Now, if you pay that money to soldiers
on service it is sufficient for the purpose; otherwise,
you need a further fund, or rather you have none at
all to begin with.
on service it is sufficient for the purpose; otherwise,
you need a further fund, or rather you have none at
all to begin with.
Demosthenese - First Philippic and the Olynthiacs
But, above all, you must
keep in hand a small standing army for offensive opera-
tions, :1 force that shall really belong to the state and obey
its commanders: we must have none of your mercenary
forces that exist only on paper (19). I would have this
small force consist of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry,
and I would also have one-fourth of each arm citizens,
on short service, to relieve one another, and the rest
mercenaries, with transports for the force, and ten swift
triremes to act as convoy (21--2). At present it is
impossible for us to raise an army fit to meet Philip in
the field ; in the first instance, we must make predatory
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? IV gs 24-33 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlvii
incursions only (23). Citizens must form part of the
force; for it will be remembered, that it was by a
combined force of mercenaries and citizens that you
defeated the Lacedaemonians (in the Corinthian war).
Mercenaries, if left to themselves, are apt to go off on
other business. You must also have citizens on service
to keep a sharp look-out on your commander's conduct
(24). We profess to be at war with Philip; but, as
for your official commanders, apart from a single general
of cavalry, the rest of them stay at home and merely
march in festal array through the market-place. Like
makers of terracotta toys, it is for the market that you
make your officers, and not for war (26). If your cavalry
must he commanded by a foreigner, he ought at least to
be elected by yourselves (27). As to rations for the force,
I reckon the cost at little more than 90 talents for the
year (28). For all other supplies the force must rely on
the spoils of war.
I shall now submit a written statement of ways and
means for the proposed supply (29), which I ask you to
sanction, if it meets with your approval (30).
It will assist your deliberations if you remember that
Philip is constantly managing to get the start of us.
Hence we must carry on the war not mflflfls
with hasty levies from Athens, which (PTOI'Mio)-_
. . . . . Arguments m
Wlll never arrive in time, but With a WWW 01pm.
permanent force on the spot, using as Pom" ? ? 3140-
winter--quarters our islands in the northern Aegean.
From Athens it is difficult to reach those regions either
during the winter, or while the winds are blowing from
the north after n1idsummer,---the seasons usually selected
by Philip for his acts of aggression (31-2). The handling
of the force will rest with the commander appointed by
yourselves and responsible to you. The result will be
that you will prevent Philip's piratical attacks on our
allies, and you will be in security yourselves (33). He
will no longer, as of late, carry off citizens of your own
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? xlviii THE FIRST PHILIPPIO' IV ? ? 34-47
from Lemnos and Imbros, or seize your corn~ships ofi'
Geraestus or your sacred trireme in the bay of Marathon.
At present, you cannot prevent all this (34). In the
arrangement of your festivals, nothing is left unascertained
or undefined, whereas, in your preparations for war, all
is unarranged, unrevised, undefined. We waste in pre-
paration the time required for action; when the crisis
comes, our forces are insufficient ; and, when they are
despatched, they arrive too late (35--6). Philip's arrogant
letter to the Euboeans tells us some unpleasant truths
(37--8). Up to this day you have never made any
proper use of your resources ; and your war with Philip
is like a barbarian's manner of boxing. When he strikes
you, you feel for the blow; you dare not look him in
the face (40). If he is in the Chersonesus, you vote to
send relief there ; if at Thermopylae, the same: you are
always running after his heels, always at his beck and
call (41). But all his activity may be almost regarded as
providential : for his constant encroachments may possibly
arouse you at last (42). I wonder that you do not
notice, with concern and indignation, that a war begun
to chastise Philip has ended in becoming a war for self-
defence. He will not pause in his advance, unless some
one opposes him (43). But, if we make the attempt, the
war will of itself reveal the weak points in his power
(44). Whenever a portion of your own force of citizens joins
in the war, the blessing of Heaven, and the influence of
Fortune, favours the struggle; but, where you merely
send out a general and an empty decree, nothing that
you desire is done. Such an armament makes your
enemies exultant and your allies mortally afraid (45).
It is impossible for all your wishes to be executed by a
general in command of wretched unpaid hirelings (46).
You must make your own citizens soldiers, to be witnesses
of your general's conduct abroad and judges at his audit
on your return. As it is, your generals are constantly
being put on their trial: they die like malefactors by
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? IV gs 48--51 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlix
sentence of the law, and not on the field of battle (47).
As for your gossip about Philip's intentions,. you may
rest assured that he will never allow his real intentions
to be known (48--9). Let us remember only that Philip
is an enemy who keeps us out of our own, and has long
been insulting us ; that the future depends on ourselves ;
and that, unless we are willing to fight him abroad, we
shall perhaps be compelled to fight him at home. The
future cannot fail to be disastrous, unless you do your
duty (50).
As for myself, I have never courted favour, and now
I have spoken my whole mind without reserve. 'What-
ever the consequences may be to lmyself, Q annoy"
I offer my adVIce With the convmtion that (pewme? wt
it will be of advantage to you. I only commwn'
trust that what is for the advantage of us all may
prevail (51).
'Such views,' says Grote, 'were so new, so inde-
pendent of party-sympathies or antipathies, and so
plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in
demands for the future, that they would hardly have
been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the
ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from
his study of Thucydides' . . . 'The first Philippic
is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenes
lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in
their beginnings " (18 ? 246) and given timely warn-
ing to his countrymen ' . . . ' He was not less honest
and judicious in his attempts to fulfil the remaining
portion of the statesman's duty--that of working up
his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enter-
prise ; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking
and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the
public enemy' (c. 87 viii 61, 67).
The date of the speech is indicated by internal
d
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? 1 DATE OF THE FIRST PHILIPPIU
evidence. Philip's march towards Thermopylae,
Data ofthe his expedition against the Chersonesus
"15,25,113", and his sudden attack on Olynthus are
35113-0- all mentioned in chronological order
(4 ? 17). These events belong to the summer of
352 B. C. and the following winter. The Athenians
sent no aid to the Chersonesus until October 351
(3 ? 5). These considerations point to the spring of
351 as the date of the First Philippic. The practical
proposals made by Demosthenes are appropriate to
the spring of that year; the fleet, which forms part
of those proposals, must clearly be sent to the
northern Aegean before July, when the Etesian
winds began to blow (note on ? 31). It is obviously
later than the speech Against Aristocrates, which
makes no mention of Philip's illness (1 ? 13) during
his second Thracian expedition in the winter of
O]. 107, 1 (352--1 B. C. ), although Thrace is the main
subject of a large portion of the speech. Again, the
First Philippic refers to Philip's sudden attack on
Olynthus (4 ? 17), whereas in the Aristocrates
Olynthus had not yet been attacked by Philip,
though she had already come to terms with Athens.
It was not until the second Thracian expedition that
Philip attacked Olynthus, soon after his recovery.
Hence Dionysius of Halicarnassus is mistaken in
placing the First Philippic earlier than the Aristocrates,
though he is right in assigning both speeches to the
same year, 01. 107, 1 (352-1 B. C. )1
Unhappily, the proposals made by Demosthenes
in the First Philippic were not carried into effect.
1 Ep. ad Ammaeum i 4 p. 725, 14 R, Thirlwall v 374-6,
ASchaefer ii 70--32, Blass III i 3002, Blass-Rehdantz p. 328.
On Dionysius' division of the speech into two parts see ASchaefer
ii 692, and note on 4 ? 30.
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? PHILIP AND 0L YNTHUS 1i
Though the speech had been delivered in the spring
of 351, it was not until October that any force was
sent against Philip, and even then it was only the
mercenary commander Charidemus who was sent to
the Chersonesus with only ten triremes and five
talents in money and no soldiers (3 ? 5).
Meanwhile, at Olynthus, there had been a change
of feeling. Athens had ceased to inspire alarm, but
the vast increase in the power of Philip excited the
liveliest apprehension. His encroachment made it
clear that he would not allow Chalcidice to be held
much longer by free Greek communities. Accord-
ingly, after the great victory of Philip over the
Phocians in Thessaly, in the first half of 352, the
Olynthians had seceded from their alliance with him,
and, before November 352, concluded a peace with
Athens which had every prospect of ripening into an
alliance (23 ? 109). No wonder that a few months
afterwards, at the date of the First Philippic, Philip
had made an inroad into the territory of Olynthus,
though without any vigorous prosecution of war.
Athens, in the meantime, had proposed to Olynthus
a scheme of definite alliance against Philip (1 ? 7,
3 7, 16). But the Olynthians were afraid to be
the first to provoke a contest. Mistrust on both
sides continued for several months, till at length
Philip began serious operations against Olynthus,
apparently towards the middle of 349.
The power of Olynthus depended mainly on her
position as the head of a confederacy including most
of the Greek cities of Chalcidice. Philip began a
series of intrigues in Olynthus and her confederate
cities. He may even have expected to incorporate
the Chalcidic confederacy in his own empire without
serious difficulty and without resorting to real war
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? lii THE FIRST OLYNTHIAG I ? ? 1--3
(1 ? 21). If so, he was disappointed, as there is
ground for believing that he encountered considerable
resistance. Philip at first disclaimed all purposes
injurious to Olynthus (9 11). The Olynthians,
however, sent envoys to Athens proposing alliance
and asking for aid to be sent to Chalcidice. The
Athenians readily accepted the alliance and promised
to send a force to co-operate against Philip.
V The Olynthiacs of Demosthenes
It was after the above recognition of Olynthus
as an ally of Athens that Demosthenes delivered
his three Olynthiac Oratilms, all of them probably
during the last seven months of 349. 1 Their
'oxwgmxbs ,1 chronological sequence has been much
3491M disputed. An abstract of each will
now be given in the usual order, and the order
itself will be considered afterwards.
The First Olynthiac
I feel sure you would give much to know what is
the true policy for the present crisis. You will therefore
A "mommy naturally be willing to listen to counsel,
(ewordimfll whether it has been preconsidered, or
Immuctm' has suggested itself on the spur of the
moment (1).
The present crisis is an eloquent call to action. My
own opinion is that you ought to vote the proposed
3, 6,165"ng succours immediately and make the speediest
possible preparations for despatching them
? ? 2_27. from Athens, and that you should also
15215317332? send envoys to announce the fact and to
mwlim? ? 2-15- watch the course of events (2). There is
real danger that Philip's adroitness and unscrupulousness
1 Grote c. 88 viii 69--75.
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? I ? 4-19 THE FIRST 0L Y N THIA C' liii
may wrest to his own purposes some of our vital in-
terests (3). Yet the very source of his own strength is
really favourable to yourselves. For purposes of war,
his autocracy is a great advantage ; but, for purposes of
peace with Olynthus, it is the very opposite (4). The
Olynthians plainly see that the peril in which they stand
involves the ruin and servitude of their country. They
know what has happened to Amphipolis and to Pydna;
and, like other free states, they mistrust a despotic power
on their borders (5). Now, if ever, you must apply your-
selves vigorously to the war by contributing promptly,
by serving personally, and by leaving nothing undone (6).
Had we acted promptly in the case of Amphipolis,
Pydna, Poteidaea, Methone, Pagasae, we should have found
Philip far easier to attack and less strong than now.
At the present moment, another crisis has come (8, 9).
If we allow Philip to reduce Olynthus, what is to prevent
his marching where he pleases (12)? If it be his
principle always to do more than before, and yours to
apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, the war which
is now at a distance will soon be at our very doors
(14, 15).
At the present crisis I advise you to send succours
in two ways z--firstly, by despatching a body of troops
to Olynthus for the express purpose of pro- II wpe? Qegtg
tecting her confederate towns ; and, secondly, P%fi$'$b_
by employing at the same time another Pom" ? ? 16--20-
force of troops and triremes to act aggressively against
Philip's own territory (17). If you neglect either of
these measures, I fear the expedition will fail. As to
pecuniary resources, you have more money than other
people, but you appropriate it yourselves according to your
good pleasure.
Now, if you pay that money to soldiers
on service it is sufficient for the purpose; otherwise,
you need a further fund, or rather you have none at
all to begin with. I shall be asked whether I propose
to apply the festival-fund to military purposes. I propose
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? liv THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC I ? ? 20--28
nothing of the kind (19). I merely say that soldiers
must be raised, and that those who do the work should
receive the pay, whereas your practice is to take the public
money, without any such condition, for the festivals. The
only alternative is an extraordinary war-tax. In any case,
you must act vigorously while you still have the chance
(20).
Let us now consider Philip's present position.
Firstly, he is disappointed at not having carried every-
m "(u-T"; thing before him in Chalcidice (21).
%%? ":}lot),;e Secondly, he is ill at ease about the treacher-
urgency anfithe one condition of Thessaly, on which he
gateway relies for funds (22). Thirdly, he knows
poms ? ? 21--7- that the Paeonians and Illyrians can-
not abide his rule (23). If Olynthus holds out, you
will carry on the war there, and enjoy your own homes
in peace ; but if Philip takes that city, who is to check
him in his advance hither? (25). Neither the Thessalians
nor the Phocians can do so (26); and if there were a
war in Attica itself, it would be attended with enormous
damage and (what is worse) disgrace (27).
Therefore we must all unite in lending our aid and
keeping the war at a distance (in the interest of all
a e? flmovos classes), so that the rich may, by a small
(peroratio). expenditure, enjoy the residue of their re-
conclwon' sources in security; those of military age
gain experience in the territory of Philip and become
redoubtable defenders of the integrity of their native
land; and our public speakers be able to give a good
account of their statesmanship. May heaven grant that
the result of your measures may in every way be
prosperous (28).
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? "$143 TIJE 8Ec'oaw 0L YNTHIAO' iv
The Second Olynthiac
It appears to me to be a remarkably providential
circumstance that We find a co le read . ,
for a. war with Philip who arI; liis neighy- magi? B
hours and who not only have some con- ----
siderable power but are implacable in their A" hostility towards him (1). We must make Introduction
good use of the allies and the advantages ? ? 1'2'
thus provided us (2).
I shall not incite you to your duty by dilating on
Philip's power. That would be too much of a com-
pliment to him, too much of a disparage- B, rim-63ers",-
ment of you (3). The source of his power is I(e? i"? $x? c);s
not in himself, but here (in the devotion of (Hermite)-
his partisans and in your own remissness) "$3,702"
(4). I propose to prove Philip's faithlessness 55 3-10-
by examining his conduct, and also to show that he has
now exhausted all the devices by which he rose to great-
ness (5). His power in itself is founded on perjury and
wrong. He has deceived yourselves, he has deceived the
Poteidaeans, he has deceived the Tliessalians, in fact, all
who have ever had any dealings with him (6, '7). Forts
and havens will not enable Philip to hold his own:
what he needs is the good-will and the common interest
of all his allies. When any one has grown strong, like
Philip, by an aggressive and a dishonest policy, the
slightest reverse is enough to 'overthrow his power. A
solid and durable power cannot possibly be acquired
by means of injustice and perjury and falsehood (9, 10).
My own opinion is that we should at once aid the
Olynthians, and that we should also send
envoys to Thessaly (11) ; but it will not be I? J$? ? gis
enough for these envo s to make s eeclies Theomm's I'm-
(12); you must act ypromptly and) serve poms ? ? 11--13'
personally, and the weakness of Philip's power will soon
be revealed (13).
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? lvi THE SECOND 0L YNTHIAC' II ? ? 14--27
The power of Macedonia, as has been repeatedly
proved by experience, is useful as a make-weight to
111 "(was turn the scale, but is feeble as an inde-
P,_Og? '$bfh'i'2-TM_ pendent force (14). Philip's power has been
livability and made less secure by the very operations
"9,3253%? " which appear to constitute his greatness.
? ? 14-3? - Philip and his subjects have not the same
predilections. His ambition is to lead a. life of adventure
and peril in quest of a glory in which they have no
share (15, 16). I know on good authority, that his
mercenaries and guards are no better than others (17),
that he is jealous of any experience in war, that he
thrusts aside any who are too virtuous to tolerate his
daily vices (18). He is surrounded by a band of
brigands, a troop of flatterers, bufi'oons and jesters (19).
His past good fortune lends to all his real weakness a
fallacious air of strength; but, on any mischance, his
weak points will be exposed to view (20, 21). If any
of you think that Philip is formidable because he is so
fortunate, I admit that fortune has a preponderance, is in
fact everything, in human affairs. But I should prefer
our own good fortune to Philip's, if you would, even to
a moderate extent, do your duty (22). Yet here you are,
sitting still, doing nothing. The idler cannot ask even his
friends to work for him, much less the gods. No wonder
that Philip, always in the field, always on the move,
doing everything for himself and never letting any
opportunity slip, prevails over you who merely talk, and
ask questions, and pass votes, without acting (23). In
bygone days, men of Athens, you lavished your treasure
and bore the brunt of battle, to secure the rights of
others: yet now you are loath to serve, and slow to con-
tribute, even in defence of your own possessions (24).
I say then that you must levy an extraordinary war-tax,
must serve in person with alacrity, and do your own
duty before scrutinising the conduct of others (27). Why
do all your commanders avoid this war and seek out
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? u ? ? 23_~31 THE SECOND OLYNTHIAO 1m
wars of their ownl Because here the prizes of war are
yours, while, in l: e other case, the risks are fewer, and
the gains belong to the commanders and soldiers (28).
When you see how badly things are going, you impeach
the commanders ; and, when they urge these strong pleas,
you acquit them. The result is that, while some hold
one opinion and some another, the public interests suffer.
You must get rid of rival factions (29), and be yourselves
again. You must restore once more a general liberty of
counsel, speech and action (30).
To sum up, you must all contribute fairly according
to your means; all take your turns of service till
all have been afield; give every speaker 0' "flows
8. hearing, and adopt the best advice, (Pev'waqivl
no matter who gives it. If you act thus, mmwn'
you will not merely praise the speaker at the moment,
but yourselves afterwards, when your general prospects
have improved (31).
After the delivery of the first two Olynthiacs,
a body of mercenary troops was sent by Athens to
the aid of the Olynthians and Chalcidians. The
wealthier citizens voluntarily contributed to the cost
of the outfit of this expedition ; but the very point
that Demosthenes had insisted on was neglected.
None of the Athenians served in person, nor was
any money whatsoever assigned for the pay of the
mercenaries. Presently a victory was gained over
Philip or his generals, and the news was sent to
Athens, where it inspired the people with the empty
hope that they were now in a fair way of taking
revenge on Philip. But Demosthenes himself was
not deceived. He clearly discerned that it was only
a partial success in no way decisive of the war as
a whole. He accordingly felt himself 'oxweuxbs Y'
constrained to address the people once 349 8-0'
more with a view to warning them against losing
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? lviii THE THIRD 0L YNTHIAG III ? ? 1-8
sight of the peril in which Olynthus was still
standing.
The Third Olynthiac
The language that I hear about ' taking vengeance on
A 6 Philip' is inconsistent with the facts. The
18283375)? " facts compel us to look to our personal
I'l'TO'i'we? io" safety. There was a time when we might
' ' have held our own and punished Philip
too ; but now our first care must be the security of our
allies (1, 2).
The present crisis calls for anxious deliberation. I
B. 61686,"; have no doubt as to your dutypmy only
I (e? ffl'zlatiol doubt is how to address you upon it. Most
Suiwnlfffe' of your losses have been due to inaction and
"mum" "3'5" not to ignorance. If I speak my mind, I
must ask you to be patient (3).
I must beg you not to make the same mistake as you
made three years ago. When Philip was besieging a
stronghold in Thrace, you energetically resolved in
November (362) to send an expedition against him Presently, there were reports that he was ill, and that
he was dead. Accordingly, you only despatched Chari-
demus with ten empty ships and five talents. If you
had promptly executed your first resolve, Philip would
have given you no further trouble (5). But the past cannot
be altered now: I mention it only to warn you against
making the same mistake in the present crisis. If you
do not send aid to Olynthus 'with all your might and
main,' you will prove to have manoeuvred everything for
Philip's benefit (6). You have long been eager to get
the Olynthians into war with Philip, and this has actually
come to pass (7). You have now no alternative except
to aid them vigorously and promptly. You will be
covered with shame, if you do not; and, besides, if
Philip conquers Olynthus, there is the fear of his invading
Attica~ There is, in fact, nothing to hinder him: the
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? 111? ? 9-16 T111; THIRD OLYNTHIAC lix
Phooians have exhausted their funds, and the Thebans
are your toes (8).
But, I shall be told, 'we have unanimously resolved
on succouring Olynthus, and succour it we shall ; we only
want you to tell us how. ' You will per-
haps be surprised, gentlemen, at my answer. 3,13%;ng
I would have you appoint an extraordi- The m'fllfu's 1W-
. . . posul ? ? 10-131
nary commission to rewse your statute-book.
At its meetings, I would have you enact no new statutes,
for you have enough already; but simply repeal those
that are at present injurious (10). I mean, speaking
plainly, those which concern the festival-fund, and some
. of those which concern our military service. By the
former you hand over to those who stay at home, money
which ought to go to soldiers on service. By the latter,
you indemnify deserters and discourage those who desire
to do' their duty. When you have repealed these statutes,
and made the path of salutary counsel safe, then, and
not till then, you may look for some one to propose what
you all know to be desirable (11); but, until you do
this, you must not expect any one to make the best
proposals in your interests, with the certainty of being
ruined by you for his pains. Moreover, it is the states-
men who proposed these statutes, who should also repeal
them (12) ; for it is unfair that their authors should enjoy
a. popularity that is mischievous to the commonwealth, while
the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all falls on
the head of the reformer. Till you set this right, you
cannot expect any one to be either powerful enough to
infringe these laws with impunity, or foolish enough to
plunge into manifest ruin (13).
Remember, again, that a decree is worthless, unless
you are ready to act (14). When will you m "5"";
do your duty, if not now? Has not Philip Awrobatito);
got possession of all our strongholds? Is 81$?
he not our enemy 'l is he not a barbarian? POW? ? 14'32'
is he not--anything you please to call him? (16).
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? 1x THE THIRD 0L YNTHIAO' III ? ? 17-24
. . . _____-_/
After allowing him, after almost aiding him to accomplish
all this, shall we then inquire who is to blame? I know
we shall none of us blame ourselves. Oh no! On the
field of battle no runaway ever blames himself (17).
keep in hand a small standing army for offensive opera-
tions, :1 force that shall really belong to the state and obey
its commanders: we must have none of your mercenary
forces that exist only on paper (19). I would have this
small force consist of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry,
and I would also have one-fourth of each arm citizens,
on short service, to relieve one another, and the rest
mercenaries, with transports for the force, and ten swift
triremes to act as convoy (21--2). At present it is
impossible for us to raise an army fit to meet Philip in
the field ; in the first instance, we must make predatory
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? IV gs 24-33 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlvii
incursions only (23). Citizens must form part of the
force; for it will be remembered, that it was by a
combined force of mercenaries and citizens that you
defeated the Lacedaemonians (in the Corinthian war).
Mercenaries, if left to themselves, are apt to go off on
other business. You must also have citizens on service
to keep a sharp look-out on your commander's conduct
(24). We profess to be at war with Philip; but, as
for your official commanders, apart from a single general
of cavalry, the rest of them stay at home and merely
march in festal array through the market-place. Like
makers of terracotta toys, it is for the market that you
make your officers, and not for war (26). If your cavalry
must he commanded by a foreigner, he ought at least to
be elected by yourselves (27). As to rations for the force,
I reckon the cost at little more than 90 talents for the
year (28). For all other supplies the force must rely on
the spoils of war.
I shall now submit a written statement of ways and
means for the proposed supply (29), which I ask you to
sanction, if it meets with your approval (30).
It will assist your deliberations if you remember that
Philip is constantly managing to get the start of us.
Hence we must carry on the war not mflflfls
with hasty levies from Athens, which (PTOI'Mio)-_
. . . . . Arguments m
Wlll never arrive in time, but With a WWW 01pm.
permanent force on the spot, using as Pom" ? ? 3140-
winter--quarters our islands in the northern Aegean.
From Athens it is difficult to reach those regions either
during the winter, or while the winds are blowing from
the north after n1idsummer,---the seasons usually selected
by Philip for his acts of aggression (31-2). The handling
of the force will rest with the commander appointed by
yourselves and responsible to you. The result will be
that you will prevent Philip's piratical attacks on our
allies, and you will be in security yourselves (33). He
will no longer, as of late, carry off citizens of your own
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? xlviii THE FIRST PHILIPPIO' IV ? ? 34-47
from Lemnos and Imbros, or seize your corn~ships ofi'
Geraestus or your sacred trireme in the bay of Marathon.
At present, you cannot prevent all this (34). In the
arrangement of your festivals, nothing is left unascertained
or undefined, whereas, in your preparations for war, all
is unarranged, unrevised, undefined. We waste in pre-
paration the time required for action; when the crisis
comes, our forces are insufficient ; and, when they are
despatched, they arrive too late (35--6). Philip's arrogant
letter to the Euboeans tells us some unpleasant truths
(37--8). Up to this day you have never made any
proper use of your resources ; and your war with Philip
is like a barbarian's manner of boxing. When he strikes
you, you feel for the blow; you dare not look him in
the face (40). If he is in the Chersonesus, you vote to
send relief there ; if at Thermopylae, the same: you are
always running after his heels, always at his beck and
call (41). But all his activity may be almost regarded as
providential : for his constant encroachments may possibly
arouse you at last (42). I wonder that you do not
notice, with concern and indignation, that a war begun
to chastise Philip has ended in becoming a war for self-
defence. He will not pause in his advance, unless some
one opposes him (43). But, if we make the attempt, the
war will of itself reveal the weak points in his power
(44). Whenever a portion of your own force of citizens joins
in the war, the blessing of Heaven, and the influence of
Fortune, favours the struggle; but, where you merely
send out a general and an empty decree, nothing that
you desire is done. Such an armament makes your
enemies exultant and your allies mortally afraid (45).
It is impossible for all your wishes to be executed by a
general in command of wretched unpaid hirelings (46).
You must make your own citizens soldiers, to be witnesses
of your general's conduct abroad and judges at his audit
on your return. As it is, your generals are constantly
being put on their trial: they die like malefactors by
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? IV gs 48--51 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlix
sentence of the law, and not on the field of battle (47).
As for your gossip about Philip's intentions,. you may
rest assured that he will never allow his real intentions
to be known (48--9). Let us remember only that Philip
is an enemy who keeps us out of our own, and has long
been insulting us ; that the future depends on ourselves ;
and that, unless we are willing to fight him abroad, we
shall perhaps be compelled to fight him at home. The
future cannot fail to be disastrous, unless you do your
duty (50).
As for myself, I have never courted favour, and now
I have spoken my whole mind without reserve. 'What-
ever the consequences may be to lmyself, Q annoy"
I offer my adVIce With the convmtion that (pewme? wt
it will be of advantage to you. I only commwn'
trust that what is for the advantage of us all may
prevail (51).
'Such views,' says Grote, 'were so new, so inde-
pendent of party-sympathies or antipathies, and so
plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in
demands for the future, that they would hardly have
been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the
ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from
his study of Thucydides' . . . 'The first Philippic
is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenes
lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in
their beginnings " (18 ? 246) and given timely warn-
ing to his countrymen ' . . . ' He was not less honest
and judicious in his attempts to fulfil the remaining
portion of the statesman's duty--that of working up
his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enter-
prise ; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking
and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the
public enemy' (c. 87 viii 61, 67).
The date of the speech is indicated by internal
d
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? 1 DATE OF THE FIRST PHILIPPIU
evidence. Philip's march towards Thermopylae,
Data ofthe his expedition against the Chersonesus
"15,25,113", and his sudden attack on Olynthus are
35113-0- all mentioned in chronological order
(4 ? 17). These events belong to the summer of
352 B. C. and the following winter. The Athenians
sent no aid to the Chersonesus until October 351
(3 ? 5). These considerations point to the spring of
351 as the date of the First Philippic. The practical
proposals made by Demosthenes are appropriate to
the spring of that year; the fleet, which forms part
of those proposals, must clearly be sent to the
northern Aegean before July, when the Etesian
winds began to blow (note on ? 31). It is obviously
later than the speech Against Aristocrates, which
makes no mention of Philip's illness (1 ? 13) during
his second Thracian expedition in the winter of
O]. 107, 1 (352--1 B. C. ), although Thrace is the main
subject of a large portion of the speech. Again, the
First Philippic refers to Philip's sudden attack on
Olynthus (4 ? 17), whereas in the Aristocrates
Olynthus had not yet been attacked by Philip,
though she had already come to terms with Athens.
It was not until the second Thracian expedition that
Philip attacked Olynthus, soon after his recovery.
Hence Dionysius of Halicarnassus is mistaken in
placing the First Philippic earlier than the Aristocrates,
though he is right in assigning both speeches to the
same year, 01. 107, 1 (352-1 B. C. )1
Unhappily, the proposals made by Demosthenes
in the First Philippic were not carried into effect.
1 Ep. ad Ammaeum i 4 p. 725, 14 R, Thirlwall v 374-6,
ASchaefer ii 70--32, Blass III i 3002, Blass-Rehdantz p. 328.
On Dionysius' division of the speech into two parts see ASchaefer
ii 692, and note on 4 ? 30.
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? PHILIP AND 0L YNTHUS 1i
Though the speech had been delivered in the spring
of 351, it was not until October that any force was
sent against Philip, and even then it was only the
mercenary commander Charidemus who was sent to
the Chersonesus with only ten triremes and five
talents in money and no soldiers (3 ? 5).
Meanwhile, at Olynthus, there had been a change
of feeling. Athens had ceased to inspire alarm, but
the vast increase in the power of Philip excited the
liveliest apprehension. His encroachment made it
clear that he would not allow Chalcidice to be held
much longer by free Greek communities. Accord-
ingly, after the great victory of Philip over the
Phocians in Thessaly, in the first half of 352, the
Olynthians had seceded from their alliance with him,
and, before November 352, concluded a peace with
Athens which had every prospect of ripening into an
alliance (23 ? 109). No wonder that a few months
afterwards, at the date of the First Philippic, Philip
had made an inroad into the territory of Olynthus,
though without any vigorous prosecution of war.
Athens, in the meantime, had proposed to Olynthus
a scheme of definite alliance against Philip (1 ? 7,
3 7, 16). But the Olynthians were afraid to be
the first to provoke a contest. Mistrust on both
sides continued for several months, till at length
Philip began serious operations against Olynthus,
apparently towards the middle of 349.
The power of Olynthus depended mainly on her
position as the head of a confederacy including most
of the Greek cities of Chalcidice. Philip began a
series of intrigues in Olynthus and her confederate
cities. He may even have expected to incorporate
the Chalcidic confederacy in his own empire without
serious difficulty and without resorting to real war
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? lii THE FIRST OLYNTHIAG I ? ? 1--3
(1 ? 21). If so, he was disappointed, as there is
ground for believing that he encountered considerable
resistance. Philip at first disclaimed all purposes
injurious to Olynthus (9 11). The Olynthians,
however, sent envoys to Athens proposing alliance
and asking for aid to be sent to Chalcidice. The
Athenians readily accepted the alliance and promised
to send a force to co-operate against Philip.
V The Olynthiacs of Demosthenes
It was after the above recognition of Olynthus
as an ally of Athens that Demosthenes delivered
his three Olynthiac Oratilms, all of them probably
during the last seven months of 349. 1 Their
'oxwgmxbs ,1 chronological sequence has been much
3491M disputed. An abstract of each will
now be given in the usual order, and the order
itself will be considered afterwards.
The First Olynthiac
I feel sure you would give much to know what is
the true policy for the present crisis. You will therefore
A "mommy naturally be willing to listen to counsel,
(ewordimfll whether it has been preconsidered, or
Immuctm' has suggested itself on the spur of the
moment (1).
The present crisis is an eloquent call to action. My
own opinion is that you ought to vote the proposed
3, 6,165"ng succours immediately and make the speediest
possible preparations for despatching them
? ? 2_27. from Athens, and that you should also
15215317332? send envoys to announce the fact and to
mwlim? ? 2-15- watch the course of events (2). There is
real danger that Philip's adroitness and unscrupulousness
1 Grote c. 88 viii 69--75.
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? I ? 4-19 THE FIRST 0L Y N THIA C' liii
may wrest to his own purposes some of our vital in-
terests (3). Yet the very source of his own strength is
really favourable to yourselves. For purposes of war,
his autocracy is a great advantage ; but, for purposes of
peace with Olynthus, it is the very opposite (4). The
Olynthians plainly see that the peril in which they stand
involves the ruin and servitude of their country. They
know what has happened to Amphipolis and to Pydna;
and, like other free states, they mistrust a despotic power
on their borders (5). Now, if ever, you must apply your-
selves vigorously to the war by contributing promptly,
by serving personally, and by leaving nothing undone (6).
Had we acted promptly in the case of Amphipolis,
Pydna, Poteidaea, Methone, Pagasae, we should have found
Philip far easier to attack and less strong than now.
At the present moment, another crisis has come (8, 9).
If we allow Philip to reduce Olynthus, what is to prevent
his marching where he pleases (12)? If it be his
principle always to do more than before, and yours to
apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, the war which
is now at a distance will soon be at our very doors
(14, 15).
At the present crisis I advise you to send succours
in two ways z--firstly, by despatching a body of troops
to Olynthus for the express purpose of pro- II wpe? Qegtg
tecting her confederate towns ; and, secondly, P%fi$'$b_
by employing at the same time another Pom" ? ? 16--20-
force of troops and triremes to act aggressively against
Philip's own territory (17). If you neglect either of
these measures, I fear the expedition will fail. As to
pecuniary resources, you have more money than other
people, but you appropriate it yourselves according to your
good pleasure.
Now, if you pay that money to soldiers
on service it is sufficient for the purpose; otherwise,
you need a further fund, or rather you have none at
all to begin with. I shall be asked whether I propose
to apply the festival-fund to military purposes. I propose
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? liv THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC I ? ? 20--28
nothing of the kind (19). I merely say that soldiers
must be raised, and that those who do the work should
receive the pay, whereas your practice is to take the public
money, without any such condition, for the festivals. The
only alternative is an extraordinary war-tax. In any case,
you must act vigorously while you still have the chance
(20).
Let us now consider Philip's present position.
Firstly, he is disappointed at not having carried every-
m "(u-T"; thing before him in Chalcidice (21).
%%? ":}lot),;e Secondly, he is ill at ease about the treacher-
urgency anfithe one condition of Thessaly, on which he
gateway relies for funds (22). Thirdly, he knows
poms ? ? 21--7- that the Paeonians and Illyrians can-
not abide his rule (23). If Olynthus holds out, you
will carry on the war there, and enjoy your own homes
in peace ; but if Philip takes that city, who is to check
him in his advance hither? (25). Neither the Thessalians
nor the Phocians can do so (26); and if there were a
war in Attica itself, it would be attended with enormous
damage and (what is worse) disgrace (27).
Therefore we must all unite in lending our aid and
keeping the war at a distance (in the interest of all
a e? flmovos classes), so that the rich may, by a small
(peroratio). expenditure, enjoy the residue of their re-
conclwon' sources in security; those of military age
gain experience in the territory of Philip and become
redoubtable defenders of the integrity of their native
land; and our public speakers be able to give a good
account of their statesmanship. May heaven grant that
the result of your measures may in every way be
prosperous (28).
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? "$143 TIJE 8Ec'oaw 0L YNTHIAO' iv
The Second Olynthiac
It appears to me to be a remarkably providential
circumstance that We find a co le read . ,
for a. war with Philip who arI; liis neighy- magi? B
hours and who not only have some con- ----
siderable power but are implacable in their A" hostility towards him (1). We must make Introduction
good use of the allies and the advantages ? ? 1'2'
thus provided us (2).
I shall not incite you to your duty by dilating on
Philip's power. That would be too much of a com-
pliment to him, too much of a disparage- B, rim-63ers",-
ment of you (3). The source of his power is I(e? i"? $x? c);s
not in himself, but here (in the devotion of (Hermite)-
his partisans and in your own remissness) "$3,702"
(4). I propose to prove Philip's faithlessness 55 3-10-
by examining his conduct, and also to show that he has
now exhausted all the devices by which he rose to great-
ness (5). His power in itself is founded on perjury and
wrong. He has deceived yourselves, he has deceived the
Poteidaeans, he has deceived the Tliessalians, in fact, all
who have ever had any dealings with him (6, '7). Forts
and havens will not enable Philip to hold his own:
what he needs is the good-will and the common interest
of all his allies. When any one has grown strong, like
Philip, by an aggressive and a dishonest policy, the
slightest reverse is enough to 'overthrow his power. A
solid and durable power cannot possibly be acquired
by means of injustice and perjury and falsehood (9, 10).
My own opinion is that we should at once aid the
Olynthians, and that we should also send
envoys to Thessaly (11) ; but it will not be I? J$? ? gis
enough for these envo s to make s eeclies Theomm's I'm-
(12); you must act ypromptly and) serve poms ? ? 11--13'
personally, and the weakness of Philip's power will soon
be revealed (13).
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? lvi THE SECOND 0L YNTHIAC' II ? ? 14--27
The power of Macedonia, as has been repeatedly
proved by experience, is useful as a make-weight to
111 "(was turn the scale, but is feeble as an inde-
P,_Og? '$bfh'i'2-TM_ pendent force (14). Philip's power has been
livability and made less secure by the very operations
"9,3253%? " which appear to constitute his greatness.
? ? 14-3? - Philip and his subjects have not the same
predilections. His ambition is to lead a. life of adventure
and peril in quest of a glory in which they have no
share (15, 16). I know on good authority, that his
mercenaries and guards are no better than others (17),
that he is jealous of any experience in war, that he
thrusts aside any who are too virtuous to tolerate his
daily vices (18). He is surrounded by a band of
brigands, a troop of flatterers, bufi'oons and jesters (19).
His past good fortune lends to all his real weakness a
fallacious air of strength; but, on any mischance, his
weak points will be exposed to view (20, 21). If any
of you think that Philip is formidable because he is so
fortunate, I admit that fortune has a preponderance, is in
fact everything, in human affairs. But I should prefer
our own good fortune to Philip's, if you would, even to
a moderate extent, do your duty (22). Yet here you are,
sitting still, doing nothing. The idler cannot ask even his
friends to work for him, much less the gods. No wonder
that Philip, always in the field, always on the move,
doing everything for himself and never letting any
opportunity slip, prevails over you who merely talk, and
ask questions, and pass votes, without acting (23). In
bygone days, men of Athens, you lavished your treasure
and bore the brunt of battle, to secure the rights of
others: yet now you are loath to serve, and slow to con-
tribute, even in defence of your own possessions (24).
I say then that you must levy an extraordinary war-tax,
must serve in person with alacrity, and do your own
duty before scrutinising the conduct of others (27). Why
do all your commanders avoid this war and seek out
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? u ? ? 23_~31 THE SECOND OLYNTHIAO 1m
wars of their ownl Because here the prizes of war are
yours, while, in l: e other case, the risks are fewer, and
the gains belong to the commanders and soldiers (28).
When you see how badly things are going, you impeach
the commanders ; and, when they urge these strong pleas,
you acquit them. The result is that, while some hold
one opinion and some another, the public interests suffer.
You must get rid of rival factions (29), and be yourselves
again. You must restore once more a general liberty of
counsel, speech and action (30).
To sum up, you must all contribute fairly according
to your means; all take your turns of service till
all have been afield; give every speaker 0' "flows
8. hearing, and adopt the best advice, (Pev'waqivl
no matter who gives it. If you act thus, mmwn'
you will not merely praise the speaker at the moment,
but yourselves afterwards, when your general prospects
have improved (31).
After the delivery of the first two Olynthiacs,
a body of mercenary troops was sent by Athens to
the aid of the Olynthians and Chalcidians. The
wealthier citizens voluntarily contributed to the cost
of the outfit of this expedition ; but the very point
that Demosthenes had insisted on was neglected.
None of the Athenians served in person, nor was
any money whatsoever assigned for the pay of the
mercenaries. Presently a victory was gained over
Philip or his generals, and the news was sent to
Athens, where it inspired the people with the empty
hope that they were now in a fair way of taking
revenge on Philip. But Demosthenes himself was
not deceived. He clearly discerned that it was only
a partial success in no way decisive of the war as
a whole. He accordingly felt himself 'oxweuxbs Y'
constrained to address the people once 349 8-0'
more with a view to warning them against losing
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? lviii THE THIRD 0L YNTHIAG III ? ? 1-8
sight of the peril in which Olynthus was still
standing.
The Third Olynthiac
The language that I hear about ' taking vengeance on
A 6 Philip' is inconsistent with the facts. The
18283375)? " facts compel us to look to our personal
I'l'TO'i'we? io" safety. There was a time when we might
' ' have held our own and punished Philip
too ; but now our first care must be the security of our
allies (1, 2).
The present crisis calls for anxious deliberation. I
B. 61686,"; have no doubt as to your dutypmy only
I (e? ffl'zlatiol doubt is how to address you upon it. Most
Suiwnlfffe' of your losses have been due to inaction and
"mum" "3'5" not to ignorance. If I speak my mind, I
must ask you to be patient (3).
I must beg you not to make the same mistake as you
made three years ago. When Philip was besieging a
stronghold in Thrace, you energetically resolved in
November (362) to send an expedition against him Presently, there were reports that he was ill, and that
he was dead. Accordingly, you only despatched Chari-
demus with ten empty ships and five talents. If you
had promptly executed your first resolve, Philip would
have given you no further trouble (5). But the past cannot
be altered now: I mention it only to warn you against
making the same mistake in the present crisis. If you
do not send aid to Olynthus 'with all your might and
main,' you will prove to have manoeuvred everything for
Philip's benefit (6). You have long been eager to get
the Olynthians into war with Philip, and this has actually
come to pass (7). You have now no alternative except
to aid them vigorously and promptly. You will be
covered with shame, if you do not; and, besides, if
Philip conquers Olynthus, there is the fear of his invading
Attica~ There is, in fact, nothing to hinder him: the
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? 111? ? 9-16 T111; THIRD OLYNTHIAC lix
Phooians have exhausted their funds, and the Thebans
are your toes (8).
But, I shall be told, 'we have unanimously resolved
on succouring Olynthus, and succour it we shall ; we only
want you to tell us how. ' You will per-
haps be surprised, gentlemen, at my answer. 3,13%;ng
I would have you appoint an extraordi- The m'fllfu's 1W-
. . . posul ? ? 10-131
nary commission to rewse your statute-book.
At its meetings, I would have you enact no new statutes,
for you have enough already; but simply repeal those
that are at present injurious (10). I mean, speaking
plainly, those which concern the festival-fund, and some
. of those which concern our military service. By the
former you hand over to those who stay at home, money
which ought to go to soldiers on service. By the latter,
you indemnify deserters and discourage those who desire
to do' their duty. When you have repealed these statutes,
and made the path of salutary counsel safe, then, and
not till then, you may look for some one to propose what
you all know to be desirable (11); but, until you do
this, you must not expect any one to make the best
proposals in your interests, with the certainty of being
ruined by you for his pains. Moreover, it is the states-
men who proposed these statutes, who should also repeal
them (12) ; for it is unfair that their authors should enjoy
a. popularity that is mischievous to the commonwealth, while
the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all falls on
the head of the reformer. Till you set this right, you
cannot expect any one to be either powerful enough to
infringe these laws with impunity, or foolish enough to
plunge into manifest ruin (13).
Remember, again, that a decree is worthless, unless
you are ready to act (14). When will you m "5"";
do your duty, if not now? Has not Philip Awrobatito);
got possession of all our strongholds? Is 81$?
he not our enemy 'l is he not a barbarian? POW? ? 14'32'
is he not--anything you please to call him? (16).
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:09 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. 31175009758841 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 1x THE THIRD 0L YNTHIAO' III ? ? 17-24
. . . _____-_/
After allowing him, after almost aiding him to accomplish
all this, shall we then inquire who is to blame? I know
we shall none of us blame ourselves. Oh no! On the
field of battle no runaway ever blames himself (17).
