No More Learning

Shawcross's charges against other enemies follow the same pattern- another factor, presumably, in the appeal of his message. Thus in pursuit of his fashionable quest to attribute primary responsibility for the continuing tragedy of Cambodia to Vietnam, not to those who were responsible for phase I of the genocide with their "careless" policies and who are now supporting Pol Pot, Shawcross rationalizes the cur- rent support for Pol Pot as a natural response to Vietnamese actions. Given Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia and subsequent conduct, he ex-
294 Mtr. NUFtr. CTURING CONSENT
plains, China and the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia (not to speak of their "Western partners") were bound "to seek to apply all possible forms of pressure upon Hanoi" to renounce its intentions, and "the Vietnamese could have predicted that such pressures would include support for the Khmer Rouge. " Thus the Vietnamese are to blame if China and the United States support Pol Pot, along with such dedicated advocates of human rights and the strict reliance on peaceful means as Indonesia and Thailand. Such analysis is, however, not extended to the Vietnamese, who are always carrying out cold-blooded strategies in a world without threats from China or the United States, threats that might allow us to "predict" (and thus implicitly exonerate) these strate- gies. According to Shawcross, "Vietnam's conduct since its invasion of Cambodia rarely suggested that it wished to see a compromise in which the Khmer Rouge were removed as a viable force in Cambodia-which was what the ASEAN countries and their Western parmers insisted was their aim. " "It is impossible to predict whether any such suggestion [from Hanoi] would have been accepted by the Chinese or the ASEAN countries, but the point is that it was never made," Shawcross asserts without qualification. 1 l 4 Hanoi has repeatedly offered to withdraw in favor of an indigenous regime, the only condition being the exclusion
of the top Khmer Rouge leadership. Whether these offers were serious or not, we do not know, as they have been dismissed by the Deng- Reagan alliance and, with more vacillation, the ASEAN countries. These rejections, in favor of continued support for Pol Pot, have not been featured in the media, which would hardly surprise a rational observer. But these facts are hardly supportive of Shawcross's analysis, to say the least.
In a further effort to cast the blame on the approved enemy, Shaw- cross asserts that the Vietnamese "placed more confidence in the tor- turers than in their victims, that many of those people were actually being promoted by the new order into positions of new authority over them. " As his sale evidence, he cites a story, told twice in his book, about an old woman he met in Cambodia "who described with great passion how the Khmer Rouge murderer of her son was living, unpun- ished, in the neighboring village. " He repeated the same story in the
New York Review of Books~ eliciting a letter from Ben Kiernan, who accompanied him when this alleged incident took place (and was his interpreter). Kiernan cited the tape of the woman's statement, which reveals that she had simply said that the murderer had "run away" to a neighboring "district," suggesting, as Kiernan notes, that he feared punishment, but not that he had been "promoted" to "new authority. " Confronted with this evidence, Shawcross maintained his position
THE INDOCHINA WARS (ll): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 295
while retreating to the claim that some officials he met "seemed rather unpleasant," which suffices to prove the point, according to his logic. 115 These examples are quite typical. ll6
6. 2. 9. Summary
Summarizing, prior tQ "the decade of the genocide," media treatment of Cambodia was as predicted by the propaganda model, and the same is true, quite dramatically, during the two phases of this terrible period aod since. During phase I, refugee testimony was considered uninter- esting, and little is known today apart from the fact that there was obviously vast slaughter and destruction; this phase does not enter the record as a "holocaust" or exercise in "genocide," and the source is forgotten. During phase II, the myth of the "gentle land" was extended through 1975, and the U. S. role and responsibility for what then took place was also quite commonly effaced, although some did not sink to this level of vulgarity. Refugee testimony was eagerly sought, although only ifit lent support to the STV, and evaluations by State Department specialists and other knowledgeable commentators that gave a more nuanced (and in retrospect, essentially accurate) picture were dismissed as lacking utility. There was massive outrage, reaching its peak in early 1977 when the death toll was still well below that of phase I, with a record of deception that is highly illuminating. 117 As something like the STV came to be realized in 1977-78, its horrors were downplayed in official government circles, and subsequent U. S. support for Pol Pot arouses little notice.
Phase III proceeded along a dual course. In a fanciful reconstruction that maintains the level of integrity shown throughout, it is alleged that "left-wing skepticism" so dominated Western opinion and governments that there was "silence" throughout the DK period; the wide accept- ance of this thesis, despite the quality of the evidence provided and its manifest absurdity, counts as yet another example of how readily the most implausible contentions can become doctrine, as long as they are serviceable. In Indochina, a new phase of Western concern about the victimization of Cambodia began, with outrage now directed not against Pol Pot but against the new oppressors who overthrew him. The United States took a leading role in orchestrating the new concern, which combined Chinese and U. S. interest in "bleeding Vietnam" with a renewed exhibition of the Western conscience, properly bounded to
exclude phase I and its long-term effects, and bypassing the U. S. role in support of Pol Pot-in part via its Chinese allies, who have been
296 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
admirably frank in explaining their stand. This carefully channeled benevolence succeeded in the goal of keeping the Pol Pot forces active and injuring Vietnam and also, incidentally, the suffering people of Cambodia who are the objects of our profound concern. The relief effort in 1979-80 did succeed in aiding Cambodians in distress, but it has also sustained the Pol Pot forces and thereby impeded Cambodia's recovery and, perhaps, its independence, although about this we can only speculate.
Putting aside the undoubtedly sincere reactions of many people who
were exposed to evidence of properly selected atrocities that passed through the media filter, the only rational conclusion from this il- luminating record is that the West was consumed with horror over Khmer Rouge atrocities during phase II not because of a sudden pas-
sion for the fate of the suffering people of Cambodia-as the record during phase I, and elsewhere, makes sufficiently clear-but because
the Khmer Rouge had a useful role to play: namely, to permit a retro- spective justification for earlier French and American crimes in Indo- china, and to facilitate the reconstruction of Western ideology after the Vietnam trauma, so as to overcome the dread "Vietnam syndrome" and prepare the ground for a "resurgent America" pursuing its historical vocation of defending freedom and justice. The actual facts were, and j remain, of little interest, for the same reason. ,1
,'
,. - 7
. -~
Conclusions
-~
DEFENDING THE MEDIA AGAINST THE CHARGE THAT THEY HAVE become too independent and too powerful for the public good, Anthony Lewis of the New York Times writes that
The press is protected [by the First Amendment] not for its own sake but to enable a free political system to operate. In the end, the concern is not for the reporter Or the editor but for the citizen-critic of government.
What is at stake when we speak about freedom of the press "is the freedom to perform a function on behalf of the polity. "l Lewis cites Supreme Court Justice Powell, who observed: "no individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. . . . By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment. " Therefore, as Judge Gurfein ruled in supporting the right of the New York Times
298 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
to publish the Pentagon Papers after the government had failed to show any threat of a breach of security but only the possibility of embarrass- ment: "a cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know. "
We do not accept the view that freedom of expression must be defended in instrumental terms, by virtue of its contribution to some higher good; rather, it is a value in itself. But that apart, these ringing declarations express valid aspirations, and beyond that, they surely express the self-image of the American media. Our concern in this book has been to inquire into the relation between this image and the reality. In contrast to the standard conception of the media as cantankerous, obstinate, and ubiquitous in their search for truth and their inde- pendence of authority, we have spelled out and applied a propaganda model that indeed sees the media as serving a "societal purpose," but not that of enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process by providing them with the information needed for the intelligent discharge of political responsibilities. On the contrary, a propaganda model suggests that the "societal purpose" of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state. The media serve this purpose in many ways: through selection of topics,
distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by keeping debate within the bounds of accept- able premises. We have sought to show that the expectations of this model are realized, and often considerably surpassed, in the actual practice of the media in a range of crucial cases. We quite agree with Chief Justice Hughes, whom Lewis also cites, on "the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press" if democratic processes are to function in a meaningful way. But the evidence we have reviewed indicates that this need is not met or even weakly approximated in actual practice.
It is frequently asserted that the media were not always as indepen- dent, vigilant, and defiant of authority as they allegedly are today; rather, the experiences of the past generation are held to have taught the media to exercise "the power to root about in our national life, exposing what they deem right for exposure," without regard to exter- nal pressures or the dictates of authority (Lewis). It is this period, then, that poses a challenge to a propaganda model, and we have therefore taken it as the focus of our inquiry. Many of the examples we discuss are from the past decade, when the liberal media were allegedly in confrontation with a "conservative" administration that they would
have been expected to oppose vigorously. In a further effort to ensure that we are not selecting exceptional cases, we have cast the net widely. We have selected for close examination cases that pose the most severe challenge to our model, namely, those put forth by critics as demon- strating that the media have gone too far in their exuberant indepen- dence and challenge to authority, so far that they must be curbed if democracy is to survive: for example, the coverage of the Tet offensive, the prime illustration of alleged excesses of the media offered in the 1970S and 1980s. Even these cases demonstrate the subordination of the media to the requirements of the state propaganda system. At the peak of alleged media independence, as the Vietnam War entered its final period and the media were threatening Nixon's presidency, the subor- dination to these demands never flagged, as illustrated by the media
coverage of the Paris peace treaty of 1973, one of the most flagrant examples of media misrepresentation based on an uncritical reiteration of official claims and adherence to the political agenda of the state.
We may illustrate the point in yet another case, chosen by those who defend the standard version of the media as their strongest ground: the Watergate affair. To many critics of the media, this incident illustrates their irresponsible excesses; to those who prOUdly defend the media, it illustrates their independence of higher authority and commitment to the values of professional journalism. What, then, are the lessons of Watergate?
The major scandal of Watergate as portrayed in the mainstream press was that the Nixon administration sent a collection of petty criminals to break into the Democratic party headquarters, for reasons that remain obscure. The Democratic party represents powerful do- mestic interests, solidly based in the business community. Nixon's ac- tions were therefore a scandal. The Socialist Workers party, a legal political party, represents no powerful interests. Therefore, there was no scandal when it was revealed, just as passions over Watergate reached their zenith, that the FBI had been disrupting its activities by illegal break-ins and other measures for a decade, a violation of demo- cratic principle far more extensive and serious than anything charged
during the Watergate hearings. What is more, these actions of the national political police were only one element ofgovernment programs extending over many administrations to deter independent political action, stir up violence in the ghettos, and undermine the popular movements that were beginning tc engage sectors of the generally marginalized public in the arena of decision-making. 2 These coven and illegal programs were revealed in court cases and elsewhere during the Watergate period, but they never entered the congressional proceedings
CONCLUSIONS 299
300 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
and received only limited media attention. Even the complicity of the FBI in the police assassination of a Black Panther organizer in Chicago was not a scandal, in marked contrast to Nixon's "enemies list," which identified powerful people who were denigrated in private but suffered no consequences. As we have noted, the U. S. role in initiating and carrying out the first phase of "the decade of the genocide" in Cam- bodia entered the Watergate proceedings only marginally: not because hundreds of thousands of Cambodians were slaughtered in the course of a major war crime, but because Congress was not properly notified,
so that its privileges were infringed, and even this was considered too slight an infraction to enter the final charges. What was true of Con- gress was also true of the media and their inveMigative reporting that "helped force a President from office" (Lewis) in what is held to be a most remarkable display of media independence, or arrogance, depend- ing on one's point of view.
History has been kind enough to contrive for us a "controlled experi- ment" to determine just what was at stake during the Watergate period, when the confrontational stance of the media reached its peak. The answer is clear and precise: powerful groups are capable of defending themselves, not surprisingly; and by media standards, it is a scandal when their position and rights are threatened. By contrast, as long as illegalities and violations of democratic substance are confined to mar- ginal groups or distant victims of U. S. military attack, or result in a diffused cost imposed on the general population, media opposition is muted or absent altogether. ) This is why Nixon could go so far, lulled into a false sense of security precisely because the watchdog only barked when he began to threaten the privileged.
Exactly the same lessons were taught by the Iran-contra scandals and the media reaction to them. 4 It was a scandal when the Reagan administration was found to have violated congressional prerogatives during the Iran-contra affair, but not when it dismissed with contempt the judgment of the International Court of Justice that the United States was engaged in the "unlawful use of force" and violation of treaties-that is, violation of the supreme law of the land and custom- ary international law-in its attack against Nicaragua. The sponsorship and support of state terror that cost some 200,000 lives in Central America in the preceding decade was not the subject of congressional inquiries or media concern. These actions were conducted in accord with an elite consensus, and they received steady media support, as we have seen in reviewing the fate ofworthy and unworthy victims and the treatment of elections in client and errant states. 5
In the case of the Vietnam War as well. as we showed in chapter 5.
i
even those who condemn the media for their alleged adversarial stance acknowledge that they were almost universally supportive of U. S. pol- iey until after large numbers of U. S. troops had been engaged in the "intervention" in South Vietnam, heavy casualties had been taken, huge dollar sums had been spent, and elite protest had surfaced on grounds of threats to elite interests_ Only then did elements of the media undertake qualified reassessments of the "cost-benefit" trade-off. But during the period of growing involvement that eventually made extrication difficult, the watchdog actually encouraged the burglar to make himself at home in a distant land, and to bomb and destroy it with abandon.
In short, the very examples offered in praise of the media for their independence, or criticism of their excessive zeal, illustrate exactly the opposite. Contrary to the usual image of an "adversary press" boldly attacking a pitiful executive giant, the media's lack of interest, investi- gative zeal, and basic news reporting on the accumulating illegalities of the executive branch have regularly permitted and even encouraged ever larger violations of law, whose ultimate exposure when elite inter- ests were threatened is offered as a demonstration of media service "on behalf of the polity. " These observations reinforce the conclusions that we have documented throughout.
The existing level of media subordination to state authority is often deemed unsatisfactory by critics. We have discussed several examples. Thus, Freedom House and others who are concerned to protect state authority from an intrusive public condemn the media for lack of sufficient enthusiasm in supporting official crusades, and even the lim- ited challenge to established authority during the Vietnam War and the Watergate period aroused concerns over the excessive power of the media. Quite commonly, the slight opening occasionally granted to dissent is considered far too dangerous to permit. This perception sometimes even takes the form of a paranoid vision of left-wing power that sweeps all in its path: for example, the plea of Claire Sterling and others who dominated media coverage of the Bulgarian Connection that they could barely be heard above the din of Soviet propaganda. A still more striking case is the Aikman-Shawcross fantasy, eagerly echoed by many others, about the "silencing" of the international media and governments by the left during the Pol Pot era. In reality, there was a huge chorus of protest over Khmer Rouge atrocities, which reached an extraordinary level of fabrication and deceit. The signifi- cance of these facts, and of the pretense of left-imposed "silence," is highlighted by the contrast with the real silence over comparable atroci- ties in Timor at the same time, and the evasions and suppressions
CONCLUSIONS 301
302 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
during the first phase of "the decade of the genocide," to mention two cases where the United States was the responsible agent and protest could have been effective in diminishing or terminating large-scale atrocities.
A propaganda model provides a ready explanation for this quite typical dichotomous treatment. Atrocities by the Khmer Rouge could be attributed to the Communist enemy and valuable propaganda points could be scored, although nothing useful could be done, or was even proposed, for the Cambodian victims. The image of Communist mon- sters would also be useful for subsequent U. S. participation in terror and violence, as in its crusades in Central America shortly after. In EI Salvador, the United States backed the murderous junta in its struggle against what was depicted as "the Pol Pot left," while Jeane Kirkpatrick mused darkly about the threat to EI Salvador of "well-armed guerrillas whose fanaticism and violence remind some observers of Pol Pot"- shortly after the archbishop had denounced her junta friends for con- ducting a "war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population. "6 Some are more circumspect-for example, Wil- liam Buckley, who observes that "the Sandinistas have given their people genocide" and are clearly heading in the direction of Pol Pot, although they have not quite reached that level yet. 7 The utility of the show of outrage over Pol Pot atrocities is evident from the way the fate
of these worthy victims was immediately exploited to justify U. S. orga- nization of atrocities that, in fact, do merit comparison to Pol Pot.
Atrocities in East Timor, however, have no such utilitarian function; quite the opposite. These atrocities were carried out by our Indonesian client, so that the United States could readily have acted to reduce or terminate them. But attention to the Indonesian invasion would have embarrassed a loyal ally and quickly disclosed the crucial role of the United States in providing military aid and diplomatic support for aggression and slaughter. Plainly, news about East Timor would not have been useful, and would, in fact, have discomfited important do- mestic power groups. The mass media-and the intellectual community generally-therefore channeled their benevolent impulses elsewhere: to Cambodia, not Timor.
As we have stressed throughout this book, the U. S. media do not function in the manner of the propaganda system of a totalitarian state. Rather, they permit-indeed, encourage-spirited debate, criticism, and dissent, as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness. No one instructed the media to focus on Cambodia and ignore East Timor.
They gravitated naturally to the Khmer Rouge and discussed them freely8-just as they naturally suppressed information on Indonesian atrocities in East Timor and U. S. responsibility for the aggression and massacres. In the process, the media provided neither facts nor analyses that would have enabled the public to understand the issues or the bases of government policies toward Cambodia and Timor, and they thereby assured that the public could not exert any meaningful influence on the decisions that were made. This is quite typical of the actual "societal purpose" of the media on matters that are of significance for established power; not "enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process," but rather averting any such danger. In these cases, as in numerous others, the public was managed and mobilized from above, by means of the media's highly selective messages and evasions. As noted by media analyst W. Lance Bennett,
The public is exposed to powerful persuasive messages from above and is unable to communicate meaningfully through the media in response to these messages. . . . Leaders have usurped enormous amounts of political power and reduced popular control over the political system by using the media to generate support, compliance, and just plain confusion among the public. 9
More significantly for our particular concerns here, the media typically provide their own independent contribution even without being "used," in the manner and for the reasons that we have discussed. Another media analyst, Ben Bagdikian, observes that the institutional bias of the private mass media "does not merely protect the corporate system. It robs the public of a chance to understand the real world. "lo That conclusion is well supported by the evidence we have reviewed.
A propaganda model has a certain initial plausibility on guided free- market assumptions that are not particularly controversial. In essence, the private media are major corporations selling a product (readers and audiences) to other businesses (advertisers). The national medja typi- cally target and serve elite opinion, groups that, on the one hand, provide an optimal "profile" for advertising purposes, and, on the other, playa role in decision-making in the private and public spheres.
The national media would be failing to meet their elite audience's needs if they did not present a tolerably realistic portrayal of the world. But their "societal purpose" also requires that the media's interpretation of the world reflect the interests and concerns of the sellers, the buyers, and the governmental and private institutions dominated by these groups.
CONCLUSIONS 303
304 MANUFACTUIUNG CONSENT
A propaganda model also helps us to understand how media person- nel adapt, and are adapted, to systemic demands. Given the imperatives of corporate organization and the workings of the various filters, con- formity to the needs and interests of privileged seeton; is essential to success. In the media, as in other major institutions, those who do not display the requisite values and perspectives will be regarded as "irre- sponsible," "ideological," or otherwise aberrant, and will tend to fall by the wayside. While there may be a small number of exceptions, the pattern is pervasive, and expected. Those who adapt, perhaps quite honestly, will then be free to express themselves with little managerial control, and they will be able to assert, accurately, that they perceive no pressures to conform. The media are indeed free-for those who adopt the principles required for their "societal purpose. " There may be some who are simply corrupt, and who serve as "errand boys" for state and other authority, but this is not the normY We know from personal experience that many journalists are quite aware of the way the system operates, and utilize the occasional openings it affords to provide information and analysis that departs in some measure from the elite consensus, carefully shaping it so as to accommodate to required norms in a general way. But this degree ofinsight is surely not common. Rather, the norm is a belief that freedom prevails, which is true for those who have internalized the required values and perspectives.
These matters are of some importance. We can readily understand
why Guatemalan reporters do not report the atrocities of the 1980s;
some fifty corpses dramatically illustrate the costs of deviance from authority on the part of independent journalists. To explain why American reporters avoid such topics, and even go so far as to describe Guatemala as a model for Nicaragua (see p. uS), requires further explanation, and the same is true in innumerable other similar cases,
some of which we have analyzed in detail. A propaganda model pro- t vides a basis for understanding this pervasive phenomenon.
No simple model will suffice, however, to account for every detail of such a complex matter as the working of the national mass media. A propaganda model, we believe, captures essential features of the pro- cess, but it leaves many nuances and secondary effects unanalyzed. There are other factors that should be recognized. Some of these con- flict with the "societal purpose" of the media as described by the propaganda model; some support it. In the former category, the human- ity and professional integrity of journalists often leads them in direc- tions that are unacceptable in the ideological institutions, and one should not underestimate the psychological burden of suppressing ob- vious truths and maintaining the required doctrines of benevolence
(possibly gone awry), inexplicable error, good intentions, injured inno- cence, and so on, in the face of overwhelming evidence incompatible with these patriotic premises. The resulting tensions sometimes find limited expression, but more often they are suppressed either con- sciously or unconsciously, with the help of belief systems that permit the pursuit of narrow interest, whatever the facts.
In the category of supportive factors, we find, first of all, elemental patriotism, the overwhelming wish to think well of ourselves, our insti- tutions, and our leaders. We see ourselves as basically good and decent in personal life, so it must be that our institutions function in accord- ance with the same benevolent intent, an argument that is often persua- sive even though it is a transparent non sequitur. The patriotic premise is reinforced by the belief that "we the people" rule, a central principle of the system of indoctrination from early childhood, but also one with little merit, as an analysis of the sociahlnd political system will quickly reveal. There are also real advantages in conformity beyond the re- wards and privilege that it yields. If one chooses to denounce Qaddafi, or the Sandinistas, or the PLO, or the Soviet Union, no credible evi- dence is required. The same is true if one repeats conventional doc- trines about our own society and its behavior-say, that the U. S. government is dedicated to our traditional noble commitment to de- mocracy and human rights. But a critical analysis of American institu- tions, the way they function domestically and their international operations, must meet far higher standards; in fact, standards are often imposed that can barely be met in the natural sciences. One has to work hard, to produce evidence that is credible, to construct serious argu- ments, to present extensive documentation-all tasks that are super-
fluous as long as one remains within the presuppositional framework of the doctrinal consensus. It is small wonder that few are willing to undertake the effort, quite apart from the rewards that accrue to con- formity and the costs of honest dissidence.
There are other considerations that tend to induce obedience. A journalist or commentator who does not want to have to work too hard can survive, even gain respectability, by publishing information (official or leaks) from standard sources;12 these opportunities may well be denied to those who are not content to relay the constructions of state propaganda as fact. The technical structure of the media virtually compels adherence to conventional thoughts; nothing else can be ex- pressed between two commercials, or in seven hundred words, without the appearance of absurdity that is difficult to avoid when one is chal- lenging familiar doctrine with no opportunity to develop facts or argu- ment. In this respect, the U. S. media are rather different from those in
CONCLUSIONS 305
306 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
most other industrial democracies, and the consequences are noticeable in the narrowness of articulated opinion and analysis. The critic must also be prepared to face a defamation apparatus against which there is little recourse, an inhibiting factor that is not insubstantial. Many such factors exist, related to the essential structural features brought to light by a propaganda model but nevertheless worthy of derailed examina- tion in themselves. The result is a powerful system of induced conform- ity to the needs of privilege and power.
In sum, the mass media of the United States are effective and power- ful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propa- ganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions. and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion. This propa- ganda system has become even more efficient in recent decades with the rise of the national television networks, greater mass-media concentra- tion, right-wing pressures on public radio and television, and the growth in scope and sophistication of public relations and news man- agement.
This system is not all-powerful, however.
Government and elite domination of the media have oot succeeded in overcoming the Viet- nam syndrome and public hostility to direct U. S. involvement in the destabilization and overthrow of foreign governments. A massive Rea- gan-era disinforrnation and propaganda effort, reflecting in large mea- sure an elite consensus, did succeed in its major aims of mobilizing support for the U. S. terror states (the "fledgling democracies"), while demonizing the Saodinistas and eliminating from Congress and the mass media all controversy beyond tactical debate over the means that should be employed to return Nicaragua to the "Central American mode" and "contain" its "aggressiveness" in attempting to defend itself from a murderous and destructive U. S. assault on al: fronts. But it failed to win public support even for proxy army warfare against Nicaragua, and as the costs to the U. S. mounted, and the proxy war accompanied by embargo and other pressures succeeded in restoring the "Central American mode" of misery and suffering in Nicaragua and aborting the highly successful reforms and prospects for development of the early years after the overthrow of Washington's ally Somoza, elite opinion too shifted-quite dramatically, in fact-toward resort to other, more cost-effective means to attain shared ends. 13 The partial failures of the very well organized and extensive state propaganda effort, and the simultaneous rise of an active grass-roots oppositional movement with very limited media access, was crucial in making an outright U. S. invasion of Nicaragua unfeasible and driving the state underground, to illegal clandestine operations that could be better
concealed from the domestic population-with, in fact, considerable media complicity. 14
Furthermore, while there have been important structural changes centralizing and strengthening the propaganda system, there have been counterforces at work with a potential for broader access. The rise of cable and satellite communications, while initially captured and domi- nated by commercial interests, has weakened the power of the network oligopoly and retains a potential for enhanced local-group access. There are already some 3,000 public-access channels in use in the United States, offering 20,000 hours of locally produced programs per week, and there are even national producers and distributors of pro- grams for access channels through satellites (e. g. , Deep-Dish Televi- sion), as well as hundreds of local suppliers, although all of them must struggle for funding. Grass-roots and public-interest organizations need to recognize and try to avail themselves of these media (and organizational) opportunities. 15 Local nonprofit radio and television stations also provide an opportunity for direct media access that has been underutilized in the United States. In France, many local groups have their own radio stations. In a notable case, the progressive cooper- ative Longo Mai, in Upper Provence, has its own 24-hour-a-day Radio Zinzine, which has become an important community institution that has helped inform and activate many previously isolated farmers. The potential value of noncommercial radio can be perceived in sections of the country where stations such as Pacifica Radio offer a view of the world, depth of coverage, and scope of discussion and debate that is generally excluded from the major media. Public radio and television, despite having suffered serious damage during the Reagan years, also represent an alternative media channel whose resuscitation and im- provement should be of serious concern to those interested in contest- ing the propaganda system. 16 The steady commercialization of the
publicly owned air waves should be vigorously opposed. In the long run, a democratic political order requires far wider control of and access to the media. Serious discussion of how this can be done, and the incorporation of fundamental media reform into political programs, should be high on progressive agendas. 17
The organization and self-education of groups in the community and workplace, and their networking and activism, continue to be the fundamental elements in steps toward the democratization of our so- ciallife and any meaningful social change. Only to the extent that such developments succeed can we hope to see media that are free and independent.
CONCLUSIONS 307
Appendix I
THE u. s. OFFICIAL OBSERVERS IN GUATEMALA, JULY 1-2, 1984
For the July I, 1984, elections in Guatemala, the Reagan administration sent an observer team, headed by Republican Congressman Ralph Regula, that also included Congressmen Jack Hightower (Democrat, Texas) and Mickey Ed- wards (Republican, Oklahoma); Secretaries of State Jack Brier, of Kansas, and Ed Simcox, of Indiana; Father Kenneth Baker, editor of Homiletic and Pastoral Review, New York City; John Carbaugh, a Washington attorney; Jesse Fried- man, of the American Institute of Free Labor Development; Tom Kahn, of the AFL-CIO; Max Singer, of the Potomac Organization; and Howard Penni- man,theelectionspecialistoftheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute. l Thisgroup, in Guatemala for a very brief stay, was transported around the country to "observe" on election day by helicopter, and made a brief statement and held a press conference on July 2. That statement and the press conference pro- ceedings were released by the U. S. embassy in Guatemala City on July 18, 1984, and form the basis for the discussion below.
Although Guatemala had been assailed by human-rights organizations for years for political murder on a vast scale and record-breaking numbers of
"disappeared," the words "murder" and "disappeared" do not appear in the remarks of any of the ten observers who spoke at the press conference. Other words or phrases never uttered were: "National Security Doctrine," "Law of Illicit Association," "state terrorism," "death squad," "massacre," "torture," "forced relocations," "civil-defense patrols," "freedom of the press," or "vot- ing requirement. " None of the observers doubted the authenticity of "posi- tive" responses by Guatemalan peasants to questions by non-Spanish-speaking foreigners flown in by helicopter in a country subject to military occupation. All of the observers felt quite capable of assessing the true feelings of the Guatemalan people on the basis of long lines, facial expressions, and a handful of responses to visitors under official protection. There was no dissent among the observers from the conclusion that the election was fair, inspiring, a testimonial to the eagerness of the Guatemalan people to participate and express their patriotic sentiments, and a first step toward democracy. No demonstration-election cliche was omitted-history was blacked out, and no basic condition of a free election was examined by the observers.
Let us sample a few of the cliches offered by these Guatemalan election observers:
1. People full of hope--'Dery positi'De start. This was a "dynamic begin- ning, . . . a first step," according to delegation head Ralph Regula. Father Kenneth Baker found a "great sense of hope for the future . . . the spirit of hopefulness. " Jack Brier also observed "a spirit of hopefulness about the future, but not necessarily confidence in whatever actions may come about as a result of the elections. " (This is a very nuanced distinction that Brier was able to make on the basis of translated brief answers by a few voters. ) Tom Kahn claimed that "many of the workers whom we spoke to on the voting lines told us that they had great hope, that this was a first step. " Kahn was asked during the press conference whether he had visited any of the embattled Coca-Cola workers. He hadn't. Neither Kahn nor his AIFLD colleague, Jesse Friedman, mentioned the enormous decline in union membership or the deci- mation of union leadership by murder.
2. Long lines, patient 'Doters. The observers were deeply impressed with "the way the people patiently waited" to vote (Regula). Howard Penniman noted "the extraordinary patience of the people voting. " Ed Simcox pointed out that the voters "did go out, they formed lines very early in the morning, they waited in some instances two, three, four hours to go up and vote. " According to Congressman Hightower, "The thing that impressed us instantly was the long lines. " Tom Kahn was impressed with the "calm and order which prevailed around the voting tables. "
Long lines and patient voters are quite compatible with voting by a terror- ized population desiring mainly to survive. The official observers, who never once mention the record of spectacular state terror in Guatemala, merely
postulate that voters who get in line and wait patiently do so for reasons that are benign.
3. The patriotic imperati'De. The main theme of this observer team is that the voters are eager to vote as good patriots, loyal to the militarized terrorist
state that Ronald Reagan and the State Department find acceptable. Max Singer says that "I did sense that Guatemalans feel that voting is important to them. " (This is correct, but Singer was not contemplating the possibility that its importance to them might lie in fear and a desire to avoid retribution by the omnipresent army. ) Regula said that the people were patiently waiting "for an opportunity to share in the process of choosing the constituent assembly. " According to Simcox, "They know that this was the patriotic thing to do, that this was important for their country. " Tom Kahn found that the people he talked to in voting lines "expressed a great sense of national pride. "
4. Absence of any sign of coercion. Father Kenneth Baker stated that "there seemed to be a general atmosphere of no intimidation. " Baker didn't say how he sensed this atmosphere, ? and whether it was assuredly reliable in a foreign country observed for a day under military guard. Baker referred to the bishops having urged people to vote, but he failed to note their extended observations suggesting that a meaningful election couldn't be held in an environment of disappearances, terror, and catastrophic socioeconomic condi- tions. Jack Brier saw "absolutely no violence. I saw no evidence of direct military involvement. " A problem that Brier doesn't discuss is that if pacifica- tion is thorough, no violence or substantial military presence will be necessary to confirm military choices. There is absolutely no violence or evidence of direct military involvement in elections in the Soviet Union. Brier plays dumb, pretending that violence on election day is really relevant, and ignoring the long-term violence that strips away institutional protections and produces a terrorized population. 2 Congressman Mickey Edwards did find a military pres- ence in Guatemala, but it was not "oppressive": "We did not find anything to indicate that the people in those areas were under any pressure or intimida- tion. " How hard Edwards looked must remain in doubt. 3
5. Amazing turnout. Jack Brier referred to the "surprisingly large turnout," and Ed Simcox found the 60-70 percent turnout "really an incredibly positive statistic. " Even the U. S. embassy noted that voting in Guatemala is compul- sory (although it tried to discount this by citing a Guatemalan official who said that the law was only rarely enforced). The official observers, however, never mentioned this small matter of a legal requirement, or the need to get an ID card stamped, let alone the army warnings and the background of mass killings and disappearances.
6. Human rights impro'Ding. Congressman Mickey Edwards found that "by all objective observations, the human-rights record in this country has improved tremendously over the last two or three years. " He does not say what objective observations he is referring to. Max Singer also found that "the human-rights record is improving in Guatemala, as near as I can tell," partly because the guerrilla movement has weakened, and that movement has been a serious threat to the human rights of the Guatemalan people. Singer was asked in the press conference how he determined this improvement. His answer was "From the statements of people living in the countryside. "
7. Reasonfor the blank and spoiled 'Dotes. Some 26 percent of the ballots cast in the Guatemalan election, far exceeding the total for any party, were
312 A P P E N D IX I
blank or spoiled. This would seem to compromise the notion that the Guatemalan people had gotten into long lines out of patriotic enthusiasm. Howard Penniman explained, however, that this was a result of illiteracy. Other possibilities are unmentioned. Why the illiteracy rates were so high thirty years after the United States saved Guatemala for freedom is also not discussed.
8. The case for further aid. The observers showed their objectivity, and the labor representatives Kahn and Friedman demonstrated their commitment to liberal principles, by acknowledging that this election wae only a "first step," and that a full-fledged democracy such as that just established in EI Salvador (Regula) was still to come. Some of the observers would sanction additional aid immediately, Mickey Edwards urging that the Guatemalan army would benefit from being "exposed to American values and to American training. "4 The others were more noncommittal, but agreed that the election was fair, meaningful, and deserving of U. S. recognition and support.
In sum, this was a caricature of observation, but a fairly typical performance of U. S. "official observers. " The report of this group was cited by Stephen Kinzer in the New York Times and elsewhere in the U. S. press as a serious source of information on the Guatemalan election. The official report of the Latin American Studies Association on the Nicaraguan election, written by specialists in the region after an intensive eight-day investigation, Kinzer and his mass-media colleagues never mentioned.
Appendix z
TAGLIABUE'S FINALE ON THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION:
A Case Study in Bias
To show in another way the propagandistic quality ofthe mass media's cover- age of the Bulgarian Connection, we will examine in detail the article by John Taglia~ue,"Verdict on Papal Plot, But No Answer," published in the New York Tzmes on March 31, 1986. This piece, which provides a final wrap-up that enters "history" as the mature judgment of the veteran Times newsman as- signed to the Rome trial, is a model illustration of the systematic bias that we
believe characterized mass-media reporting of the Bulgarian Connection with only minor exceptions. A close examination shows how Tagliabue incorp~rates a. ll of the elements. of the Sterling-Henze-Kalb (SHK) model of the connec-
tIOn, selects facts In accordance with the requirements of that model and bypasses conflicting facts and interpretations. I '
The Framing of the Issue: The Case Still "Unresolved"
The court dismissal of the case against the Bulgarians in Rome confronted the Times with a problem of framing. The Times had presented the case as plausi- ble for years, and now had to confront the rejection of the case in a court decision. The solution was to latch on to the peculiar feature of the Italian judicial system whereby a party found not guilty can be declared positively innocent or not guilty for reason of lack of evidence. Thus, as the title of Tagliabue's article suggests, there was a verdict, but "no answer," and Taglia- bue's first paragraph focuses on the "unresolved" nature of the case. It would have been possible to stress the fact that the Bulgarians were found not guilty for lack of evidence, and to emphasize that Western law requires positive proof of guilt. But the Times was not about to acknowledge defeat after five years of finding the Bulgarians guilty.
Tagliabue also downplays the court decision by making it an unsurprising event. "Few people were surprised by the verdict," states Tagliabue. But the failure to find the Bulgarians guilty should have been quite surprising, given the earlier assurances by Sterling and associates that the Bulgarians were clearly behind the plot, and that, as Paul Henze stated, the "evidence" has "steadily accumulated to the point where little real doubt is now possible. "2
An alternative frame would have been as follows: After a three-year investi- gation and lengthy trial, backed by the resources of the Italian state, and despite the powerful interests in Italy and the West with a stake in finding the Bulgarians guilty, the prosecution still failed to persuade an Italian jury of Bulgarian guilt. These vested interests and their propaganda vehicles were given a bone to chew on, however, in the form of a decision to dismiss the charge for "lack of evidence," rather than complete exoneration. This then allowed the propaganda agencies to frame the case in the Tagliabue manner.
Protection of the Italian Judicial Process
Throughout the history ofthe case, the U. S. mass media blacked out evidence of the compromised quality of the Italian institutions involved in pursuing the connection. Investigating Judge Martella was always treated as a model of probity, and conflicting facts were ignored. 3 Operating in this tradition, Taglia- bue wastes space on a gratuitous and irrelevant accolade to Martella (which is also given a subheading for emphasis). His statement that "Few people stood up to assail the magistrate" is absurd, as the trial witnesses were asked to give concrete evidence on the facts of the case; they were not in a position to assail the pretrial investigating magistrate, and any such attempts would have been impermissible in the courtroom. Only the Bulgarian defense was well qualified and able to assail Martella, and they did so, in effective statements on March 4-8, 1986, that were unreported in the T imes and the rest of the mass media. Tagliabue points out that although the trial was supposed merely to verify the
findings of t~e pre~imi~aryinvestigation, in fact the prosecution did a great
deal of new mvestlgatIve work. This suggests that the trial court may have
fo~ndMartella's investigation sadly lacking, but Tagliabue never addresses the pomt.
Agcats Desertion of the Case
An important part of the apologetic fr. amework is the claim that Agca, who had present~d an allegedly coherent verSIOn of a connection up to the trial, sud- denly dId an about face and refused to testify altogether. Tagliabue devotes several paragraphs to this theme, eventually suggesting that Agca's increas- ingly erratic behavior "may have been designed to torpedo the efforts of the court. " He suggests th~t the pr~secuto~couldn:t overcome th~s difficulty, so that the loss of the case IS lodged m Agca s behavior rather than m any inherent deficiencies in the prosecution's case.
In reality, Ag~a's claims emerged very slowly and contradictorily, with dozens of retractions that, taken together, are best explained by coaching outside information, and guesses by Agca as to what Martella and the pres~ would like to hear. There is no reason to believe that Agca ever offered or ~ettled upon a cO,herent, version of a Bulgarian connection. On the contrary, It appears that hiS version changed continually, and that the final result in Martella's report was Martella's own arbitrary synthesis. 4
The claim that Agca became more erratic during the trial is also not based on evidence. Agca's persistently erratic behavior was obscured by the secrecy of his earlier testimony, but it is clear from the Martella report that he was already claiming to be Jesus and displaying other symptoms of irrationality. Furthermore, Tagliabue's statement that Agca refused to cooperate during the trial is false-Agca periodically withdrew from the proceedings when his testimony became too incoherent, but he always returned to the stand, and he answered a vast number of questions. One hypothesis that Tagliabue never ~ntertainsis that if Agca's claims were based on coaching and/or imagination, m an open court he would be vulnerable and quickly pushed to the wall.
Tagliabue also never asks this further question: Even if Agca had clammed up (which was not true), given the extensive Martella investigation and report, why would the court not be able to follow the already established leads to a successful outcome? Why was not a single witness produced to confirm Agca's allegations of numerous meetings and trips with Bulgarians in Rome? Why was the car allegedly rented by the Bulgarians never found? Where is the money supposedly given to Agca? Tagliabue fails to address these questions.
"Partial Confirmation" of Agcats Ta Ie
Tagliabue describes some alleged partial confirmations of Agca's claims. The first is that "Mr. Ozbey said the Bulgarians had indeed wanted to use Mr. Agca
to shoot the Pope, but did not trust him. " But this is not a partial confirmation if the net result was that the Bulgarians failed to hire Agca. Furthermore, another reporter present when Ozbey testified in Rome claims that Ozbey did not tell the court that the Bulgarians "wanted to use" Agca. According to Wolfgang Achtner, of ABC-TV News, in Rome, the only thing Ozbey said was that the Bulgarians "listened with interest, but behaved with indifference" (the translation by the Turkish interpreter in court), or "listened with interest but didn't take it seriously" (Achtner's own translation). In short, it would appear that Tagliabue has doctored the evidence.
The other "partial confirmation" is that "Catli hinted at obscure secret service contacts with West German intelligence, and of payments for unspeci- fied purposes to Turks involved in the investigations. " This vague statement does not even mention the plot against the pope and is partial confirmation of nothing. The most important Catli evidence bearing on this point was his description of the attempt by the West German police to bribe Agca's supposed co-conspirator Oral Celik to come to West -Germany and confirm Agca's claims. This supports the coaching hypothesis: accordingly, Tagliabue blacks it out. The only other testimony by Catli mentioning the secret services in- volved Gray Wolves leader Ali Batman, who told Catli he had heard from the German secret police that at a meeting in Romania, the Warsaw Pact powers had decided to kill the pope. This was apparently a leak of the forged SISMI document of May 19, 1981, which had made this claim. Thus the hearsay recounting of the substance of a forgery is Tagliabue's "partial confirmation" of Agca's claims of a plot.
We should also note that while he cites these alleged "partial confirma- tions," nowhere does Tagliabue list the contentions of Agca that remained unconfirmed.
The Soviet-Bulgarian Motive
Two of Tagliabue's thirty-two paragraphs were devoted to expounding the Soviet motive in allegedly sponsoring Agca's assassination attempt: "to crack religiously inspired resistance to Communist rule in Poland. " Tagliabue here follows a long-standing Times tradition of absolutely refusing to allow a coun- terargument to be voiced on this issue. Even if they covered their tracks well, a Soviet-inspired murder of the pope would have been blamed on the Soviets, solidified Polish hostility, and had enormously damaging effects on Soviet relations with Western Europe. Thus it would have been risky without any offsetting benefits. s
Who gained and who lost from the plot? Were there any possible Western motives that might bear on the case? Tagliabue follows the SHK line in failing to raise these questions. But once Agca was imprisoned in Italy, cold warriors of the West had much to gain and little to lose by manipulating Agca to pin the assassination attempt on the East. Tagliabue mentions that the charges of a Bulgarian Connection surfaced "at the nadir" of U. S. -Soviet relations. While he notes how this added to the credibility of the plot in the West, he never
hints at the possibility that its serviceability to the new Cold War might explain Agca's belated confession.
Agca's Stay in Bulgaria
This has always been critical in the Sterling-Times scenarios, and Tagliabue drags it in. It is given further emphasis with the heading "Spent 2 Months in Bulgaria. " Tagliabue does not mention that Agca stopped in eleven other countries. He fails to note here, and the Times suppressed throughout, Cadi's testimony in Rome that the Gray Wolves liked to go through Bulgaria to reach Western Europe because the heavy Turkish traffic made it easy to hide. Taglia- bue fails to mention that bringing Agca for a long stay in Sofia would have been a violation of the rule of plausible deniability. Even more so would be using Bulgarians to help Agca in Rome. Tagliabue does not discuss the question of
plausible deniability.