this cult takes on a
multiplicity
of different forms; it is first of all devotion or con- templative prayer, which is active faith, or, in other words, it is engaged religious thinking, participating in god, so that the reconciliation is actual for him.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
hegel and protestantism 247
cal claim (i. e. deism) (V3, p. 356). this latter conclusion, however, is also accepted by Hegel, albeit on other grounds, in relation to metaphysics. that such a conclusion is not destructive to religion is just Hegel's point, insofar as religion can present the name of god and the matters, which are His domain, on their own terms, as living spirit. neither was Hegel's goal a historical, exegetical one, following from the enlightenment, in which the historical sources alone where the primary objects of inquiry, as in schleiermacher (V3, pp. 356-7; V5, p. 300). that sort of inquiry, however, was not completely foreign to him, insofar as Hegel himself participated in the movement of the Leben Jesu-Forschung (in moral terms). more spe- cifically, Hegel accepts the main difference between the 'Jesus' of histori- cal biblical science on the one hand, and the communal or ecclesiastic (theological) 'Christ' on the other, which he posits after the controversy over Protestant orthodoxy with reimarus and lessing. 14
Hegel's philosophy rejects supernaturalism, which accepts faith or posi- tive revelation ('Offenbarungsglaube') as the origin of (even philosophical) knowledge. in fact, such supernaturalism is the position of faith, which regards itself (in its self-certainty) as an insight acceptable for everybody, even philosophically. 15 Furthermore, Hegel's philosophy has no confidence in the rationality of pietism, which holds that there may be no (reflected) knowledge of divine things, but only the inner awareness of the existence of god and divine events, for the pietist himself. Both of these positions are responses to the enlightenment and are (specifically) religious posi- tions, in which the notion of rational knowledge is neither justified by critical inquiry, nor open to everyone. therefore, they are purely religious positions, certain of themselves, but not philosophical ones. in fact, Hegel will consider enlightenment rationality and pietism as specifically (philo- sophically) 'problematic' positions. on the contrary, the position of faith as a religious (rather than philosophical) position is rejected or accepted as what it is in truth: simple faith. the enlightenment is very critical or sceptical of the (misuses of ) religion, but uses only the reflected criterion
14 Hegel will not apply this strict division between Jesus and Christ in his texts, but insofar as he does not accept the resurrection as an historical fact, but rather as a fact of the community of spirit, was the result of the controversy started by lessing-reimarus (Fragmenten-streit), he is indebted to that movement. see also H. gutschmidt, Vernunft- einsicht und Glaube, go? ttingen: Vandenhoeck & ruprecht 2007, p. 61.
15 For Hegel, there is no specifically Christian philosophy at all. Philosophy is the wis- dom of the world, where even an atheist must think in a valid way about the rationality of religion, at least as an important social and historical fact with its own truth-claims.
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of reason (for Hegel, as understanding). 16 Pietism represents a simple form of religion, which is necessary, but not sufficient for religion to be grasped in its full sense. 17
the rational presentation of religion (by philosophy), on the other hand, is a conceptual presentation; and in as far as conceptuality is the mark of philosophy, this presentation is a discourse on (conceptual) knowing, and not on things. in such a presentation, a 'given' phenom- enon or domain (i. e. religion) is conceptually situated and determined within the framework of a conceptual approach to actuality: religion is neither reduced to a pre-given other domain (that of neuroscience or his- tory e. g. , as in the positivist approach), nor accepted without question, in a dogmatic or emotional way. such a rational presentation does not reject other rational (domain-specific) presentations of specific religions (i. e. historical or theological ones), which present religion either not in religious terms or, on the other hand, as religion elucidated only for the faithful. these presentations are not the affair of reason as such, nor are they philosophical. However, theological presentations, in as far as there is no one true religion, are nevertheless systematic interlocutors. Hegel's presentation shows (or proves) to what extent theological entities and events should be interpreted as concepts, and thus be considered ratio- nally valid. in this way, religion as such, and not any specific (even con- summated) religion, is taken up within a philosophical framework that can be considered rational. 18
16 For Hegel (as for Kant), there is a difference between understanding and reason; the understanding is the normal use of rationality, reason is the philosophical inquiry about the meaning of rationality in every sense (theoretical in sciences, practical, political, his- torical). applied, the rationality used within a specific sphere of inquiry is that of a fixed ontology, whereas rationality as such is to be determined by philosophical logic or phi- losophy as such.
17 supernaturalism as a theology, which only claims in vain to be philosophical, was not a serious intellectual challenge to Hegel, although it attacked his position within the public sphere and annihilated his philosophy after Hegel's death with simple positions about immortality and god's personality.
18 a philosophy of religion is a philosophical discipline of 'reality'. a philosophy of nature or history has to be based on physics in general (i. e. in the sense of 'the science of nature') or on the science of history. However, philosophy transforms the philosophical presuppositions of these constituted sciences (beings (entia) or events e. g. ). in the same way, a philosophy of religion has to take seriously theologies as sciences of religion, but such a philosophy is no longer part of any theology, but rather treats all theology as provid- ing it with conceptually insufficient data about religion for its philosophical elaboration. if this restriction were not accepted by theology, then such a theology would seem to present a positivistic version of religion (or to be supernaturalism).
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the development of a specific philosophy of religion (as a human activ- ity) is (after Kant) a philosophical necessity, insofar as 'god' as an inde- pendent being can no longer be considered a valid topic of philosophical inquiry, as was the case in the metaphysical proofs of natural theology, in view of his status as the highest being. 19 How religion specifically fits into the framework of philosophy or how religion can deliver valid thoughts in philosophy, is subsequently the basic problem. Philosophy of religion remains a possibility. this is--evidently--not itself a theological problem, nor a problem for a philosophy that is only concerned with the potential intelligibility of dogmatically accepted faith.
Hegel's treatment of philosophy in the Encyclopaedia answers the fun- damental question of the place of religion in philosophy: the whole sphere of absolute spirit is called 'religion'. this absolute spirit, however, is not a new 'entity', independent of knowing, but is rather 'only' a new self- conception of spirit. Within this sphere, a possible definition of the treat- ment of religious topics in a philosophical manner is also given. 20 the validity of religion seems restricted, insofar as its definition is concerned, to philosophical knowing, which does not claim a transcendent (non- conceptual) validity. 21 religion itself is defined as the highest sphere of the whole philosophy of spirit, where spirit in its ultimate self-conception justifies or reflects the whole of philosophy. moreover, spirit is not some thing, but a concept, which appears in different forms. these forms (indi- viduals, states, the arts) are only forms of spirit, in as far as these forms constitute the minimal concept of spirit; through this constitution they construct a specific identity as a particular coming out of nature (e3 ? 381). in this way, there are subjective spirits, who constitute singular individu- als, since they claim in their natural individuality to be thinking and free forms. moreover, there are objective spirits, which constitute their identity
19 see W. Jaeschke, Die Vernunft in der Religion, stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog 1986, pp. 18-133. For an (insufficient but very interesting) attempt to refute Kantian premises in order to give new proofs, see W. Cramer, Das Absolute und das Kontin- gente, Frankfurt a. m. : Klostermann 1959, 19762 and Gottesbeweise und ihre Kritik, Frankfurt am main: Klostermann 1967.
20 see H. -F. Fulda, Hegels Begriff des absoluten Geistes, in Hegel-Studien 36, Berlin: 2001, pp. 171-198, who stresses that even an atheist should accept this proposed definition in search of a further justification.
21 in e (with exclusion of the revealed religion), the term 'god' does not appear in the main text, as it is a specifically religious term. the encyclopaedia, indeed, is a philosophical book, neither a religious or a theological treatise.
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in taking together their own nature, the many of (individual) spirits, living on their territory.
absolute spirit is, as will become clear, not an entity, but its own form (thinkable as a philosophical concept), in which, only by thinking such an absolute sphere, spirit can completely guarantee its own specificity, and show itself as the pure manifestation of freedom. in opposition to enlightenment thought, Hegel asserts: if god is spirit, his concept is not empty (as was that of the god of natural theology), but he has fulfilled the minimal definitions and claims or requirements of the notion of spirit, in as far as only his spiritual form enables him to construct an intelligible identity as spirit. 22 only within this presentation does Hegel's philosophy assume the task of natural philosophy to 'close' the system of philosophy. However, this task is not performed in the manner or method of theology, to guarantee independent beings, nor according to its content, concerned with the highest being.
this concept of religion is the elaboration of the introduction to 'abso- lute spirit' (e3 ? ? 553-555), and this encyclopaedic concept of religion (or, of absolute spirit) is proposed to be further determined by art, consummated religion, and philosophy. if this is really the case, then some problems arise, insofar as it is not immediately clear how this concept of absolute spirit can be the starting point of a philosophy of religion. 23 to begin a philosophy of religion, a sort of philosophy which seems to be presented independently, there is to be taken up out of religion a name 'god' (i. e. the term ? god? ), that must constitute the specific difference, defined by the notion of spirit itself. such a name is itself not the result of other parts of philosophy, but it has, as a new term (and thus, as representation), the mark of the real philosophy, a new and empty form (which, through phi- losophy, must be determined further).
thus: (a) With this concept of religion, the conceptual necessity of a religious form is presented. (b) in such a philosophical presentation, it is
22 this program is dependent upon the speculative doctrine of the concept, which has to spell out its own (negatively discerned or in a sceptical way attacked) determinations, so that the result is, at the same time, the completed concept and the justification of its real specificity.
23 the second problem, for those who are familiar with Hegel in a general way, is, why philosophy, and not the Christian religion, which is called the truth of religion, would be the ultimate result. a solution to this could be that the Christian religion is the truth of the concept of religion as religion. Philosophy, on the other hand, fulfils the concept of spirit adequately, insofar as it negates the form of representation, and presents the concept of spirit itself in its truth (and purity).
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the rationality or--minimally--the universal recognition of the specifi- cally Christian religion--as the truth of religion as such--which will be worked out thereafter.
a. The Concept of Religion Proper
in Hegel's elaboration of his philosophy of religion, the concept of religion is its specific starting point. it has three parts, the concept of god (not given in this form in the philosophy of absolute spirit), religious knowl- edge, and cult.
this elaborated concept begins from the (at this point, empty) term 'god' as with that which is specific to religious claims. 'god' is the name for a specific religious reality fulfilling the (initially abstract) definition of absolute spirit as the correspondence of real spirit with its concept. With- out such a name, whether it is Zeus, JHWH or simply 'god', there is no recognisable religious dimension at all. on this introduction, two points can be made: 'god' is a name, so it is the initial approach of religion as such and, on the other hand, if religion is the highest form within spirit, god is also taken as the philosophical (or philosophically explainable) truth of the totality of spirit. 24
'god' as the new, specifically religious term and, up to this point, as an unknown determination, must unfold through its elaboration or devel- opment in a conceptual, scientific way. at this point, there is only the thought of the empty concept 'god' as the specificity or the claimed truth of all infinitude. only in as far as it can be elaborated within forms and institutions, which are the specifications for the use of such a concept (i. e. religions), can it be seen how and in what way it is rational. only in this way is there a new content (i. e. religions), which works in and through history to explain the specific (ideal) spirituality of spirit, or, in as far as freedom has such a spiritual form, to be recognised by all
24 With this definition, Hegel is not following the alternative that there is either a new philosophical theology (Jaeschke's position on the view of Hodgson) or a theo-anthropol- ogy (Feuerbach), given by Hodgson, (op. cit. , 13). religion is in fact not reducible to some- thing less complex or less determined (say biology, psychology (Feuerbach), ethics (Kant), politics (neo-marxism), or history. But, its main concern does remain rationally empty as long as there is not a (religiously) attributable essence of spirit (i. e. the truth of spirit). rationally, this essence could be interpreted as something other than spirit, but this is not a strange independent entity called 'god'. in fact, philosophy of religion replaces (ersetzt) the old philosophical theology, but is neither a new form of particular metaphysics, nor an aspect of speculative metaphysics proper.
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spirit. 25 However, as the starting point (of a philosophy of religion), such a truth remains abstract. it claims nothing, with the exception that god is, and that he is one truth over and against all other truths that have been asserted and sublated before (like those of nature and finite spirit, which failed to bring themselves to completion). even as absolute subsistence, 'god' is not concrete. 26 there is nothing in the name alone that the differ- ent names of god(s) can fulfil immediately, or that corresponds to the dif- ferent names of god(s) (ghost(s), re, Zeus, Jupiter, JHWH, god the Father, etc. ). With a name alone, it may be a concept or a pure representation, but there is not yet religion.
such a god becomes concrete only if he is the basis and moment of his development (as a concept), and the principle of his own (conceptual) particularisation. 27 there are two ways to attain such a particularisation: in the movement from either god to religious consciousness or from knowing to god. the first movement is attributed to him by religious people. the claim that god is the truth of all, is indeed a fact of religious conscious- ness, a claim that is related to the basic subsistent substance, using merely formal modes rationally, insofar as 'creation' by god and 'spiritualisation' from god are, in themselves, empty terms, if we attribute them without further determination to that truthful substance. therefore, philosophy must determine how the religious knowledge asserted by some people could lead to an insight available to everyone, and furthermore also arrive at this insight in a philosophical way, insofar as He may be conceptually reconstructed. specific to Hegel's treatment of religious knowledge is his survey of the forms of religious knowledge and his (even more specific) thesis that the proofs of god's existence show the elevation of the reli- gious subject that is involved in the topic of religion itself.
this religious knowledge (according to the account given around 1820) demonstrates the elevation of itself to that truth. For a human being, the question is: how does his religious knowledge come to god? For
25 against all sceptics who could imagine that man could be the gods of the animals, animals can have perceptions and feelings, and there are kingdoms in the animal sphere, but art, religion or philosophy do not exist in the animal domain, insofar as we wouldn't accept that a dog could be a religious being (Vorrede zu Hinrichs, gW 15: 137).
26 With such a notion, Hegel attributes to religion the claim that god is 'a se', not the philosophical but contradictory claim that he is 'causa sui'.
27 god is thus the example par excellence of the universal, or of the manner in which the universal can be represented. He may be determined by nature or by (finite) spirit, but until this point it can only be done in a negative way; only from this determination is he something, but, from now on, he is this determination as his own determination (if that may be seen in religions) by which he is himself or singular.
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this elevation, there are a number of possibilities that are presented and accepted in religion as religious knowledge (mainly in Protestant circles) rationally. 28 minimally, there is an immediate knowing or an immediate certainty that god is not only a name or merely a story i tell myself, but that he is and exists independently of me. at this starting point, the reli- gious subject and god are linked, insofar as that subject is aware of the fact and claims that god is or that this content (god) is as spiritual as the subject is. 29 However, at this stage, this claim cannot be justified further.
at this point, the claim is as empty as when the name 'god' alone was asserted. However, it is now a claim of knowledge, not simply a proposal or empty definition. it will only authentically become a content of knowl- edge when it is justified by representation and thinking. as representation, it shows itself in sensuous figures, images, myths, narratives and histories, according to the content of different religions. such representations of the acts of salvation are the beginning of religious education, but even with all these moments, the insight available for everybody (and thus justifi- able), the place of religion is not defined in a precise way. this justified determination is a thinking in which the different moments are posited as conceptually necessary. in this thinking originates the different proofs of the existence of god. these proofs are neither the concern of merely immediate knowledge, nor of simple religious faith. they are, however, religious knowledge, considered (by philosophy) in its elevation of reli- gious knowledge to god. the proofs, in this interpretation of Hegel's phi- losophy of religion, also give structure to the historical forms of religion, which do not restrict themselves to their (immediate) inwardness. 30
in as far as the proofs are specific forms of elevation, Hegel is not returning to ontology, but is rather trying to justify forms of knowledge (of absolute spirit). 31 such an interpretation of religion may be seen as
28 With this typology, Hegel has in mind all of the theological versions of Protestant religion of his time: Jacobi as a pietist, schleiermacher as an enlightened theologian, and the simple faith of the people, all of which are insufficient forms for a properly philosophi- cal approach to religion.
29 such an immediate knowledge was a common claim in pietistic and even cultivated Protestant circles around 1820-30. see Hegel's discussion of go? schel (16: 188-215) and the commentary of P. Jonkers, 'Unmittelbares Wissen und absolutes Wissen', in: W. Jaeschke & B. sandkaulen, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 2004, pp. 359-375.
30 With this thesis, Hegel is not claiming that there is a temporal history of religions exposed in his philosophy of religion, but rather that there is a rational (and conceptually based) exposition of religions, which is recognisable in the history of religion.
31 see g. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes (gW 18: 228-317). see also d. murphy, Gottesbeweis in: P. Cobben e. o. (ed), Hegel-Lexikon, darmstadt: WBg 2006, pp. 247-249.
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'heterodox',32 but is the result of the philosophical insight that the imme- diate (ontological) understanding of religion (in terms of separate enti- ties, such as a god independent of the use of religious words, or immortal souls) is not rational. the proofs of the existence of god are the explication of religious consciousness and, in that sense, of religion itself. the most important of these proofs is the ontological one (anselm, descartes and Wolff ), which is used only in Christian times. in this case, Hegel is address- ing the Christian tradition in general, not a particularly lutheran or particu- larly Protestant one, insofar as this proof is itself rational and not based on any particular faith alone. in this proof, as well as in Hegel's philosophy of religion generally, the being or the objectivity is indicated and justified in terms of the concept, for, only in the case of god, does its substance include his own being in himself. this philosophical exposition of the ontological proof is just the return to that concept that is posited at the beginning of the philosophy of religion.
educated religious people exercise their religious identity and proper ele- vation through a particular system of religious worship (i. e. 'cult'), which gives them a real unity with 'god'. in the elevation of the proofs of god's existence, which presuppose a (metaphysical) concept, it remains unclear for the religious consciousness that it is itself that is elevating itself. at this level, however, religiously knowing consciousness remains within in its own representation, separated from its divine object. to overcome this represented separation or presupposed split is the purpose of ritual and ceremonial practices (i. e. cult). Cult thus provides the highest form of enjoyment to self-consciousness, in the way in which it reconciles that consciousness with the absolute. Participation in this (represented) reconciliation, which is (for the religious subject) fully and already per- formed by the divine act of salvation, is the basic activity of cult.
this cult takes on a multiplicity of different forms; it is first of all devotion or con- templative prayer, which is active faith, or, in other words, it is engaged religious thinking, participating in god, so that the reconciliation is actual for him.
the particular forms of sacrifice, however, are secondly, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. these forms are outer or exter- nal, but, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. the external forms reproduce the reconciliation in little sacrifices and sac- ramental rites. in such practices, the religious subject is performing the
32 see C. o'regan, The Heterodox Hegel, albany: sUnY Press 1994.
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same elevation, but now for and with his own consciousness, so that the form of representation is destroyed. such a ritual sacrifice is the negation and offering of some finite thing through which the subject demonstrates that he is enjoying ('geniessend') the unity of himself with his god. 33
the most important and authentic form of sacrifice is the sacrifice of the heart, not only in the sense of the purification of desire and of par- ticular passions, but also in the production of spirituality in the form of universality. the finitude or particularity of every subject has to elevate itself to its own purity, so that there is a universal law (of reconciliation), recognisable for everybody. this is the promotion of ethicity (Sittlichkeit) or the production of such an actuality that manifests the reconciliation in this world, but with which the consciousness of the truth remains reli- giously linked. ethicity, then, does not involve simply the singular act of repentance, as it were merely a response to something bad, but it is a genuine form of reconciliation. such a realisation of the annihilation of the particularity of the heart is not so much an extension of the cult as it is the true liberation of the freedom of the world to its own (spiritual) affair ('Sache'). even better, it is not a particular grace, but everyone's actual striving toward real reconciliation! such an account, that it is not the enjoyment of the external cult, but the purification of the heart, as the highest form of cult, may seem to be particularly Protestant in its inspira- tion (as will become clear in Hegel's presentation of Christianity). the true consciousness of the actual purification in ethicity seems to be insightful religion, or that it has become a practical insight available to everybody, or, in other words, that it has become philosophy. religion depends upon this ethicity insofar as such an elevation (or purification) is linked with philosophy as the consciousness of truth, and also in as far as it is only out of this ethicity that god is no longer only a religious substance, but also interpreted as 'free spirit' (e3 ? 552 a).
at this point, this internally elaborated concept could be an illusory or merely an internal philosophical concept (or a merely semantic defini- tion) without validity, even with its allusion to real forms like sacraments and ethicity. to prove such forms have more than a merely illusory, inter- nal, or semantic validity, they should be singularised for consciousness in real religion(s).
33 Hegel is describing all religious forms, in and through his own religious attitude, in terms of Christianity. However, the sense of this conceptual presentation is formal, valid for every religion.
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b. Revealed or Consummate Religion is Christianity34
Hegel claims that the Christian religion fulfils, in historical actuality, the concept of religion, and is, as the result of the conceptual development of all other religions, therefore also true religion. in this rational form ('Gestalt'), the philosophical presentation of Christianity must be recogn- isable for everyone, including faithful or religious people. so, such a philo- sophical presentation must not be based only on a traditional view, or a view that is guaranteed by a religious authority or by the faithful, because a philosophical interpretation of Christianity is not a form of catechism (Dritter Replik, 16: 273). However, in such an interpretation, even religious people should not miss essential features of their faith (e. g. in Christianity, there must be attention to Jesus, who is their Christ) and this exposition should be a philosophical presentation of theological insights. in his sum- mary, Hegel claims that the specifically essential aspects of Christianity are the trinity (which was not taken to be theologically very essential during his time), the appearance of Jesus as Christ, the immortality of the soul and the state (when understood as the modern version of the King- dom of god) (l. c. , 16: 270). 35
in as far as Christianity is the truth of the concept, as well as of other forms of religion, all marks of such religious conceptions are emphasised, and where the central preconceptions are Christian ones. 36 in this reli- gion, the full realisation of such views is asserted, such as the trinity (in the form of religious triplicity), the incarnation (V5, 236, from W2) and the death of god (in Jesus). the differences in the views on immortal- ity between pre-Christian and Christian religions are elaborated in the courses, in order to point to the essential meaning of Christianity.
not presupposed, however, is the concrete concept of spirit. this con- cept is the idea of religion, specifying the concept of god, insofar as it
34 For a reliable english version: P. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, oxford: oxford UP 2005; the best philosophical books on Hegel's religion remain, however, W. Jaeschke, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels, darmstadt: WBg 1983 and Jaeschke, Die Ver- nunft, (o. c. ).
35 this claim is very difficult, insofar as religious people (and religious authorities) seem to be unaware of their (particular) assumptions (e. g. the so-called transcendence or infin- ity or being as well as formulations from the ecumenical Councils), but miss the point, that a philosophy should provide an insight into not just of the claimed truth of a particular religion, but of the truth of religion as such, which would apply even for atheists. For a different summary, see st. rocker, Hegel's Rational Religion, madison & london: Fairleigh dickinson UP 1995, p. 189.
36 For a discussion of other religions, see the rest of this book.
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has returned in itself. in the consummate religion, god is in himself his own distinction. only by grasping this distinction of the concept and this distinction as the self-distinction of god, is there a spiritual religion: with this self-distinction, god is spirit. as spirit, He is not (only) substance, but spirit in its distinction; such a spirit is (minimally) spirit appearing for, or manifesting itself for spirit. in true religion, Spirit is the object of religion and vice versa; (absolute) spirit is so for spirit, and spirit is the form of appearing of spirit. revelation from god is the self-manifestation of spirit for spirit itself. With this interpretation or presentation, Hegel does not stress as much the specifically Christian character of religion, but discovers, in a religious form ('Gestalt'), his own determination of spirit. spirit is the activity of the self-distinction of spirit. it manifests the particular moment(s) of its own essence or universality, through which it is never without exis- tence (i. e. being-there or 'Daseyn') (e3 ? 383-384). 37 absolute spirit is just the correspondence of the concept thereof with its own reality. revelation is the form, which is given by spirit to itself; it is rational, insofar as we can also recognise ourselves in that form ('Gestalt') as rational.
this revelation, however, is, in the Christian religion, also positive. 'Posi- tive' here means that there is an enduring object, or something present for consciousness itself. a positive side is necessary for revelatory religion, insofar as even religion must appear (for consciousness), and thus for rep- resentation, as spirit must be present for everybody (or, in as far as the content of 'a spirit' is taken up by them). as positive, however, the Bible contains the doctrine, which can be elaborated by specific churches as well as by theology, where the witness of spirit is known in scientific form. even as spirit, the content or doctrine has its positiveness. only in his concretion as activity, is god a living god, in the act of determining his own spiritual concept himself.
the content of religion, even in forms of representation, is also one of thinking, or truth. 38 religion claims to have a truth over and above that of other religions (and against other forms of [finite] consciousness). truth is present where spirit appears in religion as consciousness of its own spirit. Verification can only be the witness of spirit itself, in as far as it inte- grates or internalizes its own spirit, which appears in humans as reason or
37 With such a presentation, Hegel determines the manifestation of spirit (as god) in terms of his own logic. 'god' is also thought to be a very specific singularisation of the concept (as idea).
38 see for an (insufficient) truth discussion, insofar as Hegel seems again and again to be interpreted as a dogmatic rationalist: st. rocher, Hegel's Rational Religion, pp. 137-162.
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thinking. thinking sublates the split between both sides of the same spirit in the proofs of god's existence (as spirit, or out of the concept). these proofs start from spirit, which is truth and, more specifically, absolute spirit, which lives through its own determination and from this determination, and is also observable in the conceptual determination(s) of earlier religions. in this way, it contains finite forms in determining itself as itself, which is its self-positing. spirit has to contain (religious) finitude in itself in order to be real spirit. the point made by the ontological proof is important: only the concept attains liberation from positiveness and is real freedom or the essence of spirit for itself. 39 the transition, however, is to spirit itself, which exists as absolute subjectivity and as absolute personality. With its exposition as absolute spirit, spirit arrives at its definition as (authentic or true) spirit. thus, spirit is spiritual in its positive appearance and pres- ents spirit as absolute spirit; both are moments of its own actuality, which it manifests as spirit.
as in the concept of religion, the first moment (the abstract specificity) appears in a different form for religion (available for everybody, in repre- sentation). the first determination is god in his eternal essence, before the creation of the world, the inner trinity of god, where, in his eternal essence through his son, he becomes spirit only for himself, at the level of god's persons loving one another. in this view, Hegel uses its own (theology- based) terminology: the immanent trinity (as opposed to the 'economic' or revealed trinity) does not mean immanent in the world, but immanent in god himself. the reference to the trinity before Jesus' appearance on earth is in Hegel's view 'in itself ', and thus not transcendent. if that which is 'in itself ' is to be significant and not remain an empty concept, it must be 'fulfilled' or developed. immanence used in this sense is not opposed to transcendence. What could be called transcendence is just Hegel's imma-
39 only when the traditional form of religious expression is taken as being the 'one true' form (as in supernaturalism), is philosophy considered to be hostile to religion, when it is critical of the 'self-evidence' or the presuppositions within traditional ways of speaking. Philosophy, however, is just the analysing all these truth claims, in such a way, that truth itself is its topic (of inquiry), which is not the case for physics (nature), nor for religion (god as Christ). theology, on the other hand, most of the time provides just such a truth- inquiry to philosophy, and takes over such claims. in doing so, it comes to an apory: if god is the truth, then theology has the only object of truth, but in as far as truth also comes from other (discursive) forms of knowing, theology is dependent on just such a doctrine of truth-claims (like logic), in which there is no place (or no exclusive place) for god. if, on the other hand, a religion is only a particularity (one narrative among others), then it can have no further claim on universal recognisability and has destroyed its own claims on truth.
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nence as 'Jenseits' (or 'beyond'). the trinity could be a 'Jenseits', if it were not already related to our religious Christian knowledge, knowledge being the only possible topic of philosophy! in as far as an entity can be com- pleted without being known (as is the case for every content containing knowledge that is not philosophical), theology and religious conscious- ness can claim, within their own form or domain (i. e. religion) that there is such independent, infinite thing. 40 However, insofar as this thinking claims to be true (in Hegel's sense), even the trinity cannot remain on the other side of actuality. truth requires the determination of its own concept. it must appear as (religiously knowable) spirit. 41
the second moment is the creation of the son as an earthly person,42 through whom the oppositions between Heaven and earth, god and man, good and bad, are instantiated. really appearing and developing, god reveals himself in the suffering and death of the temporalised, eternal son, through which this son becomes spirit. to grasp this sensuous actuality as spiritual and religious actuality, finite spirit must intuit and remem- ber the birth and death of the reconciler, so that finite spirit can iden- tify itself with this reconciliation and the community may constitute the actual presence of spirit (for itself ). in the death of the reconciler, which is, at the same time, the death of god as merely abstract or immanent (in itself ) it is shown that man takes up the true religion, so that, through the reconciler, the eternal history of god has arisen into consciousness. in this way, god is the process of giving up his immanence to deliver himself to
40 in itself or immanent (trinity/Father) is only the opposite phenomenon (the 'eco- nomic' trinity/son), but neither are explicated as concrete (Parousia/spirit); that, at least, is Hegel's critical version of the Kantian argument. only metaphysical (and not so much theological) statements stress the so-called transcendence of god. However, such a god is not a trinitarian god!
41 With this thesis, a Christian theologian could see a difficulty or danger; god 'should' be free not to manifest himself, but for Hegel such a freedom is empty, and is demonstrated to be empty, in as far as god has created, and has manifested himself. even though the trinity seems to indicate some conceptual moments, Hegel's logic is not god, (as seems to be desmond's point, W. desmond, Hegel's God, aldershot: ashgate 2003, p. 130), but rather all definitions of the (metaphysical) absolute are contained in the logic (H. F. Fulda, 'spekulative logik als die eigentliche metaphysik', in: d. Pa? tzold & a. Vanderjagt, Hrsg. ), Hegels Transformation der Metaphysik, Ko? ln: dinter 1991, pp. 9-27). Without their (own) speculative methodical generation, however, which is the very contribution of the theory or doctrine of rationality, Hegel's logic has also taken up (and replaced) the philosophical importance of what was the religious (and mistakenly metaphysical) concept of god. this is really the core of every (logical) concept, which is insofar as it is an objective concept; and god is--therefore--a concept, even the main example of the logical concept, that the idea is such a truth, is therefore also a logical exposition (Darstellung).
42 Within a mythological representation, this is the first adam.
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the resurrection in spirit. on this point, there are no differences between Christian denominations, in as far as the title of 'son of god' is not inter- preted in borrowed, metaphysical terms. every Christian church accepts the basic form of Jesus as (the) Christ.
the third element of Hegel's concept of religion is the community, inspired by the Holy spirit. it is the Kingdom of god, where god is spirit. this community includes all the people who have faith in the spiritual history of god, as well as those who elaborate the spiritual development of the kingdom of god, of which they are members. the community is existing spirit and is believed in by spirit in its concreteness and reality. the religious moments present just this transformation of every spirit that manifests itself in the trinitarian way, the passing away from the senses of the singular subject, and the resurrection as universal spirit, by giving its testimony of truth. in the existent community, the doctrine of faith is grasped as valid truth. this truth of spirit is, in Christian religion, true for all people. individual members are born into it through Baptism and are educated to its truth; the church teaches freedom and educates non- spiritual people to freedom. they receive absolution within the commu- nity of reconciliation and they enjoy the presence of god in the eucharist. the process of the community is, furthermore, the whole divine process, in and through which the subject is spiritualised.
Hegel's Protestantism is apparent in his discussion of the sacraments. in both the courses of 1827 and 1831, he restricts the sacraments to just two, Baptism and the eucharist. on forgiveness or absolution, the remark about the Catholic sacrament of Confession (1821, V5, 89) is left out; it may be open to discussion, which person can, as spirit, 'undo the past' ('das Geschehene ungeschehen machen'). 43 such an action is included within the church in the form of education (1821, V5, 260). in fact, such an act is vis- ible as the real and legal power of the king.
more important, however, is Baptism, where the child learns that it will be educated toward the freedom of its own good actions, and in which it is confirmed that evil is subdued so that the subject can do good in such a reconciled world. the subsistence of the community is fully realised through participation in the eucharist. specifically for the philosophy of religion, the differences on the eucharist are presented. 44 the eucharist
43 see my 'das geschehene ungeschehen machen', in: Jahrbuch fu? r Hegel-Forschung 4/5, 2000, pp. 221-230.
44 For m. Westphal (Hegel and Protestantism, in: r. Perkins (ed. ), History and System, albany, 1985, p. 82 as well for Jonkers (in this volume) the basic difference between Cathol-
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(or lord's supper) is the participation in the resurrection of Christ by the religious subject. Here, Hegel stresses how lutheranism accepts the spiri- tual transubstantiation in spirit and faith: god as Christ is present in acts of the eating and drinking themselves, not independently in the bread and wine (Catholicism) or only in memory (Calvinism). in this Communion, the individual, Christian subject enjoys ('geniesst') the presence of god.
However, in as far as it is only the Christian individual or the particular community who enjoys the reconciliation, this reconciliation is not yet actual. such a community has a further task: it is insufficient to produce only an abstract reconciliation in opposition to the actuality proper. With the subject's purification to spirit, the grace of reconciliation for all men is discovered and may be realised in a free world. such a grace is not in opposition to freedom, as was discussed in traditional Protestantism (1821, V5, 302), but it is the grace of freedom itself (V5: 262; 288). so it becomes clear: it is not the cult that is the realisation of community, but rather a universal ethicity in a free world that is the realisation of the spiritual- ity of the community, and thus, of a spirituality available to everyone. 45 ethical life, which is the form of universal law justifiable for everybody, is in fact the divestment by the Christian community of its particular form in view of the full realisation of spirit. it is a giving up, by the Christian community, of its own particularity, for the sake of the redemption of the world (i. e. of everyone). as such, this realisation is not the promotion of a particularly Protestant way of life or of a 'Protestant' state, but rather of a really free community, which is aware that the form of the community itself is itself rationally good. in this case, it is not holiness or (Catholic) sanctity, which is abstract and retired from the word, which is important, but rather the justification and sanctification of the rational ethical world. For Hegel, it is not celibacy, poverty, or the servitude to others (priests) that is holy, but rather marriage, work, and political freedom under the self-given law that are sanctified (e3 ? 552 a). 46 in this way, true religiosity can appear
icism and Protestantism is their respective understandings of eucharist. this, however, is only an inner theological discussion. the point Hegel emphasises is not as such a theologi- cal one, but a basic concept, fully linked with Christianity, of the constitutive concept of freedom, where only the Protestants are not restoring spiritual servitude and make no fatal contradiction. this point is completely missed by m. lilla, Hegel and the Political Theology of reconciliation, in: The Review of Metaphysics 54, 2001, pp. 859-900; esp. 885 ff.
45 see the review of the end of the four courses, st. rocker, Hegel's Rational Religion, madison & london, 1995, pp. 166-176.
46 in german, Hegel can play with the words 'geistlich' and 'geistig', both rooted in spirit (Geist), (Vie, 191); the perversion in the roman-Catholic church consists for Hegel in the
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as true ethicity, in which the structures of an objective (and not subjective) world, that is reconciled as such or (minimally) in itself, are justified. 47 the modern secular world, based on Protestantism, substitutes ('ersetzt') the church as the spiritual realm in which reconciled spirit actualises itself.
in other words: in Hegel's view on Protestantism, there are two cleri- cal or confessional sacraments and there is the actual (sacrament of the) salvation of the world, in which grace is visible and acts as freedom, which is the task of all spirits, recognised as spirit, and not only of a particular confessional church.
the contribution of 'religion' to man is first and foremost that he be conscious of this gracious freedom of the world itself and to justify it (in Protestant religion or in philosophy). With this actualized reconciliation, to which consciousness has no opposition--as would be the case if there were another, separate holiness through which the actual justified world itself--the religious consciousness proposes itself in an ideal way as the consciousness of truth. this religious knowing that the subject is recon- ciled with god, has different forms; it may be 'naive', (and, for such critics, the church remains subsistent), but this knowing has become for itself also thinking (enlightenment rationalism); in reaction against enlighten- ment, religious knowing appears as immediate feeling (pietism V: 266) or even it remains in an unfree way within the claimed and confessed recon- ciliation (Catholicism V5: 267). none of these forms of knowing is aware in itself of what is actual. that is the task of philosophy. Philosophy as such (within the Protestant world) therefore replaces the form of cult. e3 restates this: philosophy is the definite form of religious content; it is the religious content developed in the free manner of spirit as such (e3 ? 552 a, and ? 573). there, philosophy posits this reconciliation as the peace of god which is not higher than all reason, but which is known by reason as the truth (V5, p.
cal claim (i. e. deism) (V3, p. 356). this latter conclusion, however, is also accepted by Hegel, albeit on other grounds, in relation to metaphysics. that such a conclusion is not destructive to religion is just Hegel's point, insofar as religion can present the name of god and the matters, which are His domain, on their own terms, as living spirit. neither was Hegel's goal a historical, exegetical one, following from the enlightenment, in which the historical sources alone where the primary objects of inquiry, as in schleiermacher (V3, pp. 356-7; V5, p. 300). that sort of inquiry, however, was not completely foreign to him, insofar as Hegel himself participated in the movement of the Leben Jesu-Forschung (in moral terms). more spe- cifically, Hegel accepts the main difference between the 'Jesus' of histori- cal biblical science on the one hand, and the communal or ecclesiastic (theological) 'Christ' on the other, which he posits after the controversy over Protestant orthodoxy with reimarus and lessing. 14
Hegel's philosophy rejects supernaturalism, which accepts faith or posi- tive revelation ('Offenbarungsglaube') as the origin of (even philosophical) knowledge. in fact, such supernaturalism is the position of faith, which regards itself (in its self-certainty) as an insight acceptable for everybody, even philosophically. 15 Furthermore, Hegel's philosophy has no confidence in the rationality of pietism, which holds that there may be no (reflected) knowledge of divine things, but only the inner awareness of the existence of god and divine events, for the pietist himself. Both of these positions are responses to the enlightenment and are (specifically) religious posi- tions, in which the notion of rational knowledge is neither justified by critical inquiry, nor open to everyone. therefore, they are purely religious positions, certain of themselves, but not philosophical ones. in fact, Hegel will consider enlightenment rationality and pietism as specifically (philo- sophically) 'problematic' positions. on the contrary, the position of faith as a religious (rather than philosophical) position is rejected or accepted as what it is in truth: simple faith. the enlightenment is very critical or sceptical of the (misuses of ) religion, but uses only the reflected criterion
14 Hegel will not apply this strict division between Jesus and Christ in his texts, but insofar as he does not accept the resurrection as an historical fact, but rather as a fact of the community of spirit, was the result of the controversy started by lessing-reimarus (Fragmenten-streit), he is indebted to that movement. see also H. gutschmidt, Vernunft- einsicht und Glaube, go? ttingen: Vandenhoeck & ruprecht 2007, p. 61.
15 For Hegel, there is no specifically Christian philosophy at all. Philosophy is the wis- dom of the world, where even an atheist must think in a valid way about the rationality of religion, at least as an important social and historical fact with its own truth-claims.
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of reason (for Hegel, as understanding). 16 Pietism represents a simple form of religion, which is necessary, but not sufficient for religion to be grasped in its full sense. 17
the rational presentation of religion (by philosophy), on the other hand, is a conceptual presentation; and in as far as conceptuality is the mark of philosophy, this presentation is a discourse on (conceptual) knowing, and not on things. in such a presentation, a 'given' phenom- enon or domain (i. e. religion) is conceptually situated and determined within the framework of a conceptual approach to actuality: religion is neither reduced to a pre-given other domain (that of neuroscience or his- tory e. g. , as in the positivist approach), nor accepted without question, in a dogmatic or emotional way. such a rational presentation does not reject other rational (domain-specific) presentations of specific religions (i. e. historical or theological ones), which present religion either not in religious terms or, on the other hand, as religion elucidated only for the faithful. these presentations are not the affair of reason as such, nor are they philosophical. However, theological presentations, in as far as there is no one true religion, are nevertheless systematic interlocutors. Hegel's presentation shows (or proves) to what extent theological entities and events should be interpreted as concepts, and thus be considered ratio- nally valid. in this way, religion as such, and not any specific (even con- summated) religion, is taken up within a philosophical framework that can be considered rational. 18
16 For Hegel (as for Kant), there is a difference between understanding and reason; the understanding is the normal use of rationality, reason is the philosophical inquiry about the meaning of rationality in every sense (theoretical in sciences, practical, political, his- torical). applied, the rationality used within a specific sphere of inquiry is that of a fixed ontology, whereas rationality as such is to be determined by philosophical logic or phi- losophy as such.
17 supernaturalism as a theology, which only claims in vain to be philosophical, was not a serious intellectual challenge to Hegel, although it attacked his position within the public sphere and annihilated his philosophy after Hegel's death with simple positions about immortality and god's personality.
18 a philosophy of religion is a philosophical discipline of 'reality'. a philosophy of nature or history has to be based on physics in general (i. e. in the sense of 'the science of nature') or on the science of history. However, philosophy transforms the philosophical presuppositions of these constituted sciences (beings (entia) or events e. g. ). in the same way, a philosophy of religion has to take seriously theologies as sciences of religion, but such a philosophy is no longer part of any theology, but rather treats all theology as provid- ing it with conceptually insufficient data about religion for its philosophical elaboration. if this restriction were not accepted by theology, then such a theology would seem to present a positivistic version of religion (or to be supernaturalism).
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the development of a specific philosophy of religion (as a human activ- ity) is (after Kant) a philosophical necessity, insofar as 'god' as an inde- pendent being can no longer be considered a valid topic of philosophical inquiry, as was the case in the metaphysical proofs of natural theology, in view of his status as the highest being. 19 How religion specifically fits into the framework of philosophy or how religion can deliver valid thoughts in philosophy, is subsequently the basic problem. Philosophy of religion remains a possibility. this is--evidently--not itself a theological problem, nor a problem for a philosophy that is only concerned with the potential intelligibility of dogmatically accepted faith.
Hegel's treatment of philosophy in the Encyclopaedia answers the fun- damental question of the place of religion in philosophy: the whole sphere of absolute spirit is called 'religion'. this absolute spirit, however, is not a new 'entity', independent of knowing, but is rather 'only' a new self- conception of spirit. Within this sphere, a possible definition of the treat- ment of religious topics in a philosophical manner is also given. 20 the validity of religion seems restricted, insofar as its definition is concerned, to philosophical knowing, which does not claim a transcendent (non- conceptual) validity. 21 religion itself is defined as the highest sphere of the whole philosophy of spirit, where spirit in its ultimate self-conception justifies or reflects the whole of philosophy. moreover, spirit is not some thing, but a concept, which appears in different forms. these forms (indi- viduals, states, the arts) are only forms of spirit, in as far as these forms constitute the minimal concept of spirit; through this constitution they construct a specific identity as a particular coming out of nature (e3 ? 381). in this way, there are subjective spirits, who constitute singular individu- als, since they claim in their natural individuality to be thinking and free forms. moreover, there are objective spirits, which constitute their identity
19 see W. Jaeschke, Die Vernunft in der Religion, stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog 1986, pp. 18-133. For an (insufficient but very interesting) attempt to refute Kantian premises in order to give new proofs, see W. Cramer, Das Absolute und das Kontin- gente, Frankfurt a. m. : Klostermann 1959, 19762 and Gottesbeweise und ihre Kritik, Frankfurt am main: Klostermann 1967.
20 see H. -F. Fulda, Hegels Begriff des absoluten Geistes, in Hegel-Studien 36, Berlin: 2001, pp. 171-198, who stresses that even an atheist should accept this proposed definition in search of a further justification.
21 in e (with exclusion of the revealed religion), the term 'god' does not appear in the main text, as it is a specifically religious term. the encyclopaedia, indeed, is a philosophical book, neither a religious or a theological treatise.
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in taking together their own nature, the many of (individual) spirits, living on their territory.
absolute spirit is, as will become clear, not an entity, but its own form (thinkable as a philosophical concept), in which, only by thinking such an absolute sphere, spirit can completely guarantee its own specificity, and show itself as the pure manifestation of freedom. in opposition to enlightenment thought, Hegel asserts: if god is spirit, his concept is not empty (as was that of the god of natural theology), but he has fulfilled the minimal definitions and claims or requirements of the notion of spirit, in as far as only his spiritual form enables him to construct an intelligible identity as spirit. 22 only within this presentation does Hegel's philosophy assume the task of natural philosophy to 'close' the system of philosophy. However, this task is not performed in the manner or method of theology, to guarantee independent beings, nor according to its content, concerned with the highest being.
this concept of religion is the elaboration of the introduction to 'abso- lute spirit' (e3 ? ? 553-555), and this encyclopaedic concept of religion (or, of absolute spirit) is proposed to be further determined by art, consummated religion, and philosophy. if this is really the case, then some problems arise, insofar as it is not immediately clear how this concept of absolute spirit can be the starting point of a philosophy of religion. 23 to begin a philosophy of religion, a sort of philosophy which seems to be presented independently, there is to be taken up out of religion a name 'god' (i. e. the term ? god? ), that must constitute the specific difference, defined by the notion of spirit itself. such a name is itself not the result of other parts of philosophy, but it has, as a new term (and thus, as representation), the mark of the real philosophy, a new and empty form (which, through phi- losophy, must be determined further).
thus: (a) With this concept of religion, the conceptual necessity of a religious form is presented. (b) in such a philosophical presentation, it is
22 this program is dependent upon the speculative doctrine of the concept, which has to spell out its own (negatively discerned or in a sceptical way attacked) determinations, so that the result is, at the same time, the completed concept and the justification of its real specificity.
23 the second problem, for those who are familiar with Hegel in a general way, is, why philosophy, and not the Christian religion, which is called the truth of religion, would be the ultimate result. a solution to this could be that the Christian religion is the truth of the concept of religion as religion. Philosophy, on the other hand, fulfils the concept of spirit adequately, insofar as it negates the form of representation, and presents the concept of spirit itself in its truth (and purity).
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the rationality or--minimally--the universal recognition of the specifi- cally Christian religion--as the truth of religion as such--which will be worked out thereafter.
a. The Concept of Religion Proper
in Hegel's elaboration of his philosophy of religion, the concept of religion is its specific starting point. it has three parts, the concept of god (not given in this form in the philosophy of absolute spirit), religious knowl- edge, and cult.
this elaborated concept begins from the (at this point, empty) term 'god' as with that which is specific to religious claims. 'god' is the name for a specific religious reality fulfilling the (initially abstract) definition of absolute spirit as the correspondence of real spirit with its concept. With- out such a name, whether it is Zeus, JHWH or simply 'god', there is no recognisable religious dimension at all. on this introduction, two points can be made: 'god' is a name, so it is the initial approach of religion as such and, on the other hand, if religion is the highest form within spirit, god is also taken as the philosophical (or philosophically explainable) truth of the totality of spirit. 24
'god' as the new, specifically religious term and, up to this point, as an unknown determination, must unfold through its elaboration or devel- opment in a conceptual, scientific way. at this point, there is only the thought of the empty concept 'god' as the specificity or the claimed truth of all infinitude. only in as far as it can be elaborated within forms and institutions, which are the specifications for the use of such a concept (i. e. religions), can it be seen how and in what way it is rational. only in this way is there a new content (i. e. religions), which works in and through history to explain the specific (ideal) spirituality of spirit, or, in as far as freedom has such a spiritual form, to be recognised by all
24 With this definition, Hegel is not following the alternative that there is either a new philosophical theology (Jaeschke's position on the view of Hodgson) or a theo-anthropol- ogy (Feuerbach), given by Hodgson, (op. cit. , 13). religion is in fact not reducible to some- thing less complex or less determined (say biology, psychology (Feuerbach), ethics (Kant), politics (neo-marxism), or history. But, its main concern does remain rationally empty as long as there is not a (religiously) attributable essence of spirit (i. e. the truth of spirit). rationally, this essence could be interpreted as something other than spirit, but this is not a strange independent entity called 'god'. in fact, philosophy of religion replaces (ersetzt) the old philosophical theology, but is neither a new form of particular metaphysics, nor an aspect of speculative metaphysics proper.
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spirit. 25 However, as the starting point (of a philosophy of religion), such a truth remains abstract. it claims nothing, with the exception that god is, and that he is one truth over and against all other truths that have been asserted and sublated before (like those of nature and finite spirit, which failed to bring themselves to completion). even as absolute subsistence, 'god' is not concrete. 26 there is nothing in the name alone that the differ- ent names of god(s) can fulfil immediately, or that corresponds to the dif- ferent names of god(s) (ghost(s), re, Zeus, Jupiter, JHWH, god the Father, etc. ). With a name alone, it may be a concept or a pure representation, but there is not yet religion.
such a god becomes concrete only if he is the basis and moment of his development (as a concept), and the principle of his own (conceptual) particularisation. 27 there are two ways to attain such a particularisation: in the movement from either god to religious consciousness or from knowing to god. the first movement is attributed to him by religious people. the claim that god is the truth of all, is indeed a fact of religious conscious- ness, a claim that is related to the basic subsistent substance, using merely formal modes rationally, insofar as 'creation' by god and 'spiritualisation' from god are, in themselves, empty terms, if we attribute them without further determination to that truthful substance. therefore, philosophy must determine how the religious knowledge asserted by some people could lead to an insight available to everyone, and furthermore also arrive at this insight in a philosophical way, insofar as He may be conceptually reconstructed. specific to Hegel's treatment of religious knowledge is his survey of the forms of religious knowledge and his (even more specific) thesis that the proofs of god's existence show the elevation of the reli- gious subject that is involved in the topic of religion itself.
this religious knowledge (according to the account given around 1820) demonstrates the elevation of itself to that truth. For a human being, the question is: how does his religious knowledge come to god? For
25 against all sceptics who could imagine that man could be the gods of the animals, animals can have perceptions and feelings, and there are kingdoms in the animal sphere, but art, religion or philosophy do not exist in the animal domain, insofar as we wouldn't accept that a dog could be a religious being (Vorrede zu Hinrichs, gW 15: 137).
26 With such a notion, Hegel attributes to religion the claim that god is 'a se', not the philosophical but contradictory claim that he is 'causa sui'.
27 god is thus the example par excellence of the universal, or of the manner in which the universal can be represented. He may be determined by nature or by (finite) spirit, but until this point it can only be done in a negative way; only from this determination is he something, but, from now on, he is this determination as his own determination (if that may be seen in religions) by which he is himself or singular.
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this elevation, there are a number of possibilities that are presented and accepted in religion as religious knowledge (mainly in Protestant circles) rationally. 28 minimally, there is an immediate knowing or an immediate certainty that god is not only a name or merely a story i tell myself, but that he is and exists independently of me. at this starting point, the reli- gious subject and god are linked, insofar as that subject is aware of the fact and claims that god is or that this content (god) is as spiritual as the subject is. 29 However, at this stage, this claim cannot be justified further.
at this point, the claim is as empty as when the name 'god' alone was asserted. However, it is now a claim of knowledge, not simply a proposal or empty definition. it will only authentically become a content of knowl- edge when it is justified by representation and thinking. as representation, it shows itself in sensuous figures, images, myths, narratives and histories, according to the content of different religions. such representations of the acts of salvation are the beginning of religious education, but even with all these moments, the insight available for everybody (and thus justifi- able), the place of religion is not defined in a precise way. this justified determination is a thinking in which the different moments are posited as conceptually necessary. in this thinking originates the different proofs of the existence of god. these proofs are neither the concern of merely immediate knowledge, nor of simple religious faith. they are, however, religious knowledge, considered (by philosophy) in its elevation of reli- gious knowledge to god. the proofs, in this interpretation of Hegel's phi- losophy of religion, also give structure to the historical forms of religion, which do not restrict themselves to their (immediate) inwardness. 30
in as far as the proofs are specific forms of elevation, Hegel is not returning to ontology, but is rather trying to justify forms of knowledge (of absolute spirit). 31 such an interpretation of religion may be seen as
28 With this typology, Hegel has in mind all of the theological versions of Protestant religion of his time: Jacobi as a pietist, schleiermacher as an enlightened theologian, and the simple faith of the people, all of which are insufficient forms for a properly philosophi- cal approach to religion.
29 such an immediate knowledge was a common claim in pietistic and even cultivated Protestant circles around 1820-30. see Hegel's discussion of go? schel (16: 188-215) and the commentary of P. Jonkers, 'Unmittelbares Wissen und absolutes Wissen', in: W. Jaeschke & B. sandkaulen, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 2004, pp. 359-375.
30 With this thesis, Hegel is not claiming that there is a temporal history of religions exposed in his philosophy of religion, but rather that there is a rational (and conceptually based) exposition of religions, which is recognisable in the history of religion.
31 see g. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes (gW 18: 228-317). see also d. murphy, Gottesbeweis in: P. Cobben e. o. (ed), Hegel-Lexikon, darmstadt: WBg 2006, pp. 247-249.
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'heterodox',32 but is the result of the philosophical insight that the imme- diate (ontological) understanding of religion (in terms of separate enti- ties, such as a god independent of the use of religious words, or immortal souls) is not rational. the proofs of the existence of god are the explication of religious consciousness and, in that sense, of religion itself. the most important of these proofs is the ontological one (anselm, descartes and Wolff ), which is used only in Christian times. in this case, Hegel is address- ing the Christian tradition in general, not a particularly lutheran or particu- larly Protestant one, insofar as this proof is itself rational and not based on any particular faith alone. in this proof, as well as in Hegel's philosophy of religion generally, the being or the objectivity is indicated and justified in terms of the concept, for, only in the case of god, does its substance include his own being in himself. this philosophical exposition of the ontological proof is just the return to that concept that is posited at the beginning of the philosophy of religion.
educated religious people exercise their religious identity and proper ele- vation through a particular system of religious worship (i. e. 'cult'), which gives them a real unity with 'god'. in the elevation of the proofs of god's existence, which presuppose a (metaphysical) concept, it remains unclear for the religious consciousness that it is itself that is elevating itself. at this level, however, religiously knowing consciousness remains within in its own representation, separated from its divine object. to overcome this represented separation or presupposed split is the purpose of ritual and ceremonial practices (i. e. cult). Cult thus provides the highest form of enjoyment to self-consciousness, in the way in which it reconciles that consciousness with the absolute. Participation in this (represented) reconciliation, which is (for the religious subject) fully and already per- formed by the divine act of salvation, is the basic activity of cult.
this cult takes on a multiplicity of different forms; it is first of all devotion or con- templative prayer, which is active faith, or, in other words, it is engaged religious thinking, participating in god, so that the reconciliation is actual for him.
the particular forms of sacrifice, however, are secondly, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. these forms are outer or exter- nal, but, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. the external forms reproduce the reconciliation in little sacrifices and sac- ramental rites. in such practices, the religious subject is performing the
32 see C. o'regan, The Heterodox Hegel, albany: sUnY Press 1994.
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same elevation, but now for and with his own consciousness, so that the form of representation is destroyed. such a ritual sacrifice is the negation and offering of some finite thing through which the subject demonstrates that he is enjoying ('geniessend') the unity of himself with his god. 33
the most important and authentic form of sacrifice is the sacrifice of the heart, not only in the sense of the purification of desire and of par- ticular passions, but also in the production of spirituality in the form of universality. the finitude or particularity of every subject has to elevate itself to its own purity, so that there is a universal law (of reconciliation), recognisable for everybody. this is the promotion of ethicity (Sittlichkeit) or the production of such an actuality that manifests the reconciliation in this world, but with which the consciousness of the truth remains reli- giously linked. ethicity, then, does not involve simply the singular act of repentance, as it were merely a response to something bad, but it is a genuine form of reconciliation. such a realisation of the annihilation of the particularity of the heart is not so much an extension of the cult as it is the true liberation of the freedom of the world to its own (spiritual) affair ('Sache'). even better, it is not a particular grace, but everyone's actual striving toward real reconciliation! such an account, that it is not the enjoyment of the external cult, but the purification of the heart, as the highest form of cult, may seem to be particularly Protestant in its inspira- tion (as will become clear in Hegel's presentation of Christianity). the true consciousness of the actual purification in ethicity seems to be insightful religion, or that it has become a practical insight available to everybody, or, in other words, that it has become philosophy. religion depends upon this ethicity insofar as such an elevation (or purification) is linked with philosophy as the consciousness of truth, and also in as far as it is only out of this ethicity that god is no longer only a religious substance, but also interpreted as 'free spirit' (e3 ? 552 a).
at this point, this internally elaborated concept could be an illusory or merely an internal philosophical concept (or a merely semantic defini- tion) without validity, even with its allusion to real forms like sacraments and ethicity. to prove such forms have more than a merely illusory, inter- nal, or semantic validity, they should be singularised for consciousness in real religion(s).
33 Hegel is describing all religious forms, in and through his own religious attitude, in terms of Christianity. However, the sense of this conceptual presentation is formal, valid for every religion.
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b. Revealed or Consummate Religion is Christianity34
Hegel claims that the Christian religion fulfils, in historical actuality, the concept of religion, and is, as the result of the conceptual development of all other religions, therefore also true religion. in this rational form ('Gestalt'), the philosophical presentation of Christianity must be recogn- isable for everyone, including faithful or religious people. so, such a philo- sophical presentation must not be based only on a traditional view, or a view that is guaranteed by a religious authority or by the faithful, because a philosophical interpretation of Christianity is not a form of catechism (Dritter Replik, 16: 273). However, in such an interpretation, even religious people should not miss essential features of their faith (e. g. in Christianity, there must be attention to Jesus, who is their Christ) and this exposition should be a philosophical presentation of theological insights. in his sum- mary, Hegel claims that the specifically essential aspects of Christianity are the trinity (which was not taken to be theologically very essential during his time), the appearance of Jesus as Christ, the immortality of the soul and the state (when understood as the modern version of the King- dom of god) (l. c. , 16: 270). 35
in as far as Christianity is the truth of the concept, as well as of other forms of religion, all marks of such religious conceptions are emphasised, and where the central preconceptions are Christian ones. 36 in this reli- gion, the full realisation of such views is asserted, such as the trinity (in the form of religious triplicity), the incarnation (V5, 236, from W2) and the death of god (in Jesus). the differences in the views on immortal- ity between pre-Christian and Christian religions are elaborated in the courses, in order to point to the essential meaning of Christianity.
not presupposed, however, is the concrete concept of spirit. this con- cept is the idea of religion, specifying the concept of god, insofar as it
34 For a reliable english version: P. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, oxford: oxford UP 2005; the best philosophical books on Hegel's religion remain, however, W. Jaeschke, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels, darmstadt: WBg 1983 and Jaeschke, Die Ver- nunft, (o. c. ).
35 this claim is very difficult, insofar as religious people (and religious authorities) seem to be unaware of their (particular) assumptions (e. g. the so-called transcendence or infin- ity or being as well as formulations from the ecumenical Councils), but miss the point, that a philosophy should provide an insight into not just of the claimed truth of a particular religion, but of the truth of religion as such, which would apply even for atheists. For a different summary, see st. rocker, Hegel's Rational Religion, madison & london: Fairleigh dickinson UP 1995, p. 189.
36 For a discussion of other religions, see the rest of this book.
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has returned in itself. in the consummate religion, god is in himself his own distinction. only by grasping this distinction of the concept and this distinction as the self-distinction of god, is there a spiritual religion: with this self-distinction, god is spirit. as spirit, He is not (only) substance, but spirit in its distinction; such a spirit is (minimally) spirit appearing for, or manifesting itself for spirit. in true religion, Spirit is the object of religion and vice versa; (absolute) spirit is so for spirit, and spirit is the form of appearing of spirit. revelation from god is the self-manifestation of spirit for spirit itself. With this interpretation or presentation, Hegel does not stress as much the specifically Christian character of religion, but discovers, in a religious form ('Gestalt'), his own determination of spirit. spirit is the activity of the self-distinction of spirit. it manifests the particular moment(s) of its own essence or universality, through which it is never without exis- tence (i. e. being-there or 'Daseyn') (e3 ? 383-384). 37 absolute spirit is just the correspondence of the concept thereof with its own reality. revelation is the form, which is given by spirit to itself; it is rational, insofar as we can also recognise ourselves in that form ('Gestalt') as rational.
this revelation, however, is, in the Christian religion, also positive. 'Posi- tive' here means that there is an enduring object, or something present for consciousness itself. a positive side is necessary for revelatory religion, insofar as even religion must appear (for consciousness), and thus for rep- resentation, as spirit must be present for everybody (or, in as far as the content of 'a spirit' is taken up by them). as positive, however, the Bible contains the doctrine, which can be elaborated by specific churches as well as by theology, where the witness of spirit is known in scientific form. even as spirit, the content or doctrine has its positiveness. only in his concretion as activity, is god a living god, in the act of determining his own spiritual concept himself.
the content of religion, even in forms of representation, is also one of thinking, or truth. 38 religion claims to have a truth over and above that of other religions (and against other forms of [finite] consciousness). truth is present where spirit appears in religion as consciousness of its own spirit. Verification can only be the witness of spirit itself, in as far as it inte- grates or internalizes its own spirit, which appears in humans as reason or
37 With such a presentation, Hegel determines the manifestation of spirit (as god) in terms of his own logic. 'god' is also thought to be a very specific singularisation of the concept (as idea).
38 see for an (insufficient) truth discussion, insofar as Hegel seems again and again to be interpreted as a dogmatic rationalist: st. rocher, Hegel's Rational Religion, pp. 137-162.
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thinking. thinking sublates the split between both sides of the same spirit in the proofs of god's existence (as spirit, or out of the concept). these proofs start from spirit, which is truth and, more specifically, absolute spirit, which lives through its own determination and from this determination, and is also observable in the conceptual determination(s) of earlier religions. in this way, it contains finite forms in determining itself as itself, which is its self-positing. spirit has to contain (religious) finitude in itself in order to be real spirit. the point made by the ontological proof is important: only the concept attains liberation from positiveness and is real freedom or the essence of spirit for itself. 39 the transition, however, is to spirit itself, which exists as absolute subjectivity and as absolute personality. With its exposition as absolute spirit, spirit arrives at its definition as (authentic or true) spirit. thus, spirit is spiritual in its positive appearance and pres- ents spirit as absolute spirit; both are moments of its own actuality, which it manifests as spirit.
as in the concept of religion, the first moment (the abstract specificity) appears in a different form for religion (available for everybody, in repre- sentation). the first determination is god in his eternal essence, before the creation of the world, the inner trinity of god, where, in his eternal essence through his son, he becomes spirit only for himself, at the level of god's persons loving one another. in this view, Hegel uses its own (theology- based) terminology: the immanent trinity (as opposed to the 'economic' or revealed trinity) does not mean immanent in the world, but immanent in god himself. the reference to the trinity before Jesus' appearance on earth is in Hegel's view 'in itself ', and thus not transcendent. if that which is 'in itself ' is to be significant and not remain an empty concept, it must be 'fulfilled' or developed. immanence used in this sense is not opposed to transcendence. What could be called transcendence is just Hegel's imma-
39 only when the traditional form of religious expression is taken as being the 'one true' form (as in supernaturalism), is philosophy considered to be hostile to religion, when it is critical of the 'self-evidence' or the presuppositions within traditional ways of speaking. Philosophy, however, is just the analysing all these truth claims, in such a way, that truth itself is its topic (of inquiry), which is not the case for physics (nature), nor for religion (god as Christ). theology, on the other hand, most of the time provides just such a truth- inquiry to philosophy, and takes over such claims. in doing so, it comes to an apory: if god is the truth, then theology has the only object of truth, but in as far as truth also comes from other (discursive) forms of knowing, theology is dependent on just such a doctrine of truth-claims (like logic), in which there is no place (or no exclusive place) for god. if, on the other hand, a religion is only a particularity (one narrative among others), then it can have no further claim on universal recognisability and has destroyed its own claims on truth.
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nence as 'Jenseits' (or 'beyond'). the trinity could be a 'Jenseits', if it were not already related to our religious Christian knowledge, knowledge being the only possible topic of philosophy! in as far as an entity can be com- pleted without being known (as is the case for every content containing knowledge that is not philosophical), theology and religious conscious- ness can claim, within their own form or domain (i. e. religion) that there is such independent, infinite thing. 40 However, insofar as this thinking claims to be true (in Hegel's sense), even the trinity cannot remain on the other side of actuality. truth requires the determination of its own concept. it must appear as (religiously knowable) spirit. 41
the second moment is the creation of the son as an earthly person,42 through whom the oppositions between Heaven and earth, god and man, good and bad, are instantiated. really appearing and developing, god reveals himself in the suffering and death of the temporalised, eternal son, through which this son becomes spirit. to grasp this sensuous actuality as spiritual and religious actuality, finite spirit must intuit and remem- ber the birth and death of the reconciler, so that finite spirit can iden- tify itself with this reconciliation and the community may constitute the actual presence of spirit (for itself ). in the death of the reconciler, which is, at the same time, the death of god as merely abstract or immanent (in itself ) it is shown that man takes up the true religion, so that, through the reconciler, the eternal history of god has arisen into consciousness. in this way, god is the process of giving up his immanence to deliver himself to
40 in itself or immanent (trinity/Father) is only the opposite phenomenon (the 'eco- nomic' trinity/son), but neither are explicated as concrete (Parousia/spirit); that, at least, is Hegel's critical version of the Kantian argument. only metaphysical (and not so much theological) statements stress the so-called transcendence of god. However, such a god is not a trinitarian god!
41 With this thesis, a Christian theologian could see a difficulty or danger; god 'should' be free not to manifest himself, but for Hegel such a freedom is empty, and is demonstrated to be empty, in as far as god has created, and has manifested himself. even though the trinity seems to indicate some conceptual moments, Hegel's logic is not god, (as seems to be desmond's point, W. desmond, Hegel's God, aldershot: ashgate 2003, p. 130), but rather all definitions of the (metaphysical) absolute are contained in the logic (H. F. Fulda, 'spekulative logik als die eigentliche metaphysik', in: d. Pa? tzold & a. Vanderjagt, Hrsg. ), Hegels Transformation der Metaphysik, Ko? ln: dinter 1991, pp. 9-27). Without their (own) speculative methodical generation, however, which is the very contribution of the theory or doctrine of rationality, Hegel's logic has also taken up (and replaced) the philosophical importance of what was the religious (and mistakenly metaphysical) concept of god. this is really the core of every (logical) concept, which is insofar as it is an objective concept; and god is--therefore--a concept, even the main example of the logical concept, that the idea is such a truth, is therefore also a logical exposition (Darstellung).
42 Within a mythological representation, this is the first adam.
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the resurrection in spirit. on this point, there are no differences between Christian denominations, in as far as the title of 'son of god' is not inter- preted in borrowed, metaphysical terms. every Christian church accepts the basic form of Jesus as (the) Christ.
the third element of Hegel's concept of religion is the community, inspired by the Holy spirit. it is the Kingdom of god, where god is spirit. this community includes all the people who have faith in the spiritual history of god, as well as those who elaborate the spiritual development of the kingdom of god, of which they are members. the community is existing spirit and is believed in by spirit in its concreteness and reality. the religious moments present just this transformation of every spirit that manifests itself in the trinitarian way, the passing away from the senses of the singular subject, and the resurrection as universal spirit, by giving its testimony of truth. in the existent community, the doctrine of faith is grasped as valid truth. this truth of spirit is, in Christian religion, true for all people. individual members are born into it through Baptism and are educated to its truth; the church teaches freedom and educates non- spiritual people to freedom. they receive absolution within the commu- nity of reconciliation and they enjoy the presence of god in the eucharist. the process of the community is, furthermore, the whole divine process, in and through which the subject is spiritualised.
Hegel's Protestantism is apparent in his discussion of the sacraments. in both the courses of 1827 and 1831, he restricts the sacraments to just two, Baptism and the eucharist. on forgiveness or absolution, the remark about the Catholic sacrament of Confession (1821, V5, 89) is left out; it may be open to discussion, which person can, as spirit, 'undo the past' ('das Geschehene ungeschehen machen'). 43 such an action is included within the church in the form of education (1821, V5, 260). in fact, such an act is vis- ible as the real and legal power of the king.
more important, however, is Baptism, where the child learns that it will be educated toward the freedom of its own good actions, and in which it is confirmed that evil is subdued so that the subject can do good in such a reconciled world. the subsistence of the community is fully realised through participation in the eucharist. specifically for the philosophy of religion, the differences on the eucharist are presented. 44 the eucharist
43 see my 'das geschehene ungeschehen machen', in: Jahrbuch fu? r Hegel-Forschung 4/5, 2000, pp. 221-230.
44 For m. Westphal (Hegel and Protestantism, in: r. Perkins (ed. ), History and System, albany, 1985, p. 82 as well for Jonkers (in this volume) the basic difference between Cathol-
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(or lord's supper) is the participation in the resurrection of Christ by the religious subject. Here, Hegel stresses how lutheranism accepts the spiri- tual transubstantiation in spirit and faith: god as Christ is present in acts of the eating and drinking themselves, not independently in the bread and wine (Catholicism) or only in memory (Calvinism). in this Communion, the individual, Christian subject enjoys ('geniesst') the presence of god.
However, in as far as it is only the Christian individual or the particular community who enjoys the reconciliation, this reconciliation is not yet actual. such a community has a further task: it is insufficient to produce only an abstract reconciliation in opposition to the actuality proper. With the subject's purification to spirit, the grace of reconciliation for all men is discovered and may be realised in a free world. such a grace is not in opposition to freedom, as was discussed in traditional Protestantism (1821, V5, 302), but it is the grace of freedom itself (V5: 262; 288). so it becomes clear: it is not the cult that is the realisation of community, but rather a universal ethicity in a free world that is the realisation of the spiritual- ity of the community, and thus, of a spirituality available to everyone. 45 ethical life, which is the form of universal law justifiable for everybody, is in fact the divestment by the Christian community of its particular form in view of the full realisation of spirit. it is a giving up, by the Christian community, of its own particularity, for the sake of the redemption of the world (i. e. of everyone). as such, this realisation is not the promotion of a particularly Protestant way of life or of a 'Protestant' state, but rather of a really free community, which is aware that the form of the community itself is itself rationally good. in this case, it is not holiness or (Catholic) sanctity, which is abstract and retired from the word, which is important, but rather the justification and sanctification of the rational ethical world. For Hegel, it is not celibacy, poverty, or the servitude to others (priests) that is holy, but rather marriage, work, and political freedom under the self-given law that are sanctified (e3 ? 552 a). 46 in this way, true religiosity can appear
icism and Protestantism is their respective understandings of eucharist. this, however, is only an inner theological discussion. the point Hegel emphasises is not as such a theologi- cal one, but a basic concept, fully linked with Christianity, of the constitutive concept of freedom, where only the Protestants are not restoring spiritual servitude and make no fatal contradiction. this point is completely missed by m. lilla, Hegel and the Political Theology of reconciliation, in: The Review of Metaphysics 54, 2001, pp. 859-900; esp. 885 ff.
45 see the review of the end of the four courses, st. rocker, Hegel's Rational Religion, madison & london, 1995, pp. 166-176.
46 in german, Hegel can play with the words 'geistlich' and 'geistig', both rooted in spirit (Geist), (Vie, 191); the perversion in the roman-Catholic church consists for Hegel in the
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as true ethicity, in which the structures of an objective (and not subjective) world, that is reconciled as such or (minimally) in itself, are justified. 47 the modern secular world, based on Protestantism, substitutes ('ersetzt') the church as the spiritual realm in which reconciled spirit actualises itself.
in other words: in Hegel's view on Protestantism, there are two cleri- cal or confessional sacraments and there is the actual (sacrament of the) salvation of the world, in which grace is visible and acts as freedom, which is the task of all spirits, recognised as spirit, and not only of a particular confessional church.
the contribution of 'religion' to man is first and foremost that he be conscious of this gracious freedom of the world itself and to justify it (in Protestant religion or in philosophy). With this actualized reconciliation, to which consciousness has no opposition--as would be the case if there were another, separate holiness through which the actual justified world itself--the religious consciousness proposes itself in an ideal way as the consciousness of truth. this religious knowing that the subject is recon- ciled with god, has different forms; it may be 'naive', (and, for such critics, the church remains subsistent), but this knowing has become for itself also thinking (enlightenment rationalism); in reaction against enlighten- ment, religious knowing appears as immediate feeling (pietism V: 266) or even it remains in an unfree way within the claimed and confessed recon- ciliation (Catholicism V5: 267). none of these forms of knowing is aware in itself of what is actual. that is the task of philosophy. Philosophy as such (within the Protestant world) therefore replaces the form of cult. e3 restates this: philosophy is the definite form of religious content; it is the religious content developed in the free manner of spirit as such (e3 ? 552 a, and ? 573). there, philosophy posits this reconciliation as the peace of god which is not higher than all reason, but which is known by reason as the truth (V5, p.
