ForitisOneof
the Explanations that St.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
ZZTZ Study and Labour, this makes every ofMm, theycan'tbeac- one exclaim against those who have y>>*w, but tixymay &t
neglected to learn them. ****&*. Thisislbtrue, Socrates, thatifyouwilltakethe
pains only to examine what that one word is, topu
nish the Wicked, what force itbears, and what end is proposed by this Punishment ; that alone issufficient
to perswade you of thisTruth, that Virtue may be acquired. * FornoBodypunishesaMiscreantvrsqx--^"othet ly because he has been wicked, unless it be some Sa-^f*j*"
vage Beast, who punishes 'em to satisfie his o w n ^ ^ ^ Cruelty. ButhewhopunisheswithReason,does
not do it for by-past Faults, for it is impossible to hinder what has been done from being done ; but
for Faults that are to come, to the end that the
guilty may not relapse, and that others may take examplebytheirPunishment. AndeveryMan,whoHotatdty hasthisforhisEnd, mustofnecessitybeperswaded,he*fiTM>>sr
that Virtue may be taught. For he punishes only /J^iw " forthefuture. Nowitisplain,thatallMen,whoMenmay
put a force * All that "Protagoras fays here is false. There are two upontbtm- things to be considered in the punishment of the wicked ;selves and
thepunishment oftheSin, whxchisasatisfactiontoDivineobeythe justice, whereof the Justice of M e n is only the Eccho, if w e Law* maybeallow'dsotospeak. Judges,asStewardsofDispen
sersOf theDivinePower? takeaway theLife,or inflictother punishments on the wicked, to the end that Sin may be pu
nished. And, as Heads of the Government, who do all for the good of the State, they order that this punishment shall be executed publickly, that eVery one may take warning ; for the Fool himself becomes more wife when the wicked Man is puniflicd : Ttftiltntt flagel/ato ffultui saphtttlor erity Pxovj
Ri pu-
? ? 258
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists]
punish the Wicked, whether it be in private or in publick, doitonlyforthisEndjandyourAthenians doitaswellasothers. Fromwhenceitfollows,by a most just and neceflary Consequence, that your
Athenians are perswaded as well as other People, thatVertuemaybeacquiredandtaught. Thusitis with a great deal of reason, that your Athenians give ear in their Councils to a Mason, a Smith, a Shooe-maker, &c. and that they are perswaded, that Vertue may be taught : Methinks this is suffi ciently proved.
The only Scruple that remains is, thatwhich you m a k e a b o u t g r e a t M e n ; f o r y o u a s k w h e n c e it c o m e s that great M e n teach their Children in their Infancy, all that can be taught by Masters, and make them verylearnedinallthoseArts, andthattheyneglect to teach them their proper Vertues, which at the fame time cause all their Grandeur and their true Character. To answer you that, Socrates, I shall have no further recourse to Fables as before, but shall give you very plain Reasons.
knottier
fdftVrin- an. t0 which all M e n are equally obliged, or other-
* Don'tyoubelieve, thatthereisonethingabove
tberJ" wifetherecan**neimerSocietynorCity> The marfo. SolutionofyourDifficultydependsuponthisone only Point alone ; for if this only thing exists, and
t h a t it b e n e i t h e r t h e A r t o f a C a r p e n t e r , n o r t h a t o f aSmith,northatofaPotter, butthatitisJustice, TemperanceandHoliness, and,inaword,allthat
*ThisisanotherfalseArgumentoftheSophist. Itiscer tain, that Vertue exists j that all M e n are obliged to partake ofit,andthatGodhasgiventhemVertue. Butitisalso certain,thattheyhayelostitbythe illusethey made of their Free-will, and that they can't recover it but by the helposGod. Education,whichisaMeanstoassistNature, isofnoefficacy,unlessGodgiveaBlessingtoit:Itmay curb the wicked for some time, by reviving some Sparks of their almcstdeadKeafcnandbymghmingthemwiththepunish ments of Vice, and it is here that it usually terminates 3 but thatalonewillneverinfuseVertue. Man plantsand Man Maters, but *cisGod who giveth the encreate.
is
? ? avery greattruth,
Prqtagoras; Or, The Sophists. 25^
is comprehended under the N a m e of Vertue, if that
thing exists and that all M e n are obliged to partake
thereof, insomuch that every particular Person, who
would instruct himself or do any other thing, is
obliged to guide himself by its Rules, or to renounce
all that it desires 5 that all those w h o will not par
take thereof, Men, Women, and Children, must be
reproved, reprehended, and chastized, till Instructi
ons or Punishments reform them ; and that those
who will not be reform'd, must either be punished
withDeathorBanished-,ifitbeso,asyoucan't
doubt of it, and that notwithstanding this, those
greatMen,ofwhomyouspeak,shouldteachtheir
Children all other things, and should neglect to
teach them this only thing, I mean Virtue j it must
then be * a Miracle if those Children, so much
neglected, become People of Worth and good Citi
zens. I have already proved to you, that every
Body is perswaded that Virtue may be taught in
Publick and Private. Since it may be taught, do
you think that Fathers teach their Children all the
things that they may be securely ignorant of, with
out incurring either the Pain of Death, or the least Penalty ? , and that they neglect to teach them those
things the Ignorance whereof is usually attended by
Death, Prison, Exile, Confiscation of Goods, and,
in a word, by the utter ruine of Families ? For this is# urdthtt
thethingthathappenstothosewho arenotbroughtthepartof up vertuouily. Is there not a greater likelihood **>>/*>>*? that they will imploy all their Pains and all their r**, not,.
Application to teach them that which isloimpor-uptau t>> tantandsonecessary> Yes,withoutdoubt,Soera-counterfeit tes,andwe oughttothink,thatthoseFathers,ta-defame.
kingtheirChildrenintheiryoungerYears, thatisto fay, as soon as those Children are capable of. under standing what is said to them, never cease all their
* Yes, without doubt, it is a Miracle; for w e are natural ly so corrupt, that God must intervene to restore the Soul to theStatewhichithaslost. ThisSophistthinkshefayssome thing that's absurd and impossible, but at the same time speaks
Rr a ? J-ife-
? 260
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
Life time to teach and reprehend th<<m, and not only theFathers, butalsotheMothers,Nurses, andPre ceptors : They all chiefly indeavour to make Chil dren honest and virtuous, * by letting them see upon every Thing they do and upon every Word they speak, that such a Thing isjust, and such a Thing is u n j u s t -, t h a t t h i s i s h a n d s o m , a n d t h a t u n h a n d s o m ; that this is holy and that impious j that w e must do this, and shun that. If Children voluntarily obey these Precepts, they are rewarded and praised ; and, if they don't obey them, they are threatned and cha stizedj they are propt up and setright, likeTrees that bend and become crooked.
When they are sent to School, it is earnestly re commended totheirMastersnottoapplythemselves somuchtoteachthemtoreadwellandtoplaywell upon Instruments,as to teach them Honesty and M o d e sty. Therefore those Masters take very great care of it. When theycanreadandunderstandwhattheyread, instead of giving them Precepts by word of Mouth, they,makethemreadthebestPoets, andobligethem togetthembyheart. TheretheyfindexcellentPre ceptsforVirtue,and. Recitalswhich containthePrai
sesofthegreatestMen ofAntiquity,totheendthat thole Children, being inflam'd with a noble Emula tion, may imitateand endeavour toresemble them.
The Masters of Mufick, and those who teach'em to play upon Instruments, take the fame Pains, they train up young People to Modesty, and take particu lar care that they do nothing unhandsom.
When they understand Mufick and can play well upon Instruments, they put into their Hands the PoemsoftheLyriquePoets,whichtheymakethem ling and . play upon the Harp, to the end tb. 3t those Numbers and that Harmony may insinuate them
*AlfthisEducationdidthenonlytend,anddoesnomore now,forthe-mostpart,buttoaccustomChildren-toobey the LawsofHonour,DecencyandJusticealamode,andtogovern
themselvesinallthingsnotbyPrinciplesofKeligion, but by M a x i m s o f P o l i c y , k t h a t t o t e a c h V i r t u e :?
? selves
? Protagoras: Or, Ike Sophists. 161
selvesintotheirSouls,whitestthey areyettender and that being thereby rendred more soft, tractable, polite, and, ifwe may say so, more harmonious and more agreeable, they may be more capable ofspeak ingwellanddoingwell:forthewholeLifeofMan has need of * Number and Harmony.
Not being satisfied with those Means, they fend
them also to Masters of Exercise, to the end that
havingafoundandrobustBody, theymay thebetter
execute the Orders of a Masculine and sound Spirit,
and that the Weakness of their Constitution m a y not By this rea-
obligethemtorefusetoservetheirCountry, whe-fi>>tixcb;i-
ther it be in War, or in other Functions ; and those ^"f*1"
who fend their Children most to Masters, are such '? ? ? $*
as are best able to do it, that is to fay, the richest, most w >> -
ipsomuch that the Children of the richest begin their <<>>*.
Exercises the earliest and continue them the longest ;But the for they go thither in their tender Years, and don't taws **?
cease going tillafter they are Men. T m ' T F They have no sooner quitted those Masters, but mr Man-
their Country obliges them to learn the Laws, and>>m. to live according to the Rules they prescribe, to the end that they may do all things by Reason, and no thingoutofConceitandFancy. And,asWriting- masters give their Scholars, who have not as yet learn'd, a Rule under their Paper, that in copying their Examples , they may always follow the Lines that are traced outj so the Country gives Laws to Men that were invented and established by the an cientLegislators. Itforceththemtogovernandto submit to be governed according to their Laws ; and ifany one goes astray it punifheth him ; and this
P u n i s h m e n t is c a l l e d w i t h y o u , a s i n m a n y o t h e r P l a c e s , byaWord whichproperlysignifiestoreform;asJustice reformingthosewho turnasidefromtheRulewhich ought to guide them.
* Yes, but it is of such Numbers and Harmony asMen don't teach : the Harmony which they teach oftentimes serves only to render them more unfit for the other.
Rr 3 After
? ? z6z
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
After so much Pains taken, both in publick and private, to inspire Virtue, are you amazed, Socra tes, and can you have the least doubt that Virtue maybetaught? Thisshouldbesofarfromsurpri zing you, that you ought, on the other hand, to be very rrrach surprized ifthe contrary should be true.
But you will say, how comes it to pass, that many of the greatest Mens Children become the mostdishonestPeopleoftheWorld? Here'savery plain Reason, that has nothing amazing in it, if what I have already supposed be firm and unshaken ;
that is to lay, if it be true, * that every M a n is in^ dilpensably obliged to have Virtue , to the end that SocietiesandCitiesmaysubsist. Ifthatbeso,as without doubt it is, choose among all the other Sciences or Professions that Men are imploy'd in, whichyoushallthinkfit,andyoushallseewhatI
Another
falserea- WOuldbeat.
fining. Set LetUSsuppose,forexample,ThatthisCitycould
'ntfss' notfubfift>unlesswewereallPlayersontheFlute: t Isitnotcertain, that we should all addict our selves to the Flute, that both in publick and private we would teach one another to play upon it; that we would reprehend and chastize those who should
neglect to play, and that we would no more make that Science a Mystery to them, than we do that of JusticeandLaw? FordoesanyBodyrefusetoteach anotherJustice? And doesanyBodykeepthatSci^ encesecret,asispracticedinotherArts> No, cer tainly. Andthereasonofitisthis,ThattheVirtue
* He isobliged to have Virtue, and God hath given him a Light capable to guide him to the true Fountain j but So cieties and Cities don't examine if he be truly virtuous ; it is enough for them that he counterfeits it, and that he lives as- ifhewereso. TheSophistarguesalwaysuponafalsePrin ciple.
tThisSophistalwaysmistakeshimself. Itisnotthefame withVirtueaswithotherArts;aManisanableArtisttho' he has not acquired the highest perfection inArt ; but a Man js not virtuous, unless he has all Virtue ; for ifone part of it bewantingalliswanting. ? "Protagorasisgoingimmediatelyto fall into a manifest Contradiction.
and
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. z6y
and Justiceof everyparticularMan isusefultothe wholeBody. That'sthereasonwhyeveryBodyis always ready to teach his Neighbour all that concerns
LawandJustice. IfitwerethefameintheArtof Playing on the Flute, and that we were all equally ready to teach others, without any reserve* what we know of it, do you think, Socrates, that the Children of the most excellent Players upon the Flute, would always become more perfect in that Art thansheChildrenoftheworstPlayers> Iam per-
fwadedyoubelievenothingofit. *TheChildren whowouldbefoundtobethemosthappilybornfor that Art, would be those who should make the greatest progress therein, and who should render themselves the most famous for it, the rest would fatigue themselves in vain and would never gain anyNameonit,aswedailyfeetheSonofanex
cellent Player upon the Flute to be but an indifferent Scholar ; and, on the other hand, the Son of a Block head to become a very able Musician : But in gene ral they are all good enough, t ifyou compare them with the ignorant and with those w h o never handled aFlute. Wemustholditforcertain,thatitisthe fameinthepresentcase;suchanoneaswouldap pear to you now to be the most unjust of all thole
* Vrotagaras contradicts himself by this Argument ; for if pone but those'who are happily born acquire the perfection of Arts, and that M e n can't change an unhappy Birth, it fol lows from thisPrinciple, that Men cannot even teach the perfectionofArts;anditisacertaintruth. Howcouldthey inspireuswithVirtuethen? forwemustbeashappilyborn forvirtue. What isitthentobehappilyborn? isittohave bur Reason less chang'd and corrupted ? In this state Educa tion cultivates the natural Seed which God hath fow'd in our Souls,andGod,by hisBlesling,makes them grow and bringsthem t o t h e i r p e r f e c t M a t u r i t y . T h e n 'tis n e i t h e r N a t u r e a l o n e t h a t procures Virtue, nor Labour alone, nor both together, 'tis God alone; for'tishewho correctsour depravedNature and bleffeth our Labour.
t One may be comparatively able in Arts, but not so in Virtue. We maybelesswickedthanothers,butthatdoes not make us virtuons.
Rr4 who
? ? a64
Protagoras! : Or, the Spfhisisl
whoarebroughtupintheknowledgeoftheLaw* andincivilSociety,wouldbeaveryjustMan and even able to teach Justice, jf you should compare him with People who have neither Education, Law, Tribunals, nor Judges, who are not forced by any necessitytoapplythemselvestoVirtue-, andwho, in a word, would resemble * those Savages which Fberecrates. caused to be acted last Year, at the t Country-feasts of Bacchus. Believe me, if you were among Men, like those Misanthropes that that Poet introduces, you would think your selfvery happy to fallintotheHands,ofan \EuribatesandaFhrynon- ddf, andyouwouldsighaftertheWickednessofour People, against which you declaim to much now. ButyourDistempercomesonlyfromtoomuchease: because every Body teaches Virtue as they can , and
you are pleased to cry out and to say, that there is not so much as one Master that teacheth it. It is just as if you should seek in Greece for a Master who teacheth the Greek tongue, you will find none: Why ? Because every Body teacheth it. Indeed if you seek for one who can teach Tradesmens Sons
the Trade of their Fathers with the fame Capaci ty as their Fathers themselves or sworn Masters can perform it, I confess, Socrates, that such a Ma-
* The PoetTherecrateshad actedaPJay, whereof the Title wasi! yqioi>TheSavages. Andthereissomeappearance,that h e r e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e i n t h e u n h a p p y L i f e t h a t t h e first M e n led, before they were united by Society ; and his aim was, to let the Greeks fee that there was no Happiness for them, but to be well united, and faithfully to execute the Treaty of Peace, u hich had so lately terminated a long and fatal War.
fAttheCountry-feastsofBacchus. HefaystheCountry- feasts, because there were otfier Feasts of Bacclw, that were celebrated in the. City the beginning of the Spring, and tbe Country-feasts were celebrated the latter end of Autumn in the Fields.
|]Euribates and Thrynondaswere two notorious Profligates, w h o had given occasion for the Proverbs, A n Attion of Euri bates , to do the jidlons of Euribates , 'tit anotter Phrynondas. HeretheSophistcompliestoKeason. Itiswithoutalldoubt thatMencanteachMentheVirtuethatthosePeoplehad.
fter
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. z. 6$ ster would not easily be found ? ,but there isnothing
moreeafiethantofindonewho canteachtheIgno-Butvirtue rant. It is the fame with Virtue and all other*<<***? Things. And how' littleToeVer the advantage \&M>>*f"f
thatanotherMan hasoverus,topushus,forward^f"0"
andtomakeusadvanceinthewayofVirtue>itis
always a very considerable thing, and for whi^h we
oughttothinkourselvesveryhappy. Now Iamobservtthe
certainlyone of those who have all the necessaryTridtostbe Qualities for that j for I k n o w better than any other So? W-
Person in the World, all that must be done to be comeperfectlyanhonestMan:andIcansay,that IdonotrobthemoftheMoneywhichItakejnay, I deserve more, even in the Opinion of m y Scholars. Wherefore this }s the Bargain that I usually make : When any Body has learned of me, if he will, he paysmewhatothersusedtogivemejifnot,he may go into a Temple, and, after having sworn that, whatIhavetaughthimisworthsomuch,deposit theSumwhichhedesignsforme. Socrates,Thisis the Fable and the simple Reasons I have thought fit tomakeuseoftoprovetoyou,thatVirtuemaybe. taught, ^nd that the Athenians are all perlwaded of itj and to let you fee, that we must not be astonish ediftheChildrenofthegreatestMen arecommon lyverylittleworth, andifthoseoftheignorantand of the poorest succeed better, since we even see that theSonsofPolycletus, whoareofthefameAgewith Xanttppm and Puralus, are nothing, if compared with theirFather, andsoofmany otherChildrenof (C)urgreatestMasters. But>>forthosewhom tjust how nam'd, itisnottimetojddgethem, thereisstill hopes, andtheirYouthisaRefugeforthem.
This long and 'fine'Discourse being pronounced with much Ostentation and Pride, Protagoras held his Tongue, and I, after having been a long time put toastand,asaMancharm'dandravish'd,Ilookt upon him as ifhe ought to speak on still, and to tell me thingsthatIveryimpatientlyexpected:Butfee
ing that he had actually done , and having at last . 'i ? resu
? ? z66
Protagoras: Or, tbeSophistsl
resumed Courage with much difficulty, I turned to wardsHippocrates. Intruth,Hippocrates,laidIto him,IcannotexpresshowmuchIamindebtedto you, for having obliged me to come hither , for I would not for all the World not have heard Protago ras : hitherto I believed, that it was nowise by the help and care of Men, that we became honest Peo ple:butnowIam perswadedthatitisathing purelyhumane. ThereisonlyonesmallDifficulty1 remaining, which Protagoras, who has just now de monstratedsuchfinethings,willeasilyresolve. If we should consult some of our great Orators upon
those Matters, perhaps they would entertain us with Herepn*- such like Discourses, * and that we should believe desailthosewq heard a Pericles, or some of those who have
te'fthat ^eenthem0^Eloquentjand,afterthat,ifweshould the]were a make objection to them, they would not know what
little taint- t o s a y n o r w h a t t o a n s w e r , b u t b e a s m u t e a s a B o o k . edbythe guttjj0'oneshouldaskthemneversolittleupon
the"? "! ! wsiattnevmighthavealreadysaid,theywouldne ws*/;the verend,andwoulddoasaBrassKettle,which,be- Sophijis. ingoncestruck,keepsitssoundalongtime,unless
one puts his Hand upon it and stops it^ for that's just what our Or-ators do, so soon as they are touch edtheyresoundwithoutend. Itisnotthefame
with Protagoras, for he is not only very capable of holdinglongandfineDiscourses, ashehasjustnow madeitappear, butalsoofansweringpreciselyand in few Words, to the Questions that are asked him,
and can start others, arid wait for and receive the Answers as he ought , which few People are able to do.
Now then, Protagoras, saidItohim, therewants but a small thing to content me upon the whole, and I shall be fully satisfied when you shall have
*This isadifficultPassage,ifwe havenoregardtothetimej thatistofay,ifwe dohotobservetheDateoftheDialogue. It is that w h i c h deceived Henry Steplxns, w h o translated it as
? iiTerideswere stillalive,whereashehadbeendeadeightor nine Years.
had
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. z6f
hadthegoodnesstoanswerit. Yousay,thatVirtue can be taught, and ifI may believe any Body in the Worlduponthat,'tisyou. *ButIprayyoutore movetheScruplewhichyouhaveleftinmyMind: You have said, that Jupiter sent Shame and Justice to Men-, and in your whole Discourse you have spoke of Justice, Temperance and Sanctity, as ifVir tue were one only thing which ineludeth all those Qualities. Explainittomethenexactly,ifVirtue be one, and if Justice, Temperance, Sanctity, are only itsParts, or ifall those Qualities which I have now named be only different Names of one and the lamething. Thisiswhat1furtherdesireofyou.
'There is nothing more eafie, Socrates, than to h-TUS^st tisfie you in that point : For Virtue is one thing and **? <<**; those are itsParts. ses,***
mSS Kofi*hinV? ethose*? p*rts>astfe? S? * Mouth, Nose, Ears and Eyes are the Parts of theftfrcoup- Face > Or are they Parts like Parts of Gold, that/"* <f*ffi- are all of the fame Nature as the Mass, and differ*"*****? from each other only in Quantity ?
They are without doubt parts of it, as the Mouth and the Nose are parts of the Face.
_ But,saidI,doMen acquire,someonepartofthis Virtue,andothersanother? Or isthereanecessity thathewho acquiresonemustacquireall>
Bynomeansansweredhe. +Foryouseeevery Pay People who are valiant and unjust, and others who arejustwithout being wife.
For
* Spcrates does not trouble himself to answer all the So phisms o? -TrotaSoras, which are too gross ; but he goes at once to the main point of the Question, which consists to know theNatureofVirtuejforVirtuebeingwellknown, it willbeclearlyseen,thatitisnotpossibleforMen toteach
? t That'sthePoison ofthisDoctrine, which isbuttoomuch
spreadabroadtothisDay Somefancy,thatVirtuemaybe divided,soasaManmayhavesomeofitspartswithoutha ving the restj which is contrary to all the Light of Reason, ashasbeenexplainedintheArgument, ftwafinopposition
? ? x68
Protagoras: Or, The Sophist/;
? .
For Valour and Wisdom are only parts of Vir"
tuc.
Assuredly, laid-he, andWisdom isthegreatestof
its parts.
And is,everyoneofitspartsdifferentfromano
ther?
'Without doubt.
And everyonehasitsProperties: Asintheparts
of the Face the Eyes are not of the lame use with
the Ears, and have different Properties and Faculties,
and ib of all the other parts, they are all different
and don't resemble each other neither in Form nor
Quality, tsitthefameofthepartsofVirtuejdoes
hot one of them in no wise resemble another ? and do
they absolutely differ in themselves and in their Fa- culties? Itisevident, thattheydonotresembleeach
otheratall,ifitbethefameofthemasoftheEx ample which we have made use of.
Socrates^, that is Very certain and the Example is . just.
Then, laid I to him, Virtue has no other of its parts which resemble Knowledge, Justice, Valour, Temperance nor Sanctity.
No withoutDoubt.
Comethen,LetyouandIseeandexaminetothe bottomtheNatureofeveryoneofitsparts. Letus beginwithJustice:Isitanythingornothing? For my part,Ifinditissomething;whatdoyouthink?
I also think it to be something.
Socrates>> IfthenanyBodyshouldapplyhimselftoyou goingto an(jmg5anjshouldfayt0US)ProtagorasandSocra-
justiceW tes->exP*aint0me>Iprayyou,whatisthatwhich SanctityanyoujustnowcalTdJustice5isitsomething thatis UtoneandjustOrUnjust?
the fame
'""*? ?
to this very Error that Solomon wrote in theEcclesiasies, Ch. 9.
HewhofinrnthinonethingfbaO. UsemuchBJches.
ForitisOneof the Explanations that St. Hierome gives to this Passage, 7l>at one only Sin cansetb many former good Works to perish , and that all Virtues accompany one another, insomuch that lie who has one has all ; and he who fins in one thing issubject to all Vices without exception*
I
? ? Pfotdgoras : Ot, the Sophists. i6?
I s h o u l d a n s w e r h i m o f f h a n d , t h a t it is s o m e t h i n g that isjust; would not you answer the feme?
Yes certainly.
Justice consists then , he would lay , according to
you, inbeingjust? Wewouldfayyes? ,isitnotso?
Without doubt, Socrates.
And ifhe. should ask us after that, Don't you also lay, that there is a Sanctity ? should not w e answer him in the same manner, that there is?
Assuredly.
You maintain, he'd reply, that it is something;
whatisitthen? isittobeholyortobeprophane?
Formy part, Iconfess, Protagoras, thatatthisQue
stion I should be all in a passion, and should say to t h e M a n , S p e a k S e n s e , I p r a y y o u ? , W h a t i s t h e r e
that can be holy , if Sanctity it self be not holy ? Wouldnotyouanswerthus?
Yes indeed, Socrates.
Ifafter that, the Man should continue to que stion us, and should say, But what did you fay a Minute ago ? have I misunderstood you ? It seem ed to me, that you said the parts of Virtue were all different, and that one was never like another. Formypart,Ishouldanswerhim,Youhavereason to alledge, that that was said ; but if you think it was Iwho saidit,youmisunderstoodme;forit isProtagoraswho affirmedit,Ionlyask'dtheQue stion : doubtless he would not fail to apply himself toyou,Protagoras;hewouldsay,Doyouagreeto what Socrates says? Is*it you alone that assure me, that none of the parts of Virtue are like to one ano
ther? Isthatyour Opinion? What would you an swer him, Protagorai ?
I should be forced to confess it, Socrates.
And, afterthisConfession, what couldwe answer
him, if he should continue his Questions and tellFar that us,AccordingtoyouthenSanctityisneitherajust""*/*'f**' j thing,norJusticeaholything; butJusticeispro-"^J'j% phaneandSanctityisunjust. IsthenthejustMm^JZwere
pro- unlike.
? ? 2jo
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
prophane and impious? what should we answer him, Protagoras? Iconfess,thatformypart,Ishould answer him, that I maintain Justice to be holy, and Sanctitytobejust; and, ifyou yourselfdid not preventme,Ishouldanswerforyou,thatyou are perswaded, that Justice is the fame thing with San ctity, or at least a thing very like it, and that Sancti ty is the fame thing with Justice, or very like it. See thenifyouwouldhinderme toanswersoforyou, o r i f y o u w o u l d c o n f e s s it t o m e .
I should not confess it to you, Socrates ; for that does not seem to m e to be true at the bottom, and we oughtnottograntsoeasily,thatJusticeisHo liness, and that Sanctity is Justice : There is some difference between them ; But what will you make ofthat? Ifyouwill,IconsentthatJusticeisHoly, and thatSanctity isJust.
How, z/J to/, said I to him, I have nothing to dowiththat,itisnotasJwillthat isinquestion, it is You or I, it is our Perswasion and our Prin
ciple,and,ifwe refuteoneanother,that fortoarz>>eagai>>siS>>t,. g whjch do? S nothing but darken tfae
tevli"1" - Tlut<<and renderProofsuseless,must be removed.
However, we may fay, answered he, that Justice resembles Sanctity in something; for
^sorryEvasionofthe l^fnlu^m^rlr tTsareLTaniai^ft
insensibleresemblance,that hemaynotacknowledge thatrtftJT "? yery^naturaa veryjen-
onethingalwaysresemblesanotherin s? mes? n'WhUe " selfhaSlns? me measurearesemblancetoBlack,Hard
tO Soft, and K) of all Other Things whichseemtobethemostcontraryto eachother- ThoseveryPartswnichwe kaveagree(jhaveeachdifferentProper
ties and Faculties , and that one is not l i k e t h e o t h e r , I m e a n t h e p a r t s o f t h e F a c e -, i f y o u look to them narrowly, you will find, that they re semble each other a little, and that they are in some measure one like another : and, after this manner, you may verywellprove,ifyouwill,thatallthings arelikeoneanother. But,however,itisnotjustto
call
? ? iProtagprast Or9 The Sophists. 27*
call things alike, that have but a small resemblance toeachother, asitisnotjustneithertocallthose thingsunlikethatdifferbutaverylittlefrom each other: As a light resemblance does not render things alike, to (peak properly, ib a finall difference does not make them unlike.
Being amazed at this Discourse of the Sophist, I askhim, Doesthenthejustandholyseemtoyouto have only a lightresemblance to each other?
That resemblance, Socrates^ is not so small as I have said, but at the fame time it is not so great as you fly.
Well, saidItohim, sinceyouseemtome tobein ibillanHumour againstthisSanctityandJustice,lee us leave them there, and let us take some other Sub ject. *WhatdoyouthinkofFolly,isitnotentire lycontrarytoWisdom?
It seems so to me.
When Men have govern'd themselves well and and profitably, don't they seem to you to be more temperate and more moderate than when they do the contrary ?
Without contradiction.
Are they not then govern'd by Moderation ?
It cannot be otherwise.
And those who have no good government over
themselves, don't they act foolishly, and are in no wise moderate in their Conduct?
I agree with you in that.
Therefore is not acting foolishly contrary to acting moderately ?
Itisagreed.
? That which is done foolishly, does it not come
from Folly 5 and does not that which is done di screetly proceed from Moderation ?
* Socrates isgoing to prove, that Temperance and Modera tionarethefamethingwithWisdom, seeingtheyarecontra ry to Folly; for one Contrary can have but one Contrary! And thus Temperance, Moderation and Wisdom are the si milarprfrtsof Virtue. . And consequently, &c.
That
? ? tyt
Protagoras: 6r, the Sophists.
Thatistrue. . - . ? ?
Isnot that whkh proceeds from Force, strongs
and that which proceeds from Weakness, feeble ?
Certainly. _
Is itnot from Swiftness that a thing is swift, and
from Slowness that a thing is flow ?
Without doubt.
Andallthatisdonethefame,isitnotdoneby the fame, and is not the contrary done by the con
trary?
Yes, doubtlels. #. Oh ! letusfeethen,saidI,Istherenotsomething
that is called Beauty ?
Yes.
This Beauty, has it any other Contrary than Ugli
ness? No,
Is there not something that is called Good ?
Yes.
This Good, has itany other contrary than Evil?
No, ithasnoother.
Is there not in the Voice a Sound which is called
Acute. Yes.
And that Shrill, has it any other Contrary than Grave ?
No.
Every Contrary then has but one Contrary, and
therearenomore?
I confess it.
Letusleethen;letusmake aRecitaloftheThings
whereinweareagreed. Wehaveagreed,
it That every Contrary his bdt one only Con
trary.
2. That Contraries are made by Contraries.
3. That that which is done foolishly is done after
a quite contrary manner to that which is done di
screetly.
4. That that which is done discreetly proceeds
fromModeration, andthatWhichisdonefoolishly proceeds from Folly. 'Tia
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. 27^
. 'Tis agreed.
Thatthereforewhichisdone'acontraryway ought*>>? contra-
to be done by the Contrary ; that which is done di- ri" "Iways screetly is done by Moderation, and that which isZ7h"C? T
done foolishly is done by Folly, of a contrary W a y tiTflml'
and always by Contraries. Certainly.
Is not Moderation then contrary to Folly? Soitseemstome.
Yourememberhowever, thatyouagreedjustnow,
that Wisdom was contrary to Folly. . I confess it.
And that one Contrary had but one. Contrary. Thatistrue. J .
From which then of those two Principles shall we recede, my dear Protagoras? shall itbe from this, That one Contrary has but one Contrary ? or from that which we assertedjust now, That Wisdom is some other thing than Temperance or Modesty ; That each of them are parts of Virtue, and that as they are different, they are also unlike, both by their N a ture and Effects, as the parts of the Face ? which of those two Principles (hall we renounce ? for they don't agree well, and they make a horrible Discord. Ah, how isitpossibletheyshouldagree, iftherebe a necessity that one Contrary must have but one only contrary, and can't have more, and that it be found
producethe far! te-
in the mean time, that Folly has two Contraries, whichareWisdomandTemperance. Doesitnot appear so to you, Protagoras ? He has agreed to it whether he will or not.
Wisdom and Temperance then must of all necessi ty be but one and the same thing, as we found just now, that Justice and Sanctity were a little while ago. Butdon'tletuswearyourselves,mydear Protagoras,andsetusexaminetherest. Iaskyou, A Man, who does an unjust thing, is he prudent in being unjust ?
Ss For
? ? tabu.
me. Foritimportsmenothingthatyouthinkthat orthatjIexamineonlytheOpinion:Butitrnay verywellbe thatinexaminingtheOpinion, 'tisrhy selfwhen Iexamine, and sometimes also the Person who Answers me.
'Upon thatProtagorasmade somescruple,disdain ing to be thus questioned, and faying, that the Mat terwasthorny. Butatlasthetookhispartandre-
. solvedtoanswerme. ThenIsaidtohim,Protago ras,Answer,Iprayyou,tomyfirstQuestion. Do you think any of those who act Injustice are pru dent?
I think there are some, said he.
Is not to be prudent, to be wise ?
Yes.
Is not to be wile, to have right Aims, and to take
the best part even in Injustice it self?
I grant it.
But do the Unjust take the right fide when they
succeed well or when their Successes nought ? When theysucceedwell.
You affirmthen,thattherearecertaingoodthings. Certainly.
Then do you call those things that are profitable
274 Protagoras: Or, the Sofbifis.
For my part, Socrates, saidhe, I should be a-
^ ^ ^ - s h a m ' d to confess it. However it is the Opinion of
? /? ;/' the People.
JTMmany Well,would youhaveme applymy selftothe
injustices People,orshallIspeaktoyou?
whichare ibe? it0fyOU faidhe,direct:yourselfonlyto
G & the People.
"profit That'sequaltome,saidI,providedyouanswer are
TheSofist to Men, good ?
Uyeryan. Yes,byJupiter;andfrequentlyIdon'tstickto
Socrate caIi those which are not Proficable to Men, also
fl)oM have S00d'
fin'dfrom TheToneinwhichhespoketome,mademe himthucon-know, thathewasexasperated, inagreatDisorder,
itcTiisllLandread*rt0betransportedwithAnger; seeinghim
whhhupro-m tnisCondition,Ihadamindtomakethebestof litMepod. him ;
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. zjf
M m : Therefore I asked him with greater Precaution andDiscretion; Protagoras, said1 tohim, Do you Callgood, thosethingsthatarenotprofitabletoany Man, or those that are no ways profitable>
Notatall,Socrates. ForIknowmanythatare absolutelyuselesstoMen, ascertain
Drinks,certainFoods,certainMedicines,
andathousandothersofthefamena-
ture;andIknowothersthatareuseful . tothem. Therearesomethatarein- differenttoMenandexcellentgoodfor
u <? n 1 r c i *. /~> j. ^1 Horses. SomeareonlyusefultoCattle,
? JjfTM2*"*f ? 'ZdHZgc*>>dtby
him,hethrowshimselfin-
*>>*iitheseDistinctions,
where>in<? mTMf>>g>>}f
an impertinent bcience. he M>0kthcchiefs&jtim.
othersonlytoDogs. Suchathingisof nousetoAnimals,andverygoodforTrees. More over, that which is good for the Root is often bad for the Twigs , which you should make to dye if youshouldcoverthemwithit. Withoutgoingfur ther, Oil is the greatest Enemy to all Plants and to theSkinofallCattle,anditisverygoodforthe SkinofMan. Itissotrue,thatthatwhichiscal led good, is various * for Oil it Ms, which I speak of, is good for the exterior parts of Man, and very badfortheinteriour. ForthatreasonthePhysicians absolutely forbid the sick to eat it, or at leaff give them but very little and only enough to correct the bad Smell of certain-things which they make them
take. .
Protagoras , having thus spoken , all the C o m p a
ny clapt their Hands, as if he had said Wonders : And Isaidtohim, Protagoras, Iam aMan natural lyveryforgetful, and,ifanyBodymakeslongDi scourses to me, I immediately forget the Subject of theDispute. Therefore,asifIweresomethingdeaf, and you had a mind to discourse with me, you would resolve to speak a little louder to me than to others, even so I-desire you to accommodate your
selftothisFaultthatIhave. Andsinceyouhave to do with a Man whose Memory is very short, shorten your Answers , if you intend that I should follow you,
Ssa . How
? ? 276
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
How would ye have me abridge my Answers? Would you have me make them shorter than they ought tobe.
No, saidI.
Then isitasshortasitmustbe?
Itis.
neglected to learn them. ****&*. Thisislbtrue, Socrates, thatifyouwilltakethe
pains only to examine what that one word is, topu
nish the Wicked, what force itbears, and what end is proposed by this Punishment ; that alone issufficient
to perswade you of thisTruth, that Virtue may be acquired. * FornoBodypunishesaMiscreantvrsqx--^"othet ly because he has been wicked, unless it be some Sa-^f*j*"
vage Beast, who punishes 'em to satisfie his o w n ^ ^ ^ Cruelty. ButhewhopunisheswithReason,does
not do it for by-past Faults, for it is impossible to hinder what has been done from being done ; but
for Faults that are to come, to the end that the
guilty may not relapse, and that others may take examplebytheirPunishment. AndeveryMan,whoHotatdty hasthisforhisEnd, mustofnecessitybeperswaded,he*fiTM>>sr
that Virtue may be taught. For he punishes only /J^iw " forthefuture. Nowitisplain,thatallMen,whoMenmay
put a force * All that "Protagoras fays here is false. There are two upontbtm- things to be considered in the punishment of the wicked ;selves and
thepunishment oftheSin, whxchisasatisfactiontoDivineobeythe justice, whereof the Justice of M e n is only the Eccho, if w e Law* maybeallow'dsotospeak. Judges,asStewardsofDispen
sersOf theDivinePower? takeaway theLife,or inflictother punishments on the wicked, to the end that Sin may be pu
nished. And, as Heads of the Government, who do all for the good of the State, they order that this punishment shall be executed publickly, that eVery one may take warning ; for the Fool himself becomes more wife when the wicked Man is puniflicd : Ttftiltntt flagel/ato ffultui saphtttlor erity Pxovj
Ri pu-
? ? 258
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists]
punish the Wicked, whether it be in private or in publick, doitonlyforthisEndjandyourAthenians doitaswellasothers. Fromwhenceitfollows,by a most just and neceflary Consequence, that your
Athenians are perswaded as well as other People, thatVertuemaybeacquiredandtaught. Thusitis with a great deal of reason, that your Athenians give ear in their Councils to a Mason, a Smith, a Shooe-maker, &c. and that they are perswaded, that Vertue may be taught : Methinks this is suffi ciently proved.
The only Scruple that remains is, thatwhich you m a k e a b o u t g r e a t M e n ; f o r y o u a s k w h e n c e it c o m e s that great M e n teach their Children in their Infancy, all that can be taught by Masters, and make them verylearnedinallthoseArts, andthattheyneglect to teach them their proper Vertues, which at the fame time cause all their Grandeur and their true Character. To answer you that, Socrates, I shall have no further recourse to Fables as before, but shall give you very plain Reasons.
knottier
fdftVrin- an. t0 which all M e n are equally obliged, or other-
* Don'tyoubelieve, thatthereisonethingabove
tberJ" wifetherecan**neimerSocietynorCity> The marfo. SolutionofyourDifficultydependsuponthisone only Point alone ; for if this only thing exists, and
t h a t it b e n e i t h e r t h e A r t o f a C a r p e n t e r , n o r t h a t o f aSmith,northatofaPotter, butthatitisJustice, TemperanceandHoliness, and,inaword,allthat
*ThisisanotherfalseArgumentoftheSophist. Itiscer tain, that Vertue exists j that all M e n are obliged to partake ofit,andthatGodhasgiventhemVertue. Butitisalso certain,thattheyhayelostitbythe illusethey made of their Free-will, and that they can't recover it but by the helposGod. Education,whichisaMeanstoassistNature, isofnoefficacy,unlessGodgiveaBlessingtoit:Itmay curb the wicked for some time, by reviving some Sparks of their almcstdeadKeafcnandbymghmingthemwiththepunish ments of Vice, and it is here that it usually terminates 3 but thatalonewillneverinfuseVertue. Man plantsand Man Maters, but *cisGod who giveth the encreate.
is
? ? avery greattruth,
Prqtagoras; Or, The Sophists. 25^
is comprehended under the N a m e of Vertue, if that
thing exists and that all M e n are obliged to partake
thereof, insomuch that every particular Person, who
would instruct himself or do any other thing, is
obliged to guide himself by its Rules, or to renounce
all that it desires 5 that all those w h o will not par
take thereof, Men, Women, and Children, must be
reproved, reprehended, and chastized, till Instructi
ons or Punishments reform them ; and that those
who will not be reform'd, must either be punished
withDeathorBanished-,ifitbeso,asyoucan't
doubt of it, and that notwithstanding this, those
greatMen,ofwhomyouspeak,shouldteachtheir
Children all other things, and should neglect to
teach them this only thing, I mean Virtue j it must
then be * a Miracle if those Children, so much
neglected, become People of Worth and good Citi
zens. I have already proved to you, that every
Body is perswaded that Virtue may be taught in
Publick and Private. Since it may be taught, do
you think that Fathers teach their Children all the
things that they may be securely ignorant of, with
out incurring either the Pain of Death, or the least Penalty ? , and that they neglect to teach them those
things the Ignorance whereof is usually attended by
Death, Prison, Exile, Confiscation of Goods, and,
in a word, by the utter ruine of Families ? For this is# urdthtt
thethingthathappenstothosewho arenotbroughtthepartof up vertuouily. Is there not a greater likelihood **>>/*>>*? that they will imploy all their Pains and all their r**, not,.
Application to teach them that which isloimpor-uptau t>> tantandsonecessary> Yes,withoutdoubt,Soera-counterfeit tes,andwe oughttothink,thatthoseFathers,ta-defame.
kingtheirChildrenintheiryoungerYears, thatisto fay, as soon as those Children are capable of. under standing what is said to them, never cease all their
* Yes, without doubt, it is a Miracle; for w e are natural ly so corrupt, that God must intervene to restore the Soul to theStatewhichithaslost. ThisSophistthinkshefayssome thing that's absurd and impossible, but at the same time speaks
Rr a ? J-ife-
? 260
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
Life time to teach and reprehend th<<m, and not only theFathers, butalsotheMothers,Nurses, andPre ceptors : They all chiefly indeavour to make Chil dren honest and virtuous, * by letting them see upon every Thing they do and upon every Word they speak, that such a Thing isjust, and such a Thing is u n j u s t -, t h a t t h i s i s h a n d s o m , a n d t h a t u n h a n d s o m ; that this is holy and that impious j that w e must do this, and shun that. If Children voluntarily obey these Precepts, they are rewarded and praised ; and, if they don't obey them, they are threatned and cha stizedj they are propt up and setright, likeTrees that bend and become crooked.
When they are sent to School, it is earnestly re commended totheirMastersnottoapplythemselves somuchtoteachthemtoreadwellandtoplaywell upon Instruments,as to teach them Honesty and M o d e sty. Therefore those Masters take very great care of it. When theycanreadandunderstandwhattheyread, instead of giving them Precepts by word of Mouth, they,makethemreadthebestPoets, andobligethem togetthembyheart. TheretheyfindexcellentPre ceptsforVirtue,and. Recitalswhich containthePrai
sesofthegreatestMen ofAntiquity,totheendthat thole Children, being inflam'd with a noble Emula tion, may imitateand endeavour toresemble them.
The Masters of Mufick, and those who teach'em to play upon Instruments, take the fame Pains, they train up young People to Modesty, and take particu lar care that they do nothing unhandsom.
When they understand Mufick and can play well upon Instruments, they put into their Hands the PoemsoftheLyriquePoets,whichtheymakethem ling and . play upon the Harp, to the end tb. 3t those Numbers and that Harmony may insinuate them
*AlfthisEducationdidthenonlytend,anddoesnomore now,forthe-mostpart,buttoaccustomChildren-toobey the LawsofHonour,DecencyandJusticealamode,andtogovern
themselvesinallthingsnotbyPrinciplesofKeligion, but by M a x i m s o f P o l i c y , k t h a t t o t e a c h V i r t u e :?
? selves
? Protagoras: Or, Ike Sophists. 161
selvesintotheirSouls,whitestthey areyettender and that being thereby rendred more soft, tractable, polite, and, ifwe may say so, more harmonious and more agreeable, they may be more capable ofspeak ingwellanddoingwell:forthewholeLifeofMan has need of * Number and Harmony.
Not being satisfied with those Means, they fend
them also to Masters of Exercise, to the end that
havingafoundandrobustBody, theymay thebetter
execute the Orders of a Masculine and sound Spirit,
and that the Weakness of their Constitution m a y not By this rea-
obligethemtorefusetoservetheirCountry, whe-fi>>tixcb;i-
ther it be in War, or in other Functions ; and those ^"f*1"
who fend their Children most to Masters, are such '? ? ? $*
as are best able to do it, that is to fay, the richest, most w >> -
ipsomuch that the Children of the richest begin their <<>>*.
Exercises the earliest and continue them the longest ;But the for they go thither in their tender Years, and don't taws **?
cease going tillafter they are Men. T m ' T F They have no sooner quitted those Masters, but mr Man-
their Country obliges them to learn the Laws, and>>m. to live according to the Rules they prescribe, to the end that they may do all things by Reason, and no thingoutofConceitandFancy. And,asWriting- masters give their Scholars, who have not as yet learn'd, a Rule under their Paper, that in copying their Examples , they may always follow the Lines that are traced outj so the Country gives Laws to Men that were invented and established by the an cientLegislators. Itforceththemtogovernandto submit to be governed according to their Laws ; and ifany one goes astray it punifheth him ; and this
P u n i s h m e n t is c a l l e d w i t h y o u , a s i n m a n y o t h e r P l a c e s , byaWord whichproperlysignifiestoreform;asJustice reformingthosewho turnasidefromtheRulewhich ought to guide them.
* Yes, but it is of such Numbers and Harmony asMen don't teach : the Harmony which they teach oftentimes serves only to render them more unfit for the other.
Rr 3 After
? ? z6z
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
After so much Pains taken, both in publick and private, to inspire Virtue, are you amazed, Socra tes, and can you have the least doubt that Virtue maybetaught? Thisshouldbesofarfromsurpri zing you, that you ought, on the other hand, to be very rrrach surprized ifthe contrary should be true.
But you will say, how comes it to pass, that many of the greatest Mens Children become the mostdishonestPeopleoftheWorld? Here'savery plain Reason, that has nothing amazing in it, if what I have already supposed be firm and unshaken ;
that is to lay, if it be true, * that every M a n is in^ dilpensably obliged to have Virtue , to the end that SocietiesandCitiesmaysubsist. Ifthatbeso,as without doubt it is, choose among all the other Sciences or Professions that Men are imploy'd in, whichyoushallthinkfit,andyoushallseewhatI
Another
falserea- WOuldbeat.
fining. Set LetUSsuppose,forexample,ThatthisCitycould
'ntfss' notfubfift>unlesswewereallPlayersontheFlute: t Isitnotcertain, that we should all addict our selves to the Flute, that both in publick and private we would teach one another to play upon it; that we would reprehend and chastize those who should
neglect to play, and that we would no more make that Science a Mystery to them, than we do that of JusticeandLaw? FordoesanyBodyrefusetoteach anotherJustice? And doesanyBodykeepthatSci^ encesecret,asispracticedinotherArts> No, cer tainly. Andthereasonofitisthis,ThattheVirtue
* He isobliged to have Virtue, and God hath given him a Light capable to guide him to the true Fountain j but So cieties and Cities don't examine if he be truly virtuous ; it is enough for them that he counterfeits it, and that he lives as- ifhewereso. TheSophistarguesalwaysuponafalsePrin ciple.
tThisSophistalwaysmistakeshimself. Itisnotthefame withVirtueaswithotherArts;aManisanableArtisttho' he has not acquired the highest perfection inArt ; but a Man js not virtuous, unless he has all Virtue ; for ifone part of it bewantingalliswanting. ? "Protagorasisgoingimmediatelyto fall into a manifest Contradiction.
and
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. z6y
and Justiceof everyparticularMan isusefultothe wholeBody. That'sthereasonwhyeveryBodyis always ready to teach his Neighbour all that concerns
LawandJustice. IfitwerethefameintheArtof Playing on the Flute, and that we were all equally ready to teach others, without any reserve* what we know of it, do you think, Socrates, that the Children of the most excellent Players upon the Flute, would always become more perfect in that Art thansheChildrenoftheworstPlayers> Iam per-
fwadedyoubelievenothingofit. *TheChildren whowouldbefoundtobethemosthappilybornfor that Art, would be those who should make the greatest progress therein, and who should render themselves the most famous for it, the rest would fatigue themselves in vain and would never gain anyNameonit,aswedailyfeetheSonofanex
cellent Player upon the Flute to be but an indifferent Scholar ; and, on the other hand, the Son of a Block head to become a very able Musician : But in gene ral they are all good enough, t ifyou compare them with the ignorant and with those w h o never handled aFlute. Wemustholditforcertain,thatitisthe fameinthepresentcase;suchanoneaswouldap pear to you now to be the most unjust of all thole
* Vrotagaras contradicts himself by this Argument ; for if pone but those'who are happily born acquire the perfection of Arts, and that M e n can't change an unhappy Birth, it fol lows from thisPrinciple, that Men cannot even teach the perfectionofArts;anditisacertaintruth. Howcouldthey inspireuswithVirtuethen? forwemustbeashappilyborn forvirtue. What isitthentobehappilyborn? isittohave bur Reason less chang'd and corrupted ? In this state Educa tion cultivates the natural Seed which God hath fow'd in our Souls,andGod,by hisBlesling,makes them grow and bringsthem t o t h e i r p e r f e c t M a t u r i t y . T h e n 'tis n e i t h e r N a t u r e a l o n e t h a t procures Virtue, nor Labour alone, nor both together, 'tis God alone; for'tishewho correctsour depravedNature and bleffeth our Labour.
t One may be comparatively able in Arts, but not so in Virtue. We maybelesswickedthanothers,butthatdoes not make us virtuons.
Rr4 who
? ? a64
Protagoras! : Or, the Spfhisisl
whoarebroughtupintheknowledgeoftheLaw* andincivilSociety,wouldbeaveryjustMan and even able to teach Justice, jf you should compare him with People who have neither Education, Law, Tribunals, nor Judges, who are not forced by any necessitytoapplythemselvestoVirtue-, andwho, in a word, would resemble * those Savages which Fberecrates. caused to be acted last Year, at the t Country-feasts of Bacchus. Believe me, if you were among Men, like those Misanthropes that that Poet introduces, you would think your selfvery happy to fallintotheHands,ofan \EuribatesandaFhrynon- ddf, andyouwouldsighaftertheWickednessofour People, against which you declaim to much now. ButyourDistempercomesonlyfromtoomuchease: because every Body teaches Virtue as they can , and
you are pleased to cry out and to say, that there is not so much as one Master that teacheth it. It is just as if you should seek in Greece for a Master who teacheth the Greek tongue, you will find none: Why ? Because every Body teacheth it. Indeed if you seek for one who can teach Tradesmens Sons
the Trade of their Fathers with the fame Capaci ty as their Fathers themselves or sworn Masters can perform it, I confess, Socrates, that such a Ma-
* The PoetTherecrateshad actedaPJay, whereof the Title wasi! yqioi>TheSavages. Andthereissomeappearance,that h e r e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e i n t h e u n h a p p y L i f e t h a t t h e first M e n led, before they were united by Society ; and his aim was, to let the Greeks fee that there was no Happiness for them, but to be well united, and faithfully to execute the Treaty of Peace, u hich had so lately terminated a long and fatal War.
fAttheCountry-feastsofBacchus. HefaystheCountry- feasts, because there were otfier Feasts of Bacclw, that were celebrated in the. City the beginning of the Spring, and tbe Country-feasts were celebrated the latter end of Autumn in the Fields.
|]Euribates and Thrynondaswere two notorious Profligates, w h o had given occasion for the Proverbs, A n Attion of Euri bates , to do the jidlons of Euribates , 'tit anotter Phrynondas. HeretheSophistcompliestoKeason. Itiswithoutalldoubt thatMencanteachMentheVirtuethatthosePeoplehad.
fter
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. z. 6$ ster would not easily be found ? ,but there isnothing
moreeafiethantofindonewho canteachtheIgno-Butvirtue rant. It is the fame with Virtue and all other*<<***? Things. And how' littleToeVer the advantage \&M>>*f"f
thatanotherMan hasoverus,topushus,forward^f"0"
andtomakeusadvanceinthewayofVirtue>itis
always a very considerable thing, and for whi^h we
oughttothinkourselvesveryhappy. Now Iamobservtthe
certainlyone of those who have all the necessaryTridtostbe Qualities for that j for I k n o w better than any other So? W-
Person in the World, all that must be done to be comeperfectlyanhonestMan:andIcansay,that IdonotrobthemoftheMoneywhichItakejnay, I deserve more, even in the Opinion of m y Scholars. Wherefore this }s the Bargain that I usually make : When any Body has learned of me, if he will, he paysmewhatothersusedtogivemejifnot,he may go into a Temple, and, after having sworn that, whatIhavetaughthimisworthsomuch,deposit theSumwhichhedesignsforme. Socrates,Thisis the Fable and the simple Reasons I have thought fit tomakeuseoftoprovetoyou,thatVirtuemaybe. taught, ^nd that the Athenians are all perlwaded of itj and to let you fee, that we must not be astonish ediftheChildrenofthegreatestMen arecommon lyverylittleworth, andifthoseoftheignorantand of the poorest succeed better, since we even see that theSonsofPolycletus, whoareofthefameAgewith Xanttppm and Puralus, are nothing, if compared with theirFather, andsoofmany otherChildrenof (C)urgreatestMasters. But>>forthosewhom tjust how nam'd, itisnottimetojddgethem, thereisstill hopes, andtheirYouthisaRefugeforthem.
This long and 'fine'Discourse being pronounced with much Ostentation and Pride, Protagoras held his Tongue, and I, after having been a long time put toastand,asaMancharm'dandravish'd,Ilookt upon him as ifhe ought to speak on still, and to tell me thingsthatIveryimpatientlyexpected:Butfee
ing that he had actually done , and having at last . 'i ? resu
? ? z66
Protagoras: Or, tbeSophistsl
resumed Courage with much difficulty, I turned to wardsHippocrates. Intruth,Hippocrates,laidIto him,IcannotexpresshowmuchIamindebtedto you, for having obliged me to come hither , for I would not for all the World not have heard Protago ras : hitherto I believed, that it was nowise by the help and care of Men, that we became honest Peo ple:butnowIam perswadedthatitisathing purelyhumane. ThereisonlyonesmallDifficulty1 remaining, which Protagoras, who has just now de monstratedsuchfinethings,willeasilyresolve. If we should consult some of our great Orators upon
those Matters, perhaps they would entertain us with Herepn*- such like Discourses, * and that we should believe desailthosewq heard a Pericles, or some of those who have
te'fthat ^eenthem0^Eloquentjand,afterthat,ifweshould the]were a make objection to them, they would not know what
little taint- t o s a y n o r w h a t t o a n s w e r , b u t b e a s m u t e a s a B o o k . edbythe guttjj0'oneshouldaskthemneversolittleupon
the"? "! ! wsiattnevmighthavealreadysaid,theywouldne ws*/;the verend,andwoulddoasaBrassKettle,which,be- Sophijis. ingoncestruck,keepsitssoundalongtime,unless
one puts his Hand upon it and stops it^ for that's just what our Or-ators do, so soon as they are touch edtheyresoundwithoutend. Itisnotthefame
with Protagoras, for he is not only very capable of holdinglongandfineDiscourses, ashehasjustnow madeitappear, butalsoofansweringpreciselyand in few Words, to the Questions that are asked him,
and can start others, arid wait for and receive the Answers as he ought , which few People are able to do.
Now then, Protagoras, saidItohim, therewants but a small thing to content me upon the whole, and I shall be fully satisfied when you shall have
*This isadifficultPassage,ifwe havenoregardtothetimej thatistofay,ifwe dohotobservetheDateoftheDialogue. It is that w h i c h deceived Henry Steplxns, w h o translated it as
? iiTerideswere stillalive,whereashehadbeendeadeightor nine Years.
had
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. z6f
hadthegoodnesstoanswerit. Yousay,thatVirtue can be taught, and ifI may believe any Body in the Worlduponthat,'tisyou. *ButIprayyoutore movetheScruplewhichyouhaveleftinmyMind: You have said, that Jupiter sent Shame and Justice to Men-, and in your whole Discourse you have spoke of Justice, Temperance and Sanctity, as ifVir tue were one only thing which ineludeth all those Qualities. Explainittomethenexactly,ifVirtue be one, and if Justice, Temperance, Sanctity, are only itsParts, or ifall those Qualities which I have now named be only different Names of one and the lamething. Thisiswhat1furtherdesireofyou.
'There is nothing more eafie, Socrates, than to h-TUS^st tisfie you in that point : For Virtue is one thing and **? <<**; those are itsParts. ses,***
mSS Kofi*hinV? ethose*? p*rts>astfe? S? * Mouth, Nose, Ears and Eyes are the Parts of theftfrcoup- Face > Or are they Parts like Parts of Gold, that/"* <f*ffi- are all of the fame Nature as the Mass, and differ*"*****? from each other only in Quantity ?
They are without doubt parts of it, as the Mouth and the Nose are parts of the Face.
_ But,saidI,doMen acquire,someonepartofthis Virtue,andothersanother? Or isthereanecessity thathewho acquiresonemustacquireall>
Bynomeansansweredhe. +Foryouseeevery Pay People who are valiant and unjust, and others who arejustwithout being wife.
For
* Spcrates does not trouble himself to answer all the So phisms o? -TrotaSoras, which are too gross ; but he goes at once to the main point of the Question, which consists to know theNatureofVirtuejforVirtuebeingwellknown, it willbeclearlyseen,thatitisnotpossibleforMen toteach
? t That'sthePoison ofthisDoctrine, which isbuttoomuch
spreadabroadtothisDay Somefancy,thatVirtuemaybe divided,soasaManmayhavesomeofitspartswithoutha ving the restj which is contrary to all the Light of Reason, ashasbeenexplainedintheArgument, ftwafinopposition
? ? x68
Protagoras: Or, The Sophist/;
? .
For Valour and Wisdom are only parts of Vir"
tuc.
Assuredly, laid-he, andWisdom isthegreatestof
its parts.
And is,everyoneofitspartsdifferentfromano
ther?
'Without doubt.
And everyonehasitsProperties: Asintheparts
of the Face the Eyes are not of the lame use with
the Ears, and have different Properties and Faculties,
and ib of all the other parts, they are all different
and don't resemble each other neither in Form nor
Quality, tsitthefameofthepartsofVirtuejdoes
hot one of them in no wise resemble another ? and do
they absolutely differ in themselves and in their Fa- culties? Itisevident, thattheydonotresembleeach
otheratall,ifitbethefameofthemasoftheEx ample which we have made use of.
Socrates^, that is Very certain and the Example is . just.
Then, laid I to him, Virtue has no other of its parts which resemble Knowledge, Justice, Valour, Temperance nor Sanctity.
No withoutDoubt.
Comethen,LetyouandIseeandexaminetothe bottomtheNatureofeveryoneofitsparts. Letus beginwithJustice:Isitanythingornothing? For my part,Ifinditissomething;whatdoyouthink?
I also think it to be something.
Socrates>> IfthenanyBodyshouldapplyhimselftoyou goingto an(jmg5anjshouldfayt0US)ProtagorasandSocra-
justiceW tes->exP*aint0me>Iprayyou,whatisthatwhich SanctityanyoujustnowcalTdJustice5isitsomething thatis UtoneandjustOrUnjust?
the fame
'""*? ?
to this very Error that Solomon wrote in theEcclesiasies, Ch. 9.
HewhofinrnthinonethingfbaO. UsemuchBJches.
ForitisOneof the Explanations that St. Hierome gives to this Passage, 7l>at one only Sin cansetb many former good Works to perish , and that all Virtues accompany one another, insomuch that lie who has one has all ; and he who fins in one thing issubject to all Vices without exception*
I
? ? Pfotdgoras : Ot, the Sophists. i6?
I s h o u l d a n s w e r h i m o f f h a n d , t h a t it is s o m e t h i n g that isjust; would not you answer the feme?
Yes certainly.
Justice consists then , he would lay , according to
you, inbeingjust? Wewouldfayyes? ,isitnotso?
Without doubt, Socrates.
And ifhe. should ask us after that, Don't you also lay, that there is a Sanctity ? should not w e answer him in the same manner, that there is?
Assuredly.
You maintain, he'd reply, that it is something;
whatisitthen? isittobeholyortobeprophane?
Formy part, Iconfess, Protagoras, thatatthisQue
stion I should be all in a passion, and should say to t h e M a n , S p e a k S e n s e , I p r a y y o u ? , W h a t i s t h e r e
that can be holy , if Sanctity it self be not holy ? Wouldnotyouanswerthus?
Yes indeed, Socrates.
Ifafter that, the Man should continue to que stion us, and should say, But what did you fay a Minute ago ? have I misunderstood you ? It seem ed to me, that you said the parts of Virtue were all different, and that one was never like another. Formypart,Ishouldanswerhim,Youhavereason to alledge, that that was said ; but if you think it was Iwho saidit,youmisunderstoodme;forit isProtagoraswho affirmedit,Ionlyask'dtheQue stion : doubtless he would not fail to apply himself toyou,Protagoras;hewouldsay,Doyouagreeto what Socrates says? Is*it you alone that assure me, that none of the parts of Virtue are like to one ano
ther? Isthatyour Opinion? What would you an swer him, Protagorai ?
I should be forced to confess it, Socrates.
And, afterthisConfession, what couldwe answer
him, if he should continue his Questions and tellFar that us,AccordingtoyouthenSanctityisneitherajust""*/*'f**' j thing,norJusticeaholything; butJusticeispro-"^J'j% phaneandSanctityisunjust. IsthenthejustMm^JZwere
pro- unlike.
? ? 2jo
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
prophane and impious? what should we answer him, Protagoras? Iconfess,thatformypart,Ishould answer him, that I maintain Justice to be holy, and Sanctitytobejust; and, ifyou yourselfdid not preventme,Ishouldanswerforyou,thatyou are perswaded, that Justice is the fame thing with San ctity, or at least a thing very like it, and that Sancti ty is the fame thing with Justice, or very like it. See thenifyouwouldhinderme toanswersoforyou, o r i f y o u w o u l d c o n f e s s it t o m e .
I should not confess it to you, Socrates ; for that does not seem to m e to be true at the bottom, and we oughtnottograntsoeasily,thatJusticeisHo liness, and that Sanctity is Justice : There is some difference between them ; But what will you make ofthat? Ifyouwill,IconsentthatJusticeisHoly, and thatSanctity isJust.
How, z/J to/, said I to him, I have nothing to dowiththat,itisnotasJwillthat isinquestion, it is You or I, it is our Perswasion and our Prin
ciple,and,ifwe refuteoneanother,that fortoarz>>eagai>>siS>>t,. g whjch do? S nothing but darken tfae
tevli"1" - Tlut<<and renderProofsuseless,must be removed.
However, we may fay, answered he, that Justice resembles Sanctity in something; for
^sorryEvasionofthe l^fnlu^m^rlr tTsareLTaniai^ft
insensibleresemblance,that hemaynotacknowledge thatrtftJT "? yery^naturaa veryjen-
onethingalwaysresemblesanotherin s? mes? n'WhUe " selfhaSlns? me measurearesemblancetoBlack,Hard
tO Soft, and K) of all Other Things whichseemtobethemostcontraryto eachother- ThoseveryPartswnichwe kaveagree(jhaveeachdifferentProper
ties and Faculties , and that one is not l i k e t h e o t h e r , I m e a n t h e p a r t s o f t h e F a c e -, i f y o u look to them narrowly, you will find, that they re semble each other a little, and that they are in some measure one like another : and, after this manner, you may verywellprove,ifyouwill,thatallthings arelikeoneanother. But,however,itisnotjustto
call
? ? iProtagprast Or9 The Sophists. 27*
call things alike, that have but a small resemblance toeachother, asitisnotjustneithertocallthose thingsunlikethatdifferbutaverylittlefrom each other: As a light resemblance does not render things alike, to (peak properly, ib a finall difference does not make them unlike.
Being amazed at this Discourse of the Sophist, I askhim, Doesthenthejustandholyseemtoyouto have only a lightresemblance to each other?
That resemblance, Socrates^ is not so small as I have said, but at the fame time it is not so great as you fly.
Well, saidItohim, sinceyouseemtome tobein ibillanHumour againstthisSanctityandJustice,lee us leave them there, and let us take some other Sub ject. *WhatdoyouthinkofFolly,isitnotentire lycontrarytoWisdom?
It seems so to me.
When Men have govern'd themselves well and and profitably, don't they seem to you to be more temperate and more moderate than when they do the contrary ?
Without contradiction.
Are they not then govern'd by Moderation ?
It cannot be otherwise.
And those who have no good government over
themselves, don't they act foolishly, and are in no wise moderate in their Conduct?
I agree with you in that.
Therefore is not acting foolishly contrary to acting moderately ?
Itisagreed.
? That which is done foolishly, does it not come
from Folly 5 and does not that which is done di screetly proceed from Moderation ?
* Socrates isgoing to prove, that Temperance and Modera tionarethefamethingwithWisdom, seeingtheyarecontra ry to Folly; for one Contrary can have but one Contrary! And thus Temperance, Moderation and Wisdom are the si milarprfrtsof Virtue. . And consequently, &c.
That
? ? tyt
Protagoras: 6r, the Sophists.
Thatistrue. . - . ? ?
Isnot that whkh proceeds from Force, strongs
and that which proceeds from Weakness, feeble ?
Certainly. _
Is itnot from Swiftness that a thing is swift, and
from Slowness that a thing is flow ?
Without doubt.
Andallthatisdonethefame,isitnotdoneby the fame, and is not the contrary done by the con
trary?
Yes, doubtlels. #. Oh ! letusfeethen,saidI,Istherenotsomething
that is called Beauty ?
Yes.
This Beauty, has it any other Contrary than Ugli
ness? No,
Is there not something that is called Good ?
Yes.
This Good, has itany other contrary than Evil?
No, ithasnoother.
Is there not in the Voice a Sound which is called
Acute. Yes.
And that Shrill, has it any other Contrary than Grave ?
No.
Every Contrary then has but one Contrary, and
therearenomore?
I confess it.
Letusleethen;letusmake aRecitaloftheThings
whereinweareagreed. Wehaveagreed,
it That every Contrary his bdt one only Con
trary.
2. That Contraries are made by Contraries.
3. That that which is done foolishly is done after
a quite contrary manner to that which is done di
screetly.
4. That that which is done discreetly proceeds
fromModeration, andthatWhichisdonefoolishly proceeds from Folly. 'Tia
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. 27^
. 'Tis agreed.
Thatthereforewhichisdone'acontraryway ought*>>? contra-
to be done by the Contrary ; that which is done di- ri" "Iways screetly is done by Moderation, and that which isZ7h"C? T
done foolishly is done by Folly, of a contrary W a y tiTflml'
and always by Contraries. Certainly.
Is not Moderation then contrary to Folly? Soitseemstome.
Yourememberhowever, thatyouagreedjustnow,
that Wisdom was contrary to Folly. . I confess it.
And that one Contrary had but one. Contrary. Thatistrue. J .
From which then of those two Principles shall we recede, my dear Protagoras? shall itbe from this, That one Contrary has but one Contrary ? or from that which we assertedjust now, That Wisdom is some other thing than Temperance or Modesty ; That each of them are parts of Virtue, and that as they are different, they are also unlike, both by their N a ture and Effects, as the parts of the Face ? which of those two Principles (hall we renounce ? for they don't agree well, and they make a horrible Discord. Ah, how isitpossibletheyshouldagree, iftherebe a necessity that one Contrary must have but one only contrary, and can't have more, and that it be found
producethe far! te-
in the mean time, that Folly has two Contraries, whichareWisdomandTemperance. Doesitnot appear so to you, Protagoras ? He has agreed to it whether he will or not.
Wisdom and Temperance then must of all necessi ty be but one and the same thing, as we found just now, that Justice and Sanctity were a little while ago. Butdon'tletuswearyourselves,mydear Protagoras,andsetusexaminetherest. Iaskyou, A Man, who does an unjust thing, is he prudent in being unjust ?
Ss For
? ? tabu.
me. Foritimportsmenothingthatyouthinkthat orthatjIexamineonlytheOpinion:Butitrnay verywellbe thatinexaminingtheOpinion, 'tisrhy selfwhen Iexamine, and sometimes also the Person who Answers me.
'Upon thatProtagorasmade somescruple,disdain ing to be thus questioned, and faying, that the Mat terwasthorny. Butatlasthetookhispartandre-
. solvedtoanswerme. ThenIsaidtohim,Protago ras,Answer,Iprayyou,tomyfirstQuestion. Do you think any of those who act Injustice are pru dent?
I think there are some, said he.
Is not to be prudent, to be wise ?
Yes.
Is not to be wile, to have right Aims, and to take
the best part even in Injustice it self?
I grant it.
But do the Unjust take the right fide when they
succeed well or when their Successes nought ? When theysucceedwell.
You affirmthen,thattherearecertaingoodthings. Certainly.
Then do you call those things that are profitable
274 Protagoras: Or, the Sofbifis.
For my part, Socrates, saidhe, I should be a-
^ ^ ^ - s h a m ' d to confess it. However it is the Opinion of
? /? ;/' the People.
JTMmany Well,would youhaveme applymy selftothe
injustices People,orshallIspeaktoyou?
whichare ibe? it0fyOU faidhe,direct:yourselfonlyto
G & the People.
"profit That'sequaltome,saidI,providedyouanswer are
TheSofist to Men, good ?
Uyeryan. Yes,byJupiter;andfrequentlyIdon'tstickto
Socrate caIi those which are not Proficable to Men, also
fl)oM have S00d'
fin'dfrom TheToneinwhichhespoketome,mademe himthucon-know, thathewasexasperated, inagreatDisorder,
itcTiisllLandread*rt0betransportedwithAnger; seeinghim
whhhupro-m tnisCondition,Ihadamindtomakethebestof litMepod. him ;
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. zjf
M m : Therefore I asked him with greater Precaution andDiscretion; Protagoras, said1 tohim, Do you Callgood, thosethingsthatarenotprofitabletoany Man, or those that are no ways profitable>
Notatall,Socrates. ForIknowmanythatare absolutelyuselesstoMen, ascertain
Drinks,certainFoods,certainMedicines,
andathousandothersofthefamena-
ture;andIknowothersthatareuseful . tothem. Therearesomethatarein- differenttoMenandexcellentgoodfor
u <? n 1 r c i *. /~> j. ^1 Horses. SomeareonlyusefultoCattle,
? JjfTM2*"*f ? 'ZdHZgc*>>dtby
him,hethrowshimselfin-
*>>*iitheseDistinctions,
where>in<? mTMf>>g>>}f
an impertinent bcience. he M>0kthcchiefs&jtim.
othersonlytoDogs. Suchathingisof nousetoAnimals,andverygoodforTrees. More over, that which is good for the Root is often bad for the Twigs , which you should make to dye if youshouldcoverthemwithit. Withoutgoingfur ther, Oil is the greatest Enemy to all Plants and to theSkinofallCattle,anditisverygoodforthe SkinofMan. Itissotrue,thatthatwhichiscal led good, is various * for Oil it Ms, which I speak of, is good for the exterior parts of Man, and very badfortheinteriour. ForthatreasonthePhysicians absolutely forbid the sick to eat it, or at leaff give them but very little and only enough to correct the bad Smell of certain-things which they make them
take. .
Protagoras , having thus spoken , all the C o m p a
ny clapt their Hands, as if he had said Wonders : And Isaidtohim, Protagoras, Iam aMan natural lyveryforgetful, and,ifanyBodymakeslongDi scourses to me, I immediately forget the Subject of theDispute. Therefore,asifIweresomethingdeaf, and you had a mind to discourse with me, you would resolve to speak a little louder to me than to others, even so I-desire you to accommodate your
selftothisFaultthatIhave. Andsinceyouhave to do with a Man whose Memory is very short, shorten your Answers , if you intend that I should follow you,
Ssa . How
? ? 276
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
How would ye have me abridge my Answers? Would you have me make them shorter than they ought tobe.
No, saidI.
Then isitasshortasitmustbe?
Itis.
