This had been impossible under
a system of non-intervention which prohibited officers from entering
the independent hills.
a system of non-intervention which prohibited officers from entering
the independent hills.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
.
.
.
.
.
.
Caste, purdah, Hinduism and Muhammadanism, with their para-
lysing strife, are unknown in Burma. But, though nine of her thirteen
million inhabitants are Burmese Buddhists, fourteen indigenous lan-
guages are spoken, and a sixth of her inhabitants, covering a third of
her area (chiefly in the hills), are Shans, Chins, Kachins, Karens, etc. ,
who have immemorial feuds with the Burmese. In these areas Burmans
will not serve, the staff is European, and the administration has often
the forms, and sometimes the spirit, of indirect rule; thus, major
chieftains in the Shan States retain powers of life and death, and
administer their native customary law, not the English codes. Slavery
and human sacrifice survive in unadministered areas west of Myitkyina
and east of Lashio.
## p. 447 (#487) ############################################
BURMESE PROBLEMS
447
a
As for the Burmese themselves, what differentiates Burma from
most of India is that the peoples of India have been commingled by
repeated invasion, whereas the Burmese, inhabiting a geographical
backwater, invaded seldom, and only by kindred races, developed
what may fairly be called a nation state, and possess a national con-
sciousness. The Anglo-Indian conquerors found in Burma a language
and society unlike anything to which they were accustomed, and
Western education was non-existent. Having to construct an adminis-
tration at short notice, they brought over their subordinate Indian
staff; and, finding Lower Burma largely an unoccupied waste, they
encouraged Indian coolie immigration, paying shipowners, until 1884,
a capitation fee on each Indian immigrant. Burmese resentment is
acute, and successive lieutenant-governors now insist on the employ-
ment of Burmans. Indians still bulk large in subordinate medical and
engineering staffs, but have been eliminated from general adminis-
tration. As for European employment, the incidence of imperial
service officers (all departments) rose from one in 26,000 people in
1850 to one in 20,000 in 1900, a year moreover when, of 142 police
inspectors (on Rs. 150 monthly) outside Rangoon, eighty-two were
-European. A Burman first became a subdivisional magistrate in 1880,
a deputy-commissioner in 1908, a chief court judge in 1917. Muni-
cipalities, created in 1875, have no vitality outside Rangoon; Ripon's
scheme of rural autonomy could not be applied, owing to the paucity
of the English-speaking public, and district boards have never existed.
The administrative machine is a modern machine, needing modern
minds to work it, and down to 1918 Burma has produced only 400
graduates.
Tribal rebellions in the Chin hills (1917-19), precipitated by
recruiting, occupied 5000 troops. Otherwise the late war left Burma
so unruffed that after Thibaw died in 1916, a state prisoner near
Bombay, Supayalat was allowed to return to Burma. Burma's war
contribution was not men but raw material-wolfram, and the three
staples (rice, teak, petroleum). The forest department supplied the
Admiralty direct, and in its need of food the home market offered
such prices that no rice would have been left in the province had not
government prohibited its export, save under official control for the
benefit of the Food Ministry.
.
## p. 448 (#488) ############################################
CHAPTER XXV
>
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
The conquest of Sind in 1843 and the annexation of the Panjab in
1849, by advancing the British administrative boundary across the
Indus, made it coterminous with the territories of the Baluch and
Pathan tribes, and eventually brought the Government of India into
closer contact with the khan of Kalat and the amir of Afghanistan.
Thus there grew up two distinct schools of frontier administration,
the Sind and the Panjab. The policy adopted in Sind can be roughly
described as an uncompromising repression of outrages by a strong
military force; the success of the Panjab system depended to a very
large extent upon an efficient political management of the tribes.
Having crushed the power of the amirs, Sir Charles Napier imme-
diately set to work to place Sind under a military administration,
selecting his subordinates not from the ranks of the civil service but
from the soldiers who had helped him in the conquest of the country,
This arrangement naturally had its disadvantages, and, like the con-
quest of Sind, became the subject of embittered controversy. The most
exposed part of the Sind frontier stretched for a distance of about
150 miles from Kasmore to the northern spurs of the Hala mountains,
but, at first, no troops were stationed here, neither was it thought
necessary to place anyone in charge of it. This immediately led to
marauding incursions by Bugtis from the Kachhi hills and Dombkis
and Jakranis from the Kachhi plain, who entered Sind in bands of
five hundred or more, plundering and burning villages far inside the
British borders. An attempt was therefore made to grapple with the
problem by building forts and posting detachments of troops at
certain points, and by appointing an officer to command this vul-
nerable part of the border. But these measures did not prove effective.
Disorder reigned supreme. On several occasions British troops were
signally defeated by these robber bands and once about sixty of the
local inhabitants, who had turned out in a body to protect their
homes, were mistaken for robbers and put to death by the 6th Bengal
Irregular Cavalry, the very force which had been posted there for
their protection. Eventually, in 1845, Sir Charles Napier led an
expedition against these disturbers of the peace, but it was only a
qualified success. The Bugtis were by no me ns crushed, for, on
10 December, 1846, about 1500 of these freebooters marched into
Sind, where they remained for twenty-four hours before returning to.
their hills, seventy-five miles away, with 15,000 head of cattle. It can
1 Records of Scinde Irregular Horse, 1, 275.
## p. 449 (#489) ############################################
JACOB IN SIND
449
be safely stated that, until the arrival of Major John Jacob and the
Scinde Irregular Horse, in January, 1847, no efficient protection had
been afforded to British subjects along this exposed frontier.
According to Jacob, the fact that the inhabitants of the British
border districts were allowed to carry arms was chiefly responsible
for the prevailing unrest, for they too were in the habit of proceeding
on predatory excursions. Some of the worst offenders were the Baluch
tribes from the Kachhi side, who had been settled in Sind by Napier
in 1845. Strange to relate, the marauders from across the border
disposed of most of their loot in Sind where the banias supplied them
with food and the necessary information to ensure the success of their
raids. What was worse, the military detachments stationed at Shahpur
and other places remained entirely on the defensive, prisoners within
the walls of their own forts, for no attempt was made at patrolling the
frontier. In 1848, Major, afterwards General, John Jacob was ap-
pointed to sole political power on the Upper Sind frontier where he
completely revolutionised Napier's system. Under Jacob's vigorous
and capable administration, lands which had lain waste for over half
a century were cultivated once more, and the people, who had lived
in constant dread of Baluch inroads, moved about everywhere un-
armed and in perfect safety. All British subjects were disarmed in
order to prevent them taking the law into their own hands, but, as
the possession of arms in a man's own house was not forbidden, the
people were not left so entirely defenceless as is sometimes supposed. "
No new forts were built and existing ones were dismantled, for Jacob
believed that the depredations of Baluch robbers could be best checked
by vigilant patrolling, to which the desert fringe of Sind was admirably
adapted. In other words, mobility was the system of defence. At first
Jacob advocated that the political boundary should coincide with the
geographical. His contention was based on the supposed permanency
of the latter, but the gradual disappearance of the desert as a result
of increased cultivation caused him to alter his opinion. Although
Jacob, in his military capacity, commanded all troops on this frontier
and was responsible to no one but the commander-in-chief, his duties
did not cease here. Not only was he the sole political agent, but he
was in addition superintendent of police, chief magistrate, engineer,
and revenue officer.
It is now generally accepted that Jacob's methods were inapplicable
to the Panjab where frontier administrators were faced by a much
more formidable problem. The first colossal mistake on the Panjab
frontier was the initial step, the taking over of the frontier districts
from the Sikhs, and the acceptance of an ill-defined administrative
boundary. Indeed, it was extremely unfortunate for the British that
the Sikhs had been their immediate predecessors in the Panjat, for
i Records of Scinde Irregular Horse, 11, 243.
· Views and opinions of General John Jacob (ed. Pelly), p. 74.
CHIVI
29
## p. 450 (#490) ############################################
450
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
Sikh frontier administration had been of the loosest type. They pos-
sessed but little influence in the trans-Indus tracts, and what little
authority they had was confined to the plains. Even here they were
obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the
country. Peshawar was under the stern rule of General Avitable
whose criminal code was blood for blood, whose object was the sacri-
fice of a victim rather than the punishment of a culprit. Hazara
groaned under the iron heel of General Hari Singh who was able to
collect revenue only by means of annual incursions into the hills.
Hence, on the Panjab frontier the British succeeded to a heritage of
anarchy, for the Sikhs had waged eternal war against the border
tribes and even against the inhabitants of the so-called settled districts.
The administration of the Panjab frontier was further complicated by
geographical conditions which offered every inducement to a ma-
rauding life. Not only was the frontier longer and therefore more
difficult to defend, but it was also extremely mountainous, whereas in
Sind a strip of desert intervened between British territory and the
haunts of the Baluch robbers, facilitating the employment of cavalry
and the use of advanced posts. In the Panjab rich harvests waved in
dangerous proximity to the intricate maze of nullahs and valleys
which gave access to the plains.
The aims of the Panjab authorities were to protect their subjects
from the attacks of marauding bands, to keep the trade-routes open,
and, as far as possible, to secure ihe tranquillity of the hitherto blood-
stained border. It was imperative to put a stop to the state of affairs
then in existence; and, in order to give the Pathans an impression of
their strength, the British were forced to resort to reprisals. There
could be no peace while raids were constantly taking place and
individual acts of fanaticism rendered the life of any government
servant unsafe. The evidence of Mr, afterwards Sir, Richard Temple,
one of Lawrence's assistants in the Panjab, points to the fact that the
tribes were absolutely incorrigible. He accuses them of giving asylum
to fugitives from justice, of violating British territory, of blackmail and
intrigue, of minor robberies, and of isolated murders of British sub-
jects. Finally he charges them with firing on British regular troops
and even with killing British officers within the limits of the Panjab. 1
On the other hand, the policy of Panjab administrators was one of
forbearance, for, although British officials were prevented from en-
tering tribal territory, the tribesmen were allowed to trade within the
British borders. It seems clear that for over twenty-five years no
official of the Panjab government crossed the border; they were
certainly discouraged from doing so. Whatever the merits of this
policy may have been, it was evidently a concession to the suscepti-
bilities of the tribesmen, and intended in the interests of peace. The
.
| Temple, Report showing relations of the British Government with the tribes of the N. -W. F.
1849-53, 1856, pp. 63-4.
## p. 451 (#491) ############################################
PANJAB POLICY
451
permission to trade and the provision of medical and other assistance
to tribesmen entering the Panjab were certainly attempts to promote
friendly relations. But the contumacious attitude of the tribesmen
themselves eventually drove the British to resort to reprisals and
resulted in a state of chronic warfare for many years. Of course it
could not be expected that they would immediately cease from
harassing the border: the customs and habits of centuries are not so
easily thrown on one side. Thus the first step of the Panjab authorities
was a defensive measure; the next was an attempt at conciliation, to
show the tribesmen how they would benefit by becoming friendly
neighbours.
Various conciliatory methods were adopted. The hated capitation
tax of Sikh days and all frontier duties were abolished; a system of
complete freedom of trade was instituted, and commercial intercourse
encouraged in every way. Steps were taken to protect and increase
the Powindah trade; fairs were held for the exchange of commodities;
roads were constructed from the passes to the nearest bazaars; and
steam communication was established on the upper Indus. Free
medical treatment was provided in the hospitals and dispensaries
established at various points along the frontier; tribal maliks and
jirgas were encouraged to enter British territory for the settlement of
their disputes; and attempts were made to colonise waste lands with
families from across the border. Lastly, the ranks of the army and
police were thrown open for all those desirous of entering British
service. 1
Because the Panjab frontier was too long and too mountainous to
admit of its being defended by the military alone, much depended
upon the political management of the tribes. At first there was no
special agency for dealing with the tribal tracts, and relations with
the tribesmen were conducted by the deputy-commissioners of the six
districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and
Dera Ghazi Khan. In 1876 the three northern districts formed the
commissionership of Peshawar, the three southern ones that of the
Derajat. The system of political agencies was not adopted until 1878
when a special officer was appointed for the Khyber during the second
Afghan War. Kurram became an agency in 1892, while the three
remaining agencies of the Malakand, Tochi, and Wana were created
between 1895 and 1896. The Malakand was placed under the direct
control of the Government of India from the outset, all the other
agencies remaining under the Panjab government. This was the
arrangement until the creation of the Frontier Province in 1901.
To protect the frontier a chain of forts was erected along the British
borders, parallel to which a good military road was constructed.
A special force, the Panjab Frontier Force, was recruited from Sikhs,
Pathans, Gurkhas, and Panjabi Mussulmans, and was placed, not
· Panjab Administration Report, 1869–70, p. 21.
a
29-2
## p. 452 (#492) ############################################
452 THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
under the commander-in-chief, but under the Board of Administra-
tion. It was not until 1886 that this force was amalgamated with the
regular army. In addition, the inhabitants of the frontier districts
were allowed to retain their arms, and were encouraged to defend
their homes.
Three methods of forcing the tribesmen to terms have been em-
ployed by the British: fines, blockades, and expeditions. The idea of
inflicting a fine was to get compensation for plundered property and
"blood-money" for lives lost. As a last resort the tribe was either
blockaded or a punitive force was marched against it. Unfortunately,
the cases in which a blockade can be successfully employed are
extremely limited. To be completely successful, the blockading power
must be in possession of the approaches to a country; it must be
able to sever the arteries of trade and supplies; and must have the
support or friendly co-operation of the surrounding tribes. From this
it becomes apparent that the success of a blockade is largely deter-
mined by geographical conditions. This is the reason why the Adam.
Khel Afridis are so susceptible to this form of coercion. Surrounded
by tribes with whom they have little in common; inhabiting hills
within easy reach of the military stations of Kohat and Peshawar;
and dependent upon their trade with British India for the necessaries
of life, they are soon forced to come to terms. The Panjab systein of
punitive expeditions has been most unfavourably criticised, but
chiefly by exponents of the Sind School, such as Sir Bartle Frere, who
condemned it because the whole tribe was punished for the offences
of a few malcontents. Frere, whose experience was confined to Sind,
failed to recognise that the intensely democratic constitution of the
majority of Pathan tribes rendered any distinction between the guilty
and the innocent extremely difficult. Lord Lytton in his memorable
minute of 22 April, 1877, condemned punitive expeditions as “a system
of semi-barbarous reprisals”, which had not always proved successful,
even in the most limited sense. 4 Sir E. C. Bayley, a member of the
viceroy's council, in his minute of dissent, pointed out that this attack
was extremely unfair, for, in its inception, this policy had been forced
upon the British as a natural consequence of Sikh misrule. Neverthe-
less, an examination of the causes leading up to frontier expeditions
should bring the impartial student to the conclusion that there have
been many occasions when the authorities in India have been only
too ready to resort to punitive measures.
The existence of two distinct systems in two widely separated parts
of the frontier, inhabited by tribes who differed considerably in
characteristics and constitution, was a necessity. But, in the Dera
· Panjab Administration Report, 1892–3, pp. 32-3; Confidential Frontier and Overseas, I, vi-vii.
· Davies, “Coercive Measures on the Indian Borderland”, Army Quarterly, April, 1928,
pp. 81-95.
's Martineau, Life of Sir Bartle Frere, 1, 363-8.
• Parl. Papers, 1878, LVII (C. 1898), 142.
9
## p. 453 (#493) ############################################
THE MARRIS AND BUGTIS
453
Ghazi Khan district, an anomalous state of affairs had grown up in
the meeting-place of Pathan and Baluch tribal areas. Certain tribes,
such as the Marris and Bugtis, came into contact with both systems
of frontier policy, for their territories were contiguous to the Dera
Ghazi Khan district of the Panjab and also to the Upper Sind frontier.
Under the former system they received allowances; under the latter
this was not the case. In the Panjab they held possessions on both
sides of the administrative boundary; in Sind this was not allowed.
Under the Sind system, military posts had been pushed far into the
neighbouring hills, with the result that the Panjab boundary was in
the rear of the Sind posts. In the Panjab the tribesmen were dealt
with by special regulations framed in accordance with their customary
laws, tribal system, and blood-feuds. The reverse was the case in Sind
where no notice was taken of tribal ties or of local custom. There, the
prosecution of a blood-feud was considered as malice aforethought,
and no allowances were made in passing sentences in such cases. To
settle this difficulty, a conference between Panjab and Sind officials
took place at Mittankot, on 3 February, 1871. Another object of the
conference was to determine the exact relations between the khan of
Kalat and his sardars. The Sind authorities considered that they alone
were responsible for political negotiations with the khan; and, acting
under this belief, they had attempted to control the Marris and Bugtis
through their legitimate chief. On the other hand, the Panjab govern-
ment had no direct relations with Kalat, and compensation for
offences committed by these tribes had been obtained through Sind.
In 1867 Captain Sandeman, the deputy-commissioner of Dera Ghazi
Khan, had entered into direct relations with these tribes, which action
had been followed by a period of peace on the Panjab frontier. Far
otherwise was the case on the Sind frontier, where the absence of any
definite engagements was considered as an excuse for marauding
ncursions. One flagrant case has been placed on record where a
tribe, which had bcen prohibited from entering Sind, still remained
in receipt of allowances on the Panjab frontier. The conference re-
sulted in the following proposals being placed before the Government
of India. In future, Marri and Bugti tribal affairs should be placed
under the control of Sandeman who, for this purpose, should consider
himself subordinate to the Sind authorities. All payments to Marri
and Bugti chiefs should be made in the name of the khan of Kalat.
No decision was arrived at regarding the relations existing between
the khan and his sardars. These recommendations were sanctioned by
the Government of India on 19 October, 1871.
During the years 1872 to 1878 several important measures calcu-
lated to improve the administration of the frontier districts were
introduced. To ensure a better understanding between government
i Parl. Papers, 1877, LXIV (C. 1807), 77.
? Idem, 1878, LVII (C. 1898), 68-76.
## p. 454 (#494) ############################################
454
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
officials and the tribesmen, civil officers were obliged to qualify them-
selves by passing an examination in either Pashtu or Baluchi. In the
interests of peace the nawab of Tank, a loyal but incompetent ally,
was relieved of the police administration of his troublesome charge.
To increase its efficiency the militia of the Derajat, a local force acting
as an auxiliary to the Panjab Frontier Force, was reorganised; and,
in 1878, as a result of a Defence Committee which met at Peshawar
in 1877, measures creating a Border Police and Militia were anctioned
for parts of the Kohat and Peshawar districts. This meant that the
procedure adopted at the annexation of the Panjab was reversed, for
the militia now took the place of the military as a first line force.
Lastly, with a view to their becoming industrious agriculturists, settle-
ments or colonies of Afridis, Waziris, Gurchanis, Bhittannis, and
Bugtis were formed in British territory. This has often been put forward
as a solution to the frontier problem, but its success or failure depends
upon the fierceness of the tribe and the distance it is removed from
its original habitat. It has been tried with success in the Yusafzai
country, but this cannot be said of the experiment in so far as the more
turbulent Mahsud is concerned. This was the state of affairs on the
Panjab frontier on the eve of the second Afghan War, in 1878. While
this system of defence was being evolved in the north, great changes
had been taking place on the southern frontier.
Relations between Kalat and the Government of India were regu-
lated by the treaty of 14 May, 1854, which pledged the khan to abstain
from ncgotiations with any other power, without first consulting the
British; to receive British troops in Kalat whenever such a step sl. ould
be thought necessary; to protect merchants passing through his terri-
tories; and to prevent his subjects from harassing the British borders.
In return for tliis he received an annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000. 1 About
the year 1869 it became apparent- that Khudadad Khan, who had
used this subsidy to raise a standing army, was attempting to increase
his authority at the expense of his confederated chiefs; and, it was
obvious that, if British support were withdrawn, Kalat would become
the scene of internecine struggles.
“It is surely time for our governinent", wrote Sandeman in 1869, “to interfere
when we find that the Khan of Khelat's mismanagement of his khanate has led
to the peace and administration of that part of the Punjab border being placed
in much jeopardy; for such truly is the case. ”?
By the end of 1871 the sardars were in open revolt against the khan's
authority, and the anarchy prevailing in Kalat led to raids along the
British borders. The climax was reached in 1873, when Major
Harrison, the British agent, was recalled, and the khan's subsidy
withheld, because he had failed to comply with the terms laid down
in the treaty of 1854. Instead of sanctioning an expedition, the
i Parl. Papers, 1873, L.
? Idem, 1877, LXIV (C. 1807), 6.
## p. 455 (#495) ############################################
SANDEMAN'S POLICY
455
Government of India decided to dispatch Sandeman on a mission of
reconciliation to the khan's territories. It was Sandeman's second
mission, in 1876, that led to the Mastung Agreement and the treaty
of 1876, which marked the death of non-intervention on the southern
frontier. By the Mastung Agreement of July, 1876, the khan and his
Brahui sardars were formally reconciled. The Treaty of Jacobabad,
signed on 8 December of the same year, renewed and : upplemented
the treaty of 1854. In return for an increased subsidy the khan granted
permission for the location of troops in, and the construction of railway
and telegraph lines through, Kalat territory. The importance of the
treaty lies in the fact that it was the foundation of the Baluchistan
Agency, for on 21 February, 1877, Major Sandeman was appointed
agent to the governor-general, with his headquarters at Quetta.
Lord Lytton justified this advance on thoground that it was impossible
to remain inert spectators of the anarchy in Kalat, when the con-
nection between Kalat and Sind was so intimate that any disturbance
in the one was immediately reflected in the other.
Sir Robert Sandeman's tribal policy was one of friendly and con-
ciliatory intervention. Casting all fear on one side, he boldly advanced
into their mountain retreats and made friends with the tribal chiefs
or tumandars. Recognising that the British side of the question was
not the only side, he never condemned the action of a tribe, until he
had fully investigated its grievances.
This had been impossible under
a system of non-intervention which prohibited officers from entering
the independent hills. The weakest part of his system was that it
depended too much upon the personal influence of one man. There
have not been wanting critics who have regarded his system of
granting allowances as blackmail. This charge falls to the ground
when it is remembered that those in receipt of allowances had strenuous
duties to perform in the guarding of trade-routes and passes, and in
the carrying out of jirga decrees. Allowances may be termed black-
mail when they are granted solely to induce the tribesmen to abstain
from raiding. Sandeman never withheld allowances because of
offences committed by individual members of a tribe. He always
demanded that the actual offenders should be brought to justice, that
the guilty alone should be punished. This system was quite successful
amongst Baluch tribes where there was some tribal chief powerful
enough to enforce his authority. Its introduction by Mr R. İ. Bruce,
the Commissioner of the Derajat (1890-6), into Waziristan among
the more democratic Mahsuds, where no such authority existed, ended
in complete failure. Bruce, who had previously served under
Sandeman, hoped that Mahsud maliks, chosen by him, would, in
return for allowances, be able to control the ulus, the name given to
the body of the Mahsud tribe. 2 But Bruce made a fatal mistake. He
| Parl. Papers, 1877 (C. 1808), pp. 255-7, 314-16.
2 Idem, 1902 (C. 1177), pp. 125-7.
## p. 456 (#496) ############################################
456
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
introduced his maliki system without first having occupied a com-
manding and central position in the Mahsud country. Sandeman,
on the contrary, realised that the first essential was to dominate the
Baluch country with troops. The policy of Sir Robert Warburton in
the Khyber was similar to that of Sandeman, in that an attempt was
made to gain the confidence of the surrounding tribes. But, in reality,
the two systems were fundamentally different, for, in the Khyber, the
object aimed at was the control of the pass. To this everything else
was subordinated. It was not considered necessary to extend British
control over the neighbouring tribes, though friendly intercourse was
not forbidden. For this reason, in the Khyber, the British never
interfered with the internal feuds of the Afridis, who were allowed to
wage war, even within sight of the walls of Jamrud, so long as their
struggles did not affect the protection of the pass.
It will be convenient at this stage to summarise the later history of
Baluchistan, for, after 1890, interest chiefly centres in the Pathan
frontier. By the Treaty of Gandammak, May, 1879, Pishin and Sibi
were handed over to the Government of India by Yakub Khan as
“assigned districts”, which meant that any surplus of revenue over
expenditure had to be handed back to the amir. Although this
treaty was abrogated by the massacre of Cavagnari and his escort,
these areas were retained by the British, but were not declared British
territory until 1877, when the agent to the governor-general was
appointed chief commissioner for them. The ten years preceding
Sandeman's death, in 1892, were marked by tremendous adminis-
trative activity. Communications were opened out in every direction,
irrigation schemes were taken in hand, forests were developed, and
arrangements made for the collection of land-revenue. In the adṁinis-
tration of justice the indigenous system of jirgas, or councils of tribal
elders, has been developed under British administration. Local cases
are referred to local jirgas, while more important disputes are placed
before inter-district jirgas, or before the Shahi Jirga, which meets
twice a year, once at Sibi and once at Quetta. The province as now
administered can be divided into British Baluchistan, consisting of
the tracts assigned by the Treaty of Gandammak; agency territories,
which have been acquired by lease or otherwise brought under the
control of the Government of India; and the native states of Kalat and
Las Bela.
Closely interwoven with the local question of tribal control is the
more important problem of imperial defence. From the conquest of
the Panjab, in 1849, frontier policy was in the hands of administrators
of the Lawrence or “non-intervention” school, but the arrival of
Lord Lytton, in 1876, marked the end of “masterly inactivity”. It was
the second Afghan War, 1878–80, and the consequent occupation of
Afghan territory, that impressed upon statesmen the necessity for a
1 Aitchison, Treaties, XI, 346.
## p. 457 (#497) ############################################
THE INDUS LINE
457
scientific frontier. Military strategists became divided into two op-
posing camps, the Forward and the Stationary. Both these terms are
unfortunate in that they can both be subdivided into the extremists
and the moderates. The extreme section of the Forward School did
not know where their advances would stop; the moderates desired
the best possible strategic frontier with the least possible advance. On
the other hand, the extreme advocates of non-intervention would have
held the Indus line; the moderates were inclined to an advance, if it
could have been proved to them that Russia constituted any real
menace.
The essential function of any frontier is that of separation. But a
good frontier, while serving this useful purpose, should at the same
time constitute a line of resistance following, as far as possible, easily
recognisable natural features, and avoiding sharp salients and re-
entrants. If possible, it should also be based upon ethnic considerations.
There are four possible lines of resistance on the Indian borderland:
the river Indus; the old Sikh line, which roughly corresponds to
the administrative boundary; the Durand line, delimited in 1893
and demarcated, as far as was possible, in the succeeding years; and
the so-called scientific frontier stretching from Kabul through Ghazni
to Kandahar. Military experts have waxed eloquent over what they
have considered to be India's best line of defence. One thing however
is certain: they have all erred in regarding it from a purely military
point of view, when the problem should have been examined in all
its aspects, military, political, ethnological, and financial.
Early writers went astray in supposing that the Indus was once the
north-west frontier of India. This is the origin of the “Back to the
Indus" cry. It can be safely asserted that the Indus frontier, in the
literal sense of the term, never existed. The British inherited their
frontier from the Sikhs who never held the river line, but the foothills
towards the independent Pathan country. The greatest exponent of
the Indus boundary was Lord Lawrence, who advocated meeting any
invader in the valley of the Indus, for the longer distance an invading
army had to march through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the
more harassed it would be. This contention is contrary to the opinion
of the greatest military authorities who hold that a river is not a good
line of defence in that it can always be forced by an enterprising
general. The defensive capacity of rivers naturally varies, and depends
very much upon whether the defenders' bank commands the other.
This is not the case with the Indus, where the left bank is flat and is
frequently commanded by the right. Although many of the defects of
the old days have been remedied by improved communications in the
rear, the natural defects still remain. The Indus is continually shifting
its course, and, when in flood, overflows its bank for miles on either
side. Again, the unhealthiness of the valley renders it unsuitable as
1 Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LXXVI (73), 15.
## p. 458 (#498) ############################################
458
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
an area for the concentration of troops. Perhaps the weightiest argu-
ment that can be brought forward against meeting an enemy on the
banks of the Indus is the disastrous moral effect such a course would
have upon the inhabitants of the Indian peninsula.
The present administrative boundary, besides violating ethnic con-
siderations, breaks ncarly every requirement of a good frontier. To
give but one example: Peshawar and Kohat are separated by a sharp
salient of independent territory, known as the Jowaki peninsula,
through which narrow strip of Afridi country runs the road between
these two important frontier outposts. This is a notorious example of
the haphazard way in which the frontier was taken over from the
Sikhs. Both here and in the Gumatti area, farther south, the boundary
line should have been straightened out long ago.
The Durand line, which demarcate, the respective spheres of
influence of the amir and the Government of India over the frontier
tribes, possesses no strategic value at all. The Khost salient between
Kurram and Waziristan is but one of its many strategical imper-
fections. This disposes of three possible lines of resistance. The real
frontier that the British are called upon to defend in India is the
mountain barrier. To do so, it is essential to cross the Indus in order
to prevent the enemy fic. n debouching on to the plains. To defend
a mountain barrier it is necessary to do more than this. The defenders
must be in a position to see what is taking place on the oth'c side.
The greatest advance from the old red line of the maps was the result
of Sandeman's work in Baluchistan. The strategic importance of
Quetta must now be discussed.
The proposal to occupy Quetta dates back to the days of General
John Jacob of Sind fame, who, in 1856, urged Lord Canning to
garrison this important point of vantage, for, as he observed, this
would enable the British to threaten the flank of any army advancing
upon the Khyber. 1 In his letter of 18 October, 1856, Lord Canning
rejected the proposal on the grounds that, surrounded by hostile
tribes and cut off from its true base, the isolated position of the garrison
would be extremely precarious. The next time, in 1866, the proposal
emanated from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Green, the political
superintendent of Upper Sind, but, unfortunately, it had to face the
united opposition of Lord Lawrence and his council. Ten years
passed. The exponents of “masterly inactivity" were no longer pre-
dominant in the viceroy's council-chamber; Khiva had fallen before
Cossack hosts which were drawing nearer and nearer to the gates of
India; and, more dangerous still, the estrangement of the amir Sher
'Ali had brought India and Afghanistan to the brink of war. Reference
has alrcady been made to the occupation of Quetta which served such
a useful purpose during the second Afghan War. During this war the
question of the so-called scientific frontier was broached: should the
1 Views and Opinions of General John Jacob (cd. Pelly), p. 349.
## p. 459 (#499) ############################################
KANDAHAR
459
British hold the Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar line? Some extremists
advocated the retention of all the recent conquests in Afghanistan;
others recommended a complete withdrawal, even to the banks of the
Indus. Amongst the moderates the stumblingblock was the retention
of, or withdrawal from, Kandahar. The question was further com-
plicated by a discussion as to the relative merits and demerits of the
Khyber, Kurram, and Bolan as channels of communication with
Afghanistan.
The retention of Kandahar was advocated on military, political,
and commercial grounds. Situated at the junction of roads leading
tö Kabul and to Herat, Kandahar dominated the whole of southern
Afghanistan. Easily defensible, with a good water supply, its garrison
would not be called upon to endure great hardships. A strongly
fortified Kandahar would not only threaten the flank of any force
advancing by way of Kabul towards the Khyber, but forces advancing
simultaneously from Kabul and Herat would also be isolated. The
majority of minutes written in support of retention entirely ignored
the financial side of the question, and refused to acknowledge that
permanent occupation would entail a drain of money and men. But
would the occupation of Kandahar have been the end of an advance
into Afghanistan? It was predicted that the defence of Kandahar
would necessitate the occupation of Girishk and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, in
which case the British would have been called upon to defend a
frontier as unscientific as the one it was proposed to abandon, for
both ran along the foothills of a wild, mountainous country. Some
even went so far as to assert that the British advance would not cease
until Herat had been reached, for the greatest difficulty confronting
the Forward School would be to know where to stop. Fortunately
the counsels of the moderates prevailed. They realised that the recent
acquisitions in Baluchistan would enable the British to occupy this
position whenever it became necessary, for in their eyes the importance
of Kandahar was a war-time importance only. Furthermore, the
later extension of the railway to New Chaman advanced the British
borders to the Khwaja Amran range, beyond which a broad desert
stretched to the walls of Kandahar. Closely connected with the
Kandahar question was the proposal to occupy the Kabul, Ghazni,
Kandahar line, which was the outcome of a desire to discover the best
possible line of defence against invasion from the direction of Central
Asia. It was argued, that, if this line were connected with the main
Indian railway system, troops could be rapidly concentrated on either
flank. Neither the right flank nor the left could be turned, for the
northern was protected by an almost impenetrable maze of moun-
tains, the southern by an impassable desert. The retirement already
· Davies, “An Imperial Problem”, Army Quarterly, October, 1927, pp. 28-41; see also
Parl. Papers, 1881, Lxx, 67.
> Parl. Papers, 1881, Lxx (C. 2776), 91.
## p. 460 (#500) ############################################
460 THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843–1918
a
referred to necessitated the abandonment of this frontier. The British
scheme of defence against Russia was settled not by military strate-
gists, but by diplomatists. The steady advance of Russia towards the
northern frontiers of Afghanistan brought about a compromise
between the Forward and Stationary Schools, and it was decided to
build up a strong, friendly, united Afghanistan to serve as a buffer
state. By means of an annual subsidy, together with gifts of arms and
ammunition, an attempt was made to form a closer and more intimate
alliance with the amir. At the same time the frontiers of Afghanistan
were strictly defined by international agreement; and, as long as
British control of Afghan foreign affairs continued, any violation of
the amir's northern frontier by Russia would have been tantamount
to a declaration of war.
This settlement of the imperial problem by no means settled the
local problem of tribal control. The causes of unrest on the Indian
borderland are geographical, economic, religious and political.
Certain factors, such as the geographical and economic, have been
operative from the dawn of history: others, such as the arms' traffic,
are of more recent origin. As long as hungry tribesmen inhabit barren
and almost waterless hills, which command open and fertile plains,
so long will they resort to plundering incursions in order to obtain
the necessaries of life. The rich daman (plain) of Dera Ismail Khan is
a case in point. The greater part of. Waziristan is a region of stony
nullahs and barren raghzas (plateaux), with only occasional stretches
of cultivated land in the warmer valleys. In close proximity lie the
fertile plains of the Derajat, while to the south runs the famous
Powindah caravan route from Ghazni and the bazaars of Central
Asia. Thus the plundering of caravans and the raiding of the daman
have been forced upon the Mahsud by his environment. In the cold
weather, from November to April, the tribesmen enter British India
to engage in agricultural labour and for the purpose of trade. In
April they receive their allowances, after which they return to their
hills. For this reason, “the political barometer of the North-West
Frontier is always more nearly at 'fair' in April than at any other
season of the year". 1 Therefore, the hot season, when no hostages
.
remain in British territory, is the Pathans' opportunity.
Although it is often stated that the economic factor is at the root of
almost every frontier disturbance, a close study of the problem should
convince anyone that political propaganda, especially from 1890
onwards, has been the most potent cause of unrest. It has been Afghan
intrigues, either instigated directly from Kabul with the full cognizance
of the amir, or carried on by his local officials, which have from time
to time incited the tribes to rebel against the British raj. The colony
of Hindustani fanatics, which for years disturbed the peace of the
Hazara border and which was reinforced by a steady stream of
i Secret Border Report, 1917-18, p. 1.
## p. 461 (#501) ############################################
THE FORWARD POLICY
461
>
recruits from Bengal and other parts of India, is a notorious example
of anti-British intrigues originating in British India.
Considerable unrest has also been produced by the practice of
dealing with the tribes through arbabs, or Pathan “middlemen". This
system, the adoption of which was to a certain extent inevitable in the
early days of British rule, when officers were ignorant of the language
and customs of the tribes, was one of the evils inherited from the Sikhs.
In the year 1877 a raid, committed by Bunerwals on the Yusafzai
border, was traced to the direct instigation of Ajab Khan, a "middle-
man” and leading khan of the Peshawar district. One of the chief
causes of trouble on the Kohat borders before the Miranzai expedi-
tions of 1891 was that a local “middleman”, the khan of Hangu, had
a
stirred up discontent amongst the very tribes for whose peaceful
conduct he was responsible. 1
Throughout the 'nineties of the last century, especially from 1895
onwards, the frontier districts were abnormally disturbed. There were
two main reasons for this: the forward policy pursued under Lord
Lansdowne and Lord Elgin, and the intrigues of the amir of Afghani-
stan. By the year 1889 Sandeman had extended British control over
the Bori and Zhob valleys, to the south of the Gumal pass. The occu-
pation of Zhob was of paramount importance from a military,
political, and commercial standpoint. Not only did it shorten the
British line of defence and prevent raiding gangs from escaping into
Afghanistan, but it also served as a protection for the Gumal trade-
route. In the year 1890 the Gumal river, from Domandi to its junction
with the Zhob stream, was declared the boundary between Baluchistan
and the Panjab frontier zone.
The opening years of the ’nineties witnessed punitive expeditions
against the Shiranis inhabiting the slopes of the Takht-i-Sulaiman;
the Orakzai clans in the neighbourhood of the Samana range; the
Isazai tribes of the ill-omened Black Mountain; and the petty chiefs,
or thums, of Hunza and Nagar. Far more important than these
petty wars was the peaceful acquisition of the Kurram valley, which
was taken over, in 1892, at the request of its Turi inhabitants. This
active policy along the entire length of the British border, especially
its later developments, not only alarmed the tribesmen whose in-
dependence has ever been their proudest boast, but it also thoroughly
alarmed the amir, Abd-ur-rahman Khan, with the result that, between
1890 and 1898, Anglo-Afghan relations were so strained, that on
several occasions war seemed imminent. When it is realised that the
inhabitants of the frontier hills, with rare exceptions, are orthodox
Muhammadans of the Sunni sect, and are, in many cases, of the same
racial stock as the people of south-eastern Afghanistan, it becomes
· Parl. Papers, 1890-1, LIX (C. 6526), 8-9.
: Mason, Expedition against Isazai clans ; Parl. Papers, 1890-1, LIX (C. 6526), pt I.
• Durand, The Making of a Frontier; Parl. Papers, 1892, Lvin (C. 6621).
## p. 462 (#502) ############################################
462
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
>
apparent that the amir has been able to show his displeasure by
exploiting the marauding proclivities of these turbulent tribesmen.
For this reason, it was fortunate for the British during the Mutiny
that diplomatic negotiations had resulted in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty
of 1855 and the Agreement of January, 1857. The outbreak of war
with Afghanistan in 1878 was the signal for increased disturbances
throughout the tribal zone. The Hazara border was in a perpetual
ferment; the Khyber was constantly raided by Zakka Khels and
Mohmands; Zaimushts harassed the Kohat line of communications;
and Mahsuds from the heart of Waziristan raided and laid waste the
country in the vicinity of Tank.
For some time before the dispatch of the Durand Mission to Kabul,
in 1893, it had been rumoured abroad that the British were desirous
of a more exact delimitation of the Indo-Afghan frontier. This know-
ledge may have led to the increase of the amir's intrigues in Zhob and
Waziristan. It undoubtedly prompted Abd-ur-rahman Khan to write
a letter to the viceroy, in which he warned Lord Lansdowne of the
results of a more forward policy.
“If you should cut them out of my dominions”, he wrote, “they will neither
be of any use to you nor to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other
trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your
government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a
strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India,
these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies. . . . In your cutting away from me
these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will
injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my
weakness is injurious for your government. ""
The Durand Agreement of 1893 resulted in the delimitation of a
boundary, afterwards known as the Durand line, across which neither
the amir nor the Government of India was to interfere in any way.
The importance of this agreement has been somewhat overrated. It
is true that by putting an end to the existing uncertainty the demarca-
tion of this boundary should have considerably facilitated frontier
administration, but frontier history, since 1893, shows that this agree-
ment has not only increased the responsibilities of the Government of
India, but has also increased the chances of collision with the tribes
and of war with the amir. The new boundary line was not based upon
sound topographical data, for, during the process of demarcation, it
was discovered that certain places, marked on the Durand map, did
not exist on the actual ground. Many ethnic absurdities were per-
petrated, such as the handing over to the amir of the Birmal tract of
Waziristan, peopled by Darwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom
were included within the British sphere of influence. The worst
blunder of all was the arrangement by which the boundary cut the
Mohmand tribal area into two separate parts. It seems certain that
i Abd-ur-rahman, Autobiography, II, 158.
## p. 463 (#503) ############################################
CHITRAL
463
this could not have been a tripartite agreement, for there is no evidence
that the tribesmen were consulted before 1893. To give but one
example: it was not until the year 1896 that the Halimzai, Kamali,
Dawezai, Utmanzai, and Tarakzai Mohmands, afterwards known as
the eastern or “assured” clans, accepted the political control of the
Government of India. " In all probability the political issues at stake
occasioned this sacrifice of ethnological requirements. If the amir had
not been promised the Birmal tract, it is quite likely that he would
have refused his consent to the inclusion of Wana within the British
sphere of influence. In the light of subsequent events it is difficult to
understand the reasons which prompted the amir to sign this agree-
ment. It may have been that the increase of his subsidy to eighteen
lakhs of rupees, and the recognition of his right to import munitions
of war, bribed him into acquiescence.
While these negotiations were taking place Chitral became the
scene of fratricidal conflicts. On his death, in 1892, . Aman-ul-mulk,
the Mehtar of Chitral, had been succeeded by one of his sons, Afzal-
ul-mulk, who, after a short reign of two months and seven days, was
slain by his uncle, Sher Afzal, who had been allowed to escape from
Kabul where he had been living as a pensioner of the amir. Sher
Afzal held the reins of government until he was ousted from his
position by his nephew, Nizam-ul-mulk, who was recognised by the
Government of India. It is significant that Sher Afzal fled to the camp
of the Afghan commander-in-chief at Asmar. In answer to the new
Mehtar's request, a mission under Dr Robertson was dispatched to
Chitral. Although Robertson advocated the retention of British
troops in Chitral and Yassin, Lord Lansdowne, towards the end of
1893, issued instructions for the withdrawal of the political officer
from Chitral, if no further complications occurred. Two factors were
instrumental in reversing this decision. It was considered inexpedient
to withdraw so long as the Pamir boundary dispute with Russia
afforded an excuse for aggressive action from that direction. It was
further feared that, owing to the hostile attitude of Umra Khan of
Jandol, on the southern borders of Chitral, withdrawal would be
followed by a period of anarchy.
Caste, purdah, Hinduism and Muhammadanism, with their para-
lysing strife, are unknown in Burma. But, though nine of her thirteen
million inhabitants are Burmese Buddhists, fourteen indigenous lan-
guages are spoken, and a sixth of her inhabitants, covering a third of
her area (chiefly in the hills), are Shans, Chins, Kachins, Karens, etc. ,
who have immemorial feuds with the Burmese. In these areas Burmans
will not serve, the staff is European, and the administration has often
the forms, and sometimes the spirit, of indirect rule; thus, major
chieftains in the Shan States retain powers of life and death, and
administer their native customary law, not the English codes. Slavery
and human sacrifice survive in unadministered areas west of Myitkyina
and east of Lashio.
## p. 447 (#487) ############################################
BURMESE PROBLEMS
447
a
As for the Burmese themselves, what differentiates Burma from
most of India is that the peoples of India have been commingled by
repeated invasion, whereas the Burmese, inhabiting a geographical
backwater, invaded seldom, and only by kindred races, developed
what may fairly be called a nation state, and possess a national con-
sciousness. The Anglo-Indian conquerors found in Burma a language
and society unlike anything to which they were accustomed, and
Western education was non-existent. Having to construct an adminis-
tration at short notice, they brought over their subordinate Indian
staff; and, finding Lower Burma largely an unoccupied waste, they
encouraged Indian coolie immigration, paying shipowners, until 1884,
a capitation fee on each Indian immigrant. Burmese resentment is
acute, and successive lieutenant-governors now insist on the employ-
ment of Burmans. Indians still bulk large in subordinate medical and
engineering staffs, but have been eliminated from general adminis-
tration. As for European employment, the incidence of imperial
service officers (all departments) rose from one in 26,000 people in
1850 to one in 20,000 in 1900, a year moreover when, of 142 police
inspectors (on Rs. 150 monthly) outside Rangoon, eighty-two were
-European. A Burman first became a subdivisional magistrate in 1880,
a deputy-commissioner in 1908, a chief court judge in 1917. Muni-
cipalities, created in 1875, have no vitality outside Rangoon; Ripon's
scheme of rural autonomy could not be applied, owing to the paucity
of the English-speaking public, and district boards have never existed.
The administrative machine is a modern machine, needing modern
minds to work it, and down to 1918 Burma has produced only 400
graduates.
Tribal rebellions in the Chin hills (1917-19), precipitated by
recruiting, occupied 5000 troops. Otherwise the late war left Burma
so unruffed that after Thibaw died in 1916, a state prisoner near
Bombay, Supayalat was allowed to return to Burma. Burma's war
contribution was not men but raw material-wolfram, and the three
staples (rice, teak, petroleum). The forest department supplied the
Admiralty direct, and in its need of food the home market offered
such prices that no rice would have been left in the province had not
government prohibited its export, save under official control for the
benefit of the Food Ministry.
.
## p. 448 (#488) ############################################
CHAPTER XXV
>
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
The conquest of Sind in 1843 and the annexation of the Panjab in
1849, by advancing the British administrative boundary across the
Indus, made it coterminous with the territories of the Baluch and
Pathan tribes, and eventually brought the Government of India into
closer contact with the khan of Kalat and the amir of Afghanistan.
Thus there grew up two distinct schools of frontier administration,
the Sind and the Panjab. The policy adopted in Sind can be roughly
described as an uncompromising repression of outrages by a strong
military force; the success of the Panjab system depended to a very
large extent upon an efficient political management of the tribes.
Having crushed the power of the amirs, Sir Charles Napier imme-
diately set to work to place Sind under a military administration,
selecting his subordinates not from the ranks of the civil service but
from the soldiers who had helped him in the conquest of the country,
This arrangement naturally had its disadvantages, and, like the con-
quest of Sind, became the subject of embittered controversy. The most
exposed part of the Sind frontier stretched for a distance of about
150 miles from Kasmore to the northern spurs of the Hala mountains,
but, at first, no troops were stationed here, neither was it thought
necessary to place anyone in charge of it. This immediately led to
marauding incursions by Bugtis from the Kachhi hills and Dombkis
and Jakranis from the Kachhi plain, who entered Sind in bands of
five hundred or more, plundering and burning villages far inside the
British borders. An attempt was therefore made to grapple with the
problem by building forts and posting detachments of troops at
certain points, and by appointing an officer to command this vul-
nerable part of the border. But these measures did not prove effective.
Disorder reigned supreme. On several occasions British troops were
signally defeated by these robber bands and once about sixty of the
local inhabitants, who had turned out in a body to protect their
homes, were mistaken for robbers and put to death by the 6th Bengal
Irregular Cavalry, the very force which had been posted there for
their protection. Eventually, in 1845, Sir Charles Napier led an
expedition against these disturbers of the peace, but it was only a
qualified success. The Bugtis were by no me ns crushed, for, on
10 December, 1846, about 1500 of these freebooters marched into
Sind, where they remained for twenty-four hours before returning to.
their hills, seventy-five miles away, with 15,000 head of cattle. It can
1 Records of Scinde Irregular Horse, 1, 275.
## p. 449 (#489) ############################################
JACOB IN SIND
449
be safely stated that, until the arrival of Major John Jacob and the
Scinde Irregular Horse, in January, 1847, no efficient protection had
been afforded to British subjects along this exposed frontier.
According to Jacob, the fact that the inhabitants of the British
border districts were allowed to carry arms was chiefly responsible
for the prevailing unrest, for they too were in the habit of proceeding
on predatory excursions. Some of the worst offenders were the Baluch
tribes from the Kachhi side, who had been settled in Sind by Napier
in 1845. Strange to relate, the marauders from across the border
disposed of most of their loot in Sind where the banias supplied them
with food and the necessary information to ensure the success of their
raids. What was worse, the military detachments stationed at Shahpur
and other places remained entirely on the defensive, prisoners within
the walls of their own forts, for no attempt was made at patrolling the
frontier. In 1848, Major, afterwards General, John Jacob was ap-
pointed to sole political power on the Upper Sind frontier where he
completely revolutionised Napier's system. Under Jacob's vigorous
and capable administration, lands which had lain waste for over half
a century were cultivated once more, and the people, who had lived
in constant dread of Baluch inroads, moved about everywhere un-
armed and in perfect safety. All British subjects were disarmed in
order to prevent them taking the law into their own hands, but, as
the possession of arms in a man's own house was not forbidden, the
people were not left so entirely defenceless as is sometimes supposed. "
No new forts were built and existing ones were dismantled, for Jacob
believed that the depredations of Baluch robbers could be best checked
by vigilant patrolling, to which the desert fringe of Sind was admirably
adapted. In other words, mobility was the system of defence. At first
Jacob advocated that the political boundary should coincide with the
geographical. His contention was based on the supposed permanency
of the latter, but the gradual disappearance of the desert as a result
of increased cultivation caused him to alter his opinion. Although
Jacob, in his military capacity, commanded all troops on this frontier
and was responsible to no one but the commander-in-chief, his duties
did not cease here. Not only was he the sole political agent, but he
was in addition superintendent of police, chief magistrate, engineer,
and revenue officer.
It is now generally accepted that Jacob's methods were inapplicable
to the Panjab where frontier administrators were faced by a much
more formidable problem. The first colossal mistake on the Panjab
frontier was the initial step, the taking over of the frontier districts
from the Sikhs, and the acceptance of an ill-defined administrative
boundary. Indeed, it was extremely unfortunate for the British that
the Sikhs had been their immediate predecessors in the Panjat, for
i Records of Scinde Irregular Horse, 11, 243.
· Views and opinions of General John Jacob (ed. Pelly), p. 74.
CHIVI
29
## p. 450 (#490) ############################################
450
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
Sikh frontier administration had been of the loosest type. They pos-
sessed but little influence in the trans-Indus tracts, and what little
authority they had was confined to the plains. Even here they were
obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the
country. Peshawar was under the stern rule of General Avitable
whose criminal code was blood for blood, whose object was the sacri-
fice of a victim rather than the punishment of a culprit. Hazara
groaned under the iron heel of General Hari Singh who was able to
collect revenue only by means of annual incursions into the hills.
Hence, on the Panjab frontier the British succeeded to a heritage of
anarchy, for the Sikhs had waged eternal war against the border
tribes and even against the inhabitants of the so-called settled districts.
The administration of the Panjab frontier was further complicated by
geographical conditions which offered every inducement to a ma-
rauding life. Not only was the frontier longer and therefore more
difficult to defend, but it was also extremely mountainous, whereas in
Sind a strip of desert intervened between British territory and the
haunts of the Baluch robbers, facilitating the employment of cavalry
and the use of advanced posts. In the Panjab rich harvests waved in
dangerous proximity to the intricate maze of nullahs and valleys
which gave access to the plains.
The aims of the Panjab authorities were to protect their subjects
from the attacks of marauding bands, to keep the trade-routes open,
and, as far as possible, to secure ihe tranquillity of the hitherto blood-
stained border. It was imperative to put a stop to the state of affairs
then in existence; and, in order to give the Pathans an impression of
their strength, the British were forced to resort to reprisals. There
could be no peace while raids were constantly taking place and
individual acts of fanaticism rendered the life of any government
servant unsafe. The evidence of Mr, afterwards Sir, Richard Temple,
one of Lawrence's assistants in the Panjab, points to the fact that the
tribes were absolutely incorrigible. He accuses them of giving asylum
to fugitives from justice, of violating British territory, of blackmail and
intrigue, of minor robberies, and of isolated murders of British sub-
jects. Finally he charges them with firing on British regular troops
and even with killing British officers within the limits of the Panjab. 1
On the other hand, the policy of Panjab administrators was one of
forbearance, for, although British officials were prevented from en-
tering tribal territory, the tribesmen were allowed to trade within the
British borders. It seems clear that for over twenty-five years no
official of the Panjab government crossed the border; they were
certainly discouraged from doing so. Whatever the merits of this
policy may have been, it was evidently a concession to the suscepti-
bilities of the tribesmen, and intended in the interests of peace. The
.
| Temple, Report showing relations of the British Government with the tribes of the N. -W. F.
1849-53, 1856, pp. 63-4.
## p. 451 (#491) ############################################
PANJAB POLICY
451
permission to trade and the provision of medical and other assistance
to tribesmen entering the Panjab were certainly attempts to promote
friendly relations. But the contumacious attitude of the tribesmen
themselves eventually drove the British to resort to reprisals and
resulted in a state of chronic warfare for many years. Of course it
could not be expected that they would immediately cease from
harassing the border: the customs and habits of centuries are not so
easily thrown on one side. Thus the first step of the Panjab authorities
was a defensive measure; the next was an attempt at conciliation, to
show the tribesmen how they would benefit by becoming friendly
neighbours.
Various conciliatory methods were adopted. The hated capitation
tax of Sikh days and all frontier duties were abolished; a system of
complete freedom of trade was instituted, and commercial intercourse
encouraged in every way. Steps were taken to protect and increase
the Powindah trade; fairs were held for the exchange of commodities;
roads were constructed from the passes to the nearest bazaars; and
steam communication was established on the upper Indus. Free
medical treatment was provided in the hospitals and dispensaries
established at various points along the frontier; tribal maliks and
jirgas were encouraged to enter British territory for the settlement of
their disputes; and attempts were made to colonise waste lands with
families from across the border. Lastly, the ranks of the army and
police were thrown open for all those desirous of entering British
service. 1
Because the Panjab frontier was too long and too mountainous to
admit of its being defended by the military alone, much depended
upon the political management of the tribes. At first there was no
special agency for dealing with the tribal tracts, and relations with
the tribesmen were conducted by the deputy-commissioners of the six
districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and
Dera Ghazi Khan. In 1876 the three northern districts formed the
commissionership of Peshawar, the three southern ones that of the
Derajat. The system of political agencies was not adopted until 1878
when a special officer was appointed for the Khyber during the second
Afghan War. Kurram became an agency in 1892, while the three
remaining agencies of the Malakand, Tochi, and Wana were created
between 1895 and 1896. The Malakand was placed under the direct
control of the Government of India from the outset, all the other
agencies remaining under the Panjab government. This was the
arrangement until the creation of the Frontier Province in 1901.
To protect the frontier a chain of forts was erected along the British
borders, parallel to which a good military road was constructed.
A special force, the Panjab Frontier Force, was recruited from Sikhs,
Pathans, Gurkhas, and Panjabi Mussulmans, and was placed, not
· Panjab Administration Report, 1869–70, p. 21.
a
29-2
## p. 452 (#492) ############################################
452 THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
under the commander-in-chief, but under the Board of Administra-
tion. It was not until 1886 that this force was amalgamated with the
regular army. In addition, the inhabitants of the frontier districts
were allowed to retain their arms, and were encouraged to defend
their homes.
Three methods of forcing the tribesmen to terms have been em-
ployed by the British: fines, blockades, and expeditions. The idea of
inflicting a fine was to get compensation for plundered property and
"blood-money" for lives lost. As a last resort the tribe was either
blockaded or a punitive force was marched against it. Unfortunately,
the cases in which a blockade can be successfully employed are
extremely limited. To be completely successful, the blockading power
must be in possession of the approaches to a country; it must be
able to sever the arteries of trade and supplies; and must have the
support or friendly co-operation of the surrounding tribes. From this
it becomes apparent that the success of a blockade is largely deter-
mined by geographical conditions. This is the reason why the Adam.
Khel Afridis are so susceptible to this form of coercion. Surrounded
by tribes with whom they have little in common; inhabiting hills
within easy reach of the military stations of Kohat and Peshawar;
and dependent upon their trade with British India for the necessaries
of life, they are soon forced to come to terms. The Panjab systein of
punitive expeditions has been most unfavourably criticised, but
chiefly by exponents of the Sind School, such as Sir Bartle Frere, who
condemned it because the whole tribe was punished for the offences
of a few malcontents. Frere, whose experience was confined to Sind,
failed to recognise that the intensely democratic constitution of the
majority of Pathan tribes rendered any distinction between the guilty
and the innocent extremely difficult. Lord Lytton in his memorable
minute of 22 April, 1877, condemned punitive expeditions as “a system
of semi-barbarous reprisals”, which had not always proved successful,
even in the most limited sense. 4 Sir E. C. Bayley, a member of the
viceroy's council, in his minute of dissent, pointed out that this attack
was extremely unfair, for, in its inception, this policy had been forced
upon the British as a natural consequence of Sikh misrule. Neverthe-
less, an examination of the causes leading up to frontier expeditions
should bring the impartial student to the conclusion that there have
been many occasions when the authorities in India have been only
too ready to resort to punitive measures.
The existence of two distinct systems in two widely separated parts
of the frontier, inhabited by tribes who differed considerably in
characteristics and constitution, was a necessity. But, in the Dera
· Panjab Administration Report, 1892–3, pp. 32-3; Confidential Frontier and Overseas, I, vi-vii.
· Davies, “Coercive Measures on the Indian Borderland”, Army Quarterly, April, 1928,
pp. 81-95.
's Martineau, Life of Sir Bartle Frere, 1, 363-8.
• Parl. Papers, 1878, LVII (C. 1898), 142.
9
## p. 453 (#493) ############################################
THE MARRIS AND BUGTIS
453
Ghazi Khan district, an anomalous state of affairs had grown up in
the meeting-place of Pathan and Baluch tribal areas. Certain tribes,
such as the Marris and Bugtis, came into contact with both systems
of frontier policy, for their territories were contiguous to the Dera
Ghazi Khan district of the Panjab and also to the Upper Sind frontier.
Under the former system they received allowances; under the latter
this was not the case. In the Panjab they held possessions on both
sides of the administrative boundary; in Sind this was not allowed.
Under the Sind system, military posts had been pushed far into the
neighbouring hills, with the result that the Panjab boundary was in
the rear of the Sind posts. In the Panjab the tribesmen were dealt
with by special regulations framed in accordance with their customary
laws, tribal system, and blood-feuds. The reverse was the case in Sind
where no notice was taken of tribal ties or of local custom. There, the
prosecution of a blood-feud was considered as malice aforethought,
and no allowances were made in passing sentences in such cases. To
settle this difficulty, a conference between Panjab and Sind officials
took place at Mittankot, on 3 February, 1871. Another object of the
conference was to determine the exact relations between the khan of
Kalat and his sardars. The Sind authorities considered that they alone
were responsible for political negotiations with the khan; and, acting
under this belief, they had attempted to control the Marris and Bugtis
through their legitimate chief. On the other hand, the Panjab govern-
ment had no direct relations with Kalat, and compensation for
offences committed by these tribes had been obtained through Sind.
In 1867 Captain Sandeman, the deputy-commissioner of Dera Ghazi
Khan, had entered into direct relations with these tribes, which action
had been followed by a period of peace on the Panjab frontier. Far
otherwise was the case on the Sind frontier, where the absence of any
definite engagements was considered as an excuse for marauding
ncursions. One flagrant case has been placed on record where a
tribe, which had bcen prohibited from entering Sind, still remained
in receipt of allowances on the Panjab frontier. The conference re-
sulted in the following proposals being placed before the Government
of India. In future, Marri and Bugti tribal affairs should be placed
under the control of Sandeman who, for this purpose, should consider
himself subordinate to the Sind authorities. All payments to Marri
and Bugti chiefs should be made in the name of the khan of Kalat.
No decision was arrived at regarding the relations existing between
the khan and his sardars. These recommendations were sanctioned by
the Government of India on 19 October, 1871.
During the years 1872 to 1878 several important measures calcu-
lated to improve the administration of the frontier districts were
introduced. To ensure a better understanding between government
i Parl. Papers, 1877, LXIV (C. 1807), 77.
? Idem, 1878, LVII (C. 1898), 68-76.
## p. 454 (#494) ############################################
454
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
officials and the tribesmen, civil officers were obliged to qualify them-
selves by passing an examination in either Pashtu or Baluchi. In the
interests of peace the nawab of Tank, a loyal but incompetent ally,
was relieved of the police administration of his troublesome charge.
To increase its efficiency the militia of the Derajat, a local force acting
as an auxiliary to the Panjab Frontier Force, was reorganised; and,
in 1878, as a result of a Defence Committee which met at Peshawar
in 1877, measures creating a Border Police and Militia were anctioned
for parts of the Kohat and Peshawar districts. This meant that the
procedure adopted at the annexation of the Panjab was reversed, for
the militia now took the place of the military as a first line force.
Lastly, with a view to their becoming industrious agriculturists, settle-
ments or colonies of Afridis, Waziris, Gurchanis, Bhittannis, and
Bugtis were formed in British territory. This has often been put forward
as a solution to the frontier problem, but its success or failure depends
upon the fierceness of the tribe and the distance it is removed from
its original habitat. It has been tried with success in the Yusafzai
country, but this cannot be said of the experiment in so far as the more
turbulent Mahsud is concerned. This was the state of affairs on the
Panjab frontier on the eve of the second Afghan War, in 1878. While
this system of defence was being evolved in the north, great changes
had been taking place on the southern frontier.
Relations between Kalat and the Government of India were regu-
lated by the treaty of 14 May, 1854, which pledged the khan to abstain
from ncgotiations with any other power, without first consulting the
British; to receive British troops in Kalat whenever such a step sl. ould
be thought necessary; to protect merchants passing through his terri-
tories; and to prevent his subjects from harassing the British borders.
In return for tliis he received an annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000. 1 About
the year 1869 it became apparent- that Khudadad Khan, who had
used this subsidy to raise a standing army, was attempting to increase
his authority at the expense of his confederated chiefs; and, it was
obvious that, if British support were withdrawn, Kalat would become
the scene of internecine struggles.
“It is surely time for our governinent", wrote Sandeman in 1869, “to interfere
when we find that the Khan of Khelat's mismanagement of his khanate has led
to the peace and administration of that part of the Punjab border being placed
in much jeopardy; for such truly is the case. ”?
By the end of 1871 the sardars were in open revolt against the khan's
authority, and the anarchy prevailing in Kalat led to raids along the
British borders. The climax was reached in 1873, when Major
Harrison, the British agent, was recalled, and the khan's subsidy
withheld, because he had failed to comply with the terms laid down
in the treaty of 1854. Instead of sanctioning an expedition, the
i Parl. Papers, 1873, L.
? Idem, 1877, LXIV (C. 1807), 6.
## p. 455 (#495) ############################################
SANDEMAN'S POLICY
455
Government of India decided to dispatch Sandeman on a mission of
reconciliation to the khan's territories. It was Sandeman's second
mission, in 1876, that led to the Mastung Agreement and the treaty
of 1876, which marked the death of non-intervention on the southern
frontier. By the Mastung Agreement of July, 1876, the khan and his
Brahui sardars were formally reconciled. The Treaty of Jacobabad,
signed on 8 December of the same year, renewed and : upplemented
the treaty of 1854. In return for an increased subsidy the khan granted
permission for the location of troops in, and the construction of railway
and telegraph lines through, Kalat territory. The importance of the
treaty lies in the fact that it was the foundation of the Baluchistan
Agency, for on 21 February, 1877, Major Sandeman was appointed
agent to the governor-general, with his headquarters at Quetta.
Lord Lytton justified this advance on thoground that it was impossible
to remain inert spectators of the anarchy in Kalat, when the con-
nection between Kalat and Sind was so intimate that any disturbance
in the one was immediately reflected in the other.
Sir Robert Sandeman's tribal policy was one of friendly and con-
ciliatory intervention. Casting all fear on one side, he boldly advanced
into their mountain retreats and made friends with the tribal chiefs
or tumandars. Recognising that the British side of the question was
not the only side, he never condemned the action of a tribe, until he
had fully investigated its grievances.
This had been impossible under
a system of non-intervention which prohibited officers from entering
the independent hills. The weakest part of his system was that it
depended too much upon the personal influence of one man. There
have not been wanting critics who have regarded his system of
granting allowances as blackmail. This charge falls to the ground
when it is remembered that those in receipt of allowances had strenuous
duties to perform in the guarding of trade-routes and passes, and in
the carrying out of jirga decrees. Allowances may be termed black-
mail when they are granted solely to induce the tribesmen to abstain
from raiding. Sandeman never withheld allowances because of
offences committed by individual members of a tribe. He always
demanded that the actual offenders should be brought to justice, that
the guilty alone should be punished. This system was quite successful
amongst Baluch tribes where there was some tribal chief powerful
enough to enforce his authority. Its introduction by Mr R. İ. Bruce,
the Commissioner of the Derajat (1890-6), into Waziristan among
the more democratic Mahsuds, where no such authority existed, ended
in complete failure. Bruce, who had previously served under
Sandeman, hoped that Mahsud maliks, chosen by him, would, in
return for allowances, be able to control the ulus, the name given to
the body of the Mahsud tribe. 2 But Bruce made a fatal mistake. He
| Parl. Papers, 1877 (C. 1808), pp. 255-7, 314-16.
2 Idem, 1902 (C. 1177), pp. 125-7.
## p. 456 (#496) ############################################
456
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
introduced his maliki system without first having occupied a com-
manding and central position in the Mahsud country. Sandeman,
on the contrary, realised that the first essential was to dominate the
Baluch country with troops. The policy of Sir Robert Warburton in
the Khyber was similar to that of Sandeman, in that an attempt was
made to gain the confidence of the surrounding tribes. But, in reality,
the two systems were fundamentally different, for, in the Khyber, the
object aimed at was the control of the pass. To this everything else
was subordinated. It was not considered necessary to extend British
control over the neighbouring tribes, though friendly intercourse was
not forbidden. For this reason, in the Khyber, the British never
interfered with the internal feuds of the Afridis, who were allowed to
wage war, even within sight of the walls of Jamrud, so long as their
struggles did not affect the protection of the pass.
It will be convenient at this stage to summarise the later history of
Baluchistan, for, after 1890, interest chiefly centres in the Pathan
frontier. By the Treaty of Gandammak, May, 1879, Pishin and Sibi
were handed over to the Government of India by Yakub Khan as
“assigned districts”, which meant that any surplus of revenue over
expenditure had to be handed back to the amir. Although this
treaty was abrogated by the massacre of Cavagnari and his escort,
these areas were retained by the British, but were not declared British
territory until 1877, when the agent to the governor-general was
appointed chief commissioner for them. The ten years preceding
Sandeman's death, in 1892, were marked by tremendous adminis-
trative activity. Communications were opened out in every direction,
irrigation schemes were taken in hand, forests were developed, and
arrangements made for the collection of land-revenue. In the adṁinis-
tration of justice the indigenous system of jirgas, or councils of tribal
elders, has been developed under British administration. Local cases
are referred to local jirgas, while more important disputes are placed
before inter-district jirgas, or before the Shahi Jirga, which meets
twice a year, once at Sibi and once at Quetta. The province as now
administered can be divided into British Baluchistan, consisting of
the tracts assigned by the Treaty of Gandammak; agency territories,
which have been acquired by lease or otherwise brought under the
control of the Government of India; and the native states of Kalat and
Las Bela.
Closely interwoven with the local question of tribal control is the
more important problem of imperial defence. From the conquest of
the Panjab, in 1849, frontier policy was in the hands of administrators
of the Lawrence or “non-intervention” school, but the arrival of
Lord Lytton, in 1876, marked the end of “masterly inactivity”. It was
the second Afghan War, 1878–80, and the consequent occupation of
Afghan territory, that impressed upon statesmen the necessity for a
1 Aitchison, Treaties, XI, 346.
## p. 457 (#497) ############################################
THE INDUS LINE
457
scientific frontier. Military strategists became divided into two op-
posing camps, the Forward and the Stationary. Both these terms are
unfortunate in that they can both be subdivided into the extremists
and the moderates. The extreme section of the Forward School did
not know where their advances would stop; the moderates desired
the best possible strategic frontier with the least possible advance. On
the other hand, the extreme advocates of non-intervention would have
held the Indus line; the moderates were inclined to an advance, if it
could have been proved to them that Russia constituted any real
menace.
The essential function of any frontier is that of separation. But a
good frontier, while serving this useful purpose, should at the same
time constitute a line of resistance following, as far as possible, easily
recognisable natural features, and avoiding sharp salients and re-
entrants. If possible, it should also be based upon ethnic considerations.
There are four possible lines of resistance on the Indian borderland:
the river Indus; the old Sikh line, which roughly corresponds to
the administrative boundary; the Durand line, delimited in 1893
and demarcated, as far as was possible, in the succeeding years; and
the so-called scientific frontier stretching from Kabul through Ghazni
to Kandahar. Military experts have waxed eloquent over what they
have considered to be India's best line of defence. One thing however
is certain: they have all erred in regarding it from a purely military
point of view, when the problem should have been examined in all
its aspects, military, political, ethnological, and financial.
Early writers went astray in supposing that the Indus was once the
north-west frontier of India. This is the origin of the “Back to the
Indus" cry. It can be safely asserted that the Indus frontier, in the
literal sense of the term, never existed. The British inherited their
frontier from the Sikhs who never held the river line, but the foothills
towards the independent Pathan country. The greatest exponent of
the Indus boundary was Lord Lawrence, who advocated meeting any
invader in the valley of the Indus, for the longer distance an invading
army had to march through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the
more harassed it would be. This contention is contrary to the opinion
of the greatest military authorities who hold that a river is not a good
line of defence in that it can always be forced by an enterprising
general. The defensive capacity of rivers naturally varies, and depends
very much upon whether the defenders' bank commands the other.
This is not the case with the Indus, where the left bank is flat and is
frequently commanded by the right. Although many of the defects of
the old days have been remedied by improved communications in the
rear, the natural defects still remain. The Indus is continually shifting
its course, and, when in flood, overflows its bank for miles on either
side. Again, the unhealthiness of the valley renders it unsuitable as
1 Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LXXVI (73), 15.
## p. 458 (#498) ############################################
458
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
an area for the concentration of troops. Perhaps the weightiest argu-
ment that can be brought forward against meeting an enemy on the
banks of the Indus is the disastrous moral effect such a course would
have upon the inhabitants of the Indian peninsula.
The present administrative boundary, besides violating ethnic con-
siderations, breaks ncarly every requirement of a good frontier. To
give but one example: Peshawar and Kohat are separated by a sharp
salient of independent territory, known as the Jowaki peninsula,
through which narrow strip of Afridi country runs the road between
these two important frontier outposts. This is a notorious example of
the haphazard way in which the frontier was taken over from the
Sikhs. Both here and in the Gumatti area, farther south, the boundary
line should have been straightened out long ago.
The Durand line, which demarcate, the respective spheres of
influence of the amir and the Government of India over the frontier
tribes, possesses no strategic value at all. The Khost salient between
Kurram and Waziristan is but one of its many strategical imper-
fections. This disposes of three possible lines of resistance. The real
frontier that the British are called upon to defend in India is the
mountain barrier. To do so, it is essential to cross the Indus in order
to prevent the enemy fic. n debouching on to the plains. To defend
a mountain barrier it is necessary to do more than this. The defenders
must be in a position to see what is taking place on the oth'c side.
The greatest advance from the old red line of the maps was the result
of Sandeman's work in Baluchistan. The strategic importance of
Quetta must now be discussed.
The proposal to occupy Quetta dates back to the days of General
John Jacob of Sind fame, who, in 1856, urged Lord Canning to
garrison this important point of vantage, for, as he observed, this
would enable the British to threaten the flank of any army advancing
upon the Khyber. 1 In his letter of 18 October, 1856, Lord Canning
rejected the proposal on the grounds that, surrounded by hostile
tribes and cut off from its true base, the isolated position of the garrison
would be extremely precarious. The next time, in 1866, the proposal
emanated from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Green, the political
superintendent of Upper Sind, but, unfortunately, it had to face the
united opposition of Lord Lawrence and his council. Ten years
passed. The exponents of “masterly inactivity" were no longer pre-
dominant in the viceroy's council-chamber; Khiva had fallen before
Cossack hosts which were drawing nearer and nearer to the gates of
India; and, more dangerous still, the estrangement of the amir Sher
'Ali had brought India and Afghanistan to the brink of war. Reference
has alrcady been made to the occupation of Quetta which served such
a useful purpose during the second Afghan War. During this war the
question of the so-called scientific frontier was broached: should the
1 Views and Opinions of General John Jacob (cd. Pelly), p. 349.
## p. 459 (#499) ############################################
KANDAHAR
459
British hold the Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar line? Some extremists
advocated the retention of all the recent conquests in Afghanistan;
others recommended a complete withdrawal, even to the banks of the
Indus. Amongst the moderates the stumblingblock was the retention
of, or withdrawal from, Kandahar. The question was further com-
plicated by a discussion as to the relative merits and demerits of the
Khyber, Kurram, and Bolan as channels of communication with
Afghanistan.
The retention of Kandahar was advocated on military, political,
and commercial grounds. Situated at the junction of roads leading
tö Kabul and to Herat, Kandahar dominated the whole of southern
Afghanistan. Easily defensible, with a good water supply, its garrison
would not be called upon to endure great hardships. A strongly
fortified Kandahar would not only threaten the flank of any force
advancing by way of Kabul towards the Khyber, but forces advancing
simultaneously from Kabul and Herat would also be isolated. The
majority of minutes written in support of retention entirely ignored
the financial side of the question, and refused to acknowledge that
permanent occupation would entail a drain of money and men. But
would the occupation of Kandahar have been the end of an advance
into Afghanistan? It was predicted that the defence of Kandahar
would necessitate the occupation of Girishk and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, in
which case the British would have been called upon to defend a
frontier as unscientific as the one it was proposed to abandon, for
both ran along the foothills of a wild, mountainous country. Some
even went so far as to assert that the British advance would not cease
until Herat had been reached, for the greatest difficulty confronting
the Forward School would be to know where to stop. Fortunately
the counsels of the moderates prevailed. They realised that the recent
acquisitions in Baluchistan would enable the British to occupy this
position whenever it became necessary, for in their eyes the importance
of Kandahar was a war-time importance only. Furthermore, the
later extension of the railway to New Chaman advanced the British
borders to the Khwaja Amran range, beyond which a broad desert
stretched to the walls of Kandahar. Closely connected with the
Kandahar question was the proposal to occupy the Kabul, Ghazni,
Kandahar line, which was the outcome of a desire to discover the best
possible line of defence against invasion from the direction of Central
Asia. It was argued, that, if this line were connected with the main
Indian railway system, troops could be rapidly concentrated on either
flank. Neither the right flank nor the left could be turned, for the
northern was protected by an almost impenetrable maze of moun-
tains, the southern by an impassable desert. The retirement already
· Davies, “An Imperial Problem”, Army Quarterly, October, 1927, pp. 28-41; see also
Parl. Papers, 1881, Lxx, 67.
> Parl. Papers, 1881, Lxx (C. 2776), 91.
## p. 460 (#500) ############################################
460 THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843–1918
a
referred to necessitated the abandonment of this frontier. The British
scheme of defence against Russia was settled not by military strate-
gists, but by diplomatists. The steady advance of Russia towards the
northern frontiers of Afghanistan brought about a compromise
between the Forward and Stationary Schools, and it was decided to
build up a strong, friendly, united Afghanistan to serve as a buffer
state. By means of an annual subsidy, together with gifts of arms and
ammunition, an attempt was made to form a closer and more intimate
alliance with the amir. At the same time the frontiers of Afghanistan
were strictly defined by international agreement; and, as long as
British control of Afghan foreign affairs continued, any violation of
the amir's northern frontier by Russia would have been tantamount
to a declaration of war.
This settlement of the imperial problem by no means settled the
local problem of tribal control. The causes of unrest on the Indian
borderland are geographical, economic, religious and political.
Certain factors, such as the geographical and economic, have been
operative from the dawn of history: others, such as the arms' traffic,
are of more recent origin. As long as hungry tribesmen inhabit barren
and almost waterless hills, which command open and fertile plains,
so long will they resort to plundering incursions in order to obtain
the necessaries of life. The rich daman (plain) of Dera Ismail Khan is
a case in point. The greater part of. Waziristan is a region of stony
nullahs and barren raghzas (plateaux), with only occasional stretches
of cultivated land in the warmer valleys. In close proximity lie the
fertile plains of the Derajat, while to the south runs the famous
Powindah caravan route from Ghazni and the bazaars of Central
Asia. Thus the plundering of caravans and the raiding of the daman
have been forced upon the Mahsud by his environment. In the cold
weather, from November to April, the tribesmen enter British India
to engage in agricultural labour and for the purpose of trade. In
April they receive their allowances, after which they return to their
hills. For this reason, “the political barometer of the North-West
Frontier is always more nearly at 'fair' in April than at any other
season of the year". 1 Therefore, the hot season, when no hostages
.
remain in British territory, is the Pathans' opportunity.
Although it is often stated that the economic factor is at the root of
almost every frontier disturbance, a close study of the problem should
convince anyone that political propaganda, especially from 1890
onwards, has been the most potent cause of unrest. It has been Afghan
intrigues, either instigated directly from Kabul with the full cognizance
of the amir, or carried on by his local officials, which have from time
to time incited the tribes to rebel against the British raj. The colony
of Hindustani fanatics, which for years disturbed the peace of the
Hazara border and which was reinforced by a steady stream of
i Secret Border Report, 1917-18, p. 1.
## p. 461 (#501) ############################################
THE FORWARD POLICY
461
>
recruits from Bengal and other parts of India, is a notorious example
of anti-British intrigues originating in British India.
Considerable unrest has also been produced by the practice of
dealing with the tribes through arbabs, or Pathan “middlemen". This
system, the adoption of which was to a certain extent inevitable in the
early days of British rule, when officers were ignorant of the language
and customs of the tribes, was one of the evils inherited from the Sikhs.
In the year 1877 a raid, committed by Bunerwals on the Yusafzai
border, was traced to the direct instigation of Ajab Khan, a "middle-
man” and leading khan of the Peshawar district. One of the chief
causes of trouble on the Kohat borders before the Miranzai expedi-
tions of 1891 was that a local “middleman”, the khan of Hangu, had
a
stirred up discontent amongst the very tribes for whose peaceful
conduct he was responsible. 1
Throughout the 'nineties of the last century, especially from 1895
onwards, the frontier districts were abnormally disturbed. There were
two main reasons for this: the forward policy pursued under Lord
Lansdowne and Lord Elgin, and the intrigues of the amir of Afghani-
stan. By the year 1889 Sandeman had extended British control over
the Bori and Zhob valleys, to the south of the Gumal pass. The occu-
pation of Zhob was of paramount importance from a military,
political, and commercial standpoint. Not only did it shorten the
British line of defence and prevent raiding gangs from escaping into
Afghanistan, but it also served as a protection for the Gumal trade-
route. In the year 1890 the Gumal river, from Domandi to its junction
with the Zhob stream, was declared the boundary between Baluchistan
and the Panjab frontier zone.
The opening years of the ’nineties witnessed punitive expeditions
against the Shiranis inhabiting the slopes of the Takht-i-Sulaiman;
the Orakzai clans in the neighbourhood of the Samana range; the
Isazai tribes of the ill-omened Black Mountain; and the petty chiefs,
or thums, of Hunza and Nagar. Far more important than these
petty wars was the peaceful acquisition of the Kurram valley, which
was taken over, in 1892, at the request of its Turi inhabitants. This
active policy along the entire length of the British border, especially
its later developments, not only alarmed the tribesmen whose in-
dependence has ever been their proudest boast, but it also thoroughly
alarmed the amir, Abd-ur-rahman Khan, with the result that, between
1890 and 1898, Anglo-Afghan relations were so strained, that on
several occasions war seemed imminent. When it is realised that the
inhabitants of the frontier hills, with rare exceptions, are orthodox
Muhammadans of the Sunni sect, and are, in many cases, of the same
racial stock as the people of south-eastern Afghanistan, it becomes
· Parl. Papers, 1890-1, LIX (C. 6526), 8-9.
: Mason, Expedition against Isazai clans ; Parl. Papers, 1890-1, LIX (C. 6526), pt I.
• Durand, The Making of a Frontier; Parl. Papers, 1892, Lvin (C. 6621).
## p. 462 (#502) ############################################
462
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
>
apparent that the amir has been able to show his displeasure by
exploiting the marauding proclivities of these turbulent tribesmen.
For this reason, it was fortunate for the British during the Mutiny
that diplomatic negotiations had resulted in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty
of 1855 and the Agreement of January, 1857. The outbreak of war
with Afghanistan in 1878 was the signal for increased disturbances
throughout the tribal zone. The Hazara border was in a perpetual
ferment; the Khyber was constantly raided by Zakka Khels and
Mohmands; Zaimushts harassed the Kohat line of communications;
and Mahsuds from the heart of Waziristan raided and laid waste the
country in the vicinity of Tank.
For some time before the dispatch of the Durand Mission to Kabul,
in 1893, it had been rumoured abroad that the British were desirous
of a more exact delimitation of the Indo-Afghan frontier. This know-
ledge may have led to the increase of the amir's intrigues in Zhob and
Waziristan. It undoubtedly prompted Abd-ur-rahman Khan to write
a letter to the viceroy, in which he warned Lord Lansdowne of the
results of a more forward policy.
“If you should cut them out of my dominions”, he wrote, “they will neither
be of any use to you nor to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other
trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your
government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a
strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India,
these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies. . . . In your cutting away from me
these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will
injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my
weakness is injurious for your government. ""
The Durand Agreement of 1893 resulted in the delimitation of a
boundary, afterwards known as the Durand line, across which neither
the amir nor the Government of India was to interfere in any way.
The importance of this agreement has been somewhat overrated. It
is true that by putting an end to the existing uncertainty the demarca-
tion of this boundary should have considerably facilitated frontier
administration, but frontier history, since 1893, shows that this agree-
ment has not only increased the responsibilities of the Government of
India, but has also increased the chances of collision with the tribes
and of war with the amir. The new boundary line was not based upon
sound topographical data, for, during the process of demarcation, it
was discovered that certain places, marked on the Durand map, did
not exist on the actual ground. Many ethnic absurdities were per-
petrated, such as the handing over to the amir of the Birmal tract of
Waziristan, peopled by Darwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom
were included within the British sphere of influence. The worst
blunder of all was the arrangement by which the boundary cut the
Mohmand tribal area into two separate parts. It seems certain that
i Abd-ur-rahman, Autobiography, II, 158.
## p. 463 (#503) ############################################
CHITRAL
463
this could not have been a tripartite agreement, for there is no evidence
that the tribesmen were consulted before 1893. To give but one
example: it was not until the year 1896 that the Halimzai, Kamali,
Dawezai, Utmanzai, and Tarakzai Mohmands, afterwards known as
the eastern or “assured” clans, accepted the political control of the
Government of India. " In all probability the political issues at stake
occasioned this sacrifice of ethnological requirements. If the amir had
not been promised the Birmal tract, it is quite likely that he would
have refused his consent to the inclusion of Wana within the British
sphere of influence. In the light of subsequent events it is difficult to
understand the reasons which prompted the amir to sign this agree-
ment. It may have been that the increase of his subsidy to eighteen
lakhs of rupees, and the recognition of his right to import munitions
of war, bribed him into acquiescence.
While these negotiations were taking place Chitral became the
scene of fratricidal conflicts. On his death, in 1892, . Aman-ul-mulk,
the Mehtar of Chitral, had been succeeded by one of his sons, Afzal-
ul-mulk, who, after a short reign of two months and seven days, was
slain by his uncle, Sher Afzal, who had been allowed to escape from
Kabul where he had been living as a pensioner of the amir. Sher
Afzal held the reins of government until he was ousted from his
position by his nephew, Nizam-ul-mulk, who was recognised by the
Government of India. It is significant that Sher Afzal fled to the camp
of the Afghan commander-in-chief at Asmar. In answer to the new
Mehtar's request, a mission under Dr Robertson was dispatched to
Chitral. Although Robertson advocated the retention of British
troops in Chitral and Yassin, Lord Lansdowne, towards the end of
1893, issued instructions for the withdrawal of the political officer
from Chitral, if no further complications occurred. Two factors were
instrumental in reversing this decision. It was considered inexpedient
to withdraw so long as the Pamir boundary dispute with Russia
afforded an excuse for aggressive action from that direction. It was
further feared that, owing to the hostile attitude of Umra Khan of
Jandol, on the southern borders of Chitral, withdrawal would be
followed by a period of anarchy.
