No More Learning

? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I seem to be hearing something very novel. Are you claim- ing, perhaps, that not only the form of the universe, but also all the forms of natural things are souls?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butwhowillagreewithyouthere?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butwhocouldreasonablyrefuteit?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Common sense tells us that not everything is alive. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Themostcommonsenseisnotthetruestsense.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I can readily believe that that last point is defensible. But it
is not enough for one to be be able to defend a thing to render it true: we must be able to provide a proof.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnotdifficult. Aretherenotphilosopherswhosaythat the world is animated?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Manyoftheleadingonesdosayso.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, why do those same philosophers not declare that the world's parts are animated?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . They, indeed, say it, but only of the principal parts, those which are the true parts of the world, for when they affirm that the soul is entire in the entire world, and entire in any of its parts, they are as reason- able as when they hold that the soul of living creatures we can perceive is wholly present throughout their bodies.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So,whichdoyouthinkarenottruepartsoftheworld?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Those which are not primary bodies, as the Peripatetics call them: the Earth, with the waters and other parts that, as you say, constitute the entire creature, along with the moon, the sun and other bodies. Besides these principal organisms, there are those that are not primary parts of the
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Second dialogue
? universe of which, it is said, some have a vegetative soul, others a sensitive soul, still others an intellective soul.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butifthesoul,presentinthewhole,isalsointheparts,why do you not admit it in the parts of the parts?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ido,butonlyinthepartsofpartsofanimatethings.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But what are these things that are not animated, or that are not parts of animated things?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doyounotthinkafewofthemarerightbeforeoureyes? All lifeless things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And which things do not possess life, or at least the vital principle?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So, in short, you hold that there is nothing that does not possess a soul and that has no vital principle?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes,exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then a dead body has a soul? So, my clogs, my slippers, my boots, my spurs, as well as my ring and my gauntlets are supposedly animated?
My robe and my pallium are animated?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Oh, yes, indeed, Master Poliinnio, why not? I do believe your robe and mantle are fully animated when they contain such an animal as you; the boots and spurs are animated when they cover the feet, the hat is when it covers the head, which is not deprived of a soul; the stable is animated also, when it shelters the horse, the mule or your lordship. Is that not what you mean, Teofilo? Do you not think I understand it better than the dominus magister [chief master]?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Cuium pecus? [Whose cattle? ] Do we not find asses etiam atque etiam [several times] subtle? You have the nerve, you apirocal4, you abecedarian, to compare yourself with an archididascalos5 and rector of a minerval6 school such as myself?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Pax vobis, domine magister, servus servorum et scabellum pedum tuorum. [Peace be with you, lord master, I am your servant's servant and the footstool of your feet. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Maledicattedeusinseculaseculorum. [MayGodcurseyou, world without end. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No fighting: allow us to settle these questions.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ProsequatorergosuadogmataTheophilus. [ThenletTeofilo continue to expound his theory. ]
? 4 Hellenism for 'ignoramus'. 5 Another hellenism formed from ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? , 'teacher'. 6 Humorous latinism meaning 'literary'.
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Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So I will. I say, then, that the table is not animated as table, nor are the clothes as clothes, nor leather as leather, nor the glass as glass, but that, as natural things and composites, they have within them matter and form. All things, no matter how small and minuscule, have in them part of that spiritual substance which, if it finds a suitable subject, disposes itself to be plant, or to be animal, and receives the members of such or such a body, commonly qualified as animated, for in all things there is spirit, and there is not the least corpuscle that does not contain within itself some portion that may animate it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ergo, quidquid est, animal est. [Therefore, whatever is, is animal. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Notallthingsthathaveasoularecalledanimate. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,atleast,allthingshavelife?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . All things that have a soul are animated, in terms of sub-
stance, but their life is not recognizable to the Peripatetics, who define life too strictly and grossly, using the extrinsic and sensible act and operation, and not the substance.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You reveal a plausible way of supporting Anaxagoras' opin- ion that all things are in all things, for since the spirit, or soul, or the universal form is in all things, everything can be produced from everything.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnotonlyplausiblebuttrue,forthatspiritisfoundin all things which, even if they are not living creatures, are animate. If not according to the perceptible presence of life and animation, then accord- ing to the principle, and a certain primary act of life and animation. I will go no further, since I wish to look later at the properties of many stones and gems which, broken, recut or set in irregular pieces, have certain virtues of altering the spirit or of engendering affections and passions in the soul, not only in the body. And we know that these effects do not, and could not, pro- ceed from purely material qualities, but must be attributed to a symbolic principle of life and animation. Besides, we see the same phenomenon sensibly working in withered plants and roots which, purging and concen- trating humours and altering their spirits, reveal unmistakable signs of life. Not to mention that necromancers, not without reason, hope to accomplish many things using the bones of the dead, believing that they retain, if not the very activity of life, at least some sort of vitality, which can be used to achieve extraordinary effects. Other occasions will give me the chance more fully to discuss thought, the spirit, the soul, the life which penetrates all, is in all, and moves all matter, fills its bosom, and dominates it rather than
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7 Virgil, Aeneid, ? ? , ? ? ? -? .
8 The author, supposed to be Solomon, of the Wisdom of Solomon, ? , ? .
Second dialogue
? being dominated by it, given that the spiritual substance cannot be surpassed by the material substance, but, rather, contains it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This seems to me to conform not only to the thought of Pythagoras, whose thesis the Poet states when he says:
Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis, lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem, totoque se corpore miscet;7
[First, the heaven and earth, and the watery plains,
the shining orb of the moon and Titan's star,
a spirit within sustains, and mind, pervading its members, sways the whole mass and mingles with its mighty frame. ]
but also the thought of the Theologian, who says, 'the spirit pervades and fills the Earth, and what contains all things. '8 Also, another, speaking per- haps of the relationships of form with matter and potency, says that act and form dominate.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . If, then, spirit, soul, life is found in all things and in varying degrees fills all matter, it can assuredly be deduced that it is the true act and true form of all things. The world soul, therefore, is the formal constitu- tive principle of the universe and all it contains. I say that if life is found in all things, the soul is necessarily the form of all things, that form presides everywhere over matter and governs the composites, determines the com- position and cohesion of the parts. That is why it seems that such form is no less enduring than matter. I conceive this form in such a way that there is only one for all things. But according to the diversity of the dispositions of matter and the capacity of the material principles, both active and pas- sive, it happens to produce different configurations and realize different potentialities, bringing forth sometimes non-sensitive life, sometimes sen- sitive but not intellective life, sometimes seeming to suppress or restrain all outside signs of life, because of the incapacity or some other characteristic of matter.