Satirische Bilder aus der Geschichte der mensch- lichen
Dummheiten
(The human being is stupid.
Peter-Sloterdijk-Critique-of-Cynical-Reason
" Educators themselves often surround children with an illusory reality made of lies and threats, pretenses and double standards.
In such a climate, the
jump to a "precriminal disposition" is not great. Cheating, bragging, exaggera- tion, misrepresentation, flattery-they are the human excitations well known to general psychology from which the transition into the impostor's trade can be eas- ily made. It is also known that in the "crisis of puberty" (where it eventuates), behavior patterns can arise that occasionally lead to habitual swindling. Anyone looking for a literary witness's report of such pubertal amoralism and youthful double-living can read in Klaus Mann's first autobiography Kind dieser Zeit (Child of these times, 1932) how the Mann children at that time "went about things. " The twenty-six-year-old author provides --the title alludes to it --themes for a social psychology of the present and simultaneously a kind of history of phi- losophy for the sins of his own youth. He cites Hofmannsthal's verse: "Look out,
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look out, the times are peculiar / And peculiar children they have: us. " From
the erotic sphere, too, phenomena are known that spill over into that of the impostor--the seducer as Don Juan, as marriage swindler; the double-life of up- right married couples.
Impostors invent criminal variants of what is officially called careers. For they make a career, but in a different way from those who are assimilated. Their mo- tives are "peculiar" and are comparable to those of the gambler, the mountain climber, and the hunter, and in large numbers they become unwilling victims of their own talents, among which stand out agility, a talent for languages, charm, the power of seduction, a feel for situations, presence of mind, and imagination. Rhetoricians are represented among them just as much as mimes. They are often subject to strong autonomous dynamics of the "articulatory organs" and to a drive to carry things out that comes from their ability to perceive their own fantasies
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Swindle,
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with an extremely plausible degree of probability and to latch onto all things from the angle of their feasibility. Through their behavior, they are highly successful at extinguishing the everyday ontological boundaries between the possible and the real. They are the inventors in the existential domain.
Wulffen now comes to the ticklish side of the topic: He establishes connections to social and political phenomena. He gives the impression that he sees what is decisive but is not inclined to discuss it. He mentions in passing the swindling side of all modern advertising and the "disreputable" side of the modern business world as such, where there are bankrupt entrepreneurs who, three days before they register their bankruptcy, "clothe wife and daughter once again in velvet and satin" and continue to live in luxury until the police arrive. Wulffen even concedes a certain sociopolitical protest value to swindling because it is in fact not infre- quently the children of poor people who in this way fulfill everyone's dream of ascent into the big time. But Wulffen avoids looking at the current social situation and the most recent political past. He is silent about inflation with all its mental consequences; not only does he pass over the thoroughly deceitful, improvising, and hectically "imaginative" atmosphere of the year 1923, but he also neglects the concrete political application of his cultural criminology. True, he, too, refers to Napoleon, who, according to him, was an adventurer and a "fool of fortune," but for a German at that time, that was an accepted example and in any case was part of the general atmosphere. However, the account makes a discreet detour around Kaiser Wilhelm II. Those kinds of associations, at least in public, were not per- mitted for a former public prosecutor. That this theme nevertheless must also be present as the "unsaid" is self-evident when connections between swindling and society, theater, and politics are investigated seriously. The acting out of dreams and fantasies in grand gestures, since Wilhelm II, had become an element of Ger-
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man politics transparent from all sides. In November 1923, a populist associa-
tion of impostors gave its first unsuccessful performance in the Munich Hitler- Ludendorff putsch.
Thomas Mann-whose Felix Krull, a high-society impostor's story, had ap- peared in the right atmospheric moment in 1922 (in its first version) --also had a clear view of the political-symbolic dimension of the phenomenon of the impos- tor. From the Italian novelle Mario und der Zauberer (Mario and the magician; 1930) on, the conventional Thomas Mann stories about the artist and the citizen, the actor and the charlatan, and about the ambiguity of the artist's life which oscil- lates between people of rank and conjurers in the "green wagon," took on new dimensions. He now turned his attention to the political field and made the mod- ern demagogue, hypnotist, and mass conjurer recognizable as a twin of the actor and the artist. Thomas Mann's narration represents the deepest probe of literary
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diagnostics of the times for that period. It explores the histrionic-charlatanistic
areas of transition between the political and the aesthetic, between ideology and
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trickery, seduction and criminality. Later Mann even wrote a sketch with the provocative title, Bruder Hitler (Brother Hitler).
Where the everyday ontological border between game and seriousness is blurred and the safety gap between fantasy and reality has melted away, there the relation between what is respectable and what is bluff slackens. To the ambitious, publicity-hungry characters falls the task of demonstrating this "slackening" (see Serner's Final Slackening, discussed earlier) in the public sphere. This is called a sense for representation. An aspect of illusionism, pose, and deception always clings to everything representative in service of the public. Representers are the character actors of orderliness, and, with the best among them --Thomas Mann's behavior permits us to include him here--they openly show themselves to be gamblers.
Where insights of this kind are dawning, cynicism cannot be far behind. Manolescu, the impostor of the century, toward the end of his short life came up with the equally coquettish and serious thought of donating his unique (or so he probably thought) brain to scientific research in order to complete his existence in the representational sphere. As an anatomical-psychological specimen, his brain was supposed to go down in anthropology. With this in mind, he offered his body to the world-famous criminal psychologist, Lombroso. However, the scientist, whose fame was based precisely on the "respectable" investigation of the ambiguity between genius and madness, giftedness and criminality, probably had no desire to see his fame tainted by that of this impostor. He answered the mortally ill Manolescu on a postcard: "Keep your skull! "
Addendum:
That today there is not so much talk about impostors only proves the onward
march of respectability in this area. The uneducated impostors of yesteryear have become the professional impostors of today. What counts today is not the spec- tacular effects but the solid facades, respectability. What was earlier called swin- dle today is called expert advice. Is it a matter of educational economics or of technical progress? Today, without an academic education one cannot even be- come a swindler anymore.
Excursus 6. Political Coueism: The Modernization of Lying
When, however, people struggle for existence on this planet, and consequently the fateful question of being or nonbeing con-
fronts them, all considerations of humanity or aesthetics col- lapse into nothing. For all these considerations do not float in the ether but stem from human fantasy and are bound to the human. . . .
. . . If however these viewpoints of humanity and beauty
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are suspended provisionally during the struggle, they cannot be employed as a yardstick for propaganda. . . . The most horri- ble weapons were humane if they led to a speedier victory, and only those methods were beautiful that helped the nation secure the dignity of freedom. . . .
The masses are not now in the position to distinguish where the other's injustice ends and one's own begins. In such a case, they become insecure and mistrustful. . . .
That at the decisive places, it is of course not meant in this way does not occur to the consciousness of the masses. The
people, in the overwhelming majority, are . . . femininely in- clined. . . .
. . . In this there are not many differentiations but only a positive or a negative, love or hate, right or wrong, truth or
lie, however never half-and-half or partially, etc.
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, excerpts from chapter 6
What Hitler presents here may be read as a program for an artful primitivization of consciousness. With a high degree of consciousness it is shown how experience can be extinguished in people. Experience furthers differentiations, reflective- ness, doubt, and the awareness of ambivalences. In the interest of struggle, this is supposed to be voided. In the fateful year 1925, Hitler published in Mein Kampf the grammar of stupefaction; this may be understood as a great act of involuntary enlightenment.
However, it was not understood, and Hitler knew from the start that it would not be understood. "That this will not be comprehended by our smart alecks proves only their mental laziness, or conceit" (ibid. p. 198). Hitler realized that the consciousness of the cynic possesses an entire dimension in addition to that of the normal intellectual, educated, or "conceited" person. The fighting ego in the cynic looks over the shoulder of the ego of experience and thinking and sorts the experiences into what can be used and what cannot. It proceeds from the idea that things have to be simplified. Hitler's recipe is therefore: First simplify, then repeat endlessly. This will be effective. However, one can only simplify what one has already grasped as something ambiguous, multifaceted, multivalent. So that politicians can make an impression on the masses, they must learn to hide that "more" that they know and outwardly identify themselves with their own simpli- fications. With the concept of playacting, this procedure is not yet fully grasped. Thomas Mann hit the mark very clearly not only by describing the vaudeville character of political seduction but also and especially by emphasizing the sugges- tive and hypnotic aspects of these phenomena. The suggestion, however, begins in the politicians themselves, and their own consciousness is the first addressee of suggestive persuasion. In the beginning, rhetoricians must, as they say, "con-
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centrate," that is, collect themselves through autosuggestion and make themselves one with the pretended simplicity and unambiguity of their theses. In the vernacu- lar, we say of such phenomena: They are beginning to believe their own lies. Hit- ler had command of this autosuggestive ability to such an extraordinary extent that, being sure of his cause, he could afford to reveal his recipe.
He rightly assumed that the artful person is superior to the merely "intelligent" person. The intelligent person knows how to gain experience and to think it through in a differentiated way. The artful person knows how the differentiations can be thrown overboard again.
The Weimar Republic may be understood as an age of a universal dawning of reflection, insofar as at that time, such tactics and theories of artfulness and of "simplicity with duplicity" were developed on all levels. We have already dis- cussed Dada and logical positivism. One would have to discuss further the depth psychologies of Freud, Jung, and Adler, among others. Critique of ideology, so- ciology of knowledge, and psychotechnology open up additional dimensions. All these phenomena have multiple meanings. They can serve to simplify the com- plex or to restore the apparently simple to its real complexity. The consciousness of contemporaries becomes a battlefield on which the means of simplification and those of complication struggle. Both can be based on "realism," albeit on different realisms, of course. In general, it holds that the simplifications are of a polemical nature and correspond to a realism of struggle. The complications are rather of a more integrative and conciliatory nature and evidence a therapeutic realism, or a "learning. " They can, of course, also lead to confusion and excessive com- plexity.
Among the therapeutic methods of suggestion during the Weimar period, the Coueian technique, is particularly worth mentioning. It was widely discussed at that time and represented a very simple and effective tool for positive autosugges- tion. It represents a transformation and watering-down of hypnosis to an autosug- gestive procedure, and as such enjoyed in those years extraordinary public in- terest. One bibliography lists for the period of the Weimar Republic alone around seven hundred scientific or popular publications on the themes of Coueism, hyp- nosis, autohypnosis, and suggestion. This enormous interest is proof of a, I would like to say, realist countercurrent to the partly too contemplative, partly too vola- tile discussion of psychoanalysis, in which one could retreat into a rather comfort- able "interpretation" of "symbols" and could look past the real dynamic of the con- scious and the unconscious.
At one point, Hitler even has a go at playing anthropologist:
The first step that visibly separated the human being from the animal was that to invention. Invention itself rests on the discovery of sly tricks and ruses whose application facilitates the struggle against other beings for life. {Mein Kampf, p. 494)
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What Hitler wants to provide here is not, as with Wulffen, a criminal anthro- pology; the latter is concerned primarily with the phenomenon of deception. Hit- ler wants an anthropology of struggle, and for this reason he emphasizes the mar- tial character of invention. This word is to be understood in its double meaning as technical invention and subjective dissimulation. The practical and the fantas- tic are thus the same from the beginning. Of course, Hitler eventually wants to make the point that the "inventor" is to be praised as the outstanding, aristocratic individual who is more adept at life. The "Fiihrer" has a theory of an elite in mind. However, what we can literally read says: To be one of the elite means to belong to those who discover "sly tricks and ruses" in the struggle for existence. The aris- tocrat as the "inventor" of cunning. The circle toward swindle is about to complete itself. But Hitler makes even more unambiguous connections between politics and autosuggestion.
Only the superior training of the German soldier in peacetime im- munized the entire giant organism with that suggestive belief in one's own superiority to an extent that even our adversaries had not thought possible. . . .
Precisely our German people . . . need that suggestive power that lies in self-confidence. This self-confidence, however, must be drilled into the young fellow countryman from early childhood. His entire edu- cation and training must be so ordered as to give him the conviction of being unconditionally superior to others, (p. 456)
Hitler demands, in a uniquely transparent form of expression, what character- izes the young and neoconservatives: self-confidence without self-experience; suggestion against perception. That results in the identities from the primitive- artful test tube.
Five years previously, Ferdinand Avenarius had presented a documentation of the English "horror propaganda" during the First World War and had set him- self the task of exposing tendentious falsifications of images and texts by the Brit- ish. He wanted to contribute to peace, as he said, by uncovering the lies of war. But this would be possible only if we overcame the "suggestive war and its poi- sons" and saw through the "madness of the world. " Avenarius tried to illuminate the suggestions technically. He gives numerous examples of the "poisonous flowers" of suggestion --from small swindles and misrepresentations to grave crimes of misinformation. He stated, I think, realistically:
It is probably good if we first remind ourselves what suggestion is. The pursuit of psychological questions can become universal, it can become "fashion" when some kind of particular stimulation, a "sensation," is as- sociated with it. That is what happened with the dream analyses of Freud and his school; it also happened this way earlier with the discov- eries about hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestion. For the life of peo-
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? Title page of Avenarius's book.
pies, however, it is imcomparably more important what reigns every- where in broad daylight: suggestion during waking hours. We breathe it in, we breathe it out, like air, and like the air--we do not see it. That our consciousness does not notice it is what enables it to have its full effect. Wakeful suggestion has a powerful biological (? ) value for the individual, for it relieves it of much of the world's tediousness and of thinking for oneself. Of course, it also turns the individual into a herd animal. But it does not notice that, for precisely in this lies one of the most important effects of suggestion: that it causes the suggestee to be-
ON THE GERMAN REPUBLIC OF IMPOSTORS ? 493
lieve what he thinks comes from his own head, and what he feels, from his own heart. {Die Mache im Weltwahn, p. 24)
In contrast to Freudian psychoanalysis, Avenarius emphasized not problems of the conscious and the unconscious but those of attentiveness and inattentive- ness. Through suggestion, those pictures of reality become plausible for us that pander to our secret (not unconscious; see chapter 8, "Sexual Cynicism") fanta- sies. Phenomena of suggestion touch on the domain of automatic consciousness, not the unconscious as such. In this, inattentivenesses in perceiving the world combine with inattentivenesses in perceiving oneself. Thus, through suggestive seduction, latent prejudices and inclinations are pseudospontaneously brought to light.
Excursus 7. Spectral Analysis of Stupidity
We are all the more stupid in our actions, the less ignorant we are.
Charles Richet (1921)
With the emergence of impostors' ambivalences in modernity, the social economy of intelligence is altered. Almost imperceptibly, but nonetheless dramatically, the relation between intelligence and stupidity is displaced. Stupidity loses its appar- ent simplicity; in it, one no longer recognizes a primary state of unenlightened minds but a complicated phenomenon that in itself is many-sided, indeed down- right exciting. As soon as one has taken on the social psychology of deception, "stupidity" is drawn into the complications of these observations as the com- plementary phenomenon to deception. "Nothing is simple anymore," not even stupidity. That is perhaps the saddest triumph of enlightenment.
In the light of reflection, the phenomenon of stupidity is torn from everyday thinking and illuminated theoretically. When this is done, the phenomenon proves to be a special case of subjugation and defiance. Deception alone would be nothing without a highly explosive readiness to be deceived in the so-called victim. The early-modern Narrenschijf (Ship of fools) of Sebastian Brant (1494) already calls this structure by its name: Mundus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur. The world wants to be deceived; therefore, it should be deceived. Thus, the theory of the fool and the deceived recognizes in them from the beginning an indepen- dent, active element {vult). The Stultitia is not innocent but contains an aspect of false naivete that clings to those who let themselves be made fools of. This precipitates aggressive laughter: Mocking laughter is a ferment of the European tradition of satire.
In this century, the scandalous contrast between the norms of reason in enlight- enment and the unreasonableness of the human condition demands theoretical ex-
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planations that stretch out beyond satirical wisdom. Here, psychoanalysis has without doubt achieved a great deal by penetrating the phenomenon of stupidity psychogenetically and psychodynamically. It, too, spins out the motif of wanting- to-be-deceived; it discovers that there certainly is subjective sense in being stupid.
A telling documentation of the nascent theorizing about stupidity is provided by a small humorous book by Charles Robert Richet (1850-1935), a world- renowned physiologist and psychologist who had also distinguished himself as a writer of fables; as a Nobel Prize winner, he was one of the leading lights of the French learned world. Written in 1921, his tract was immediately translated into German: Der Mensch ist dumm.
Satirische Bilder aus der Geschichte der mensch- lichen Dummheiten (The human being is stupid. Satirical pictures from the his- tory of human stupidities [no place of publication given, 1922]). Richet is a clas- sic representative of the bourgeois type of learned scholar of the Third Republic, radical rationalist, an enlightener, and teacher of biting stringency and gentle hu- manity. One may surmise that, with this work from his later years, he wanted to express his outrage at the devastations of humanity through the First World War. It is written in a bourgeois dignitary's style that, in a very French way, walks the tightrope between clarity and platitude. Under such conditions, naive cyni- cisms of all kinds flourish, for whose understanding a glance at the author's medi- cal background is useful. In addition, Richet, at the end of his life's work, no longer feels the compulsion to be more brilliant than the occasion demands. What he relates about the First World War sounds as cynical as it is helpless.
Thus I do not decry war for the sake of the dead and the ruins. The newborn will replace the dead and, through them, the ruins will be built up again! The trees grow once again and the harvests come again. But there is an uncanny reality that nothing can extinguish in the eternity of time: the mourning.
Fifteen million dead, that is no great misfortune-at least for these dead --for the dead no longer suffer. . . . Fifteen million dead are replenished by fifteen million births. But hundreds of millions of un- happy people, hundreds of millions of martyrs for whom every joy has dried up(! ) forever, that is something! [Richet means the bereaved. -- Author] (pp. 48, 51)
Cynicism appears here as a form of the labor of mourning. It mirrors the hor- ror of a gentle rationalist at a human society that is incapable of conceiving oi war as a cardinal stupidity. Richet proclaims that he is ashamed to belong to this low species, humanity. One can no longer speak of the Homo sapiens of the Lin- nean system. Richet replaces the expression with a new anthropological classi- fication: Homo stultus. Animals are after all far more clever. An ape can learn
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to play cricket like an Englishman, but the human being does not understand "that peace deserves priority over war" (p. 62).
In the feeling of bitterness, the old man now unfurls the picture scroll of human stupidities: mutilation, circumcision, castration, celibacy, royal cults, sycophancy, subjugation, class society, drugs, alcoholism, tobacco, fashion, jewels, war and armament, superstition, bullfighting, the extinction of animal species, the destruction of forests, protective tariffs, sicknesses through negli- gence, and so on and so on. In this, he indulges in a multitude of extreme insipidi- ties in the notorious style of the nineteenth century, for which the other side, not entirely without justification, attacked him as an "enblightener" (Aujklaricht), to say nothing of his racist vulgarities about the stupidity of the Negroes and the cul- tural worthlessness of the yellow and red races.
It is fascinating to see how in this old scholar the language of ancient kynicism emerges as soon as he comes to the topic that provided the touchstone for wise teachings in antiquity: the relation of the wise person to dying. Like the ancient kynics and materialists, Richet teaches a sovereign indifference toward one's own death, no matter how much he also recognizes the mourning of the death of loved ones. He classifies every kind of death cult as stupid and as superstitious aliena- tion. The dead body, this "earthly sack of maggots" (p. 125), does not deserve any honor. In classical manner--no matter how immediately inspired he is by kynical and Stoic sources --Richet teaches an honorable death. He celebrates So- crates' death as the model of an end worthy of a human being, that is, a serene euthanasia in contrast to that tormenting dysthanasia to which doctors of his time subjected the dying (p. 127).
As far as my own corpse is concerned, I herewith quite solemnly declare that is to be thrown into the knacker's yard, burned, buried, or dissected; I don't care what happens to it, and I beseech my family not to worry themselves over it. (p. 125)
This way of thinking, oriented toward antiquity, does not hide that Richet's writing, too, belongs to the modern twilight of "stupidity. " For it pinpoints pre- cisely the dependence of stupidity on intelligence. Stupidity is an act of defiance, a refusal, a not-wanting-to-be-otherwise that advances parallel to enlightenment.
Wherever there is no reason at all, one cannot nevertheless be un- reasonable! However, the more one is gifted with intelligence, the more one is inclined to drown in a sea of banalities! (p. 13)
From the aphorisms of the novelist and psychoanalyst, Ernst Weiss (Von der Wollust der Dummheit [On the pleasure of stupidity; 1938]), who is almost for- gotten today, one can perceive an enriched echo of Richet's theses. Where Richet still cites the mundis vult decipi in classical fashion, Weiss, following Nietzsche, speaks of a "will to night" [Wille zur Nacht instead of Nietzsche's Wille zur
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Macht; -- Trans. ] -- as a universal regressive tendency ("to extinguish lights, to lie down flat, to be stupid").
This is what psychologists of the masses have to take into account if they want to speak of fascism.
In the eyes of the stupid, God is stupid. The people want God to be stu- pid. A God who understood chemistry and relativity physics would not be to their liking. Luther said: Deus stultissimus. The word could come from Hitler, if he had learned Latin.
Excursus 8. Actors and Characters
That is, in fact, a fancy-dress ball and not reality! You can't get out ofyour costumes!
J. Roth, Die Flucht ohne Ende (1927)
The proletarian-revolutionary movement, which was organizing itself anew after the war, was disturbed by the ironic metamorphoses of the bourgeoisie. In bour- geois culture, atmospherically omnipresent, the ascent of the theatrical type predicted by Nietzsche had come about. And just as at the time of its militant rise against feudalism, when the bourgeoisie had set its steadfast morality against aristocratic cynicisms, the leaders of the revolutionary movement now recreated the antithesis of character and actor.
In his essay Die kulturelle Stellung des Schauspielers (The cultural position of the actor [1919]), Ludwig Rubiner, one of the heralds of expressionist activism, confirms the bourgeois success of actors as an occupational group. The bourgeois contempt for this profession ceased. But not just contempt: Today it is the "strug- gling classes" who continue to view the actor with "instinctive deprecation. " In this there is something worse than contempt, namely, mistrust of the actor.
Mistrust of his reliability, his character, of the assessment of the actor as a companion and fellow fighter. For today there is no longer any evasion: You belong either to the reaction or the revolution. The point is to make a decision. The actor has not yet decided. {Der Dichter greift in die Politik [The poet intervenes in politics], [Leipzig, 1976], pp. 318-19)
According to Rubiner, actors are not much more than "badly or well-fed circus animals" of the bourgeoisie, agents of planned diversion from real struggles. They are "capons," entertainment slaves, fools prostituting themselves, doomed to "existence as Untermenschen" because of their ambivalent position in bour- geois culture. On them falls the suspicion of being asocial --an unbearable suspi- cion in the eyes of those who speak the language of the "coming humanity. Rubiner damns the bourgeois actor by basing himself on a new sociality that looks
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into the future: the "new community," the new humanity. The actor who had ceased to be merely a "hunter of roles" would have to decide in favor of this new humanity, and in doing so would again become a full fellow human and character. Rubiner's slogan was "Character is again worth something" (p. 323). In the new society, actors, as we know them, would disappear, and in their place would step the intellectually distinguished "dilettante," the "speaker," with whose emergence the "epoch of the prostitution of the actor" would end. Rubiner's text reads like a document for a new socialist moralism whose heyday was in the feverish months after the fall of Wilhelminian rule-and the young Russian Revolution close on its heels.
It is superfluous to comment on Rubiner's text; events themselves have taken over this task and have shown that the sociopsychological trend did not make ac- tors into characters once again but made more and more characters into actors. However, from the millions of little stories that have been spun together into a big story, I want to cite one related by Gustav Regler. It provides an atmospheric snapshot from the milieu of prominent Berlin Communists who at that time still believed that with mere rhetoric they could resist the victory march of the Fas- cists. The date is January 28, 1933, two days before the fateful day.
28 January 1933 was a final grotesque day in Berlin. Kantorowicz cooked up his stiff goo of oats as I sought him out to look for the mail. . . . I found an invitation to Green Week, the farmers' exhibi- tion. "Ask Dewald," said Kantorowicz. "He was here yesterday. "
Dewald, an unemployed actor, walked out of the kitchen, puffed up his cheeks, stuck out his stomach and jammed a monocle into his eye. "Quite excellent show! " he teased. . . . "Beast becomes impudent. Produces too many vegetables, too, eats less bread. Soon it will be otherwise. . . . Fourteen years of Marxism have passed, haven't they? " Dewald no longer spoke like a Junker from East Prussia; he imitated Hitler's voice. Kantorowicz stirred his porridge, which he consumed ev- ery morning as a cure for the previous night's poisoning by cigarettes. Dewald pushed a strand of hair onto his forehead. "I have waited long enough! " he cried. "I will be the Chancellor with the bow tie under his nose. My strand of hair will enchant all Germans. The bags under my eyes will become the new ideal of beauty. . . . The Social Democratic party will crawl into its mousehole. The Communist party will distrib- ute a printed protest door-to-door . . . "
"Hey! " said Kantorowicz and looked somewhat concernedly at the jester who, with all his mockery, took on the shine of a visionary.
"I will not stand for any backtalk! " Dewald screamed in the monoto- nous but nevertheless hysterical tone of the "Fuhrer. " "There is no proletariat, I will send it to Moscow; there is only the German people, and they will follow me into the deepest misery because they are loyal and recognize their Fuhrer and like being kicked in the behind. This
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Schleicher has been at the helm now for one month and twenty-four days, but it belongs to me. . . . I will put a stop to his cheating and, before the week is out, there will be one general less and a great Fuhrer in Wilhelmstrasse, so help me my bow tie and my shock of hair . . . "
The telephone rang. Kantorowicz lifted the receiver, listened with his raven's face at first as if he were asleep, tapped with his fingers, then he wrinkled his forehead, nodded several times and hung up. His face seemed to have grown older as he said, looking up at Dewald: "Schleicher has resigned. Hitler will become chancellor. "
Dewald hastily pushed the strand of hair from his forehead. He looked as if he was scared that we would beat him to death. {Das Ohr desMalchus [Frankfurt, 1975], pp. 189-90)
Notes
1. Plagiarism was, by the way, the point of access of the psychoanalyst, E. Bergier, to his analysis of cynicism (see chapter 13, Excursus 2). Bergier boggled at the answer of plagiarists: for them, the concept of "intellectual private property" is nonsense; see Brecht's reply to the proof of his borrowings from Villon in the Threepenny Opera.
2. References to Mann's autobiography are provided in my book Literatur und Lebenserfahrung. Autobiographien der20er Jahre (Munich, 1978). pp. 145ff. , 166ff. ("AufdemZauberberg der Puber- tal"), pp. 275f.
3. In 1911, the spectacle of the "panther leap" to Agadir had ignited the second Moroccan crisis, the prelude to the now "unavoidable" world war. This was a coincidence rich in its many connections: Through the Agadir crisis, through becoming conscious of the approaching Great War, Oswald Spen- gler came for the first time in his cultural historical studies definitively onto the political track.
4. See Bruno Frank's Politische Novelle of 1928, where likewise, with Italian material, the specta- cle of caesarism in the Fascist Duce is depicted.
hapter 24
ey! Are We Alive? New Matter-of- Fact Cynicisms and Stories about the Difficulties of Life
Since then, 10 years have gone by. Where we saw absolutely straight paths, relentless reality came and made them crooked. Nevertheless, things are moving forward. . . . It is a matter of tactics, my dear.
Social Democrat minister Kilman, in Ernst Toller, Hoppla, wir leben! (1927)
In me grows a tiny feeling against dichotomies (strong-weak; big-small; happy-unhappy; ideal-not ideal). It is so only be- cause people cannot think more than two things. More does not
fit into a sparrow's brain. But the healthiest thing is simply: maneuver.
Bertolt Brecht, Tagebucher 1920-1922
If the revolutionary period had been a time of abrupt contrasts and absolute alter- natives in which black and white reigned, ten years later, a game of gray-in-gray nuances, complicated to excess, ruled. By 1928, the people of November 1918 had long since become caught up in the shoving of "hard facts" and the "lesser evil. " An all-pervading moral and tactical relativism gnawed away on older im- ages of "identity. " Literary expressionism had been a final rearing up of the will to simplify--an uprising of modern means of expression against modern ex- periences, against complexity, relativity, perspectivism. By contrast, the cubist tendency in painting seemed adequate to modernity in that it took account of the experience that things looked different from different perspectives.
In the age of tactics, advertising, propaganda, a cubist "mentality" becomes a general fact of intelligence. With it, from now on, older models of identity and character seem archaic or folkloric, if not narrow-minded. Under such circum- stances, it becomes an existential problem how what tradition called the "humane" can be saved from a total emptying and destruction. It is, to use Thomas Mann's words, the "suffering and greatness" of late-bourgeois art that it let itself in for
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the torment of such questions and the psychopolitical perceptions that force one to them. I want to try to describe some of these perceptions and, with their help, to render intelligible the meaning and the painfulness of such questions about the humane and the inhumane. In doing so, I initially work with some very bold ab- stractions that are meant to clarify the modern splitting apart of "systems" and "sensibilities. "
Weimar "social character" was formed under the pressure of a threefold front of complexity. The first front imposed itself on the contemporaries as a downright depressing confusion of political structures and power relations. What has been investigated as "antidemocratic thinking in the Weimar Republic" (Sontheimer and others) is only the tip of the iceberg of social skepticism and private reserva- tions about politics. In it there was a component of reason that to the present day cannot be overlooked. At no time did the transmission of any kind of political will --"mandate"--function in the government's policy in a way that would have allowed reliable loyalties to be formed between the voters and the elected. The "politicization" of the masses was accompanied from the beginning by a sublimi- nal antipolitics and was influenced by disappointment, confusion, resentment, and anxious rage as well as by a profound split between liberal conceptions and a reactionary state apparatus. Between continual foreign-political blackmail and extraparliamentary radicalism, the republic was put into a state of permanent weakness and lack of respectability. Large social groups did not want to ac- knowledge at any time "political achievement" on the part of the government (in spite of Rathenau and Stresemann, Rapallo and Locarno). This unstable, unat- tractive state of affairs effected a psychopolitical polarization between a--let us say --new matter-of-factness and an old moralist type. Where the former, in part
cynically maneuvering, in part realistically dutiful, tried to come to terms with circumstances in order to make the best of them, the other, far more powerful wing rehearsed an uprising of convictions against the facts; the putsch of charac- ter against the complications. We have already spoken about fascism as a sugges- tive political movement of simplification. As such it participates in a global psy- chopolitical problematic of modernity.
jump to a "precriminal disposition" is not great. Cheating, bragging, exaggera- tion, misrepresentation, flattery-they are the human excitations well known to general psychology from which the transition into the impostor's trade can be eas- ily made. It is also known that in the "crisis of puberty" (where it eventuates), behavior patterns can arise that occasionally lead to habitual swindling. Anyone looking for a literary witness's report of such pubertal amoralism and youthful double-living can read in Klaus Mann's first autobiography Kind dieser Zeit (Child of these times, 1932) how the Mann children at that time "went about things. " The twenty-six-year-old author provides --the title alludes to it --themes for a social psychology of the present and simultaneously a kind of history of phi- losophy for the sins of his own youth. He cites Hofmannsthal's verse: "Look out,
2
look out, the times are peculiar / And peculiar children they have: us. " From
the erotic sphere, too, phenomena are known that spill over into that of the impostor--the seducer as Don Juan, as marriage swindler; the double-life of up- right married couples.
Impostors invent criminal variants of what is officially called careers. For they make a career, but in a different way from those who are assimilated. Their mo- tives are "peculiar" and are comparable to those of the gambler, the mountain climber, and the hunter, and in large numbers they become unwilling victims of their own talents, among which stand out agility, a talent for languages, charm, the power of seduction, a feel for situations, presence of mind, and imagination. Rhetoricians are represented among them just as much as mimes. They are often subject to strong autonomous dynamics of the "articulatory organs" and to a drive to carry things out that comes from their ability to perceive their own fantasies
1
Swindle,
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with an extremely plausible degree of probability and to latch onto all things from the angle of their feasibility. Through their behavior, they are highly successful at extinguishing the everyday ontological boundaries between the possible and the real. They are the inventors in the existential domain.
Wulffen now comes to the ticklish side of the topic: He establishes connections to social and political phenomena. He gives the impression that he sees what is decisive but is not inclined to discuss it. He mentions in passing the swindling side of all modern advertising and the "disreputable" side of the modern business world as such, where there are bankrupt entrepreneurs who, three days before they register their bankruptcy, "clothe wife and daughter once again in velvet and satin" and continue to live in luxury until the police arrive. Wulffen even concedes a certain sociopolitical protest value to swindling because it is in fact not infre- quently the children of poor people who in this way fulfill everyone's dream of ascent into the big time. But Wulffen avoids looking at the current social situation and the most recent political past. He is silent about inflation with all its mental consequences; not only does he pass over the thoroughly deceitful, improvising, and hectically "imaginative" atmosphere of the year 1923, but he also neglects the concrete political application of his cultural criminology. True, he, too, refers to Napoleon, who, according to him, was an adventurer and a "fool of fortune," but for a German at that time, that was an accepted example and in any case was part of the general atmosphere. However, the account makes a discreet detour around Kaiser Wilhelm II. Those kinds of associations, at least in public, were not per- mitted for a former public prosecutor. That this theme nevertheless must also be present as the "unsaid" is self-evident when connections between swindling and society, theater, and politics are investigated seriously. The acting out of dreams and fantasies in grand gestures, since Wilhelm II, had become an element of Ger-
3
man politics transparent from all sides. In November 1923, a populist associa-
tion of impostors gave its first unsuccessful performance in the Munich Hitler- Ludendorff putsch.
Thomas Mann-whose Felix Krull, a high-society impostor's story, had ap- peared in the right atmospheric moment in 1922 (in its first version) --also had a clear view of the political-symbolic dimension of the phenomenon of the impos- tor. From the Italian novelle Mario und der Zauberer (Mario and the magician; 1930) on, the conventional Thomas Mann stories about the artist and the citizen, the actor and the charlatan, and about the ambiguity of the artist's life which oscil- lates between people of rank and conjurers in the "green wagon," took on new dimensions. He now turned his attention to the political field and made the mod- ern demagogue, hypnotist, and mass conjurer recognizable as a twin of the actor and the artist. Thomas Mann's narration represents the deepest probe of literary
4
diagnostics of the times for that period. It explores the histrionic-charlatanistic
areas of transition between the political and the aesthetic, between ideology and
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trickery, seduction and criminality. Later Mann even wrote a sketch with the provocative title, Bruder Hitler (Brother Hitler).
Where the everyday ontological border between game and seriousness is blurred and the safety gap between fantasy and reality has melted away, there the relation between what is respectable and what is bluff slackens. To the ambitious, publicity-hungry characters falls the task of demonstrating this "slackening" (see Serner's Final Slackening, discussed earlier) in the public sphere. This is called a sense for representation. An aspect of illusionism, pose, and deception always clings to everything representative in service of the public. Representers are the character actors of orderliness, and, with the best among them --Thomas Mann's behavior permits us to include him here--they openly show themselves to be gamblers.
Where insights of this kind are dawning, cynicism cannot be far behind. Manolescu, the impostor of the century, toward the end of his short life came up with the equally coquettish and serious thought of donating his unique (or so he probably thought) brain to scientific research in order to complete his existence in the representational sphere. As an anatomical-psychological specimen, his brain was supposed to go down in anthropology. With this in mind, he offered his body to the world-famous criminal psychologist, Lombroso. However, the scientist, whose fame was based precisely on the "respectable" investigation of the ambiguity between genius and madness, giftedness and criminality, probably had no desire to see his fame tainted by that of this impostor. He answered the mortally ill Manolescu on a postcard: "Keep your skull! "
Addendum:
That today there is not so much talk about impostors only proves the onward
march of respectability in this area. The uneducated impostors of yesteryear have become the professional impostors of today. What counts today is not the spec- tacular effects but the solid facades, respectability. What was earlier called swin- dle today is called expert advice. Is it a matter of educational economics or of technical progress? Today, without an academic education one cannot even be- come a swindler anymore.
Excursus 6. Political Coueism: The Modernization of Lying
When, however, people struggle for existence on this planet, and consequently the fateful question of being or nonbeing con-
fronts them, all considerations of humanity or aesthetics col- lapse into nothing. For all these considerations do not float in the ether but stem from human fantasy and are bound to the human. . . .
. . . If however these viewpoints of humanity and beauty
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are suspended provisionally during the struggle, they cannot be employed as a yardstick for propaganda. . . . The most horri- ble weapons were humane if they led to a speedier victory, and only those methods were beautiful that helped the nation secure the dignity of freedom. . . .
The masses are not now in the position to distinguish where the other's injustice ends and one's own begins. In such a case, they become insecure and mistrustful. . . .
That at the decisive places, it is of course not meant in this way does not occur to the consciousness of the masses. The
people, in the overwhelming majority, are . . . femininely in- clined. . . .
. . . In this there are not many differentiations but only a positive or a negative, love or hate, right or wrong, truth or
lie, however never half-and-half or partially, etc.
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, excerpts from chapter 6
What Hitler presents here may be read as a program for an artful primitivization of consciousness. With a high degree of consciousness it is shown how experience can be extinguished in people. Experience furthers differentiations, reflective- ness, doubt, and the awareness of ambivalences. In the interest of struggle, this is supposed to be voided. In the fateful year 1925, Hitler published in Mein Kampf the grammar of stupefaction; this may be understood as a great act of involuntary enlightenment.
However, it was not understood, and Hitler knew from the start that it would not be understood. "That this will not be comprehended by our smart alecks proves only their mental laziness, or conceit" (ibid. p. 198). Hitler realized that the consciousness of the cynic possesses an entire dimension in addition to that of the normal intellectual, educated, or "conceited" person. The fighting ego in the cynic looks over the shoulder of the ego of experience and thinking and sorts the experiences into what can be used and what cannot. It proceeds from the idea that things have to be simplified. Hitler's recipe is therefore: First simplify, then repeat endlessly. This will be effective. However, one can only simplify what one has already grasped as something ambiguous, multifaceted, multivalent. So that politicians can make an impression on the masses, they must learn to hide that "more" that they know and outwardly identify themselves with their own simpli- fications. With the concept of playacting, this procedure is not yet fully grasped. Thomas Mann hit the mark very clearly not only by describing the vaudeville character of political seduction but also and especially by emphasizing the sugges- tive and hypnotic aspects of these phenomena. The suggestion, however, begins in the politicians themselves, and their own consciousness is the first addressee of suggestive persuasion. In the beginning, rhetoricians must, as they say, "con-
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centrate," that is, collect themselves through autosuggestion and make themselves one with the pretended simplicity and unambiguity of their theses. In the vernacu- lar, we say of such phenomena: They are beginning to believe their own lies. Hit- ler had command of this autosuggestive ability to such an extraordinary extent that, being sure of his cause, he could afford to reveal his recipe.
He rightly assumed that the artful person is superior to the merely "intelligent" person. The intelligent person knows how to gain experience and to think it through in a differentiated way. The artful person knows how the differentiations can be thrown overboard again.
The Weimar Republic may be understood as an age of a universal dawning of reflection, insofar as at that time, such tactics and theories of artfulness and of "simplicity with duplicity" were developed on all levels. We have already dis- cussed Dada and logical positivism. One would have to discuss further the depth psychologies of Freud, Jung, and Adler, among others. Critique of ideology, so- ciology of knowledge, and psychotechnology open up additional dimensions. All these phenomena have multiple meanings. They can serve to simplify the com- plex or to restore the apparently simple to its real complexity. The consciousness of contemporaries becomes a battlefield on which the means of simplification and those of complication struggle. Both can be based on "realism," albeit on different realisms, of course. In general, it holds that the simplifications are of a polemical nature and correspond to a realism of struggle. The complications are rather of a more integrative and conciliatory nature and evidence a therapeutic realism, or a "learning. " They can, of course, also lead to confusion and excessive com- plexity.
Among the therapeutic methods of suggestion during the Weimar period, the Coueian technique, is particularly worth mentioning. It was widely discussed at that time and represented a very simple and effective tool for positive autosugges- tion. It represents a transformation and watering-down of hypnosis to an autosug- gestive procedure, and as such enjoyed in those years extraordinary public in- terest. One bibliography lists for the period of the Weimar Republic alone around seven hundred scientific or popular publications on the themes of Coueism, hyp- nosis, autohypnosis, and suggestion. This enormous interest is proof of a, I would like to say, realist countercurrent to the partly too contemplative, partly too vola- tile discussion of psychoanalysis, in which one could retreat into a rather comfort- able "interpretation" of "symbols" and could look past the real dynamic of the con- scious and the unconscious.
At one point, Hitler even has a go at playing anthropologist:
The first step that visibly separated the human being from the animal was that to invention. Invention itself rests on the discovery of sly tricks and ruses whose application facilitates the struggle against other beings for life. {Mein Kampf, p. 494)
ON THE GERMAN REPUBLIC OF IMPOSTORS ? 491
What Hitler wants to provide here is not, as with Wulffen, a criminal anthro- pology; the latter is concerned primarily with the phenomenon of deception. Hit- ler wants an anthropology of struggle, and for this reason he emphasizes the mar- tial character of invention. This word is to be understood in its double meaning as technical invention and subjective dissimulation. The practical and the fantas- tic are thus the same from the beginning. Of course, Hitler eventually wants to make the point that the "inventor" is to be praised as the outstanding, aristocratic individual who is more adept at life. The "Fiihrer" has a theory of an elite in mind. However, what we can literally read says: To be one of the elite means to belong to those who discover "sly tricks and ruses" in the struggle for existence. The aris- tocrat as the "inventor" of cunning. The circle toward swindle is about to complete itself. But Hitler makes even more unambiguous connections between politics and autosuggestion.
Only the superior training of the German soldier in peacetime im- munized the entire giant organism with that suggestive belief in one's own superiority to an extent that even our adversaries had not thought possible. . . .
Precisely our German people . . . need that suggestive power that lies in self-confidence. This self-confidence, however, must be drilled into the young fellow countryman from early childhood. His entire edu- cation and training must be so ordered as to give him the conviction of being unconditionally superior to others, (p. 456)
Hitler demands, in a uniquely transparent form of expression, what character- izes the young and neoconservatives: self-confidence without self-experience; suggestion against perception. That results in the identities from the primitive- artful test tube.
Five years previously, Ferdinand Avenarius had presented a documentation of the English "horror propaganda" during the First World War and had set him- self the task of exposing tendentious falsifications of images and texts by the Brit- ish. He wanted to contribute to peace, as he said, by uncovering the lies of war. But this would be possible only if we overcame the "suggestive war and its poi- sons" and saw through the "madness of the world. " Avenarius tried to illuminate the suggestions technically. He gives numerous examples of the "poisonous flowers" of suggestion --from small swindles and misrepresentations to grave crimes of misinformation. He stated, I think, realistically:
It is probably good if we first remind ourselves what suggestion is. The pursuit of psychological questions can become universal, it can become "fashion" when some kind of particular stimulation, a "sensation," is as- sociated with it. That is what happened with the dream analyses of Freud and his school; it also happened this way earlier with the discov- eries about hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestion. For the life of peo-
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? Title page of Avenarius's book.
pies, however, it is imcomparably more important what reigns every- where in broad daylight: suggestion during waking hours. We breathe it in, we breathe it out, like air, and like the air--we do not see it. That our consciousness does not notice it is what enables it to have its full effect. Wakeful suggestion has a powerful biological (? ) value for the individual, for it relieves it of much of the world's tediousness and of thinking for oneself. Of course, it also turns the individual into a herd animal. But it does not notice that, for precisely in this lies one of the most important effects of suggestion: that it causes the suggestee to be-
ON THE GERMAN REPUBLIC OF IMPOSTORS ? 493
lieve what he thinks comes from his own head, and what he feels, from his own heart. {Die Mache im Weltwahn, p. 24)
In contrast to Freudian psychoanalysis, Avenarius emphasized not problems of the conscious and the unconscious but those of attentiveness and inattentive- ness. Through suggestion, those pictures of reality become plausible for us that pander to our secret (not unconscious; see chapter 8, "Sexual Cynicism") fanta- sies. Phenomena of suggestion touch on the domain of automatic consciousness, not the unconscious as such. In this, inattentivenesses in perceiving the world combine with inattentivenesses in perceiving oneself. Thus, through suggestive seduction, latent prejudices and inclinations are pseudospontaneously brought to light.
Excursus 7. Spectral Analysis of Stupidity
We are all the more stupid in our actions, the less ignorant we are.
Charles Richet (1921)
With the emergence of impostors' ambivalences in modernity, the social economy of intelligence is altered. Almost imperceptibly, but nonetheless dramatically, the relation between intelligence and stupidity is displaced. Stupidity loses its appar- ent simplicity; in it, one no longer recognizes a primary state of unenlightened minds but a complicated phenomenon that in itself is many-sided, indeed down- right exciting. As soon as one has taken on the social psychology of deception, "stupidity" is drawn into the complications of these observations as the com- plementary phenomenon to deception. "Nothing is simple anymore," not even stupidity. That is perhaps the saddest triumph of enlightenment.
In the light of reflection, the phenomenon of stupidity is torn from everyday thinking and illuminated theoretically. When this is done, the phenomenon proves to be a special case of subjugation and defiance. Deception alone would be nothing without a highly explosive readiness to be deceived in the so-called victim. The early-modern Narrenschijf (Ship of fools) of Sebastian Brant (1494) already calls this structure by its name: Mundus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur. The world wants to be deceived; therefore, it should be deceived. Thus, the theory of the fool and the deceived recognizes in them from the beginning an indepen- dent, active element {vult). The Stultitia is not innocent but contains an aspect of false naivete that clings to those who let themselves be made fools of. This precipitates aggressive laughter: Mocking laughter is a ferment of the European tradition of satire.
In this century, the scandalous contrast between the norms of reason in enlight- enment and the unreasonableness of the human condition demands theoretical ex-
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planations that stretch out beyond satirical wisdom. Here, psychoanalysis has without doubt achieved a great deal by penetrating the phenomenon of stupidity psychogenetically and psychodynamically. It, too, spins out the motif of wanting- to-be-deceived; it discovers that there certainly is subjective sense in being stupid.
A telling documentation of the nascent theorizing about stupidity is provided by a small humorous book by Charles Robert Richet (1850-1935), a world- renowned physiologist and psychologist who had also distinguished himself as a writer of fables; as a Nobel Prize winner, he was one of the leading lights of the French learned world. Written in 1921, his tract was immediately translated into German: Der Mensch ist dumm.
Satirische Bilder aus der Geschichte der mensch- lichen Dummheiten (The human being is stupid. Satirical pictures from the his- tory of human stupidities [no place of publication given, 1922]). Richet is a clas- sic representative of the bourgeois type of learned scholar of the Third Republic, radical rationalist, an enlightener, and teacher of biting stringency and gentle hu- manity. One may surmise that, with this work from his later years, he wanted to express his outrage at the devastations of humanity through the First World War. It is written in a bourgeois dignitary's style that, in a very French way, walks the tightrope between clarity and platitude. Under such conditions, naive cyni- cisms of all kinds flourish, for whose understanding a glance at the author's medi- cal background is useful. In addition, Richet, at the end of his life's work, no longer feels the compulsion to be more brilliant than the occasion demands. What he relates about the First World War sounds as cynical as it is helpless.
Thus I do not decry war for the sake of the dead and the ruins. The newborn will replace the dead and, through them, the ruins will be built up again! The trees grow once again and the harvests come again. But there is an uncanny reality that nothing can extinguish in the eternity of time: the mourning.
Fifteen million dead, that is no great misfortune-at least for these dead --for the dead no longer suffer. . . . Fifteen million dead are replenished by fifteen million births. But hundreds of millions of un- happy people, hundreds of millions of martyrs for whom every joy has dried up(! ) forever, that is something! [Richet means the bereaved. -- Author] (pp. 48, 51)
Cynicism appears here as a form of the labor of mourning. It mirrors the hor- ror of a gentle rationalist at a human society that is incapable of conceiving oi war as a cardinal stupidity. Richet proclaims that he is ashamed to belong to this low species, humanity. One can no longer speak of the Homo sapiens of the Lin- nean system. Richet replaces the expression with a new anthropological classi- fication: Homo stultus. Animals are after all far more clever. An ape can learn
ON THE GERMAN REPUBLIC OF IMPOSTORS ? 495
to play cricket like an Englishman, but the human being does not understand "that peace deserves priority over war" (p. 62).
In the feeling of bitterness, the old man now unfurls the picture scroll of human stupidities: mutilation, circumcision, castration, celibacy, royal cults, sycophancy, subjugation, class society, drugs, alcoholism, tobacco, fashion, jewels, war and armament, superstition, bullfighting, the extinction of animal species, the destruction of forests, protective tariffs, sicknesses through negli- gence, and so on and so on. In this, he indulges in a multitude of extreme insipidi- ties in the notorious style of the nineteenth century, for which the other side, not entirely without justification, attacked him as an "enblightener" (Aujklaricht), to say nothing of his racist vulgarities about the stupidity of the Negroes and the cul- tural worthlessness of the yellow and red races.
It is fascinating to see how in this old scholar the language of ancient kynicism emerges as soon as he comes to the topic that provided the touchstone for wise teachings in antiquity: the relation of the wise person to dying. Like the ancient kynics and materialists, Richet teaches a sovereign indifference toward one's own death, no matter how much he also recognizes the mourning of the death of loved ones. He classifies every kind of death cult as stupid and as superstitious aliena- tion. The dead body, this "earthly sack of maggots" (p. 125), does not deserve any honor. In classical manner--no matter how immediately inspired he is by kynical and Stoic sources --Richet teaches an honorable death. He celebrates So- crates' death as the model of an end worthy of a human being, that is, a serene euthanasia in contrast to that tormenting dysthanasia to which doctors of his time subjected the dying (p. 127).
As far as my own corpse is concerned, I herewith quite solemnly declare that is to be thrown into the knacker's yard, burned, buried, or dissected; I don't care what happens to it, and I beseech my family not to worry themselves over it. (p. 125)
This way of thinking, oriented toward antiquity, does not hide that Richet's writing, too, belongs to the modern twilight of "stupidity. " For it pinpoints pre- cisely the dependence of stupidity on intelligence. Stupidity is an act of defiance, a refusal, a not-wanting-to-be-otherwise that advances parallel to enlightenment.
Wherever there is no reason at all, one cannot nevertheless be un- reasonable! However, the more one is gifted with intelligence, the more one is inclined to drown in a sea of banalities! (p. 13)
From the aphorisms of the novelist and psychoanalyst, Ernst Weiss (Von der Wollust der Dummheit [On the pleasure of stupidity; 1938]), who is almost for- gotten today, one can perceive an enriched echo of Richet's theses. Where Richet still cites the mundis vult decipi in classical fashion, Weiss, following Nietzsche, speaks of a "will to night" [Wille zur Nacht instead of Nietzsche's Wille zur
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Macht; -- Trans. ] -- as a universal regressive tendency ("to extinguish lights, to lie down flat, to be stupid").
This is what psychologists of the masses have to take into account if they want to speak of fascism.
In the eyes of the stupid, God is stupid. The people want God to be stu- pid. A God who understood chemistry and relativity physics would not be to their liking. Luther said: Deus stultissimus. The word could come from Hitler, if he had learned Latin.
Excursus 8. Actors and Characters
That is, in fact, a fancy-dress ball and not reality! You can't get out ofyour costumes!
J. Roth, Die Flucht ohne Ende (1927)
The proletarian-revolutionary movement, which was organizing itself anew after the war, was disturbed by the ironic metamorphoses of the bourgeoisie. In bour- geois culture, atmospherically omnipresent, the ascent of the theatrical type predicted by Nietzsche had come about. And just as at the time of its militant rise against feudalism, when the bourgeoisie had set its steadfast morality against aristocratic cynicisms, the leaders of the revolutionary movement now recreated the antithesis of character and actor.
In his essay Die kulturelle Stellung des Schauspielers (The cultural position of the actor [1919]), Ludwig Rubiner, one of the heralds of expressionist activism, confirms the bourgeois success of actors as an occupational group. The bourgeois contempt for this profession ceased. But not just contempt: Today it is the "strug- gling classes" who continue to view the actor with "instinctive deprecation. " In this there is something worse than contempt, namely, mistrust of the actor.
Mistrust of his reliability, his character, of the assessment of the actor as a companion and fellow fighter. For today there is no longer any evasion: You belong either to the reaction or the revolution. The point is to make a decision. The actor has not yet decided. {Der Dichter greift in die Politik [The poet intervenes in politics], [Leipzig, 1976], pp. 318-19)
According to Rubiner, actors are not much more than "badly or well-fed circus animals" of the bourgeoisie, agents of planned diversion from real struggles. They are "capons," entertainment slaves, fools prostituting themselves, doomed to "existence as Untermenschen" because of their ambivalent position in bour- geois culture. On them falls the suspicion of being asocial --an unbearable suspi- cion in the eyes of those who speak the language of the "coming humanity. Rubiner damns the bourgeois actor by basing himself on a new sociality that looks
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into the future: the "new community," the new humanity. The actor who had ceased to be merely a "hunter of roles" would have to decide in favor of this new humanity, and in doing so would again become a full fellow human and character. Rubiner's slogan was "Character is again worth something" (p. 323). In the new society, actors, as we know them, would disappear, and in their place would step the intellectually distinguished "dilettante," the "speaker," with whose emergence the "epoch of the prostitution of the actor" would end. Rubiner's text reads like a document for a new socialist moralism whose heyday was in the feverish months after the fall of Wilhelminian rule-and the young Russian Revolution close on its heels.
It is superfluous to comment on Rubiner's text; events themselves have taken over this task and have shown that the sociopsychological trend did not make ac- tors into characters once again but made more and more characters into actors. However, from the millions of little stories that have been spun together into a big story, I want to cite one related by Gustav Regler. It provides an atmospheric snapshot from the milieu of prominent Berlin Communists who at that time still believed that with mere rhetoric they could resist the victory march of the Fas- cists. The date is January 28, 1933, two days before the fateful day.
28 January 1933 was a final grotesque day in Berlin. Kantorowicz cooked up his stiff goo of oats as I sought him out to look for the mail. . . . I found an invitation to Green Week, the farmers' exhibi- tion. "Ask Dewald," said Kantorowicz. "He was here yesterday. "
Dewald, an unemployed actor, walked out of the kitchen, puffed up his cheeks, stuck out his stomach and jammed a monocle into his eye. "Quite excellent show! " he teased. . . . "Beast becomes impudent. Produces too many vegetables, too, eats less bread. Soon it will be otherwise. . . . Fourteen years of Marxism have passed, haven't they? " Dewald no longer spoke like a Junker from East Prussia; he imitated Hitler's voice. Kantorowicz stirred his porridge, which he consumed ev- ery morning as a cure for the previous night's poisoning by cigarettes. Dewald pushed a strand of hair onto his forehead. "I have waited long enough! " he cried. "I will be the Chancellor with the bow tie under his nose. My strand of hair will enchant all Germans. The bags under my eyes will become the new ideal of beauty. . . . The Social Democratic party will crawl into its mousehole. The Communist party will distrib- ute a printed protest door-to-door . . . "
"Hey! " said Kantorowicz and looked somewhat concernedly at the jester who, with all his mockery, took on the shine of a visionary.
"I will not stand for any backtalk! " Dewald screamed in the monoto- nous but nevertheless hysterical tone of the "Fuhrer. " "There is no proletariat, I will send it to Moscow; there is only the German people, and they will follow me into the deepest misery because they are loyal and recognize their Fuhrer and like being kicked in the behind. This
498 ? ON THE GERMAN REPUBLIC OF IMPOSTORS
Schleicher has been at the helm now for one month and twenty-four days, but it belongs to me. . . . I will put a stop to his cheating and, before the week is out, there will be one general less and a great Fuhrer in Wilhelmstrasse, so help me my bow tie and my shock of hair . . . "
The telephone rang. Kantorowicz lifted the receiver, listened with his raven's face at first as if he were asleep, tapped with his fingers, then he wrinkled his forehead, nodded several times and hung up. His face seemed to have grown older as he said, looking up at Dewald: "Schleicher has resigned. Hitler will become chancellor. "
Dewald hastily pushed the strand of hair from his forehead. He looked as if he was scared that we would beat him to death. {Das Ohr desMalchus [Frankfurt, 1975], pp. 189-90)
Notes
1. Plagiarism was, by the way, the point of access of the psychoanalyst, E. Bergier, to his analysis of cynicism (see chapter 13, Excursus 2). Bergier boggled at the answer of plagiarists: for them, the concept of "intellectual private property" is nonsense; see Brecht's reply to the proof of his borrowings from Villon in the Threepenny Opera.
2. References to Mann's autobiography are provided in my book Literatur und Lebenserfahrung. Autobiographien der20er Jahre (Munich, 1978). pp. 145ff. , 166ff. ("AufdemZauberberg der Puber- tal"), pp. 275f.
3. In 1911, the spectacle of the "panther leap" to Agadir had ignited the second Moroccan crisis, the prelude to the now "unavoidable" world war. This was a coincidence rich in its many connections: Through the Agadir crisis, through becoming conscious of the approaching Great War, Oswald Spen- gler came for the first time in his cultural historical studies definitively onto the political track.
4. See Bruno Frank's Politische Novelle of 1928, where likewise, with Italian material, the specta- cle of caesarism in the Fascist Duce is depicted.
hapter 24
ey! Are We Alive? New Matter-of- Fact Cynicisms and Stories about the Difficulties of Life
Since then, 10 years have gone by. Where we saw absolutely straight paths, relentless reality came and made them crooked. Nevertheless, things are moving forward. . . . It is a matter of tactics, my dear.
Social Democrat minister Kilman, in Ernst Toller, Hoppla, wir leben! (1927)
In me grows a tiny feeling against dichotomies (strong-weak; big-small; happy-unhappy; ideal-not ideal). It is so only be- cause people cannot think more than two things. More does not
fit into a sparrow's brain. But the healthiest thing is simply: maneuver.
Bertolt Brecht, Tagebucher 1920-1922
If the revolutionary period had been a time of abrupt contrasts and absolute alter- natives in which black and white reigned, ten years later, a game of gray-in-gray nuances, complicated to excess, ruled. By 1928, the people of November 1918 had long since become caught up in the shoving of "hard facts" and the "lesser evil. " An all-pervading moral and tactical relativism gnawed away on older im- ages of "identity. " Literary expressionism had been a final rearing up of the will to simplify--an uprising of modern means of expression against modern ex- periences, against complexity, relativity, perspectivism. By contrast, the cubist tendency in painting seemed adequate to modernity in that it took account of the experience that things looked different from different perspectives.
In the age of tactics, advertising, propaganda, a cubist "mentality" becomes a general fact of intelligence. With it, from now on, older models of identity and character seem archaic or folkloric, if not narrow-minded. Under such circum- stances, it becomes an existential problem how what tradition called the "humane" can be saved from a total emptying and destruction. It is, to use Thomas Mann's words, the "suffering and greatness" of late-bourgeois art that it let itself in for
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500 ? HEY! ARE WE ALIVE?
the torment of such questions and the psychopolitical perceptions that force one to them. I want to try to describe some of these perceptions and, with their help, to render intelligible the meaning and the painfulness of such questions about the humane and the inhumane. In doing so, I initially work with some very bold ab- stractions that are meant to clarify the modern splitting apart of "systems" and "sensibilities. "
Weimar "social character" was formed under the pressure of a threefold front of complexity. The first front imposed itself on the contemporaries as a downright depressing confusion of political structures and power relations. What has been investigated as "antidemocratic thinking in the Weimar Republic" (Sontheimer and others) is only the tip of the iceberg of social skepticism and private reserva- tions about politics. In it there was a component of reason that to the present day cannot be overlooked. At no time did the transmission of any kind of political will --"mandate"--function in the government's policy in a way that would have allowed reliable loyalties to be formed between the voters and the elected. The "politicization" of the masses was accompanied from the beginning by a sublimi- nal antipolitics and was influenced by disappointment, confusion, resentment, and anxious rage as well as by a profound split between liberal conceptions and a reactionary state apparatus. Between continual foreign-political blackmail and extraparliamentary radicalism, the republic was put into a state of permanent weakness and lack of respectability. Large social groups did not want to ac- knowledge at any time "political achievement" on the part of the government (in spite of Rathenau and Stresemann, Rapallo and Locarno). This unstable, unat- tractive state of affairs effected a psychopolitical polarization between a--let us say --new matter-of-factness and an old moralist type. Where the former, in part
cynically maneuvering, in part realistically dutiful, tried to come to terms with circumstances in order to make the best of them, the other, far more powerful wing rehearsed an uprising of convictions against the facts; the putsch of charac- ter against the complications. We have already spoken about fascism as a sugges- tive political movement of simplification. As such it participates in a global psy- chopolitical problematic of modernity.
