No More Learning

Spcrat. What do you * think then that, ifwhat isUseful and what isJust are very different, as you faytheyare,youknowwhatisusefultoMen,and
whyitisso>
' Alcib. W h a t should hinder me, Socrates? ? Unless
youwouldaskmeofwhomIlearn'dthistoo;or howIfounditoutmyself>
Socrat. Is your proceeding just, Alcibiades, sup posing what you say is not right, as that may very well be ; and that 'tisvery easy to refute you by the
same Reasons which I haye already employ'd > You
would have new Proofs, and fresh Demonstrations,
and treat the former as old Clothes, which you are
not willing to wear any longer. You arestillfor
having something entirely new -,but for my part,
without following you in your Stragglings and Es
capes,Ishallaskyou, asIhavealreadydone,whence y o u c a m e t o k n o w w h a t U t i l i t y i s ? , a n d w h o w ? i s
your Instructor : In a word I ask you all I have ask'd youbefore. - 'Tisverycertainyoullanswermetoo after the same manner you have done, and that you'll not be able to shew m e either that you have learn'd ofothers, to know what isuseful, or that you have found it out yOur self. But because you are very nice, and don't love to hear the same thing twice,
I am willing to drop this Question whether you
knowwhatisusefultotheAtheniansorno, "But
ifwhatisjustandwhatisusefulareoneandthe
same thing ; or ifthey are very different asyou fay,
w h y h a v e y o u n o t p r o v ' d it t o m e ? P r o v e it m e ,
e i t h e r b y i n t e r r o g a t i n g m e a s I h a v e d e a l t w i t h y o u -,
orinmakingme afineDiscoursewhich may set the Matter in a clear Light. ?
* If what isuseful, and what isjust, wered'fferentthiags,yet if one knew what is Useful, one nvght also know what isJust : ForweknowContrariesbytheirContraries. Buttheyarenot different,andSocratesisgoingtoproveit. Alcibiadesknowsno
more what is useful thsn what isjust.
'(? -'? ? - '- ,, . . (. . . : . '-. ";-" Alcik
? ? 1 8 6
T h e F i r s t A l c i b i a d e s ,? o r ,
Alcib. But, SocratesIknownotwhetherIamca pable of speaking before you.
Socrat. My dearAlcibiades, imagineme tobethe Assembly,supposemetobethePeople:When you are among them, must you not endeavour to perswade every one of 'em?
Alcib. Yes.
S0cr. 1t. And when a Man knows a thing well, is
it not equal to him to demonstrate to this and that Person one after another ; or to prove it to divers Personsallatonce; asonethatteachesReadingor Arithmetick can equally instruct one or more Scholars together ?
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. And consequently of whatsoever you are capable of persuading many you may very easily persuade one single Person. But of what can a Man persuade others, isitnotof thatwhich he
knows himself? . .
Mcib. Without doubt.
Socrat. What otherdifferenceistherebetweenan
Oratorthatspeaks toamultitudeofPeople, anda
Man thatdiscourseswithhisFriendinfamiliarCon- - versation,butthattheformerpersuadesagreatNum
berofPeopleatonce, andthelatterpersuadesbut one ? , .
Alcib. Tis likelytheremay beno other difference.
S o c r a t . C o m e t h e n ; S i n c e h e w h o is c a p a b l e o f p r o vingwhatheknowstomany,isbyamuchstrong er Reason capable of proving it to one single per s o n -, d i s p l a y h e r e a l l y o u r E l o q u e n c e t o m e , a n d . e n deavourtollicvvme thatwhatisjustisnotalways useful. . . /? ? /'. si\
Alcib. You are very urgent, Socrates.
Socrat. I a m so urgent, that I'll presently prove to you the contrary of that which you refuse to prove to me.
Alcib. Do so.
Socrat. Only answer me. '
Alcib. Ha! NothingbutQuestions; le'trheintreat
you to speak your selfalone. Socr. it.
? ? OftheNatureofMa,u 187
Socrat. W h a t are you not willing to be convinc'd ? AIc5y d Mcib. Yes with allmy heart. is^firlidlf Socrat. Whenyouyourself(hallgrant, andas-Socratesbis
firmtome thatwhatladvanceistrue,willyounotQa'P"*** be convinc'd? g j '
Alcib. I think I (hall. tobethe'
Socrat. Answer me then t And if you your M s bestmethod. don't say that what isjust is always useful, nevert0<<>>w'>><<1
believeanyMan livingthatshalltellyouso.
Alcib. Agreed, I am ready to answer you, for I
shall receive no damage by it.
Socrat. You are a Prophet, Alcibiades? ,buttell
me ; do you think there aue some justthings which are useful, and others which are not so >
Alcib. Yes certainly.
Socrat. Do youthinktoothatsomeofthemare comely and honorable, and others the quite contrary ?
Alcib. Howdoyoufay?
Socrat. Iaskyouforinstance, ifaMan who does an Action that isshameful, does an Action that isjust >
Alcib. Iamveryfarfromsuchathought.
Socrat. You believethenthat whatsoever isjust is comely.
Alcib. Iam entirely convinc'd of that.
Socrat. Butiseverythingthatiscomelyandhono rable good ? or do you think there are some comely and honorable things that are Good, and others that are Evil ?
Alsib. Formypart,SocratesIthinktherearesome honorable things that are Evil.
Socrat. And by consequence that there are some shameful things that are Good ?
Alcib. Yes.
undrtjute.
Socrat. SeeifIunderstandyouwell. Ithasoften happen'd in Battles, that one M a n in attempting to. succour his Friend, or Relation, has receiv'd a gtcat manyWounds, orhasbeenkill'd;andanother,by abandoning his Relation, or Friend, has lav'd his
Life : Is not this your meaning ?
? Alcib. "Tis the very thing I would fay.
. **'? ? ' "'? <. Socrat,
? ? i88
The FirstAlcibiades] o^
Socrat. The succouraMan gives tohisFriendis a comely and honourable thing, in that he endea vourstosaveone whom heisohlig'dtosave-,and is not this what we callValour,
Alclb. Yes.
Socrat. And this very Succour is an evil thing, in thatitisthe cause ofaMan'sreceivingWounds, or of being kill'd ?
Alcib. Yes, without doubt.
Socrat. * But isnot Valour one thing,and Death another ?
Alcib. Yes certainly.
Socrat. ThisSuccourthenwhichaMangivesto his Friend, is not at the fame time an honourable and an evil thing in the lame respect.
Alcib. So I think.
Socrat. But observe, if that which renders this Action comely, is not that which also, renders it good : for you have your self acknowledg'd that in respectofValourthisActionwascomely. Letus now examine whether ValourisaGood oranEvil. AndI'llshewyouthewaytomakethisExamena- right. DoyoudesireforyourselfGoodsorEvils?
Alcib. Goods without doubt.
Socrat. And the greatest?
Alcib. Yes, you may besure on't.
Socrat. And would you not suffer any one to de
prive you of 'em >
Alcib. Why shouldIsufferthat?
Socrat. What do you think of Valour ? at what
rate do you value it ? is there any good in the Worldforwhichyouwouldbedepriv'dofit>
Alcib. No, not Life it self. What to be a Coward ? I would a thousand times rather choose to dye.
* Socratesmeans, thatValourandDeathbeing twoverydiffe rentthings, 'tisridiculoustojudgof onebytheother:Buteach, of 'em ought to be examin'd by it self. The former of these is; thethingunderdebate, andnotthelatter. This lsextreamly in genious j and Aktiudis. did not expect such a very quick Re partee.
Socrat.
? ? Of theNature osMan.
Socrat. ThenCowardiseseemstoyouthegreat est of allEvils?
Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. And more to be fearM than Death it self >
Alcib. Most certainly.
Socrat. ArenotLifeandValourtheContrariesto Death and Cowardise ?
Alcib. Whodoubtsit?
Socrat. You desire the former, and by no means
w i s h f o r t h e l a t t e r -, i s i t n o t b e c a u s e y o u f i n d t h o s e very good, and these very evil?
Alcib. Yes doubtless.
Socrat. You have your self acknowledg'd, that theSuccouraMan givesto hisFriendinBattleis a comely and honourable Action ; ifitbe confider'd with respect to the good that is in it, which is Valour.
Alcib. Ihaveacknowledg'dit.
Socrat. And that 'tis an evil Action, when con fider'd with respect to the Evil that attends it, that isWounds and Death.
Alcib. Iconfessit.
Socrat. * Then it hence follows, that we ought to call each Action according to what it produces ?
weoughttocallitGood,ifGoodspringsfromitj and Evil, if Evil arise out of it?
Alcib. So itseems tome.
Socrat.
Is not an Action comely in that it isGood, andshameful inthatitisEvil?
Alcib. That's beyond (Contradiction.
Socrat. When you fay then that the Succour a M a n gives his Friend in a Battle is a comely Action, and at the iame time an evil Action, 'tis as if you should say, 'tis Evil tho itbe Good.
Alcib. IndeedIthinkwhatyoufayistrue. Socrat. Then there is nothing comely and honour-
* ThisMaximisfalseinAlcibiadeshis fense, butverytruein that of Soctmis: for nothing can ever spring from a good Action butGood, asnothingbutEvilcanspringfromanevilone.
able
? ? tpo she First Alcibiades ; or,
able which is Evil so far as itiscomely and honour able;norisanythingwhichisshamefulgood, so far as it is shameful.
Alcih. So Ithink.
mppimfs Socrat. LetusseekforanotherProofofthis
haiJays Truth. ArenotallthatdogoodActionshappy? tbtfruitof Can they be happy, unless itbe by the Possession of good Atli- G o o d ? Is not this Possession o f G o o d the fruit o f a ons.
good Lite ? And consequently is not Happiness ne cessarily for them that do good Actions ?
Alcib. Whocandenyit?
Socrat. * Then Happiness is a comely and honora blething. Henceitfollowsthatwhatiscomelyand what is good are never two different things, as we :ust now agreed, and that whatsoever we ,take td
'? ecomely, weshallalsotaketobegood; ifwe '. o o k n a r r o w l y i n t o i t .
Alcib. This is absolutely necessary.
Socrat. What do you saythen, isthatwhich is good useful, or not ?
Alcib. Yes, itis useful.
Socrat. Doyourememberwhatwesaidwhenwe ipoke of Justice, and about what we agreed ?
Alcib. Ithink we agreedthatallMen that dojust A c t i o n s , m u s t n e e d s d o w h a t is c o m e l y a n d h o n o r a b l e ;
Socrat. Then that which is comely is good ? Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. Then that which is good is useful ? Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat: And consequently whatsoever 'isjust is useful ? . Alcib. So^t seems.
Socrat. Take good Notice that 'tis your self who affirmthese Truths; fcfIformy part, onlyask Questions. Alcib. Iacknowledge it.
Socrat. Ifany one then thinking he well under stood theNatme ofJustice should go into theAssem- bly-of the Athenian^ or Parthians ifyou please, (to lay the Scene more remote) and should tell 'em he
* A n d c o n s e q u e n t l y H a p p i n e s s c a n ' t b e t h e f r u i t o f a n il l L i f e afidof illActions. "
? ? Os theNatureof. Man. ipf
certainly knows that just Actions are sometimes E- vil ; would not you laugh at him, who have just now granted and acknowledg'd that Justice and U-
tility are one and the fame thing ? <
Alcib. I solemnly protest to you Socrates, that 1knownotwhatIsay,norwhereIam? ,forthese
things appear to me sometimes one way and some times another, according as you interrogate me.
Socrat. DontyouknowtheCauseofthisdisorder? Alcib. No, I know nothing at all ofit.
Socrat. And ifany one should ask you ifyou have
threeEyesorfourHands,doyouthinkyoushould answer sometimes after one manner and sometimes
aster another ? or would you not answer him always ' after the fame manner ?
Alcib. Tho I begin to be diffident of my self, yet I think I should always answer the same thing. Socrat. Andisnotthisbecauseyouknowverywell
you have but two Eyes and two Hands ?
Alcib. I think so.
Socrat. Sincethenyouanswersodifferentlywhe
ther you will or no about the same thing, 'tisa cer tain sign that you are ignorant of it.
Alcib. So one would think.
Sotrat. You confessthenthatyourthoughtsareun-Vnaminij certainand fluctuatingaboutwhatisjustandunjust;alwap- honorable or dishonorable, good or evil, useful or comsfrm thecontrary. Andisitnotevidentfromhencethat*zmm"'
this uncertainty springs only from your ignorance ? AlciB. 'Tis evident.
Socrat. Then'tisacertainMaximthat theMind
isalways fluctuatingand uncertainabout everything itdoesnotknow?
Alcib. It cannot be otherwise.
Socrat * But do you know how to mount up to
Heaven ?
* AfterhehadsliownAlcibiades,thatIgnoranceisthecauseof
all the Errors of Mankind ; he goes about to prove to him, that Men ought not to be accus'd of Ignorance in general, for if one kindofitisEvil,thereisanotherkindGood, andthishemain- uinsverysolidly.
Alcib.
? ? i p i . T h e F i r s t A l c i b i a d e s ] ot",' *
Alc'ih. No* Iprotest. (
Socraf. Are you in any doubt, or does your Mind . fluctuate about this ?
Alcih. Not inthe least;
Socrat. Do you know thereason Ofthis,orwould youhavemetellityou?
Alcib. Tellitme.
Socrat. 'Tis because as you don't know how to mountuptoHeaven; soyoudon'tthinkyouknow itneither.
Alcih. Howisthat>
Socrat. LetYouandIexaminethis. Whenyou are ignorant of a thing, and you know you are ig n o r a n t o f it, a r e y o u u n c e r t a i n a n d f l u c t u a t i n g a b o u t this ? For Example, about the Art of Cookery > Don'tyouknowyouareignorantofit? Do youthen amuse your self in reasoning about the manner of dressing Meat, and speak sometimes one way, and sometimes another, don't you rather suffer the Cook to take his own way ?
Alcib. Yes certainly.
Socrat. And if you were on board a Ship, would you concern your selfto give advice to turnthe Helm . totheright,orleft;andwhenyoudon'tunderstand
the Art of Navigation, would you speak about it sometimes after one fashion, and sometimes after a- nOther> Would you not rather be quiet, and leave the Pilot to steer >
Alcih. T o be sure I should leave that to him. Socrat. Then you are never fluctuatingand uncer
tain about things you don't know, provided you know that you don't know 'em ?
Alcih. So it seems.
Socrat. By this then you- very well discern that all the faults we commit proceed only from this fortofignorance,which makesusthinkweknow that of which we are indeed igriorant. '
Alcih. Howdoyoufay?
Socrat. I fay that which induces us to attempt a thingisthethoughtWe havethat we know how to do
? ? Os the Nature of Man.
do itv for when we areconvinc'dthatwe don'tknow it,weleaveittoothers. Alcib. Thatiscertain. Socrat. Thus they who are under this last fort of ignorance never commit any fault, because they leave
to others the care of such things as they know not how to do themselves.
Alcib. That's true.
Socrat. Who aretheythenthatcommitfaults> 'Tisnottheythatknow things?
Alcib. No certainly.
Socrat. S'eing 'tis neither they that k n o w things,
northey who whiletheyareignorantof'em, know that they are ignorant ^ it necessarily follows that 'tis they who while they are ignorant of 'em, yet thinktheyknow'em:canitbeanyothers?
Alcib. N o 'tis only they.
Socrat. Wellthenthismustbetheignorancewhich is shameful and the Cause of all Evils:
Alcib. True.
Socrat. And when this Ignorance happens to be a- bout things of very great consequence, is it not ve ry pernicious, and very shameful >
Alcib, It cannot be denied.
Socrat. But can you name me any thing that is of greater consequence, than what is just, what is honorable, what is good, and what is useful ?
Alcib. No certainly.
Socrat. Is it not about these things that you your
self fay you are fluctuating and uncettain ? Is not this Uncertaintyasuresign,aswe havelaidalready, not only that you are ignorant of these things that are so great and important ^ but also that while you" are ignorant of 'em, you think you know 'em ?
Alcib. Iam affraidthisisbuttootrue.
Socrat. O h Alcibiaies ! In what a deplorable con. ditionthenareyou! *Idarenotmenrionit,yet *? Hedoesnotmentionieimmediately. Alcihiidesisnotyet
inicondition tobearthehorrourofit; Buthe'JImentionitat Jengrhj when he has dispos'd and prepar'd the young Man to re bfeifc this Thu'nder-clap,
0 seeing
? ? i<? 4
The First Alcibiades ; or,
feeingwe arealone'tisnecessaryIshouldtellityou. M y dear Alcibiades you are under a very shameful kind-ofIgnorance,asappears byyourWords, and your'own Testimonyagainstyourself. And thisis theReasonyouthrowyourselfwithsomuch pre cipitancy into the Government ; before you are in structedinwhatbelongstoit. Butyouarenotthe only Person w h o has fallen under this Unhappiness ; 'tis common to you with the greatestpart of those who haveintermedledwiththeAffairsoftheCom monwealth. I can except but a small Number. Nav itmay be your Tutor PericlesistheonlyPer son that is to be exempted.
jlicib. And,Socrates, 'tislikewisesaid,hedidnot become loaccomplishedofhimself;butthathehad a great deal of Conversation with many great Men, such as Pytboclides, and Anaxagoras ; and to this Very day, as old as he is, he spends whole days with *Damon, toinformhimselfstillmoreandmore.
Socrat. t Did you ever see any one,who perfectly knewathing,andyetcouldnotteachitanother? Your Reading-Master taught you what he knew ; andtaughtitwhomhepleas'd. Andyouthathave learn'ditofhimmightteachitanother. Thefame may be said of a Mufick-Master, and of a Master of Exercises.
A/cib* This is certain.
Socrat* For the best sign that one knows a thing well is to be in a condition to teach it others. ? '
Alcib. Sol think.
'*Thisisheofwhom PlutarchspeaksintheLifeofPericltsi tinderthespaeiousVeilofMustekhehidhisProfession, which wastoteachPoliticks. ThePeopleperceivedthis,andbanifh'd him withtheSeBtenceof the Ostracism.
t UponwhatAlcibiadtshadjustsaid,thatPirideshadrender'd himself acre nplished by the Conversation of Philosophers and Sophists, Stcrttiswouldintimatetohim,thatthisConversation wa$veryusele'sfortheacquiringofVertue, inwhichtraeAc compli" rrent consists. And t^is he ingeniously proves by the ExampleofPeridtshimself,whohadnotbeenabletoteachhis ownChildrenanything;asuresignthathehadlearn'dnogreat Matter of hisSophists.
Socrat.
? ? 6 s the Nature of Mart.
i^ J
Socrat. Butcanyounamemeanyonewhom Pe ricles has accomplished ? Let's begin with his own Children. -
Alcib. Whatdoesthisprove, Socrates,ifPeri cleshis Children were Block-heads ?
Socrat.