No More Learning

17 Hegel, Fru? he Schriften, ed. e. Moldenhauer/K. M. Michel, Theorie-Werkausgabe, vol. 1,
frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1971, pp. 421-422. this edition is relatively reliable and for everybody at hand. i quote from it in my translation (HK).
18 Hegel, Schriften und Entwu? rfe (1799-1808), p. 237.
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the different parts of this 'system of philosophy' are not documented in the remaining passages of the Systemfragment of 1800. they can be recon- structed by using the information on the 'Philosophy of nature' and the 'Philosophy of Spirit', which we have from texts of the years 1801 and 1802. thus it becomes clear that not only the religious dimension of this system is strongly determined by the concepts of life and of nature, but all parts of that system. if this is the case, i dare say that Hegel's thought during this period can be characterised as 'animistic'. everything is understood as 'living', which means also that everything has a soul. the affinity of Hegel's thought in these years with Spinoza's philosophy, especially with the deus sive natura, underpins this interpretation. He contributes to the Spinoza- edition of H. e. g. Paulus, which appears in 1803. 19 Moreover, this affinity is also expressed by the fact that his metaphysics until 1803/04 is based on the Spinozian concept of 'substance'. only in the Systematic Drafts of 1804/05 fichte becomes more important for Hegel again and when the conception of the Phenomenology of 1807 is prepared, which says that there is a unity of 'substance and subjectivity'. 20
up to this point my considerations can be defended easily in the realm of recent Hegel-research. However, the following step, which i will take, is new and therefore risky. this step is to a certain extent prepared by my contribution to the Rotterdam Hegel-symposium of 2003 on the specific meaning of the Jena systematic conceptions. in the already mentioned Differenzschrift of 1801, Hegel states, also in this respect clearly different from his later convictions, that philosophy 'has no history', but that its task is 'the same at all times', namely to grasp in concepts the conditions of its own time. 21 from an intercultural philosophical perspective, i have added to this statement, that philosophy then also will have this same task 'in all places' and 'in all cultures'. Correspondingly, i want to say here that the animistic conception of religion as it is worked out in Hegel's writings from 1800-1802, can be related to conceptions of the 'religion of nature' and their animistic way of thought as we find them in other cultures.
19 Hegel, Schriften und Entwu? rfe (1799-1808), pp. 513-516.
20 K. Du? sing, ? Von der Substanzmetapysik zur Philosophie der Subjektivita? t. Zum Para- digmenwechsel Hegels in Jena? , in: Kimmerle (ed. ), Die Eigenbedeutung von Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen, pp. 185-199.
21 H. Kimmerle, ? Das Verha? ltnis von Philosophie und geschichte am anfang der Jenaer Periode des Hegelschen Denkens und dessen aktuelle Bedeutung? , in: Die Eigenbedeutung von Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen, pp. 11-24.
? religion of nature 13
4. the 'Religion of Sorcery' as the first Concrete form of the 'Religion of nature' in Hegel's lectures Since 1821
General Description of the 'Religion of Sorcery' and Its Occurrence with the Eskimos
in paragraph 'b. the Concrete Representation' of the first chapter of Hegel's manuscript of 1821 for his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (in the lecture-notes of students from 1824 this paragraph is called 'b. Rep- resentation of god'), Hegel describes concrete forms of the 'religion of nature' in different cultures. He starts with the 'religion of sorcery'. in my critical reading, i will follow the text of the lecture-notes of 1824. as a general characteristic of this first concrete form of the 'religion of nature', it can be said that it expresses the 'power over nature', which the 'single self-consciousness' possesses or thinks to possess. Human beings can heal sick persons by magic practices or make rain, when it is needed. this power is something 'spiritual'. With the presence of something spiritual the presence of god in the world of man is given. in correspondence with the conceptual determination of the 'religion of nature' (see ii. 1) this is to be understood as the first concrete form of religion, which is not at the same time the foundation for the ensuing forms. the 'religion of sorcery' is described as the 'oldest' and the 'most wild and rude' form of religion.
for a more detailed description Hegel uses rather recent reports of trav- ellers (from 1819), which deal with the religion of the eskimos. the eski- mos call their sorcerers 'angekoks'. about them is reported that they have the power to make storm come up or calm it down, or to bring whales close to men. they do this by using words, making gestures and dancing until they lose consciousness. the eskimos do not have any 'figure, human being, animal, or anything like that to worship'. according to the notes of Jaeschke, related to this passage, Hegel has not read well or not taken over carefully the reports about dancing. the reports on dancing refer to general cultural habits and not specifically to religious forms of conjura- tion. (l2 24, 272-275/176-179) Hegel finds the 'religion of sorcery' also in Mongolia, in africa and in China.
The African Form of the 'Religion of Sorcery'
for his extensive descriptions of the 'religion of sorcery' in africa, Hegel quotes from the reports of missionaries, especially of the Capuchin
14 heinz kimmerle
J. a. Cavacci from 1694 (original italian edition 1687). 22 Hegel is aware of the fact that these reports are old and little trustworthy, because the mis- sionaries are partial when they talk about non-Christian religious habits and representations. However, he does not take pains to get more recent and more trustworthy sources, which were certainly available for him. He takes over the stories of Cavacci almost literally. these stories contain conjuration of bad spirits by strange and exotic means, healing of sick people with most cruel practices and a lot of killing and cannibalism at different occasions. no critical remark is made by Hegel when he quotes from these one-sided stories. He describes in a somewhat more adequate way the knowledge and practices of the rainmakers. these people know much about weather conditions, but they also use magic practices and certain forms of conjuration. this corresponds to the facts. the magic practices, however, have highly negative connotations. in a similar way is spoken about medicine men and -women. they have extensive knowl- edge of healing herbs, but combine it with magic practices. in addition, they take social relations into consideration when they heal sick persons. (l2 24, 274-281/179-185; 281-293/185-197)
Hegel regards the way of doing things by the traditional healers as a higher type of sorcery. He speaks of 'indirect' or 'mediated sorcery'. the healing herbs are the means, by which the power of sorcery can work. a reflection is at stake, a spiritual procedure, which interrupts the direct operation of the power of sorcery. Hegel deems it important that some kind of 'objectification' takes place here. the subject matter of religious worship becomes partly independent, gets the form of a self-reliant object. in this context, fetishism is discussed, which is rather important for afri- can religion. Plants, animals, rocks, rivers and also artefacts can be adored or worshipped. they have the function to protect the house, village or city or to create a holy place. according to Hegel all this is part of the lowest and rudest form of religion. one step higher leads to the religion of the Chinese empire, where all power of sorcery, all power over nature and over humans, is concentrated in one person, the emperor. this form of the
22 Cf. Walter Jaeschke in Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manu- skripte. vol. 4b, 1985, pp. 839-840. Jaeschke gives the exact reference of the book of Cavacci, from which he takes extensive documentation of the context of Hegel's quotations: J. a. Cavacci, Historische Beschreibung der in dem unteren occidentalischen Mohrenland ligenden drey Ko? nigreichen Congo, Matamba, und angola. und derjenigen apostolischen Missionen so von denen P. P. Capucinern daselbst verrichtet worden . . . auss dem Welschen in die teutsche Sprache u? bersetzt, Mu? nchen: 1694.
? religion of nature 15
'religion of sorcery' is not discussed here. as mentioned above, the ancient Chinese religion is not in every year when Hegel has given these lectures, subsumed under the lowest form of religion. like the indian and egyptian religions in those cases, it is part of the 'religion of imagination'.
5. 'Religion of Spirits' in traditional african thought
The Belief in Spirits and the Animist Religion
Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (since 1821) are related to the chapter on 'Revealed Religion' in the Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences (1st edition 1817). they provide, so to speak, the prehistory of the concrete religion of spirit, the revealed religion of Christianity, which has the same contents as the absolute truth of absolute philosophy. the 'religion of life', which is documented in Hegel's systematic writing of the years 1800-1802, is also related to philosophy in an essential way. in 1800, religion is higher than philosophy, because philosophy is restricted to finite thinking. in 1801 and 1802, religion and philosophy are on the same level: the absolute self-consciousness of life is expressed in the religious language of representations or in the philosophical language of concepts. However, there is no prehistory of the absolute religion of Christianity. if i provide in the following text some details about the african religion of life as we can know it today, this will not be part of such a prehistory of the Christian religion. it is the explanation of a religion of life, which shows in a different, but equivalent way, what the details of such a religion can look like.
there is no direct relation between Hegel's ideas about a 'religion of life' and the concrete form of this religion in sub-Saharan africa. nev- ertheless, it should be said that Hegel in this period has thought about africa much more positive than in his later conception, when africa is not part of world-history at all. 23 it can be made credible that the rebellion of the slaves in Haiti in 1802/03, the self-liberation of the black slaves of this island, has inspired Hegel for his conceptualisation of the dialectics between master and servant. 24 in the Systematic Drafts of 1803/04, Hegel does not yet speak of the dialectics between master and servant like in
23 See note 26.
24 S. Buck-Morss, 'Hegel and Haiti', in: S. Hassan & i. Dadi (eds), Unpacking Europe. A Critical Reading, Rotterdam: Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen 2001, pp. 42-70.
? 16 heinz kimmerle
the famous chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, but of a sudden turn in the relation between master and slave. 25
it is in general necessary to depart from a different appreciation of afri- can and other non-Western cultures than Hegel and his time did. other- wise, it would not make sense to connect the 'religion of life' in Hegel's philosophy of 1800-1802 to the traditional animistic religion of african peoples south to the Sahara. these cultures have been regarded as primi- tive by a colonial ideology, which has been justified philosophically also by Hegel in his later writings. as i have mentioned already, the later Hegel in his philosophy of history does not situate africa on the lowest level of world-history, but totally outside of it. 26 if we presently work on a decolo- nisation of the mind, it is part of this endeavour to come to a new esti- mation of animism as the traditional african religion. 'life' is the central notion of traditional african thought and religion. the whole universe, nature on earth and the human world are parts of the interplay of the forces of life. all beings in this interplay have a soul. that is also expressed by the idea that all beings can be the dwelling place of spirits. therefore, the traditional animistic african religion can be characterised as a 'reli- gion of spirits'.
With regard to the dwelling of spirits in all beings, one difference is important: their presence in the visible and the invisible world. 27 in the visible world, the spirits are united to things in nature and to human beings. in the invisible world they exist without such a union, but purely as spirits. they have some kind of a non-physical bodily existence. the vis- ible and the invisible world, however, are not separated from each other. they exist on the same scene. therefore, it would be more adequate to speak of a visible and an invisible dimension of the world.
When a human being passes away, his spirit leaves his body and exists from this moment on purely as a spirit. the spirits of the deceased or more in general of the ancestors, play an important role for the now liv- ing people. the spirits can also dwell in natural things. this makes of the belief in spirits an animistic religion. indeed, animals, plants, rivers,
25 Hegel, Jenaer Systementwu? rfe i (1803/04), p. 311.
26 H. Kimmerle, 'Hegel und afrika', in: Die Dimension des Interkulturellen, amsterdam/ atlanta: Rodopi 1994, pp. 85-112, especially 109-112.
27 See for the following text: H. Kimmerle, 'the world of spirits and the respect for nature: towards a new appreciation of animism' in: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 249-263. the most important sources for this article are: g. Parrinder, African Traditional Religion, london: Sheldon Press 19743 and t. fourche & H. Morlichem, Une bible noire, Brussels: Max arnold 1973.
? religion of nature 17
rocks etc. have a soul, for spirits can dwell in them. trees are preferred as dwelling places of spirits. they are bigger, stronger and older than human beings are. their tops reach high into the air so that they can easier make contact with the invisible world of spirits.
there are not only good, but also bad spirits. in the universe, in nature and in the human world harmonious relations are presupposed. that is the case as long as the good spirits prevail over the bad. Human beings or the spirits within them have the task to help maintaining the harmony by contributing to the preponderance of the good spirits. 28 When we consider, what happens presently in and between african countries (the mutual genocide of Hutu and tutsi in Rwanda, the struggles between Hema and lendu in eastern Congo or the long lasting civil war between Moslems and Christians in Sudan and nigeria), we can have heavy doubts about the maintenance of harmonic relations in the universe and in the human world. it is not easy to understand these horrible events. We do not know what really is at stake for the people concerned. it might be possible to compare these events with the terrible stories, which Hegel takes over from Cavazzi. However, also in other parts of world we find different esti- mations of the value of human life than in the West. Just think of the suicide-attacks of Moslem-fighters against their enemies in the western world and even against fellow-citizens and fellow-believers. also in the West, we have experienced horrible examples of genocides in recent times. Stories about the conduct of uS-american soldiers towards prison- ers of war in iraq or in guantanamo testify to exorbitant cruelty.
in african traditional religion the spirits in natural things and those of the ancestors exist close to the now living people, so to speak on the same scene, as i have said already. independently from them there is a Supreme Being, far away, somewhere in heaven, from where He reigns the universe. in certain parts of West africa, there is also a belief in deities, who live in between the spirits and the Supreme Being. they take care of the fertility of the land and of the women, of good weather conditions, preponderance in war situations etc. in many cases, they are responsible for the well- being of certain regions and the people who live there.
the Yoruba who live in the present states of nigeria, Benin and niger believe in hundreds of deities with specific tasks. 29
28 M. B. Ramose, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books 1999.
29 Ch. Staewen, Ifa--African Gods Speak. The Oracle of the Yoruba in Nigeria, Hamburg: litVerlag 1996.
? 18 heinz kimmerle
African Philosophers About Animism and the Belief in Spirits
african philosophers have no problem with the religious beliefs of their peoples. they do not find that the belief in spirits is in opposition to a rational way of thought. according to them, spirituality and rationality are not contradictory. i could give many examples for that from the writings of odera oruka from Kenya, appiah from ghana, oluwole from nigeria, among others. 30 gyekye from ghana is critical in respect of the belief in spirits. nevertheless, he does not contest the belief in spirits as such. He is afraid that an "excessive and incessant attention to the ancestors" and what they would have done in the present situation is "an impediment to the cultivation of the innovative spirit or outlook required for making progress in the . . . transition to modernity. " instead, he pleads for an adap- tation of the " 'pristine values and attitudes' to the 'setting of the present'. " Struggling against excessive corruption, he tries to reanimate traditional values under changed conditions. traditional harmonious relations in the human communities are highly appreciated by him: mutual support for each other, especially for those who are in need or in dangerous situa- tions. also in this respect, he warns for sticking in an uncritical way to the traditional ways of thinking and acting. in a final analysis, he suggests for the relations in the human world a "moderate communitarianism. "31
Conclusions
in most of the african countries south to the Sahara, Christianity and islam are the biggest religions. in their present form, they have taken over many elements from animism. also traditional animist representa- tions and practices still exist. 'Black islam' in the countries directly under the Sahara is impregnated by the belief in spirits and the magic powers of their religious leaders. 32 Moreover, within the big number of Christian
30 H. odera oruka, Sage Philosophy. Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate in African Philosophy, leiden: Brill 1990, pp. 74-75; K. a. appiah, in My Father's House. Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, london: Methuen 1992, pp. 218-220; S. B. oluwole, Witchcraft, Rein- carnation and the God-Head, lagos: excel Publishers 1992, p. 52.
31 K. gyekye, Tradition and Modernity. Philosophical Reflections on the African Experi- ence, new York/oxford: oxford university Press 1997, pp. 257-260, 189-191 and 75-76.
32 R. l. Moreau, Africains Musulmans, Paris/abidjan: Pre? sence africaine/inades edition 1982; V. Monteil, L' Islam noir, Paris: le Seuil 1964.
? religion of nature 19
denominations, the speaking in tongues, the healing of sick people by the power of belief or exorcizing bad spirits are practices that occur daily. 33
in the West, this kind of religious representations and practices is pushed back strongly since and by enlightenment. this is also charac- teristic for the explanation of the 'religion of nature' in the context of a 'religion of spirit' in the later Hegel. the 'religion of life' and its animist connotations in an earlier period of Hegel's thought, which i have brought to the fore, cannot be related directly, and first of all not in the context of the enlightenment mentality that prevailed at that time, to the traditional animist african 'religion of life'.
However, in subcultures, in literature and figurative art and in language, the belief in spirits has never disappeared totally in the West. Derrida has recently worked out a new 'spectrology', that is a new conception of spir- its, spectres and phantoms. in his book Spectres de Marx, he determines the reality-status of spirits and spectres as the 'present absence' or the 'absent presence'. He analyses in this connection the unconscious or not as such recognizable powers in politics and economy. 34 He does not take the step to speak also of spirits in nature, as it is done in african tradi- tional thought what i propose to be taken seriously. in the realm of this discussion, the relation between the 'religion of life' in Hegel's writings of 1800-1802 to animist religious representations, as they are practised in sub-Saharan africa, becomes meaningful.
? 33 J. S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, new York: anchor 1970. 34 J. Derrida, Spectres de Marx, Paris: galile? e 1995.
Hegel on CHinese Religion sander griffioen
1. introduction
The focus of this contribution is Hegel's approach to Chinese religion. The main sources are the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Towards the end, we venture into the broader field of the intellectual history of europe's encounter with China. our aim there is to determine the sig- nificance of Hegel's contribution compared to the pioneering work of the Jesuit fathers and leibniz.
Concerning the reception history, there is one large field we will not enter. We will not deal with the Chinese reactions to Hegel. Apart from the problem of having to rely on materials that for the greatest part have not been translated, it would also be incongruent with the present contri- bution. Hegel's reception in China has only little to do with his writings on China, which, as we will see, are ill suited to impress a Chinese public. Fortunately, in this respect others have done what we will not do. espe- cially through the recent work of Martin Mu? ller much of this terrain has been covered. 1
The body of texts on China is far from large. The section in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy only counts nine pages (five of which serve as an introduction to oriental philosophy in general). The section in the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion is somewhat bigger: about thirty-five pages; a few pages on lamaism included. (l2 27, 547-579/445-475). The chapter on China in the Lectures on World History is the largest: forty- four pages in the most recent edition, offering a well-structured survey of China's ancient history. However, this is still relatively small. Throughout Hegel is dependent on secondary sources. on the whole he is content to gather materials without establishing what is reliable and what is not.
1 Martin Mu? ller, 'Chinas Hegel und Hegels China: Untersuchung zu 'Rezeption' als interpretationskonstellation am Beispiel der chinesischen Bescha? ftigung mit Hegels China-sicht', Jahrbuch fu? r Hegelforschung, Vols. 10-11/ 2004-2005 (2006). He is also the editor of an extensive bibliography: 'Die chinesischsprachige Hegel-Rezeption von 1902 bis 2000. eine Bibliographie'. Hegeliana, Vol. 16, Frankfurt am Main: 2002 (480 pp. ).
? 22 sander griffioen
Although the texts show a keen interest in the orient, there is not one aspect of Chinese thought that is dealt with exhaustively. even though these texts tell us less about China than about Hegel's philosophy, they nevertheless need to be taken seriously. it would be too easy to conclude that Hegel's account of Chinese thought represents a pure regress com- pared to the Jesuit fathers, and to leibniz, Wolff and goethe. studying the texts leads to a more nuanced conclusion. Yes, there is regress in some respects, but in others, Hegel can be said to have carved out a sui generis position in the receptionhistory, which is worth being studied.
2. orientation
Hegel's study of oriental religion and philosophy (Religion of Ancient China, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. ) only starts in the 1820's. 2 With respect to China, his foremost source is the Jesuit Me? moirs concernant les Chi- nois (1776-1814). For his knowledge of Taoism he is mainly dependent on Abel Re? musat, Me? moire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu (1823). 3 Until 1824, these exploits do not effect his overall classification of religions: The religion of ancient China remains subsumed under the 'nature religions', within which category it represents the rubric of 'the religion of magic'. However, from 1827 on the picture starts to change. As Jaeschke puts it, then Hegel's approach to the pre-Christian religions comes closer to a 'sequence of interpretations' than to the application of a rigid system. Although in 1827 the religion of ancient China is still classified as magical, it now represents a 'developed religion of magic'. eventually, in 1831, all links between China and nature religions are severed. 4
one peculiarity needs to be pointed out at this stage, the lack of a sharp demarcation between religion and philosophy. Where the texts show a preference for 'religion', it is because (as we will see) the category of 'phi- losophy' in a strict sense is not applicable to China and to the (broader) oriental world, since philosophy presupposes a measure of freedom unknown to the orient. This explains why Hegel in his own expositions shows preference for 'religion' as a term with a broader application than
2 Cf. Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, stuttgart: Metzler 2003, p. 461.
3 see Hodgon's editorial introduction to g. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one Volume edition, Peter Hodgson (ed. ), Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1988, p. 43.
4 Cf. Hodgson, 'editorial introduction' in: Hegel, The Lectures of 1827, pp. 40-46, and Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, pp. 461-2.
? hegel on chinese religion 23
'philosophy'. nevertheless, there is no watertight division between religion and philosophy. The religion of Ancient China is being interpreted and assessed throughout as if it were an aspirant philosophy. Clearly, Hegel's interest is in doctrines, in thought contents, and less in religious rites and customs (although he does deal with these in the pertinent sections of the Lectures on World History). Finally, the texts also use 'philosophy' in a non-emphatic sense. This is true for general references to 'oriental phi- losophy', 'Chinese philosophy', etc. Here Hegel simply follows common designations.
3. Three stages
Hegel's survey of Chinese religion opens with what he calls 'the state reli- gion of the Chinese empire'. it comprises the religious practices and doc- trines as reconstructed on the basis of the (quite heterogeneous) materials collected in the Shujing (the Book of Annals), and includes the teachings of Confucius. only around 1827 does he gain knowledge of Taoism, mainly through Re? musat's study. He then starts to distinguish three stages in the development of Chinese thought. The first stage being the 'state religion', the second one being represented by Taoism, and the third one by Bud- dhism. With respect to the latter, there is no distinction between indian and Chinese Buddhism. in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the survey of Chinese philosophy proper closes with a section on the Yi Jing (Vorl. 6, 371-3). systematically those are at the level of the second stage, and will be included here accordingly.
laozi, whom he regards as an older contemporary of Confucius, is portrayed as a reformer of a much older Taoist 'sect'. This second stage entails a shift from a nature religion to a higher, more speculative form of thought. Thus, it is not Taoism that is classified as a religion of nature, but the state religion. normally the latter is viewed as essentially moral (esp. in its Confucian shape), and the former as focussing on nature rather than on a moral order. The explanation is that Hegel takes Heaven (tian), the central concept of the state religion, to refer mainly to the physical order, rather than to the moral order. Whereas, on the other hand, he holds that Taoism represents a higher, purer level in the development of thinking. Hegel discovers here the beginning of speculative thought. As we will see, his interest is drawn by what he takes to be vestiges of Trinitarian thought in certain texts.
The treatment of the Yi Jing resembles the approach to Taoism. Hegel appreciates its speculative interest as to the order of the cosmos, which
24 sander griffioen
he considers as a major progress vis-a`-vis Confucius' moral teachings. However, no matter how speculative its intentions, the outcome is found wanting. Hegel thinks the hexagrams of the Yi Jing are not equipped as a medium of thought and are only able to grasp the external order of things.
it is only in the third stage, represented by Buddhism that oriental reli- gion is thought to reach its apex. Buddhist thought is praised for having developed the concept of the one substance in which all particularities and individualities submerge. Here thinking attains infinity, liberating itself from all attachment to finite life. in this respect Buddhist thought is on a par with spinoza's philosophy. (l2 27, 564/461; 573-574/470-471)
4. state Religion
let us take a closer look at each of the stages. The first stage is most exten- sively dealt with in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Although, as mentioned before, tian (Heaven) is assumed to connote primarily nature, these lectures do stress that ancient teachings are moral and social rather than anything else. This shows that China does not neatly fit Hegel's sys- tematization. 'Magic' is another category that appears strangely out of place in the present context. on first hearing, one is inclined to think it is introduced to account for the fascination China exerted on an impress- ible european public. in fact, the reason for its use is quite different: it is because tian is thought to be entirely indeterminate and therefore for its content dependent on the whims of the rulers. Just as in more primi- tive religions of magic, such as found among the inuit, magicians and conjurers (l2 27, 541/439) play an essential role in finding out the will of Heaven, China developed a system of divinations placed under the supervision of high state officials, the mandarin class. According to Hegel, this state religion lacks any form of rationality. 'The emperor is lord over the visible world of the mandarins just as he is over the invisible shen. ' (l2 27, 555/453)
The descriptions of the shen (spirits) make clear that Hegel focuses on the chthonic aspect of Chinese ancient religion, viz. the local genii (Vorl. 12, 162), at the expense of the ouranic, heavenly aspects. 5 Therefore,
5 Raguin (following the research conducted by Kristoffer schipper) has shown that official religion focused on the Dao of Heaven whereas popular religion was primarily interested in local, terrestrial spirits: cf. Yves Raguin, Lec? ons sur le taoi? sme, Taipei: institut Ricci, 1989, pp. 119-121.
? hegel on chinese religion 25
it is only logical for him to assume that the common people are not able to develop an outlook transcending their own localities and hence can- not but fall prey to all sorts of superstition once the emperor recedes. 'The Chinese are the most superstitious people of the world; they have a ceaseless fear and anxiety of everything, because everything external has a significance for them, is a power over them . . . ' (l2 27, 561/458). in a similar vein the 1831 manuscripts read: 'This power is that of the shen, and with this an enormous realm of superstition comes into play. ' (l2 27, 561/458, note 135)
5. Taoism and the Yi Jing
With respect to Taoism Hegel's attention is drawn to places in the Daode- jing (the book of The Way and the Power, attributed to laozi) that evi- dence triadic cosmological thought, esp. chapter 42: 'Tao gave birth to one, one gave birth to Two, Two gave birth to Three, Three gave birth to all the myriad things. '6 This text was one of the proof texts in Re? musat's effort to show a direct relation between China and the Bible. Whereas schelling in his Philosophy of Mythology (1857) expresses serious doubts about Re? musat's speculations, Hegel reproduces the hypothesis of a his- torical link to the biblical account of the creation of the world. 7 He con- cludes that laozi's text offers Trinitarian thought in a rudimentary form: 'Unless three determinations are recognized in god, "god" is an empty word.