO MEAN DEPENDENT ARISING.
\ Who would not make an effort to achieve this end?
.
(i. e. The perfection of wisdom: The Middle Way: while one should not take Dependent Origination as taught in the Abhidharma as an absolute truth (with inherently existing elements in it), one should not fall into the other extreme and think emptiness is the absolute truth. - Those two, dependent origination and emptiness, form two poles of an apparent duality; so we could use the same treatment as for any duality as stated in verse 346. Dependently originated phenomena cannot exist and then be empty of inherent existence. Nor can something empty exist and then be dependently originated. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. Thus both dependent origination and emptiness itself are also empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. They are both conventional truths, even if emptiness is called the ultimate truth, or sacred truth. The real final truth is something else beyond any conceptualization. They are like two complementary antidotes, or skillful means. One fights nihilism or non-existence, the other fights realism or existence. This is the same thing as saying "we need both method and wisdom together all the time". - We cannot say what is the absolute truth beyond conceptualization (so we say there is no absolute truth, only adapted skillful means), but we can say what it is not; and it is not Dependent Origination (conventional truths), not emptiness (ultimate truth), not both together, not neither or something else that those two. That is how we stay away from the four extremes conceptions. The final truth is beyond conceptualization, it cannot be described and has to be directly seen, but it is called the Union of the Two Truths, the inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfection of dependent origination and of emptiness where one realize their non-duality: not two but still not one. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the fourteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions.
79 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
.
This concludes the commentary on the fourteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
80 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2] L2: [Chapter 15 - Refuting Truly Existent Characteristics [of products] -
Production / origination, duration, cessation - P. 277]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF THAT WHICH CONSTITUTES PRODUCTS.
.
-- Refuting the inherent existence of production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products.
-- One of the argument used to assert the true existence of things is based on the supposedly objective observation of their production, duration and disappearance. It may also be assumed that things change into something else.
-- But the exact link between the cause and conditions and the effect is not clear at all. They cannot overlap in time, nor be simultaneous in time. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other. So there is no stopping of the cause, and starting of the effect at all.
-- There is no real production, and so forth, otherwise we would have infinite regress.
-- When we say a thing is in the process of production; it is never absolute. Some conditions can change and there would be no final product as expected. So nothing is absolutely in the process of production; nothing is being produced. -- The process of production itself is unclear; it cannot be found.
-- So the exact time of production cannot be found. And the distinction between past, present and future become blur. Why? Because there is no real production and so forth; it is merely labeled by the mind.
-- So thing are not produced from other things, nor by themselves, nor from non-things, . . . And things do not change.
-- The three characteristics of impermanent things (the product) are not real characteristics either. They cannot exist independently of each other, and of the characterized. Nor are they all the same. Neither simultaneous, nor consecutive.
-- In general, the characteristics and the characterized are not different, not the same. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other.
-- So there is no real cause, production, product. There is no real impermanent things with origination, duration, cessation. Production cannot be used as an argument to prove the existence of things.
-- Nothing is before, during or after production / change.
-- There is no real past, present, future. Why? Because they are relative to the existence of something real, and nothing is real.
-- But, still, there is no effect without a cause. )
.
-- (Assumption: Things exist and change; they have origination, duration and cessation. Because there is this inherent production, things really exist. )
.
L3: [I. Extensively establishing dependent arising which are not inherently produced as existing in the manner of a magicians's illusions]
L4: [A. Specific refutation of inherent production]
L5: [1. Extensive explanation]
L6: [a. Refutation by examining whether that which exists or does not exist is produced] L7: [(1) Reason refuting production of that which exists or does not exist]
.
\ ###
\ 351.
\ How can the non-existent be produced,
\ If what does not exist at the last is produced?
\ How can that which exists be produced,
\ If what exists from the outset is produced?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the effect cannot be existing, nor non-existing at the time of its cause. Examining whether it exists or not at the time of its cause. If they, cause & effect, exist simultaneously then there is no need for production; if they exist sequentially then there is no causal link between the two. So there is no real cause and effect as we think they are, there is no real production as we think there is. It is much more subtle than this. )
.
(-- Inherent production of a thing is impossible, for neither that which exists nor that which does not exist at the time of its causes is produced by way of its own entity.
-- Assertion: Products exist inherently because their characteristics such as production exist.
-- Answer: Products would exist if their characteristics existed, but these do not exist inherently. If production is
81 / 117
.
\ ###
\ 354.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
asserted to produce products, then according to those who propound the non-existence of the effect, the sprout which does not exist at the time of the seed is produced after the final moment of a seed for which the necessary causes and conditions are assembled.
-- A sprout which does not exist during the last moment of the seed cannot be produced by way of its own entity, otherwise it follows that donkey's horn and so forth would also be produced. Thus how can anything which does not exist at the time of its cause be produced by way of its own entity? It cannot. How can anything which exist at the time of its cause be produced? It follows that it will not be produced, since anything existing at the time of its cause was produced from the outset, prior to being itself. The subject, a sprout, is not produced by way of its own entity, for neither that which exists at the time of its cause nor that which does not exist at the time of its cause is produced by way of its own entity. )
.
L7: [(2) Establishing its mode [of operation]]
.
\ ###
\ 352.
\ Since the effect destroys the cause,
\ That which does not exist will not be produced.
\ Nor will that which exists be produced
\ Since what is established needs no establisher.
.
(i. e. The cause and the effect cannot be sequential, not overlapping, because then there is no causal link between the two and it would mean that the effect is without any cause, that anything could be produced from anything else. The cause and the effect cannot overlap either because if the effect is already existing at the time of the cause what need is there to produce it again? )
.
(-- Something non-existent at the time of its causes cannot come into being in and of itself. If it could, even totally non- existent things like rabbits' horns could occur, since they would not depend on producing causes. On the other hand, neither would something already existent at the time of its causes require anything to bring it into existence.
-- ab: Since the sprout cannot be produced unless the seed undergoes change, the process which produces the resultant sprout destroys the causal seed.
