In both case there would be no
duration
possible.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
General refutation]
L4: [A. Erroneousness of thinking a personal self exist]
.
\ ###
\ 243.
\ Some see it as ubiquitous and for some
\ The person is the mere [size of the] body.
\ Some see it as a mere particle.
\ The wise see it as non-existent.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self. Since it doesn't exist those who assert its existence cannot agree among themselves. )
.
( -- It follows that the conception of a personal self is erroneous. Since the self, if it existed, would do so by way of its own entity, it should appear without differences.
-- Some such as Vaisesikas and Samkhyas see the self as existing in each body and as being ubiquitous like space. Others such as Nirgranthas see that which has a body as proportionate to the size of that body, such as an ant's or an elephant's.
Nirgranthas assert the life force is large or small like the size of the body.
Others, unable to accept this, see it as a mere particle.
Those with the wisdom that perceives the suchness of functional things without distortion see the self as non-existent. Indeed, if the self existed by way of its own entity, the Forders' view would not differ. )
.
L4: [B. Impossibility of liberation from cyclic existence for a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 244.
\ How can what is permanent be harmed,
\ Or the unharmed be liberated?
\ Liberation is irrelevant
\ For one whose self is permanent.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not seek protection and liberation. The path would be useless for a permanent self. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to suffering of cyclic existence and would therefore not need to seek release.
-- For an opponent who asserts a permanent self, attaining liberation is irrelevant. How can that which is permanent be harmed by dangers and so forth in cyclic existence, and how can that which is unharmed in cyclic existence be liberated by subsequent mediation on the paths? It cannot for these very reasons. )
.
L4: [C. Inappropriateness of asserting the existence of a self during liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 245.
\ If the self exists it is inappropriate
\ To think there is no self
\ And false to claim one attains nirvana
\ Through certain knowledge of reality.
.
(i. e. There is no individual Liberation - no self in Nirvana: To say that a permanent self is liberated by abandoning the belief in a self is contradictory. There is no self being liberated, or attaining Nirvana. )
.
(-- Moreover, if the self were truly existent, how could giving up conceptions of a self be the means to attain liberation, as is claimed?
-- If the self exists by way of its own entity, it follows that thinking there is no self is inappropriate and that attainment of liberation is not feasible, since the basis for conceptions of a self is intact. Moreover the contention of these amazing people [who assert that the self exists but claim] that though ascertaining knowledge of suchness one abandons conceptions of a self and thereby attains nirvana would be false. Therefore those who seek liberation should accept
30 / 117
selflessness. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [D. Refuting a substantially established liberated [person] without a self]
.
\ ###
\ 246.
\ If it exists at liberation
\ It should not be non-existent before.
\ It is explained that what is seen
\ Without anything is its nature.
.
(i. e. Nothing permanent heving rebirths - no self in samsara: And if there is no individual liberation there is also no real individuality taking rebirths in samsara. )
.
(-- Fearing the absurd consequence that conceptions of a self would occur in the liberated state if the self exists, one might assert that though there is no self, there is a truly existent liberated person.
-- It follows that there must be such a truly existent liberated person previously too during cyclic existence, because its entity, isolated from any associated factors, as perceived by unmistaken awareness, is said to be its nature. If there is no self during liberation, it should not be asserted as existing during the cycle of rebirths either. )
.
L3: [III. Eliminating any fault of annihilation with regard to selflessness]
L4: [A. Although there is no self, there is no danger of the composite and transitory discontinuing]
.
\ ###
\ 247.
\ If the impermanent discontinues
\ How could there be grass at present?
\ If, indeed, this were true,
\ No one would have ignorance either.
.
(i. e. No-self doesn't mean no possible continuity of karma or Liberation: There is no need for a permanent self, to support karma and rebirth, to explain bondage and continuity, and the possibility of Liberation. There is a flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. There is continuity in the endless chain of causes and effects without the need to postulate any inherently existing cause or effect. - This is the same as saying that emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination, or that the Two Truths are not contradictory, but inseparable. . . )
.
(Nothing has origination, duration, cessation; nothing is impermanent; this model would not explain continuity and bounding; there is just the flow without anything inherently existent in it. Reality should not be seen as real impermanent things changing from one moment to another through discrete steps. Nothing really originate or discontinue. There is no real cause and effect. Just the continuum. The model consisting of "moments" (ksana) is not consistent, it cannot explain continuity, nor the dependence in samsara. See Karikas 19-21. There is no need for permanence to have continuity, and the illusion of duration; on the contrary, permanent cause and effect would inhibit any change. Bondage is explained with the continuous flow of cause & effect, without the necessity for a permanent self to be the holder of karma.
-- All these views are based on a failure to understand that impermanence does not necessitate discontinuation. Nothing impermanent can be produced from a permanent cause. Therefore a permanent self is not feasible as an initiating cause of activity. Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue. This become clear when we correctly understand the nature of dependent arising, for though the cause ceases an effect has arisen from it and thus there is continuity.
-- Assertion: if there is no self, composite things whose nature is to disintegrate moment by moment would discontinue because of disintegration as soon as they are produced.
-- Answer: Understanding impermanence to mean discontinuation is unacceptable. If it did, how could there today be fields and grass whose continuity is beginningless? There should not be any, for if impermanence meant discontinuation, then whatever is impermanent would have the defect of discontinuing. If the view that whatever is impermanent discontinues were true, it follows that no one would have ignorance because it is impermanent. It also follows that pleasure and desire would not occur either. )
.
31 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [B. Even if a self exists, it is unsuitable as the cause that starts and stops [production]]
.
\ ###
\ 248.
\ Even if the self exists
\ Form is seen to arise from other [causes],
\ To continue by virtue of others
\ And to disintegrate through others.
.
(i. e. The self is not a primary cause: As we have seen in the previous chapter, a permanent cause cannot explain the effect. The effect is always dependent on an infinity of other causes and conditions, never on only one absolute cause. This cause would itself need to be triggered and stopped. So the self should not be seen as a permanent cause, independent of any other causes and conditions. )
.
(If the self is a permanent cause, all its effects should not be also dependent on other causes and conditions. But that is not what is seen. The self is not a primary permanent absolute cause of everything that is attributed to it. Another way to see this: Seems to point to the fact that "it is not completely mind fabrications"; there are other causes and conditions beside the mind; things are not "non-existent" at all. There is a flow out there, although the chunks are created by our own mind.
-- It follows that even if the self exists, it is not acceptable as the initiating cause of things which are seen to arise exclusively from other causes. Fire arises from the contact between sunlight and a fire-crystal, water from the contact between moonlight and a water-crystal, the sprout from the seed, and forms such as the sense organs from an earlier stage of the fetus. They continue because of other factors: fire keeps burning because of fuel and so forth and just as it does not burn when there is insufficient fuel, they disintegrate through other factors. The self cannot exist for if it did, it alone should produce all effects. )
.
L4: [C. Producers and that which is produced exist in relation only to impermanent things]
.
\ ###
\ 249.
\ Just as the sprout which is a product
\ Is produced from a product, the seed,
\ Similarly all that is impermanent
\ Comes from the impermanent.
.
(i. e. No permanent self, just an endless chain of interdependence / karma: The actual self is an impermanent self that is the result of an endless chain of causes and effects. The five aggregates produce karma; karma conditions the production of the next five aggregates; and both are interdependent endlessly, until one can transcend the whole cycle by seeing through its real nature. There is no need for a permanent self here; there has never been any permanent self; there is no self Liberation. )
.
(-- An effect cannot arise from something permanent and thus, just as the sprout, a product, arises from the seed which is a product, all that is impermanent comes from impermanent causes. Therefore composite things, undergoing production and disintegration moment by moment, can never be permanent nor discontinue. The thunderbolts of permanence and annihilation which strike and destroy the relationship of cause and effect between composite things are
driven off to a distance by the wise with the mantra of dependent arising. ) .
L4: [D. Showing briefly how permanence and annihilation are avoided in terms of the conventional]
.
\ ###
\ 250.
\ SINCE FUNCTIONAL THINGS ARISE
\ THERE IS NO DISCONTINUATION
\ AND BECAUSE THEY CEASE
\ THERE IS NO PERMANENCE.
.
(i. e. The Two Truths: dependent origination and emptiness, or karma and no-self. We need both method and wisdom together (the two accumulations) to stay away from all extremes. Dependent origination or karma is the antidote to
32 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
nihilism or discontinuity, and emptiness or no-self is the antidote to inherent existence or permanence. Merit is accumulated using methods based on dependent origination, the explanation of the Wheel of Life, the law of karma . . . Wisdom is accumulated by gradually combining the realization of the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas (including the self) with the various methods until we can transcend it all. Dependent origination and emptiness (or karma and no-self) do not contradict each other; one implies the other. )
.
(-- Since resultant things like sprouts arise and are produced, the cause's continuum is not in danger of being annihilated. Since the seed ceases once the sprout has been produced, the cause is not in danger of being permanent. The "Fundamental [Treatise Called] Wisdom" says:
~ Whatever has arisen depending on something
~ Is firstly not [one with] it
and so .
.
\
\
\
\
\
.
\
\
self.
.
This concludes the commentary on the tenth chapter, showing how to meditate on refuting the self, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
.
forth. In brief this shows how permanence and annihilation are avoided in relation to the conventional. ) L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
###
Through familiarity with meditating on
The impermanence, suffering and uncleanness of cyclic existence, Abandon the limitless views of the self,
Both innate and those imputed by tenets.
###
This is the tenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting the
33 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L2: [Chapter 11 - Refuting Truly Existent Time - There is no truly existing absolute time, duration or impermanence - P. 227]
.
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON REFUTING TIME.
Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting truly existent time.
-- Refuting time as a truly existent functional thing / that past, present and future things are all existent (now)
-- If the future and the past exist now, they are not past and future.
-- If the past and present continue to exist, the future already exist, the present permanent, then nothing really originate or ceased, nothing is impermanent, nothing is produced through causality -- but that is not what is seen.
-- If the future already exist, is there another production?
-- If the future already exist, there is no need to work on it.
-- Directly seeing the future, or past lives: bull-. . .
-- On the other hand: past, present, future, they are not non-existent at all either; otherwise there would be no causality at all, no bounding, and no possibility for liberation.
-- Avoiding both extremes: it is not existing, nor non-existing. In both case morality would be useless.
-- Actual change, production, origination or cessation, . . . is not seen. So there is no clear present.
-- Nothing last the same even a moment; everything is continually changing. Nothing last long enough to "be existent". So nothing could be used as an objective absolute time comparator.
-- Time, duration, is not directly perceptible; so it is not a true functional thing.
-- Time and duration: not two separate thing, nor either one. One cannot be used to prove the other.
-- Impermanence and things: not separate, not one.
In both case there would be no duration possible. So they cannot be used to prove duration, or time.
-- The unclear opposition of two characteristics of things: impermanence and duration
-- Past, present and future: they are not the same, they are not different / separate real existent entities, they are dependent on each other, they are fabrications of the mind because the mind does not understand how continuity really works
-- Not knowing how to posit continuity and transitoriness, They say time is permanent and the three times exist substantially.
.
-- see also
-- Chapter 9 verses: 107- About Refuting permanent time
-- even time, like seasons, is dependent, an effect, thus not an absolute permanent cause
-- because there is no cause without having causes and conditions itself
-- the cause itself change from being non active, to being active, depending on other conditions, thus it is not permanent -- If a permanent cause cannot be the real cause, then there would be no cause at all.
-- how can permanence cause impermanence? )
.
L3: [I. Refuting that time is substantially established by nature] L4: [A. Refuting the past and the future]
L5: [1. Refuting a substantially established future]
L6: [a. Showing the fallacies if the future is truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 251.
\ The present pot and the past one
\ Do not exist in the future pot.
\ Since both would be future,
\ The future would not exist.
.
(i. e. Past, present and future cannot exist simultaneously - like cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously: Some think time is a primary cause, without being an effect - like with the seasons. Permanent time would mean that the past and present would still exist in the future - or that the future exist in the present. But, the causes, past and present, are not the same as the effect, future, otherwise there would be no need for production of the future. They are not different or consecutive either, otherwise there would be no continuity or causality. )
.
(-- Assertion by Vaidantikas and other proponents of permanent time: Though it is correct to admit a permanent self
34 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
does not exist since it is not established by either direct or inferential cognition, permanent functional things are not non-existent since there is permanent time. Though water, manure, seeds and so forth are present, one observes that sprout, flowers and the like are not produced at certain times but are produced at others. From this one can infer the presence of another cause which is time. Though it is a permanent entity different from the functional things which exist in the three times, it is revealed in terms of instants, moments, brief spans, and so forth.
-- Answer: This is unacceptable, for if time were an entity different from functional things it should be perceived but it is not perceived. That has already been refuted. In this context the refutation is made taking a future pot to represent future time. The same should be understood with respect to the other two times.
-- It follows that the present pot does not exist in the future pot, nor does the past pot exist at that time, for if they both existed at that time, time would be disrupted, since things which are to occur later would already exist at an earlier time. Also at any one time another cannot exist. For these reasons, since both the past and present would be future if they existed at the time of the future pot, they do not already exist at that time. If the future of the future existed by way of its own entity, it should be future. In that case since all three times would have to be future, there could not be any past or present. If that were so, the future itself would not exist, since it could not be posited as future in relation to anything. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 252.
\ If a disintegrated thing exists as
\ A future entity in the future,
\ How can what is future in nature
\ Become that which is past?
.
(i. e. No permanent future: The future becomes the present and then the past. So there is no permanent future, no inherently existing future. )
.
(-- Assertion: The past pot is not altogether non-existent in the future pot. Since there is a part of it which has not yet come into existence as an entity that has occurred, there is no error.
-- Answer: If at the time of the future pot, the disintegrated pot existed in the future as an entity which had not yet come into existence, it would follow that the pot was future because of being, by way of its own entity, that which had not yet occurred at the time of the future pot. If this is accepted, it follows that there would be no past. This would necessarily be so, for how could anything that truly existed as future in nature become past? It is contradictory. Moreover by virtue of this reasoning, if the future relation to the pot is asserted as truly existent it must be accepted as being only future, which undermines the contention. )
.
L6: [c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 253.
\ Because of being future in nature
\ A future functional thing
\ Is thus present
\ And cannot be future.
.
(i. e. A truly existing future would not be the future: If the future is truly existing, it exist now, and is not the future. So there is no truly existent future. )
.
(If, according to proponents of permanent time, future things exist, it follows that the future pot is present because of already being in the nature of a future substantially existent thing. If something exists as a substantially established entity, it must be present since it has been produced and has not disintegrated. If this is accepted, it follows that it cannot be future. )
.
L6: [d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 254.
35 / 117
.
\ ###
\ 257.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If the future, past and present exist,
\ What does not exist?
\ How can there be impermanence
\ For one for whom all times exist?
.
(i. e. Truly existing past, present and future would mean nothing is impermanent: If the past continue to exist, the future already exist, as the present, then nothing originate or disintegrate, nothing is impermanent. Thus the tree times cannot truly exist, be permanent. )
.
(-- If it were truly existent, things could undergo no change and there would be nothing impermanent.
-- If, as asserted by Vaisesikas, Vaibhasikas and so forth, things existent by way of their own character exist in the future, exist in the past and exist in the present, what part of a thing could ever not exist? How could there be impermanence for a proponent of substantially existent time? It follows that there cannot be any impermanent things, for if all three times are substantially existent, whatever exist at an earlier time must be accepted as existing later and whatever exists at a later time must be accepted as existing earlier. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting a substantially established past]
.
\ ###
\ 255.
\ If it has passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
\ If it has not passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
.
(i. e. A truly existing past would not be the past: If the past exist, it exist now, and is not the past. Thus the past is not a real existing functional independent thing. )
.
(-- The future is not substantially existent since future time cannot exist in the future. Similarly has the past passed beyond its own nature as the past or not?
-- In the first case, why is it the past? It follows that it is not the past because of having passed beyond and gone from the past [just as curd which is no longer milk cannot be called milk and a youth who has left childhood behind cannot be called a child. ] In the second case, for what reason is it the past? It follows that it is not the past for it has not passed beyond being a past substantial entity but continues to exist as a substantial entity performing a function. )
.
L5: [3. Detailed refutation of the future]
L6: [a. Refuting the assertion of Vaibhasikas and so forth]
L7: [(1) Refutation by examining whether the future is produced or unproduced] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 256.
\ If the future is produced
\ Why is it not present?
\ If it is unproduced
\ Is the future permanent or what?
.
(i. e. The future cannot be truly existing, permanent, because we cannot see it. )
.
(-- Regarding Vaibhasikas and so forth who assert that there is a common locus of a pot and the future:
-- If a produced future pot exists, why is it not present? It follows that it should be, because it has been produced and has not ceased. If it is not produced, is the future pot permanent or what? It follows that it should be permanent because of being an unproduced thing. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting the rejoinder]
36 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If the future is impermanent because
\ Though not produced it disintegrates,
\ Since the past does not disintegrate
\ Why not consider it permanent?
.
(i. e. If one assume future is impermanent because it becomes present, then past would be permanent because it doesn't become present or future? See next verse . . . )
.
( -- Assertion: Although the future is unproduced, causes and conditions make it become the present, thus it is not permanent.
-- Answer: If even the future is not produced, the future pot is impermanent because it subsequently disintegrates [in that it undergoes change], why not consider that past pot permanent since it does not disintegrate? It follows that it is permanent because of being a thing which does not disintegrate. )
.
L7: [(2) Consequence that impermanence is impossible if the two times are substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 258.
\ If the past and present
\ Are not impermanent,
\ The third which is different
\ From these is also not.
.
(i. e. But, if the past, and present, are permanent, so is the future. Thus nothing would be impermanent, and there would be no need for time; which is absurd. )
.
( -- Alternatively, what is impermanent according to you?
-- The past and present are not impermanent because the past cannot disintegrate, If the present is impermanent by way of its own entity, through its subsequent connection with disintegration it follows that disintegration, too, is impermanent [or that the present is permanent because of its connection with disintegration which is permanent. ] Since the third which is different from both the past and present, namely the future, also is not impermanent, there is nothing impermanent for proponents of inherently existing things. Thus it is inappropriate for them to assert the existence of time. )
.
L7: [(3) Showing that the existence of future functional things is absurd]
.
\ ###
\ 259.
\ If a thing which will be produced
\ later exists beforehand,
\ The contention of Niyativadins
\ Is not erroneous.
.
(i. e. If the future is inherently existing, nothing is produced through causality. But that is not what we observe. )
.
( -- Assertion: Future things exist because they are produced later when the conditions obtain. That which is previously non-existent, like a barren woman's child, will not be produced later.
-- Answer: If a thing to be produced later is substantially existent prior to its production, the contention that things are inherently established as causeless held by Niyativadins and those asserting that things are not created by peoples' activity and are without cause is not erroneous. Yet their assertion are wrong for they contradict everything that is both seen and unseen. )
.
L7: [(4) Consequence that things already produced are produced again]
.
\ ###
\ 260.
\ To say something which will be made to occur
\ Already exists is unreasonable.
37 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If that which exists is produced,
\ What has been produced will arise again.
.
(i. e. If the future exist, now, then is there another production? )
.
( -- Moreover even if the future were substantially existent, it would be unreasonable to say that a thing which will be made to occur later is substantially existent prior to its production. If that which already exist is produced later, what has already been produced will come into existence again, which is purposeless. As a consequence the effect would find no opportunity for production, since the cause must reproduce itself until the end. )
.
L7: [(5) Refuting that Yogic perception of wished for objects directly perceives future things] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 261.
\ If future things are seen,
\ Why is the non-existent not seen?
\ For one for whom the future exists
\ There can be no distant [time].
.
(i. e. The Middle-Way about the nature of the three times: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. It is false to pretend that one can see the future as if really existing now. But still this doesn't mean that the future is completely non-existent either. A Buddha can directly see their real non-dual nature: the beginningless chain of causes, and the endless chain of effects. A flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. )
.
( -- Assertion: The future exist because there is Yogic perception of wished-for objects which focuses on future things, and because predictions concerning the future are later seen to turn out just as predicted. This is impossible in relation to a barren woman's child.
-- Answer ab: If future things are directly perceived by way of their own entity in the period before their production, why are non-existent things not seen? It follows that they would be seen, for it is not feasible to make distinctions between what is seen and not seen with regard to the non-existent. Such fallacies arise for those who assert that the past and future exist by way of their own entity, but no fallacies accrue to us who assert the three times as arising dependently without inherent existence.
Buddhas directly perceive in the present even those things which will occur after ten millions aeons. Though they are future at the time of the consciousness perceiving them, they are neither non-functional nor permanent for they will not remain for a second moment after their formation. There is no need for a Buddha to cognize the present explicitly and the past and future implicitly, for though the latter do not exist at that time, they are in general directly perceived.
L4: [A. Erroneousness of thinking a personal self exist]
.
\ ###
\ 243.
\ Some see it as ubiquitous and for some
\ The person is the mere [size of the] body.
\ Some see it as a mere particle.
\ The wise see it as non-existent.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self. Since it doesn't exist those who assert its existence cannot agree among themselves. )
.
( -- It follows that the conception of a personal self is erroneous. Since the self, if it existed, would do so by way of its own entity, it should appear without differences.
-- Some such as Vaisesikas and Samkhyas see the self as existing in each body and as being ubiquitous like space. Others such as Nirgranthas see that which has a body as proportionate to the size of that body, such as an ant's or an elephant's.
Nirgranthas assert the life force is large or small like the size of the body.
Others, unable to accept this, see it as a mere particle.
Those with the wisdom that perceives the suchness of functional things without distortion see the self as non-existent. Indeed, if the self existed by way of its own entity, the Forders' view would not differ. )
.
L4: [B. Impossibility of liberation from cyclic existence for a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 244.
\ How can what is permanent be harmed,
\ Or the unharmed be liberated?
\ Liberation is irrelevant
\ For one whose self is permanent.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not seek protection and liberation. The path would be useless for a permanent self. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to suffering of cyclic existence and would therefore not need to seek release.
-- For an opponent who asserts a permanent self, attaining liberation is irrelevant. How can that which is permanent be harmed by dangers and so forth in cyclic existence, and how can that which is unharmed in cyclic existence be liberated by subsequent mediation on the paths? It cannot for these very reasons. )
.
L4: [C. Inappropriateness of asserting the existence of a self during liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 245.
\ If the self exists it is inappropriate
\ To think there is no self
\ And false to claim one attains nirvana
\ Through certain knowledge of reality.
.
(i. e. There is no individual Liberation - no self in Nirvana: To say that a permanent self is liberated by abandoning the belief in a self is contradictory. There is no self being liberated, or attaining Nirvana. )
.
(-- Moreover, if the self were truly existent, how could giving up conceptions of a self be the means to attain liberation, as is claimed?
-- If the self exists by way of its own entity, it follows that thinking there is no self is inappropriate and that attainment of liberation is not feasible, since the basis for conceptions of a self is intact. Moreover the contention of these amazing people [who assert that the self exists but claim] that though ascertaining knowledge of suchness one abandons conceptions of a self and thereby attains nirvana would be false. Therefore those who seek liberation should accept
30 / 117
selflessness. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [D. Refuting a substantially established liberated [person] without a self]
.
\ ###
\ 246.
\ If it exists at liberation
\ It should not be non-existent before.
\ It is explained that what is seen
\ Without anything is its nature.
.
(i. e. Nothing permanent heving rebirths - no self in samsara: And if there is no individual liberation there is also no real individuality taking rebirths in samsara. )
.
(-- Fearing the absurd consequence that conceptions of a self would occur in the liberated state if the self exists, one might assert that though there is no self, there is a truly existent liberated person.
-- It follows that there must be such a truly existent liberated person previously too during cyclic existence, because its entity, isolated from any associated factors, as perceived by unmistaken awareness, is said to be its nature. If there is no self during liberation, it should not be asserted as existing during the cycle of rebirths either. )
.
L3: [III. Eliminating any fault of annihilation with regard to selflessness]
L4: [A. Although there is no self, there is no danger of the composite and transitory discontinuing]
.
\ ###
\ 247.
\ If the impermanent discontinues
\ How could there be grass at present?
\ If, indeed, this were true,
\ No one would have ignorance either.
.
(i. e. No-self doesn't mean no possible continuity of karma or Liberation: There is no need for a permanent self, to support karma and rebirth, to explain bondage and continuity, and the possibility of Liberation. There is a flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. There is continuity in the endless chain of causes and effects without the need to postulate any inherently existing cause or effect. - This is the same as saying that emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination, or that the Two Truths are not contradictory, but inseparable. . . )
.
(Nothing has origination, duration, cessation; nothing is impermanent; this model would not explain continuity and bounding; there is just the flow without anything inherently existent in it. Reality should not be seen as real impermanent things changing from one moment to another through discrete steps. Nothing really originate or discontinue. There is no real cause and effect. Just the continuum. The model consisting of "moments" (ksana) is not consistent, it cannot explain continuity, nor the dependence in samsara. See Karikas 19-21. There is no need for permanence to have continuity, and the illusion of duration; on the contrary, permanent cause and effect would inhibit any change. Bondage is explained with the continuous flow of cause & effect, without the necessity for a permanent self to be the holder of karma.
-- All these views are based on a failure to understand that impermanence does not necessitate discontinuation. Nothing impermanent can be produced from a permanent cause. Therefore a permanent self is not feasible as an initiating cause of activity. Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue. This become clear when we correctly understand the nature of dependent arising, for though the cause ceases an effect has arisen from it and thus there is continuity.
-- Assertion: if there is no self, composite things whose nature is to disintegrate moment by moment would discontinue because of disintegration as soon as they are produced.
-- Answer: Understanding impermanence to mean discontinuation is unacceptable. If it did, how could there today be fields and grass whose continuity is beginningless? There should not be any, for if impermanence meant discontinuation, then whatever is impermanent would have the defect of discontinuing. If the view that whatever is impermanent discontinues were true, it follows that no one would have ignorance because it is impermanent. It also follows that pleasure and desire would not occur either. )
.
31 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [B. Even if a self exists, it is unsuitable as the cause that starts and stops [production]]
.
\ ###
\ 248.
\ Even if the self exists
\ Form is seen to arise from other [causes],
\ To continue by virtue of others
\ And to disintegrate through others.
.
(i. e. The self is not a primary cause: As we have seen in the previous chapter, a permanent cause cannot explain the effect. The effect is always dependent on an infinity of other causes and conditions, never on only one absolute cause. This cause would itself need to be triggered and stopped. So the self should not be seen as a permanent cause, independent of any other causes and conditions. )
.
(If the self is a permanent cause, all its effects should not be also dependent on other causes and conditions. But that is not what is seen. The self is not a primary permanent absolute cause of everything that is attributed to it. Another way to see this: Seems to point to the fact that "it is not completely mind fabrications"; there are other causes and conditions beside the mind; things are not "non-existent" at all. There is a flow out there, although the chunks are created by our own mind.
-- It follows that even if the self exists, it is not acceptable as the initiating cause of things which are seen to arise exclusively from other causes. Fire arises from the contact between sunlight and a fire-crystal, water from the contact between moonlight and a water-crystal, the sprout from the seed, and forms such as the sense organs from an earlier stage of the fetus. They continue because of other factors: fire keeps burning because of fuel and so forth and just as it does not burn when there is insufficient fuel, they disintegrate through other factors. The self cannot exist for if it did, it alone should produce all effects. )
.
L4: [C. Producers and that which is produced exist in relation only to impermanent things]
.
\ ###
\ 249.
\ Just as the sprout which is a product
\ Is produced from a product, the seed,
\ Similarly all that is impermanent
\ Comes from the impermanent.
.
(i. e. No permanent self, just an endless chain of interdependence / karma: The actual self is an impermanent self that is the result of an endless chain of causes and effects. The five aggregates produce karma; karma conditions the production of the next five aggregates; and both are interdependent endlessly, until one can transcend the whole cycle by seeing through its real nature. There is no need for a permanent self here; there has never been any permanent self; there is no self Liberation. )
.
(-- An effect cannot arise from something permanent and thus, just as the sprout, a product, arises from the seed which is a product, all that is impermanent comes from impermanent causes. Therefore composite things, undergoing production and disintegration moment by moment, can never be permanent nor discontinue. The thunderbolts of permanence and annihilation which strike and destroy the relationship of cause and effect between composite things are
driven off to a distance by the wise with the mantra of dependent arising. ) .
L4: [D. Showing briefly how permanence and annihilation are avoided in terms of the conventional]
.
\ ###
\ 250.
\ SINCE FUNCTIONAL THINGS ARISE
\ THERE IS NO DISCONTINUATION
\ AND BECAUSE THEY CEASE
\ THERE IS NO PERMANENCE.
.
(i. e. The Two Truths: dependent origination and emptiness, or karma and no-self. We need both method and wisdom together (the two accumulations) to stay away from all extremes. Dependent origination or karma is the antidote to
32 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
nihilism or discontinuity, and emptiness or no-self is the antidote to inherent existence or permanence. Merit is accumulated using methods based on dependent origination, the explanation of the Wheel of Life, the law of karma . . . Wisdom is accumulated by gradually combining the realization of the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas (including the self) with the various methods until we can transcend it all. Dependent origination and emptiness (or karma and no-self) do not contradict each other; one implies the other. )
.
(-- Since resultant things like sprouts arise and are produced, the cause's continuum is not in danger of being annihilated. Since the seed ceases once the sprout has been produced, the cause is not in danger of being permanent. The "Fundamental [Treatise Called] Wisdom" says:
~ Whatever has arisen depending on something
~ Is firstly not [one with] it
and so .
.
\
\
\
\
\
.
\
\
self.
.
This concludes the commentary on the tenth chapter, showing how to meditate on refuting the self, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
.
forth. In brief this shows how permanence and annihilation are avoided in relation to the conventional. ) L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
###
Through familiarity with meditating on
The impermanence, suffering and uncleanness of cyclic existence, Abandon the limitless views of the self,
Both innate and those imputed by tenets.
###
This is the tenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting the
33 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L2: [Chapter 11 - Refuting Truly Existent Time - There is no truly existing absolute time, duration or impermanence - P. 227]
.
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON REFUTING TIME.
Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting truly existent time.
-- Refuting time as a truly existent functional thing / that past, present and future things are all existent (now)
-- If the future and the past exist now, they are not past and future.
-- If the past and present continue to exist, the future already exist, the present permanent, then nothing really originate or ceased, nothing is impermanent, nothing is produced through causality -- but that is not what is seen.
-- If the future already exist, is there another production?
-- If the future already exist, there is no need to work on it.
-- Directly seeing the future, or past lives: bull-. . .
-- On the other hand: past, present, future, they are not non-existent at all either; otherwise there would be no causality at all, no bounding, and no possibility for liberation.
-- Avoiding both extremes: it is not existing, nor non-existing. In both case morality would be useless.
-- Actual change, production, origination or cessation, . . . is not seen. So there is no clear present.
-- Nothing last the same even a moment; everything is continually changing. Nothing last long enough to "be existent". So nothing could be used as an objective absolute time comparator.
-- Time, duration, is not directly perceptible; so it is not a true functional thing.
-- Time and duration: not two separate thing, nor either one. One cannot be used to prove the other.
-- Impermanence and things: not separate, not one.
In both case there would be no duration possible. So they cannot be used to prove duration, or time.
-- The unclear opposition of two characteristics of things: impermanence and duration
-- Past, present and future: they are not the same, they are not different / separate real existent entities, they are dependent on each other, they are fabrications of the mind because the mind does not understand how continuity really works
-- Not knowing how to posit continuity and transitoriness, They say time is permanent and the three times exist substantially.
.
-- see also
-- Chapter 9 verses: 107- About Refuting permanent time
-- even time, like seasons, is dependent, an effect, thus not an absolute permanent cause
-- because there is no cause without having causes and conditions itself
-- the cause itself change from being non active, to being active, depending on other conditions, thus it is not permanent -- If a permanent cause cannot be the real cause, then there would be no cause at all.
-- how can permanence cause impermanence? )
.
L3: [I. Refuting that time is substantially established by nature] L4: [A. Refuting the past and the future]
L5: [1. Refuting a substantially established future]
L6: [a. Showing the fallacies if the future is truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 251.
\ The present pot and the past one
\ Do not exist in the future pot.
\ Since both would be future,
\ The future would not exist.
.
(i. e. Past, present and future cannot exist simultaneously - like cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously: Some think time is a primary cause, without being an effect - like with the seasons. Permanent time would mean that the past and present would still exist in the future - or that the future exist in the present. But, the causes, past and present, are not the same as the effect, future, otherwise there would be no need for production of the future. They are not different or consecutive either, otherwise there would be no continuity or causality. )
.
(-- Assertion by Vaidantikas and other proponents of permanent time: Though it is correct to admit a permanent self
34 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
does not exist since it is not established by either direct or inferential cognition, permanent functional things are not non-existent since there is permanent time. Though water, manure, seeds and so forth are present, one observes that sprout, flowers and the like are not produced at certain times but are produced at others. From this one can infer the presence of another cause which is time. Though it is a permanent entity different from the functional things which exist in the three times, it is revealed in terms of instants, moments, brief spans, and so forth.
-- Answer: This is unacceptable, for if time were an entity different from functional things it should be perceived but it is not perceived. That has already been refuted. In this context the refutation is made taking a future pot to represent future time. The same should be understood with respect to the other two times.
-- It follows that the present pot does not exist in the future pot, nor does the past pot exist at that time, for if they both existed at that time, time would be disrupted, since things which are to occur later would already exist at an earlier time. Also at any one time another cannot exist. For these reasons, since both the past and present would be future if they existed at the time of the future pot, they do not already exist at that time. If the future of the future existed by way of its own entity, it should be future. In that case since all three times would have to be future, there could not be any past or present. If that were so, the future itself would not exist, since it could not be posited as future in relation to anything. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 252.
\ If a disintegrated thing exists as
\ A future entity in the future,
\ How can what is future in nature
\ Become that which is past?
.
(i. e. No permanent future: The future becomes the present and then the past. So there is no permanent future, no inherently existing future. )
.
(-- Assertion: The past pot is not altogether non-existent in the future pot. Since there is a part of it which has not yet come into existence as an entity that has occurred, there is no error.
-- Answer: If at the time of the future pot, the disintegrated pot existed in the future as an entity which had not yet come into existence, it would follow that the pot was future because of being, by way of its own entity, that which had not yet occurred at the time of the future pot. If this is accepted, it follows that there would be no past. This would necessarily be so, for how could anything that truly existed as future in nature become past? It is contradictory. Moreover by virtue of this reasoning, if the future relation to the pot is asserted as truly existent it must be accepted as being only future, which undermines the contention. )
.
L6: [c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 253.
\ Because of being future in nature
\ A future functional thing
\ Is thus present
\ And cannot be future.
.
(i. e. A truly existing future would not be the future: If the future is truly existing, it exist now, and is not the future. So there is no truly existent future. )
.
(If, according to proponents of permanent time, future things exist, it follows that the future pot is present because of already being in the nature of a future substantially existent thing. If something exists as a substantially established entity, it must be present since it has been produced and has not disintegrated. If this is accepted, it follows that it cannot be future. )
.
L6: [d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 254.
35 / 117
.
\ ###
\ 257.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If the future, past and present exist,
\ What does not exist?
\ How can there be impermanence
\ For one for whom all times exist?
.
(i. e. Truly existing past, present and future would mean nothing is impermanent: If the past continue to exist, the future already exist, as the present, then nothing originate or disintegrate, nothing is impermanent. Thus the tree times cannot truly exist, be permanent. )
.
(-- If it were truly existent, things could undergo no change and there would be nothing impermanent.
-- If, as asserted by Vaisesikas, Vaibhasikas and so forth, things existent by way of their own character exist in the future, exist in the past and exist in the present, what part of a thing could ever not exist? How could there be impermanence for a proponent of substantially existent time? It follows that there cannot be any impermanent things, for if all three times are substantially existent, whatever exist at an earlier time must be accepted as existing later and whatever exists at a later time must be accepted as existing earlier. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting a substantially established past]
.
\ ###
\ 255.
\ If it has passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
\ If it has not passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
.
(i. e. A truly existing past would not be the past: If the past exist, it exist now, and is not the past. Thus the past is not a real existing functional independent thing. )
.
(-- The future is not substantially existent since future time cannot exist in the future. Similarly has the past passed beyond its own nature as the past or not?
-- In the first case, why is it the past? It follows that it is not the past because of having passed beyond and gone from the past [just as curd which is no longer milk cannot be called milk and a youth who has left childhood behind cannot be called a child. ] In the second case, for what reason is it the past? It follows that it is not the past for it has not passed beyond being a past substantial entity but continues to exist as a substantial entity performing a function. )
.
L5: [3. Detailed refutation of the future]
L6: [a. Refuting the assertion of Vaibhasikas and so forth]
L7: [(1) Refutation by examining whether the future is produced or unproduced] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 256.
\ If the future is produced
\ Why is it not present?
\ If it is unproduced
\ Is the future permanent or what?
.
(i. e. The future cannot be truly existing, permanent, because we cannot see it. )
.
(-- Regarding Vaibhasikas and so forth who assert that there is a common locus of a pot and the future:
-- If a produced future pot exists, why is it not present? It follows that it should be, because it has been produced and has not ceased. If it is not produced, is the future pot permanent or what? It follows that it should be permanent because of being an unproduced thing. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting the rejoinder]
36 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If the future is impermanent because
\ Though not produced it disintegrates,
\ Since the past does not disintegrate
\ Why not consider it permanent?
.
(i. e. If one assume future is impermanent because it becomes present, then past would be permanent because it doesn't become present or future? See next verse . . . )
.
( -- Assertion: Although the future is unproduced, causes and conditions make it become the present, thus it is not permanent.
-- Answer: If even the future is not produced, the future pot is impermanent because it subsequently disintegrates [in that it undergoes change], why not consider that past pot permanent since it does not disintegrate? It follows that it is permanent because of being a thing which does not disintegrate. )
.
L7: [(2) Consequence that impermanence is impossible if the two times are substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 258.
\ If the past and present
\ Are not impermanent,
\ The third which is different
\ From these is also not.
.
(i. e. But, if the past, and present, are permanent, so is the future. Thus nothing would be impermanent, and there would be no need for time; which is absurd. )
.
( -- Alternatively, what is impermanent according to you?
-- The past and present are not impermanent because the past cannot disintegrate, If the present is impermanent by way of its own entity, through its subsequent connection with disintegration it follows that disintegration, too, is impermanent [or that the present is permanent because of its connection with disintegration which is permanent. ] Since the third which is different from both the past and present, namely the future, also is not impermanent, there is nothing impermanent for proponents of inherently existing things. Thus it is inappropriate for them to assert the existence of time. )
.
L7: [(3) Showing that the existence of future functional things is absurd]
.
\ ###
\ 259.
\ If a thing which will be produced
\ later exists beforehand,
\ The contention of Niyativadins
\ Is not erroneous.
.
(i. e. If the future is inherently existing, nothing is produced through causality. But that is not what we observe. )
.
( -- Assertion: Future things exist because they are produced later when the conditions obtain. That which is previously non-existent, like a barren woman's child, will not be produced later.
-- Answer: If a thing to be produced later is substantially existent prior to its production, the contention that things are inherently established as causeless held by Niyativadins and those asserting that things are not created by peoples' activity and are without cause is not erroneous. Yet their assertion are wrong for they contradict everything that is both seen and unseen. )
.
L7: [(4) Consequence that things already produced are produced again]
.
\ ###
\ 260.
\ To say something which will be made to occur
\ Already exists is unreasonable.
37 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If that which exists is produced,
\ What has been produced will arise again.
.
(i. e. If the future exist, now, then is there another production? )
.
( -- Moreover even if the future were substantially existent, it would be unreasonable to say that a thing which will be made to occur later is substantially existent prior to its production. If that which already exist is produced later, what has already been produced will come into existence again, which is purposeless. As a consequence the effect would find no opportunity for production, since the cause must reproduce itself until the end. )
.
L7: [(5) Refuting that Yogic perception of wished for objects directly perceives future things] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 261.
\ If future things are seen,
\ Why is the non-existent not seen?
\ For one for whom the future exists
\ There can be no distant [time].
.
(i. e. The Middle-Way about the nature of the three times: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. It is false to pretend that one can see the future as if really existing now. But still this doesn't mean that the future is completely non-existent either. A Buddha can directly see their real non-dual nature: the beginningless chain of causes, and the endless chain of effects. A flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. )
.
( -- Assertion: The future exist because there is Yogic perception of wished-for objects which focuses on future things, and because predictions concerning the future are later seen to turn out just as predicted. This is impossible in relation to a barren woman's child.
-- Answer ab: If future things are directly perceived by way of their own entity in the period before their production, why are non-existent things not seen? It follows that they would be seen, for it is not feasible to make distinctions between what is seen and not seen with regard to the non-existent. Such fallacies arise for those who assert that the past and future exist by way of their own entity, but no fallacies accrue to us who assert the three times as arising dependently without inherent existence.
Buddhas directly perceive in the present even those things which will occur after ten millions aeons. Though they are future at the time of the consciousness perceiving them, they are neither non-functional nor permanent for they will not remain for a second moment after their formation. There is no need for a Buddha to cognize the present explicitly and the past and future implicitly, for though the latter do not exist at that time, they are in general directly perceived.
