In any case,
clause 41 of the act of 1858 survived Lord Salisbury's assault.
clause 41 of the act of 1858 survived Lord Salisbury's assault.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
Success was less swift than it might have been if he had
followed the advice of Outram, who, pointing to the example of the
younger Havelock, urged him to form a corps of mounted infantry;
but the cordon with which he surrounded the province was of over-
whelming strength, and by the end of December the rebels had been
driven into Nepal. Still, in many parts of the peninsula small columns
were employed in hunting down marauders; and it was not until the
end of 1859 that India was restored to something like its normal state.
It remains to consider certain questions relating to the Mutiny, the
1 Cf. Holmes, op. cit. pp. 503 sqq. and references there cited.
## p. 204 (#240) ############################################
204
THE MUTINY
isolated rebellions connected with it, and the disturbances to which it
gave rise among the civil population. Before the story of the greased
cartridges was circulated, there was no definite plot for a general
rising of the Bengal army, and it is improbable that such a plot was
formed even after the first mutinies. For, though Cracroft Wilson,
the judge of Moradabad, collected evidence which convinced him
that 31 May had been fixed for a simultaneous revolt, and that the
plan was marred by the premature outbreak at Meerut, John Lawrence
found in the numerous intercepted letters written by sepoys not the
faintest hint of an organised conspiracy, while none of the faithful
sepoys, none of the condemned mutineers who might have saved their
lives by disclosing it, if it had existed, knew anything about it. In
reply to questions put to prisoners in the North-Western Provinces,
the cartridge, and it alone, was named as a grievance.
While the mutincers lacked a head, many were half-hearted and
fought reluctantly against the leaders whom they had been accus-
tomed to obcy; and between the various groups there was a want of
concert. Sikhs, Panjabis, Gurkhas fought whole-heartedly against
them. Even so, however, the prospects of the British would have been
almost desperate if Indian princes-particularly the rajas of Patiala,
Jhind and Nabha-had not given invaluable aid. Colin Campbell
made serious mistakes and lost precious opportunities; but his critics,
who contrasted him with the men who, without help from England,
had repelled the first onslaught of the mutineers, and complained
that with forces enormously superior he was slow in extinguishing the
revolt, forgot that his task, in itself even harder than theirs, was
rendered still more difficult by the delay in offering an amnesty and
by the confiscation proclaimed by Lord Canning.
Although many whose pride was offended by the domination of an
alien and infidel race, or who had personal objects to gain, desired
the overthrow of the British raj, diversities of race, rank, status, aim
and, above all, religion made it impossible for them to combine.
Aggrieved chiefs, such as Kunwar Singh, dispossessed land-holders,
villagers who objected to taxation, hereditary thieves, budmashes of
every kind took advantage of the prostration of authority to redress
their grievances, to rob, or to gratify private animosities; but civil
disturbances, except in a few isolated regions and on the part of a few
embittered or fanatical groups, never amounted to rebellion. After
the Mutiny broke out, the titular king of Delhi was proclaimed head
of a movement by which Muhammadan zealots hoped to regain
supremacy; but this probably deterred many to whom Muhammadan
rule was abhorrent from supporting the mutineers. The Nana, pro-
fiting by the military rising which he had helped to encourage,
became the representative of those Marathas who desired to restore
the power once exercised by the Peshwa. Among the states which
Dalhousie had annexed rebellion broke out in Jhansi and Oudh
a
## p. 205 (#241) ############################################
DALHOUSIE'S ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY
205
alone; and in Oudh it was due not to annexation, but to the harshness
with which the talukdars were treated, to the failure of Havelock's
earlier attempts to relieve the residency, to the abandonment of
Lucknow, justifiable though it may have been, by Sir Colin Campbell,
to the errors which he committed during the siege, and to Canning's
impolitic proclamation. These rebellions arose in consequence of the
Mutiny, and there is no evidence that any of the rebels, except the
Nana, conspired before it began.
Dalhousie, except in so far as he had failed to remedy the indisci-
pline of the army, which was rather the business of the commander-
in-chief than of the governor-general, and had neglected to safeguard
Delhi and Allahabad, was unjustly blamed, and has been fully
vindicated. Even the annexation of Jhansi would have been harmless
if it had been supported by armed force; the increase of European
troops, for which he had in vain pleaded, would have at least averted
the worst calamities of the Mutiny; while by the construction of roads
and telegraphs, and by the administration which he bestowed upon
the Panjab, he contributed much to the power by which the Mutiny
was quelled.
Even before the reconquest of Oudh an event had occurred which,
while it marked the restoration of British supremacy, inaugurated a
new period of Indian history. The East India Company, upon which
all political parties in England agreed in throwing the blame of the
Mutiny, was abolished; and India was to be ruled in the name of the
queen. A proclamation, prepared under her direction, announced
that the government of India had been assumed by the queen; that
Lord Canning was to be the first viceroy, and that all officers who had
been in the service of the Company were confirmed in their offices;
that all treaties made by the Company with Indian princes were to
be maintained; that the queen desired no extension of territory,
promised full religious toleration to her Indian subjects, and would
always respect their ancient usages; that she offered pardon to all
rebels and mutineers who had not directly taken part in the murder of
Europeans; and that she would constantly endeavour to promote the
prosperity of her Indian dominions.
## p. 206 (#242) ############################################
CHAPTER XI
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
The government of India is an amazingly complex and dual form of adminis-
tration. It has two chiefs, the secretary of state here, the man at the desk and on
the front bench in this country; and the viceroy, the man on the spot in India. It
is the latter who, at any rate in India, is invested with paramount power; but the
final responsibility rests with the secretary of state. 1
In his British Government in India Lord Curzon further observes :
This dualism has arisen not merely from the simultaneous existence of one half
of the government in England, and the other half in India, for that is a feature of
the administration from a sovereign centre of all dependencies or dominions, but
from the subdivision of that authority both in England and in India. ?
The subject of this chapter is the history of the London branch of
British administration in India from 1858, the memorable year which
was marked by the end of the Mutiny and the proclamation of Lord
Canning as first viceroy and governor-general for the crown, to 1918,
the
year
which
saw the conclusion of the great war.
In February, 1858, a weighty and dignified petition was presented
to both houses of parliament on behalf of the East India Company.
It failed to avert the impending sentence, but certainly influenced
subsequent legislation.
The petitioners assumed that the minister of the crown who would
henceforward conduct the home portion of the administration of
India would be assisted by a council composed of statesmen ex-
perienced in Indian affairs. The knowledge necessary for governing
a foreign country, and in particular a country like India, could not
possibly be possessed by anyone who had not devoted a considerable
portion of his life to the acquisition of it. The council should be
qualified not only to advise the minister, “but also by its advice
to exercise a certain degree of moral check". The minister would
generally be unacquainted with India and would constantly be ex-
posed to solicitations from individuals and bodies
either entirely ignorant of that country or knowing enough of it to imposc on those
who knew still less than themselves and having very frequently objects in view
other than the good government of India.
British public opinion was necessarily unacquainted with Indian
affairs and therefore liable to be misled. The responsible minister's
council should, therefore, derive sufficient weight from its constitution
1 Lord Curzon, Hansard, 13 July, 1917, XXV, 1027-8.
2 11, 67.
3 Hansard, 1858, CXLVIII, Appendix.
## p. 207 (#243) ############################################
THE COMPANY'S PETITION
207
to be a substantial barrier against inroads of self-interest and ignorance
in England from which parliament could hardly be expected to afford
a sufficient protection. The council must be so constituted as to be
personallyindependent of the minister, and should feel itself responsible
for recording an opinion on any Indian subject and pressing that
opinion on the minister whether it was agreeable to him or not. The
minister when overruling his council must be bound to record his
views. Thus the council would be a check and not a screen. Otherwise
it would merely serve to weaken the minister's responsibility and “to
give the colourable sanction of prudence and experience to measures
in the framing of which these qualities have had no share”.
A council composed of crown nominees would not preserve the
independence of judgment which had marked the court of directors.
If a substantial portion of the old spirit was to remain, a majority at
least of the council which would assist the new minister for India
should hold their seats independently of his appointment. That body
should not be smaller in numbers than the existing court of eighteen
directors. The petitioners went on to plead for the continuance of
the existing system, to urge that the present home government of India
was not really a double government, as the final word always rested
with the cabinet, and that a new arrangement which in any way
checked the minister's discretion would be liable to a similar reproach.
This reproach, however, originated
in an entire misconception of the functions devolving on the home government of
India, and in the application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive
departments.
The executive government of India was and must be situated in India
itself. The court of directors was not so much an executive as a
deliberative body. Its principal function and that of the home govern-
ment generally was not to direct the details of administration, but to
scrutinise and revise the past acts of the Indian government; to lay
down principles and issue general instructions for their future guidance
and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures which were
referred home for approval. Such functions admitted of and required
the concurrence of more judgments than one. They were more
analogous to the functions of parliament than to those of an executive
board; and it was considered an excellence in parliament to be not
merely a double but a triple government. The petitioners ended by
praying that no change should be made in the constitution of the
Indian government until the conclusion of “the present unhappy
disturbances or without a full previous enquiry into the operations of
the present system”.
But both the great political parties in parliament were resolved
that there should be no delay in completing the process which had
definitely begun in 1853. It was an obvious anachronism that a
a
## p. 208 (#244) ############################################
208
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
chartered company should take part in administering a great empire.
It was wrong that there should be a Company's army and a royal
army, an Indian and a royal navy. In India itself the prestige of the
Company had lately suffered irretrievable damage. 1 Immediately
after the presentation of the Company's petition, Lord Palmerston,
then prime minister, introduced his bill for transferring the govern-
ment of India entirely to the crown. But when the bill had been read
a second time he was turned out of office on the Conspiracy to Murder
Bill, and was succeeded by Lord Derby. Then Disraeli, who came in
as Derby's chancellor of the exchequer, introduced a new bill which
provided the Indian minister with a council composed partly of
crown nominees and partly of persons to be elected by two con-
stituencies, one consisting of men who had served in India or possessed
financial interests in that country, the other made up from the parlia-
mentary electors of the leading commercial cities of the United
Kingdom, London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast.
These proposals, for which Lord Ellenborough, then president of the
Board of Control, was largely responsible, were received with general
ridicules and were dropped. Ellenborough’s dispatch to Canning
regarding the Oudh proclamation caused his own resignation. His
successor, Lord Stanley, piloted certain resolutions through the House
of Commons which formed the basis for a measure destined to regulate
the government of India from London for sixty-two years. Its main
provisions were:
(a) The place of the Board of Control and court of directors would
be taken by a secretary of state in council. The new secretary would
be assisted by a “Council of India” consisting of fifteen members, of
whom eight were to be appointed by the crown and seven were to be
elected by the directors of the East India Company. The majority of
both appointed and elected members were to be persons who had
served or resided in India for ten years at least, and had not left the
country more than ten years before their appointment. Future
appointments or elections were to be so regulated that nine at least
of the members of council should hold these qualifications. Future
vacancies in crown appointments would be filled by crown nominees;
vacancies among the seven members elected by the directors would be
filled by persons co-opted by the council. No member could sit or
vote in parliament. All would hold office during good behaviour and
could be removed only on petition by both houses of parliament.
(6) The council would conduct Indian business transacted in the
United Kingdom and would correspond with the Government of
India, but would not possess the initiative which had all along rested
with the court of directors. It could give its opinion only on questions
1 Martineau, Life of Frere, I, 230.
2 Hansard, 1857-8, CXLVIII, 1276.
3 Idem, cxLix, 1675; cf. also 1677.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, iv, 138, 164-5.
>
## p. 209 (#245) ############################################
THE INDIA ACT OF 1858
209
referred to it by the secretary of state, who would preside over meetings
with power to overrule should he be unable to obtain agreement. In
such an event he might require that his opinion and the reasons for it
should be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, and any member
who had been present at the meeting could exercise the same privilege.
(c) The secretary of state might constitute committees of his council
for the more convenient transaction of business, and might distribute
departments of business among those committees. He would direct
the manner in which all business should be conducted. The council
would meet once at least every seven days and could do no business
without a quorum of five.
(d) Con. munications from the secretary of state to the governor-
general, and orders proposed to bi made in the United Kingdom by
the secretary of state, must, subject to certain provisions, be either
submitted to a meeting of the council or be deposited in the council-
room for seven days before issue. Any member of council might record
his opinion on any such communication or order in a minute-book
kept for the purpose, and a copy of such entry would be sent forth with
to the secretary of state. If a majority minuted against a communica-
tion or order, the secretary of state must, if adhering to such com-
munication or order, record his reasons.
(e) Orders of the secretary of state relating to expenditure and
loans required the concurrence of a majority of the Council of India.
The revenues of India, which would be charged with a dividend on
the Company's stock and with their debts, could only be used for the
purposes of the government of India. Clause 41 of the act provided
that no grant or appropriation of any part of such revenues or of any
property coming into the possession of the secretary of state in council
should be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a
meeting of the council. All powers of issuing securities for money in
the United Kingdom vested in the secretary of state in council must
be exercised by the former with concurrence of a majority of votes at
a council meeting.
(s) The salary of the secretary of state and the cost of his office
would be charged to the revenues of India. A statement of “moral
and material progress” would be annually submitted to parliament.
The secretary of state would every year lay Indian accounts before
parliament, on occasions which became famous as “budget debates",
although in fact they were simply reviews of Indian affairs.
(8) It was provided that urgent communications or orders which
did not, under the terms of the act, require the concurrence of a
majority of council votes, might issue on the authority of the secretary
of state alone without reference to the council. But in such cases the
secretary would record the reason for urgency and give notice thereof
to the members of the council.
(h) Orders concerning the levying of war or the making of peace,
CHI VI
14
## p. 210 (#246) ############################################
210
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
>
or the treating or negotiating with any prince or state, which virtually
gave effect to cabinet decisions and did not require the support of a
majority of council votes, might be marked as "secret” and sent off
on the authority of the secretary alone without any notice or reference
to the council. “Secret” dispatches from the governor-general in
council or the governors of Madras or Bombay relating to such
matters need not be communicated to the Council of India.
(i) Appointment to the offices of governor-general and governors
of presidencies vested in the crown. The governor-general would
appoint lieutenant-governors to provinces subject to the approval of
Her Majesty. Members of the various councils in India would be
appointed by the secretary of state in council.
(j) The naval and military forces of the Company were transferred
to the crown, their separate local character being retained. It was
directed by clause 55 that except for the purpose of preventing or
repelling invasion, or under other sudden or urgent necessity, Indian
revenues should not be applicable for military operations outside
India without the consent of parliament.
The basic principles of the bill were fully discussed in parliament. 1
The object was to vest full charge of the government of India in the
crown “in order that the direct superintendence of the whole empire
might be placed under one executive authority". The new secretary
of state would be a member of the cabinet. His individual responsi-
bility was essential. His decision would be final on all matters. But
he should not be allowed to choose all his councillors, for the council
should possess considerable independence. It must exercise "moral
control” 3 As Sir Henry Maine subsequently observed, the ultimate
power of the secretary of state was regarded with apprehension by
certain spcakers in the House of Commons. On 23 June the directors
drew up a letter criticising the bill and stating that in their opinion
the council should have more than a consultative voice in all questions
regarding expenditure. In such cases the secretary of state should not
be able to exercise his overruling power. Precautionary provisions
were then engrafted on the bill and appeared as clauses 41 and 55. 4
The semi-independent status accorded to the Council of India by
the cabinet was approved by Mr Gladstone for the opposition. In
order“to clothe this new body with all the moral weight and influence
that was consistent with retaining intact the responsibility of the
secretary of state”, he recommended that its first members should be
named in the bill. Each nomination would thus receive the express
approval of parliament. This would give the council a start which
would secure for it a good character hereafter. It needed all possible
weight at this time of transition from one form of government to
)
3 Idem, CLI, 323.
1 Hansard, 1858, CXLIX, CL. 2 Idem, CL, 2066.
• Unpublished memorandum, dated 8 November, 1880.
5 Hansard, CLI, 470, 757-8.
## p. 211 (#247) ############################################
THE DEBATES OF 1858
211
another and there were precedents for such procedure. The proposal
was rejected by the cabinet, mainly on the ground that, if accepted, it
would deprive the court of directors of the power of electing any
members of the new body. The government wished to avoid needless
changes. It had found in the court of directors a council in being
which consisted partly of crown nominees and partly of persons elected
by the Company's court of proprietors. It would practically con-
tinue this council, increasing the number of nominees and reducing
the number of elected members so as nearly to equalise the two
varieties. 1
Both the cabinet and parliament desired to deal tenderly with the
Company which had fallen before “he inevitable consequences of
time, change and progress", 2 and to set up a substantial barrier
against inroads of unbalanced sentiment and attempts to debit the
revenues of India with unfair charges. India must not be brought
into the cockpit of party politics. The members of the Council of India
must be “neither the masters nor the puppets but the valuable
advisers of the new minister" 3
While, however, the council would be invested with an appreciable
degree of independence and would be so large as to represent the
various presidencies and public services in India, it would have no
powers of initiative, and would, in the main, confine its attention to
such questions of policy and matters of first-class interest as were laid
before it by its president, who in “secret" affairs could act by himself
entirely apart from his councillors. He was a member of the cabinet
which could not be forced to take into its confidence any given
number of persons whom it did not wish of its own accord to con-
sult. The president of the Board of Control had always possessed
the privilege of communicating with the governor-general through
the secret committee of the court of directors in regard to “secret”
business. 5
Secret orders, however, concerning the levying of war and other
matters might involve considerable expenditure from Indian revenues.
It was so newhat difficult to see how members of council could in such
cases discharge their statutory responsibilities.
While it was hoped that all these arrangements would conduce to
the better government of India, the cabinet was convinced that, in
Lord Derby's words, "the government of India must be, on the whole,
carried out in India itself”. 6 Interference should be on as small a
scale as possible; although, apart from the large amount of Indian
business which was necessarily transacted in England, since parlia-
ment was responsible to the nation for the administration of India, it
must discharge its responsibilities conscientiously.
1 Hansard, Cli, 759-60.
; Idem, CLI, 1454-5;
• Lec-Warner, Dalhousie, 1, 107-8.
Idem, cxLix, 820.
• Idem, CLI, 1457-8.
• Hansard, CLI, 1448.
14-2
## p. 212 (#248) ############################################
212
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
The Act“for the better government of India” (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106)
received the royal assent on 2 August, 1858; and a month later the
directors issued their last instructions to their servants in the East and
in memorable words commended their splendid trust to the care of
the sovereign of Great Britain.
Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift-let her take the vast country and the
teeming millions of India under Her direct control; but let Her not forget the great
corporation from which she has received them nor the lessons to be learnt from its
success.
Lord Stanley, afterwards Earl of Derby, who, as president of the
Board of Control, had piloted the bill of 1858 through the House of
Commons, was the first secretary of state for India. With the board's
two secretaries, he migrated to a new India Office which took the
place of the Company's East India House. The secretaries became
the first Parliamentary and Permanent Under-Sccretaries of State for
India. Resigning in 1859 with the Conservative cabinet, Stanley was
succeeded by Sir Charles Wood, who, as president of the Board of
Control, had been responsible for the Charter Act of 1853 and the
education dispatch of 1854, and now held office till 1866 with excellent
results. He was a single-minded man, of great knowledge, patience
and judgment, and was largely responsible for the success with which
Indian affairs were conducted during a very difficult period of transi-
tion and reconstruction. The arrangements for the councils of the
governor-general and those of the governors of Madras and Bombay,
the setting up of new High Courts of Judicature, the reorganisation
of finances, the codification of the law, railway extension, the amal-
gamation of the queen's and the Company's British regiments, the
determination of the number of British troops to be quartered in India,
the adjustment of numerous conflicting interests, all demanded careful
consideration in London. The council was a very strong one, including
ex-directors and men who had earned distinction in the Mutiny
period. Although there were necessarily differences of opinion and
outlook from time to time, although the transaction of business by
committees sometimes caused irritating delays, although time was
sometimes wasted over trifling financial questions which could better
have been decided in India, some years after quitting office Wood,
who had meantime become Lord Halifax, told the House of Lords
that any secretary of state who firmly and honestly discharged his
duties would never experience the slightest difficulty with his council. 4
On a subsequent occasion he
deprecated any measure which could diminish the independence and self-respect
of the council, for a strong council was needed to give the secretary of state the
support requisite for resisting party pressure, a pressure not always applied in a
manner beneficial to India. 5
i Foster, East India House, pp. 153-4.
2 Cf. Hansard, cxlviii, 1298.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 447.
• Hansard, cxcv, 1085. • Idem, cxcvi, 693.
6
## p. 213 (#249) ############################################
THE LEGISLATION OF 1869
213
In 1866, however, a more brilliant and impulsive, but less patient and
experienced, secretary of state presided at the council-board. Lord
Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne), while in office, avoided an open
breach with his council. But afterwards, when speaking in the House
of Lords as Marquis of Salisbury on 11 March, 1869, on“ the Governor-
general of India Bill”, he expressed his belief that the “tutelage” in
which the secretary of state for India was held by his council was
injurious to the good government of that country. In such matters
as railway guarantees and other commercial affairs the council's
"veto” was a protection, but, with that exception, responsibility
should lie with the secretary of state alone. Opportunity should be
taken of another bill then pending to clear up "the mystery” which
enabled the council, under cover of vetoing money questions, to inter-
fere in every other measure on the plea that it involved money con-
siderations and thus to become "an incubus on the minister". 1
On this occasion Lord Salisbury was followed by his successor in
office, the Duke of Argyll, who assured him that there was no mystery.
The true interpretation of the law was that the secretary of state was
“absolutely supreme" in financial, as in other matters, and could
overrule his council whenever he thought fit to do so. The duke was
aware of no case in which the council had set up its authority in
opposition to the will of the secretary of state. On 19 April, in bringing
forward the “Government of India Act Amendment Bill”, he ex-
plained to the House the history of clause 41 in the act of 1858 which
had given rise to Lord Salisbury's contention. Considerable discussion
followed, and extended over 29 April, when the bill was read a second
time, to 13 May, when Lord Salisbury moved and withdrew an
amendment. The subject revived in a debate in the House of Com-
mons on 17 August, 1880, when it was raised by Fawcett, the econo-
mist, afterwards postmaster-general. ? The view eventually taken was
that the true intentions of parliament in enacting clause 41 of the act
of 1858 were to impose constitutional restraint on the powers of the
secretary of state with respect to the expenditure of money, but by no
means to extend the effective assertion of this restraint to all cases,
especially where imperial questions were concerned. The secretary of
state was a member of the cabinet and in cabinet questions the views
of the cabinet must prevail. It was never intended that the council
should be able to resist the cabinet by stopping supplies. Vis-à-vis the
secretary of state, as representing the latter, the Council of India
possessed no veto. As Sir Henry Maine expressed it, “any such
power given to the council and exercised by it would produce before
long a combination of both the great English parties to sweep away
the council itself". 3
In the course of the debate in the House of Lords on 13 May, 1869,
· Hansard, cxciv, 1074.
· Idem, CCLV, 1453.
3 Unpublished memorandum.
## p. 214 (#250) ############################################
214
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
1
the Duke of Argyll stated that Lord Salisbury had been moved to
raise the question by the opposition which his council had offered to
a project put forward by certain commercial bodies to which the
secretary of state had agreed. The council had been supported by the
Government of India, but had eventually given way.
In any case,
clause 41 of the act of 1858 survived Lord Salisbury's assault.
The Government of India Act Amendment Bill", which pro-
duced the Lords debate of 13 May, 1869, contained proposals for
altering the life-tenure of members of the Council of India to one of
ten years, which might, for reasons of public advantage, be extended
to fifteen years. The secretary of state justified his recommendation by
the rapid changes which were taking place in India, largely as a result
of extending railway communications, and by the need of not only
intimate but recent Indian experience on his council. His views
were accepted by the House. Lord Salisbury moved an amendment
to the bill proposing that in future all members of the council should
be appointed by the crown. None should be co-opted by the council
itself. The amend. nent was carried and embodied in the bill, together
with a provision transferring from the secretary of state in council
to the crown the right of filling vacancies on the councils of the
governor-general and governors in India. The general effect of the
legislation and debates of 1869 was to strengthen the position of the
secretary of state vis-à-vis his council. His position vis-à-vis the Govern-
ment of India was fortified by the completion in 1870 of a direct
telegraph line between India and England by submarine cable through
the Red Sea. He could thus less than ever be confronted with accom-
plished facts.
For years after 1869 the history of the Council of India was un-
eventful. When Lord Salisbury again presided over the India Office
(1874-7) his Afghan and North-West Frontier policy, especially the
occupation of Quetta and the separation of the trans-Indus districts
from the Panjab, was strongly opposed by members of his council who
followed Lord Lawrence's lead. 3 But a secretary of state who could
rely on cabinet support could now certainly get his way. Although,
according to Lord Salisbury's biographer, he was a believer “in the
virtue of a single inspiration and in the evil of hampering it by the
intrusion of competing ideas”, he was exercised by the problem of
combining an independence of initiative in the government of India
with his own responsibility for final decision, and considered that
it could be solved only by private correspondence between himself
and the viceroy. " He carried this doctrine to lengths to which Lord
Northbrook refused to follow him.
Lord Northbrook recognised the subordinate position of the viceroy but held
that parliament had confurred certain rights, not orily on the viceroy, but on his
1 Hansard, cxcvi, 700.
? Idem, cxcv, 1077-8. Cf. Martineau, op. cit. I, 356–7.
: Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, 11, 159. • Idem, pp. 65-6.
a
>
## p. 215 (#251) ############################################
POLICY OF THE INDIA OFFICE
215
council, which differentiated the latter in a very notable degree from subordinate
officials. 1
Lord Cromer has stated that Lord Salisbury was disposed to reject,
and, he thought, to underrate, the value of the views of Anglo-Indian
officials.
This does not appear to have been the practice of some of his
successors. Lord George Hamilton, who first as under-secretary and
afterwards as secretary of state introduced thirteen Indian budgets in
the House of Commons, writes that the Council of India was really a
cabinet with the important exception that its procedure and powers
were prescribed by an act of parliament. It had absolute control over
Indian expenditure. It preserved an unbroken record of the reasons
for expenditure of all kinds and performed the business of checking
far more effectively than the treasury, obtaining better results from
the expenditure sanctioned. 2 Lord Randolph Churchill found the
council "an invaluable instrument”. 3
As regards the general policy of the India Office in the latter years
of the nineteenth century, although relations between India and
England had become more intimate, involving a constantly increasing
degree of interference, and though the cases in which final orders
could be passed in India had become less frequent, yet the secretary
of state did not constantly interfere in the ordinary work of Indian
administration, but mainly confined his action to answering references
from the Indian government. Apart from great political or financia)
questions, the number or nature of these references depended on the
character of the governor-general for the time being. The secretary
of state initiated almost nothing. In domestic affairs the Indian
government was almost independent so long as it was content to
carry on without largely increasing the cost of existing establishments
or incurring new and heavy charges. The secretary of state had no
disposition to interfere needlessly in the details of administration in
India, but was sometimes subjected to pressure which could with
difficulty be resisted. On such occasions the council was extremely
useful. It further assisted in preserving continuity of administrative
principles in India where the official personnel was necessarily always
changing. "
The views of the majority of the Council of India on the subject of
divided control of the India army provoked the impatience of Lord
Ripon who, at the close of the first year of his viceroyalty, complained
of the increasing interference of the India Office which he ascribed to
the “subordinates", and the fact that Lord Hartington, then secretary,
was overworked with other than Indian business. But had the same
1 Mallet, Life of Northbrook, p. 91.
2 Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections (1874-1880), pp. 307-8.
• Winston Churchill, Life of Lord Randolph Churchill, 1, 475.
• Strachey, India, pp. 74 81 (1911 ed. ).
## p. 216 (#252) ############################################
216 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
viceroy received the warning drawn up by Sir Henry Maine, the most
prominent member of the then existent Council of India, relating to
the projected Ilbert bill, he might have been saved from a course of
action which he lived to regret bitterly. The council had in 1883
desired Lord Hartington, then secretary of state, to transmit Maine's
“secret” memorandum to the viceroy; but this was not done, and
they were subsequently consoled by Lord Kimberley, Hartington's
successor, with the just reminder that they should formally have
conveyed the warning themselves. 1
Meantime the constitution of the council was slightly altered. In
1876 the secretary of state was allowed to appoint not more than three
special experts (legal or financial) on the old tenure of good behaviour.
In 1889 he was allowed to abstain from filling vacancies until the
number of members should be reduced to ten. Reduction was asked
for in the interest of economy. In the previous year the council had
been joined by nne of its most distinguished members, Sir Alfred
Lyall, described by Lord George Hamilton as his “right-hand
adviser”, who held office for fifteen years and has left us some passing
impressions of its proceedings. Fresh from governing great provinces
he wrote:
The India Office is comfortable and convenient, but rather depressing: in the
first place, death visits the council rather frequently: secondly, we have all rather
the look of oid hulks laid up in dock,
and are men who have. said good-bye to active
service; thirdly, the distance and difference between London and India makes one
feel as if looking at things through a glass darl. ly, and not face to face, and in a year
or two I shall begin to distrust my own judgment. . . . In council we stand up and
orate, which breaks down desultory discussion, but is no good for thrashing out
questions.
Again, he says "one can prevent some mischief but do little good on
the council”. A year later, however, he liked his work, found that it
gave him enough to do and even more than he cared for. In 1894,
with all his colleagues, ne protested vainly and vigorously against the
exclusion of cotton goods from the general import duty of 5 per cent. ,
as a serious concession to British interests which would damage Indian
confidence in the British Government.
Neither parliament nor the secretary of state was inclined to inter-
fere with the administration of India as long as all went well and
Indian affairs hardly touched British politics. Between 1880 and 1905
so little did parliament seriously concern itself with Indian domestic
business that in 1889 and 1891 the secretary of state was able to dis-
regard resolutions of the House of Commons relating to the opium
trade, and in 1894, after consulting the Government of India, he
declined to take action on another resolution of the same House in
favour of simultaneous examinations in England and India for ad-
i Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 137-9,
Durand, Life of Lyall, p. 322.
3 Debates of 3 May, 1889, and 10 April, 1891, Hé usard, cccxxxv, CCCLII.
## p. 217 (#253) ############################################
MORLEY AND HIS COUNCIL
217
>
mission to the civil service. 1 The general feeling in this country was
that Indian affairs were safe in the hands of the Indian government;
and as late as 1904 Lord Curzon, after his first term of office, struck
no jarring note when he asked that his government might not be
bothered with “an excessive display of parliamentary affection” and
decíared that the ideal party in England for people in India was the
party which would act “both as the impartial umpire as well as the
superior authority in the disputes that sometimes arise between us,
and that will not unduly favour the home country at our expense
A year later, however, the viceroy resigned in consequence of a
difference with the Home Government and secretary of state, the bitter-
ness of which is recalled by some of his last words. 2 The quarrel came
as a climax to various disagreements, and at one time Lord Curzon,
with evident injustice, ascribed to the members of the Council of
India "a desire to thwart and hinder his work". 3 After his departure
a new era began. The partition of Bengal produced a violent agita-
tion; a revolutionary movement gradually emerged into view; a
scheme of wide constitutional reform was projected; and in 1907
John Morley, then secretary of state, desiring to add two Indian
gentlemen to his council, introduced and carried through parliament
a bill which empowered him to increase the strength of that body
from twelve to fourteen. No member would be appointed who had
been absent from India for more than five years; and no member
would hold office for more than seven years. Salaries of members
were reduced from £1200 to £1000.
General J. H. Morgan says that no more autocratic secretary for
India ever reigned at Whitehall,- none ever consulted his council less,
and none ever admonished a viceroy more. It must be remembered
that Morley was subjected to considerable pressure from the left wing
of his own party. But there is ample evidence to support General
Morgan's views, both in a letter from Lord Minto to Lord Stamford-
ham dated 5 July, 1910,' and in Morley' own Recollections. Yet it is
cvident that at one time Morley was anxious not to depress but to
elevate the position of the Council of India. Ir. August, 1907, he
invited Lord Cromer to join it and Cromer consented. Then the
secretary of state discovered that the act of 1858 forbade the appoint-
ment of anyone "capable of sitting and voting in parliament”. He
wrote to Minto on 23 August, 1907, that he would propose to the
cabinet that the law should be altered, for Cromer would “give to my
council a strength and authority in the public eye, of which, if we are
in for troublesome times, we shall stand in much need”. The project,
however, unfortunately ſell through; and Morley was left with coun-
cillors, none of whom individually carried weight in parliament.
a
1 Pp. 368-70, infra.
• Ronaldshay, Curzon, 1. 237.
6 Buchan, Momoir of Lord Minio, p. 311.
1 British Government in India, I1, 255.
• John Viscount Morley, an appreciation, p. 32.
Morley, Recollections, 11, 233.
## p. 218 (#254) ############################################
218 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
5
Regarding some of these as reactionary, he opened his doors wide to
irresponsible advisers;+ and finding no particular difficulty in getting
his own way, absorbed in the fascination of his task, gathered more
and more power into his own hands, much to the vexation of a long-
suffering viceroy. ?
The close of the Morley régime found the late Mr E. S. Montagu,
as parliamentary under-secretary, enquiring into the conduct of
business at the India Office. The Marquess of Crewe, its new head,
introduced proposals for reform which appear to have largely
emanated from Montagu, and were rejected by the Lords after an
illuminating debate.
On 31 July, 1913, in answer to a question put by Viscount Midleton,
Lord Crewe announced his intention of introducing proposals for
legislation which would facilitate and quicken India Office procedure
by making the transaction of council business by committees excep-
tional and no longer usual. 3 Members of council would now be
attached to particular departments. They would be reduced to eight
or ten, the two Indian members being retained, and would become
whole-time servants, their salaries being raised once more to £1200.
They must possess recent experience, and, if qualified by official
service, would sit on the council in the concluding years of their active
service and not in the first years of their retirement. The secretary of
state emphasised the value of the council, which assisted him by
enabling matters to come up for decision in a more compact and
concentrated way than they did in other offices. He derived marked
advantage in case of a difference of opinion and a discussion on a
particular subject in council, from being obliged to present that sub-
ject in a more accurate, form than he probably would do if he had
only to argue the pros and cons of it with himself. Moreover, and
this was by no means the least important point, the council greatly
strengthened the position of the secretary of state in dealing with the
government of India, especially if he were a new-comer to office.
If the existence be conceived of a viceroy backed by a body of local experts of
long practical experience, then, I think, the secretary of state would need to be a
Bismarck to hold his own in any controversy against so powerful a combination as
that, and the only result, as I think, would be that India might be brought more
often than it is into the cockpit of parliamèntary politics.
The council's financial powers were such that in theory it might make
the government of India under our parli mentary system almost
impossible; theoretical possibilities, however, need not alarm practical
men who were anxious to agree if they could. A proof of this was that
in matters not financial "in which the secretary of state could overrule
his council”, such a step had been taken only “on the very rarest
occasions”. In 1914 Lord Crewe introduced a “Council of India”
a
>
>
1 Cf. Hansard, cxcv, 1083.
? See Buchan, op. cit. p. 312.
3 Hansard, xiv, 1574-86.
## p. 219 (#255) ############################################
LORD CREWE'S PROPOSALS
219
a
bill based on these views and including two novel proposals: (a) for
imposing statutory obligation to appoint two persons domiciled in
India to the council, selected from a list drawn up by the non-official
members of the imperial and provincial legislative councils in British
India; (6) for amplifying the list of “secret” matters with which,
under the act of 1858, the secretary of state could deal exclusively.
The bill was rejected by a large majority of the Lords. It was
strongly condemned by Lord Curzon as designed to withdraw from
the council's cognisance an enormous number of questions covering
the whole sphere of Indian government and to reduce that body,
which by its passive acquiescence in the removal of the capital from
Calcutta to Delhi had already shown itself flexible and pliant, to “an
impotent and costly sham”. i In proposing to compel the secretary
of state to choose two Indian politicians as his councillors, it was for-
gotten that the council was a body of experts, not one of politicians
or public speakers.
Lord Curzon's reference to the Delhi policy takes us back to certain
incidents of the year 1911 which formed an extraordinary episode in
the constitutional history of British India. ?
In 1876 Disraeli's government introduced a Royal Titles bill which
was in-ended to mark the new relation which, since 1858, the sovereign
had occupied towards her subjects in India. The bill passed through
pa ment by a very large majority; and in Mr Buckle's words:
The world understood that a new pledge had been given of the determination
of the British crown to cherish India; and her princes and peoples understood that
their sovereign had assumed towards them a nearer and more personal relation. "
At a great durbar held at Delhi on 1 January, 1877, Queen Victoria
was proclaimed “Queen-Empress of India”. On 1 January, 1903,
at a second Delhi durbar her successor was proclaimed “King-
Emperor”. On 12 December, 1911, there was a third Delhi durbar,
distinguished beyond its predecessors by the presence of the sovereigns
themselves and by the remarkable announcements which were made,
on the advice of his ministers, by the king-emperor. Up to that time
all changes of signal importance in the government of India had taken
place after full discussion in parliament and under parliamentary
sanction. Now, however, changes of great moment were proclaimed
of which parliament had no previous cognisance. At the durbar His
Majesty announced that the capital of India would henceforward be
Delhi and not Calcutta; the partition of Bengal, which had caused
such bitter controversy, would be revoked; Bengal would be one
province under a governor in council; a new province of Bihar and
Orissa would be created; Assam would once more be the charge of
a chief commissioner. These measures, which necessarily involved
heavy expenditure and far-reaching consequences, naturally pro-
1 Hansard, xvi. 484.
· Curzon, op. in. II, 119.
· Life of Disraeli, iv, 93, 167; V, 471.
3
## p. 220 (#256) ############################################
220
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
voked the criticism that the cabinet had “used the authority of the
sovereign to settle in their own way an issue of an acutely controversial
character”. 1 They originated with the governor-general in council,
found favour with the secretary of state and the Asquith cabinet, and
were therefore accepted by the Council of India, who can hardly have
obtained an opportunity to give even a passing thought to the large
issues and heavy expenditure involved. Approval was transmitted to
the governor-general; and parliament only became aware of all that
was contemplated after His Majesty had made the announcement.
Lord Crewe argued inter alig that in fact the action taken was ad-
ministrative and did not require parliamentary sanction. The original
partition of Bengal had been carried out without reference to parlia-
ment. But in fact these later changes were of far greater moment even
than that ill-starred measure.
In the third year of the last war, the Council of India and the India
Office came prominently before the nation. The management and
conduct of the campaign in Mesopotamia had been originally en-
trusted to the government and military authorities in India. The
commission of enquiry which was appointed, after the capture of
Kut-el-Amara by the Turks, and sat in London, commented un-
favourably on the India Office organisation and on the substitution of
private telegrams from the secretary of state to the viceroy for public
telegrams which would have passed through or been communicated
to the Council of India. The practice had so much developed of recent
years as to make the private telegrams “almost the regular channel of
official inter-communication”. 2 There were strong and obvious ob-
jections to this procedure. The private telegrams, moreover, did not
always remain in the office, for Lord Morley had taken his away.
Neither the Council of India nor the governor-general's council had
been kept in touch with the varying fortunes of the Mesopotamian
expedition, the control of which had been
narrowed down to two high officials, both heavily charged with many other anxious
and pressing duties, and both permanently stationed in localities which had little,
if any, private or personal touch with the forces campaigning in Mesopotamia. '
The conclusions of the commission were debated in both houses
of parliament and led to the resignation of the secretary of state,
MrAusten Chamberlain, who had succeeded late to a situation created
by others. His predecessor, Lord Crewe, contended in the House of
Lords that the policy of the expedition all through was a matter for
the cabinet and the cabinet alonc. 4 His own private telegrams of
importance relating to this matter had been made official and were
preserved at the India Office.
Lord Islington, under-secretary of state, admitted that private
telegrams had been excessively employed. 5 In future they would be
1 Lord Curzon, ap. Hansard, xi, 142. 2 Report of Mesopota,nia Commission, p. 102.
3 Idem, p. 103
• Hansard, xxv, 929.
5 Idem, 952.
5
## p. 221 (#257) ############################################
THE MESOPOTAMIA DEBATES
221
.
fewer and wherever possible would be made “official” after dispatch.
The India Office was not established or equipped for the conduct of
an extended campaign outside India. 1
Lord Curzon said that without the machinery of private letters and
telegrams the government of India, an “amazingly complex and dual
form of administration” which had two chiefs, could not go on. Still
these communications should not be employed to such an extent as to
leave the Council of India at home in ignorance of what was being
done. The secretary of state and the viceroy must not become "a kind
of concealed duumvirate”. They would gain by acting with, and not
without, their councils. In the Commons Montagu, who was then
out of office, had attacked the government of India as too wooden,
inelastic and antediluvian for modern purposes. The British democracy
had never enjoyed an opportunity of trying to rule India. Even if the
House of Commons were to give orders to the secretary of state, that
minister could be overruled by a majority of his council in vital
matters. He knew of one case in which
it was a very near thing, where the action of council might without remedy have
involved the government of India in a policy out of harmony with the declared
policy of the House of Commons and the cabinet.
The whole system of the India Office was designed to prevent control
by the House of Commons, for fear that there might be too advanced
a secretary of state. The statutory organisation of the office produced
an apotheosis of circumlocution. The whole system of governing India
must be explored in the light of the Mesopotamian Commission
Report. 2
Mr Chamberlain explained that both Lord Crewe and himself had
acted in relation to the Mesopotamian campaign as spokesmen of His
Majesty's government. Supreme control had been exercised by the
secretary of state on behalf of and by direction of the cabinet. The
India Office was notorganised to conduct militaryoperations and never
attempted to do so. It would therefore have been better if from the
first the control exercised on behalf of His Majesty's government had
been vested in the General Staff or Army Council. All the private
telegrams on which the commission had commented related to the
levying of war, and might, under the act of 1858, have been marked
"secret " instead of private, and then the commission's criticisms in
this connection would have gone by the board. Nothing but injury
could come to national, imperial and Indian interests by mixing up
a debate on a military breakdown, or alleged military mismanage-
ment, with the question of the whole future fabric of Indian govern-
ment. His Majesty's government were already considering a dispatch
from the Government of India on reforms in the political system of
that country:
1 Hansard, xxv, 956, 1027-8.
Idem, xcv, 2199-210.
2
## p. 222 (#258) ############################################
222
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
1
Immediately after the Mesopotamia debates Mr Austen Chamber-
lain resigned and was succeeded by Mr Montagu. The declaration of
20 August, 1917, shortly followed, and late in the same year, at the
invitation of the viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, the secretary of state
arrived in India. After preliminary conferences at Delhi, he toured
to Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, accompanied by the viceroy, the
home member of the governor-general's council and two members of
the Council of India, one British and one Indian. On the conclusion
of the tour, further consultations were held; and it was not until about
the end of April, 1918, that Mr Montagu returned to England.
followed the advice of Outram, who, pointing to the example of the
younger Havelock, urged him to form a corps of mounted infantry;
but the cordon with which he surrounded the province was of over-
whelming strength, and by the end of December the rebels had been
driven into Nepal. Still, in many parts of the peninsula small columns
were employed in hunting down marauders; and it was not until the
end of 1859 that India was restored to something like its normal state.
It remains to consider certain questions relating to the Mutiny, the
1 Cf. Holmes, op. cit. pp. 503 sqq. and references there cited.
## p. 204 (#240) ############################################
204
THE MUTINY
isolated rebellions connected with it, and the disturbances to which it
gave rise among the civil population. Before the story of the greased
cartridges was circulated, there was no definite plot for a general
rising of the Bengal army, and it is improbable that such a plot was
formed even after the first mutinies. For, though Cracroft Wilson,
the judge of Moradabad, collected evidence which convinced him
that 31 May had been fixed for a simultaneous revolt, and that the
plan was marred by the premature outbreak at Meerut, John Lawrence
found in the numerous intercepted letters written by sepoys not the
faintest hint of an organised conspiracy, while none of the faithful
sepoys, none of the condemned mutineers who might have saved their
lives by disclosing it, if it had existed, knew anything about it. In
reply to questions put to prisoners in the North-Western Provinces,
the cartridge, and it alone, was named as a grievance.
While the mutincers lacked a head, many were half-hearted and
fought reluctantly against the leaders whom they had been accus-
tomed to obcy; and between the various groups there was a want of
concert. Sikhs, Panjabis, Gurkhas fought whole-heartedly against
them. Even so, however, the prospects of the British would have been
almost desperate if Indian princes-particularly the rajas of Patiala,
Jhind and Nabha-had not given invaluable aid. Colin Campbell
made serious mistakes and lost precious opportunities; but his critics,
who contrasted him with the men who, without help from England,
had repelled the first onslaught of the mutineers, and complained
that with forces enormously superior he was slow in extinguishing the
revolt, forgot that his task, in itself even harder than theirs, was
rendered still more difficult by the delay in offering an amnesty and
by the confiscation proclaimed by Lord Canning.
Although many whose pride was offended by the domination of an
alien and infidel race, or who had personal objects to gain, desired
the overthrow of the British raj, diversities of race, rank, status, aim
and, above all, religion made it impossible for them to combine.
Aggrieved chiefs, such as Kunwar Singh, dispossessed land-holders,
villagers who objected to taxation, hereditary thieves, budmashes of
every kind took advantage of the prostration of authority to redress
their grievances, to rob, or to gratify private animosities; but civil
disturbances, except in a few isolated regions and on the part of a few
embittered or fanatical groups, never amounted to rebellion. After
the Mutiny broke out, the titular king of Delhi was proclaimed head
of a movement by which Muhammadan zealots hoped to regain
supremacy; but this probably deterred many to whom Muhammadan
rule was abhorrent from supporting the mutineers. The Nana, pro-
fiting by the military rising which he had helped to encourage,
became the representative of those Marathas who desired to restore
the power once exercised by the Peshwa. Among the states which
Dalhousie had annexed rebellion broke out in Jhansi and Oudh
a
## p. 205 (#241) ############################################
DALHOUSIE'S ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY
205
alone; and in Oudh it was due not to annexation, but to the harshness
with which the talukdars were treated, to the failure of Havelock's
earlier attempts to relieve the residency, to the abandonment of
Lucknow, justifiable though it may have been, by Sir Colin Campbell,
to the errors which he committed during the siege, and to Canning's
impolitic proclamation. These rebellions arose in consequence of the
Mutiny, and there is no evidence that any of the rebels, except the
Nana, conspired before it began.
Dalhousie, except in so far as he had failed to remedy the indisci-
pline of the army, which was rather the business of the commander-
in-chief than of the governor-general, and had neglected to safeguard
Delhi and Allahabad, was unjustly blamed, and has been fully
vindicated. Even the annexation of Jhansi would have been harmless
if it had been supported by armed force; the increase of European
troops, for which he had in vain pleaded, would have at least averted
the worst calamities of the Mutiny; while by the construction of roads
and telegraphs, and by the administration which he bestowed upon
the Panjab, he contributed much to the power by which the Mutiny
was quelled.
Even before the reconquest of Oudh an event had occurred which,
while it marked the restoration of British supremacy, inaugurated a
new period of Indian history. The East India Company, upon which
all political parties in England agreed in throwing the blame of the
Mutiny, was abolished; and India was to be ruled in the name of the
queen. A proclamation, prepared under her direction, announced
that the government of India had been assumed by the queen; that
Lord Canning was to be the first viceroy, and that all officers who had
been in the service of the Company were confirmed in their offices;
that all treaties made by the Company with Indian princes were to
be maintained; that the queen desired no extension of territory,
promised full religious toleration to her Indian subjects, and would
always respect their ancient usages; that she offered pardon to all
rebels and mutineers who had not directly taken part in the murder of
Europeans; and that she would constantly endeavour to promote the
prosperity of her Indian dominions.
## p. 206 (#242) ############################################
CHAPTER XI
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
The government of India is an amazingly complex and dual form of adminis-
tration. It has two chiefs, the secretary of state here, the man at the desk and on
the front bench in this country; and the viceroy, the man on the spot in India. It
is the latter who, at any rate in India, is invested with paramount power; but the
final responsibility rests with the secretary of state. 1
In his British Government in India Lord Curzon further observes :
This dualism has arisen not merely from the simultaneous existence of one half
of the government in England, and the other half in India, for that is a feature of
the administration from a sovereign centre of all dependencies or dominions, but
from the subdivision of that authority both in England and in India. ?
The subject of this chapter is the history of the London branch of
British administration in India from 1858, the memorable year which
was marked by the end of the Mutiny and the proclamation of Lord
Canning as first viceroy and governor-general for the crown, to 1918,
the
year
which
saw the conclusion of the great war.
In February, 1858, a weighty and dignified petition was presented
to both houses of parliament on behalf of the East India Company.
It failed to avert the impending sentence, but certainly influenced
subsequent legislation.
The petitioners assumed that the minister of the crown who would
henceforward conduct the home portion of the administration of
India would be assisted by a council composed of statesmen ex-
perienced in Indian affairs. The knowledge necessary for governing
a foreign country, and in particular a country like India, could not
possibly be possessed by anyone who had not devoted a considerable
portion of his life to the acquisition of it. The council should be
qualified not only to advise the minister, “but also by its advice
to exercise a certain degree of moral check". The minister would
generally be unacquainted with India and would constantly be ex-
posed to solicitations from individuals and bodies
either entirely ignorant of that country or knowing enough of it to imposc on those
who knew still less than themselves and having very frequently objects in view
other than the good government of India.
British public opinion was necessarily unacquainted with Indian
affairs and therefore liable to be misled. The responsible minister's
council should, therefore, derive sufficient weight from its constitution
1 Lord Curzon, Hansard, 13 July, 1917, XXV, 1027-8.
2 11, 67.
3 Hansard, 1858, CXLVIII, Appendix.
## p. 207 (#243) ############################################
THE COMPANY'S PETITION
207
to be a substantial barrier against inroads of self-interest and ignorance
in England from which parliament could hardly be expected to afford
a sufficient protection. The council must be so constituted as to be
personallyindependent of the minister, and should feel itself responsible
for recording an opinion on any Indian subject and pressing that
opinion on the minister whether it was agreeable to him or not. The
minister when overruling his council must be bound to record his
views. Thus the council would be a check and not a screen. Otherwise
it would merely serve to weaken the minister's responsibility and “to
give the colourable sanction of prudence and experience to measures
in the framing of which these qualities have had no share”.
A council composed of crown nominees would not preserve the
independence of judgment which had marked the court of directors.
If a substantial portion of the old spirit was to remain, a majority at
least of the council which would assist the new minister for India
should hold their seats independently of his appointment. That body
should not be smaller in numbers than the existing court of eighteen
directors. The petitioners went on to plead for the continuance of
the existing system, to urge that the present home government of India
was not really a double government, as the final word always rested
with the cabinet, and that a new arrangement which in any way
checked the minister's discretion would be liable to a similar reproach.
This reproach, however, originated
in an entire misconception of the functions devolving on the home government of
India, and in the application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive
departments.
The executive government of India was and must be situated in India
itself. The court of directors was not so much an executive as a
deliberative body. Its principal function and that of the home govern-
ment generally was not to direct the details of administration, but to
scrutinise and revise the past acts of the Indian government; to lay
down principles and issue general instructions for their future guidance
and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures which were
referred home for approval. Such functions admitted of and required
the concurrence of more judgments than one. They were more
analogous to the functions of parliament than to those of an executive
board; and it was considered an excellence in parliament to be not
merely a double but a triple government. The petitioners ended by
praying that no change should be made in the constitution of the
Indian government until the conclusion of “the present unhappy
disturbances or without a full previous enquiry into the operations of
the present system”.
But both the great political parties in parliament were resolved
that there should be no delay in completing the process which had
definitely begun in 1853. It was an obvious anachronism that a
a
## p. 208 (#244) ############################################
208
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
chartered company should take part in administering a great empire.
It was wrong that there should be a Company's army and a royal
army, an Indian and a royal navy. In India itself the prestige of the
Company had lately suffered irretrievable damage. 1 Immediately
after the presentation of the Company's petition, Lord Palmerston,
then prime minister, introduced his bill for transferring the govern-
ment of India entirely to the crown. But when the bill had been read
a second time he was turned out of office on the Conspiracy to Murder
Bill, and was succeeded by Lord Derby. Then Disraeli, who came in
as Derby's chancellor of the exchequer, introduced a new bill which
provided the Indian minister with a council composed partly of
crown nominees and partly of persons to be elected by two con-
stituencies, one consisting of men who had served in India or possessed
financial interests in that country, the other made up from the parlia-
mentary electors of the leading commercial cities of the United
Kingdom, London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast.
These proposals, for which Lord Ellenborough, then president of the
Board of Control, was largely responsible, were received with general
ridicules and were dropped. Ellenborough’s dispatch to Canning
regarding the Oudh proclamation caused his own resignation. His
successor, Lord Stanley, piloted certain resolutions through the House
of Commons which formed the basis for a measure destined to regulate
the government of India from London for sixty-two years. Its main
provisions were:
(a) The place of the Board of Control and court of directors would
be taken by a secretary of state in council. The new secretary would
be assisted by a “Council of India” consisting of fifteen members, of
whom eight were to be appointed by the crown and seven were to be
elected by the directors of the East India Company. The majority of
both appointed and elected members were to be persons who had
served or resided in India for ten years at least, and had not left the
country more than ten years before their appointment. Future
appointments or elections were to be so regulated that nine at least
of the members of council should hold these qualifications. Future
vacancies in crown appointments would be filled by crown nominees;
vacancies among the seven members elected by the directors would be
filled by persons co-opted by the council. No member could sit or
vote in parliament. All would hold office during good behaviour and
could be removed only on petition by both houses of parliament.
(6) The council would conduct Indian business transacted in the
United Kingdom and would correspond with the Government of
India, but would not possess the initiative which had all along rested
with the court of directors. It could give its opinion only on questions
1 Martineau, Life of Frere, I, 230.
2 Hansard, 1857-8, CXLVIII, 1276.
3 Idem, cxLix, 1675; cf. also 1677.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, iv, 138, 164-5.
>
## p. 209 (#245) ############################################
THE INDIA ACT OF 1858
209
referred to it by the secretary of state, who would preside over meetings
with power to overrule should he be unable to obtain agreement. In
such an event he might require that his opinion and the reasons for it
should be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, and any member
who had been present at the meeting could exercise the same privilege.
(c) The secretary of state might constitute committees of his council
for the more convenient transaction of business, and might distribute
departments of business among those committees. He would direct
the manner in which all business should be conducted. The council
would meet once at least every seven days and could do no business
without a quorum of five.
(d) Con. munications from the secretary of state to the governor-
general, and orders proposed to bi made in the United Kingdom by
the secretary of state, must, subject to certain provisions, be either
submitted to a meeting of the council or be deposited in the council-
room for seven days before issue. Any member of council might record
his opinion on any such communication or order in a minute-book
kept for the purpose, and a copy of such entry would be sent forth with
to the secretary of state. If a majority minuted against a communica-
tion or order, the secretary of state must, if adhering to such com-
munication or order, record his reasons.
(e) Orders of the secretary of state relating to expenditure and
loans required the concurrence of a majority of the Council of India.
The revenues of India, which would be charged with a dividend on
the Company's stock and with their debts, could only be used for the
purposes of the government of India. Clause 41 of the act provided
that no grant or appropriation of any part of such revenues or of any
property coming into the possession of the secretary of state in council
should be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a
meeting of the council. All powers of issuing securities for money in
the United Kingdom vested in the secretary of state in council must
be exercised by the former with concurrence of a majority of votes at
a council meeting.
(s) The salary of the secretary of state and the cost of his office
would be charged to the revenues of India. A statement of “moral
and material progress” would be annually submitted to parliament.
The secretary of state would every year lay Indian accounts before
parliament, on occasions which became famous as “budget debates",
although in fact they were simply reviews of Indian affairs.
(8) It was provided that urgent communications or orders which
did not, under the terms of the act, require the concurrence of a
majority of council votes, might issue on the authority of the secretary
of state alone without reference to the council. But in such cases the
secretary would record the reason for urgency and give notice thereof
to the members of the council.
(h) Orders concerning the levying of war or the making of peace,
CHI VI
14
## p. 210 (#246) ############################################
210
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
>
or the treating or negotiating with any prince or state, which virtually
gave effect to cabinet decisions and did not require the support of a
majority of council votes, might be marked as "secret” and sent off
on the authority of the secretary alone without any notice or reference
to the council. “Secret” dispatches from the governor-general in
council or the governors of Madras or Bombay relating to such
matters need not be communicated to the Council of India.
(i) Appointment to the offices of governor-general and governors
of presidencies vested in the crown. The governor-general would
appoint lieutenant-governors to provinces subject to the approval of
Her Majesty. Members of the various councils in India would be
appointed by the secretary of state in council.
(j) The naval and military forces of the Company were transferred
to the crown, their separate local character being retained. It was
directed by clause 55 that except for the purpose of preventing or
repelling invasion, or under other sudden or urgent necessity, Indian
revenues should not be applicable for military operations outside
India without the consent of parliament.
The basic principles of the bill were fully discussed in parliament. 1
The object was to vest full charge of the government of India in the
crown “in order that the direct superintendence of the whole empire
might be placed under one executive authority". The new secretary
of state would be a member of the cabinet. His individual responsi-
bility was essential. His decision would be final on all matters. But
he should not be allowed to choose all his councillors, for the council
should possess considerable independence. It must exercise "moral
control” 3 As Sir Henry Maine subsequently observed, the ultimate
power of the secretary of state was regarded with apprehension by
certain spcakers in the House of Commons. On 23 June the directors
drew up a letter criticising the bill and stating that in their opinion
the council should have more than a consultative voice in all questions
regarding expenditure. In such cases the secretary of state should not
be able to exercise his overruling power. Precautionary provisions
were then engrafted on the bill and appeared as clauses 41 and 55. 4
The semi-independent status accorded to the Council of India by
the cabinet was approved by Mr Gladstone for the opposition. In
order“to clothe this new body with all the moral weight and influence
that was consistent with retaining intact the responsibility of the
secretary of state”, he recommended that its first members should be
named in the bill. Each nomination would thus receive the express
approval of parliament. This would give the council a start which
would secure for it a good character hereafter. It needed all possible
weight at this time of transition from one form of government to
)
3 Idem, CLI, 323.
1 Hansard, 1858, CXLIX, CL. 2 Idem, CL, 2066.
• Unpublished memorandum, dated 8 November, 1880.
5 Hansard, CLI, 470, 757-8.
## p. 211 (#247) ############################################
THE DEBATES OF 1858
211
another and there were precedents for such procedure. The proposal
was rejected by the cabinet, mainly on the ground that, if accepted, it
would deprive the court of directors of the power of electing any
members of the new body. The government wished to avoid needless
changes. It had found in the court of directors a council in being
which consisted partly of crown nominees and partly of persons elected
by the Company's court of proprietors. It would practically con-
tinue this council, increasing the number of nominees and reducing
the number of elected members so as nearly to equalise the two
varieties. 1
Both the cabinet and parliament desired to deal tenderly with the
Company which had fallen before “he inevitable consequences of
time, change and progress", 2 and to set up a substantial barrier
against inroads of unbalanced sentiment and attempts to debit the
revenues of India with unfair charges. India must not be brought
into the cockpit of party politics. The members of the Council of India
must be “neither the masters nor the puppets but the valuable
advisers of the new minister" 3
While, however, the council would be invested with an appreciable
degree of independence and would be so large as to represent the
various presidencies and public services in India, it would have no
powers of initiative, and would, in the main, confine its attention to
such questions of policy and matters of first-class interest as were laid
before it by its president, who in “secret" affairs could act by himself
entirely apart from his councillors. He was a member of the cabinet
which could not be forced to take into its confidence any given
number of persons whom it did not wish of its own accord to con-
sult. The president of the Board of Control had always possessed
the privilege of communicating with the governor-general through
the secret committee of the court of directors in regard to “secret”
business. 5
Secret orders, however, concerning the levying of war and other
matters might involve considerable expenditure from Indian revenues.
It was so newhat difficult to see how members of council could in such
cases discharge their statutory responsibilities.
While it was hoped that all these arrangements would conduce to
the better government of India, the cabinet was convinced that, in
Lord Derby's words, "the government of India must be, on the whole,
carried out in India itself”. 6 Interference should be on as small a
scale as possible; although, apart from the large amount of Indian
business which was necessarily transacted in England, since parlia-
ment was responsible to the nation for the administration of India, it
must discharge its responsibilities conscientiously.
1 Hansard, Cli, 759-60.
; Idem, CLI, 1454-5;
• Lec-Warner, Dalhousie, 1, 107-8.
Idem, cxLix, 820.
• Idem, CLI, 1457-8.
• Hansard, CLI, 1448.
14-2
## p. 212 (#248) ############################################
212
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
The Act“for the better government of India” (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106)
received the royal assent on 2 August, 1858; and a month later the
directors issued their last instructions to their servants in the East and
in memorable words commended their splendid trust to the care of
the sovereign of Great Britain.
Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift-let her take the vast country and the
teeming millions of India under Her direct control; but let Her not forget the great
corporation from which she has received them nor the lessons to be learnt from its
success.
Lord Stanley, afterwards Earl of Derby, who, as president of the
Board of Control, had piloted the bill of 1858 through the House of
Commons, was the first secretary of state for India. With the board's
two secretaries, he migrated to a new India Office which took the
place of the Company's East India House. The secretaries became
the first Parliamentary and Permanent Under-Sccretaries of State for
India. Resigning in 1859 with the Conservative cabinet, Stanley was
succeeded by Sir Charles Wood, who, as president of the Board of
Control, had been responsible for the Charter Act of 1853 and the
education dispatch of 1854, and now held office till 1866 with excellent
results. He was a single-minded man, of great knowledge, patience
and judgment, and was largely responsible for the success with which
Indian affairs were conducted during a very difficult period of transi-
tion and reconstruction. The arrangements for the councils of the
governor-general and those of the governors of Madras and Bombay,
the setting up of new High Courts of Judicature, the reorganisation
of finances, the codification of the law, railway extension, the amal-
gamation of the queen's and the Company's British regiments, the
determination of the number of British troops to be quartered in India,
the adjustment of numerous conflicting interests, all demanded careful
consideration in London. The council was a very strong one, including
ex-directors and men who had earned distinction in the Mutiny
period. Although there were necessarily differences of opinion and
outlook from time to time, although the transaction of business by
committees sometimes caused irritating delays, although time was
sometimes wasted over trifling financial questions which could better
have been decided in India, some years after quitting office Wood,
who had meantime become Lord Halifax, told the House of Lords
that any secretary of state who firmly and honestly discharged his
duties would never experience the slightest difficulty with his council. 4
On a subsequent occasion he
deprecated any measure which could diminish the independence and self-respect
of the council, for a strong council was needed to give the secretary of state the
support requisite for resisting party pressure, a pressure not always applied in a
manner beneficial to India. 5
i Foster, East India House, pp. 153-4.
2 Cf. Hansard, cxlviii, 1298.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 447.
• Hansard, cxcv, 1085. • Idem, cxcvi, 693.
6
## p. 213 (#249) ############################################
THE LEGISLATION OF 1869
213
In 1866, however, a more brilliant and impulsive, but less patient and
experienced, secretary of state presided at the council-board. Lord
Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne), while in office, avoided an open
breach with his council. But afterwards, when speaking in the House
of Lords as Marquis of Salisbury on 11 March, 1869, on“ the Governor-
general of India Bill”, he expressed his belief that the “tutelage” in
which the secretary of state for India was held by his council was
injurious to the good government of that country. In such matters
as railway guarantees and other commercial affairs the council's
"veto” was a protection, but, with that exception, responsibility
should lie with the secretary of state alone. Opportunity should be
taken of another bill then pending to clear up "the mystery” which
enabled the council, under cover of vetoing money questions, to inter-
fere in every other measure on the plea that it involved money con-
siderations and thus to become "an incubus on the minister". 1
On this occasion Lord Salisbury was followed by his successor in
office, the Duke of Argyll, who assured him that there was no mystery.
The true interpretation of the law was that the secretary of state was
“absolutely supreme" in financial, as in other matters, and could
overrule his council whenever he thought fit to do so. The duke was
aware of no case in which the council had set up its authority in
opposition to the will of the secretary of state. On 19 April, in bringing
forward the “Government of India Act Amendment Bill”, he ex-
plained to the House the history of clause 41 in the act of 1858 which
had given rise to Lord Salisbury's contention. Considerable discussion
followed, and extended over 29 April, when the bill was read a second
time, to 13 May, when Lord Salisbury moved and withdrew an
amendment. The subject revived in a debate in the House of Com-
mons on 17 August, 1880, when it was raised by Fawcett, the econo-
mist, afterwards postmaster-general. ? The view eventually taken was
that the true intentions of parliament in enacting clause 41 of the act
of 1858 were to impose constitutional restraint on the powers of the
secretary of state with respect to the expenditure of money, but by no
means to extend the effective assertion of this restraint to all cases,
especially where imperial questions were concerned. The secretary of
state was a member of the cabinet and in cabinet questions the views
of the cabinet must prevail. It was never intended that the council
should be able to resist the cabinet by stopping supplies. Vis-à-vis the
secretary of state, as representing the latter, the Council of India
possessed no veto. As Sir Henry Maine expressed it, “any such
power given to the council and exercised by it would produce before
long a combination of both the great English parties to sweep away
the council itself". 3
In the course of the debate in the House of Lords on 13 May, 1869,
· Hansard, cxciv, 1074.
· Idem, CCLV, 1453.
3 Unpublished memorandum.
## p. 214 (#250) ############################################
214
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
1
the Duke of Argyll stated that Lord Salisbury had been moved to
raise the question by the opposition which his council had offered to
a project put forward by certain commercial bodies to which the
secretary of state had agreed. The council had been supported by the
Government of India, but had eventually given way.
In any case,
clause 41 of the act of 1858 survived Lord Salisbury's assault.
The Government of India Act Amendment Bill", which pro-
duced the Lords debate of 13 May, 1869, contained proposals for
altering the life-tenure of members of the Council of India to one of
ten years, which might, for reasons of public advantage, be extended
to fifteen years. The secretary of state justified his recommendation by
the rapid changes which were taking place in India, largely as a result
of extending railway communications, and by the need of not only
intimate but recent Indian experience on his council. His views
were accepted by the House. Lord Salisbury moved an amendment
to the bill proposing that in future all members of the council should
be appointed by the crown. None should be co-opted by the council
itself. The amend. nent was carried and embodied in the bill, together
with a provision transferring from the secretary of state in council
to the crown the right of filling vacancies on the councils of the
governor-general and governors in India. The general effect of the
legislation and debates of 1869 was to strengthen the position of the
secretary of state vis-à-vis his council. His position vis-à-vis the Govern-
ment of India was fortified by the completion in 1870 of a direct
telegraph line between India and England by submarine cable through
the Red Sea. He could thus less than ever be confronted with accom-
plished facts.
For years after 1869 the history of the Council of India was un-
eventful. When Lord Salisbury again presided over the India Office
(1874-7) his Afghan and North-West Frontier policy, especially the
occupation of Quetta and the separation of the trans-Indus districts
from the Panjab, was strongly opposed by members of his council who
followed Lord Lawrence's lead. 3 But a secretary of state who could
rely on cabinet support could now certainly get his way. Although,
according to Lord Salisbury's biographer, he was a believer “in the
virtue of a single inspiration and in the evil of hampering it by the
intrusion of competing ideas”, he was exercised by the problem of
combining an independence of initiative in the government of India
with his own responsibility for final decision, and considered that
it could be solved only by private correspondence between himself
and the viceroy. " He carried this doctrine to lengths to which Lord
Northbrook refused to follow him.
Lord Northbrook recognised the subordinate position of the viceroy but held
that parliament had confurred certain rights, not orily on the viceroy, but on his
1 Hansard, cxcvi, 700.
? Idem, cxcv, 1077-8. Cf. Martineau, op. cit. I, 356–7.
: Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, 11, 159. • Idem, pp. 65-6.
a
>
## p. 215 (#251) ############################################
POLICY OF THE INDIA OFFICE
215
council, which differentiated the latter in a very notable degree from subordinate
officials. 1
Lord Cromer has stated that Lord Salisbury was disposed to reject,
and, he thought, to underrate, the value of the views of Anglo-Indian
officials.
This does not appear to have been the practice of some of his
successors. Lord George Hamilton, who first as under-secretary and
afterwards as secretary of state introduced thirteen Indian budgets in
the House of Commons, writes that the Council of India was really a
cabinet with the important exception that its procedure and powers
were prescribed by an act of parliament. It had absolute control over
Indian expenditure. It preserved an unbroken record of the reasons
for expenditure of all kinds and performed the business of checking
far more effectively than the treasury, obtaining better results from
the expenditure sanctioned. 2 Lord Randolph Churchill found the
council "an invaluable instrument”. 3
As regards the general policy of the India Office in the latter years
of the nineteenth century, although relations between India and
England had become more intimate, involving a constantly increasing
degree of interference, and though the cases in which final orders
could be passed in India had become less frequent, yet the secretary
of state did not constantly interfere in the ordinary work of Indian
administration, but mainly confined his action to answering references
from the Indian government. Apart from great political or financia)
questions, the number or nature of these references depended on the
character of the governor-general for the time being. The secretary
of state initiated almost nothing. In domestic affairs the Indian
government was almost independent so long as it was content to
carry on without largely increasing the cost of existing establishments
or incurring new and heavy charges. The secretary of state had no
disposition to interfere needlessly in the details of administration in
India, but was sometimes subjected to pressure which could with
difficulty be resisted. On such occasions the council was extremely
useful. It further assisted in preserving continuity of administrative
principles in India where the official personnel was necessarily always
changing. "
The views of the majority of the Council of India on the subject of
divided control of the India army provoked the impatience of Lord
Ripon who, at the close of the first year of his viceroyalty, complained
of the increasing interference of the India Office which he ascribed to
the “subordinates", and the fact that Lord Hartington, then secretary,
was overworked with other than Indian business. But had the same
1 Mallet, Life of Northbrook, p. 91.
2 Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections (1874-1880), pp. 307-8.
• Winston Churchill, Life of Lord Randolph Churchill, 1, 475.
• Strachey, India, pp. 74 81 (1911 ed. ).
## p. 216 (#252) ############################################
216 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
viceroy received the warning drawn up by Sir Henry Maine, the most
prominent member of the then existent Council of India, relating to
the projected Ilbert bill, he might have been saved from a course of
action which he lived to regret bitterly. The council had in 1883
desired Lord Hartington, then secretary of state, to transmit Maine's
“secret” memorandum to the viceroy; but this was not done, and
they were subsequently consoled by Lord Kimberley, Hartington's
successor, with the just reminder that they should formally have
conveyed the warning themselves. 1
Meantime the constitution of the council was slightly altered. In
1876 the secretary of state was allowed to appoint not more than three
special experts (legal or financial) on the old tenure of good behaviour.
In 1889 he was allowed to abstain from filling vacancies until the
number of members should be reduced to ten. Reduction was asked
for in the interest of economy. In the previous year the council had
been joined by nne of its most distinguished members, Sir Alfred
Lyall, described by Lord George Hamilton as his “right-hand
adviser”, who held office for fifteen years and has left us some passing
impressions of its proceedings. Fresh from governing great provinces
he wrote:
The India Office is comfortable and convenient, but rather depressing: in the
first place, death visits the council rather frequently: secondly, we have all rather
the look of oid hulks laid up in dock,
and are men who have. said good-bye to active
service; thirdly, the distance and difference between London and India makes one
feel as if looking at things through a glass darl. ly, and not face to face, and in a year
or two I shall begin to distrust my own judgment. . . . In council we stand up and
orate, which breaks down desultory discussion, but is no good for thrashing out
questions.
Again, he says "one can prevent some mischief but do little good on
the council”. A year later, however, he liked his work, found that it
gave him enough to do and even more than he cared for. In 1894,
with all his colleagues, ne protested vainly and vigorously against the
exclusion of cotton goods from the general import duty of 5 per cent. ,
as a serious concession to British interests which would damage Indian
confidence in the British Government.
Neither parliament nor the secretary of state was inclined to inter-
fere with the administration of India as long as all went well and
Indian affairs hardly touched British politics. Between 1880 and 1905
so little did parliament seriously concern itself with Indian domestic
business that in 1889 and 1891 the secretary of state was able to dis-
regard resolutions of the House of Commons relating to the opium
trade, and in 1894, after consulting the Government of India, he
declined to take action on another resolution of the same House in
favour of simultaneous examinations in England and India for ad-
i Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 137-9,
Durand, Life of Lyall, p. 322.
3 Debates of 3 May, 1889, and 10 April, 1891, Hé usard, cccxxxv, CCCLII.
## p. 217 (#253) ############################################
MORLEY AND HIS COUNCIL
217
>
mission to the civil service. 1 The general feeling in this country was
that Indian affairs were safe in the hands of the Indian government;
and as late as 1904 Lord Curzon, after his first term of office, struck
no jarring note when he asked that his government might not be
bothered with “an excessive display of parliamentary affection” and
decíared that the ideal party in England for people in India was the
party which would act “both as the impartial umpire as well as the
superior authority in the disputes that sometimes arise between us,
and that will not unduly favour the home country at our expense
A year later, however, the viceroy resigned in consequence of a
difference with the Home Government and secretary of state, the bitter-
ness of which is recalled by some of his last words. 2 The quarrel came
as a climax to various disagreements, and at one time Lord Curzon,
with evident injustice, ascribed to the members of the Council of
India "a desire to thwart and hinder his work". 3 After his departure
a new era began. The partition of Bengal produced a violent agita-
tion; a revolutionary movement gradually emerged into view; a
scheme of wide constitutional reform was projected; and in 1907
John Morley, then secretary of state, desiring to add two Indian
gentlemen to his council, introduced and carried through parliament
a bill which empowered him to increase the strength of that body
from twelve to fourteen. No member would be appointed who had
been absent from India for more than five years; and no member
would hold office for more than seven years. Salaries of members
were reduced from £1200 to £1000.
General J. H. Morgan says that no more autocratic secretary for
India ever reigned at Whitehall,- none ever consulted his council less,
and none ever admonished a viceroy more. It must be remembered
that Morley was subjected to considerable pressure from the left wing
of his own party. But there is ample evidence to support General
Morgan's views, both in a letter from Lord Minto to Lord Stamford-
ham dated 5 July, 1910,' and in Morley' own Recollections. Yet it is
cvident that at one time Morley was anxious not to depress but to
elevate the position of the Council of India. Ir. August, 1907, he
invited Lord Cromer to join it and Cromer consented. Then the
secretary of state discovered that the act of 1858 forbade the appoint-
ment of anyone "capable of sitting and voting in parliament”. He
wrote to Minto on 23 August, 1907, that he would propose to the
cabinet that the law should be altered, for Cromer would “give to my
council a strength and authority in the public eye, of which, if we are
in for troublesome times, we shall stand in much need”. The project,
however, unfortunately ſell through; and Morley was left with coun-
cillors, none of whom individually carried weight in parliament.
a
1 Pp. 368-70, infra.
• Ronaldshay, Curzon, 1. 237.
6 Buchan, Momoir of Lord Minio, p. 311.
1 British Government in India, I1, 255.
• John Viscount Morley, an appreciation, p. 32.
Morley, Recollections, 11, 233.
## p. 218 (#254) ############################################
218 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
5
Regarding some of these as reactionary, he opened his doors wide to
irresponsible advisers;+ and finding no particular difficulty in getting
his own way, absorbed in the fascination of his task, gathered more
and more power into his own hands, much to the vexation of a long-
suffering viceroy. ?
The close of the Morley régime found the late Mr E. S. Montagu,
as parliamentary under-secretary, enquiring into the conduct of
business at the India Office. The Marquess of Crewe, its new head,
introduced proposals for reform which appear to have largely
emanated from Montagu, and were rejected by the Lords after an
illuminating debate.
On 31 July, 1913, in answer to a question put by Viscount Midleton,
Lord Crewe announced his intention of introducing proposals for
legislation which would facilitate and quicken India Office procedure
by making the transaction of council business by committees excep-
tional and no longer usual. 3 Members of council would now be
attached to particular departments. They would be reduced to eight
or ten, the two Indian members being retained, and would become
whole-time servants, their salaries being raised once more to £1200.
They must possess recent experience, and, if qualified by official
service, would sit on the council in the concluding years of their active
service and not in the first years of their retirement. The secretary of
state emphasised the value of the council, which assisted him by
enabling matters to come up for decision in a more compact and
concentrated way than they did in other offices. He derived marked
advantage in case of a difference of opinion and a discussion on a
particular subject in council, from being obliged to present that sub-
ject in a more accurate, form than he probably would do if he had
only to argue the pros and cons of it with himself. Moreover, and
this was by no means the least important point, the council greatly
strengthened the position of the secretary of state in dealing with the
government of India, especially if he were a new-comer to office.
If the existence be conceived of a viceroy backed by a body of local experts of
long practical experience, then, I think, the secretary of state would need to be a
Bismarck to hold his own in any controversy against so powerful a combination as
that, and the only result, as I think, would be that India might be brought more
often than it is into the cockpit of parliamèntary politics.
The council's financial powers were such that in theory it might make
the government of India under our parli mentary system almost
impossible; theoretical possibilities, however, need not alarm practical
men who were anxious to agree if they could. A proof of this was that
in matters not financial "in which the secretary of state could overrule
his council”, such a step had been taken only “on the very rarest
occasions”. In 1914 Lord Crewe introduced a “Council of India”
a
>
>
1 Cf. Hansard, cxcv, 1083.
? See Buchan, op. cit. p. 312.
3 Hansard, xiv, 1574-86.
## p. 219 (#255) ############################################
LORD CREWE'S PROPOSALS
219
a
bill based on these views and including two novel proposals: (a) for
imposing statutory obligation to appoint two persons domiciled in
India to the council, selected from a list drawn up by the non-official
members of the imperial and provincial legislative councils in British
India; (6) for amplifying the list of “secret” matters with which,
under the act of 1858, the secretary of state could deal exclusively.
The bill was rejected by a large majority of the Lords. It was
strongly condemned by Lord Curzon as designed to withdraw from
the council's cognisance an enormous number of questions covering
the whole sphere of Indian government and to reduce that body,
which by its passive acquiescence in the removal of the capital from
Calcutta to Delhi had already shown itself flexible and pliant, to “an
impotent and costly sham”. i In proposing to compel the secretary
of state to choose two Indian politicians as his councillors, it was for-
gotten that the council was a body of experts, not one of politicians
or public speakers.
Lord Curzon's reference to the Delhi policy takes us back to certain
incidents of the year 1911 which formed an extraordinary episode in
the constitutional history of British India. ?
In 1876 Disraeli's government introduced a Royal Titles bill which
was in-ended to mark the new relation which, since 1858, the sovereign
had occupied towards her subjects in India. The bill passed through
pa ment by a very large majority; and in Mr Buckle's words:
The world understood that a new pledge had been given of the determination
of the British crown to cherish India; and her princes and peoples understood that
their sovereign had assumed towards them a nearer and more personal relation. "
At a great durbar held at Delhi on 1 January, 1877, Queen Victoria
was proclaimed “Queen-Empress of India”. On 1 January, 1903,
at a second Delhi durbar her successor was proclaimed “King-
Emperor”. On 12 December, 1911, there was a third Delhi durbar,
distinguished beyond its predecessors by the presence of the sovereigns
themselves and by the remarkable announcements which were made,
on the advice of his ministers, by the king-emperor. Up to that time
all changes of signal importance in the government of India had taken
place after full discussion in parliament and under parliamentary
sanction. Now, however, changes of great moment were proclaimed
of which parliament had no previous cognisance. At the durbar His
Majesty announced that the capital of India would henceforward be
Delhi and not Calcutta; the partition of Bengal, which had caused
such bitter controversy, would be revoked; Bengal would be one
province under a governor in council; a new province of Bihar and
Orissa would be created; Assam would once more be the charge of
a chief commissioner. These measures, which necessarily involved
heavy expenditure and far-reaching consequences, naturally pro-
1 Hansard, xvi. 484.
· Curzon, op. in. II, 119.
· Life of Disraeli, iv, 93, 167; V, 471.
3
## p. 220 (#256) ############################################
220
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
voked the criticism that the cabinet had “used the authority of the
sovereign to settle in their own way an issue of an acutely controversial
character”. 1 They originated with the governor-general in council,
found favour with the secretary of state and the Asquith cabinet, and
were therefore accepted by the Council of India, who can hardly have
obtained an opportunity to give even a passing thought to the large
issues and heavy expenditure involved. Approval was transmitted to
the governor-general; and parliament only became aware of all that
was contemplated after His Majesty had made the announcement.
Lord Crewe argued inter alig that in fact the action taken was ad-
ministrative and did not require parliamentary sanction. The original
partition of Bengal had been carried out without reference to parlia-
ment. But in fact these later changes were of far greater moment even
than that ill-starred measure.
In the third year of the last war, the Council of India and the India
Office came prominently before the nation. The management and
conduct of the campaign in Mesopotamia had been originally en-
trusted to the government and military authorities in India. The
commission of enquiry which was appointed, after the capture of
Kut-el-Amara by the Turks, and sat in London, commented un-
favourably on the India Office organisation and on the substitution of
private telegrams from the secretary of state to the viceroy for public
telegrams which would have passed through or been communicated
to the Council of India. The practice had so much developed of recent
years as to make the private telegrams “almost the regular channel of
official inter-communication”. 2 There were strong and obvious ob-
jections to this procedure. The private telegrams, moreover, did not
always remain in the office, for Lord Morley had taken his away.
Neither the Council of India nor the governor-general's council had
been kept in touch with the varying fortunes of the Mesopotamian
expedition, the control of which had been
narrowed down to two high officials, both heavily charged with many other anxious
and pressing duties, and both permanently stationed in localities which had little,
if any, private or personal touch with the forces campaigning in Mesopotamia. '
The conclusions of the commission were debated in both houses
of parliament and led to the resignation of the secretary of state,
MrAusten Chamberlain, who had succeeded late to a situation created
by others. His predecessor, Lord Crewe, contended in the House of
Lords that the policy of the expedition all through was a matter for
the cabinet and the cabinet alonc. 4 His own private telegrams of
importance relating to this matter had been made official and were
preserved at the India Office.
Lord Islington, under-secretary of state, admitted that private
telegrams had been excessively employed. 5 In future they would be
1 Lord Curzon, ap. Hansard, xi, 142. 2 Report of Mesopota,nia Commission, p. 102.
3 Idem, p. 103
• Hansard, xxv, 929.
5 Idem, 952.
5
## p. 221 (#257) ############################################
THE MESOPOTAMIA DEBATES
221
.
fewer and wherever possible would be made “official” after dispatch.
The India Office was not established or equipped for the conduct of
an extended campaign outside India. 1
Lord Curzon said that without the machinery of private letters and
telegrams the government of India, an “amazingly complex and dual
form of administration” which had two chiefs, could not go on. Still
these communications should not be employed to such an extent as to
leave the Council of India at home in ignorance of what was being
done. The secretary of state and the viceroy must not become "a kind
of concealed duumvirate”. They would gain by acting with, and not
without, their councils. In the Commons Montagu, who was then
out of office, had attacked the government of India as too wooden,
inelastic and antediluvian for modern purposes. The British democracy
had never enjoyed an opportunity of trying to rule India. Even if the
House of Commons were to give orders to the secretary of state, that
minister could be overruled by a majority of his council in vital
matters. He knew of one case in which
it was a very near thing, where the action of council might without remedy have
involved the government of India in a policy out of harmony with the declared
policy of the House of Commons and the cabinet.
The whole system of the India Office was designed to prevent control
by the House of Commons, for fear that there might be too advanced
a secretary of state. The statutory organisation of the office produced
an apotheosis of circumlocution. The whole system of governing India
must be explored in the light of the Mesopotamian Commission
Report. 2
Mr Chamberlain explained that both Lord Crewe and himself had
acted in relation to the Mesopotamian campaign as spokesmen of His
Majesty's government. Supreme control had been exercised by the
secretary of state on behalf of and by direction of the cabinet. The
India Office was notorganised to conduct militaryoperations and never
attempted to do so. It would therefore have been better if from the
first the control exercised on behalf of His Majesty's government had
been vested in the General Staff or Army Council. All the private
telegrams on which the commission had commented related to the
levying of war, and might, under the act of 1858, have been marked
"secret " instead of private, and then the commission's criticisms in
this connection would have gone by the board. Nothing but injury
could come to national, imperial and Indian interests by mixing up
a debate on a military breakdown, or alleged military mismanage-
ment, with the question of the whole future fabric of Indian govern-
ment. His Majesty's government were already considering a dispatch
from the Government of India on reforms in the political system of
that country:
1 Hansard, xxv, 956, 1027-8.
Idem, xcv, 2199-210.
2
## p. 222 (#258) ############################################
222
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
1
Immediately after the Mesopotamia debates Mr Austen Chamber-
lain resigned and was succeeded by Mr Montagu. The declaration of
20 August, 1917, shortly followed, and late in the same year, at the
invitation of the viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, the secretary of state
arrived in India. After preliminary conferences at Delhi, he toured
to Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, accompanied by the viceroy, the
home member of the governor-general's council and two members of
the Council of India, one British and one Indian. On the conclusion
of the tour, further consultations were held; and it was not until about
the end of April, 1918, that Mr Montagu returned to England.
