No More Learning

To replace
* Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, quoted in India's Contribution to the Great War, pp. 99–102.


## p. 480 (#520) ############################################

480
INDIA AND THE WAR
them twenty-nine territorial field batteries and thirty-five territorial
battalions were sent from England. For India, the exchange was
highly unprofitable, and, indeed, involved considerable risk: since the
new arrivals were unfit for employment either upon the frontier or
in Mesopotamia until they had been properly armed, duly equipped,
and completely trained. The difficulty of these tasks was increased by
the fact that, within a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, India
had supplied England with 70,000,000 rounds of small arm ammu-
nition, 60,000 rifles of the latest type, and more than 550 guns.
The effort made by the administration in the early months of the
war showed no signs of diminishing. By the early spring of 1915, India
had sent overseas two Indian army corps, seven infantry brigades,
two cavalry divisions, two cavalry brigades, and a mixed force in-
cluding three infantry battalions: together with the necessary acces-
sories of corps, divisional, attached troops, administrative services and
reinforcements. Moreover, as the struggle gradually assumed a
world-wide character, the area of operations constantly extended.
When at length peace came, Indian soldiers had fought in France,
Belgium, Gallipoli, Salonika, Palestine, Egypt, the Sudan, Meso-
potamia, Aden, Somaliland, the Cameroons, East Africa, North-West
Persia, Kurdistan, South Persia, Trans-Caspia, and North China,
besides the North-West and North-East frontiers of India.
It was hardly to be expected that the Government of India, despite
the best will in the world, would rise at once to the task of discharging
in an adequate manner the obligations so suddenly laid upon it. The
difficulties it encountered were beyond measure enhanced by its own
peculiar characteristics. Of this government it has been remarked by
a cynic that its guiding principle would seem to consist in entrusting
three men's work to a single individual. In times of peace, such an
arrangement is only possible because the backbone of the adminis-
tration is composed of picked men, thoroughly trained in their duties.
But in the early days of the war, such a condition no longer obtained.
Many of the best officials managed, on one pretext or another, to
place themselves “nearer the fighting”: while for those who remained,
the tasks now for the first time laid upon them constituted a burden
as heavy as it was unfamiliar. After the commencement of the Meso-
potamia campaign, India's needs became urgent. The results of her
sacrifices at the beginning of the war were soon reaped in disastrous
fashion. Her best troops were not available: her supplies were de-
pleted. Owing to shortage of transport, essential munitions were
unobtainable. As a natural result, while the civil machinery managed
somehow to “carry on”, the military machinery came perilously near
a break-down. The management of the Mesopotamia campaign
became an ugly scandal: official enquiry serving only to confirm some
of the worst rumours. Indeed it was painfully obvious to all that the
“Frontier War” standard of military preparedness, when exposed to


## p. 481 (#521) ############################################

RECRUITMENT
481
a strain it was never designed to endure, had involved India in a
confusion almost as disastrous as any that might have arisen from
sheer unreadiness. From the standpoint of the whole commonwealth,
it is true, the importance of India's contribution during the early days
of the war is difficult to exaggerate: but it was made at a cost to herself
which entailed a heavy loss of lives, of reputation, and of efficiency.
Fortunately, by the time the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission
was published, the Indian headquarters staff had been strengthened,
and the administrative machinery had adapted itself to new re-
quirements. Sir Stanley Maude's brilliant campaign, culminating in
the capture of Baghdad, and the crushing of the Turkish Army in
Iraq, rehabilitated the reputation of India in the eyes of the world.
One by one the pressing problems which beset the authorities were
faced and overcome: and in a comparatively short space of time, the
machinery of war-time administration was running with a smoothness
reminiscent of the days of peace.
The first, and most obvious, of these problems was the provision of
the personnel required for the various expeditionary forces overseas.
At the outbreak of the war, there were in India some 80,000 British
officers and men, and some 230,000 Indian ranks, combatant and
non-combatant. During the course of hostilities, government re-
cruited, on a voluntary basis, more than 800,000 combatants and over
400,000 non-combatants, giving a grand total of some 1,300,000 men.
Prior to the war, the normal rate of recruitment had been about
15,000 nien per annum. In the year ending May, 1917, thanks to the
efforts of the administration, this figure had risen to 121,000: and in
the year ending May, 1918, it stood at 300,000. From that time
forward, until the end of the war, it was immensely stimulated by
the call for further efforts, as will subsequently be related. Certain
provinces and certain communities distinguished themselves from
the first. The Panjab, under the energetic guidance of Sir Michael
O'Dwyer, furnished 110,000 fighting men in the first two years
of the war. Between April, 1917, and March, 1918, it further
distinguished itself by raising 114,000 men. Up to the date of the
armistice the total recruitment, combatant and non-combatant, rose
nearly to half a million. The United Provinces, after 1916, redoubled
its efforts, and in the last two years of the struggle, recruited 140,000
men for the fighting services. In the matter of non-combatant
recruiting, the United Provinces led the way, providing more than
200,000 men between April, 1917, and November, 1918. Among the
particular communities, Panjabi Mussulmans and Sikhs stood out
pre-eminent: the former with 136,000 fighting men: the latter with
88,000-an immensely preponderating proportion of their eligible
man-power. The Indian states, considering their comparatively small
population, bore their share well. Kashmir sent nearly 5000 com-
1 India's Contribution to the Great War, p. 79.
31
CHIVI


## p. 482 (#522) ############################################

482
INDIA AND THE WAR
batants to serve overseas: Patiala sent 2700: Gwalior 2600; Bharatpur
1600; Alwar 1500; Mysore 1400; Jodhpur 1300; Jaipur 1200 and
Bikaner 1100. Other states sent according to their resources.
Another, and more difficult, aspect of the problem of man-power
was the provision of British officers for Indian units. The small British
community in India, engaged as it was in government service or in
industries of national importance, offered a very limited scope for
recruitment. At the same time, the pre-war organisation of the army
in India, with its “Frontier Campaign” standard, had made no
provision for such a reserve of officers as might have sufficed to
replace casualties on a large scale and to fill the junior commissioned
ranks of newly raised units. The first step was to augment the
Indian Army reserve. The English commercial community made
great sacrifices in order to relieve every eligible man. Cadet colleges
were opened at Quetta and Wellington: and a large number of officers
were transferred, by arrangement with the War Office, from the
special reserve or the territorial force, to the Indian Army. Nearly
a thousand temporary commissions were given to men in the ranks
of British units: the public services were depleted of all their reserves
in order that some five hundred officials might join the officers' schools
of instruction now established at Ambala, Bangalore and Nasik. The
result of the efforts of the authorities in this direction is summed up in
the statement that whereas the pre-war establishment of British
officers of the Indian Army stood at 2586, the total number of British
officers sent overseas from India up to 31 October, 1918, amounted
to no less than 23,040.
The provision of specialist personnel was also successfully accom-
plished. At the outbreak of the war, there were fewer than 300 officers
of the Indian Medical Service immediately available in military
employ. But by the surrender of officers from civil employ and the
grant of temporary commissions to private practitioners, a force of
nearly 1400 qualified medical men became available. The establish-
ment of the Indian Medical Department, which stood at 646 before
the war, was doubled. In all, 1069 officers of the Indian Medical
Service, 360 of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 1200 nursing sisters,
2142 assistant and sub-assistant surgeons, 979 British other ranks,
2674 Indian other ranks, and 26,179 followers were sent to the various
theatres of war. Personnel for the various technical directorates over-
seas presented a difficult problem. At first, since railway training was
in great demand, recruitment was done through the agency of the
Railway Board. Late", when operations developed, the need arose
for skilled staff in connection with other branches: such as military
works, inland water transport, irrigation, ordnance labour, and other
services. Training schools were accordingly started for railwaymen,
mechanical transport personnel, and the like: with the result that
in the course of the war years, some 150,000 operatives, skilled and


## p. 483 (#523) ############################################

THE MUNITIONS BOARD
483
unskilled were sent overseas. In addition India provided a large
number of labour, porter, and syce corps for service in France and
Mesopotamia: supply and transport personnel, veterinary personnel,
and very considerable quantities of horses, mules, camels, draught
bullocks and dairy cattle.
In the matter of material, India's contribution to the allied cause
was at least as important as her effort in man-power. From the
first she had a great and growing task to perform in equipping her
armies overseas, while at the same time placing her immense wealth
of raw material at the service of the empire. Her difficulties were
increased by the rudimentary condition of her industrial develop-
ment. At the moment when her sea communications were seriously
threatened, she could not produce more than a small fraction of the
articles essential for the maintenance of ordinary civilised activities.
She made no nails, screws, steel springs, iron chains, wire ropes, steel
,
plates, machine tools, or internal combustion engines. The munition-
making resources of the country were first co-ordinated by the Rail-
way Board. Excellent work was done; but as the magnitude of the
task became more apparent, it was plain that a special organisation
was needed to prevent overlapping purchase, to restrict to the mini-
mum all demands upon the United Kingdom, and to develop local
industries and manufactures. The difficulties in the way were great,
and to the genius of Sir Thomas Holland is due the eventual triumph
over them. The Indian Munitions Board, which was set up in 1917,
gathered together the existing fragments of purchasing departments,
and welded them into an organised machine for regulating con-
tracts and amalgamating demands. Local resources were utilised and
developed. Great Britain and America were relieved of a heavy
burden as India became an adequate base of supply for Mesopotamia
and other theatres of war. The flourishing cotton and jute industries
were placed at the service of the allies; the infant iron and steel
industry proved remarkably useful. The wolfram mines of Burma were
developed until they produced one-third of the world's output; the
Indian deposits of manganese ore became the principal source of
supply to the European allies. Mica, saltpetre, rubber, skins, petro-
leum, tea—the list of supplies forthcoming for the needs of the empire
could be lengthened almost indefinitely. In foodstuffs also, India's
services, particularly to Great Britain, were remarkable, for she was
able to place at the disposal of the Royal Commission on Wheat
Supplies a total of some 5,000,000 tons. 1
From the financial standpoint, the war effort of India is well
worthy of commemoration. The country is poor, there are rigid limits
to her taxable capacity. Despite these two handicaps, the monetary
assistance she rendered to the allied cause was by no means incon-
siderable. In the first place must be counted her expenditure upon
1 India in 1917–18.
31-2


## p. 484 (#524) ############################################

484
INDIA AND THE WAR
military services. The cost of expeditions sent outside India does not
normally fall upon the Indian exchequer, but in compliance with her
own request, she paid the normal cost of maintaining the troops no
longer employed within her borders. This cost varied between
£20,000,000 and £30,000,000 per annum, at a time when India's
central revenues were less than £100,000,000. Further, in September,
1918, the imperial legislative council voted that India should assume,
as from the previous April, the cost of an additional 200,000 men, and
from the succeeding April, a further 100,000. The cessation of hos-
tilities prevented the scheme from fully developing, but even in its
elementary stage it cost the country another £12,000,000. There
were also financial contributions of a more direct character. India
made a free gift of £100,000,000 to the British Government--a sum
which was equivalent to more than a year's income, which added
30 per cent. to her national debt. The greater part of this amount was
raised by two war loans which together aggregated nearly £75,000,000
-an immense sum in view of the fact that the largest loan ever raised
by an Indian Government before the war realised only £3,000,000.
In addition to these services, India found herself obliged to act as
banker for Great Britain in purchasing the enormous quantities of
foodstuffs and munitions which were factors so essential for the
prosecution of the war. Payment for these commodities was, it is true,
made in London, but owing to the difficulty of transferring funds,
India had to find the money in the first instance. As a result, she
became involved in currency difficulties of the most serious nature,
which may claim to be ranked among her sacrifices in the cause of
victory. In the years 1917 and 1918, her whole currency system was
threatened with inconvertibility, the Government of India being com-
pelled to purchase silver from every available quarter—including the
United States treasury--for the coining of 700,000,000 rupees. Lastly,
mention must be made of generous contributions towards war
charities, which, among other causes, bore the burden of Red Cross
work. The “Our Day” fund rose to £800,000, the “Imperial Indian
Relief” fund to £1,000,000. The various provincial war funds realised
large amounts, which were expended upon comforts for the troops
and their dependents. " Here, as in other directions, the great princes
of India played a worthy part. The bare list of their donations fills
200 printed pages. In money, in cars, and in supplies, the aggregate
value of these gifts totals many millions. But quite beyond all value
is the imagination and the good will which these gifts display. The
princes placed their palaces at the disposal of the wives and children
of British officers, they entertained whole armies of troops, they
equipped and maintained hospital ships, they presented their most
magnificent vehicles as ambulances, they subscribed colossal sums to
1 India in 1917-18.


## p. 485 (#525) ############################################

CENTRAL ASIA
485
the war loan, and in many cases gave the scrip to the government or
arranged for its cancellation.
It is only fair to recall at this time the manifold anxieties of the
authorities. The country remained quiet: but the occurrence of revo-
lutionary outbreaks was a contingency which government did not
omit from its calculations. There was a small anarchist element among
the Sikhs, which came into prominence with the Ghadr conspiracy.
In Bengal, the Nihilists, though few in numbers, were extremely active
and formidable. In 1915-16 there were sixty-four outrages in this
part of India, including the murder of eight police officers. There
were also serious movements, directed from beyond the frontier,
which had as their object the undermining of the loyalty of the
Muhammadan community, already uneasy from the alliance of
Turkey with the Central Powers. All possible precautionary measures
were taken. The Defence of India Act invested the executive with
wide discretionary authority. The establishment of the Indian defence
force mobilised the entire British and Anglo-Indian community for
the preservation of internal security.
All these anxieties were enhanced by the fact that the peace of the
frontier itself hung upon a hair. Much assistance was derived from
the friendly attitude of Amir Habib-ullah of Afghanistan, who, despite
all difficulties and dangers, kept his turbulent people to strict neu-
trality and threw the whole of his great influence into the task of
tranquillising the border. He displayed remarkable dexterity in
countering German and Turkish intrigues with the militant party
among his subjects, while at the same time curbing the fanaticism of
the mullahs. Even so, there was more or less serious trouble with the
Mohmands and the Marris: while in 1917 the persistent hostility of
the Mahsuds necessitated the dispatch of a regular expeditionary
force into Waziristan. The border was still unquiet when the collapse
of Russia enabled the Central Powers to carry their aggressive designs
to the very gates of India. German troops overran a large part of
South Russia, and crossed into the Caucasus, while Turkish forces
invaded Persia. In the last country, precautions had already been
taken to offset any damage that might ensue from the failure of the
administration to resist attack or to maintain order. Cordons of troops
had been established along the boundaries of Eastern and Western
Persia; the Nushki railway was extended, and the approaches to India
generally safeguarded as much as possible. Baku was also temporarily
occupied in order to block the enemy line of advance.
The necessity of meeting a probable German diversion in the
direction of India was the signal for a redoubling of war effort
throughout the whole country. Since the first great outburst of en-
thusiasm, of which the government made so little use, the bulk of
Indian opinion had relapsed into comparative apathy. Early in 1918,
in response to appeals from the prime minister, government for the


## p. 486 (#526) ############################################

486
INDIA AND THE WAR
first time seriously endeavoured to give a lead to the people. Towards
the end of April, a war conference was held at Delhi, attended by
ruling princes, political leaders, and representatives of the central and
local governments. As a result, all parties agreed to sink their political
differences and to co-operate wholeheartedly in the increased effort
necessitated by the new danger. Central organisations for controlling
recruiting, communications, foodstuffs, voluntary service and war
publicity, were either established for the first time or galvanised into
new life. The result was immediate. The resources of the country were
for the remaining months of the war utilised as never before; and it is
no exaggeration to say that when the armistice was declared, India
was at the climax of her effort. The significance of the struggle had
been brought home in a somewhat highly coloured form even to the
masses: recruiting was at its maximum, and the possibility of further
sacrifices was clearly envisaged. Accordingly, the country as a whole
having just commenced to throw her real strength into the scale, and
being newly aroused to the supreme importance of victory, received
the news with less relief than expectancy. The spontaneous rejoicings
which broke out were not so much a sign that India was relieved from
apprehension, as a symptom that she expected the immediate dawn
of the Golden Age which she had been newly taught to associate with
the victory of the allies. Whence arose many troubles which are
1
discussed in another section of this volume.
So much for the obvious, the external, aspects of India in war time.
But what were the real currents of opinion which flowed beneath the
calm impenetrability of her people? To the careful observer, a dis-
tinct sequence of emotion is perceptible, and this we shall endeavour,
in however summary and inadequate a fashion, to trace.
At the time when war broke out, the educated classes of India were
uneasy. They had realised that from their own standpoint the Morley-
Minto constitution was unsatisfactory. It gave them no power to
achieve the various measures upon which they had set their heart-
the Indianisation of the higher administrative offices: an accelerated
educational programme, some degree of financial control, and co-
operation in national defence. It is true that these classes were small
in comparison with the mass of their fellow. countrymen. But they were
leaders, and their influence counted for much. They were growing
impatient. In certain parts of India, anarchism gained ground. There
is every reason to believe that if the year 1914 had pursued its antici-
pated course, an intense campaign of political agitation for constitu-
tional progress would have occurred. Now when war broke out, much
of this pent-up energy found release in the channels of loyal enthusiasm.
Some leaders there were who adopted the not unnatural course of
attempting to bargain with authorities; such and such constitutional
advance to be the price of India's assistance. But they found no
support with their fellows, and were compelled to rehabilitate them-
1 India in 1917-18; India in 1919.


## p. 487 (#527) ############################################

POLITICAL EFFECTS
487
selves as best they could. In effect, it is entirely impossible to doubt
that India's war enthusiasm was wholly disinterested and entirely
genuine. In this fact, it may be hoped, historians will find excuse for
the exaggerated eulogies of India in which British statesmen so
lavishly indulged in the early days of the war. These solemn pledges
of the empire's gratitude surprised India. Her educated classes,
awaking to the fact that the doings of their countrymen had become
a "front page feature" of the English press, leaped to the conclusion
that the British cabinet was about to give some tangible expression
to its gratitude. But as the months drew on, and the prosecution of
the war engrossed all the efforts of government both in England and
in India, disillusionment set in. Little had been done to guide and
enlist the early war enthusiasm, and the educated classes turned back
to politics. Rumours of imperial federation were in the air; some
readjustment of relations between the mother country and the
dominions seemed already in progress. What would India's place
be in the new scheme? Would she become an equal member of the
commonwealth, or would the dominions, whose treatment of Indian
settlers had inflicted such a blow upon her national pride, hence-
forward share in controlling her destinies? Moreover, as the war
proceeded, and the defence of democratic ideals became an acknow-
ledged plank in the allied platform, the scope of Indian Nationalist
ambitions became imperceptibly enlarged. Was a struggle waged on
behalf of the weak against the strong, on behalf of the peaceful against
the aggressive, on behalf of the oppressed against the oppressors, to
leave the political status of India unaffected? The heady doctrine
of self-determination, with all the catchwords of modern democracy,
swept India like a flame. The educated classes determined to assert
their right to control their own destinies. They turned eagerly to the
home rule movements launched by such leaders as Mrs Besant and
the late Bal Gangadhan Tilak. Even educated Islam, which had for
so long held itself aloof, joined the congress fold on the assurance of
adequate safeguards for the interests of the Muhammadan community.
A scheme of constitutional reform was hastily adumbrated, and as
hastily accepted as the minimum of India's demand. A whirlwind
campaign of political agitation was launched in its support. Govern-
ment unwittingly added fuel to the flames by arresting and interning
Mrs Besant, whose activities were considered inconvenient. This
'action united in support of the home rule movement many Indians
who had previously held aloof from it. The pressure upon the adminis-
tration became overwhelming, and was only relieved by a dramatic
announcement. The home government at length, amidst all the
preoccupations of the war, turned their attention to Indian affairs.
Mr E. S. Montagu, who had succeeded Mr Austen Chamberlain as
secretary of state, declared on August 20, 1917, that the policy of His
Majesty's Government was the increasing association of Indians in
1 India in 1917–18.


## p. 488 (#528) ############################################

488
INDIA AND THE WAR
every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of
self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of
responsiblegovernmentin India as anintegral partofthe British Empire.
The effect of this announcement was startling. In the first place
it dramatically confirmed the hopes of those who aspired for India's
equality with the self-governing dominions, thus suddenly enlarging
the scope of “legitimate” aspirations. But in the second place it
threw the apple of discord into the Nationalist camp. The moderate
party, after being temporarily submerged beneath the domination of
the left wing, found in the declaration a long-sought battle-cry. The
extremists in their turn were heartened by what they regarded as
merely the firstfruits of intensive agitation, and prepared to exploit
their control over the impressionable youth of the educated classes.
Thirdly, the Muhammadan community, already disquieted by the
misfortunes of Turkey, saw in the declaration at once a triumph of
Hindu ideals, and a threat to themselves. The “political" section lost
ground; communal tension grew, and a serious breach between
Hindus and Muslims shortly developed. The visit of the secretary of
state to India, which called forth a flood of separate memorials and
representations, increased the sectional spirit already prevailing.
In the midst of all these currents and cross-currents came the war
crisis of 1918. For the moment discord ceased, and the old unanimity
of feeling was in some measure restored. But long before the dissen-
sions really healed, the armistice intervened. Peace found India
united indeed, so far as the war effort was concerned, but divided on
every other ground, and fiercely discussing the merits and demerits
of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The terrible influenza epidemic,
which accounted for more victims in India alone than had perished
in four years of world war, cast a sombre shadow over the scene of
victory. Economic dislocation, now become serious, was causing deep
distress to the masses. The educated classes were but little happier.
Their political horizon had, indeed, enlarged, but they felt themselves
disappointed of their hopes. They were distracted by conflicting pro-
grammes, perplexed by divergent ideals.
Their country had been set
upon the path of dominion status; their representatives had found
admission to the innermost councils of the empire in the war cabinet
and the imperial conference. The old stigma upon Indian military
prowess had been removed by admitting Indian gentlemen to king's
commissions in the army. A territorial force and a university training
corps were being organised to give the lie to the charge that England
had “disarmed and emasculated ” India. Yet the millennium had not
come to pass. The alien was still master in their country. What was
left to them but agitation, agitation and yet more agitation?
As succeeding years were to prove only too plainly, the closing
scenes of the world war brought to India, despite all her sacrifices in
the cause of victory, not peace, but a sword.


## p. 489 (#529) ############################################

CHAPTER XXVII
THE RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA WITH THE INDIAN STATES, 1858-1918
The relations of the Government of India with the Indian states
offer questions of extraordinary difficulty for the historian, especially
in the period covered by the present chapter. The position at the
outset in 1858 is full of ambiguities, the available information is most
imperfect, and the existing treatises either confuse arguments drawn
from treaty-rights with others drawn from moral considerations or
attempt to show that the relations ought to have been international
in character as between independent European states. Lee-Warner's
well-known volume, The Native States of India, an admirable exposition
of the government's standpoint about 1900, is an outstanding example
of the first; and Nicholson's Scraps of Paper, a characteristic specimen
of the second. Both are concerned rather to prove a case than to lay
bare and analyse the facts.
Indeed from the beginning the facts are strangely elusive. In what
did the paramountcy of the Company consist and what were its
foundations? The enquirer of 1858 would have found that within
seven-eighths of the 600 odd states with which the Company's govern-
ment was in actual or potential contact, its relations were not and had
never been defined. All these states were tiny and many of them
insignificant. No treaty or agreement had ever been necessary. They
lay under the shadow of their great neighbour, and carried out such
orders as they might receive from it. Nor did their existence represent
any new phenomenon in Indian politics. Every Indian conqueror
had found himself embarrassed by the difficulties of administering the
great extent of India, and had always left more or less undisturbed
great numbers of local chiefs who thus fell into dependence without
ever undergoing the rigours of conquest. Their position had always
depended on the attitude and might of the dominant power; and
what they had been under the Moghul emperor they continued to be
under the East India Company.
With the remaining eighth the Company's relations had once been
defined by a series of treaties. The contents of these documents varied
a
greatly. One class—the treaties with Baroda, with Mysore, with Oudh
-gave the Company wide powers of interference in the internal
affairs of the state, besides transferring to the Company the control
of external relations. Since the occasions of interference would
assuredly be selected by the Company and not by the state, such


## p. 490 (#530) ############################################

490 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
princes were undoubtedly dependent. With a second class—the
Rajput states, for example-treaties had been made vesting in the
Company the whole control of external relations, entitling it to de-
mand in he event of war the whole resources of the states, but stipu-
lating at the same time that the princes should be absolute rulers
within their own territories. Chiefs so bound clearly enjoyed nothing
like international status, but equally clearly retained wide sovereign
powers which according to the letter of the treaty they could exercise
as they pleased. A third class is illustrated by the Nizam of Hydera-
bad, who originally entered into treaties with the Company on at
least equal terms. At the close of the century, however, he was reduced
by his inferiority of power, especially as compared with his Maratha
neighbours, to accept the Company's military protection, in return
for which he surrendered control of his foreign policy, and engaged if
necessary to assist the Company with a specific (not unlimited) force.
No clause in his treaties deals with the matter of his internal au-
thority, which when the earlier treaties were concluded was regarded
as unquestionable.
These treaties all have one peculiarity
which marks them out from
most of the documents familiar to the European diplomatist. Most
European treaties relate to states not indeed of equal power, but of
equal rank. They rarely cede any element of sovereignty. Territory
may be neutralised and guaranteed, a succession may be guaranteed,
even in the case of Greece a constitution may be guaranteed. But
even in the last case which went near in principle to the Indian
treaties, the sovereignty of the guaranteed constitution remained un-
impaired. The nearest European parallel seems to be offered by the
treaties which Prussia concluded with the other German states after
defeating Austria in 1866. But time was not given to develop these
agreements as time developed Indian agreements. But no prince can
accept a foreign garrison, which remains under the orders of a foreign
state and constitutes the only reliable military force in his dominions
(and this was the case with the Nizam), without losing a great deal
more than the control of his foreign policy. Whatever his treaties may
declare, he has ceased to be master in his own house, and the effects
of such agreements must in fact always prove extensive, however
moderate their actual terms may be, for the prince's sole remedy is to
denounce his treaties, engage in a desperate war, and place himself
yet more completely at the mercy of the other party than he was
before. What was true of the Nizam was a fortiori true of the other
princes who passed more formally under the Company's tutelage. In
fact, while European treaties have normally constituted a settlement
of past questions, the Indian treaties much more often have formed
a point of departure; the first have generally recognised and defined
existing conditions, while the second have by their very signature
created a new situation. In form the relations between the Company


## p. 491 (#531) ############################################

THE COMPANY'S PARAMOUNTCY
491
9
and the Indian states seem to follow the international practice of
Europe; but in substance they follow much more closely the lines of
a constitutional development. This confusion of form and substance,
of theory and practice, has produced many of the uncertainties and
difficulties with which the study of the subject is beset. Again, the
language of the treaties is often inconsistent. The Gaikwar's treaty of
1817, regarding an exchange of territory with the Company, speaks
of the transfer “in sovereignty”. One might suppose from this that
the Gaikwar enjoyed sovereign status in the Company's eyes. A letter
from the governor of Bombay in 1841, even explicitly acknowledges
the Gaikwar to be "sole sovereign” of his territories. But this view is
scarcely reconcilable with the fact that the Company not only
managed his external relations, but possessed a formal right of inter-
ference when it judged proper in his internal management and a
formal right of being consulted in the choice of his principal minister.
Such controlled powers amount to something appreciably lower than
sovereign status. In these circumstances a wide latitude of inter-
pretation had been introduced. In the Company's eyes one funda-
mental purpose of the treaties had always been the protection of the
respective states, usually undertaken by the Company on specific
financial conditions. Financial disorder within a state would therefore
threaten to undermine a vital condition of the promised protection,
and was normally held by the Company's government to justify
interference alike when the treaty was silent on the point of internal
management and when it contained an express stipulation against
interference. Again, in some cases the Company had specifically
agreed to protect the prince not only against external attack, but also
against rebellion. Such obligations were considered to involve a right
of internal interference whatever might be the other provisions of the
treaty in question. Frequently we find the Company's government
following the practice of advising certain princes on the choice of their
chief minister, at Baroda, for instance, where it was a treaty right, and
at Hyderabad, where it was not. After about 1834 also the Company
made a practice of insisting that no succession should take place
without its sanction and approval. The ground for this would seem
to consist, not in any inheritance from the Moghul Empire which
indeed the Company never claimed, but in the need of securing the
succession of rulers who would not persistently evade their treaty
obligations.
However, in this matter of constructive rights claimed under the
treaties, there had been little uniformity of policy. The attitudes of
successive governors-general might differ completely. Dalhousie, for
instance, was rigidly consistent in his view that the treaties should be
observed to the letter. When urged, for example, by the resident at
Hyderabad to interfere actively in the Nizam's internal administra-
tion, he repudiated wholly the doctrine that the Government of India


## p. 492 (#532) ############################################

492 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
was responsible for the good administration of the state. But this
strict stand upon the treaties was singularly dangerous to the states
themselves. Many states were financially mismanaged, and the
financial clauses always were precise. States which had been created
by force of the Company's arms, states which had been conquered
and regranted, states which had been dependent on the Peshwa when
the Peshwa was overthrown by the Company, were restricted from
adoption in case of a failure of natural heirs either by the explicit
clauses of their treaties or by the traditional need of sanction which
the Company inherited with the Peshwa's other political rights. The
net result was that the position of the Indian states was reduced by
those who desired above everything to avoid annexation, while their
very existence was threatened by those who adopted as their guide
strict diplomatic right.
The position in 1858 was therefore exceedingly indefinite. Beside
the rights vested by treaty in the Company, there had arisen under
no sanction but that of superior power on the one side and reluctant
acquiescence on the other a body of precedents relating to successions
and to interference in the internal administration of the states.
Together these constituted the Company's paramonintcy, undefined,
undefinable, but always tending to expand under the strong pressure
of political circumstances. The process, as has already been suggested,
was a constitutional, not a diplomatic development. The princes who
in the eighteenth century had been de facto sovereigns but de jure
dependents, had become de facto dependents though possessing treaties
many of which recognised them as de jure sovereigns.
The change of government in 1858 offered a great opportunity for
the removal of these anomalies. What was needed was discussion and
definition. But the need seems to have been completely overlooked.
At a moment when it was the fashion to describe the Indian states as
breakwaters on which the Mutiny had dashed in vain, it would have
seemed perhaps unwise, certainly ungracious, to insist on the princes'
formal recognition of the changes that had taken place after the earlier
treaties had been made, and to define precisely their position and
obligations. No attempt was made to simplify the ambiguities of the
situation. The treaties were confirmed en bloc, first in the new Govern-
ment of India Act, and then in the proclamation announcing the
policy which the crown would follow. This meant plunging yet deeper
into the embarrassment arising from the inexperience of early nego-
tiators and the looseness of oriental political terms. The dilemma
remained unsolved. The representatives of the crown, like the repre-
sentatives of the Company, would have to choose between giving
treaties a literal effect (which in the past had invariably led to mis-
government, disorder, and annexation) or giving them such a con-
1 Fraser, Memoir of J. S. Fraser, p. 291.
? But cf. Durand, Life of Sir H. M. Ďurand, 11, 222.


## p. 493 (#533) ############################################

THE CROWN'S PARAMOUNTCY
493
>
32
structive interpretation as would materially affect some of them, but
would at the same time promote the main purpose of all, the main-
tenance and protection of the states themselves, in a growing closeness
of union with British India.
The language of the early viceroys shows conclusively that they
never hesitated about the course they meant to follow. Canning
writes that the Government of India is not debarred
from stepping in to set right such serious abuses in a native government as may
threaten any part of the country with anarchy or disturbance, nor from assuming
temporary charge of a native state when there shall be sufficient reason to do so.
This has long been the practice. We have repeatedly exercised the power with
the assent, and sometimes at the desire, of the chief authority in the state; and it
is one which, used with good judgment and moderation, it is very desirable that
we should retain. It will indeed, when once the proposed assurance (against
annexation) shall have been given, be more easy than heretofore to exercise it. '
Canning's successor, Elgin, is equally explicit.
"If we lay down the rule”, he says, “that we will scrupulously respect the right
of the chiefs to do wrong, and resolutely suppress all attempts of their subjects
to redress their wrongs by violence,. . . we may find perhaps that it may carry
us somewhat far-possibly to annexation, the very bug-bear from which we are
seeking to escape.
In short, both Canning and Elgin assumed that the act and the
proclamation only confirmed the treaties in so far as they were actually
operative in 1858.
This assumption was accompanied by a measure that was more
welcome to the princes than any other that could have been devised,
except perhaps a decision to revert to the chaos of the eighteenth
century. “We desire”, ran the queen's proclamation of 1858, "no
extension of our present territorial possessions. ” This marks a great
contrast with the Company's later policy of abandoning no just and
honourable accession of territory”. The change was so important that
it was resolved to signalise it by a declaration of more than ordinary
solemnity. In the recent past several staics had been annexed under
claims arising from the "doctrine of lapse”, on a failure of natural
heirs. Such claims were for the future emphatically renounced. In
1860 a number of sanads, commonly known as “sanads of adoption"
were issued to the leading princes. The Hindu chiefs were informed
that adoptions on a failure of natural heirs would be recognised and
confirmed, and Muslim rulers that any succession which might be
legitimate according to Muslim law would be upheld. The significance
of this was that the
states were to be perpetuated as an integral part
of the Indian system. They were no longer mere transitory govern-
ments awaiting the political chances which would permit and justify
their gradual extinction. It is clear that neither this most formal
i Quoted ap. Lee-Warner, Native States of India, p. 164.
3 Walrond, Elgin's Letters and Journals, p. 423.


## p. 494 (#534) ############################################

494 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
disavowal of annexationist policy nor its most scrupulous observance
could affect the individual rights of the princes. But it is equally clear
that the new policy afforded them a strong reason to acquiesce in con-
structive interpretations of their treaties, and so tended to strengthen
that element in their relations with the crown which was sanctioned
rather by usage and sufferance than by any documentary engagements.
The first and most general consideration suggested by a review of
the half-century following the Mutiny is that the abandonment of
annexation was in fact accompanied by an ever-growing closeness of
control from the time of Canning to the close of Curzon's administra-
tion. In part this development was less the result of conscious policy
than of changed conditions. The development of communications,
the building of railways, the construction of telegraph lines, and the
growth of the public press, accompanied by an ever-rising standard of
administration in British India itself, all made for an increased degree
of interference in the territories of the princes. Incidents which in the
Company's time would have passed unreported or only have become
known to the Government of India months after their occurrence,
came to its notice at once, when perhaps it was still possible to inter-
vene with effect, while the changing temper of the time converted
into “atrocities" actions which a former generation would have
contemplated with resigned regret. Interference would therefore
have increased in frequency even if the current view of political
obligations had remained quite unchanged. But the tendency was
strengthened by a growing disposition to extend the process of con-
structive interpretation. It will be most convenient first to illustrate
the actual policy followed by the Government of India, and then to
discuss the basis on which the policy was raised.
One new element emerged from the direct relations, established for
the first time in 1858, between the princes and the crown. "There is
a reality”, wrote Canning in 1860, “in the suzerainty of the sovereign
of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt
but is eagerly acknowledged by the chiefs. "1 No personal loyalty
could be expected towards a corporation of merchants, despite the
qualities of their government and the characters of most of their
governors-general. But towards Queen Victoria it was expected.
- Allegiance to Her Majesty”,2 "loyalty to the British crown”,3 such
are the new phrases that appear. In a legal sense such terms had
much the same force as the "subordinate co-operation" of the earlier
documents. But the underlying sentiment had changed, and though
changes of sentiment cannot possibly alter legal rights they may
deeply affect political conduct. The princes were no longer looked
upon as rulers driven by force into an unequal alliance. They had
>
>
1
i Quoted ap. Lee-Warner, op. cit. p. 317.
2 Instrument of Rendition, Aitchison, Treaties.
3 See any of the sanads of adoption.


## p. 495 (#535) ############################################

THE QUEEN AND THE PRINCES
495
become members of the empire, and the new position was accepted
not unwillingly. The visit of the Prince of Wales to India in 1875 was
made by all but one notable state the occasion of eager demonstrations
of welcome; and when in the following year Lytton held his great
durbar to announce the queen's assumption of the title of Empress of
India, the leading Maratha prince rose immediately after Lytton's
speech to salute the queen under the old Delhi title-Shah-inshah
Padshah. 1 The Company had never attempted to bestow honours on
the princes. In its time the Nawab Wazir of Oudh had been en-
couraged to assume the independent title of Shah; but in form the act
had been his own. But now a change was made. Titles were bestowed.
In quite recent times the additional title of “His Exalted Highness
was conferred on the Nizam. In 1861 the order of the Star of India
was founded and bestowed on many of the leading princes. This was
a very different matter from the interchange of orders between crowned
heads. And while the obligation of loyalty to the crown has been
repeatedly and publicly asserted, it has also been repeatedly and
publicly admitted by the princes themselves. Even the modern
lawyer, seeking painfully to disentangle the legal rights and duties of
the princes from a mass of conflicting documents and questionable
practice, concludes emphatically that loyalty is owed, though he
would find it hard to justify his opinion save by a constructive inter-
pretation such as he so gravely reprobates. ? Relations in fact havecome
into being not envisaged in the treaties concluded by the Company.
In the field of external relations (until very recent times) less change
has appeared under the crown administration than in any other.
From the first the control of foreign relations was so essential to the
maintenance of a general peace and so indispensable an accompani-
ment to promises of external protection, that the treaties commonly
lay down the Company's right of control in unmistakable language.
Nor did the development of events produce here any general conflict
between the treaty rights and the political needs of the Government of
India. In the case of Kashmir however difficulties did arise. When
that territory was granted to Gulab Singh in 1846, the Pamirs in-
spired the government with no political terrors. The Russian advance
in Central Asia had been directed on and through Persia, and the
extension of Russian authority from Orenburg to Tashkent was as yet
undreamed of. Article 5 of the treaty with Gulab Singh therefore
merely declared that any disputes with neighbouring states were to
be referred to the arbitration of the British Government and that its
decision was to be accepted. Nor was any resident appointed to the
new state. A verbal promise is stated to have been given to Gulab
Singh that no such appointment should be made. This sounds
1 Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, 11, 97.
2 Sir Leslie Scott, ap. Report of the Indian Slates Commillee (1929), p. 73.
• Aitchison, op. cit. XI, 264.
* Panikkar, Gulab Singh, p. 132.


## p. 496 (#536) ############################################

496 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
"
possible, since at that time the only disputes likely to possess political
importance were those which might arise with the still independent
Sikh power. The Russian movements towards the North-West Frontier
however introduced new problems and dangers. In 1873 Northbrook
was very anxious to appoint a permanent resident but at that time the
secretary of state was unwilling to overrule the objections of the state.
The measure, however, was decided on by Ripon and Hartington in
1884 and carried into effect in the following year on the death of the
old maharaja, Gulab Singh's son. 1 The claims put forward by the
state were that it was independent and “outside the Indian political
system”. ? The first of these was seemingly based on article i of the
treaty by which the territory was transferred “in independent
possession”. 3 The phrase is exceedingly vague, and is indeed more
applicable to private ownership than political dominion; and what-
ever meaning it may carry is limited by the unqualified assertion of
British supremacy in the last article. Any claim to independent status
does not seem justified by the language of the treaty; while the further
assertion seems entirely inconsistent with the article declaring that
British adjudication on all external disputes should be final. The
evidence on which Ripon and Hartington decided to appoint a
resident has never been published; but the political character of the
two men warrants the assumptions, (1) that they were not seeking a
pretext for extending British authority, and (2) that the evidence
before them appeared to them conclusive. It is in fact highly probable
that Russian agents were busy in Kashmir, although they may not
have been countenanced by the maharaja. So far the conduct of the
government appears unexceptionable. The published evidence re-
garding the remainder of the story is too slender to permit judgment
either way. In 1889 a quantity of correspondence reached the resident
by a very questionable channel, implicating the maharaja in Russian
intrigues. The Government of India, while refusing to take these
documents very seriously, “accepted the maharaja's resignation” and
set up a council of regency upon the ground of the maladministration
of the state. Their action certainly rested on mixed political and
administrative motives; and it seems unlikely that they would have
done anything but for the importance of the external issues involved.
As in the control of external relations, so also in the matter of
successions, the crown adopted in its entirety the position which the
Company had occupied. The sanads of adoption issued by Canning
in no way derogate from the claim that the Government of India is
entitled to determine all successions. The existing practice was con-
tinued. Every heir on his accession was installed by an agent of the
government; none was recognised as prince until he had been so
installed. “It is the right and duty of the British Government”, runs
i Parl. Papers, 1890, LIV, 231.
2 The British Crown and the Indian States, p. 85.
3 Aitchison, op.