Now
Augustine says (De Civ.
Augustine says (De Civ.
Summa Theologica
10:4): "The weapons of
our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God. " Such are salutary
warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the
sentence of excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of
their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly,
by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps.
Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to
sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that
bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an
abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2662]Q[23], A[4], ad 2) every
power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is
directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be
considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which
clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and
counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to
take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an
occupation is unbecoming their personality.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have
vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war.
For it is written (Dt. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that
which is just. " But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem
to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even
in a just war.
Objection 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra
Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy,
as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is
unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to
be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by
laying ambushes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):
"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be
carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority
of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai
(Joshua 8:2).
I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the
enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways.
First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a
promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy
in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which
ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De
Officiis i).
Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not
declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to
do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be
concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according
to Mat. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs. " Wherefore much
more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this
reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of
concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated
in the Book on Strategy [*Stratagematum i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like
concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully
employed in a just war.
Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they
contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an
inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything
from him
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy
days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.
Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex.
20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest. " But wars are full of unrest.
Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.
Objection 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Is. 58:3) because
on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of
strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it
unlawful to fight on holy days.
Objection 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal
harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.
Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of
avoiding temporal harm.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly
determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight
on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him. "
I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those
things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence
Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me
because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day? " Hence
physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now
there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby
many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal
and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual.
Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the
faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there
be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if
notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from
fighting.
However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on
a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES) [*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]
We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether strife is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
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Whether strife is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For strife
seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that the word
"rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog,
because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in
brawling, and provokes contention. " Now contention is not always a sin.
Neither, therefore, is strife.
Objection 2: Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the servants of
Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise. "
Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled publicly,
without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore
strife is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But
war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.
On the contrary, Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are
reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do
such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. " Therefore strifes are
not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.
I answer that, While contention implies a contradiction of words,
strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another
through anger. " Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes
place between private persons, being declared not by public authority,
but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is always sinful. In
fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks another unjustly, for it
is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the
deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be
without sin, or it may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a
mortal sin; and this depends on his intention and on his manner of
defending himself. For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury
done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin,
and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if,
on the other hand, his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and
hatred, it is always a sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of
hatred or vengeance obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed
moderation in defending himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for
his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting
grievous harm on him.
Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and
there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which
express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is
always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready
to contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well
or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage
proceeds, "and delights in brawling. " Thirdly, "he" provokes others to
quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention. "
Reply to Objection 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of
Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled
with them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who
bore the calumny [*Cf. Gn. 26:20].
Reply to Objection 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared
by authority of the governing power, as stated above ([2663]Q[40],
A[1]); whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or
hatred. For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their
public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it is
not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who
resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this
case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend
themselves inordinately.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether strife is a daughter of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For
it is written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are they
not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members? " But
anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a
daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth
and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels. " Now strife is apparently
the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of
pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool
intermeddle with strife. " Now folly differs from anger, for it is
opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife
is not a daughter of anger.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up
strifes. " But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.
xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
Objection 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth
discords, soweth [Vulg. : 'loveth'] quarrels. " But discord is a daughter
of vainglory, as stated above ([2664]Q[37], A[2]). Therefore strife is
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives rise
to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A passionate man
stirreth up strifes. "
I answer that, As stated above [2665](A[1]), strife denotes an
antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another.
Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In
one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which
in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is
directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In
another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands his
intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly to
anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not
content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to
feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he
has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the
passion of anger ([2666]FS, Q[46], A[6], ad 2). Therefore, properly
speaking, strife arises from anger.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2667]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), all
the irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty,
so that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from
concupiscence as from its first root.
Reply to Objection 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the
result of anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional
cause of quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being
preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in
quarrel and strife.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger, as stated above ([2668]FS, Q[48], A[3])
hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to
folly. Hence they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in
the reason that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.
Reply to Objection 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it
is not the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it
is beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner,
since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees
himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel.
But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the
reason given above.
Reply to Objection 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the
hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies,"
i. e. , intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among
themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by
directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife
is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct
from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a seditious man
is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord. " Now, by
provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin
than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a
special sin distinct from discord.
Objection 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism
takes its name from scission, as stated above ([2669]Q[39], A[1]).
Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of
schism.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other
sins, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now
sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those
vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where
both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special
sin, distinct from other sins.
On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins (2
Cor. 12:20).
I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common
with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something
in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and
it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife
denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said
to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such
aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says that "seditions are
tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make
preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in
that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being
as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between
one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few
on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between
mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state
rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is
opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a
people, it is a special kind of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to
sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that
a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but
between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only
in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another
inordinately.
Reply to Objection 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects.
First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the
multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to
the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city
or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a
material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.
Reply to Objection 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under
discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but
between the parts of a multitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin.
For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the
gloss quoted above [2670](A[1]). But fighting is not always a mortal
sin, indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q[40],
A[1]). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes
without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a
tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension
in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the
tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be
sedition without mortal sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), sedition is contrary to
the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom.
Now
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the word
people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those
who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the
common good. " Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition
is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows
manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good.
Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity
will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails
surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.
Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by
them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common
good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious,
even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends
himself, as stated above ([2671]Q[41], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the
common good, as stated above ([2672]Q[40], A[1]). But sedition runs
counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be
without sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without
sin: and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the
unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.
Reply to Objection 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it
is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the
ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10).
Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,
that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance
than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that
is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among
his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is
tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the
injury of the multitude.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to
beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those,
to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to
be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider
scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is scandal?
(2) Whether scandal is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a special sin?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?
(6) Whether they can give scandal?
(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?
(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or
done that occasions spiritual downfall?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as
"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual
downfall. " For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on
[2673](A[2]). Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a
sin is a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God. " Therefore
the definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or
"desire. "
Objection 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more
virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect
rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore,
scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that every
virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.
Objection 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing
accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the
thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say
that it is an "occasion. "
Objection 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of
another's spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are
indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions
another's spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and
this seems unreasonable.
Objection 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall
when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with offense
and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good not to eat
flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is
offended or scandalized, or weakened. " Therefore the aforesaid
definition of scandal is unfitting.
On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Mat. 15:12, "Dost thou know that
the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we read
'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by deed or
word, occasion another's spiritual downfall. '"
I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek {skandalon} may be rendered
offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body,
while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to
stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a
{skandalon}.
In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be
disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so far,
to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves
another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.
Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,
except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly
right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his
downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less
rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall. "
Reply to Objection 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the
heart, wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an
obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come
under the head of scandal.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because
something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack
of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or
through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were
to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this is not
sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet,
since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of
worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual
downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): "From all appearance
of evil refrain yourselves. " Scandal is therefore fittingly described
as something done "less rightly," so as to comprise both whatever is
sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2674]FS, Q[75], AA[2],3;
[2675]FS, Q[80], A[1]), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's
spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another
man's words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat
to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a
cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an
accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions
should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is
accidental to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental
cause is mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).
Reply to Objection 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of
another's sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a
man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into
sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as
to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a
sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In this case he
that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of
another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called "active
scandal. " One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of another's
sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of
a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being
ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy of another's
good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he
is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's downfall, but it is
this other one who takes the occasion according to Rom. 7:8: "Sin
taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of
concupiscence. " Wherefore this is "passive," without "active scandal,"
since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the
occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes therefore it happens that
there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the
other, as when one commits a sin being induced thereto by another;
sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when
one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not
consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we
have already said.
Reply to Objection 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while
"offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin,
which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and
"scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether scandal is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not
occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above
([2676]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2). Now it is written (Mat. 18:7): "It must
needs be that scandals come. " Therefore scandal is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness,
because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). But
scandal may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to
Peter (Mat. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which
words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of
dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil. " Therefore
scandal is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles
does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can
be without sin.
On the contrary, Scandal is "something less rightly said or done. " Now
anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is always
with sin.
I answer that, As already said (A[1], ad 4), scandal is of two kinds,
passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the
person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual downfall.
Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person scandalized;
for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a
spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.
Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the person
whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when a person
is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active scandal is
always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either what he does
is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be
left undone out of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to
be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare; so that if he
persist in doing it he acts against charity.
Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person
scandalized, as stated above (A[1], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals
come," are to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the
conditional necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that
whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken
conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the [2677]FP,
Q[14], A[13], ad 3; [2678]FP, Q[23], A[6], ad 2.
Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity
of end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are
reproved may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19).
Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails to
shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of
unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs injure his health,
which is to be understood on the condition that he does not change his
diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals come, so long as
men fail to change their evil mode of living.
Reply to Objection 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of
hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense
of dutifulness towards Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept
back somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a
venial sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether scandal is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For
scandal is "something said or done less rightly. " But this applies to
every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently,
scandal is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind
of injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in
Ethic. v, 3,5. But scandal is not to be found separately from other
sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something
which specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in
its being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a
sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance,
does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal is
not a special sin.
On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. But
scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is written
(Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou
walkest not now according to charity. " Therefore scandal is a special
sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2679](A[2]), scandal is twofold, active
and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through
another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the
fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed, does
not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a
special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.
On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,
directly and accidently. The scandal is accidental when it is beside
the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate
deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall, but merely to
satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a
special sin, because a species is not constituted by that which is
accidental.
Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word or
deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind of
sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because moral
actions take their species from their end, as stated above ([2680]FS,
Q[1], A[3]; [2681]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Hence, just as theft and murder
are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of
doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a special
kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to his
neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a
man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.
Reply to Objection 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but
it may derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other
sins, as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a
sin in itself, but has an appearance of evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special
sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the
end, as stated above.
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Whether scandal is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every sin
that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[24],
A[12]; Q[35] , A[3]). But scandal is contrary to charity, as stated
above ([2682]AA[2],3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment
of eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
damnation, according to Mat. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of
these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a
mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be
drowned in the depth of the sea. " For, as Jerome says on this passage,
"it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a fault, than to
await everlasting torments. " Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin,
because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a sin
against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound the
weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg. : 'When you sin thus against the
brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin against Christ. "
Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It may be a venial sin to lead a person into venial
sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be a
venial sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2683](A[1]), scandal denotes a
stumbling whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall.
Consequently passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it
consists in a stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person
is disturbed by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's
inordinate word or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the
stumbling results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so
far as to commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or
deed.
Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin; for
instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either commits
a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has
some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a mortal
sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he has
such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he declines,
for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he wishes to do. But
in the case of active direct scandal, as when a person intends to lead
another into sin, if he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own
sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a
mortal sin himself, to lead another into venial sin; whereas if he
intends, by committing a venial sin, to lead another into venial sin,
there will be a venial sin of scandal.
And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to the
perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to Peter
(Mat. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me. " Much more therefore can other
perfect men suffer scandal.
Objection 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We would
have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
hindered us. " Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
Objection 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves. " Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial, as stated above [2684](A[4]). Therefore passive
scandal may be found in perfect men.
On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat. 18:6, "He that shall
scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is the
little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take scandal. "
I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who
takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can be
unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i. e.
the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchangeable, for
though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as
these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ. " Wherefore, however much others may appear
to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do
not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. 124:1: "They that
trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for
ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. " Therefore scandal is not found in
those who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165:
"Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block [scandalum]. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage,
scandal is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance.
Hence Our Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he
was endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according
to Rom. 8:38,39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to
separate us from the love of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins
through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking
scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although
there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
feet were almost moved. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized
passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to Mat.
15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,
were scandalized? " Therefore active scandal can be found in the
perfect.
Objection 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i. e. Peter, "before
them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles,
and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do
the Jews? " Therefore active scandal can be in the perfect.
Objection 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin.
our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God. " Such are salutary
warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the
sentence of excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of
their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly,
by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps.
Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to
sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that
bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an
abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2662]Q[23], A[4], ad 2) every
power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is
directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be
considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which
clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and
counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to
take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an
occupation is unbecoming their personality.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have
vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war.
For it is written (Dt. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that
which is just. " But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem
to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even
in a just war.
Objection 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra
Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy,
as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is
unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to
be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by
laying ambushes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):
"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be
carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority
of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai
(Joshua 8:2).
I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the
enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways.
First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a
promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy
in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which
ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De
Officiis i).
Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not
declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to
do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be
concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according
to Mat. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs. " Wherefore much
more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this
reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of
concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated
in the Book on Strategy [*Stratagematum i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like
concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully
employed in a just war.
Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they
contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an
inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything
from him
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy
days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.
Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex.
20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest. " But wars are full of unrest.
Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.
Objection 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Is. 58:3) because
on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of
strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it
unlawful to fight on holy days.
Objection 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal
harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.
Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of
avoiding temporal harm.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly
determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight
on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him. "
I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those
things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence
Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me
because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day? " Hence
physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now
there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby
many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal
and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual.
Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the
faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there
be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if
notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from
fighting.
However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on
a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES) [*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]
We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether strife is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether strife is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For strife
seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that the word
"rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog,
because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in
brawling, and provokes contention. " Now contention is not always a sin.
Neither, therefore, is strife.
Objection 2: Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the servants of
Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise. "
Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled publicly,
without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore
strife is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But
war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.
On the contrary, Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are
reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do
such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. " Therefore strifes are
not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.
I answer that, While contention implies a contradiction of words,
strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another
through anger. " Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes
place between private persons, being declared not by public authority,
but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is always sinful. In
fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks another unjustly, for it
is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the
deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be
without sin, or it may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a
mortal sin; and this depends on his intention and on his manner of
defending himself. For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury
done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin,
and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if,
on the other hand, his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and
hatred, it is always a sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of
hatred or vengeance obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed
moderation in defending himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for
his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting
grievous harm on him.
Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and
there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which
express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is
always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready
to contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well
or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage
proceeds, "and delights in brawling. " Thirdly, "he" provokes others to
quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention. "
Reply to Objection 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of
Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled
with them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who
bore the calumny [*Cf. Gn. 26:20].
Reply to Objection 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared
by authority of the governing power, as stated above ([2663]Q[40],
A[1]); whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or
hatred. For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their
public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it is
not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who
resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this
case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend
themselves inordinately.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether strife is a daughter of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For
it is written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are they
not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members? " But
anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a
daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth
and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels. " Now strife is apparently
the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of
pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool
intermeddle with strife. " Now folly differs from anger, for it is
opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife
is not a daughter of anger.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up
strifes. " But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.
xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
Objection 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth
discords, soweth [Vulg. : 'loveth'] quarrels. " But discord is a daughter
of vainglory, as stated above ([2664]Q[37], A[2]). Therefore strife is
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives rise
to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A passionate man
stirreth up strifes. "
I answer that, As stated above [2665](A[1]), strife denotes an
antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another.
Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In
one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which
in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is
directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In
another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands his
intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly to
anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not
content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to
feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he
has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the
passion of anger ([2666]FS, Q[46], A[6], ad 2). Therefore, properly
speaking, strife arises from anger.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2667]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), all
the irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty,
so that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from
concupiscence as from its first root.
Reply to Objection 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the
result of anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional
cause of quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being
preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in
quarrel and strife.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger, as stated above ([2668]FS, Q[48], A[3])
hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to
folly. Hence they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in
the reason that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.
Reply to Objection 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it
is not the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it
is beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner,
since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees
himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel.
But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the
reason given above.
Reply to Objection 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the
hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies,"
i. e. , intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among
themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by
directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife
is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct
from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a seditious man
is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord. " Now, by
provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin
than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a
special sin distinct from discord.
Objection 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism
takes its name from scission, as stated above ([2669]Q[39], A[1]).
Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of
schism.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other
sins, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now
sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those
vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where
both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special
sin, distinct from other sins.
On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins (2
Cor. 12:20).
I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common
with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something
in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and
it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife
denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said
to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such
aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says that "seditions are
tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make
preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in
that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being
as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between
one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few
on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between
mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state
rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is
opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a
people, it is a special kind of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to
sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that
a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but
between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only
in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another
inordinately.
Reply to Objection 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects.
First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the
multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to
the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city
or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a
material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.
Reply to Objection 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under
discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but
between the parts of a multitude.
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Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin.
For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the
gloss quoted above [2670](A[1]). But fighting is not always a mortal
sin, indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q[40],
A[1]). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes
without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a
tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension
in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the
tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be
sedition without mortal sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), sedition is contrary to
the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom.
Now
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the word
people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those
who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the
common good. " Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition
is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows
manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good.
Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity
will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails
surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.
Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by
them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common
good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious,
even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends
himself, as stated above ([2671]Q[41], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the
common good, as stated above ([2672]Q[40], A[1]). But sedition runs
counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be
without sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without
sin: and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the
unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.
Reply to Objection 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it
is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the
ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10).
Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,
that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance
than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that
is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among
his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is
tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the
injury of the multitude.
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OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to
beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those,
to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to
be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider
scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is scandal?
(2) Whether scandal is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a special sin?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?
(6) Whether they can give scandal?
(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?
(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
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Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or
done that occasions spiritual downfall?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as
"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual
downfall. " For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on
[2673](A[2]). Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a
sin is a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God. " Therefore
the definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or
"desire. "
Objection 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more
virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect
rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore,
scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that every
virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.
Objection 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing
accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the
thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say
that it is an "occasion. "
Objection 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of
another's spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are
indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions
another's spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and
this seems unreasonable.
Objection 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall
when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with offense
and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good not to eat
flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is
offended or scandalized, or weakened. " Therefore the aforesaid
definition of scandal is unfitting.
On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Mat. 15:12, "Dost thou know that
the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we read
'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by deed or
word, occasion another's spiritual downfall. '"
I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek {skandalon} may be rendered
offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body,
while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to
stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a
{skandalon}.
In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be
disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so far,
to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves
another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.
Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,
except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly
right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his
downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less
rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall. "
Reply to Objection 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the
heart, wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an
obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come
under the head of scandal.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because
something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack
of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or
through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were
to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this is not
sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet,
since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of
worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual
downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): "From all appearance
of evil refrain yourselves. " Scandal is therefore fittingly described
as something done "less rightly," so as to comprise both whatever is
sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2674]FS, Q[75], AA[2],3;
[2675]FS, Q[80], A[1]), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's
spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another
man's words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat
to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a
cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an
accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions
should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is
accidental to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental
cause is mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).
Reply to Objection 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of
another's sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a
man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into
sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as
to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a
sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In this case he
that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of
another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called "active
scandal. " One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of another's
sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of
a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being
ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy of another's
good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he
is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's downfall, but it is
this other one who takes the occasion according to Rom. 7:8: "Sin
taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of
concupiscence. " Wherefore this is "passive," without "active scandal,"
since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the
occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes therefore it happens that
there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the
other, as when one commits a sin being induced thereto by another;
sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when
one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not
consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we
have already said.
Reply to Objection 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while
"offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin,
which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and
"scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.
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Whether scandal is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not
occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above
([2676]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2). Now it is written (Mat. 18:7): "It must
needs be that scandals come. " Therefore scandal is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness,
because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). But
scandal may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to
Peter (Mat. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which
words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of
dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil. " Therefore
scandal is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles
does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can
be without sin.
On the contrary, Scandal is "something less rightly said or done. " Now
anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is always
with sin.
I answer that, As already said (A[1], ad 4), scandal is of two kinds,
passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the
person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual downfall.
Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person scandalized;
for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a
spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.
Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the person
whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when a person
is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active scandal is
always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either what he does
is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be
left undone out of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to
be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare; so that if he
persist in doing it he acts against charity.
Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person
scandalized, as stated above (A[1], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals
come," are to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the
conditional necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that
whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken
conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the [2677]FP,
Q[14], A[13], ad 3; [2678]FP, Q[23], A[6], ad 2.
Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity
of end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are
reproved may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19).
Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails to
shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of
unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs injure his health,
which is to be understood on the condition that he does not change his
diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals come, so long as
men fail to change their evil mode of living.
Reply to Objection 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of
hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense
of dutifulness towards Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept
back somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a
venial sin.
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Whether scandal is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For
scandal is "something said or done less rightly. " But this applies to
every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently,
scandal is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind
of injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in
Ethic. v, 3,5. But scandal is not to be found separately from other
sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something
which specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in
its being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a
sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance,
does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal is
not a special sin.
On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. But
scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is written
(Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou
walkest not now according to charity. " Therefore scandal is a special
sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2679](A[2]), scandal is twofold, active
and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through
another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the
fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed, does
not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a
special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.
On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,
directly and accidently. The scandal is accidental when it is beside
the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate
deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall, but merely to
satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a
special sin, because a species is not constituted by that which is
accidental.
Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word or
deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind of
sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because moral
actions take their species from their end, as stated above ([2680]FS,
Q[1], A[3]; [2681]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Hence, just as theft and murder
are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of
doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a special
kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to his
neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a
man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.
Reply to Objection 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but
it may derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other
sins, as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a
sin in itself, but has an appearance of evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special
sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the
end, as stated above.
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Whether scandal is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every sin
that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[24],
A[12]; Q[35] , A[3]). But scandal is contrary to charity, as stated
above ([2682]AA[2],3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment
of eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
damnation, according to Mat. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of
these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a
mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be
drowned in the depth of the sea. " For, as Jerome says on this passage,
"it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a fault, than to
await everlasting torments. " Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin,
because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a sin
against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound the
weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg. : 'When you sin thus against the
brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin against Christ. "
Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It may be a venial sin to lead a person into venial
sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be a
venial sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2683](A[1]), scandal denotes a
stumbling whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall.
Consequently passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it
consists in a stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person
is disturbed by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's
inordinate word or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the
stumbling results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so
far as to commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or
deed.
Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin; for
instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either commits
a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has
some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a mortal
sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he has
such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he declines,
for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he wishes to do. But
in the case of active direct scandal, as when a person intends to lead
another into sin, if he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own
sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a
mortal sin himself, to lead another into venial sin; whereas if he
intends, by committing a venial sin, to lead another into venial sin,
there will be a venial sin of scandal.
And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to the
perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to Peter
(Mat. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me. " Much more therefore can other
perfect men suffer scandal.
Objection 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We would
have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
hindered us. " Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
Objection 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves. " Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial, as stated above [2684](A[4]). Therefore passive
scandal may be found in perfect men.
On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat. 18:6, "He that shall
scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is the
little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take scandal. "
I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who
takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can be
unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i. e.
the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchangeable, for
though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as
these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ. " Wherefore, however much others may appear
to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do
not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. 124:1: "They that
trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for
ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. " Therefore scandal is not found in
those who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165:
"Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block [scandalum]. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage,
scandal is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance.
Hence Our Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he
was endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according
to Rom. 8:38,39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to
separate us from the love of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins
through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking
scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although
there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
feet were almost moved. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized
passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to Mat.
15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,
were scandalized? " Therefore active scandal can be found in the
perfect.
Objection 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i. e. Peter, "before
them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles,
and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do
the Jews? " Therefore active scandal can be in the perfect.
Objection 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin.
