No More Learning

de
Of. Praetoris, Tertio, rationem, nam
populus Romanus potest inducere con-
suetudinen; generalem, 1. de quibus ff.
de legibus (Dig. i. 3, 32) ergo et statuere
legem generalem, arg. 1. cQ. quid, ff.
c. cer. pet. (I). Quarto quia populus
Romanus non transtulit omnimodam
jurisdictionem in imprratorem, sed
illam sibi concessit, ut in d. 1. i. ff. de
const, principum (Inst. I. 2, 6), quod
verbum, concessit, significat transla-
tionem usus, non dominium . . . ergo
potest quemcunque revocare . . . De tu-
que quia licet populus Romanus con-
cessit primo imperatori jurisdiotionem,
eo mortuo non est acquisitum suo
successore. . . . Vel reeponditur ut in
glo. non obstat, quod populus transtu-
terit, quia respondoo quod illa verba
sunt exponenda, i. concessit, per hunc
textum in 1. i. de constitutionibus
principum (Inst. i. 2, 6), . . . non
obstat quod eligitur a dominis de Ale-
mannia ot confirmetur per Papam,
quia huiusmodi eleotio, et Papae con-
rirmatio facta in jure communi, non
videtur tollere jus alterius xii. Dist. c.
praeceptis (Uratian Decretum D. xii. 2)
unde non videtur tollere jus populi
Romani revocandi imporatorem. "
1 Cf. vol. ii. pp. 59-67, vol. v. p. 66.
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? CHAP. II. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
147
the power of doing this had passed to the Church or the
Pope. 1
Paulas de Castro, one of the most important Civilians of
the fifteenth century, interprets the action of the Eoman
people in conferring the authority upon the Emperor by the
"lex regia," in the same way as Porcius, that is, he describes
it as a " concessio " rather than a " translatio," and therefore,
he says, the Eoman people could, before the coming of Christ,
have revoked the " lex regia " and deposed the Emperor. But,
with the coming of Christ, this was all changed, for the Empire
was then transferred to the Church, and only the Pope could
confirm and crown the Emperor, or depose him, for the Church
holds the Temporal as well as the Spiritual sword. It is evident
that Paulus is stating the extreme Papalist theory, but we
are not here concerned with this. In another passage he sets
out his principle in direct terms: the Eoman people cannot
now make a law or create a " general custom. " 2 It is possible
1 Bartholomaeus De Saliceto: Comm.
on Code I. 14, 12: "Opp. quod non
soli imperstori liceat legem condere,
quia etiam populus Romamis potest
. . . item, non obstat, videlicet, quod
hie non dicitur solum per adverbium
sed etiam per nomon, ad denotandum
quod nullus alius potest nisi solus
princeps: nam populus constat ex
personis pluribus . . . item non obstat
quod populus non possit hodie quia
omnem potestatem populus traustulit
id principem . . . Jac. Butrigarius
videtur velle quod posset, potestatem
principi concessum revocando, quod
assert posse, quia per viam 1. s. regiae
transtulit . . . igitur per contrariam
legem revocare posset . . . concludit,
quod imperium ad se populus Romanus
revocare posset. Haec opinio forte
olim tolerari poterat, sed hodie non
toleratur, cum eloctio imperatoris
spectat ad principes de Alamania, et
jus privandi eum spectat ad Papam,
ut extra de re judicata C. ut apostolicae,
et sic cum populus imperio et potestate
imperatoris non babeat se impedire.
videtur, quod nec legem generalem
possit condere, et etiam vacante im-
perio, quia tunc donee eleetio sit facta,
sucoedit ecclesia, seu papa. "
Cf. Joannes de Imola: Comm. on
Decretals i. 7, 1.
>> Paulus de Castro: Comm. on
Digest i. 3, 9 (" Non ambigitur "):
"Ex quo patet quod ilia (lex regia)
fuit magis concessio quam translatio;
ut patet in I. 1. 1. ti. in verb, concessit
(Inst. i. 2, 6): per quam non abdicatur
substantia, ut in concedente, sed
transfertur usus. . . . Sed expone,
quantum ad usum non quantum ad
substantiam. Et ideo dico quod popu-
lus Romanus ante adventum Christi
poterat revocare legem rogiam, et
ea revocata privare imperatorem; quia
non poterit sibi imponere legem a qua
recedere non potuerit. . . . Secundo,
potest intelligi post adventum Christi, et
tunc dico quod imperium Romanum
? ? fuit a populo Romano translatum in
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? 148
[PART II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
that in this last passage he is referring to the actual people
of the city of Eome. These Jurists then seem clearly to hold
that the Eoman people had no longer any general legislative
authority.
We turn to the question of the nature of the legislative
authority of the Prince. Paulus de Castro, commenting on the
words "Quod Principi placuit," &c, says that though the
Prince, when making laws, ought to consult the " periti," his
laws are valid even though he has not done so, and in his
Commentary on the Code he repeats emphatically that the
Prince can make laws by his own authority, and without
the Counsel of the " Proceres," and he explains the terms of
that rescript of Theodosius and Valentinian which seemed
to require some consultation of the Senate, as expressing, not
necessity but "humanitas. " 1 Jason de Mayno, one of the
most important Civilians of the later part of the fifteenth
century, says the same. 2 We have pointed out that some of
the great Civilians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
sicut confirmaro et coronare . . . Et
iurat sibi fidelitatom; nam apud
ecclesiam est uterque gladius temporalis
et spiritualis. . . . Nihil concludo
potest hodie populus Romanus in
imperio. "
Cf. Paulus : Comm. on Digest i. 3, 32:
"Hodie secus, quia imperium non est
apud populum Romanum nec ab eo
recogoosoitur; et sic hodie non potest
legem face re sed est apud Romanam
ecclesiam. Et ideo non potest intro-
ducere goneralem consuetudinem. "
Cf. also Antonius de Butrio, a Canon-
ist of the late fourteenth century.
Commentary on Decretals i. 2, 3 (fol.
xii. ): "Sicut originaliter princepe
reciperet potestatem a populo Romano,
tamen hodie potestatem jurisdictiona-
lem recognoscit a Papa . . . quia in eo
vera erat habita potestas utri usque
juris. . . . Romanus populus non
posset revocare potestatem imperii,
quia non habet potestatem illam a
populo sed a Papa. Solus ergo im-
perator habet potestatem legis univer-
salis condendae, populus autem non,
vel senatus, nisi quatenus permittoret
princepe. "
1 Paulus de Castro: Comm. on Digest
i. 4, 1: "Quod principi placuit.
Nota hie in verbo placuit quod licet in
legibus condendis debet adhiberi con-
silium peritorum, ut in 1. humanum
Cod. De Lfg. (Cod. I. 14, 8). . . .
Si tamen non requiritur, valet, quia
sumcit quod ita placuit legislatori. "
Id. , Comm. on Code I. 14, 12: "Im-
perialis. (2) Nota quod imperator solus
etiam sine consilio procerum potest
legem condere et sic illud quod dicitur
in 1. humanum (Code I. 14, 8), non est
necessitatis sed humanitatis ut debeat
adhibere consilium procerum. "
Cf. Bertachinus Repertorium Juris,
vol. iii. fol. 10.
1 Jason de Mayno: Comm. on Digeat
? ? i. 21 (fol. 25).
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? CHAP. II. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
149
and specially the author of the Summa Trecensis (Irerius ? ),
Boger and Azo, had maintained that the Emperor must,
when making laws, follow the method prescribed in Code I.
14, 8, while Bulgarus maintained the opposite. 1
More important, however, are some statements of Jason de
Mayno, with regard to the relation of the Prince to the laws
when made.
In his Commentary on the Digest he cites Baldus
as having said in his treatise on Feudal Law, that the Prince
has "plenitudo potestatis," and that when he wills anything
"ex certa scientia " no one can ask him why he does it, and in
another place again he cites Baldus, as having said that the
Pope and the Prince can do anything " supra jus et contra jus,
et extra jus. " In his Commentary on the Code, Jason cites
Bartolus, as having said in one of his "Consilia" that when
the Prince does anything "ex certa scientia" he removes all
legal obstacles. 2 The impression produced by these passages
is only confirmed by Jason's observation on the well-known
rescript of Theodosius and Valentinian, "Eescripta contra
jus elicita a iudicibus praescribimus refutari" (Cod. I. 19, 7).
This does not mean, Jason says, that the Prince had not
authority to issue such rescripts, but only that, as there might
be a doubt whether they had not been obtained from him
"per importunitatem," when the Prince issues such a rescript,
he should add a " non obstante " clause. 3 It is, however, true
that the effect of these passages is to some extent modified by
1 Vol. ii. pp. 67-70.
2 Jason de Mayno: Comm. on Digest
I. 4, 1: "Et dioit Baldus in Prelud.
Feud, in xiii. col. : 'Quod in principe
est plenitudo potestatis et postquam
? liquid vult ex certa scientia nemo
potest ei dieere, cur facie ista. . . .
Alibi dicit Baldus, quod Papa et Prin-
ce ps ex certa scientia super jus et contra
jus et extra jus omnia possunt. '"
Id. , Comm. on Cod. I. 19, 1 (fol. 40,
>>. ): "Licet servilis. . . quinto . . .
confirmo quia quum princeps iiliquid
facit ex certa scientia, tollit omne ob-
staculum juris, secundum Bartolum,
in consilio quod incipit Civitati Cam-
erini. "
? Id. , Comm. on Code 1. 19, 7: "Re-
scripta. . . . No. primo regulam,
quod rescripta, contra jus impetrata,
non debent per judices observari. . . .
Sed numquid ista regula procedat ex
defectu potestatis principis, quia non
possit, vel ex defectu voluntatis.
Baldus . . . et Paulus . . . dicunt
quia ex defectu voluntatis, quia non
preeumitur principem aliquid velle,
quod sit contra jus; et si aliquid con-
cessit, presumitur per importunitatsm
concessisse et ideo si princeps vellet,
posset rescribere contra jus, adiecta
clausula non obstante. ''
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? 150
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
another citation which Ja>son makes from Baldus: it is sacri-
legious to dispute about the authority of the Prince, but it is
lawful to discuss his knowledge and intention, for the Prince
sometimes errs; it is always to be presumed that the Prince
desires what is just and true, and he wishes his actions to be
controlled by the justice of heaven and the Courts of Law
(poli et fori). 1 It would seem then that these Civilians were
clear that the Eoman people had no longer any legislative
authority in the formal sense, while the Emperor had an abso-
lute and unconditional authority in relation to positive law.
There are, however, certain aspects of the relation of the
Prince to Law, which require a separate treatment and
first, we must consider his relation to Custom, and here we
must take account of the Canonists as well as of the Civilians.
John of Imola, who was both Civilian and Canonist, says first
that "Consuetudo " may be called that form of law which is
established by the "mores" of him who has the power of
making law, and that it does not require the knowledge or
consent of the Prince; but he adds that this was so because the
Pope permitted the development of a custom even if contrary
to the law, if it were reasonable, and had a sufficient prescrip-
tion, and he refers to the terms of the Decretal of Gregory IX.
on which he is commenting. He adds that the Emperor had
also permitted this by the law " omnes populi " (Digest i. 1, 9),
and, therefore, custom did not require the knowledge or consent
of either Pope or Emperor, in order to be valid. 2
1 Id. , Comm. on Digest i. 4, 1 (fol.
25): "Tamen adverte quod licet de
potestnte principie sacrilegium ait ut
dixi, disputare, de scientia et voluntate
principis licitum est disputare. quia
princeps quandoque errat, 1. 2. ft.
De Sup. leg. secundum Baldum hie:
qui etiam subdit quod in principe nun-
quam aliquid preeumitur place re, nisi
quod justum et verum sit: et princeps
vult actus suos regulari a justitia poli
et fori. "
1 John of Imola: Comm. on Decre-
tals i. 4, 11: "Potest dicere ut hie
Jo, quod consuetudo est jus quoddam
moribus illius inductum qui jus con-
dere potest, habens vim legis. . . .
Nam non videtur requiri conscusua
vel scientia principis. Nam Papa hie
permittit consuetudinem induci etiam
contra jus, dummodo sit rationabilis et
prescripta, et sic non requiritur alitor
consensus vel scientia ejus. Et simi-
liter imperator concedit potestatem
condendi statuta, et consequenter
consuetudines in 1. omnes populi
(Dig. i. I, 9) et ideo non requiritur ejus
consensus vel scientia. "
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? chap, n. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
151
Bertachinus, in his 'Eepertorium' or Dictionary of Law,
of the later fifteenth century, cites various emphatic phrases
about the authority of custom. Custom and statute have
equal authority, a general custom creates the " Jus Commune,"
a custom of such antiquity, that there is no memory to the
contrary, has the force of a "Privilegium" of the Prince;
the Emperor is "solutus legibus," but he is not "solutus
moribus et ratione," he is bound to maintain the "con-
suetudines. " 1
That great Canonist of the early fifteenth century, Zabarella
(generally referred to as "the Cardinal") treats the subject
of the source and authority of Custom at some length, but
with such caution that it is difficult to arrive at any certain
conclusion. He is commenting upon the Decretal of Pope
Gregory IX. (Decretals i. 4, 11). Some people had maintained
that it was only in former times that custom could make or
abrogate law, while others maintained that it did not follow
because the people could not now make " law " that they could
not make custom. He cites Gul. de Cuneo as maintaining that
while the power of making " law " had been transferred to the
Prince, the power of making custom neither had been, nor
could be transferred. Zabarella does not indeed agree with
this last contention, but he is convinced that at least in the
c ase of Canon Law, custom would in some cases prevail against
a canon without the consent of the Prince (i. e. the Pope). 2
1 Bertachinus,' Repertorium Juris,' habebat hano auotoritatem olim quum
vol. i. fol. 471, v. : "Consuotudo et populus condebat legem . . . nam cum
Htatutum aequiparantur. . . . Con- legislatoris suffragio leges scribantur,
euetudo generalis facit jus commune. ejus etiam tacito consensu abrogantur.
. . . Consuetudo tanti temporis quod . . . Hanc opinionem aliqui improbant,
non sit memoria in contrarium habet quia etiam, praesupposita ilia opinione,
vim privilegii principis. . . . Con- quod hodie populus Romanus non
suetndo habet vim constitutionis. " possit legem condore, non per hoc
Vol. iii. fol. 10, r. : "Imperator est infertur, idem esse de consuetudine,
solutus legibus . . . sed do equitate nam de permissione legis procodit, quod
debet vivere legibus . . . non tamen consuetudo valeat etiam ad tollendam
eat solutus moribus et ratione. " . . . legem, si consuetudo est rationabilia
Fol. 12, r. : "Imperator tenetur ser- et prescripta, ut bic inde dicit Gul. do
vare consuetudines suas. " Cuneo in 1. de quibus (Dig. i. 3, 32)
* F. Zabarella: Comm. on Deere- quod lioet in principem sit tranalata
tals I. iv. 11 (fol. 86): "Quidam ergo, potestas condendi legem, non est
ut refert Inno. dicunt quod consuetudo translate potestas inducendi con-
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? 152
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
Another great Canonist of the fifteenth century, Nicolas de
Tudeschis, who is generally known as Panormitanus, sets out
very clearly the superiority of custom over Positive Law,
if it has prescription and is " rational," while it is invalid if it
lacks " reason. " He maintains that it was thought (by some)
that custom could only be created with the knowledge of him
who can make law, but he cites the opinion of John (? ) as main-
taining that the knowledge or counsel of the Pope was not
necessary for the creation of custom, otherwise it would rarely
or never come into being. 1
Yet another very important Canonist of the same century,
Turrecremata, deals in considerable detail with the whole
question of the nature and authority of law, in his Commentary
on the Decretals of Gratian. It is natural that his treatment
of the nature of law has something of the breadth and scope
of Gratian's treatment of the subject. He was also greatly
suetudinem: nec transferri potuit,
quum surgit ex tacito consensu, quod
tenet Bart. 1. quae sit longa consue-
tudo, 1. secunda in repetitione (Cod. %'iii.
52).
Haec ratio non urget, quoniam
poterit hodie induci consuetudo, inter-
veniente tacito consensu principis;
nec potest esse translata jurisdictio
in principom, quin etiam sit translata
potestes consuetudinis inducendae,
quum sit jus ex quo legantur subditi,
et pro lege servare ut in diffinitione
consuetudinis. . . .
Secundo, solvit Inno, quia leges,
quae dicunt quod consuetudo est abro-
gatrix legum ete. loquuntur de legibus
municipalibus, quas sibi quisque popu-
lus statuit, quas etiam contraria lege
vel consuetudine potest tollere; secus in
lege imperiali quae solum lege imperiali
tollitur. . . . Tertio solvit Inno quod
leges primae loquuntur de consuetudine
generali, quae ex certa scientia legis-
latoris s. principis inducitur. .