But when it follows that judgment, as
through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of
reason's command.
through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of
reason's command.
Summa Theologica
Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into
intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.
Objection 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not
reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are
consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not
adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Objection 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they
are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above
([1534]Q[57], AA[2] ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they
are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral
virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual
and moral.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is
twofold, intellectual and moral. "
I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his
doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human
actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are
the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text.
48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one
of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or
practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an
intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a
moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either
intellectual or moral.
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue.
But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common
with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done,
as stated above ([1535]Q[57], A[4]). It is in this sense that it is
reckoned with the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Contingency and perseverance are not perfections
of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions
abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the
case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it
conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however,
perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest
reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since
intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect
of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it
may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i. e. the ends, on
which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and
persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles
be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit
corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal
agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if
the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive
faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect;
however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will
be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be
a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures,
and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something
less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).
Reply to Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues:
for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
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Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual
virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is
"a habit like a second nature in accord with reason. " Now though nature
may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no
need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is
evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there
may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to
his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains
perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous
and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason.
Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
Objection 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works.
But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural
inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without
intellectual virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues,
unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues. "
But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ([1536]Q[57],
A[5]). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual
virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding
and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a
habit of choosing, i. e. making us choose well. Now in order that a
choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be
directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines
the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which
is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have
reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel,
judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the
virtues annexed to it, as stated above ([1537]Q[57], AA[5],6).
Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and
consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by
the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both
in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right
reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally
known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so
also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of
reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of
necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with
choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires
that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of
reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those
things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men
have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through
lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mat.
10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple
as doves. "
Reply to Objection 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a
kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the
stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be,
unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of
fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind,
the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more
grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be
not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to
right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according
to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli. ];
but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle
declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
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Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral
virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the
perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive
appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the
reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the
appetitive faculty; and can be without it.
Objection 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things
makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper
matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the
moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most
akin to the moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good
counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having
the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.
On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral
virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral
virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be
without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right
reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but
also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason
demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason
argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also
particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is
rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he
understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical
science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright
about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid
universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is
destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed
by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire
seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his
reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of
science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal
principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with
regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs
to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it
were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue:
for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such
a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently
the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man
to have moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the
appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as
arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of
prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of
principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is
based.
Reply to Objection 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our
appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it
does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters:
in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does
not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel,
but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the
impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of
prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
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OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.
And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ
accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the
relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue
in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?
(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?
(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
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Whether moral virtue is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the
mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean
between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another,
are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such
as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
Objection 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for
another's ills, as stated above ([1538]Q[35], A[8]). Now "Cicero the
renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine
states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are
neither virtues nor vices. "
I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for
three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite, as stated above ([1539]Q[22], A[3]): whereas moral virtue is
not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite,
being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves
good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to
reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable
both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with
reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is
referable to good alone, as stated above ([1540]Q[55], A[3]). Thirdly,
because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good
only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion,
begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite
tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of
virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the
appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the
definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of
choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint
it. "
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason
of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it
establishes the mean between passions.
Reply to Objection 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil
deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to
mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a
vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so
far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i. e. an act of
virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason";
viz. "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor
are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he
bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from
being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.
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Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion.
For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is
not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not
give way. " The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all
moral virtues are without passion.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as
health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue
is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv).
But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as he says in the
same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither
is passion compatible with virtue.
Objection 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even
in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the
judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin. ) that "when they,"
i. e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to
grasp the truth. " Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is
perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but
if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy. "
But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore
moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with
them.
I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the
soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the
Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral
virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of
words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not
discriminating between the intellective appetite, i. e. the will, and
the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and
concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the
passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of
their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other
emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the
intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions
being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These
emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose
deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man,
if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [*Noct.
Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in
our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and
when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind
of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed
with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason
without his approving of such things or consenting thereto. "
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they
cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately;
as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any
movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in
so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic.
ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from
passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion
should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from
those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many
other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his
own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the
passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher
rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not
freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that when he says "a
gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of inordinate
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings
forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of
reason's command.
Reply to Objection 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason,
so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel
and the judgment of reason.
But when it follows that judgment, as
through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of
reason's command.
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Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7:
"She," i. e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude. " Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no
bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is
incompatible with virtue also.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is
incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De
Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue,
which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to
virtue and is incompatible with it.
On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in
Him, for He said (Mat. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death. "
Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held
that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i. e.
"three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead
of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead of fear,
"caution. " But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could
be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.
First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they
held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just
as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so
man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is
unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever
conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not
his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which
is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him
moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave
sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves. " A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not
actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to
be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The
sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation. " Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for
another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the
same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason.
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about
evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is
about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the
enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one
possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the
mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary
to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is
unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous
man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason.
Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by
sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates.
Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to
reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an
object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for
avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake
of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue
is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the
other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no
matter how.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is
not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders
wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in
whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful:
but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but
moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to
the present state of life.
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Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is
about objects of pleasure and sorrow. " But pleasure and sorrow are
passions, as stated above ([1541]Q[23], A[4];[1542] Q[31], A[1];[1543]
Q[35], AA[1], 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
Objection 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty
which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above
([1544]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore every moral virtue is about the
passions.
Objection 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral
virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some
are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the
passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by
directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by
reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently
there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's
direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of
the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective
appetite, i. e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as
stated above ([1545]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore not all the moral virtues
are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and
sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting
from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of
virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the
words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now
every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in
this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as about
something that results from virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the
subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the
will, where there are no passions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper
matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for
all cases.
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Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion.
For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the
passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether
without passion.
Objection 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from
its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the
passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom.
7:5) they are called "passions of sins. " Therefore perfect virtue is
altogether without passion.
Objection 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as
Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all
things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is
without any passion.
On the contrary, "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as
stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as
the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is
without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of
the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about
the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue
makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the
function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their
proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by
exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the
bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the
sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but
about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice:
because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion.
Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the
will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased
through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive
appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the
higher, as stated above ([1546]Q[17], A[7];[1547] Q[24], A[3]).
Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue
is, the more does it cause passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces
ordinate passion.
Reply to Objection 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that
leads to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of
its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels,
as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels
is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the
good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the
body's help.
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HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are
distinct from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of
the passions?
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Whether there is only one moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because
just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the
subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong
to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is
only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts
their respective inclinations.
Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material
objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the
formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one
thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is
but one moral virtue.
Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by
their end, as stated above ([1548]Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one
common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and
proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves
are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above
(Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in
the [1549]FP, Q[80], A[2]; [1550]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there
cannot be only one moral virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([1551]Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral
virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ
specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as
stated above ([1552]Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of
appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it
receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the
passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it
receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the
agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if
the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a
form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity
something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter
receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically
as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation:
thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received
into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the
adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for
instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of
various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various
adaptability of matter.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of
commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved.
But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so
to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation
(Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of
reason belong to various species, according to their various relations
to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species
and are not one only.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all
moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one
kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such
matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive
power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its
various relations to reason, the directing power.
Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on
account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account
of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from
the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they
be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
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Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are
about passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into
those which are about operations and those which are about passions.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an
operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or
sorrow. " Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above
([1553]Q[31], A[1];[1554] Q[35], A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which
is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative
habit.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action.
If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues
are about both passions and operations.
Objection 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill
towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive
appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about
operations are also about passions.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about
operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions
(Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq. ).
I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to
virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow
which are passions, as stated above ([1555]Q[59], A[4], ad 1).
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about
which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which
are about operations must needs differ from those which are about
passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain
operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no
matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and
evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In
operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the
operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such
operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to
another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about
operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some
operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent.
Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in
which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like
operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which
are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with
temperance, fortitude and the like.
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that
the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion
of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due
measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is
destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure.
Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed
in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate
anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first
considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two
consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in
some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about
passions, for the reason given above.
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Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is
but one virtue about operations.
Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are
directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause
diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good,
does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's
actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not
cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various
operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of
operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of
justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and
again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2.
intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.
Objection 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not
reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are
consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not
adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Objection 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they
are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above
([1534]Q[57], AA[2] ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they
are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral
virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual
and moral.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is
twofold, intellectual and moral. "
I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his
doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human
actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are
the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text.
48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one
of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or
practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an
intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a
moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either
intellectual or moral.
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue.
But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common
with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done,
as stated above ([1535]Q[57], A[4]). It is in this sense that it is
reckoned with the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Contingency and perseverance are not perfections
of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions
abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the
case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it
conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however,
perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest
reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since
intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect
of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it
may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i. e. the ends, on
which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and
persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles
be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit
corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal
agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if
the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive
faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect;
however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will
be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be
a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures,
and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something
less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).
Reply to Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues:
for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
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Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual
virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is
"a habit like a second nature in accord with reason. " Now though nature
may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no
need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is
evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there
may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to
his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains
perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous
and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason.
Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
Objection 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works.
But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural
inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without
intellectual virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues,
unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues. "
But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ([1536]Q[57],
A[5]). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual
virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding
and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a
habit of choosing, i. e. making us choose well. Now in order that a
choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be
directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines
the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which
is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have
reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel,
judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the
virtues annexed to it, as stated above ([1537]Q[57], AA[5],6).
Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and
consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by
the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both
in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right
reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally
known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so
also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of
reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of
necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with
choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires
that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of
reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those
things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men
have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through
lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mat.
10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple
as doves. "
Reply to Objection 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a
kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the
stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be,
unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of
fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind,
the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more
grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be
not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to
right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according
to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli. ];
but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle
declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
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Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral
virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the
perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive
appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the
reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the
appetitive faculty; and can be without it.
Objection 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things
makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper
matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the
moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most
akin to the moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good
counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having
the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.
On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral
virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral
virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be
without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right
reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but
also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason
demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason
argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also
particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is
rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he
understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical
science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright
about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid
universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is
destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed
by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire
seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his
reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of
science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal
principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with
regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs
to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it
were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue:
for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such
a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently
the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man
to have moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the
appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as
arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of
prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of
principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is
based.
Reply to Objection 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our
appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it
does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters:
in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does
not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel,
but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the
impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of
prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
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OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.
And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ
accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the
relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue
in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?
(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?
(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
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Whether moral virtue is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the
mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean
between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another,
are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such
as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
Objection 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for
another's ills, as stated above ([1538]Q[35], A[8]). Now "Cicero the
renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine
states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are
neither virtues nor vices. "
I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for
three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite, as stated above ([1539]Q[22], A[3]): whereas moral virtue is
not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite,
being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves
good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to
reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable
both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with
reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is
referable to good alone, as stated above ([1540]Q[55], A[3]). Thirdly,
because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good
only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion,
begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite
tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of
virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the
appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the
definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of
choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint
it. "
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason
of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it
establishes the mean between passions.
Reply to Objection 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil
deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to
mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a
vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so
far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i. e. an act of
virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason";
viz. "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor
are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he
bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from
being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.
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Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion.
For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is
not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not
give way. " The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all
moral virtues are without passion.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as
health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue
is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv).
But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as he says in the
same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither
is passion compatible with virtue.
Objection 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even
in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the
judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin. ) that "when they,"
i. e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to
grasp the truth. " Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is
perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but
if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy. "
But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore
moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with
them.
I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the
soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the
Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral
virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of
words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not
discriminating between the intellective appetite, i. e. the will, and
the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and
concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the
passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of
their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other
emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the
intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions
being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These
emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose
deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man,
if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [*Noct.
Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in
our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and
when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind
of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed
with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason
without his approving of such things or consenting thereto. "
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they
cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately;
as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any
movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in
so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic.
ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from
passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion
should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from
those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many
other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his
own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the
passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher
rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not
freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that when he says "a
gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of inordinate
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings
forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of
reason's command.
Reply to Objection 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason,
so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel
and the judgment of reason.
But when it follows that judgment, as
through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of
reason's command.
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Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7:
"She," i. e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude. " Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no
bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is
incompatible with virtue also.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is
incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De
Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue,
which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to
virtue and is incompatible with it.
On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in
Him, for He said (Mat. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death. "
Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held
that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i. e.
"three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead
of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead of fear,
"caution. " But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could
be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.
First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they
held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just
as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so
man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is
unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever
conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not
his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which
is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him
moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave
sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves. " A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not
actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to
be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The
sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation. " Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for
another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the
same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason.
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about
evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is
about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the
enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one
possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the
mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary
to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is
unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous
man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason.
Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by
sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates.
Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to
reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an
object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for
avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake
of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue
is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the
other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no
matter how.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is
not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders
wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in
whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful:
but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but
moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to
the present state of life.
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Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is
about objects of pleasure and sorrow. " But pleasure and sorrow are
passions, as stated above ([1541]Q[23], A[4];[1542] Q[31], A[1];[1543]
Q[35], AA[1], 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
Objection 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty
which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above
([1544]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore every moral virtue is about the
passions.
Objection 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral
virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some
are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the
passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by
directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by
reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently
there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's
direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of
the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective
appetite, i. e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as
stated above ([1545]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore not all the moral virtues
are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and
sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting
from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of
virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the
words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now
every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in
this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as about
something that results from virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the
subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the
will, where there are no passions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper
matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for
all cases.
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Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion.
For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the
passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether
without passion.
Objection 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from
its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the
passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom.
7:5) they are called "passions of sins. " Therefore perfect virtue is
altogether without passion.
Objection 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as
Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all
things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is
without any passion.
On the contrary, "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as
stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as
the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is
without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of
the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about
the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue
makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the
function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their
proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by
exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the
bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the
sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but
about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice:
because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion.
Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the
will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased
through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive
appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the
higher, as stated above ([1546]Q[17], A[7];[1547] Q[24], A[3]).
Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue
is, the more does it cause passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces
ordinate passion.
Reply to Objection 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that
leads to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of
its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels,
as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels
is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the
good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the
body's help.
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HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are
distinct from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of
the passions?
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Whether there is only one moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because
just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the
subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong
to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is
only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts
their respective inclinations.
Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material
objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the
formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one
thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is
but one moral virtue.
Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by
their end, as stated above ([1548]Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one
common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and
proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves
are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above
(Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in
the [1549]FP, Q[80], A[2]; [1550]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there
cannot be only one moral virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([1551]Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral
virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ
specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as
stated above ([1552]Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of
appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it
receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the
passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it
receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the
agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if
the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a
form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity
something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter
receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically
as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation:
thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received
into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the
adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for
instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of
various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various
adaptability of matter.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of
commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved.
But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so
to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation
(Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of
reason belong to various species, according to their various relations
to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species
and are not one only.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all
moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one
kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such
matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive
power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its
various relations to reason, the directing power.
Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on
account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account
of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from
the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they
be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
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Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are
about passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into
those which are about operations and those which are about passions.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an
operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or
sorrow. " Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above
([1553]Q[31], A[1];[1554] Q[35], A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which
is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative
habit.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action.
If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues
are about both passions and operations.
Objection 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill
towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive
appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about
operations are also about passions.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about
operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions
(Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq. ).
I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to
virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow
which are passions, as stated above ([1555]Q[59], A[4], ad 1).
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about
which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which
are about operations must needs differ from those which are about
passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain
operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no
matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and
evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In
operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the
operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such
operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to
another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about
operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some
operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent.
Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in
which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like
operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which
are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with
temperance, fortitude and the like.
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that
the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion
of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due
measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is
destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure.
Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed
in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate
anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first
considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two
consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in
some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about
passions, for the reason given above.
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Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is
but one virtue about operations.
Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are
directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause
diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good,
does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's
actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not
cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various
operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of
operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of
justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and
again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2.
