No More Learning

Such comportment is related to mimetic comportment. Even artworks that announce themselves as replicas are such only peripherally; by reacting to reality they be- come a second-order reality, subjective reflection, regardless whether the artists have reflected or not. Only artwork that makes itself imageless as something existing in itself [achieves the essence, and this requires a developed aesthetic domination of nature] . 20
If the precept held that artists are unknowing to the point of not knowing what an artwork is, this would collide with the ineluctable necessity today of reflection in art; it can hardly be conceived other than by way of the artists' consciousness. Such unknowingness in fact often becomes a blemish in the work of important artists, especially within cultural spheres where art still to some extent has a place; unknowingness, for instance in the form of a lack of taste, becomes an immanent deficiency. The point of indifference between unknowingness and necessary re- flection, however, is technique. It not only permits reflection but requires it, yet it does so without destroying the fruitful tenebrosity of works by taking recourse to the subordinating concept.
The artwork' s enigmaticalness is the shudder, not however in its living presence but as recollection.
The artwork of the past neither coincided with its cultic element nor stood in sim- ple opposition to it. Rather, art tore itself free from cult objects by a leap in which the cultic element was both transformed and preserved, and this structure is repro- duced on an expanding scale at every level of its history . All art contains elements by virtue of which it threatens to fail its laboriously won and precarious concept: The epic threatens to fail as rudimentary historiography, tragedy as the afterimage of a judicial proceeding, the most abstract work as an ornamental pattern , and the realistic novel as protosociology or reportage.
The enigmaticalness of artworks is intimately bound up with history. It was his- tory that once changed them into enigmas and continues to do so; conversely, it is history alone, which invested them with authority, that keeps from them the em- barrassing question oftheirraison d'etre.
Artworks are archaic in the age in which they are falling silent. But when they no longer speak, their muteness itself speaks.
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Not all advanced art bears the marks of the frightening; these marks are most evi- dent where not every relation of the peinture to the object has been severed, where not every relation of dissonance to the fulfilled and negated consonance has been broken off: Picasso's shocks were ignited by the principle of deformation. Many abstract and constructive works lack these shocks; it is an open question whether the force of still-unrealized reality free of fear is active in these works or if- and this may well be the case- the harmony of abstract works is deceptive just as was the social euphoria of the first decades after the European catastrophe; even aes- thetically, however, such harmony is apparently in decline.
Problems of perspective, which were once the decisive agent in the development of painting, may reemerge, this time emancipated from all functions of replica- tion. It is worth considering if it is possible to conceive of absolutely nonrepresen- tational art in the visual domain; if everything that appears, even when reduced to its utmost, does not bear traces of the world of objects; all such speculations become untrue as soon as they are exploited for the purposes of any sort of restoration. Knowledge has its subjective limits in the inability of the knower to resist the temptation of extrapolating the future from his own situation. The taboo on invariants is, however, also an interdiction on such extrapolation. The future indeed is no more to be positively depicted than invariants are to be posited; aes- thetics is concentrated in the postulates of the instant.
To the same extent that it cannot be defined what an artwork is, aesthetics is un- able to renounce the desire for such a definition if it is not to be guilty of making false promises. Artworks are images that do not contain replicas of anything, therefore they are imageless; they are essence as appearance. They do not fulfill the requirements of Platonic archetypes or reflections, especially in that they are not eternal but historical through and through. The pre-artistic comportment that approaches art most closely and ultimately leads to it is a comportment that trans- forms experience into the experience of images; as Kierkegaard expressed it: "My booty is images. " Artworks are the objectivations of images, objectivations of mimesis, schemata of experience that assimilate to themselves the subject that is experiencing.
Forms of the so-called lowbrow arts, such as the circus tableau, in which at the finale all the elephants kneel on their hind legs , while on each trunk stands a grace- fully posed, impassive ballerina, are unintentional archetypal images of what the philosophy of history deciphers in art; from its disdained forms much can be gleaned of art ' s secret which is so well hidden back of its current level of develop- ment, as if art had never been otherwise.
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Beauty is the exodus of what has objectivated itself in the realm of means and ends from this realm.
The idea of an objectivity that is nonobjectivated-and therefore an objectivity that cannot adequately be given in intentions-appears in aesthetic purposeful- ness as well as in the purposelessness of art. But art comes into possession of this idea only by way of the subject, only through that rationality from which purpose- fulness derives. Art is a polarization: Its spark connects a self-alienated subjectiv- ity turned in on itself with what is not organized by rationality; it connects the block that separates the subject with what philosophy once called the in-itself. Art is incommensurable with the realm between these poles , that of constituta .
Kant' s purposefulness without a purpose is a principle that emigrated out of em- pirical reality and the realm of the purposes of self-preservation and found its way into a remote realm, formerly that of the sacred. The purposefulness of artworks is dialectical as the critique of the practical positing of purposes. It takes sides with repressed nature, to which it owes the idea of a purposefulness that is other than that posited by humanity; an idea, obviously, that was undermined by the rise of natural science. Art is the rescue of nature-or of immediacy-through its nega- tion, that is, total mediation. It makes itself like what is free of domination by the limitless domination over its material; this is what is hidden back of Kant's oxymoron.
Art, the afterimage of human repression of nature, simultaneously negates this re- pression through reflection and draws close to nature. The subjectively instituted totality of artworks does not remain the totality imposed on the other, but rather, by its distance from this other, becomes the imaginative restitution of the other. Neutralized aesthetically, the domination of nature renounces its violence. In the semblance of the restoration of the mutilated other to its own form, art becomes the model of the nonmutilated. Aesthetic totality is the antithesis of the untrue whole. If art, as Valery once said, wants to be indebted only to itself, this is because art wants to make itself the likeness of an in-itself, of what is free of domination and disfigurement. Art is the spirit that negates itself by virtue of the constitution of its own proper realm.
Evidence that the domination of nature is no accident of art, no original sin result- ing from some subsequent amalgamation with the civilizing process, is given at the very least by the fact that the magical practices of aboriginal peoples bear in themselves undifferentiatedly the element of the domination of nature: "The pro- found effect produced by the image of animals is simply explained by the fact that the image, by its characteristic features, psychologically exercises the same effect as does the object itself, and so as a result of his psychological alteration the per-
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son believes that he has been touched by magic . On the other hand, from the fact that the motionless image is entirely subject to his own powers, he comes to be- lieve that the represented animal can be tracked and subdued; therefore the image appears to him as a means of power over the animal. "21 Magic is a rudimentary form of that causal thinking that ultimately liquidates magic .
Art is mimetic comportment that for the purpose of its objectivation disposes over the most advanced rationality for the control of its material and procedures. This contradiction is art's answer to the contradiction of the ratio itself. If the telos of reason is a fulfillment that is in-itself necessarily not rational-happiness is the enemy of rationality and purpose, of which it nevertheless stands in need-art makes this irrational telos its own concern. In this, art draws on an unrestrained rationality in its technical procedures, which are, in the supposedly "technical world," constrained by the relations of production and thus remain irrational. - In the age of technology , art i s spurious when it masks universal mediation as a social relation.
The rationality of artworks has as its aim opposition to empirical existence: The rational shaping of artworks effectively means their rigorous elaboration in- themselves. As a result they come into contrast with the world of the nature- dominating ratio, in which the aesthetic ratio originates, and become a work for- themselves. The opposition of artworks to domination is mimesis of domination. They must assimilate themselves to the comportment of domination in order to produce something qualitatively distinct from the world of domination . Even the immanently polemical attitude of artworks against the status quo internalizes the principle that underlies the status quo, and that reduces it to the status of what merely exists; aesthetic rationality wants to make good on the damage done by nature-dominating rationality.
The proscription of the element of willful domination in art is not aimed at domi- nation but at the expiation of domination, in that the subject places the control of itself and its other in the service of the nonidentical .
The category of formation [Gestaltung], which is embarrassing when it is cited as an autonomous ideal, must be supplemented by the concept of the work's struc- ture . Yet the quality of the work is all the higher, the work all the more formed , the less it is disposed over. Formation means nonformation.
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It is precisely the integrally constructed artworks of modernism that starkly illu- minate the fallibility of logicality and formal immanence; to fulfill their concept they must outfox it; this is documented in Klee ' s diary entries. One of the tasks of an artist who insistently seeks the extreme is both to realize the logic of "coming to the end"-Richard Strauss was in this regard strangely insensitive-and to interrupt this logic, to suspend it, so as to cancel its mechanical aspect, its flawed predictability. The requirement of becoming assimilated to the work is precisely that of intervening in it so that it does not become an infernal machine. Perhaps the gestures of intervention, with which Beethoven, as if by an act of will, pro- vided the later parts of his development sections , are early evidence of this experi- ence. The fertile instant of the artwork otherwise becomes lethal to itself.
The difference between aesthetic and discursive logicality can be demonstrated in Georg Trakl's poetry. The succession of images-"so beautiful how image fol- lows image"22-certainly does not constitute a nexus of meaning according to logical procedures and causality such as those that govern the apophantic realm, especially the realm of existential judgments. This is not contravened by Trakl's "it is," which the poet chose for its paradoxical force: I n this context "it is" means that "what is not, is. " In spite of the initial impression of a web of associations, his poetic textures are not those of a freely shifting order. Indirectly and obscurely logical categories play a part, as, for instance, in the musically rising or falling curves of the individual elements , the distribution of light and dark , the relations between beginning, continuation, and conclusion. The pictorial elements partici- pate in formal categories, but they are legitimated only by virtue of these rela- tions, which organize the poems and raise them above the contingency of mere conceits. Aesthetic form has its rationality even in poetic association. In it, as one moment calls up the next , there is something of the force of stringency demanded by the conclusions in logic and music . In fact, in a letter in which he criticized an
irksome imitator, Trakl spoke of the aesthetic means he had acquired; none of them lacks an element of logicality .
Aesthetics ofForm andAesthetics ofContent [Inhalt]. -Ironically, in the con- test between the two, the aesthetics of content holds the upper hand by the fact that the content [Gehalt] of works and of art as a whole-its ultimate end-is not formal but concrete. Yet this content [Gehalt] becomes concrete only by virtue of aesthetic form. If form must be at the center of aesthetics, aesthetics develops its content by rendering forms eloquent.
The results of formal aesthetics cannot simply be rejected. However little they do justice to undiminished aesthetic experience, this experience is unthinkable with- out formal elements such as mathematical proportions and symmetry and dynamic formal categories such as tension and release. Without the functions these cate-
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gories fulfill, the great works ofthe past would be as incomprehensible as it would be impossible to hypostatize these elements as aesthetic criteria. They were always only elements and as such inseparable from the manifold elements of content; they never had immediate value except in relation to what they formed. They are para- digms of the dialectic . It is according to what is formed that they are modified ; with the emergence of radical modem art they were thoroughly transformed by nega- tion: Their effect is indirect as a result of being avoided and annulled; prototypical here-as Valery noted-is, since Manet, the relation of artists to the traditional rules of pictorial composition. Their authority makes itself felt in the opposition of specific works to them. A category such as that of an artwork's proportions is only meaningful to the extent that it also encompasses the overthrow ofproportions, in other words, their own dynamic. By way of such a dialectic, throughout mod- ernism, the formal categories have been reestablished at ever higher levels: The quintessence of the dissonant was harmony; the quintessence of dynamic tensions was equilibrium. This would be inconceivable if the formal categories had not themselves been suffused with content. The formal principle according to which artworks should be both tension and equilibrium registers the antagonistic content of aesthetic experience, that of an unreconciled reality that nevertheless wants reconciliation. Even static formal categories, such as that of the golden mean, are congealed content, that of reconciliation itself. In artworks it is only as a result that harmony has ever amounted to anything; when it was simply posited and asserted it was already ideology, which is what the newly won homeostasis also ultimately became. Conversely, and this is effectively an apriori of art, all mater- ial in art developed by way of a process of formation that was then abstracted as the categories of form. These categories were in turn transformed through their relation to the material . Forming means the adequate completion of this transfor- mation. This may explicate immanently the concept of the dialectic in art.
The formal analysis ofan artwork, and what can properly be called form in an art- work, only has meaning in relation to the work's concrete material. The construc- tion of the most impeccable diagonals, axes, and vanishing lines in a picture, the most stringent motivic economy in a musical composition , remains a matter of in- difference so long as the construction is not developed specifically out of that par- ticular picture or composition . No other use of the concept of construction in art is legitimate; otherwise the concept inevitably becomes a fetish. Many analyses contain everything except the reason why a painting or a piece of music is held to be beautiful or from what they derive their right to exist. Such analytical methods are in fact vulnerable to the critique of aesthetic formalism. But although it is not defensible simply to insist on the reciprocity of form and content-rather, this reciprocity needs to be demonstrated in detail-the formal elements, at every point referring back to content, preserve their tendency to become content. Crude materialism and a no less crude classicism agree in the mistaken belief that there
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is some sort of pure form. The official doctrine of materialism overlooks the dialectic even of the fetish character in art. Precisely when form appears emanci- pated from any preestablished content [Inhalt] , the forms themselves acquire their own expression and content [Inhalt] . Surrealism operated in this fashion in many of its works, and Klee did throughout: The contents [Inhalte] sedimented in the forms awake as they age. This is what befell lugendstil at the hands of surrealism, which polemically severed ties with it. Aesthetically, the solus ipse becomes aware of the world, which is his own, and that isolates him as solus ipse in the same instant that he jettisons the conventions of the world .
The concept of tension frees itself from the suspicion of being formalistic in that, by pointing up dissonant experiences or antinomical relations in the work, it names the element of "form" in which form gains its substance by virtue of its relation to its other. Through its inner tension, the work is defined as a force field even in the arrested moment of its objectivation . The work is at once the quintessence of rela- tions oftension and the attempt to dissolve them.
In opposition to mathematical theories of harmony, it must be asserted that aes- thetic phenomena cannot be mathematically conceived. In art, equal is not equal. This has become obvious in music . The return of analogous passages of the same length does not fulfill what the abstract concept of harmony promises: The repeti- tion is irksome rather than satisfying, or, in less subjective terms, it is too long for the form; Mendelssohn was probably one of the first composers to have acted upon this experience, which made itself felt right up until the serial school's self- critique of mechanical correspondences. This self-critique became more intense with the emerging dynamization of art and the soupron felt for all identity that does not become a nonidentity . The hypothesis may be risked that the well-known differences that distinguish the "artistic volition" of the visual arts of the baroque from those of the Renaissance were inspired by the same experience. All relations that appear natural, and are to this extent abstract invariables, undergo necessary modifications before they can function as aesthetic means; the modification of the natural overtone series by tempered tuning is the most striking example of this. Most often these modifications are ascribed to the subjective element, which sup- posedly finds the rigidity of a heteronomously imposed material order insupport- able. But this plausible interpretation remains all too remote from history. It is only late that art takes recourse to so-called natural materials and relations in revolt against incoherent and unbelievable traditionalism: This revolt, in a word, is bourgeois. The mathematization of strictly quantifiable artistic materials and of the technical procedures spun out of them is in fact itself an achievement of the emancipated subject, of "reflection" that then rebels against its emancipation. Primitive procedures have nothing of this. What passes for natural facts and nat- ural law in art is not primordially given but rather an inner-aesthetic development;
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it is mediated. Such nature in art is not the nature for which it longs; rather it has been projected upon art by the natural sciences, to compensate it for the loss of preestablished structures. What is striking in pictorial impressionism is the modernity of the physiologically perceivable, quasi-natural elements. Second re- flection therefore demands the critique of all reified natural elements; just as they once emerged, they will pass away. After World War II consciousness- in the illusion of being able to begin anew without the transformation of so- ciety-clung to allegedly primordial phenomena; these are as ideological as the forty German marks of new currency per person with which the economy was supposed to be rebuilt from the ground up. Clearcutting is a character mask of the status quo; what is different does not hide its historical dimension. This is not to say that in art there are no mathematical relations. But they can only be grasped in relation to a historically concrete configuration, they cannot be hypo- statized.
The concept of homeostasis, an equilibrium of tension that asserts itself only in the totality of an artwork, is probably bound up with that instant in which the art- work visibly makes itself independent: It is the instant when the homeostasis, if not immediately established, can be envisioned. The resulting shadow over the concept of homeostasis corresponds to the crisis of this idea in contemporary art. At precisely that point when the work comes into its own self-possession, be- comes sure of itself, when it suddenly "fits" together, it no longer fits because the fortunately achieved autonomy seals its reification and deprives it of the opennes s that is an aspect of its own idea. During the heroic age of expressionism, these reflections were not far from painters like Kandinsky who, for instance , observed that an artist who believes he has found his style has thereby already lost it. Yet the problem is not as subjectively psychological as that epoch held; rather it is grounded in the antinomy of art itself. The openness toward which it tends and the closure - the "perfection" -by which it approximates the idea of its being-in- itself, of being completely uncompromised, a being-in-itself that is the agent of openness, are incompatible.
That the artwork is a result means that, as one of its elements, it should bear no residue of the dead, unworked, unformed, and sensitivity to this is an equally definitive element of all art criticism; the quality of each and every work depends on this element just as much as this element atrophies everywhere that cultural- philosophical cogitation hovers freely above the works. The first look that glides over a musical score, the instinct that-in front of a painting-judges its dignity, is guided by a consciousness of the degree to which it is fully formed, its integral structuration, and by a sensitivity to what is crude, which often enough coincides with what convention imposes on artworks and what the philistine wherever pos- sible chalks up to its transsubjectivity . Even when artworks suspend the principle
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of their integral structuration and open themselves to the crude, they reflect the postulate of this principle . Those works are fully elaborated over which the form- ing hand has most delicately felt its way; this idea is exemplarily embodied in the French tradition. In good music not a measure is superfluous or rings hollow, not a measure is isolated from the phrase, just as no instrumental sound is introduced that-as musicians put it-has not truly been "heard," drawn by subjective sensi- bility from the specific character of the instrument before the passage is entrusted to it. The instrumental combination of a musical complex must be fully heard; it is the objective weakness of early music that only by exception did it achieve this mediation. The feudal dialectic of master and servant takes refuge in these art- works, whose very existence has a feudal quality.
That old and silly cabaret phrase, "Love, it's so erotic" provokes the variation: "Art, it's so aesthetic"; this is to be taken with deep seriousness as a memento of what has been repressed by its consumption. The quality that is at stake here reveals itself primarily in acts of reading, including the reading of musical scores: It is the quality of the trace that aesthetic forming leaves behind in what it forms without doing violence to it: It is the conciliatory element of culture in art that characterizes even its most violent protestation. It is implicit in the word metier, and it cannot simply be translated as craft [Handwerk] . The relevance of this ele- ment seems to have intensified in the history of modernism; in spite of Bach ' s op- timal level of form, it would be rather anachronistic to discuss his work in terms of metier; even for Mozart and Schubert, and certainly for Bruckner, it is not quite right; but it applies to Brahms, Wagner, and even Chopin. Today this quality is the difef rentia specifica of art in opposition to the deluge of philistinism, and at the same time it is a criterion of mastery. Nothing crude may remain, even the sim- plest must bear that civilizatory trace. That trace is what is redolent of art in the artwork .
Even the concept of ornament against which Sachlichkeit revolts has its dialectic . To point out that the baroque is decorative does not say everything about it. It is decorazione assoluta , as if it had emancipated itself from every purpose , even the theatrical, and developed its own law of form. It ceases to decorate anything and is, on the contrary, nothing but decoration; thus it eludes the critique of the deco- rative . With regard to baroque works of exalted dignity the objections to "plaster art" are misdirected: The pliant material perfectly fulfills the formal apriori of ab- solute decoration. In these works , through progressive sublimation, the great world theater, the theatrum mundi, became the theatrum dei, the sensual world became a spectacle for the gods.
If the artisanal bourgeois mind expected from the solidity of things that they, holding out against time, can be bequeathed, this idea of solidity has gone over to
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the rigorous working out of objets d'art. Nothing in the circumference of art should be left in its rawness; this intensifies the closure of artworks vis-a-vis em- pirical reality and is associated with the idea of protecting artworks from their transience. Paradoxically, aesthetic bourgeois virtues such as that of solidity have emigrated into antibourgeois avant-garde art.
In so plausible and apparently universally valid a demand as that of clarity-the articulation of every element in the artwork-it is possible to show how every invariant of aesthetics motivates its own dialectic. A second specifically artistic logic is able to surpass the first, that of the distinct. Artworks of high quality are able, for the sake of the densest possible relations, to neglect clarity and bring into proximity with one another complexes that, with regard to the requirement of clarity, would need to be strictly distinguished. The idea of many artworks that want to realize the experience of vagueness actually demands that the boundaries of their constitutive elements be effaced. But in such artworks the vague must be made distinct. Authentic works that defy the exigency of clarity all the same posit it implicitly in order to negate it; essential to these works is not an absence of clarity but rather negated clarity. Otherwise they would be simply amateurish.
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Hegel's dictum that the owl of Minerva begins its flight at dusk is confirmed in art. So long as the existence and function of artworks in society was self-evident and a sort of consensus ruled between the self-certainty of society and the place of artworks in it, no question of aesthetic meaningfulness arose: Its meaningfulness was a foregone conclusion. Aesthetic categories are first subjected to philosophi- cal reflection when art, in Hegel's language, is no longer substantial, no longer immediately present and obvious.
The crisis of meaning in art, immanently provoked by the unstoppable dynamism of nominalism, is linked with extra-aesthetic experience, for the inner-aesthetic nexus that constitutes meaning reflects the meaningfulness of the world and its course as the tacit and therefore all the more powerful apriori of artworks.
The artwork's nexus, as its immanent life, is the afterimage of empirical life on which the reflection of the artwork falls and bestows a reflection of meaning. However, the concept of a nexus of meaning thereby becomes dialectical. The process that immanently reduces the artwork to its own concept, without casting an eye on the universal, reveals itself in the history of art on a theoretical level only after the nexus of meaning itself, and thus its traditional concept, becomes uncertain .
In aesthetics . as in all other domains , rationalization of means necessarily implies their fetishization. The more directly they are disposed over, the more they tend objectively to become ends in themselves. It is this that is truly fatal in the most recent developments in art, not the rejection of any sort of anthropological invari- ants or the sentimentally bemoaned loss of naIvete. The ends, that is, the works, are replaced by their possibilities; vacuous schemata of works take the place of the works themselves; thus the works themselves become a matter of indifference. With the intensification of subjective reason in art, these schemata become sub- jective in the sense of being arbitrarily elaborated independently of the works. As is frequently indicated by the titles of these works, the means employed become ends in themselves, as do the materials employed. This is what is false in the loss of meaning. Just as true and false must be distinguished in the concept of mean- ing, there is also a false collapse of meaning. Its index is affirmation, the glorifica- tion of the status quo in a cult of pure materials and pure mastery; both are thereby falsely severed.
That today positivity is blocked amounts to a verdict over the positivity of the past, but not over the longing that first stirred within it.
Aesthetic splendor is not just affirmative ideology; it is also the reflected glimmer of life free of oppression: In its defiance of ruin it takes the side of hope . Splendor
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is not only the cheap tricks of the culture industry. The higher the quality of a work, the greater its brilliance, and this is most strikingly the case in the instance of those grey-on-grey works of modernism that eclipse Hollywood's technicolor.
Morike' s poem of the abandoned girl is profoundly sad in a way that goes far be- yond the theme itself. Verses such as "Suddenly I realized / unfaithful boy / that all night / I dreamt of you"23 express without any reserve dreadful experiences: here that of awakening from the sensed fragility of sleep's comfort directly into despair. Nevertheless, even this poem has its affirmative element. Despite the authenticity of feeling, this element is lodged in the form, even though that form defends itself against the consolation of secure symmetry through strophic meter. In the tender fiction of a folksong the girl speaks as one among many: Traditional aesthetics would praise the poem for its prototypical qualities. What has been lost since that time is the latent community in which all loneliness was embedded, a situation in which society whispers consolation to one who is as alone as in the earliest dawn. As the tears have run dry, this consolation has become inaudible.
As component parts of the encompassing whole , artworks are not simply things . They participate specifically in reification because their objectivation is modeled on the objectivation of things external to them; it is in this sense, if at all, and not as imitations of any particular reality, that artworks are to be understood as copies. The concept o f classicality , which cannot b e reduced exclusively t o ideology , ap- plies to those artworks that have largely succeeded in such objectivation and thus to those that are most reified. By disowning its own dynamic the objectivated art- work opposes its own concept.
Therefore aesthetic objectivation is always also fetishism and provokes permanent rebellion. As Valery recognized, just as no art- work can escape the idea of its classicality, every authentic work must struggle against it; and in this antinomy, not least of all, art has its life . Under the compul- sion to objectivation, artworks tend toward petrification: It is immanent to the principle of their perfection. In that artworks seek to rest in themselves as what exists in-itself, they seal themselves in; yet it is only insofar as they are open that they go beyond the status of being mere entities. Because the process, which all artworks are, dies off in the course of their objectivation, all classicism progres- sively approximates mathematical relations. The rebellion against classicality is raised not only by the subject, who feels repressed, but by the truth claim of art- works, with which the ideal of classicality collides. Conventionalization is not ex- ternal to the objectivation of artworks, nor a result of their decline . Rather, it lurks within them; the overarching bindingness that artworks achieve through their ob- jectivation assimilates them to an ever dominating universality. The classicistic ideal of drossless perfection is no less illusory than the longing for a pure unco-
erced immediacy. Classicistic works lack validity and not just because the ancient models are too remote for imitation; the all-powerful principle of stylization is
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incompatible with the impulses with which it lays claim to unity, a claim on which its prerogative is founded: The achieved incontestability of any and all classicism has something underhanded about it. Beethoven's late works mark the revolt of one of the most powerful classicistic artists against the deception implicit in the principle of his own work . The rhythm of the periodic return of romantic and clas- sicist currents in art, to the extent that such movements can truly be discerned in the history of art, bears witness to the antinomical character of art itself as it is most palpably manifest in the relation of its metaphysical claim of being situated above and beyond time to its actual transience as a merely human work. Indeed, artworks become relative because they must assert themselves as absolute. The perfectly objectivated artwork would be a thing existing absolutely in-itself and no longer an artwork. If the work became nature, as idealism expects, it would be annulled. Ever since Plato , bourgeois consciousness has deceived itself that objec- tive antinomies could be mastered by steering a middle course between them, whereas the sought-out mean always conceals the antinomy and is tom apart by it. The precariousness of classicism is that of the artwork in terms of its own concept. The qualitative leap-the leap by which art approaches the boundary that marks its ultimate muteness - is the consummation of its antinomy .
Valery so honed the concept of classicality that, elaborating on Baudelaire, he dubbed the successful romantic artwork classicaI. 24 This strains the idea of classi- cality to the breaking point. Modem art already registered this more than forty years ago. It is only in its relation to this, as to a disaster, that neoclassicism can be adequately understood. It is directly evident in surrealism. It toppled the images of antiquity from their Platonic heaven. In the paintings of Max Ernst they roam about as phantoms among the burghers of the late nineteenth century, for whom they have been neutralized as mere cultural goods and truly transformed into specters . Wherever the art movements that converged temporarily in Picasso and others external to the groupe took up the theme of antiquity, it led aesthetically directly to hell, just as it did theologically for Christianity. Antiquity's embodied epiphany in prosaic everyday life, which has a long prehistory, disenchants it. Formerly presented as an atemporal norm, antiquity now acquires a historical statu s , that of the bourgeois idea reduced to its bare contours and rendered power- less. Its form is deformation. Inflated interpretations of neoclassicism such as Cocteau's ordre apres Ie desordre, as well as the surrealist interpretation decades later of a romantic liberation of fantasy and association , falsify the phenomena to the point of harmlessness: Following Poe's lead, they summon up the shudder of the instant of disenchantment as enchantment. That this instant was not to be fixed for eternity damned the followers of these movements either to restoration or to a powerless ritual of revolutionary gesturing . Baudelaire proved to be correct: Em- phatic modem art does not thrive in Elysian fields beyond the commodity but is, rather, strengthened by way ofthe experience ofthe commodity, whereas classi-
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cality itself becomes a commodity, an exemplary daub. Brecht's mockery of the cultural treasure secured by its guardians in the form of plaster statues originates in the same context; that a positive concept of classicality worked its way into his thought later on, as it also did in the aesthetics of Stravinsky, whom Brecht scorned as a Tui intellectual, was as inevitable as it was revelatory of the rigidifi- cation of the Soviet Union into an authoritarian state. Hegel's attitude toward classicality was as ambivalent as the attitude of his philosophy toward the alterna- tive between ontology and dynamics . He glorified the art of the Greeks as eternal and unsurpassable and recognized that the classical artwork had been surpassed by what he called the romantic artwork . History , whose verdict he sanctioned, had itself decided against invariance. His sense of the obsolescence of art may well have been colored by a presentiment of such progress. In strictly Hegelian terms, classicism, along with its modem sublimated form, is responsible for its own fate. Immanent critique - its most magnificent model , on the most magnificent object, is Benjamin's study of the Elective tWJnities-pursues the fragility of canonical works into the depths of their truth content; the full potential of such critique still remains to be developed and discovered. Art indeed never embraced the ideal of classicality all that rigorously; to do so, it would have needed to be harder on itself than it in general has been, and when it was, then it really damaged itself and did itself injustice. The freedom of art vis-a-vis the Dira necessitas of the factual is incompatible with classicality in the sense ofperfect univocity, which is as much borrowed from the compulsion of inevitability as it is opposed to it by virtue of its transparent purity. Summum ius summa iniuria is an aesthetic maxim. The more art pursues the logic of classicism and seeks to become an incorruptible reality sui generis, the more indurately it prevaricates an impenetrable threshold between itself and empirical reality. There is some justice to the speculation that, in its relation between what it lays claim to and what it is, art becomes all the more problematic the more rigorously, the more objectively, indeed-if one will-the more classically it proceeds, though with the caveat that the situation of art is not in the least improved when it makes things easier for itself.
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When Benjamin criticized the application to art of the category of necessity,25 he was concerned with the cultural historian's subterfuge of claiming that one art- work or another was necessary for the course of art's development. In fact, this concept of necessity does fulfill the subaltern apologetic function of attesting that without some stale old works, of which there is nothing other to praise, there would have been no getting any further.
The other in art inheres in art's own concept and in every instant threatens to crush it just as neo-Gothic New York churches and Regensburg's medieval city center were destroyed when they became traffic impediments. Art is no fixed set of boundaries but rather a momentary and fragile balance, comparable to the dy- namic balance between the ego and the id in the psychological sphere. Bad art- works become bad only because they objectively raise the claim to being art, a claim they disavow subjectively, as Hedwig Courths-Mahler26 did in a notable letter. The critique that demonstrates how bad they are nevertheless honors them as artworks. They are artworks and then again they are not.
In the course of history, works that were not produced as art or were produced prior to the age of its autonomy are able to become art, and the same is possible in the case of contemporary works that challenge their own status as art. This obvi- ously does not happen, however, in the sense of constituting a putatively valuable preliminary step toward something worthwhile. On the contrary, as occurred in the instance of surrealism, specific aesthetic qualities may emerge that were re- jected by an anti-art deportment that never achieved its goal of becoming a politi- cal force; this is the shape of the careers of important surrealists such as Masson. Equally, what once was art may cease to be art. The availability of traditional art for its own depravation has retroactive power. Innumerable paintings and sculp- tures have been transformed in their own essence to mere decoration as a result of their own offspring. Anyone who would decide to paint cubistically in 1 970 would be providing posters useful for advertisements, and the originals, too, are not safe from being sold off cheap .
Tradition could be salvaged only by its separation from the spell of inwardness. Great artworks of the past were never identical with inwardness; most exploded it through externalization. Strictly speaking, every artwork is a critique of inward- ness in that it externalizes appearance and thus is contrary to the ideology of inwardness, which tradition equates with the hoarded-up treasure of subjective recollection.
The interpretation of art based on its origin is dubious across the board: from bio- graphical research on the study of cultural-historical influences to ontological sublimations of the concept of origin. All the same, origin is not radically external
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to the work . I t i s an implicit part of artworks that they are artifact s . The configura- tions sedimented in each address the context from which it issued. In each its like- ness to its origins is thrown into relief by what it became. This antithetic is essen- tial to its content. Its immanent dynamic crystallizes the dynamic external to it and indeed does so by virtue of its aporetic character. Regardless of their individual endowments and contrary to them, if artworks are unable to achieve their mon- adological unity, they succumb to real historical pressure; it becomes the force that inwardly dislocates them. This is not the least of the reasons why an artwork is adequately perceived only as a process. If however the individual work is a force field, a dynamic configuration of its elements , this holds no less for art itself as a whole . Therefore art cannot be understood all at once , but only in terms of its elements, in a mediated fashion . One of these elements is that by which artworks contrast with what is not art; their attitude to objectivity changes.
The historical tendency reaches profoundly into the aesthetic criteria. It decides, for instance, whether someone is a mannerist. That is what Saint-Saens accused Debussy of being . Frequently the new appears as a sort of mannerism; whether the new is more than that can be discerned only by knowledge of the historical ten- dency. Yet the tendency is no arbiter either. In it true and false consciousness commingle; it too is open to criticism. For this reason the process that transpires between tendency and mannerism is never finished and requires tireless revision; mannerism is as much a protest against the historical tendency as that historical tendency unmasks what is merely contingent and arbitrary in a mannerism as the trademarks of the work.
Proust, and after him Kahnweiler, argued that painting had transformed vision and thus the objects . However authentic this experience may be, it may have been formulated too idealistically. The reverse might also be supposed: that the objects themselves were historically transformed, that the sensorium conformed to this, and that painting then found the ciphers for this transformation. Cubism could be interpreted as a form of reaction to a stage of the rationalization of the social world that undertook its geometrical organization; in these terms cubism was an attempt to bring within the bounds of experience what is otherwise contrary to it, just as impressionism had sought to do at an earlier and not yet fully planned stage of industrialization. By contrast, what is qualitatively new in cubism is that, whereas impressionism undertook to awaken and salvage a life that was becom- ing numb in the commodity world by the strength of its own dynamic, cubism de- spaired of any such possibility and accepted the heteronomous geometrization of the world as its new law, as its own order, and thus made itself the guarantor of the objectivity of aesthetic experience. Historically, cubism anticipated something real, the aerial photographs of bombed-out cities during World War II. It was through cubism that art for the first time documented that life no longer lives . This
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recognition was not free of ideology: Cubism substituted the rationalized order for what had become unexperienceable and thereby confirmed it. This probably drove Picasso and Braque beyond cubism, though their later works were not nec- essarily superior to it.
The attitude of artworks to history in turn varies historically. Lukacs declared in an interview about recent literature , especially Beckett: Just wait ten, fifteen years and you'll see what people will say then. He thus adopted the standpoint of a pa- ternalistic, far-seeing businessman who wants to dampen the enthusiasm of his son; implicitly he invokes for art durability and ultimately the category of posses- sion. Still, artworks are not indifferent to the dubious judgment of history. At times quality has historically asserted itself against precisely those works that were simply content to swim with the tides of the Zeitgeist. It is rare that works that have won great renown have not in some way deserved it. The development of legitimate renown, however, necessarily coincided with the unfolding of the inner law of those artworks through interpretation, commentary, and critique. This quality is not directly produced by the communis opinio, least of all by that manipulated by the culture industry, a public judgment whose relation to the work is questionable. It is a disgraceful superstition that fifteen years after the fact the judgment of an anti-intellectual journalist or a musicologist of the good old school should be held to be more significant than what is perceived in the instant of the work's appearance.
The afterlife of artworks , their reception as an aspect of their own history , transpires between a do-not-Iet-yourself-be-understood and a wanting-to-be-understood ; this tension is the atmosphere inhabited by art.
Many early works of new music , beginning with the those of Schoenberg ' s middle period and with Webern's works , have a character of untouchability, a refractori- ness that rebuffs the listener by the strength of their objectivation, which becomes a life of its own; it is as if recognizing the priority of such works already does them an injustice.
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The philosophical construction of the unequivocal primacy of the whole over the part is as alien to art as it is epistemologically untenable. In important works , de- tails never merge tracelessly into the totality . Certainly the autonomization of the details, when they become indifferent to the nexus of the work and reduce it to a subordinating schema, is accompanied by the regression of the work to the preartistic. Yet artworks distinguish themselves productively from the merely schematic exclusively by the element of the autonomy of their details; every au- thentic work is the result of centripetal and centrifugal forces . Anyone who listens to music seeking out the beautiful passages is a dilettante; but whoever is unable to perceive beautiful passages, the varying density of invention and texture in a work, is deaf. Until the most recent developments in art, differentiation between the intensive and the secondary within a whole was an accepted artistic means; the negation of the whole through partial wholes is itself demanded by the whole. If today this possibility is disappearing, this is not only the triumph of a structuration that at every instant wants to be equally near the midpoint without falling slack; it is also the result of the lethal potential inherent in the contraction of the means of articulation. Art cannot be radically separated from the instant of being touched, of enchantment, that instant of elevation, without being confounded in the indif- ferent. This instant, however much it is also a function of the whole, is never- theless essentially particular: The whole never offers itself to aesthetic experience in that immediacy without which aesthetic experience cannot be constituted. Aesthetic asceticism toward the detail and the atomistic comportment of the re- cipient indeed has an aspect of renunciation and threatens to deprive art of its very ferment.
That autonomous details are essential to the whole is confirmed by the repulsive quality of aesthetically concrete details that bear the trace of being prescribed from above, of in truth being heteronomous. When Schiller in Wallenstein's Camp27 rhymes the words "Potz Blitz" with "Gustel von Blasewitz" he outstrips in abstractness the most pallid classicism; this aspect renders plays like Wallen- stein insupportable.
At present, the details of artworks tend to be submerged in the whole through inte- gration: not, however, under the pressure of planning but rather because they are themselves drawn to their own annihilation. What gives details meaning, cachet, and distinguishes them from the indifferent is that by which they seek to go be- yond themselves, the precondition immanent to them of their synthesis. It is their death drive that permits the integration of the details. Their tendency to dissocia- tion and their tendency to unification are not radically opposed to each other: In that it is posited and therefore insufficient, the detail is inevitably relativized. Dis- integration inheres in the depth of integration and shimmers through it. Indeed the whole, the more detail it absorbs, itself effectively becomes a detail , one element
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among others, a singularity. The craving of the detail for its own annihilation becomes the demand of the whole . And indeed precisely because it- the whole - extinguishes the detail . If they have truly disappeared into the whole, if the whole becomes an aesthetic particular, its rationality loses its rationality, which was nothing other than the relation of the particulars to the whole, to the aim that defined them as means. If the synthesis is no longer a synthesis of something, it becomes null. The vacuity of the technically integrated structure is a symptom of its disintegration through tautological indifference . In the opacity of the perfectly unspontaneous work, a work that has totally rejected subjective inspiration, func- tionless functioning transforms the element of opacity into the fatality that art always bore in itself as its mimetic inheritance. This can be explicated in the musi- cal category of inspiration. Schoenberg, Berg, and even Webem refused to give it up; they criticized Krenek and Steuermann. Actually, constructivism no longer grants any role to inspiration, which is unplanned arbitrariness. Schoenberg's in- spirations, which-as he confirmed-also underlay his twelve-tone compositions, are simply indebted to the limits set by his constructive procedures, limits that others chalked up to a lack of consequentiality. But if the element of inspiration were fully liquidated, if composers were not permitted to be inspired by forms as a whole, which would instead be predetermined exclusively by the material, the result would lose its objective interest and fall mute. By contrast, the plausible demand for the restitution of inspiration suffers from powerlessness: In art one can hardly postulate a countervailing force to the programmatic programam ti- cally. Compositions that, out of disgust with their own abstractness, strive for moments of inspiration, protean subsidiary forms and their endowment with char- acter, expose themselves to the objection of being retrospective; as if in these works second aesthetic reflection - out of fear of the fatality inherent to rational- ization - simply ignored the constraints of rationalization on the basis of a subjec- tive decision. Kafka's obsessively varied situation-whatever one does, it is done wrong - has become the situation of art itself. Art that rigorously bans inspiration is condemned to indifference; but if inspiration is fetched back, it pales to a shadow, almost to a fiction. Already in Schoenberg's authentic works, such as his Pierrot lunaire, inspirations were ingeniously unauthentic, fractured, and shrunken to a sort of minimum existence. The question of the weight of details in new art- works is indeed so relevant because no less than in the totality of new artworks - the sublimation of organized society-society is also embodied in the details: Society is the fertile soil that sublimates aesthetic form. The details of artworks behave just as do individuals in society who, by their own interests largely op- posed to society , are not only faits sociaux but society itself, reproduced by and reproducing it and therefore asserting themselves against it. Art is the appearance of the social dialectic of the universal and the individual mediated by the subjec-
tive spirit. It goes beyond this dialectic insofar as it does not simply carry out this dialectic but reflects it through form. Figuratively, its particularization makes
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good on the perpetuated injustice of society to the individuals. What hinders it in this restitution is that it is unable to perfonn anything that it cannot extract as a concrete possibility from the society in which it has its locus. Contemporary society is altogether remote from any structural transfonnation that would give individuals their due and thus dissipate the spell of individuation .
On the Dialectic of Construction and Expression-That each element dialecti- cally reverses into the other is a maxim of contemporary art: Its structures must no longer endeavor to find some compromise between construction and expression but seek, rather, the extremes, so that in them, through them, an equivalent can be found for what an older aesthetics called synthesis. This is fundamental to the qualitative definition of modem art. The plurality of possibilities that was avail- able up to the threshold of modem art, and which had grown extraordinarily dur- ing the nineteenth century, has been displaced by polarization. The polarization socially requisite is manifest in artistic polarization. 28 Where organization is nec- essary, in structuring material life and in the human relations that depend on it, there is too little organization, too much is ceded to an anarchistic private sphere. Art has a latitude of play in which models of planning can be developed that would not be tolerated by the social relations of production. On the other hand, the irrational administration of the world has been heightened to the virtual liquida- tion of the ever precarious existence of the particular . Where it survives it is made to serve a complementary ideology of the omnipotence of the universal. Individ- ual interest that refuses this universal converges with the interest of universal, realized rationality. Rationality would become rational only once it no longer repressed the individuated in whose unfolding rationality has its right to exist. Yet the emancipation of the individual could succeed only to the extent that the individual grasps the universal on which individuals depend. Even socially, a reasonable order of the public world could be achieved only if, at the other ex- treme, opposition to the overly complex as well as inadequate organization were to suffuse individual consciousness. If the individual sphere in a certain sense lags behind the organized world, organization should nevertheless exist for the sake of the individual . The irrationality of organization still provides a measure of freedom to individuals. Their vestigiality becomes the last resort of what would go beyond progressive domination. This dynamic of what is out-of-date endows taboo expression aesthetically with the right of a resistance that lays its finger directly on the untruth of the whole. In spite of its ideological distortedness, the division of public and private in art is a given in such a fashion that art is unable to carry out any sort of transfonnation without establishing some relation to the givenness of this division. What in social reality would amount to powerless con- solation has far more concrete chances as a plenipotentiary within the sphere of aesthetics .
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In themselves, artworks ineluctably pursue nature-dominating reason by virtue of their element of unity, which organizes the whole. But through the disavowal of real domination this principle returns transformed, truncated, in a shadowy fashion, to put it metaphorically, which is perhaps the only way to describe it. Reason in artworks is reason as gesture: They synthesize like reason, but not with concepts , propositions, and syllogisms - where these forms occur in art they do so only as subordinated means - rather, they do so by way of what transpires in the artworks. Their synthetic function is immanent; it is the unity of their self, without immediate relation to anything external given or determined in some way or other; it is directed to the dispersed, the aconceptual, quasi-fragmentary material with which in their interior space artworks are occupied. Through this reception, as well as through the modification of synthesizing reason, artworks participate in the dialectic of enlightenment. Even in its aesthetically neutralized form, how- ever, nature-dominating reason has something of the dynamic that once inhered in its external form. However much it is separated from this dynamic, the identity of the principle of reason effects a development internally and externally that is simi- lar to the external dialectic: Windowless, artworks participate in civilization. That by which artworks distinguish themselves from the diffuse coincides with the achievements of reason qua reality principle. In artworks this reality principle is as active as its counterpart. Art carries out the correction of self-preserving rea- son, but not by simply setting itself in opposition to it; rather, the correction of reason is carried out by the reason immanent to artworks themselves. Whereas the unity of artworks derives from the violence that reason does to things , this unity is at the same time the source of the reconciliation of the elements of artworks .
It can hardly be contested that Mozart provided the prototype for the balance between form and the formed, that which is fleeting and centrifugal. This balance, however, is only as authentic as it is in his music because its thematic and motivic cells, the monads out of which it is composed-however much they are conceived with an eye to contrast and precise difference-seek to pull apart even while the tactful hand binds them together. The absence of violence in Mozart's music has its source in the fact that within an overarching balance the qualitative thusness of the details is not allowed to atrophy, and what can rightfully be called his genius of form is not his mastery of forms - which was for him in any case a given -but his capacity to employ them without an element of domination, using them to bind the diffuse without restraint. Form in Mozart is the equilibrium found in centrifu- gal forces, not their subjugation. This is most evident in the large operatic forms, a s in the finale of the second act of Figaro, a form that is neither composed nor a synthesis-unlike instrumental music it is not obliged to refer to schemas that are legitimated by the synthesis of what they subsume-but rather a pure configura- tion of adjoined parts whose character is won from the shifting dramaturgical situa- tion. Such works, no less than many of his most audacious instrumental move-
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ments , such as several of his violin concertos, tend as profoundly , if not as obvi- ously, toward disintegration as do Beethoven ' s last quartets . Mozart ' s classicality is immune to the charge of classicism only because it is situated on the boundary of a disintegration that in Beethoven's late work-which is so much more the work of subjective synthesis - was surpassed in the critique of this synthesis. Dis- integration is the truth of integral art.
Mozart, whom a harmonistic aesthetics to all appearances plausibly claims as its foundation, towers over its norms by virtue of what is itself, in the contemporary idiom, a formal dimension: his capacity to unify the ununifiable by doing justice to what the divergent musical characters require without dissolving it into an obligatory continuum. In this regard, Mozart is the composer of Viennese classi- cism who is most remote from the established classical ideal and thereby achieves a higher ideal, what might be called authenticity [Authentizitiit]. It is this element by which, even in music, in spite of its nonrepresentationality , the distinction can be made between formalism as an empty game and that for which there is no other term than the disreputable one of profundity .
The formal law of an artwork is that all its elements and its unity must be orga- nized in conformity with their own specific character.
Because artworks are not the unity of a multiplicity but rather the unity of the one and the many, they do not coincide with phenomenality.
Unity is semblance,just as the semblance of artworks is constituted by theirunity.
The monadological character of artworks would not have formed without the guilt of the monstrous monadological character of society , but only by its means do art- works achieve that objectivity that transcends solipsism.
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Art has no universal laws, though in each of its phases there certainly are objec- tively binding taboos. They radiate from canonical works. Their very existence defines what forthwith is no longer possible.
So long as forms were available with a certain immediacy, works could be con- cretized within them; their concretion could, in Hegel's language, be termed the substantiality of the forms. In the course of the total nominalistic movement, the more this substantiality was vitiated - from a critical perspective, justly so- the more its nevertheless continuing existence became a fetter for concrete works. What was once objectivated productive force was transformed into aesthetic relations of production and collided with the forces of production . Forms , that by which artworks seek to become artworks, themselves require autonomous production. This at the same time threatens them: The concentration on forms as a means of aesthetic objectivity distances them from what is to be objectivated. It is for this reason that currently models, the ideas of the possibility of artworks, so often overshadow the works themselves. In the substitution of means for ends it is possible to recognize the expression of a total social movement as well as the cri- sis of the artwork . Relentless reflection gravitates toward the annihilation of what is reflected. There is complicity between reflection, to the extent that it does not reflect on itself, and the merely posited form that is indifferent to what it forms. On their own, even the most exacting formal principles are worthless if the au- thentic works, for the sake of which the principles were sought, fail to materialize; aesthetic nominalism has today culminated in this simple antinomy.
So long as genres were givens, the new flourished within them. Increasingly, how- ever, newness has shifted to the genres, because they are scarce. Important artists have responded to the nominalistic situation less through new works than through models of their possibility, through types; this contributes further to the under- mining of the traditional category of artwork .